The public opinion poll was conducted by Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on September 21–27, 2023 as a part of its project implemented under the USAID/ENGAGE activity, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact. The contents of the Results are the sole responsibility of Pact and it’s implementing partners and do not necessary reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

Face-to-face interviews were taken in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions — only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted using stratified multistage sampling with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2016 respondents over the age of 18 were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

Assessment of the processes taking place in the country

After the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the share of citizens who believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction increased significantly (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September–October 2022, reaching the highest values in February–March 2023 (61%). After that, there is a tendency to a decrease in this indicator (to 49%, according to the latest poll). 30.5% of respondents believe that events are developing in a wrong direction (21% are undecided).

38% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome the existing problems and difficulties within the next few years, 43% believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome problems in a longer term, and 9% do not believe that Ukraine will manage to overcome the existing problems (the rest is undecided). In July 2023, these figures were 43%, 42%, and 6%, respectively, and in December 2021 — 18%, 54%, and 18%.

Assessment of the economic situation

Citizens of Ukraine are quite sceptical about the economic situation in the country: in May 2021, eight months before the start of the full-scale war, 60% of respondents termed it "very bad" or "rather bad" (only 5% — "good" or "very good", and 32% — "neither bad and not good"). In September–October 2022, that is, seven months into the war, the share of citizens who called it as "very bad" or "rather bad" increased (up to 64.5%). However, the poll held in February–March 2023 showed a decrease in negative assessments even compared to the pre-war period: at that time, 55% called the economic situation in the country "very bad" or "rather bad" (4% — "good" or "very good", 37% — "neither bad and not good"). Since then, these assessments have practically not changed: in September, 2023, they made, respectively, 56.5%, 5% and 35%).

The wellbeing of families, as a rule, is assessed by citizens better than the economic situation in the country. In May 2021 only 36% called it "very" or "rather" bad, 48% — "neither bad nor good", 14% — "good" or "very good"). In September–October 2022, the share of citizens who rated it as "very" or "rather" bad" increased slightly (to 39%), the share of those who considered it "good" or "very good" decreased to 10%. According to the poll conducted in February–March 2023 and the assessment of the economic situation in the country, the assessment of the family wellbeing improved slightly and approached the indicators of May 2021: 35% called "very" or "rather" bad, 50% — "neither bad nor good", 12% — "good" or "very good". This may evidence a certain adaptation of citizens to the war situation. Just like assessments of the country's economic standing, assessments of the family wellbeing have not statistically changed since then and in September 2023 equalled 34%, 50% and 14%, respectively").

When assessing the wellbeing of families in terms of purchases that could be made with the family income after the start of the full-scale aggression, compared to June 2021, the share of citizens who said that they barely made ends meet, there is not enough money even for the necessary foodstuffs has increased (from 9% in June 2021 to 14% in February–March 2023). However, in September 2023 their share decreased to 11% and is not statistically different from mid-2021. Similarly, there was no statistical difference in June 2021 and September 2023 between the shares of those who reported that they only had enough money for food and necessary inexpensive items (38% and 37%, respectively), those who said that "in general, you can live with it but acquisition of durables, such as furniture, a refrigerator, a TV set, causes difficulties" (44% and 43%), of those who "do well but cannot afford some purchases yet (to buy an apartment, a car, etc.)" (6% and 7%), and those who "can afford almost everything they want" (0.9% and 0.6%, respectively).

Before the start of the full-scale war, citizens did not believe in rapid changes in the economy: in May, 2021, only 12% believed that in the next 3 months the economic situation of the country would change for the better, 13% hoped that within this timeframe the wellbeing of their family would change for the better. More often, citizens expected the situation to worsen in the months after the poll: 22% answered that the economic situation in the country would change for the worse, 18% — that within this timeframe the wellbeing of their family would change for the worse. But the most widespread opinion was that the situation would not change significantly in 3 months (respectively, 56% and 57% did not expect changes in this respect). In September–October, 2022, the share of those who expected the state of affairs in the economy to deteriorate significantly increased — to 35% (due to a decrease of the share of those who believed that the situation would not change to 37.5%), only 9.5% believed that the situation would change for the better. However, according to the poll conducted in February–March, 2023, the share of those who expected the situation in the economy to deteriorate within 3 months fell to 23%, with an increase in the share of those who expected the situation to improve (up to 13%) and those who believed that it would not change (up to 45%). In September 2023 the share of those who believed that the situation would change for the better has decreased to 10%, of those who believed that it would get worse increased to 28%, and those who believed that it would not change increased to 50%.

