Results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on May 23–31, 2023 within the frameworks of the MATRA Programme supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. 

The opinions expressed are those of the authors only and should not be considered as representative of the Embassy’s official position.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions — only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted using stratified multistage sampling with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2020 respondents over the age of 18 were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of the Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

The poll results are compared with the data of previous polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service since 2000.

"Farewell to Russia"

Having launched a "hybrid" and later a full-scale war against Ukraine, Russia itself shattered its image not only in Ukraine but also in the whole world.

While 84% of respondents in Ukraine mainly associate the European Union with progress and development, 83% of respondents associate Russia with backwardness and devolution (in 2017, "only" 51% reported such association). Only 3% of respondents associate Russia with progress and development (in 2017 — 16%).

When answering the question, with whom — Ukraine or Russia — they primarily associate such notions as "democracy", "wellbeing", "stability", "freedom", "aggression", "humanity", "justice ", "cruelty", "dictatorship", "respect for personal rights", respondents the most often associate the notions of "democracy", "freedom", "humanity", "wellbeing", "justice", "respect for personal rights", "stability" with Ukraine. Noteworthy, the association of Ukraine with these notions became much stronger than in 2017. Say, the share of those for whom "respect for personal rights" is primarily associated with Ukraine has increased, compared to 2017, from 21% to 60.5%, "wellbeing" — from 18% to 62%, "justice" — from 24.5% to 61%, "humanity" — from 36% to 74%, "freedom" — from 40% to 81%, "democracy" — from 41.5% to 76%, "stability" — from 12% to 49%.

The association of Ukraine with a certain notion or value cannot always be explained by the fact that this value is fully realized in Ukraine. For example, the growth of the association with "stability" cannot be attributed to the growth of stability during the war in Ukraine. Rather, for the respondents, this means that they associate the possibility of realizing this value (and others) in the (near or more distant) future with Ukraine.

Only 0.4% of respondents primarily associate the notion of "democracy" with Russia, only 0.6% — "freedom", 0.3% — "wellbeing", 0.7% — "stability", 1% — "humanity", "justice" and "respect for personal rights".

Primarily associated with Russia are the notions of "aggression" (this association increased from 66% in 2017 to 91% in 2023), "dictatorship" (increased from 60% to 87%), "cruelty" (from 57% to 89%).

"Non-fraternal nations"

One of the fundamental myths of Soviet times was the myth of the "brotherhood of the Russian and Ukrainian nations." The "hybrid" and full-scale wars of Russia against Ukraine have shattered the idea of brotherhood of the Russian and Ukrainian nations. How is the mythologeme of such brotherhood perceived in modern Ukraine? Respondents were asked to make a choice among three statements: "Ukrainians and Russians have always been and remain fraternal nations", "Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but they are no longer such", and "Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal nations".

About a quarter (27%) of respondents agreed with the first statement ("Ukrainians and Russians have always been and remain fraternal nations") in 2017; in 2023, it was shared by only 4%. The share of those who believe that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but are no longer like that, has not changed statistically since 2017 (50% and 48%, respectively), but the share of those who hold the opinion that Ukrainians and Russians had never been fraternal nations increased significantly (from 16% to 43%).

The changes compared to 2017 are especially noticeable in the Eastern and Southern regions. While in 2017, 52% of residents of the East believed that "Ukrainians and Russians have always been and remain fraternal nations", in 2023 this point of view is shared by only 10%. In the South, the share of those who think so has decreased from 45% to 3%. In the East and South, the majority of respondents now believes that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but they are no longer such (53% and 72.5%, respectively). In the Centre, this opinion is shared by a relative majority (48%), a bit fewer believe than that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal nations (43%). In the West, in 2017 a relative majority (43%) believed that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but they are not. Now the majority (61.5%) of the residents of that region holds the opinion that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal nations.

If among the representatives of the older (50 and more) age group, the majority (54%) share the opinion that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but are no longer such, in the younger age group (18 to 35 years) the majority (54%) believes that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal nations (in the middle age group (36-49 years), these two opinions have approximately equal numbers of supporters.

Among ethnic Ukrainians, 3% consider Ukrainians and Russians fraternal nations, among ethnic Russians — 17%. Accordingly, 47% and 52% believe that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations, but no longer are, respectively; 44.5% and 26% — that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal nations.

Social distance between residents of different regions of Ukraine and social distance to residents of other countries

In the policy of both the Russian and Soviet authorities in relation to Ukraine and Ukrainians, there was a tendency to contrapose different parts of the Ukrainian ethnos, one of which was perceived as "loyal", "pro-Russian", the other — separatist or nationalist. In the USSR, Western Ukrainians (primarily Galicians) became such a "stigmatized" (from the viewpoint of disloyalty to Russia) group.

