The results of a sociological survey conducted from September 20th to 26th, 2024 by Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service as part of its project implemented under the USAID/ENGAGE activity, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact. The contents of this survey are the sole responsibility of Pact and its implementing partners and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.
The face-to-face survey was conducted in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts, and in the city of Kyiv. In the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts, it was conducted only in the territories under the control of Ukrainian military forces, where no active armed conflict is taking place.
The survey was conducted using stratified multistage sampling with random selection at the first sampling stages and using a quota method of respondent selection at the final stage (when respondents were selected according to gender and age quotas). The sample structure represents the demographic pattern of the adult population in the areas where the survey was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of urban/rural classification).
2,016 respondents over the age of 18 were surveyed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sample deviations may be caused by the consequences of the Russian military's destruction, most notably the forced displacement of millions of citizens.
Assessing the situation in the country
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion against Ukraine in 2022, the share of citizens considering that events in Ukraine were developing in the right direction increased significantly (from 20% in December 2021 to 51% in September–October 2022, with the highest indicators in February–March 2023 (61%). Later, a decreasing trend for this indicator decrease was observed. Thus, according to a sociological survey conducted in June 2024, the share of those who believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the right direction has decreased in comparison to those who believe that they are developing in the wrong direction (33% and 47%, respectively). That said, according to the survey conducted in the first half of August 2024, the share of those who believed that events were developing in the right direction increased to 40% (this survey was held while the Armed Forces of Ukraine was launching its offensive into Kursk Oblast), while by the end of September these indicators had subsided (33% and 48%, respectively) back to the level of June 2024. However, this ratio is better than the same observed before the 2022 full-scale invasion (in December 2021, 20% and 65.5%, respectively).
30% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is capable of overcoming current problems and difficulties within the next few years, 46% believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome problems in the more distant future, and 11% believe that Ukraine is not capable of overcoming current problems (the rest are undecided). Ukrainians were most optimistic about the problems and difficulties being possibly overcome at the end of 2022 and at the beginning of 2023 (for example, in February – March 2023: 49%, 36%, and 3%, respectively). In comparison, estimates prior to the 2022 invasion (in December 2021: 18%, 54%, and 18%, respectively) were much more pessimistic.
Assessing authorities: how well have they been performing their functions during the war
|
According to the citizens, the authorities are dealing with issues in the following areas best: energy supply (55% of respondents answered that the authorities have been coping “very well” or “rather well,” 39.5% – “very poorly” or “rather poorly”); education (50% and 38%, respectively); and foreign policy (50% and 38%, respectively). In these three areas, positive attitudes outweigh negative ones. Positive and negative attitudes are mostly equal in two areas: national defense (47% and 47%, respectively) and health care (47% and 47.5%, respectively). The authorities' performance is more often negatively evaluated in the following areas: anti-corruption (82% of respondents answered that the government is performing “very poorly” or “rather poorly,” and only 12% – “very well” or “rather well”); the economy (69% and 24%, respectively); justice (69% and 16%, respectively); crime prevention (66% and 23%, respectively); recovery of the country (56% and 27%, respectively); and social protection and pension benefits (54% and 38%, respectively).
|
Trust in social institutions
Among the government and civil society institutions, the most trusted are the Armed Forces of Ukraine (91.5% of respondents trust the military), the State Emergency Service (83%), volunteer organizations (80%), volunteer units (79.5%), the National Guard of Ukraine (74%), the State Border Guard Service (70%), the Security Service of Ukraine (64%), the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (63%), the Clergy (62.5%), and civil society organizations (59%).
Trust prevails over distrust for the National Bank of Ukraine (50% and 39%, respectively), the National Police of Ukraine (50% and 41%, respectively), the President of Ukraine (48.5% and 44.5%, respectively), and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada (Ombudsman) (42% and 34%, respectively).
