The ongoing war in Ukraine and russia’s hybrid aggression in Europe have brought the issue of EU enlargement to the forefront. The European discourse actively focuses on the specifics, pace and means of promoting democracy in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.[1] In today’s reality, the EU prioritises the enlargement and sees it as a way to counter internal and external threats. Despite the Hungarian factor, Kyiv expects EU accession negotiations to begin in early 2025, in particular, in the key democratic cluster — the fundamentals of the EU accession process”.

Meanwhile, it is also clear that democracy promotion of democracy is neither linear nor one-size-fits-all process, and each case has its unique aspects. In this context, it is necessary to carefully consider some of the following aspects.

“EU enlargement hotspot”: protecting and preserving democracies

Security is the dominant component of EU enlargement. It is driven by the increasing threat from the aggressive russian empire, including the expansion of information operations, massive cyberattacks, increased espionage and sabotage activity, forceful border “testing”, instigation of migration crises, bribery of politicians and MPs, and the like.

On the other hand, there is also rapid global polarisation along the “democracy-authoritarianism” line. Today, an alliance of authoritarian states is seeking to expand its influence on the countries of the Global South and form a geopolitical counterbalance to the collective West, in particular, in the BRICS format. This and the uncertainty regarding the US post-election foreign policy pushes the EU to transform its security policy, pursue the idea of strategic autonomy and accelerate the implementation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS). It is no coincidence that current European Commission includes a new post of European Commissioner for Defence.

It is obvious that amidst the escalation of external threats and the expansion of the “russian world”, the main priority is to protect and preserve democracies in the “hottest” areas — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

Ukraine. In the midst of a critical phase in the war, Ukraine’s top priority is to secure foreign military, financial and economic assistance. Challenges include limited and slow supply of arms to the Ukrainian armed forces; prohibition to use Western long-range weapons on the aggressor’s territory; refusal to help destroy russian missiles and drones, at least in western Ukraine; Hungary’s continued blocking of military and financial support to Kyiv; unresolved issue of confiscating russian frozen assets; and indecision on the establishment of an international tribunal to hold russia accountable for its crimes against Ukraine. These challenges can be attributed to various factors, such as remaining illusions about “pacifying” the aggressor, the rise of right-wing forces in the EU, socio-economic difficulties, and fear of getting involved in a conflict with an unpredictable nuclear empire.

One way or another, the “power support” of European integration is now crucial on the Ukrainian direction.

Georgia. Despite criticism and warnings from Brussels and Washington, official Tbilisi is gradually making an “anti-Western U-turn”. The ruling party is adopting the repressive russian model of authoritarianism, with measures such as targeting “foreign agents”, consolidating “traditional gender values” in law, cracking down on the opposition and establishing a pro-russian dictatorship of the “Georgian Dream” party headed by the notorious oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. The upcoming parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 may be falsified, potentially leading to an internal political crisis with unpredictable consequences. In this situation, the key issue is to provide comprehensive support to Georgia’s civil society in protecting democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms.

Moldova. An absolute priority for Brussels is to provide active political, diplomatic, and economic support to the country’s pro-European forces ahead of the presidential election and referendum on EU accession set on 20 October 2024. In the face of russia’s powerful hybrid influence, which tries to disorient society, discredit the authorities, and inspire political instability, chaos, and political “earthquakes” in Transnistria and Gagauzia, the official Chisinau is taking appropriate countermeasures. In early August, the Moldovan Central Election Commission refused to register the Victory bloc, established in russia by the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. But pro-russian revenge is a real and present threat.

The EU enlargement eastwards obviously requires adequate decisions, efforts and measures from Europe. In these settings, the armchair development of an enlargement methodology and criteria for assessing democratic progress is, to put it mildly, a “parallel priority”. Unfortunately, Brussels’ responses, especially on the Georgian and Moldovan tracks, do not look decisive and effective, at least for now.

