The new wave of massive missile attacks by the aggressor country, Russia, on major cities in Ukraine pursues two main goals. The first one is to destroy our country's energy infrastructure, the second is to exert psychological pressure on Ukrainians, to try to break their will, which, according to the enemy's plan, should speed up the Ukrainian government's consent to negotiations on the Kremlin's terms. The possibilities of Ukrainian air defences are not limitless, but the situation can be improved if we work with Western partners in a somewhat new way.
Currently, the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia gives Ukraine not only a military but also a political advantage, and therefore, forces should not be withdrawn from the Russian territory now. Success in the Pokrovsk direction is a "pink line" for the Kremlin’s leader Vladimir Putin. His image at home depends on it. However, the enemy's offensive can be stopped there, too — such is the opinion of the Razumkov Centre military programmes director, military expert Mykola Sunhurovskyi expressed in an exclusive interview for OBOZ.UA.
— We are watching a new wave of massive enemy attacks on large Ukrainian cities: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy... What do you think of the main goal of the occupier, apart from just bombarding Ukraine, if any? And what does our air defence system lack?
— It’s not just one goal. Russia never sets one goal for itself. They chase several hares at once, but cannot catch either.
The first goal is to destroy our energy structure. The second goal is to undermine the morale of Ukrainian society, to create chaos, panic, etc. This would make pressure on the government, to agree to negotiations on Russia's terms.
What can we contrapose? Only what we have. When talking about layered anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence, we should realize that, unfortunately, we do not have such a full-fledged system; mostly we defend ourselves with what our partners give us. We simply cannot close all the gaps, so we cover the most critical sites and territories — Kyiv, power plants, NPPs, etc.
When we appeal to our partners to allow their troops to shoot down aircraft, missiles or Shakheds over the territory of Ukraine, I think we have not used all approaches and arguments yet. I believe that an environmental factor could be used here, namely the fact that striking technologically hazardous critical facilities can affect our neighbours. For example, the enemy hits a chemical plant, and the cloud goes to Poland or Romania. That is, Europeans should also take care of it.
Thanks to such rhetoric, it might be possible to strengthen the positions of Western politicians and the military in order to close the sky at least over western Ukraine. In this case, we could move part of our air defence equipment to other threatened areas and strengthen air defence over other territories. But we are currently unable to fully protect all the territory of Ukraine.
— Can you predict how the events in Kursk region will develop next month? What is appropriate and what is inappropriate for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Russian territory?
— It is very difficult to make such forecasts not knowing the goals and tasks set by the General Staff. This is impossible. There are always hidden tactical and strategic measures that are not public and are difficult to guess. If they were easy to guess, it would make the task easier for Russian intelligence.
Therefore, I do not want to make any predictions. But I can say that if we start withdrawing our forces from Kursk region now, it would not be very justified politically. Because one of the goals set before the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk operation was to occupy the enemy's territory and protect Ukraine from pressure regarding negotiations on Russia's terms. That such negotiations are not about the exchange of territories, but about the restoration of the principle of inviolability of borders in general.
If the troops are withdrawn now, this advantage will disappear. This will weaken our positions.
And militarily, we can hold this bridgehead because Putin refuses to redeploy serious reserves there from other sections of the front. The main direction of his attack is Pokrovsk. He will press until the end. This is not even a red line for him, but a pink one, because a loss in this direction can shatter his image. So, this is both a military and a political goal.
— You said that Putin wants to push to the end. Do you mean to the administrative border of Donetsk region?
— I don't think that if we let him reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, he will stop. But for him, this would be an excuse, to tell the Russian people: "We have achieved the goal we set. Now, we continue to kill Ukrainians, because they are our enemies." But if Putin reaches these administrative borders, the pressure may decrease. Then, it will be possible to move reserves from this direction to the Kursk direction.
— So, Putin has some wishes, plans, crazy dreams, but there is also an objective reality. Do you think that sooner or later the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have the opportunity to stop the enemy's offensive in the east of our country?
— I believe that this can and should be done. The question of resources it more difficult. Everything depends on the rate of building up these resources. How much time do we need to, first of all, recruit people, train people, coordinate them not only at the level of small units, that is, platoons, companies, but at the level of brigades? In fact, it is necessary to simultaneously do this and to replenish brigades that sustain losses.
Whoever does it faster will have an advantage. But it should also be taken into account that so far Russia is ahead of us in this respect, because the price of human life in Russia is zero. They can throw unprepared men into battle, immediately send conscripts en masse to the front, to death, to the meat grinder.
This cannot be called our weakness. But this reality must be taken into account.
