This was demonstrated by another air strike on December 6, 2025 on generating capacities mainly on the Left Bank and on the Ukrenergo main transmission line system. Such complex strikes are carried out with a regular frequency of 7–10 days, which leads to an increase in the generation deficit and network restrictions in the first days after the attack up to 5000 MW, with subsequent repairs and reduction of restrictions to 2000–3000 MW. After that, a new attack follows.
This means that household consumers in the Eastern and Southern regions (including Kyiv) should expect an average of 2–4 outages this winter, changing according to the specified schedule (sinusoidally). In the Western regions, the situation with emergency and stabilization outage schedules is expected to be noticeably better. The reason lies in the configuration of the energy system, where all 9 NPP units are located on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, and all imports come from the West.
At the same time, Russian terrorists are repeatedly attacking distribution networks in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson and Odessa regions, striking gas production facilities in Poltava and Kharkiv regions.
Actually, this Russian strategy is of a clearly genocidal nature and involves planned destruction of all life-supporting infrastructure in Ukraine, including substations for power transmission from NPPs, which creates high risks of technological accidents of the highest level.
Such an inhuman strategy can be countered by accelerated construction of protective structures over energy facilities, build-up of air defences, and constant retaliatory strikes on Russian refineries and oil export routes from ports such as Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse. In addition, the terrorist country should not be immune to the attacks on high-voltage power line substations.
