Religiosity, confessional affiliation and inter-church relations in Ukrainian society. Differences among believers of the major Ukrainian confessions and churches in assessments of events in Ukraine and the world.

Results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service with support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office Ukraine on November 22–29, 2025.

Face-to-face interviews were taken in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted using a stratified multi-stage sample with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was conducted at the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2009 respondents above 18 years were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. However, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

The poll results are compared with the results of previous surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre, starting from 2000.

Level of religiosity

The 2014 survey recorded an increase, compared to the “pre-war” year of 2013, in the number of believers from 67% to 76% — which is typical for a society that found itself in a stressful situation due to the outbreak of hostilities. This indicator still remains the highest for all years of observation; later, it decreased to 68% at the end of 2021. With the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression, it rose again, to 74% in 2022, but in 2023-2025 it slightly decreased and amounted to 70.5% in 2023, 68% in 2024 and 70% in 2025 (from 86% of residents of the country’s West to 54% of residents of the East). That said, in 2014 and 2022, under the influence of the shock caused by the outbreak of the war, there was an increase in the share of those who called themselves believers, but with time it returned to the pre-war level.

The dependence of religiosity on gender, age, and settlement type persists. Traditionally, the level of religiosity is higher in older age groups compared to younger ones (in 2025, the lowest number of believers was among 18–24-year-olds — 52%, while in other age groups — from 62% to 77%).

There are more believers among women than men (76% and 63%, respectively). The share of believers is slightly higher among villagers (73%) than among city residents (69%).

Confessional distribution

In 2000-2018, the share of those who called themselves Orthodox ranged from 66% to 71%. After 2018, there was a downward trend in the share of self-identified Orthodox (their share decreased from 67% in 2018 to 58% in 2025). After 2014, the share of Greek Catholics somewhat rose (from 8% to 12%). In 2025, 10% called themselves “just Christian”, 3% — Protestants, 1% — Roman Catholics, 0.4% belonged to other religions, and 15.5% answered that they did not belong to any religion.

Confessional self-identification has a distinct regional specificity. The largest number of Orthodox is recorder of the Central regions (67%). In the South, they make 61%, in the East — 56%. In the West of the country, the share of Orthodox is 45%, while 40% of residents in this part of the country called themselves Greek Catholics (in other regions — from 0.4% to 2.5%). The Western regions also have a slightly higher share of Roman Catholics than other regions (3%, in other regions — from 0% to 0.8%).

Compared to other regions, the South has a higher share of those who called themselves “just Christian” (23%, in other regions — from 5% to 11%). The East gave a higher share of those who do not identify themselves with any religion (30%, in other regions — from 7% to 14%).

Just as the number of believers increases with age, the share of Orthodox Christians increases from 46% among young people aged 18–24 to 61-62% in the middle and older age groups (40+ years). The younger the respondents are, the higher the share of those who do not belong to any religion is (13% in the middle and older age groups and 26.5% among those under 25).

In recent years, significant changes have been taking place in the church identity of Orthodox believers, due to changes in the organizational structure of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and the impact of Russia's full-scale aggression on public consciousness.

Until 2018, three largest Orthodox churches legally and de facto operated in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (UAOC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC(MP)), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP).

The number of UOC-MP believers was going up in 2000–2010 (9% in 2000, 11% in 2005, 24% in 2010), but after 2010 the share of UOC(MP) decreased (20% in 2013, 12% in 2018).

The number of UOC-KP believers was growing: 12% in 2000, 14% in 2005, 15% in 2010, 18% in 2013, 29% in 2018).

In December 2018, UOC-KP and UAOC merged into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which in January 2019 received a Tomos of Autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

However, in 2020, the number of believers of OCU was smaller (20%) than the number of UOC-KP believers in 2018, because believers were kind of lost in their church identification after UOC-KP Patriarch Filaret announced the withdrawal of his signature from the decision to create the OCU and proclaimed restoration of the UOC-KP. Meanwhile, the share of respondents who called themselves “just Orthodox” rose from 23% in 2018 to 27% in 2020 (another 1% did not know which Orthodox church they belonged to). However, as soon as in 2021, the share of those who called themselves believers of the OCU reached 24%, in 2022 — 36%, in 2023 — 42% among all respondents, and in 2025 it also amounted to 42%.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, ever fewer people were calling themselves believers of the UOC(MP) (their share fell from 13% in 2021 to 5% in 2025).

In recent years, the share of those who consider themselves “just Orthodox” has significantly decreased — 39% in 2000, 29% in 2013, 27% in 2020, 22% in 2021, 19% in 2022, 14% in 2024, and 10% in 2025.

In 2025, the largest share of OCU believers was among residents of the Central regions (53%). In the South, they made 40%, in the East — 37%, and in the Western regions — 30%.

Believers of the UOC(MP) make 10% of respondents in the Western regions (0% in Galicia, 21% in the other West Ukrainian regions), 4% in the Central and Eastern regions, and 3% in the Southern region.

