The results of a sociological survey conducted from June 6th to 12th, 2024 by Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service as part of its project implemented under the USAID/ENGAGE activity, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact in Ukraine. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of Pact and its implementing partners and do not necessary reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts, and in the city of Kyiv. In Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts, it was conducted only in the territories under the control of Ukrainian military forces, where no active armed conflict is taking place.

The survey was conducted using stratified multistage sampling with random selection at the first sampling stages and using a quota method of respondent selection at the final stage (when respondents were selected according to gender and age quotas). The sample structure represents the demographic pattern of the adult population in the areas where the survey was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

2,016 respondents over the age of 18 were surveyed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sample deviations may be caused by the consequences of the Russian military's destruction, most notably the forced displacement of millions of citizens.

Number of citizens taking pride in Ukrainian citizenship and state symbols

In June 2024, when answering the question “How proud are you of being a citizen of Ukraine?,” 91% of surveyed citizens responded that they are “very proud” or “rather proud” of their Ukrainian citizenship. In 2015, the number was 68%, 62% in 2010, and 62% in 2000. 95% of residents of the western region, 93% in the central region, 92% in the southern region, and 83% in the eastern region take pride in their Ukrainian citizenship.

The share of respondents who take pride in the state symbols of Ukraine is also high: the national flag of Ukraine (64%), the national emblem of Ukraine (63.5%), and the National Anthem (61%). 65% of respondents take pride in the state language of Ukraine, and 51% in its currency (the hryvnia). These indicators significantly exceed those observed before Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, although they are somewhat lower than similar indicators from 2023.

National, regional, and local identity

As compared to 2006, the share of respondents who primarily relate (identify) themselves with Ukraine has increased significantly (from 31% to 53%). The share of those who identify themselves with their city or village decreased from 44% to 28%, and those identifying with their region did not change significantly (from 15% and 13%). A small share of respondents identified themselves with Europe (3%), although this indicator is higher than the same in 2006 (0.8%). The share of those identifying themselves with the USSR (2%) and Russia (0.1%) is insignificant.

In other words, if local identity prevailed in 2006, it has now been replaced by a national one. Respondents who primarily identified themselves with Ukraine constitute the majority in the western and central regions (58% and 56%, respectively). That said, the total share of those who identify themselves primarily with their city/village or region is more than half (53%) in the southern region (given 45% of those who identify themselves with Ukraine). In the eastern region, the shares of the first and second groups are almost equal (45% and 44%, respectively).

Those identifying themselves primarily with Ukraine are the majority in the younger (18–35 years, 57%) and middle (36–59 years, 56%) age groups. The same is slightly less than half in the older age group (48%).

Ethnic identity: decrease in the bi-ethnic level

95% of respondents identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, 2% as ethnic Russians, 2% as other ethnic groups, and 1.5% could not state their ethnicity.

In 2017, 74% of respondents in Ukraine believed in having one nationality identity, 12% in having two or more nationalities at once, 6% believed in having no nationality, and 8% could not state. According to the survey conducted in 2024, the share of those believing in having one national identity only has increased to 84%, the share of those believing in having two or more national identities has decreased to 7%, while the share of those believing in having no national identity almost has changed little (5%). The share of those unable to state their ethnic origin has decreased (4.5%). As compared to 2017, the share of ethnic Ukrainians believing themselves to have only one national identity has increased from 77% to 85%.

As compared to 2017, the self-image of residents of the western region has not changed (89% of respondents considered themselves to have only one nationality), while the share of such people has increased in the central (from 82% to 86%), southern (from 61% to 78.5%), and eastern (from 58% to 74%) regions. The share of people with a binary identity decreased in the western (from 6% to 2%), in the southern (from 24% to 12%), and in the eastern (from 19% to 10%) regions, while in the central region, the share did not change significantly (6% and 8%, respectively).