Such propaganda influence resulted in the "ideological stigmatization" of residents of the western regions of Ukraine, which was observed not only in the USSR, but under the influence of the Soviet stereotypes — for a long time after Ukraine gained independence. This, in particular, manifested itself in the formation of a negative image of the Western Ukrainians as "Banderites", "bourgeois nationalists" and in encouraging the social distance of residents of other regions of Ukraine from them. The process of unveiling these stereotypes significantly accelerated after 2014, when Russia's "hybrid war" against Ukraine began.

During a poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in May 2006, assessing how close the residents of different regions of Ukraine and some neighbouring countries are in terms of character, customs and traditions, in general, citizens of Ukraine assessed their proximity to the residents of the western regions of the country (Galicia, Bukovyna, Volyn, Transcarpathia) lower than residents of other regions of Ukraine, and residents of the Southern and Eastern regions — even significantly lower than residents of Russia. Say, the Southerners assessed their closeness in terms of character, customs and traditions with Galicians at 4.3 points on a scale from 0 to 10, while the closeness with the residents of Russia — 7.3 points; the Easterners — respectively, 4.7 and 7.6 points.

If we compare the results obtained in 2023 with those of 2006, we can see that in the Eastern, Southern and Central regions, the self-assessment of cultural closeness with the western regions of the country increased (for example, the assessment of closeness with Galicia increased in the East from 4.7 to 6.2 points, in the South — from 4.3 to 6.7 points, in the Centre — from 6.2 to 7.0 points), with a decrease in the perceived proximity to Donbas (in the East — from 8.4 to 6.5 points, in the South — from 7.4 to 6.3 points, in the Centre — from 6.9 to 5.7 points), and Crimea (in the East — from 7.4 to 6.6 points, in the South — from 7.9 to 7.1 points, in the Centre — from 6.9 to 6.5 points).

In general, the perceived closeness to residents of Crimea and Donbas in the country in 2023 was lower than in 2006, the perceived cultural closeness to residents of the Southern regions did not statistically change, while the perceived cultural closeness to residents of the Centre, Kyiv, Galicia, Volyn, Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, Slobozhanshchyna grew up, compared to 2006.

There is a tendency to a decrease in the level of cultural closeness with the residents of Russia — it dropped from 6.8 points in 2006 to 3.5 points in 2021 and to 1.4 points in 2023 (which is the lowest indicator among all the compared countries). Compared to 2006, the perceived cultural closeness with residents of Belarus also decreased (from 6.0 to 4.6 points in 2021 and to 2.0 points in 2023), while with residents of countries bordering on Ukraine in the West and Southwest (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova), as well as with Turkey, increased. The indicator of closeness with Poland is the highest (6.1 points, while in 2006 it was 3.7 points).

The perceived cultural closeness with Russia and Belarus decreased, compared to 2006, in all regions of the country without exception, while the perceived cultural closeness to the residents of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova and Turkey increased in all regions.

This tendency is manifested not only among ethnic Ukrainians, but also among ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. Say, ethnic Russians' self-assessment of cultural closeness with the residents of Russia dropped from 8.6 points in 2006 to 5.6 points in 2021 and to 3.1 points in 2023 (although it remains higher than among ethnic Ukrainians — 1.3 points).

Cultural tradition, to which the citizens of Ukraine refer themselves

Answering the question about their cultural tradition, in May 2023 respondents most often answered that they belonged to the Ukrainian cultural tradition (81%). Their share compared to 2006 increased significantly (then it was 56%). The share of those who referred themselves to the pan-European cultural tradition also increased, from 7% to 10%, and of those who attribute themselves to Russian and Soviet cultural traditions decreased (from 11% to 0.5% and from 16% to 4%).

The increase in the number of those who identify themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition occurred in all regions, but most of all — in the South and East. In the Southern regions, their share increased from 50% to 80%, in the Eastern regions — from 46% to 76%.

A statistically significant increase in the share of those who associate themselves with the pan-European cultural tradition occurred in the Central (from 6% to 12%) and Eastern (from 6% to 9.5%) regions. Attribution to the Soviet and Russian cultural traditions decreased in all regions.

The growth of self-attribution to the Ukrainian cultural tradition occurred almost mainly at the expense of the Russian-speaking population (those who mainly speak Russian at home) — among them, the share of such people more than doubled (from 29% to 64%), while among Ukrainian-speakers this growth was much less evident (from 80% to 85.5%).

Both among Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking respondents, self-attribution to the Soviet cultural tradition decreased, among Russian-speaking respondents — also to the Russian cultural tradition (from 26% to 2%).

