Ukraine should have a plan "B" in case the peace talks fail and military assistance from the US is terminated. Why is everything so serious? Because, as the recent events show, US President Donald Trump, instead of acting as an impartial mediator between Ukraine and Russia, has de facto sided with the aggressor. So, today our country has to confront two great nuclear powers. The situation is extremely challenging.
Can the US completely stop military assistance to Ukraine? Theoretically, yes. Of course, there is hope that Trump will be saved from this step by purely economic interests, because he does not give, but sells weapons. At the same time, there are signs of a danger that the US president will put his own business interests above the national ones. In fact, Ukraine has already had experience of living without US assistance for 7 months, but one of the biggest problems is protecting the country from ballistic missiles. After all, the US Patriot systems are a critical element of defence against enemy ballistic missiles, - says the co-director of foreign policy programmes, coordinator of international projects of Razumkov Centre, military expert Oleksiy Melnyk in an exclusive interview for OBOZ.UA.
– NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that NATO does not have a plan "B" in case the talks on ending the war in Ukraine fail and the US refuses to supply weapons to our country even for money, because he does not believe in such a scenario. Do you believe that this worst-case scenario is possible? If so, what should NATO's plan "B" look like, and especially Ukraine's plan "B"?
– It is really strange when the NATO Secretary General says, they have no plan "B". Perhaps, as a politician, he wanted to make kind of a provocation, because NATO has a political and a military dimension. If we talk about the wing where the military sits, then I am sure that the military should always make plans, based on the worst-case scenario. Hence, we assume that this was kind of a provocation in order to once again make emphasis on it and, perhaps, achieve the goals – for instance, to encourage more active participation of partners, like in the PURL Ukraine support program, which so far has only 11 members, and a dozen more have declared their commitment. It's only a guess, but why exactly this is so, frankly, is difficult to understand.
- How likely is it that the US will continue to put pressure on Ukraine, but not on Russia? Unfortunately, we already see confirmation of this. In October, when Trump introduced powerful sanctions against Russian oil companies, there were reasons to cautiously suggest that he had finally understood everything and would act in the right direction.
But again, we see that this weathervane has turned the other way. In the context of what is happening while we talk, I mean the negotiation process, a big question arises. We do not know what happened behind closed doors, but we can guess it, since Putin has repeated previously and again now that that Moscow is not going to depart from its maximalist positions, that Moscow is going to fight not only with Ukraine. He is openly threatening Europe now.
What can the Ukrainian and US delegations talk about now? It looks like talks, in which one side defends the position of the aggressor. That is, the situation is very disturbing.
- How far can Trump go in his pressure? Against the backdrop of all this negativity, there is one positive point - the fact that the United States is now selling weapons. Given that Trump, in fact, has put all foreign policy on a commercial basis, whether it is the financial interests of the United States or the financial interests of his family, this factor may still prevail - US arms manufacturers are to make profit. And this is the huge market where they can do this. This is on the one hand.
But on the other hand, there are signs that for Trump, his own financial interests may sometimes outweigh national financial interests. His son-in-law was present at the negotiations, there were reports that they had discussed not only the Russo-Ukrainian war but also potential cooperation between the two countries. This gives rise to strong suspicions that Kushner may have been promised something, that he will convince his father-in-law that losses of US arms companies are less important than the potential gains that either Dmitriev or Putin personally promised him. This cannot be ruled out.
- What will happen next? Returning to where we started, there must be a plan "B". How to act in this situation? Definitely, this will create a lot of problems for Ukraine and, first of all, for air defence. Because, as we see it, today, Patriot is a critical element of our missile defence, primarily against ballistic missiles. This is not all – it’s just one of the bottlenecks. Other methods of protection are also needed – active, passive – to defend infrastructure, to defend civilian cities and facilities.
Intelligence: it seems that there is some progress among European partners, apparently, the resources of commercial satellites have not been fully used. And in order not to lose hope, keep in mind that we have already experienced a period of 7 months in 2023-24, when Trump stopped aid to Ukraine. After Trump became president, we had several waves when intelligence sharing was stopped, arms supplies were stopped. That is, we do have such experience. The only thing that is needed now is to start preparing for this worst-case scenario as early as possible.
– Note that the negotiation track on ending the war in Ukraine involves only three parties - the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. Europe is not involved at all. What can and should be Europe's position on this issue? Should it demand a say in these negotiations? Maybe it can just increase military aid to Ukraine so that we do not worry about what will happen if we lose military aid from the US?
– First of all, when we talk about the current format of negotiations, there should be two warring parties and an independent mediator, a middleman in the talks. But it seems to me that Ukrainians quite often see Americans on the opposite side of the virtual negotiating table. Witkoff’s drools, regularly translated by Trump, are purely pro-Russian – attempts to take into account what Russia wants as much as possible, while putting pressure on the Ukrainian side.
We have a well-founded feeling that we are trying to negotiate peace simultaneously with a mediator and an aggressor. Such a paradox. These are not three parties. In essence, Ukraine conditionally stands against the two most powerful states in the world, nuclear powers, members of the UN Security Council. This is an extremely disadvantageous position.
Regarding Europe, first of all, the unity and cohesion that they declare is not there in practice. I am not talking about the role of Orbán or Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico. Even in Europe itself, there are debates about the seized Russian assets. All this shows that Europe has enough of its own contradictions but lacks political will and understanding of the seriousness of the threat they face in connection with the opportunities that Russia is given to continue this war and achieve success.
- Does Europe still have the reserves? If we are talking about purely material means, Europe has already cleaned up all its available stocks. Yes, arms production is increasing. This year, we have already received a million shells, but – wait a minute – Russia alone is producing 5 million. Plus what it receives openly from North Korea. There are also suspicions that China is tacitly helping somewhere – with components, if not with finished products. This is not fully confirmed information, but, probably, it is not groundless.
Therefore, what Europe can and should do now is political support for Ukraine, a more active stand in the dialogue with the US administration, using the opportunities that exist at the personal level, at the institutional level. And still, providing some kind of proper financial cushion for Ukraine – because Ukraine's budget today, everything that Ukraine collects as taxes makes only half of its budget. If the second half is reduced critically, then Russia's chances of winning this war of attrition will grow.
https://razumkov.org.ua/statti/tramp-vidstoiuie-pozytsiiu-agresora-ukraini-terminovo-potriben-plan-b