Definition of the Ukrainian nation

In 2015 and 2021, the majority (56% and 51%, respectively) of respondents deemed the civic definition of the Ukrainian nation as a community of all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origin, their language of communication, and their traditions. Following the survey conducted in June 2024, the share of those upholding this position decreased to 46%. Instead, the share of those supporting the definition of the Ukrainian nation as an ethnic community (based on one having Ukrainian ancestors) increased to 28% from 24.5% (2021). However, that particular definition of the nation was even more popular in 2006 (when it was supported by 34% of respondents). The share of those supporting the cultural definition of the nation with an emphasis on communicating in the Ukrainian language, following national traditions, and raising children respectively, has increased by a small extent (from 18% in 2021 to 21% in 2024).

The civic definition of the nation is supported by the majority of respondents in the southern (58%) and eastern (57%) regions, and 48% in the central and 29.5% in the western regions. The ethnic definition of the nation is most supported by residents of the western region (32%), while varying in other regions from 24% to 27%. Residents of the western region more often support the cultural definition of the nation (35%) than residents of other regions. This definition is supported by 20.5% of residents of the central, 14% of the southern, and 9% of the eastern regions.

Supporting democratic values ​​as a component of Ukrainian national identity

Most Ukrainian citizens support democratic values. Accordingly, 61% of respondents answered that democracy is the most desirable type of government for Ukraine. 50.5% agreed with the statement that “people's rule is more important for our country than the strict order,” while only 21% agreed that “strict order is more important than the people's rule.” When choosing between freedom and material wealth, 47% prefer freedom (and only 24% prefer material wealth). Support of democratic values ​​is higher now than in 2021, before Russia's full-scale invasion.

Support of democratic values ​​is higher among respondents who identify themselves foremost with Ukraine (71.5% of them answered that democracy is the most desirable type of government for Ukraine), while among those identifying themselves foremost with their city/village — 52%, and region — 46%. 58.5%, 43%, and 41%, respectively, believe that people's rule is more important for the country than strict order. 53%, 41%, and 41%, respectively, prefer freedom to material wealth.

Focus on future

Public opinion in Ukraine is focused on the future — 67% support the view that the best times for our country are yet to come, and only 13% believe that they are in the past (whereas in 2017 — 57% and 26%, respectively).

Focus on the future is related to the fact that, as compared to 2001, the number of respondents who are confident that their children residing in Ukraine will be able to get an education, including higher education should they wish, has increased significantly (from 27% to 64%), will be able to get a job meeting their expectations (12% to 48%), will be able to get quality health care services (12% to 47%), will have housing (24% to 45%), will feel protected from encroachments on their rights and freedoms (6% to 40%), will be able to travel and see the world (9% to 52.5%), will have time for quality leisure (24% to 57%), and will be grateful to their parents for bringing them into this world (49% to 69.5%).

That said, it should be noted that such optimistic estimates for most of these indicators were higher in 2023 than in 2024.

Cultural traditions with which the citizens of Ukraine identify themselves

In June 2024, when answering the question about the cultural traditions they identify themselves with, respondents mostly mentioned Ukrainian cultural traditions (76%). As compared to 2006, this share has increased significantly (it was 56% back then). The share of those identifying themselves with pan-European cultural traditions also increased, from 7% to 14%, and the shares of those identifying themselves with Russian (from 11% to 0.5%) and Soviet (from 16% to 4%) cultural traditions has decreased.

The increase in the share of those identifying themselves with Ukrainian cultural traditions was observed in all regions, though mostly in the southern and eastern ones. In the southern region, their share increased from 50% to 73%, and in the eastern region from 46% to 64%.

A significant statistical increase in the share of those referring themselves to pan-European cultural traditions is observed in the central (from 6% to 15%), southern (from 7% to 16%), and eastern (from 6% to 15%) regions. The share of those referring themselves to Soviet and Russian cultural traditions has decreased across all regions.

The increase in the share of those identifying themselves with Ukrainian cultural traditions occurred at the expense of the russophone population (those who mostly speak Russian at home) — from 29% to 43%, while among Ukrainian speakers, this indicator did not change significantly (80% and 81%, respectively).

