Attitude of Ukrainian citizens to political forces, the need for new political forces and new politicians. Vision of the role of war veterans in politics and government. Ideological factors is support for political forces. Assessment of the role of the opposition in political life in wartime

Results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on November 11–18, 2025 as part of the project "Ukraine: socio-political challenges of transition from war to peace and post-war recovery", which is carried out with support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office Ukraine.

Face-to-face interviews were taken in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted using a stratified multi-stage sample with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was conducted at the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2008 respondents aged above 18 years were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. However, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

Attitude to political forces, the need for new political forces and new politicians

After the start of the full-scale war, compared to the end of 2020, the share of respondents who believed that political parties were necessary for the normal development of Ukraine as a state dropped significantly. Between 2014 and 2020, the share of such respondents made 70-75%, but in September–October 2022 it fell to 53%, which may be explained by the loss of public interest in political life with the beginning of the war. However, in November 2025 it came close to the pre-war indicators (67%).

The share of those who suggest that political parties are not needed increased in 2022, compared to 2020, from 14% to 28.5%, but in 2025 it fell to 18%.

Compared to 2020, the share of respondents who believe that there is a party in Ukraine representing their interests significantly decreased (from 38% to 21% in November 2025). 64% of respondents don’t see such a party in Ukraine.

The share of those who believe that such a party exists is somewhat higher among residents of the Eastern regions (32%, in other regions — from 18% to 20%), among those who trust the authorities (29%), and among those who trust the opposition (30%). However, paradoxically, the majority (52%) of those who trust the authorities and the majority (55%) of those who trust the opposition answered that there is no political party representing their interests.

Respondents who support Ukraine’s accession to the EU are somewhat more likely to believe that there is a party representing their interests in Ukraine than those who oppose it (24% and 15%, respectively).

When asked whether they see among the existing political forces those that could be entrusted with power after the war, only 21% of respondents said “yes”. This is noticeably less than in July 2023 (when 38.5% gave such an answer). A negative answer was given by 54% and 41%, respectively.

30% of those who trust the authorities gave an affirmative answer to this question (negative — 45.5%), among those who do not trust the authorities — 17% and 68.5%, respectively. Among those who trust the political opposition, 32.5% of respondents said “yes” (48.5% — “no”), among those who do not trust the opposition — 19% and 65%, respectively).

Compared to 2020, the share of respondents who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties has increased significantly (from 35% to 58%). At the same time, among those respondents who believe that there is a party representing their interests in Ukraine, the need for new political parties is even higher than among those who don’t see such a party in Ukraine (73% and 56%, respectively), somewhat higher — among those who do not trust the Ukrainian authorities, compared to those who do trust them (62% and 55%, respectively), and higher among Russian-speakers than among Ukrainian-speakers (69.5% and 54%, respectively). New political forces are especially demanded by residents of the Eastern regions (73%).

Over the last decade before the start of the full-scale war, the need for new political leaders was most of all pronounced by Ukrainians in 2015 (then, 55% said so, and only 28% believed that the current political leaders were sufficient). In 2020, the number of citizens who felt such a need fell to 46%. This may be explained by the fact that at that time, the election of V. Zelenskyy was to some extent seen as the appearance of “a new leader”. Even fewer respondents expressed the need for new political leaders in September–October 2022 (41%). However, in November 2025, the share of those who wanted new political leaders reached a “historical maximum” (70%), which may indicate the desire of the renewal of power.

The need for new political leaders is reported by 93% of those who express the need for new political parties (which may point to the fact that a “new political party” is seen by the majority of citizens as a “leader’s party”, i.e. as a political project created in support for a certain politician.

The need for new political leaders is higher among those who do not trust the authorities compared to those who trust them (74% and 65%, respectively), as well as among those who do not trust the opposition compared to those who trust it (73% and 68%, respectively). Among Russian-speakers, this need is higher than among Ukrainian-speaking citizens (80% and 66%, respectively). As with new political parties, the need for new leaders is more often reported by residents of the Eastern regions (80%).

The majority of respondents (56%) answered that at the next elections they are more likely to vote for new faces, people who have not been in power yet. Experienced politicians who have already been in power would be preferred by 22% of respondents.

