Results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on November 11–18, 2025, as part of the project "Ukraine: socio-political challenges of transition from war to peace and post-war recovery", carried out with the support from Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office Ukraine.

Face-to-face interviews were taken in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted in stratified multi-stage samples with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample reflects the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was held as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2008 respondents aged above 18 were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. However, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, including by forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

Ukrainian citizens' support for democratic values​

Although after the start of the full-scale war, the share of citizens who believe in democracy as the most desirable type of government for Ukraine increased compared to the pre-war period (from 54% in June 2021 to 66% in September 2025), in November 2025 this figure became approximately the same (55.5%) as in 2021.

Meanwhile, the share of those who believe that a democratic political system is good for Ukraine prevails (86.5% in 2017 and 87% in November 2025). The share of those who believe that a system with a strong leader independent of parliament and elections is good decreased, compared to 2017, from 80% to 60%.

If compared to 2017, the share of those who believe that a system ruled by the military or a military regime is good has increased (from 12% to 40%), the majority (60%) continues to consider this system to be bad.

In addition, 83% of those who believe that the military rule or a military regime is good also believe that a democratic political system is good, and only 16% of them believe a democratic system to be bad. Hence, in wartime, the "military rule" in Ukraine is mainly seen as a means to protect the democratic system, rather than an alternative to it.

Similarly, among those who believe that a system with a strong leader independent of parliament and elections is good, 83% also believe that a democratic political system is good.

A relative majority of respondents (49%) believes that only electoral democracy, the rule of law and independent judiciary may guarantee order (the share of such people has increased, compared to March 2024, when 42% of respondents believed so). Compared to 2024, the share of those who believe that it is necessary to combine some democratic procedures with a "strong hand" policy has also slightly increased (from 23% to 27%), and the share of those who believe that the power and responsibility should be taken by a strong political leader and his political force has decreased from 19% to 15.5%.

47% of respondents, choosing between freedom and wellbeing, preferred freedom (only 30% preferred wellbeing). In 2010, these figures made 32% and 30%, respectively, in 2021 — 43% and 31%.

At the same time, when choosing between freedom and security, respondents tend to prioritize security (39% — "in exchange for security, I am ready to give up some of my rights and civil liberties to the state") over freedom (33%).

The lower the level of well-being of respondents is, the more often they prefer security to freedom. Say, among those who "barely make ends meet," these priorities correlate as 39% and 27%, and among those who "do well" — 32% and 38%, respectively.

Former combatants are much more likely to prefer freedom (47.5%) over security (31%). Also, combatants more than the general population tend to prefer freedom (60%) to wellbeing (26%).

Assessment of the level of democracy in the country

Compared to 2021, the share of those who believe that Ukraine is a fully democratic state has increased (from 18% to 23%). The share of those who believe that Ukraine is not a fully democratic state yet but is moving towards democracy has somewhat decreased (52% and 47.5%, respectively), while the share of those who believe that Ukraine is not a democratic state and is not moving towards democracy has not statistically changed (18% and 20.5%, respectively).

When asked directly how the level of democracy in Ukraine has changed compared to the pre-war times (before 2022), 38% reported that the level of democracy in Ukraine is now lower than before 2022, 33% — that it remains the same as before 2022, and for 15.5% it is higher than before 2022.

The belief that the level of democracy in Ukraine has decreased is more pronounced among those who do not trust the authorities (46% of them believe so), compared to those respondents who trust them (27%).

Paternalistic expectations are fading away

Compared to 2013, the share of citizens who believe that the state should assume full responsibility for satisfaction of all needs of every person has significantly decreased (from 42% to 29%), while the share of those who believe that the state should secure uniform "rules of the game" for all increased (from 51% to 63%).

The majority (52%) of respondents believes that the standard of living of citizens should be ensured both by the state and the people themselves. 26% believe that the standard of living of every person (except for those unable to work) should depend on such person (the share of such people has increased, compared to March 2024, when 21% of respondents believed so). The share of those who believe that the state is obliged to ensure an adequate standard of living for all citizens has decreased (from 22% to 18%).

Paternalistic expectations are the most pronounced among people with low incomes: 46% of those who barely make ends meet believe that the state should bear full responsibility for providing everyone with everything they need, while among those who live comfortably, only 23%. Also, among the poorest, the share of those who believe that the state is to guarantee an adequate standard of living for all citizens is higher (30%) than among those who do well (14%).

Vision of the country’s future

A relative majority (45%) of respondents believe that "Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country in the future." 33% believe that Ukraine will be a country that follows a special path of development. Few respondents expect negative scenarios: 5.5% of them believe that Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West, 3% — that Ukraine will forever become a "third world" country, undeveloped and of little influence, 1% — that Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of Russia, 1% — that Ukraine will disappear as an independent state. 0.4% answered that they "are not interested in the future of this country."

Residents of the Western (53%) and Eastern (52%) regions mostly tend to believe that "Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country in the future" (in the Centre they make 37%, in the South — 41%).

The younger the respondents are, the more they believe that "Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country in the future" (the share of such people increases from 39% among respondents aged 60+ to 51% among young people under 30).