The number of russophone respondents identifying themselves with Russian cultural traditions decreased (from 26% to 5%). In 2006, the share of native Ukrainian speakers identifying themselves with Russian cultural traditions was already very low (1%), and in 2024 it decreased to 0.1%.

Still, as compared to 2006, the share of russophone respondents identifying themselves with Soviet cultural traditions did not significantly change (23.5% in 2006 and 22% in 2024), while the same share of Ukrainian-speaking respondents decreased from 9% to 1%.

The share of Ukrainian-speaking respondents identifying themselves with pan-European cultural traditions increased from 6% to 15%, and among russophone respondents increased from 8% to 21%.

The younger the respondents, the more they identify themselves with pan-European cultural traditions (the respective share increases from 10% among those aged 50+ to 23% among those aged 18–35) and less with the Soviet culture (7% and 0.6%, respectively).

As compared to 2006, when answering the question: “In your opinion, what cultural traditions will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20–25 years)?”, respondents most often say that Ukrainian cultural traditions will prevail (their share increased from 35% to 55%). The share of those who believe that pan-European cultural traditions will prevail has increased from 16% to 19%. The share of those who believe that various cultural traditions will prevail in different regions decreased from 22% to 16%. The share of those who believe that Soviet and Russian cultural traditions will prevail remains extremely low (in 2024, only 0.9% and 0.5% of respondents claimed that, respectively).

The amount of citizens who know Ukrainian, consider it their native language, and speak it

When assessing their Ukrainian language proficiency, 69.5% of respondents answered that they speak it fluently. 27% answered that their Ukrainian language proficiency is sufficient for everyday communication but encounter difficulties when using it for discussing field-specific topics. 2% answered that they have problems understanding and speaking the Ukrainian language, and 0.5% answered that they do not understand the Ukrainian language at all.

78% of respondents named Ukrainian as their native language, compared to 2017 — 68%, 2015 — 60%, 2006 — 52%. 13% of respondents answered that both Ukrainian and Russian are their native languages (in 2006, 16% of respondents answered thusly, and in 2015 — 22%). The share of those who named Russian as their native language is 6%, compared to 31% in 2006, and 15% in 2015.

70.5% of respondents speak only or mostly Ukrainian at home, whereas in 2015 it was 50%, and in 2006 — 46%. 11% of respondents speak only or mostly Russian at home, in 2015 this number was 24%, and in 2006 — 38%. 18% speak Ukrainian and Russian equally (in 2015 — 25%, in 2006 — 15%).

72% of respondents use only or mostly Ukrainian outside the home (for example, at work, study), in 2023 it was 65%, and in 2015 — 46%. 8% of respondents use only or mainly Russian, in 2023 — also 8%, in 2015 — 24%. 20% speak Ukrainian and Russian equally outside the home (in 2023 — 26%, and in 2015 — 29%).

When answering the question about the more prestigious language to communicate with friends and colleagues at work or study, 75.5% of respondents named Ukrainian, 6% — Russian, and 16% answered that “it doesn't really matter.” In 2015, these indicators were 43%, 21.5%, and 29%, respectively.

“Farewell to Russia”

Following Russia's 2014 hybrid and then 2022 full-scale war against Ukraine, the Russian image has been significantly damaged, not only in Ukraine but across the world.

76.5% of respondents in Ukraine associate the European Union with progress and development to a greater extent, and 78% of respondents associate Russia with underdevelopment and regression (in 2017, only 51% saw this relation). Only 4% of respondents associate Russia with progress and development (in 2017, it was 16%).

According to the survey conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in cooperation with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2017, when answering the question: “Which model of social development is more attractive to you?”, 58% chose “the European model” and only 4% chose the “Russian model.” According to 2024 data, 64% of respondents see the European model as more attractive, and only 0.7% prefer the Russian model. The share of respondents who see European and Russian models as equally attractive decreased from 7% to 3%.

