Offensive in Kharkiv region: can the entire border with the Russian Federation turn a hot front line? Interview with military expert Melnyk

The advance of the Russians in Kharkiv region was not an operational-scale offensive, so there is no talk of a catastrophe. Indeed, the enemy has accomplished some of its tasks, but the situation remains largely under control, at least for the time being. It is also important to understand that we are talking about an enemy offensive on a small section of the front — in the villages right near the border with the Russian Federation.

Will the enemy manage to expand this area and turn the entire border, including in Chernihiv and Sumy regions, into a front line? Despite the huge resources of the aggressor country, such prospects are unlikely, says the co-director of foreign policy programmes, coordinator of international projects of Razumkov Centre, military expert Oleksiy Melnyk in an exclusive interview with OBOZ.UA.


— The head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Department Kyrylo Budanov said that the situation in Kharkiv region was "on the brink" and "getting closer to critical every hour." He also noted that there is a threat of the invaders’ offensive in Sumy region. At the same time, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says that "enemy activity" was observed near Sumy and Chernihiv regions. How do you assess the current situation in those regions?

— First of all, statements in the headlines are a traditional problem of our mass media. They do not quite correspond to the essence of what Budanov was talking about. If you read the headline, you might think that everything is lost, there is panic. But later in his interview, he says that despite the critical situation, Russian forces are not enough to develop this offensive at the operational level, at least for the time being.

Of course, this is not a reason for complacency, because the enemy is partially achieving its goals — creating tension points along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, stretching the front line, diverting Ukrainian reserves — human, material, intellectual, attention of the military and political leadership of our country.

But if we look at those few villages in Kharkiv region, these are villages in the immediate vicinity of the border, where physically, for objective reasons, it was impossible to build, figuratively speaking, a defensive wall or engineering fortifications to stop the enemy right there, on that border.

So, the situation remains uncertain, but active defence, that is, manoeuvres, is possible. If it is impossible to stop the enemy without excessive losses, the command makes a decision to retreat and stop where it is advantageous for us, although there were reports that, to put it mildly, not everything went according to the plan. This, in particular, can be evidenced by the urgent change of command in this direction.

But despite the dramatic moments, we hope that the situation mostly remains under control.

— Of course, the aggressor country has an enormous potential, especially human. But don't you think that in order to open a new front in the north of our country, the enemy had to redeloy part of its forces, for example, from the east? Do you see such signs?

— I do not have enough information to assess if the reserves were moved only from other directions, or if there were additional reserves. Most likely, both. There were reports of redeployment of the most combat-ready airborne units, considered the elite. At the same time, according to estimates, Russia can mobilize 30,000 people every month. So, apparently, this is a mix of more experienced fighters and new recruits.

It is also important to keep in mind that this concentration of Russian troops took place on the territory of Russia — precisely where Ukraine has restrictions on the use of Western weapons, even if Ukrainian intelligence sees concentration of manpower and equipment.

— Returning to border protection. Indeed, there is a problem with the construction of fortifications here, because everything is under fire. Are there any available, albeit less effective, options for building physical border defences?

— Yes, despite the objective impossibility of creating engineering and fortification structures there, for some reason these territories in threatening directions were not sufficiently mined. Our military analysts, journalists and bloggers noted this. Perhaps this is the answer to your question.

Mines and other obstacles can be installed with minimal risk and would make it significantly more difficult for the Russians to complete their task.

The Russians entered a relatively small area in Kharkiv region. Will they be able to do this along the entire border? This requires completely different forces. Considering that they have reserves, but those are not unlimited, I do not think that there is a realistic prospect of the entire border turning into a hot front line.

— Good news about F-16 fighters from Denmark. Its Prime Minister announced that they "will be in the air over Ukraine in a month." Do you think a few F-16s will improve the situation, particularly in the north? What is your estimate?

— We know that the number of these aircraft will be quite limited. So, unfortunately, this will not change the situation. This will increase our capabilities to solve urgent problems that arise today. In my opinion, their priority mission will be to shot down Russian Su-34 bombers that drop guided aerial bombs, to destroy the enemy's air defence systems with organic weapons, anti-radar missiles.

But if we talk about the scale of their possible effect, there is a number of nuances. I am talking not about the training of individual pilots but about the tactical integration of these aircraft in general. It all takes time. So, it is definitely not worth counting on an immediate large-scale effect from the arrival of F-16s.


Source:

https://razumkov.org.ua/statti/nastup-na-kharkivshchyni-chy-mozhe-ves-kordon-z-rf-peretvorytysia-na-gariachu-liniiu-frontu-interviu-z-viiskovym-ekspertom-melnykom

Oleksiy Melnyk

Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Coordinator of International Projects


Born in 1962 in Khmelnytsty Rgn

Education:

Royal College of Defence Studies, London, UK (2007)

Air Field Operations Officer School, Biloxy, MS, US (2001)

Squadron Officer School, Montgomery, AL, US (1994)

Defence Language Institute, San Antonio, TX, US (1994)

Chernihiv Higher Military Air Force Academy, Ukraine (1984)

Employment:

1980 – 2001 — Air Force Active Service (Cadet, Instructor Pilot, Flight Commander, Squadron Commander, Deputy Air Force Base Commander, Participant of two UN peacekeeping operations, Lt.Colonel (Ret)

2001 – 2004 — Razumkov Centre

2004 – 2005 — State Company Ukroboronservice

2005 – 2008 — Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Head Organisational and Analytical Division — First Assistant to Minister of Defence

(044) 201-11-95

melnyk@razumkov.org.ua

oleksiy.melnyk