This is the idea of its future for 54% for supporters of the EU accession, and only of 17% of its opponents. Almost a third of the EU opponents sees Ukraine's future in a negative light (in this group of respondents, those who believe that "Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West or Russia", "Ukraine will forever become a "third world" country, underdeveloped and of little influence", "Ukraine will disappear as an independent state" together make 31.5%), but a relative majority (38%) of the EU opponents believe that Ukraine will follow a special path of development (among supporters of the EU accession, 30% think so).

Opinions about joining the European Union and NATO

If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union were held in the near future, 75% of all respondents, or 88% of those who are going to take part in such a referendum, would vote for joining the Union (11% and 7% would vote against it, respectively). Before the beginning of the full-scale war, in November–December 2021, 56% of all respondents, or 78% of those who were going to go to the polls, planned to vote for joining the EU (26%; 18% — against it).

According to the most recent poll, almost all residents in the West, 79% in the East, 70% of residents in the Centre and 58% of residents of the South of the country would vote for joining the EU. The share of those who would vote against it is 2%, 10%, 15%, and 22%, respectively.

The younger the respondents are, the more likely they are to vote for accession — their share increases from 68% in the oldest (60+) group to 82% among those under 30.

Among those who trust the Ukrainian authorities, 79% are going to vote for the EU accession (with 9.5% against it), among those who do not trust the authorities — 74% and 14%, respectively.

Among those who mainly speak Ukrainian at home, 76% are going to vote for the EU accession (10% are against it), and among those who mainly speak Russian — 69.5% and 17.5%, respectively.

If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held in the near future, 63% of all respondents would vote for accession to this organization — 79% of those who are certain to go to the polls (21% and 14.5%, respectively, would vote against it). Before the beginning of the full-scale war, in November–December 2021, 48% of all respondents, or 70% of those who were going to take part in the referendum, intended to vote for joining NATO (33% and 24.5% would vote against it, respectively).

According to the latest survey, 82% of all residents of the Western regions would vote for joining NATO, as will 65% of residents of the East, 56% of residents of the Centre, but only 39% of residents of the country’s South. The shares of those who would vote against it made 6.5%, 19%, 27% and 36.5%, respectively. So, unlike residents of other regions (where the majority is ready to vote for Ukraine’s accession to NATO), in the South the shares of supporters and opponents of joining NATO do not statistically differ.

The younger the respondents are, the more they are likely to vote for NATO accession — the share of such people increases from 56% in the oldest group (60 and over) to 70% among those under 30.

Among those who trust the Ukrainian authorities, 70% are going to vote for NATO accession (16% of them are against it), and among those who do not trust them — 59% and 25%, respectively.

Among those who mainly speak Ukrainian at home, 66% are going to vote for NATO accession (19% of them are against it), and among those who mainly speak Russian — 58.5% and 25%, respectively.

80% of those who will vote for the EU accession and 9.5% of those who are against the EU accession are ready to vote for NATO accession.

When asked: "When do you think Ukraine may join the EU?", only 14% of respondents suggested that this would happen within the next 1–3 years. 21% said, 3–5 years, 23% — 5–10 years, 9% — 10–20 years, and 10% say that it will never happen.

Regarding the accession to NATO, only 11% of respondents believe that this will happen within the next 1–3 years. 15% mentioned 3–5 years, 19% — 5–10 years, 11% — 10–20 years, and 19% say that it will never happen.

These expectations are less optimistic than in 2022-2024. For example, in 2023, 35% of respondents believed that in 1–3 years Ukraine would be able to join the EU, and 32% believed that within this period it would be able to join NATO.

To what extent do Ukrainians feel European?

Respondents’ answers to the question: "Do you feel European?" are not so much about their self-identification as about assessing the chances of approaching or joining the European community. It is no coincidence that their European feelings grew most of all between December 2015 and December 2017 (from 29% to 40%), after the agreement on visa-free movement with the EU was signed in May 2017.

Under the influence of events related to the full-scale war, the acceptance of refugees from Ukraine by European countries, their share increased even more and in 2023–2025 reached 49–51% (in 2025 — 51%).

In 2025, compared to 2021, the share of those who feel like Europeans did not statistically change in the Western (56.5% and 57.5%, respectively) and Central (43.5% and 42%, respectively) regions, and increased significantly in the South (from 24% to 52%) and East (from 32% to 62%).

While in the oldest age group (60+ years) the majority does not feel European (52%; 41% do), in all other groups the majority is European (51–54% in the age groups of 30 to 59 years, and 64% among young people under 30).

POLL RESULTS IN TABLES

(data in the tables are given in percentages, unless stated otherwise)

With which of the following statements do you tend to agree more?

How good are the following types of the political system for our country?

With which of these statements about the means of restoring order in Ukraine do you personally agree?

With which of the following statements do you tend to agree more?

With which of the following statements do you tend to agree more?

Do you believe that Ukraine is a democratic state?

With which of the following statements do you tend to agree more?

With which of the following statements do you tend to agree more?

Who do you think should secure a decent standard of living for the people?

What is your idea of Ukraine’s future?

If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU were held in the near future, would you go to the polls?

How would you vote at a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to the EU?

How would you vote at a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, if held in the near future?

How would you vote at a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO?

When do you think Ukraine may join the EU?

When do you think Ukraine may join NATO?

Do you feel like European? %

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