Respondents who believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders (68%) and new political parties (68%), those who trust neither the government (62%) nor the opposition (61%) are especially likely to vote for “new faces”.

Vision of the role of war veterans in politics and government

According to the poll, servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and veterans of the war with Russia enjoy a positive attitude of the vast majority of citizens express (94% and 92.5%, respectively).

When asked whether the military and war veterans should go into politics after the war, 57% of respondents said that they should go into politics at the national level, and 50% — at the local level, and only 15% — that they should not go into politics.

When asked whether volunteers who currently help the military should go into politics after the war, 49% of respondents said that they should go into politics at the national level, and 50% — at the local level, and only 17% — that they should not go into politics.

More likely to believe that the military and war veterans should go into politics at the national level after the war are those who suggest that Ukraine needs new political leaders (61%) and new political parties (61%), combatants (70.5%), and residents of the Western regions (71%).

More likely to believe that volunteers should go into politics at the national level after the war are those who suggest that Ukraine needs new political parties (54%), residents of the Western (61.5%) and Eastern (55.5%) regions.

People would like to see the military and war veterans mainly in the future Verkhovna Rada (48%). 41% would like to see there new politicians, 40% — corruption fighters, 35% — experienced politicians, 35% — public activists, 31% — volunteers, 18% — representatives of local self-government bodies, 15% — businessmen, and only 7% — religious figures.

Those who believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders (51.5%) and new political parties (52%), combatants (65%) and residents of the Western regions (59%) are more willing to see military personnel and war veterans in parliament.

According to citizens, the political force that may be entrusted with power after the war is likely to come from among the military (47% of respondents believe so), 40% — from among humanitarian or technical intellectuals (which is much higher than during the polls of 2023-2024, when 17% to 25% of respondents gave such an answer). 33% of respondents believe that it could emerge from civil society organizations (in 2022-2023, 19% said so), 30% — from the volunteer movement, 25% — from the existing political parties, 17% — from business (which is higher than in 2023-2024, when 6% to 9% gave such an answer).

Those respondents who trust the authorities more often than others believe that such a political force could emerge from the existing political parties (37%). The same applies to those who trust the political opposition (33.5%).

Such a political force is expected to emerge from among the military by 54% of residents in the West, 48% in the Centre, 41% in the East and 36% of the South of the country.

Answering the question: "What traits of war veterans do you consider useful in political and public activities?", respondents most often mentioned honesty (18%), patriotism (12%), justice (9%), resilience, indomitability, strength, endurance (7%), courage, bravery (7%), devotion to the people, to Ukraine (6%), responsibility (5.5%), determination (5%), integrity, desire to fight corruption (5%), experience (5%).

Ideological factors of support for political forces

Political parties in their activities must reflect the ideological stand and preferences of citizens (otherwise they have no chance to win their support). Therefore, identifying these preferences allows us to predict which political forces will dominate in the near future.

In order to identify political preferences, respondents were asked to choose the position of the political party for which they could vote at the parliamentary elections, between two alternatives. These political alternatives concerned foreign and home policy, economy, social and humanitarian policy. The alternatives in the questions were formulated as “left-right” on an 11-point scale (“Put on a scale from 0 to 10 the position of the political force that you would support in the elections”). For analysis, the answers in the range of “0–3”, “4–6” and “7–10” were grouped, which allowed us to more clearly describe the distribution of political preferences in society.

In this survey we tried to reveal the dynamics of these preferences, comparing them with 2018 and 2022.

Foreign policy orientations. While in 2018, researchers noted significant social divisions in the issues of Ukraine’s foreign policy orientations, and within the framework of the proposed dilemmas, none of the alternatives was supported by at least half of the respondents, during the latest survey, the public opinion has become more unanimous. Say, in 2018 only a relative majority (46%) of respondents was ready to support a political force advocating Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future, but after the beginning of the full-scale war their share increased significantly and in November 2025 reached 81%. The share of supporters of the union of Russia and Belarus fell during this timeframe from 22.5% to 5%.

