Ukrainian Contribution to the Global World Order

April 01, 2022

The fight of Ukraine against russian aggression has reflected the peculiarities and contradictions of global integration processes. It has encouraged and accelerated the formation of renewed unions and institutions, adjusted priorities, partnerships, the level of acceptability of compromises, and much more.

Of course, in most cases, the US (in partnership with the EU) and China (with the aggressive involvement of russia) remain the centers of global decisions and influence (in the political, security and economic spheres). At the same time, as strange as it might seem, among the factors that determine the direction and effectiveness of recognised global forces, the Ukrainian "trail" clearly stands out, due to the heroic defense of the country from the russian aggressor. Even today, the integration effectiveness of large unions largely depends on the support / non-support of Ukraine by the countries participating in such unions. The United States has become a positive pole of support, which is one of the most important factors of the military resistance of Ukraine to russia-racist aggression.

It is important to note that from the very beginning of the new leadership, the United States has intensified institutional strengthening of partnerships and directed political and economic activities in support of countries fighting for their own freedom and independence. Indeed, already in March 2021 (remembering that President Biden officially became President in January 2021), a system of US foreign policy priorities was presented, which states that, although the leadership of the country will focus and insist on diplomatic solutions to any type of issues and conflicts, military assistance will, if necessary, also be provided to those countries that really need it. Indeed, in less than a year, the United States has led not only political or diplomatic, but also economic and military support to Ukraine.

Confirmation of the US intensification in the formation of a new world order was the announcement (in early September 2021) of the conclusion of the AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was aimed at strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific region, including neutralisation and opposition to China (which in recent years has begun to show openly aggressive intentions in the region of Southeast Asia, in particular, claims to Taiwan as part of "its territory"). It should be noted that the announcement of the pact came as a surprise to the European Union, to which it was only announced as a confirmed fact without prior consultation and justification for such a step. However, it is clear why the decision on the pact was prepared in secret — long consultations and agreements between EU member states could nullify the realisation of intentions.

It is remarkable that all AUKUS member states have unconditionally supported Ukraine since the first days of enemy aggression. At the same time, China was active during the same period, particularly in claims to islands and territories in the South China Sea region (primarily Taiwan). However, the determination and unity of the AUKUS member states in countering the aggression against Ukraine was an eloquent signal to China about the likely further course of events if China continues its aggressive intentions. Thus, the example of the unity of leading countries in support of Ukraine has certainly played a positive role in preventing the escalation of the conflict in the region of Southeast Asia.

Another strategic platform, which was originally aimed at neutralising excessive activity of China and strengthening security, should be the so-called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (founded in 2007) in Australia, India, the United States and Japan. And if at first the focus of the dialogue was mainly on regional issues, already in 2021 (along with the "return" of the United States), its activities began to become truly global. And one of the main dimensions of the importance of the platform was the events in Ukraine.

Moreover, the manifestation of the "Ukrainian factor" in the security sphere, not surprisingly, exacerbated the dilemma for one of the participants — India. We underline that the peculiarity of this platform is that India hopes to counteract the expansion of China into the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. We recall that the confrontation (of varying levels of "antagonism") between China and India has already a long history, whilst the dominance of China has been growing in recent years. Therefore, India hopes that expanding cooperation with the United States and leading developed countries will strengthen its own position in conflict spheres (with China).

However, the "Ukrainian factor" can significantly harm such intentions and expectations of India. The fact is that, given the long-standing fruitful relations (including in the military sphere) of India with russia, India has taken a largely pro-russian stance on Ukraine (whilst the other three countries of the Quadrilateral Dialogue are the most ardent allies of Ukraine). In particular, the leadership of India refused to publicly condemn the aggressor, and when voting in the UN Security Council on Ukraine, India mostly abstained (campaigning only for dialogue and de-escalation). Such a "special position" could call into question the expediency of intensifying the Quadripartite Dialogue in the interests of India.

Of course, in order for allied intentions to be effective, clarity of the partners' positions, commonality and balance of interests are required. And this includes "purely" economic interests. Indeed, exports of India to the United States in 2021 reached $ 71.6 billion (18% of total exports), to Australia — $ 7 billion (1.8%), to Japan — $ 6 billion (1.6%), and to Russia — only $ 3.3 billion (less than 1%). It is obvious that the pragmatism of economic interests should contribute to the rationality of choice.

Finally, the Prime Minister of Japan even asked the Indian government to state a clear position on the invasion of russia into Ukraine. The answer to this question will obviously define further solutions. Therefore, today there is reason to expect that India will soon also appear among the countries that support Ukraine.

The Ukrainian factor also plays a catalytic role in European relations with other countries, primarily China. We note that at the end of 2020, after 35 rounds of talks, China and the EU have announced a "significant political achievement" — by signing the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which is expected to bring significant positive changes in mutual market access in both the EU and China. Of course, this should mean the convergence of not only economic, but also political and humanitarian interests, improving business and security trust, adherence to the principles of democracy, human rights, etc.

However, the effectiveness of the Agreement did not satisfy European countries. Moreover, the attitude to the Chinese presence has deteriorated markedly with the beginning of russian aggression. It turned out that despite internal contradictions, the EU was practically the only one to condemn the aggression, to urgently provide assistance (of various kinds) to Ukraine, to support internally displaced persons, etc. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine reunited the European Union.

China, by having taken a detached position, can no longer count on the speedy approval by the parliaments of EU member states of this investment agreement (in which China is openly interested), nor on broad support from European countries (especially Eastern and Central European countries) for the entry of Chinese investment.

Moreover, the choice of the majority of Europeans between a reliable security system embodied by the United States and the need for which has become clear in the fight of Ukraine against russian aggression and the illusory benefits of economic expansion of China will undoubtedly be decided in favour of the former. And the contradiction of views and positions of the largest countries in the world is due not only to the attitude to the fate and fight of Ukraine, but the choice of modern and future world order.

Vasyl Yurchyshyn

Director, Economic Programmes

Born in 1955 in Kamyanets-Podilskyi.


T. Shevchenko Kyiv State University, Department of Cybernetics (1977).

Institute of Public Administration and Local Government at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (1994).

Professor in Public Administration. Author of nearly 100 scientific works.


In 1977–1993, worked at the Kyiv University as an engineer, research fellow and senior research fellow;

1994–1999 — head economic researcher at the International Centre for Policy Studies, Fund for Banking and Finance Development;

1999–2004 — Assistant Professor, Department of Economic Policy of the Ukrainian (currently, National) Academy of Public Administration, office of the President of Ukraine;

1999–2004 — Research Director at the Agency of Humanitarian Technologies, later — Agency for Social Analysis;

2002–2003 — advisor to the Minister of Economy of Ukraine;

since April, 2004 — Professor, Department of Economic Policy of the National Academy of Public Administration, office of the President of Ukraine;

since June, 2005 — Economic Programmes Director at Razumkov Centre.

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