One of the fundamental Soviet mythologems was the one about the “fraternity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.” Both the hybrid and the full-scale wars Russia has waged against Ukraine have discredited the very core of the idea of any brotherhood between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. How is the mythologem of such fraternity perceived in modern Ukraine? Respondents were asked to choose from the following three statements: “Ukrainians and Russians have always been and will remain fraternal people,” “Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal people but they no longer are,” and “Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal people.”

In 2017 about a quarter (27%) of respondents agreed with the first statement (“Ukrainians and Russians have always been and will remain fraternal people”), while in 2024 — only 3%. The share of those who believe that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal people has increased significantly (from 16% to 44%). The share of those who believe that Ukrainians and Russians are no longer fraternal people, although they used to be, decreased from 50% to 46%.

As compared to 2017, the most significant changes were observed in the eastern and southern regions^[1]. In 2017, 52% of residents of the East believed that “Ukrainians and Russians have always been and will remain fraternal people,” while in 2024, this point of view is supported by only 7%. The share of those supporting the same opinion in the southern region has decreased from 45% to 7%. In the southern region, the majority of respondents nowadays believe that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal people but no longer are (66%), in the eastern and central regions — a relative majority (45% and 49%, respectively), in the western region — 33%. 62.5% of the residents of the western region, 43% of the residents of the central region, 34% of the residents of the eastern region, and 21.5% of the residents of the south of the country believe that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal people.

The majority of representatives of the older (50+) age group (51%) support the idea that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal people but no longer are, the younger age group (18–35) mostly (50%) believes that Ukrainians and Russians have never been fraternal people, the middle age group (36–49) supports these ideas equally (46% each).

“Farewell to the USSR”

Lately, the number of Ukrainian citizens with a negative attitude to the idea of restoring the USSR in any form has increased significantly. As compared to 2017, the share of those wishing to restore the ways of the Soviet Union has decreased from 21% to 9%, and the share of those who are against it has increased from 63% to 78%. 67% of residents of the eastern region, 74% of the central region, 76% of the southern region, and 93% of the western region would not like to restore the ways of the USSR. 71% of representatives of the older (50+) age group and 84% of those below 50 would not like to bring those times back.

Focus on the past (or the future) is a mere nostalgia (or lack thereof) for the Soviet past. Among those who would like to restore the ways of the USSR, only 26% believe that the best times for our country are yet to come, while among respondents who would not like to restore the ways of the USSR answered 75%.

In 2013, when assessing the fairness of Soviet society as compared to modern Ukrainian society on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning “extremely unfair” and 10 meaning “definitely fair,” respondents rated the level of justice in Soviet society higher than that in modern Ukrainian society (6.2 and 4.0 points, respectively), and by 2021 these indicators had become almost equal (5.1 and 5.6 points, respectively), while in 2024, the fairness of modern Ukrainian society is rated significantly higher (5.8 points, while Soviet society scored a mere 3.2 points).

The results of the all-Ukrainian survey conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in cooperation with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2017, showed that 59% of Ukrainian citizens then believed that the collapse of the USSR was not only natural but also a predicted historical event, and only 27% said that it was a historical disaster. Data from the latest (2024) survey show that the share of those who see the collapse of the USSR as a natural and predicted historical event has increased to 69%, and the share of those who see it as a historical disaster has decreased to 12%.

The social gap between residents of different regions of Ukraine and the social gap between residents of other countries

Both the Russian and Soviet policies related to Ukraine and Ukrainians tended to oppose different parts of the Ukrainian ethnic group, one of which was referred to as “loyal” and “pro-Russian,” while the other as “separatist” or “nationalistic.” In the USSR, western Ukrainians (primarily Galicia residents) became one of such stigmatized groups due to their lack of loyalty to Russia.