People are less likely to identify themselves as “just Orthodox” in the Western regions (4%). In the Central regions, they make 10%, in the East — 14%, and in the South — 17.5%.

When describing the church and confessional self-identification, researchers most often pay attention to the nominal self-attribution of citizens to one or another church, although an important sign of active involvement in the Church life is presented by affiliation with a certain religious community. Just 29% of respondents called themselves community members (but in 2020, there were only 16%).

The largest number of religious community members is recorded in the country’s West (45% of all respondents there). In the Centre they make 25%, in the East — 20%, in the South — 19%. Older respondents are more likely to call themselves religious community members (their share increases from 18% in the age group of 18–24 years to 37% among those aged 60 and over). Villagers are more united in religious communities than urban residents (32.5% and 27%, respectively), women — more than men (32.5% and 24%).

Members of religious communities who attributed themselves to the OCU make 14.5% of all respondents (in 2021 — 6%), members of Greek Catholic communities — 7% (in 2021 — 6%). 2.5% of all respondents identified themselves as members of the UOC(MP) communities (in 2021 — 4%), members of Protestant communities — 2% (in 2021 — 1%), members of Roman Catholic communities — 0.6% (in 2021 — 0.4%).

Inter-church relations

The majority (59%) of respondents described relations among believers of different churches and religions in the area where they live as calm. Another 9% called them friendly. In 2022, compared to 2021, the share of those who called them conflict-like increased from 3% to 6%, those who called them tense — from 5% to 14%, but in 2025, compared to 2022, the assessment of proneness to conflicts fell to 3%, and the share of those who called them tense dropped to 7%.

13% of respondents in the Central regions reported conflicts or tension in relations among believers of different churches, as did 10% in the East, 7% in the West, and only 2.5% in the South.

Conflicts or tension among believers of different churches were more often reported by believers of the UOC(MP) (33%). Among believers of the OCU, 11% said so, among Protestants — 10%, among Greek Catholics — only 4%.

Answering the direct question: “Which churches (or representatives of which religions) in the area where you live have tense or conflict-like relations?”, people more often said “of the OCU and the UOC(MP)” (9% of all respondents). When answering this question, residents of the Central (12%) and Eastern (9%) regions most often spoke about conflicts between the OCU and the UOC(MP), as did 6% of residents in the Western regions, and only 2% of residents of the South. Among believers of the UOC(MP) the existence of such conflicts was reported by 28.5%, among OCU believers — by 11%.

Conflicts among other churches are mentioned much more rarely. Say, only 0.3% of respondents reported the existence of conflicts between the UOC(MP) and Greek Catholics (in the Western regions — 0.7% of all respondents).

Differences among believers of the major Ukrainian confessions and churches in assessments of developments in Ukraine and the world and in foreign policy preferences

We also examined the existence of differences among believers of the major Ukrainian confessions and churches in assessments of events in Ukraine and the world, including their foreign policy preferences. As the poll results show, there are certain differences in assessments of events and foreign policy preferences among believers of different Ukrainian churches, but these differences are not fundamental — opinions of the majority of believers of all confessions and churches coincide.

Say, 70% of the UOC(MP) believers reported a positive attitude to the European Union (only 22% reported a negative one), among Greek Catholics — 82% and 12%, respectively, among the believers of Protestant and Evangelical churches — 83% and 8%, OCU believers — 84% and 9%.

A positive attitude to NATO was reported by 54% of the UOC(MP) believers (negative — 36%), Protestants and Evangelists — 60% and 23%, respectively, OCU believers — 70% and 17%, Greek Catholics — 76% and 15%.

53% of UOC(MP) believers agreed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had positive rather than negative consequences (38% disagreed), among Protestants and Evangelists — 65% and 15%, respectively, OCU believers — 72% and 16%, Greek Catholics — 89% and 6%.

The majority of representatives of all confessional and church groups agreed with the statement “It is the Russian people who is responsible for the war against Ukraine”: 55.5% of UOC(MP) believers (35.5% disagrees), Protestants and Evangelists — 83% and 11.5%, respectively, OCU believers — 90% and 7%, Greek Catholics — 97% and 2%.

POLL RESULTS IN TABLES

(data in tables are given as percentages)

Regardless of whether you go to church or not, whom do you consider yourself?

* The West: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; Centre: Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; the South: Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson regions; the East: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk regions.

“Regional affiliation” of respondents was determined on the basis of the region of their residence before the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression (i.e., before February 24, 2022). The only exception is that when analyzing the regional distribution of answers to the question “What are the relations between believers of different churches and religions in the area where you live?”, the current region of residence of the respondents was taken into account.

Please tell me, what religion you belong to?

Which Orthodox Church do you belong to?

Are you a member of a particular religious community (parish)?

How would you describe the relations among believers of different churches and religions in the area where you live?

How positive is your attitude to the following unions of organisations?

Do you agree with the following statements?

https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/riven-religiinosti-konfesiinyi-i-tserkovnyi-rozpodil-ta-mizhtserkovni-vidnosyny-v-ukrainskomu-suspilstvi-lystopad-2025r