Similar trends were observed in the dynamics of expected changes in the short-term prospects of their family wellbeing. According to the latest survey, the share of those who believed that it would improve during this period made 10%, of those who suggested that it would worsen — 22%, that it would not change — 54%.

It should be noted that the expectations of changes in the short run were less pessimistic than in December 2020: then, 41% of respondents expected deterioration of the economic situation in the country within the next 3 months, and 32% expected deterioration of the wellbeing of their family.

After the start of the large-scale war, med-term (2–3 years) economic expectations improved significantly. Namely, the share of those who expected that the country's economy would improve in the next 2–3 years, in September–October 2022, compared to May 2021, increased from 30% to 43%, and in February–March 2023 — to 52%. However, in September 2023 this optimism has decreased: now 38% think so (which is still 8% more than in May 2021). The share of those who expect the situation to worsen is 20% (approximately the same as in May 2021), of those who believe that the situation in this area will not change is 17% (which is 9% less than in May 2021).

The same trend is observed in the expectation of changes in the family wellbeing. The share of those who expected that their family wellbeing would improve in the next 2–3 years, in September–October 2022, compared to May 2021, increased from 29% to 41%, and in February–March 2023 — to 49.5%. According to the latest survey, the share of such people makes 36.5%, of those who believe that the wellbeing of their family will deteriorate during this period — 16.5%, that it will not change — 21%.

Trust in the institutes of society

Among state and public institutions, the most trusted are the Armed Forces of Ukraine (93% of respondents trust them), volunteer units (85%), volunteer organizations (84%), the State Emergency Service (83%), the National Guard of Ukraine (81%) , the State Border Service (76.5%), the President of Ukraine (72%), the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (71%), the Security Service of Ukraine (66%), public organizations (60.5%), the Church (59%), the National Police of Ukraine (57%), the Mayor of the city (town, village) in which the respondent lives (54%).

Trust is also expressed more often than distrust in the council of the city (town, village) in which the respondent lives (49% and 41%, respectively), in the Ukrainian mass media (47% and 43%, respectively), the National Bank of Ukraine (46% and 42%, respectively), and the Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) (44% and 31%, respectively).

The majority of respondents expressed distrust in political parties (74% do not trust them), the state machinery (officials) (72%), courts (the judicial system as a whole) (70%), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (64%), the Prosecutor's Office (61%), the Government of Ukraine (60%), commercial banks (59%), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (53%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (52%), the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (52%). Distrust in trade unions is also expressed more often than trust (46% do not trust, and 25% trust them).

Despite the fact that political parties are trusted by only 14% of respondents, answering the question whether they see among the existing political forces those who could be entrusted with power after the war, a slight majority of respondents gave an affirmative answer (27%). However, it is noticeably less than in July 2023 (38.5%). The negative answer was given by 49% and 41%, respectively.

According to citizens, the political force that can be entrusted with power in the post-war period may most likely come from among the military (52% of respondents think so). 30% of respondents are of the opinion that it may come from the volunteer community (5% more than in July 2023), 25% — from among the humanitarian or technical intellectuals (7% more than in July 2023), 23% — from the existing political parties (3% less than in July), 19% — from civil society organizations, 8% — from the business community.

Among those who see among the existing political forces those who can be entrusted with power after the war, 62% answered that such a political force could emerge from the already existing political parties, although 50% of them also believe that such a political force can emerge from the military. The emergence of such a political force from among the military is expected by 53% of residents in the Western, 57.5% in the Central, 61% in the Southern and 31% in the Eastern regions.

Trust in politicians, officials and public figures

Among the politicians, officials, public figures and journalists whose popularity was assessed during the poll, respondents the most often reported trust in V. Zelenskyy (75%), V. Kim (64%) and S. Prytula (51%).

Trust was expressed more often than mistrust in M. Podoliak (45% and 30%, respectively), V. Klitschko (44% and 39.5%), O. Danylov (42% and 35.5%), V. Maliuk (34% and 21%), Yu. Butusov (31% and 25%), S. Sternenko (28.5% and 26%), I. Klymenko (26% and 22%), R. Umerov (25% and 21%). The majority of respondents does not trust Y. Boiko (82%), Y. Tymoshenko (82%), P. Poroshenko (73%), O. Arestovych (71%), D. Gordon (58%), D. Arakhamia (54%), A. Yermak (53%).