The related propaganda resulted in the ideological stigmatization of the residents of the western regions of Ukraine, not only in the USSR but under the influence of stereotypes formed in the USSR that persisted for a long time after Ukraine gained independence in 1991. The said was mainly manifested in a negative image of the residents of the western part of Ukraine as “Banderites” and “bourgeois nationalists,” in a social gap between residents of other regions of Ukraine.

During a survey conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in May 2006, when assessing the level of similarity between residents of different regions of Ukraine and some neighboring countries in terms of character, customs, and traditions, ^[2]Ukrainian citizens generally assessed their similarity with residents of the western regions (Galicia, Bukovyna, Volyn, Zakarpattia) lower than that with residents of other regions, while residents of the southern and eastern regions assessed the same significantly lower than the same with residents of Russia. Thus, the residents of the southern region assessed their similarity with the residents of Galicia in terms of character, customs, and traditions at 4.3 points on a scale from 0 to 10, the same with the residents of Russia at 7.3 points, the assessment of residents of the eastern region was at 4.7 and 7.6 points, respectively.

In 2024, the self-assessment of similarity with the western regions has generally increased across the country, as compared to 2006 and 2021. So, the self-assessment of similarity with the residents of Galicia increased from 5.9 points in 2006 and 6.0 points in 2021 to 6.6 points in 2024. The self-assessment of similarity with the residents of the central region also increased (7.5, 7.4, and 7.8 points, respectively). As compared to 2021, there was an increase in self-assessment of similarity with the southern region (from 6.5 to 6.8 points) and Slobozhanshchyna (from 6.6 to 7.0 points), while the self-assessment of similarity with Crimea did not change significantly (5.7 and 5.8 points, respectively). However, the current self-assessment of similarity between these three regions is lower than the same dated 2006. In 2024, self-assessment of similarity with Donbas is lower (4.9 points) than the same in 2006 (7.3 points) and 2021 (5.4 points).

In 2024, self-assessment of similarity with residents of Russia generally decreased across the entire country and its regions as compared to 2006 and 2021. So, in the southern region, it averaged 7.3 points, in 2021 — 5.2 points, and in 2024 — only 3.1 points, in the eastern region — 7.6; 5.7, and 2.2 points, respectively, across the country — 6.8, 3.5, and 1.4 points, respectively (which is the lowest indicator among all compared countries).

The same decreasing trend is observed if 2006 and 2021 are compared in terms of self-assessment of cultural similarity with the residents of Belarus (from 6.0 in 2006 to 4.6 in 2021, and 2.0 points in 2024 across the country).

As compared to 2006, the self-assessment of similarity with residents of such neighboring countries as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, and Turkey have increased.

However, it should be noted that in 2023, the self-assessment of cultural similarity with residents of all regions of Ukraine and neighboring countries (except for Russia and Belarus) was higher than the same in 2024. In other words, in 2024, as compared to the previous year, there was a certain drop in solidarity and unity between both the residents of different regions of Ukraine and the residents of western neighboring countries.

To what extent do Ukrainians see themselves as Europeans?

As compared to 2005, the number of respondents who see themselves as Europeans has increased from 36% to 49%, and the number of those who do not has decreased from 58% to 45%. In 2021, the year before the full-scale invasion, 41% of respondents saw themselves as Europeans and 49% did not.

As compared to 2021, the share of those who saw themselves as Europeans in the western region increased from 56.5% to 64%, in the central — from 43.5% to 48%, in the southern — from 24% to 32%, and in the eastern — from 32% to 40%.

The majority in the western region (64%) are those seeing themselves as Europeans, the majority in the southern and eastern regions (63.5% and 53.5%, respectively) do not see themselves as Europeans, and in the central region, there are no significant differences between those who see themselves as Europeans and those who do not (48% and 45%, respectively).

The majority representatives (56%) of the oldest age group (50+) are those who do not see themselves as Europeans, and the majority in the younger and middle age groups (64% and 55%, respectively) are those who see themselves as Europeans. As compared to 2021, there has been an increase in the share of those who see themselves as Europeans across all age groups.