In 2018, the choice between joining NATO and non-alignment divided society into three almost equal parts (supporters of each alternative and those undecided). During the 2025 poll, the share of NATO supporters reached almost two-thirds (65%), and only 16% preferred a non-aligned status.

While in 2018 significant regional differences in foreign policy issues persisted (for example, the vast majority of respondents in the West and Centre supported Ukraine's accession to the EU, while in the East a relative majority tended to support the Eurasian Economic Union, and in the South there were supporters of both vectors), now the vast majority of residents in all regions would support a party that advocates Ukraine's accession to the EU (96% in the West, 82% in the East, 74% in the Centre and 70% in the South).

Regarding the party's position on NATO accession, in 2018 the vast majority in the West and a relative majority in the Centre supported NATO accession, while in the East and South about half of respondents preferred Ukraine's non-aligned status. Now, most residents of the Western (88%), Central (56%), and Eastern (70%) regions have a positive attitude towards joining NATO, while in the South, the shares of supporters of joining NATO and a non-aligned status (36% and 41%, respectively) do not statistically differ.

Distribution of power. A relative majority (40%) of respondents supports reducing the functions of the central government, transferring more powers to local governments, and decentralization. Expanding the functions of the central government, reducing the powers of local governments, and strengthening the controllability of all government bodies from the centre are supported by 21% of respondents. However, in the conditions of a full-scale war, the share of supporters of decentralization is still lower than in 2018, when it made 56% (and only 10% of respondents supported expanding the functions of the central government).

In 2018, the vast majority of respondents in all regions supported reducing the functions of the central government and expanding the powers of local governments and decentralization. In November 2025, this opinion was shared by the majority of residents of the Western (54%) and Southern (53%) regions, while in the Centre it is supported by only 35%, although this is more than the number of supporters of expanding the functions of the central government (22%). In the East, on the contrary, there are fewer supporters of decentralization (26%) than of expanding the functions of the central government (35%). It may be assumed that the opinion of residents in the Eastern regions is influenced by their proximity to the frontline.

While before the start of the full-scale war, the share of those who favoured greater influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive branch and limiting presidential powers outweighed the share of supporters of greater influence of the President on the Government and the executive branch, limiting the powers of the Verkhovna Rada (35% and 19%, respectively), after its start, in 2022, their ratio reversed — 15% and 39%, respectively. In 2025, the share of supporters of greater influence of the President also remains higher (30%) than the share of supporters of greater of the Parliament (23%), although both in 2018 and now the relative majority took a “centrist” position on this issue: 44.5% of respondents in 2018 and 47% of respondents now are not ready to support greater influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Government and the executive branch and limiting the powers of the President, or vice versa, strengthening the role of the President. This may be interpreted as the reluctance of the relative majority of citizens to change the balance of powers.

Economic and social policy. In the economic policy, citizens rely on state regulation rather than on market tools. However, while in 2018 the majority (59%) of respondents preferred an active role of the state in economic processes and price control, in 2022 only a relative majority (46%) said so, and in 2025 their share fell to 39.5%. The share of those who oppose state intervention in the economy and price control (everything should be decided by the market) rose from 11% in 2018 to 22.5% in 2022 and to 28% in 2025. Although, as we can see, support for state regulation remains somewhat higher than for refusal for state regulation of the market.

In 2018, a relative majority (46%) of citizens advocated expanding the state sector of the economy, returning previously privatized enterprises into state ownership (only 15% stood for privatization of state enterprises, priority development of the private sector of economy). In 2022, these opinions were supported by 36% and 27%, respectively — and almost the same in 2025 (35% and 23%). That is, although the preference of support for the state sector of economy persists, it has become much less pronounced.

Significant changes occurred in the ideas about the sectors of the economy that should be prioritized: while in 2018 respondents somewhat more often placed their hopes on the development of traditional industries — metallurgy, mechanical engineering, mining and agriculture — as opposed to the priority development of new industries and technologies (IT sector, robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, etc.) — 39% vs 21%, in 2022, priorities changed — 25% vs 36.5%, respectively. In 2025, support for the priority development of new industries and technologies somewhat decreased (to 30%) and now doesn’t statistically differ from support for the development of traditional industries (28%).