The heads of the city (or town, village) (47% and 45%, respectively) and the council of the city (town, village) where the respondent resides (45% and 46%, respectively) are trusted and distrusted equally.
Most respondents distrust the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (78.5% do not trust), the state apparatus (public officials) (77%), political parties (73.5%), the Government of Ukraine (72.5%), courts (the judicial system in general) (70%), the Prosecutor's Office (63%), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (58%), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (58%), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (57%), commercial banks (55%), the State Bureau of Investigation (53%), and the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (51%).
Distrust also prevails over trust in relation to the mass media of Ukraine (48% do not trust, 45% trust) and trade unions (46% and 26%, respectively).
Even though political parties are trusted by only 15% of respondents when answering the question of whether they believe that any of the current political forces can be entrusted with power in the post-war period, more respondents answered affirmatively (27%). However, this is significantly less than in July 2023 (38.5%). 54% and 41%, respectively, answered negatively.
Most citizens believe that a political force that can be entrusted with power in the post-war period can emerge from among the military (47% of respondents believe so). 24% of respondents consider that it can emerge from the volunteer environment, 20% – from the humanitarian or technical professionals, 19% – from civil society organizations, 17% – from already existing political parties, and 9% – from the business environment.
52% of residents of the Western and Central regions, 36% of Southern, and 35% of Eastern regions believe that such a political force may emerge from among the military.
Trust in politicians, public officials, and society figures
Of the politicians, officials, and public figures whose level of trust was assessed during this study, respondents most often trusted V. Zelenskyy (51%).
Trust prevails over distrust to V. Kim (46% and 34, respectively), V. Maliuk (36% and 27%, respectively), M. Fedorov (31% and 24.5%, respectively).
Most respondents do not trust Y. Boyko (79%), Y. Tymoshenko (79%), P. Poroshenko (68%), M. Bezugla (64%), A. Yermak (62%), D. Arakhamia (60%), R. Stefanchuk (53%), I. Vereshchuk (52%), D. Shmygal (52%).
Distrust prevailed over trust for V. Klitschko (47% do not trust, 39% trust), S. Prytula (46% and 42%, respectively), R. Umerov (41% and 29%, respectively), M. Podoliak (40% and 35%, respectively), D. Hetmantsev (39% and 16%, respectively), I. Klymenko (34% and 20.5%, respectively), H. Halushchenko (32% and 11%, respectively), O. Stefanishyna (31% and 16%, respectively), O. Kuleba (30% and 16%, respectively), O. Lisovyi (26% and 14%, respectively), Y. Svyrydenko (23% and 10%, respectively), and A. Sybiha (22% and 9%, respectively).
Attitudes on holding national elections in Ukraine before the end of war
Only 28% of respondents positively regard the idea of holding national elections in Ukraine (presidential or parliamentary) before the end of the war, with most respondents (56%) expressing a negative attitude to the issue.
Support for the idea of holding elections before the end of the war depends on the level of trust in the current government, namely in the President of Ukraine. Thus, among those who trust the President of Ukraine, only 17% would support elections (69% – not), while among those who do not trust him – 41% and 42%, respectively.
The idea of holding presidential and parliamentary elections before the end of the war is less dependent on the level of trust in the Verkhovna Rada: among those who trust it, 23% would support elections (63.5% – not), and among those who do not trust – 30% and 54%, respectively.
Belief in victory and vision of victory
83% of respondents believe in the victory of Ukraine in the war (72% of residents of the Southern region, 75% of the Eastern , 87% of the Western, and 88% of residents of the Central regions). Those who do not believe – 11% (ranging from 7% in the Central region to 21% in the Southern).
As to the terms of victory, among the respondents who believe in it, 39% claim that it will be in 1-2 years, 19.5% – by the end of this year, 15% – that it will take 3 to 5 years, 5% – more than 5 years, 2% – that they “won't live to see victory.”
The most optimistic expectations of victory were in February-March 2023, when 50% believed that victory would be before the end of the same year.