Among the reasons preventing them from seeing themselves as Europeans, the respective respondents most often mention a low level of well-being (75%). 41% mentioned social and cultural living conditions, 38% — language barriers (their share increased as compared to 2006 when it was 24%), 33% — “non-European” mentality (29% claimed this in 2006), 24% — low level of culture and education (35% in 2006). The share of those who claimed to be a representative of another culture has increased from 11% to 24%, of different religious affiliation — from 3% to 6.5%. 9% complained about the lack of information about the EU.

Respondents were asked about European aspects of Ukraine as a state. Quite expected, the geographical aspect is mentioned most often (85%), however, as compared to 2021, the share of those giving this answer has increased by 8%. 69% mentioned the historical aspect (in 2021, there were fewer such answers — 55%). As compared to 2021, the assessment of the cultural aspect increased (from 44% to 55%). As compared to 2021, the share of those who believe that Ukraine is a European country in political aspects has not changed significantly — 32.5% and 32%, respectively. Still, in 2024, this share significantly decreased as compared to 2023, — 47%.

The lowest points were given to the social (only 26% believe that Ukraine is a European state in the social area) and economic (18%) aspects.

STUDY OUTCOMES AS COMPARED TO PREVIOUS SURVEYS

The data in the tables are given in percentages (unless otherwise specified)

How proud are you of being a citizen of Ukraine? % of respondents with Ukrainian citizenship

What is your attitude to the following symbols of an independent Ukrainian state?

Which of the following do you most relate (identify) with in the first place?

What nationality do you consider yourself?

Do you believe in having a certain national identity:

Which of the following definitions of the Ukrainian nation do you find the most acceptable?

Which of the following statements do you most agree with?

Which of these statements do you agree with most?

Are you sure that your children, who reside in Ukraine:

In your opinion, which cultural tradition do you belong to?

In your opinion, what cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20–25 years)?

How would you rate your level of Ukrainian language proficiency?

What is your native language?

What is your household's main language of communication?

What is your language of communication outside your home and family (at work, study, etc.)?

Which language of communication is more prestigious among your friends and colleagues at work or study?

You mostly associate the European Union with:

You mostly associate Russia with:

In your opinion, which social development model is more appealing?

Choose one statement from the following sets that you agree with most

Would you like the ways of the USSR to be restored?

Given a general evaluation of modern Ukrainian society, to what extent is it fair or unfair in your opinion? Please rate it using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is “extremely unfair” and 10 is “definitely fair,” average points

Using the same scale, please rate Soviet society (the one that existed in the USSR), average points

How much in common in terms of character, customs, and traditions do you have with the residents of different Ukrainian regions and some neighboring countries? Please rate on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning that you have nothing in common with the residents of a certain region in terms of character, customs, and traditions, and 10 meaning that you have a lot in common with the residents of a certain region in terms of character, customs, and traditions. average points

Do you see yourself as a European?

What prevents you from seeing yourself as a European?, respondents could choose several answers, % of those who do not see themselves as Europeans

In your opinion, is Ukraine a European country?

Oblasts are divided into regions as follows: Western: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts; Central: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskiy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts, and the city of Kyiv; Southern: Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts; Eastern: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv oblasts.

As the survey has not been conducted in Crimea since 2014 or the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts from 2022 to 2024 due to their partial occupation and active combat operations, for the comparability of the results by macro-regions, the data for the southern region for previous years is also presented excluding Crimea, and for the eastern region excluding the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The all-national results are given by the territorial sample used at the time of the survey (i.e., before 2014 — the entire territory of Ukraine, after 2014 — the territory fully controlled by the Ukrainian government, where no active hostilities are taking place). ↑

The assessment was carried out on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 meaning that a respondent has nothing in common with the residents of a certain region or a country in terms of character, customs, and traditions, and 10 meaning that a respondent has a lot in common with the residents of a certain region or a country in terms of character, customs, and traditions. ↑