Support for political forces, depending on their position on economic and social issues, differs across age groups. The younger the respondents are, the less they rely on mechanisms of state regulation of the economy (their share decreases from 45% among those aged over 60 to 31% among those under 30), while the share of those who advocate the refusal from state regulation of the economy increases in younger age groups from 24% to 34.5%.

Only 23% of respondents aged over 60 support priority development of new industries and technologies, but their number makes 42% among those under 30.

Respondents’ answers to questions about alternative approaches to the social policy clearly indicate a demand for a high role for the state in this area.

Those who believe that the social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) should be state-owned prevail (they made 67% of all respondents in 2018, 64.5% in 2022, 62% in 2025 (only 8%, 11.5% and 14%, respectively, suggested that the social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be managed by private companies). The older the respondents are, the more often they believe that the social security system should be state-run (their share increases from 55% in the youngest age group to 65% in the oldest one).

While in 2018 and 2022 citizens tended to prefer high taxes and free social services from the state (36.5% in 2018 and 35% in 2022) to low taxes and paid social services (15% in 2018 and 26% in 2022), in 2025, the shares of the former and the latter did not statistically differ (29% and 27%, respectively). As we may see, the share of supporters of the first point of view is gradually decreasing, and of the second one is increasing.

Civil rights and freedoms, humanitarian policy. While in 2018, 49% of respondents favoured state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (mandatory teaching of Ukrainian at school, language quotas on radio and television) (against 29% of those who believed that the state should treat all languages ​​equally), in 2022, their ratio turned 64% vs 16%. In 2025, the share of supporters of the state protection and support for the Ukrainian language is lower (52%) than in 2022, but still higher than in 2018. There are also fewer (22%) than in 2018 of those who believe that the state should treat all languages ​​equally.

In the Western regions, the majority (77%) of respondents support state protection and support of the Ukrainian language, in the Central and Eastern regions — a relative majority (49% and 44%, respectively), in the South, the shares of those who support state protection of the Ukrainian language and those who believe that the state should treat all languages ​​equally do​ not statistically differ (26% and 34%, respectively).

Among Russian-speaking respondents, the shares of those who support state protection of the Ukrainian language and those who believe that the state should treat all languages ​​equally do not statistically differ (30% and 31%); among those who communicate both in Ukrainian and Russian at home, a relative majority supports state protection of the Ukrainian language (39% and 27%, respectively); among Ukrainian-speakers, state protection of the Ukrainian language is supported by the majority (61% and 18%, respectively).

In 2018, 36% of respondents were ready to support a political force that advocated further de-communization, and 30% would support the one that would stop de-communization, but in 2022 the share of the former rose to 58%, and the share of the latter fell to 16.5%. In 2025, support for de-communization somewhat weakened (46% and 22%, respectively), but remains significantly higher than in 2018.

Residents of the Western regions (80%) support de-communization the most; in the Central (37% and 27%, respectively) and Eastern (32% and 25%, respectively) regions, the share of those who support further de-communization exceeds the share of those who support its termination; in the South, these shares do not statistically differ (31% and 30%, respectively).

Significant differences are observed in the positions of supporters and opponents of the EU accession: while 52% of the former stand for further de-communization, and only 19% are against it, among the opponents of the EU accession they make 19% and 40.5%, respectively.

In recent years, the traditional idea of a marriage as a union between man and woman has somewhat weakened (the share of those who would support a party that advocates this idea of a marriage fell from 77% in 2018 to 65% in 2025), while the share of those who would support a political force that advocates the right to marriage (partnership) between people of the same sex has increased from 4% to 11%.

Residents of the Western (79%) and Southern (74%) regions are most supportive of the idea of ​​a traditional marriage, and residents of the country's East are the least supportive (48.5%, while 19% of residents of this part of the country would support a political force that advocates official recognition of same-sex marriages (partnerships).

Compared to 2018, there is a slight increase (from 5% to 11%) in support for decriminalization of the use and possession for personal use of certain soft drugs, but 74% of respondents in 2018 and 68% in 2025 support a tough policy against drugs, criminal punishment for their use and possession. Residents of the Eastern regions (51%) are somewhat less likely to support a tough anti-drug policy, although even among them 15% are ready to support a political force that advocates decriminalization of the use and possession for personal use of certain soft drugs.