On the issue of the conditions of victory itself, the relative majority (38%) of those who believe in victory answer that driving Russian troops from all of Ukraine and re-establishing borders as of January 2014 can be deemed a victory. Another 17.5% deem the elimination of the Russian army and the promotion of revolutions/separatist movements within Russia a victory. 17% see the restoration of the status quo as of February 23, 2022, as a victory, 7.5% – driving Russian troops from all of Ukraine except for Crimea, and 8% – the war's termination, even if the Russian army remains on the territories it has captured since the full-scale invasion (after February 24, 2022).
A relative majority (47%) of Ukrainians believe that permission from the Western countries to use their weapons without restrictions to destroy targets within Russia is more likely to result in peace in Ukraine than negotiations between Ukraine and Russia (only 29% of respondents believe that such negotiations are a more effective way to establish peace).
Respondents who believe in Ukraine's victory usually claim that permission from Western countries to use their weapons without restrictions to destroy targets within Russia is more likely to result in peace in Ukraine (52%, while 25% of them prefer negotiations). Those who do not believe in victory see negotiations as a more effective way to establish peace (18% and 56%, respectively). The same opinion is common among those who consider the victory as the war's termination even if the Russian army remains on territories occupied in 2022 or later (15% and 67%, respectively).
In August 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched an offensive into Kursk Oblast in Russia. Respondents were asked about their attitude to the fact that Ukrainian troops are conducting combat operations not only in Ukraine but also within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation. 58% were positive about it, only 20% were negative, and 7% were neutral (16% – undecided).
Most (65%) respondents who believe in the victory of Ukraine expressed a positive attitude (negative – only 15%), while those who do not believe in victory had a more negative attitude (22% and 50%, respectively). Those who consider victory as the war's termination even if the Russian army remains on the territories occupied in 2022 or later are more likely to express a negative attitude (29% and 47%, respectively).
SURVEY RESULTS IN TABLES
The data in the tables are given in percentages, unless otherwise specified
Generally speaking, in your opinion, are events in Ukraine developing in the right or wrong direction?
|
In the right direction |
33.4 |
|
In the wrong direction |
48.0 |
|
Not sure |
18.6 |
In your opinion, is Ukraine capable of overcoming the current problems and difficulties?
|
Capable of overcoming within the next few years |
30.3 |
|
Capable of overcoming in the more distant future |
46.3 |
|
Not capable |
10.9 |
|
Not sure |
12.5 |
In your opinion, how well has the government coped with solving problematic issues in the listed sectors since February 24, 2022?
|
|
Very well |
Rather well |
Rather poorly |
Very poorly |
Not sure |
|
Economy |
2.4 |
21.3 |
44.9 |
24.3 |
7.1 |
|
Country's defense |
8.1 |
39.2 |
31.9 |
15.1 |
5.8 |
|
Anti-corruption strategies |
1.6 |
10.5 |
34.9 |
47.2 |
5.8 |
|
Crime prevention |
2.2 |
20.5 |
38.0 |
27.9 |
11.4 |
|
Social protection and pension benefits |
5.5 |
32.8 |
32.9 |
21.0 |
7.8 |
|
Healthcare |
3.7 |
43.5 |
30.9 |
16.6 |
5.2 |
|
Education |
5.3 |
45.1 |
24.9 |
13.4 |
11.3 |
|
Energy supply |
9.4 |
45.8 |
25.1 |
14.4 |
5.2 |
|
Foreign policy |
11.2 |
39.0 |
23.6 |
14.8 |
11.4 |
|
Justice |
2.9 |
13.3 |
37.4 |
31.5 |
14.9 |
|
Country's recovery |
2.8 |
23.8 |
32.1 |
23.6 |
17.6 |
What is the level of your trust in these social institutions?