In other words, the democracies that Brussels plans to improve and develop must first be protected and preserved. Otherwise, the enlargement will be limited to the Western Balkans and the EU’s influence on the continent will shrink like a shagreen skin.

The value and cost of European integration for Ukraine

For Ukraine, European integration is a factor of survival, preservation of national statehood and identity, and the values of European democracy. By and large, it is about the country’s further existence. It is suffering enormous human, financial and economic losses due to russian intervention. Russia continues its policy of genocide against the Ukrainian nation and its physical destruction by launching daily missile attacks and methodically destroying housing, utility and energy infrastructure, health and educational facilities, and historical monuments in Ukraine. Over the past 2,5 years, russia has fired about 10,000 missiles of various types, more than 33,000 guided aerial bombs, and 14,000 attack drones at Ukraine. 11,879 objects were hit, including 6,203 civilian objects.[2] Every day, the aggressor deliberately and ruthlessly kills Ukrainian civilians, referring to them as “collateral damage” using Nazi terminology.

Today, with more than half of its energy system destroyed, Ukraine is forced to spend the lion’s share of its budget on defence.

Therefore, conditions for implementing democratic values are different for the people of the Balkans and Ukrainians, and so is the geopolitical weight and cost of European integration. Ukraine is essentially defending the EU’s eastern flank from aggression of the Kremlin on a 1,000-kilometre-long front. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that not only the future of Ukraine, but also the future of Europe’s political system and security architecture depend on the Ukrainian army. Moreover, European integration serves as a motivation for internal reforms and a powerful moral and psychological stimulus for Ukrainians in their fight for a European future. In addition, the war against the totalitarian empire entrenches and reinforces the commitment to democratic system, the rule of law, and the values of freedom in Ukrainian society.

While there may be growing war fatigue in Europe and a certain addiction to regular tragic news from Ukraine, this situation should not be seen as a “new normal” or a “bad background” or “complication” for Ukraine’s European integration.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen praised Ukraine's progress and commitment during her visit to Kyiv.

On 20 September 2024, while visiting Kyiv, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that she was “impressed by the high quality and speed with which Ukraine is moving forward”.[3]

And this is not a formal courtesy of a high-ranking Brussels guest. Since receiving the candidate status and relevant European Commission recommendations in June 2022, Ukraine turned on the “turbo mode” of its pro-European transformations. Over the past two years, the country has taken a number of important steps towards Europe, such as passing key laws on national minorities, media, and the Constitutional Court, as well as the packages of laws to adapt national legislation in various areas; renewing and rebooting its highest judicial bodies and anti-corruption institutions, including the reconstruction of the Bureau of Economic Security and granting an independent status to the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office; approving the State Anti-Corruption Programme and the Strategy for reforming law enforcement agencies; and conducting a comprehensive self-audit of national legislation for compliance with EU standards. On 21 August 2024. Ukraine has ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Roadmaps for public administration and rule of law reform are currently being drafted.

Is this much or not? In peacetime, this can be considered significant progress, but in times of war, the pace of reforms needs to be accelerated, because Ukraine lives in different time coordinates and cannot afford slow, gradual and unhurried reforms. Kyiv has no right to stop, pause or retreat from the integration process, including because every day means numerous human casualties in the country’s fight for the European future.

The strong factor of public support deserves special attention. During the war, a stable pro-European consensus has developed between the government and society. According to the Razumkov Centre’s research, 84% of Ukrainians support joining the EU. Among international organisations and associations, most respondents express a positive attitude towards the European Union (87%) and NATO (77%).[4] This means that the government has public support and carte blanche in the European direction.