Distrust was expressed more often than trust in R. Stefanchuk (46% do not trust, and 25% trust him), D. Shmygal (44% and 36%, respectively), D. Hetmantsev (29% and 18%).

Attitude to the national elections in Ukraine to be held before the end of the war

Only 15% of respondents welcomed the idea of holding national elections in Ukraine before the end of the war, almost two-thirds (64%) rejected this idea (21% were undecided).

Support for the idea of holding elections during the war is reasoned by the respondents saying that it is necessary to support democracy in the country (6% of all respondents think so), that it is necessary to demonstrate to the world that Ukraine is a democratic state (5%), the need to change the government (5%) or, at least, renew it (even if the same political forces stay in power) (5%), because elections will contribute to the discussion in society about the existing problems in the country and the ways to solve them (5%).

The negative attitude towards elections during the war is most often justified by the fact that there is no money for elections in the country (36% of all respondents think so), that the Ukrainian legislation does not allow elections during martial law (32%), it will be problematic to ensure security for voters (31%), during martial law it is impossible to observe democratic standards of elections due to the temporary restriction of political rights and freedoms of citizens (29%), it is impossible to organize voting in temporarily occupied territories (26%), there will be problems with the voting by temporarily displaced persons, Ukrainian refugees abroad (24%), it is impossible to organize the voting of military personnel in the area of hostilities (22.5%). Also, 14% cited as a motive for a negative attitude the fact that if online voting is allowed, Russian special services will be able to interfere in the voting, 13% — that there is a danger of intensifying internal political conflict and adoption of populist decisions in wartime, 11% — that a temporary lifting of martial law in wartime to hold elections will have a negative impact on the security and defence capabilities of the country, 9% — that members of election commissions, observers and candidates may be mobilized.

If the elections do take place, 15% reported that they would vote for the existing political parties, 24% — for newly created political forces (if any), but a relative majority (31%) answered that it does not matter if it is a newly created or an existing party.

SURVEY RESULTS IN TABLES

(data in the tables are given as percentages, unless indicated otherwise)

Generally speaking, do you think that things in Ukraine are moving in the right or wrong direction?

Do you believe that Ukraine can overcome the existing problems and difficulties?

How would you assess the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors? Put a mark on a 5-point scale, where "1" means that the situation is very bad, "5" — that the situation is very good.

How would you describe the wellbeing of your family?

How do you think the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors will change in the next three months?

How do you think the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors will change in the next 2–3 years?

To what extent do you trust the following institutes of society?

* Difference between trust and distrust

Do you see among the existing political forces those who could be entrusted with power after the war?

From where do you think a political force may emerge, to which you would entrust power after the war? Give all answers that suit you

To what extent do you trust the following politicians, officials and public figures?

* Difference between trust and distrust

In the recent months, there has been much talk about the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine even before the end of the war. What is your attitude to the idea of holding national elections (presidential or parliamentary) in 2024?

If you are POSITIVE about holding national elections in 2024, why? Respondents might choose several answers, % of all those polled

If you OPPOSE holding national elections in 2024, why? Respondents might choose several answers, % of all those polled

If the elections do take place, will you vote for the existing political parties, or choose among the newly created political forces (if any)?

CHANGES COMPARED TO PREVIOUS POLLS

Generally speaking, do you think that things in Ukraine are moving in the right or wrong direction?

Do you believe that Ukraine can overcome the existing problems and difficulties?

How would you assess the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors? Put a mark on a 5-point scale, where "1" means that the situation is very bad, "5" — that the situation is very good

How would you describe the wellbeing of your family?

How do you think the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors will change in the next three months?

How do you think the situation in Ukraine in the following sectors will change in the next 2–3 years?

Trust in social institutes

* sum total of answers "totally distrust" and "rather, distrust"

** sum total of answers "fully trust" and "rather, trust"

*** difference between trust and distrust

Do you see among the existing political forces those who could be entrusted with power after the war?

From where do you think a political force may emerge, to which you would entrust power after the war? Give all answers that suit you

To what extent do you trust the following politicians, officials and public figures?

* sum total of answers "totally distrust" and "rather, distrust"

** sum total of answers "fully trust" and "rather, trust"

*** difference between trust and distrust