|
|
Do not trust at all |
Somewhat distrust |
Somewhat trust |
Fully trust |
Not sure |
Trust-distrust balance* |
|
President of Ukraine |
17.4 |
27.1 |
35.4 |
13.1 |
7.1 |
4.0 |
|
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine |
41.3 |
37.2 |
13.7 |
2.3 |
5.6 |
-62.5 |
|
Government of Ukraine |
36.0 |
36.5 |
18.3 |
2.2 |
7.1 |
-52.0 |
|
State apparatus (public officials) |
39.0 |
38.4 |
12.5 |
1.7 |
8.3 |
-63.2 |
|
Head of your city / town / village |
18.5 |
26.2 |
40.3 |
7.1 |
7.9 |
2.7 |
|
Local council of your city / town / village |
18.5 |
27.4 |
37.1 |
7.5 |
9.4 |
-1.3 |
|
Armed Forces of Ukraine |
2.2 |
3.7 |
24.9 |
66.6 |
2.6 |
85.6 |
|
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine |
9.5 |
19.6 |
39.8 |
23.0 |
8.1 |
33.7 |
|
State Border Guard Service |
7.9 |
15.5 |
42.0 |
27.8 |
6.9 |
46.4 |
|
National Guard of Ukraine |
7.4 |
11.1 |
40.6 |
33.8 |
7.1 |
55.9 |
|
National Police |
13.7 |
27.7 |
35.4 |
14.4 |
8.8 |
8.4 |
|
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) |
9.0 |
17.1 |
40.1 |
23.5 |
10.3 |
37.5 |
|
State Emergency Service |
4.9 |
7.5 |
33.5 |
49.6 |
4.4 |
70.7 |
|
Prosecutor's Office |
28.1 |
34.5 |
18.4 |
4.8 |
14.1 |
-39.4 |
|
Courts (judicial system in general) |
32.3 |
37.9 |
12.2 |
4.2 |
13.5 |
-53.8 |
|
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) |
22.5 |
35.5 |
18.3 |
3.8 |
19.9 |
-35.9 |
|
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) |
24.4 |
33.6 |
15.6 |
3.8 |
22.7 |
-38.6 |
|
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) |
23.7 |
33.7 |
15.8 |
3.4 |
23.4 |
-38.2 |
|
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) |
20.3 |
32.8 |
18.8 |
4.8 |
23.4 |
-29.5 |
|
Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESB) |
20.6 |
30.4 |
17.8 |
4.1 |
27.1 |
-29.1 |
|
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) |
14.1 |
20.3 |
34.7 |
7.7 |
23.2 |
8.0 |
|
Ukrainian social media |
16.0 |
32.1 |
37.0 |
7.6 |
7.3 |
-3.5 |
|
National Bank of Ukraine |
13.3 |
26.1 |
42.1 |
8.1 |
10.4 |
10.8 |
|
Commercial banks |
21.2 |
33.7 |
24.5 |
4.8 |
15.8 |
-25.6 |
|
Trade unions |
20.0 |
26.1 |
21.9 |
4.0 |
28.0 |
-20.2 |
|
Political parties |
34.2 |
39.3 |
11.8 |
2.9 |
11.9 |
-58.8 |
|
Civil society organizations |
8.9 |
20.4 |
48.8 |
10.0 |
11.8 |
29.5 |
|
Clergy |
13.5 |
13.3 |
39.4 |
23.1 |
10.6 |
35.7 |
|
Volunteer units |
5.0 |
7.3 |
41.7 |
37.8 |
8.2 |
67.2 |
|
Volunteer organizations |
4.4 |
9.3 |
47.7 |
32.6 |
5.9 |
66.6 |
* The difference between the share of those who trust, and those who do not trust
Do you believe that any of the current political forces can be entrusted with power in the post-war period?