Among ethnic Ukrainians, self-identification with the Ukrainian cultural tradition increased from 66% to 83%, with the pan-European one — from 6% to 10.5%, with the Soviet one — decreased from 14% to 3%, with the Russian one — from 6% to 0.2 %. Among ethnic Russians, self-identification with the Ukrainian cultural tradition increased from 21% to 53%, and with the Russian one, it dropped from 35% to 0.0%. However, the share of those who associate themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition remains quite high (30%). So, among ethnic Russians, the relative majority in 2006 associated themselves with the Russian cultural tradition, in 2023 — with Ukrainian.

While in 2021 association with the Ukrainian cultural tradition was more often manifested in the younger and middle age groups, compared to the older one (76%, 78% and 67.5%, respectively), in 2023, there are no statistically significant differences among age groups in this respect.

Representatives of the older age group somewhat less often than middle-aged and younger respondents associate themselves with the pan-European tradition (respectively, 8%, 12%, and 13%) and somewhat more often — with the Soviet tradition (respectively, 7%, 1%, and 0.5%).

When answering the question: "What cultural tradition, in your opinion, will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20-25 years)?", respondents more often than in 2006 answer that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will prevail (their share increased from 35 % to 55%). The share of those who suggest that the pan-European cultural tradition will prevail increased from 16% to 24%. The share of those who believe that different cultural traditions will prevail in different regions decreased from 22% to 11%. The share of those who believe that Soviet and Russian cultural traditions will prevail remains extremely low (in 2023, only 0.5% and 0.4% of respondents believed so, respectively).

To what extent do Ukrainians feel like Europeans?

Compared with 2005, the number of respondents who feel European has increased from 36% to 51%, and the number of those who do not feel European has decreased from 58% to 43%. At the same time, the most noticeable changes occurred after 2021, when 41% of respondents felt European, and 49% did not.

Compared with 2021, in the Western regions, the share of those who feel European increased from 56.5% to 68%, in the Central — from 43.5% to 49%, in the Eastern — from 32% to 42%, and did not statistically change in the Southern regions (24% and 29%, respectively).

While in the Western regions about two-thirds feel European, in the South about two-thirds do not feel European, and in the Central and Eastern regions the shares of those who feel and do not feel European do not statistically differ.

Among the representatives of the oldest age group, the majority (52%) do not feel European (in 2021, there were 58 of them in this age group), in the younger and middle age groups, the majority (62% and 56%, respectively) feels European. The increase in the share of those who feel European, compared to 2021, occurred in all age groups.

When naming the reason that prevents them from feeling European, those respondents who do not feel European the most often mention a low wellbeing (although the share of such respondents decreased, compared to 2006, from 76% to 56%). There were also fewer people who cited the low level of culture and education as the reason (a decrease from 35% to 21%). 45% mentioned socio-cultural living conditions (41% in 2006). There were more people who mentioned language barriers (their share increased from 24% to 39%) and the feeling of being a representative of another culture (increased from 11% to 23%), religious affiliation (from 3% to 8%). 32% pointed to "non-European" consciousness (in 2006, approximately the same number — 29%). Compared to 2006, the share of those who say there is a lack of information about the EU has not changed (8%).

Respondents were asked in which aspects Ukraine is a European state. Quite expectedly, they were mainly geographical (86%), although their share has increased, compared to 2021, by 9%. They also traditionally mentioned the historical aspect (68%, in 2021 there were fewer such answers — 55%). Compared to 2021, the assessment of the cultural aspect increased significantly (from 44% to 60%). The assessment of the political aspect has also risen (the share of those who believe that Ukraine is politically a European country increased from 32.5% to 47%). The lowest estimates concerned the social (only 28.5% believe that Ukraine is a European state in the social terms) and economic aspects (19%), although in recent years, we have also seen some increase in estimates here.

Ethnic self-stereotypes

Ethnic self-stereotypes (the system of ideas of representatives of one or another ethnic group about themselves and the features they attribute to themselves) — both positive and negative — are a component of ethnic consciousness. Respondents were asked the question: "To what extent do Ukrainians possess each of these qualities?", and were asked to rate the strength of 24 different qualities on a scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means "the quality is not inherent in any Ukrainian", and "10" means "the quality is possessed by all Ukrainians". Where the assessments of the qualities of Ukrainians were given by respondents representing other ethnic groups (the largest of them being ethnic Russians), their assessments could be combined as elements of self-stereotypes (to the extent that they associate themselves with Ukrainians, as, for example, in the situation of bi-ethnicity), and heterostereotypes (to the extent that they distance themselves from Ukrainians).

As a rule, positive ethnic self-stereotypes prevail over negative ones. Ukrainians are no exception. Most often, residents of Ukraine note the following qualities of Ukrainians: love for freedom (8.9 points), laboriousness (8.8 points), patriotism (8.7 points), hospitality (8.6 points), national pride (8.6 points), peacefulness (8.5 points), kindness (8.3 points), zest for life (8.2 points), sincerity (8.0 points), religiosity (7.5 points), independence in thoughts and views (7.4 points), honesty (7.2 points), public activism (7.2 points), individualism (7.1 points, and at the same time collectivism — 6.6 points), militancy (6.0 points). The assessment of the strength of all the mentioned qualities has increased, compared to 2017, when a similar poll was conducted.

