NATO countries have realized that the aggressor – Russia – poses a real threat to them and that the Alliance is not ready for a direct military clash with the Russian army now. At the same time, NATO experts are convinced that as long as Russia is fighting in Ukraine, it will not be able to open a new front. However, this is not the case. Precisely because the Russian Federation does not have convincing success in Ukraine it may attack one of the Allies in order to divert attention and significantly weaken Western military assistance to our country.
Russia almost daily arranges dangerous incidents in NATO countries, the danger that such an incident will cause great human casualties and force Western governments to respond militarily is growing every minute. The West fears the Russian Oreshnik missile, because it is designed to carry a nuclear charge. However, they forget that other Russian missiles used by the enemy to attack Ukraine also have a dual purpose, says the co-director of foreign policy programmes, coordinator of international projects at Razumkov Centre, military expert Oleksiy Melnyk in an exclusive interview for OBOZ.UA.
— Commander of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Mike Elviss made a strong statement regarding the Russian danger to the Alliance. According to him, the Russian Federation has become much more dangerous, in particular, because its soldiers have combat experience. Do you suppose that under the current circumstances, including the economic situation in Russia, in a situation where Russia has not reached its "SMO goals", the Kremlin may launch a limited military ground operation against a NATO country?
— To start with: in the last two weeks I have had an opportunity to participate in major international events. Today I am in Odessa, where a security forum is taking place (the Black Sea Security Forum, dedicated to the response to the most pressing security challenges in the Black Sea region, began in Odessa on May 29, — Ed.), last week in Prague, with high-ranking NATO military officials present at the GLOBSEC Forum, and noticed a rather serious change in the rhetoric and in their assessments of the threat coming from Russia.
This is good, because they recognize that this threat is real, and that NATO is not ready for a large-scale war, a direct military clash with Russia now. If there is such recognition, then there is hope that certain measures, both political and military, will be taken to correct this weakness that NATO is currently experiencing.
Another extremely useful experience for them was participation of Ukrainian units playing for the enemy in internal NATO exercises. Such exercises took place in Estonia last year, a naval exercise in Portugal, and in Sweden.
In these three known cases, Ukrainian units playing for the potential enemy defeated and destroyed their hypothetical adversary within minutes or hours. For NATO members, this was kind of a cold shower that prompted them to make such statements, and in the future – to take the right steps. So, this is the first positive thing that should be noted.
As for certain reservations, in my opinion, they still do not fully understand how Russia will act. They continue to think in terms of traditional risk assessment and defence planning procedures, to which they got accustomed during the Cold War and the three decades after it. They are not yet mature enough to seriously begin preparing to repel the Russian threat.
— How do you assess the Kremlin's possible plans? Do you think that precisely in a situation where it cannot achieve any significant successes on the battlefield, it may resort to another adventure, this time against a NATO country, just to divert it and the world community from their failures on the Ukrainian front?
— This is a very good question, because for some reason the NATO guys do not want to consider this scenario. Perhaps this is due to psychological factors, or maybe they have more information than you and I do. Currently, they are tend to assume that at the moment Russia is locked in the war with Ukraine and does not have sufficient resources to open a second front.
But, as you correctly formulated in your question, and what we, Ukrainian experts, are trying to convey to them — they need to seriously consider another scenario as well. Precisely because Russia cannot currently demonstrate any significant progress on the Ukrainian front, it may choose this option of opening a conditional second front. At the same time, this should not be perceived literally as a large-scale front, just a strike on one of the Baltic States or even Poland – precisely to distract Europe from supporting Ukraine.
Their calculations, as we imagine, may be approximately as follows: at a certain point, after a strong provocation, voices will be heard in the West that Ukraine is very important, but now we need to focus on internal defence, our own territory and citizens, that is, to leave some part of anti-aircraft weapons, air defence, finances, etc. for ourselves.
In my opinion, this may be Russia's goal, so we should not hope that Russia will not do anything serious while it is fighting in Ukraine.
— Recently, two incidents have occurred, which are also related to Russia's actions towards NATO members. A Russian drone crashed into an apartment building in Romania, and a Turkish ship was attacked. Is this a coincidence, or a certain strategy that the Kremlin is already trying to implement now?
— I do not have a clear answer to this question, because there should be an investigation, but I would not rule out that this could be a planned provocation, given the crazy Russian logic.
If we talk about the targets chosen, Turkey can hardly be seen by Russia as a target at the moment. Turkey is definitely not the state with which Russia would like to spoil relations. Despite Turkey is a NATO member, despite it supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence, in any case, in this balance of pros and cons, Russia would most likely not resort to a planned provocation against it. This would probably be a mistake.
As for the Russian drones and the latest incident in Romania, this was most likely not a targeted attack either.
What are the huge risks of today's situation? That these incidents will repeat. For now, the countries that are suffering from these incidents are still trying to follow the path of de-escalation, that is, not to escalate with Russia. But at some point, especially if an incident results in big casualties, democratic governments will have no choice but to respond to these incidents in some way, so as not to be accused at home of neglecting the safety of their citizens.
Again, we have only mentioned two incidents, but this happens almost every day, for example, dangerous manoeuvres of Russian aircraft on the verge of disaster. But the likelihood of an unplanned incident with human casualties that would force Western governments to respond increases with every day and with every such incident.
— The last question is about the Russian Oreshnik. The enemy used this missile during a massive attack on Ukraine on the night of May 24 — it damaged garages in Bila Tserkva. How does NATO see such Russian weapon? Is the West afraid of Oreshnik?
— The first thing I noticed when talking to foreign journalists and colleagues is that they do not understand why Russia has made an official warning about the attack this time. But there are technical nuances — this is how the agreements between Russia and the United States work on the obligation to notify the parties when it comes to the launch of strategic ballistic missiles. It is in the interests of both states that the early warning systems for the launch of ballistic missiles do not perceive this as an attack.
When Russia warns the US, it is not so much concerned about American diplomats in Kyiv as about the US not retaliating, perceiving its launch as an attack on the US.
People who are not deeply familiar with the agreements between the US and Russia are starting to fall for Russian propaganda that Russia wants to avoid excessive human casualties, destruction, etc. They do not care about humanitarian considerations. These are purely security agreements that are still in effect between the two largest nuclear powers.
As for the Oreshnik, yes, they are concerned. What worries them most of all is that the Oreshnik is designed to carry a nuclear warhead. But they forget that Iskanders or Kinzhals that fly over Ukraine almost every day are also dual-purpose. The only thing that distinguishes them from the Oreshnik is the range. But for any missile flying towards Ukraine, until it hits the ground, we don't know if it's just TNT or a nuclear charge. They're scared of Oreshnik, but this is a reaction to one episode, not to the nature of the threat that comes from Russia.