The attitude to the ​​restoration of the death penalty for the most serious and cruel crimes has been varied in recent years. In 2018, a relative majority (41%) favoured restoration of the death penalty, in 2022, a relative majority (42%) was against its restoration (and only 29% were in favour), in 2025, the public opinion on this issue has actually returned to the pre-war one: a relative majority (43.5%) favours restoration of the death penalty and only 24% are against it.

War veterans (54%), residents of the Western regions (51.5%) are more likely to support restoration of the death penalty than residents of the Central regions (36%), but in all regions supporters of restoration of the death penalty are in a majority.

A relative majority (45%) of respondents believes that restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by foreign aggression (the same as in 2018). Much fewer (21.5%) respondents believe that certain civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted in the conditions of foreign aggression. This is not much higher than in 2018, when they made 17%.

The majority or a relative majority (from 39% to 53%) of residents in all regions believe that restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by foreign aggression.

Those who do not trust the authorities are more likely to believe that restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression (49% and 40%, respectively).

Assessment of the role of political opposition in wartime

59% of respondents believe that opposition to the government in wartime is necessary, while a minority (20%) holds the opposite opinion. Respondents who do not trust the authorities (80.5%) more tend to agree with this than those who trust them (72.5%); those who support accession to the European Union are more likely to agree (79%) than those who oppose accession (71%).

Similarly, the majority (56%) of respondents believe that during martial law the actions of the country's leadership in matters of national defence may be criticized (29.5% hold the opposite view). Criticizing the actions of the country leadership in matters of national defence is considered permissible by 60% of those who suggest that opposition to the government is necessary during the war, and by only 37% of those who believe that opposition during war is not needed (26% and 54%, respectively, called such criticism inadmissible).

The lower the well-being of respondents is, the more permissive they are of criticism of the government in matters of national defence (from 49% among those who do well to 61% among those who barely make ends meet). Those who do not trust the government are more likely than those who trust it to allow such criticism (65% and 42%, respectively).

At the same time, defence and security are the sectors in which respondents most often say that the opposition must necessarily support the government (32.5%). 31% believe that it should offer alternatives, and 29% — that it should act dependent on the circumstances.

Regarding other sectors (foreign policy, economy, social sphere, home policy), only from 20% to 25% believe that the opposition must necessarily support the government, and from 37% to 41% — that the opposition should offer alternative ideas.

Regarding the necessity of a political opposition to the government after the war, the vast majority (77%) suggests that it is needed. Only 12% of respondents stick to the opposite opinion.

POLL RESULTS IN TABLES

(data in the tables are given as percentages, unless stated otherwise)

Do you think that political parties are necessary for normal development of Ukraine as a state?

Is there a party in Ukraine of which you can say that it represents your interests?*

* In 2017, the question was: "Is there a party defending your interests among the existing political parties?"

Do you see among the existing political forces the one that can be entrusted with power after the war?

Do you believe that Ukraine needs new political parties?

Do you believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders?

At the next elections you will most probably vote for…

Do you believe that the military and war veterans should go into politics after the war?
respondents could choose several answers

Do you think that volunteers who currently help the military should go into politics after the war? respondents could choose several answers

Whom would you like to see in the future parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) in the first place? respondents could choose several answers

From where do you think the political force that may be entrusted with power after the war is likely to come? Respondents could choose several answers

What traits of war veterans do you consider useful in political and public activities?
(give your answer), only the answers given by 1% or more respondents

Put on a scale from 0 to 10 the position of the political force that you would support at the elections (0 means maximum support for the position shown on the left, 10 — full support for the position on the right)

Do you believe that political opposition to the government is necessary in wartime?

With which of the following statements do you agree more?

Should opposition support the government or offer alternative ideas to the government in various sectors in wartime?

Do you think that political opposition to the government is needed after the end of the war?

https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/stavlennia-gromadian-ukrainy-do-politychnykh-syl-potreba-v-novykh-politychnykh-sylakh-ta-novykh-politykakh-lystopad-2025r