The inherent qualities that are clearly interpreted as negative are evaluated below: envy (5.2 points), indifference to social problems (4.7 points), greed (4.6 points), spitefulness (4.4 points), closedness (4.0 points), treachery (3.5 points), cruelty (3.4 points), hostility towards people of another nationality (3.2 points). The assessment of the strength of these negative qualities decreased, compared to 2017.

We should separately dwell on the quality of "militancy". Judging by the fact that the assessment of the inherent nature of this quality correlates to the greatest extent with the assessment of such qualities as hostility to people of other nationalities (Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.311), cruelty (0.265), spitefulness (0.250), treachery (0.230), this quality is more often interpreted as negative. However, the presence of a significant (albeit slightly lower) correlation with such positive qualities as cheerfulness (0.187), independence in thoughts and views (0.158), sincerity (0.109), hospitality (0.097), kindness (0.089), diligence (0.068), freedom-loving (0.050) indicates that this quality is interpreted as positive by a large part of the respondents.

It should be noted that the assessment of the inherent qualities of "individualism" and "collectivism" are quite closely correlated (the Pearson coefficient is 0.236). Likewise, both of these qualities are correlated with positive features, that is, they are interpreted by the respondents as positive and "complementary" and do not contradict each other.

In the assessments of the prevalence of various qualities among Ukrainians, ethnic Russians generally little differ from ethnic Ukrainians, most often attributing positive qualities to them (hospitality, diligence, peace-loving, freedom-loving, kindness, cheerfulness). Statistically significant differences between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians are found in the attribution of the following qualities to Ukrainians: honesty (respectively, 6.4 and 7.3 points), kindness (respectively, 7.7 and 8.3 points), peacefulness (respectively, 7.8 and 8 .5 points), cheerfulness (respectively, 7.2 and 8.2 points), sincerity (respectively, 6.8 and 8.0 points), collectivism (respectively, 5.7 and 6.7 points).

Compared with 2017, the assessment of positive qualities characteristic of Ukrainians increased in all regions. Among the most significant differences in assessments between residents of different regions, one may note a significantly higher assessment of religiosity by residents of the Western region compared to the Ukrainian average (8.5 points, compared to the average for the entire array of respondents — 7.5 points). .

Attitude towards the state symbols of Ukraine and attributes of an independent state

Compared to the previous years, the share of those who are proud of the state symbols of Ukraine has increased: the Flag of Ukraine (from 26% in 2011 to 75% in 2023), the Coat of Arms of Ukraine (from 25% to 74%), the National Anthem (from 22.5 % to 69%). Also, the share of those who are proud of the official language of Ukraine increased from 32% to 74%, and the share of those who are proud of its currency (the hryvnia) increased from 19% to 57%.

The majority of residents of all regions are proud of the Ukrainian Flag (from 84% in the West of the country to 66% in the East), the Coat of Arms of Ukraine — from 82% in the West of the country to 67% in the East, the National Anthem — from 80% in the West of the country to 56.5% in East), in the official language of Ukraine — from 86% in the West of the country to 64% in the East), in its currency — from 69% in the West of the country to 43.5% in the South.

Representatives of younger age groups are proud of the state symbols of Ukraine and the attributes of an independent state more often than representatives of older age groups. Thus, 80% of respondents under the age of 30 and 69% of those 60 and older are proud of the Flag of Ukraine, 79% and 68%, respectively — of the Coat of Arms of Ukraine, 78% and 62%, respectively — of the National Anthem, 81% and 67% — of the official language of Ukraine, of its monetary unit — 65% and 51.5%, respectively.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS POLLS

(data in the tables are given as percentages, unless stated otherwise)

You mainly associate the European Union with:

You mainly associate Russia with:

Please say with whom — Ukraine or Russia — you mainly associate each of the following notions?

Choose one statement in each set, with which you tend to agree more

How close are the residents of different regions of Ukraine and some neighbouring countries to you in terms of character, customs, traditions? Rate on a scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means that the residents of this region have nothing in common with you in character, customs, traditions, "10" — that the residents of this region are most similar to you in character, customs, traditions. average scores

With which cultural tradition do you associate yourself, in the first place?

Which cultural tradition do you think will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20–25 years)?

Do you feel European?

What prevents you from feeling European? Respondents could choose several answers. % among those who do not feel European

Do you think that Ukraine is a European state?

To what extent do you think each of the following qualities is inherent in Ukrainians? (on a scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means "the quality is not inherent in any Ukrainian", and "10" means "the quality is possessed by all Ukrainians"), average scores

What is your attitude to the following attributes of the Ukrainian independent state?