In general, there are no evident anti-European sentiments in the public discourse, but the fierce struggle in the public information space continues. The Kremlin is trying to use civil society to promote its propaganda ideologies and narratives. The SBU reports that since the onset of the full-scale invasion, 19 pro-russian political parties have been banned for subversive activities.[5] On 24 August 2024, a law entered into force prohibiting the Russian Orthodox Church from operating in Ukraine, as it supported and promoted aggression against Ukraine and blessed the crimes of the occupiers. Since February 2022, the SBU opened criminal cases against more than 100 priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate for collaboration, justification of aggression, high treason, assistance to the occupying country, etc.[6]

Overcoming the “curse of consensus”

In a recent interview, Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, noted that “we’ll need to build up our ability not to be disheartened” and that “difficulties will arise... constantly and regularly” in the EU membership talks due to the requirement of unanimous votes at different stages of the negotiations.[7] Despite this being commonplace in the EU negotiations, which is called “family business”, it is also clear that Ukraine has its own specific challenges. First, it must introduce European democratic norms and rules under martial law. Second, Kyiv is facing an openly biased and unfriendly attitude from Budapest, which can hardly be called a democracy role model. So far, the Ukrainian side’s efforts to optimise bilateral relations, including to remove the artificial, speculative “problem” of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, have not been successful.

But the issue of consensus in the EU has broader implications. Such a decision-making mechanism is in fact a chronic problem that slows down European institutions and makes Brussels vulnerable in the face of hybrid aggression and authoritarian regimes. The UN Security Council is currently the most alarming example of how the veto power devalues and paralyses international institutions, but this also applies to the EU and NATO and the OSCE and others.

Different EU leaders have regularly and persistently called for a change in the decision-making model. In particular, President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized this in her annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament on 14 September 2022, stressing the priority of changing the EU voting system and making appropriate adjustments to the EU’s basic documents. This issue was also recalled in her next speech on 13 September 2023.[8]

So, how to tackle the abuse of the veto power with its regular blackmailing of Brussels over the “Ukrainian issue” and deliberate disregard for a common foreign policy?

To address this challenge, there is a proposed need for a comprehensive legal, political, financial and economic instrument to prevent actions by member states that contradict the EU’s common policy and fundamental values. The flexibility of using Article 7 of the EU Treaty, which allows for temporary restriction of rights and deprivation of voting rights, is seen as a relevant consideration in this context.

The European Union’s history has never faced such an array of threats and challenges. And today there are no easy solutions in the EU project case. This applies to both internal transformations and further enlargement of the European Union, which in current realities is gaining crucial security significance and content. It is about comprehensive (including military) protection of democracy on the continent, and there are no other acceptable alternatives for Brussels.

[1] Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Tefta Kelmendi Marlene Marx. The interest of values: The EU’s democracy promotion in the Western Balkans and the eastern neighbourhood. Policy Brief, 31 July 2024 — https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-interest-of-values-the-eus-democracy-promotion-in-the-western-balkans-and-the-eastern-neighbourhood/

[2] Russia has used 10,000 missiles and 33,000 glide bombs gainst Ukraine. Deutsche Welle, 25 August 2024 — https://www.dw.com/uk/rf-zastosuvala-proti-ukraini-10-tisac-raket-ta-33-tisaci-kabiv/a-70042434 (in Ukrainian)

[3] President of the European Commission: I am impressed by the high quality and speed with which Ukraine is moving towards EU membership. Interfax, 20 September 2024 — https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/1015184.html (in Ukrainian)

[4] See the Razumkov Centre’s sociological research — https://razumkov.org.ua/en/research-areas/surveys

[5] SBU data — https://t.me/SBUkr/12204

[6] SBU: Over 100 priests served suspicion notices during full-scale war — Fakty, 12 August 2024 — https://fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/20240812-ponad-100-svyashhennykam-ogolosheno-pro-pidozru-za-chas-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijny-sbu/ (in Ukrainian)

[7] Olha Stefanishyna: “My goal is to erase the perception of Ukraine as a country of inferior, corrupt officials” — European Pravda, 6 September 2024 — https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2024/09/6/7193641/

[8] Five conclusions from Ursula von der Leyen’s grand speech. Radio Svoboda, 13 September 2023. — https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/fon-der-lyayen-promova-ukrayina-rozshyrennya-yees/32590986.html (in Ukrainian)