|
Yes |
26.9 |
|
No |
53.7 |
|
Not sure |
19.4 |
In your opinion, which population group should the political force represent for you to entrust it with power in the post-war period? Please, choose all the options that apply
|
from the already existing political parties |
17.0 |
|
from business environment |
8.9 |
|
from civil society organizations |
19.0 |
|
from humanitarian or technical professionals (academics, teachers, etc.) |
21.4 |
|
from military personnel |
46.6 |
|
from volunteer environment |
23.6 |
|
other |
4.5 |
|
not sure |
22.5 |
To what extent do you trust the following politicians, public officials, and society figures?
|
|
Do not trust at all |
Somewhat distrust |
Somewhat trust |
Fully trust |
I've never heard of this person |
Not sure |
Trust-distrust balance* |
|
Davyd Arakhamia |
35.2 |
25.1 |
12.6 |
1.1 |
14.9 |
11.1 |
-46.6 |
|
Maryana Bezugla |
45.8 |
18.6 |
9.2 |
0.7 |
17.6 |
8.2 |
-54.5 |
|
Yuriy Boiko |
65.0 |
14.3 |
3.9 |
0.6 |
9.8 |
6.3 |
-74.8 |
|
Iryna Vereshchuk |
28 |
24.3 |
22.4 |
4.3 |
10.5 |
10.5 |
-25.6 |
|
Herman Halushchenko |
16.5 |
15.3 |
8.9 |
2 |
48 |
9.2 |
-20.9 |
|
Danylo Hetmantsev |
20.4 |
18.4 |
14.1 |
2.0 |
34.1 |
11.0 |
-22.7 |
|
Andriy Yermak |
38.2 |
23.7 |
17.9 |
3.4 |
5.2 |
11.6 |
-40.6 |
|
Volodymyr Zelenskyy |
18.6 |
22.9 |
30.7 |
20.5 |
0.0 |
7.3 |
9.7 |
|
Vitalii Kim |
16.6 |
17.8 |
33.2 |
12.6 |
7.0 |
12.8 |
11.4 |
|
Ihor Klymenko |
15.5 |
18.2 |
17 |
3.5 |
33.1 |
12.7 |
-13.2 |
|
Vitaliy Klytschko |
20.9 |
25.9 |
33.8 |
5.3 |
1.8 |
12.2 |
-7.7 |
|
Oleksiy Kuleba |
14.7 |
14.9 |
12.8 |
2.9 |
37.5 |
17.2 |
-13.9 |
|
Oksen Lisovyi |
13.0 |
12.9 |
12.0 |
1.9 |
49.9 |
10.2 |
-12.0 |
|
Vasyl Maliuk |
12.4 |
14.6 |
26.9 |
9.3 |
26.5 |
10.2 |
9.2 |
|
Mykhailo Podoliak |
20.7 |
19.2 |
28.2 |
6.9 |
11.7 |
13.2 |
-4.8 |
|
Petro Poroshenko |
39.9 |
28.4 |
18.2 |
4.6 |
0.6 |
8.3 |
-45.5 |
|
Serhiy Prytula |
23.1 |
23 |
32.9 |
9.3 |
1.9 |
9.7 |
-3.9 |
|
Yulia Svyrydenko |
12.7 |
9.9 |
8.8 |
1.4 |
58.4 |
8.7 |
-12.4 |
|
Andriy Sybiha |
12.2 |
10.0 |
7.5 |
1.7 |
56.9 |
11.6 |
-13.0 |
|
Olha Stefanishyna |
15.5 |
15.5 |
14.0 |
1.9 |
41.1 |
12.0 |
-15.1 |
|
Ruslan Stefanchuk |
27.5 |
25.6 |
16.3 |
1.7 |
17.3 |
11.5 |
-35.1 |
|
Yulia Tymoshenko |
51.0 |
27.6 |
11.8 |
1.7 |
0.6 |
7.3 |
-65.1 |
|
Rustem Umerov |
19.1 |
21.5 |
25.6 |
3.7 |
14.7 |
15.4 |
-11.3 |
|
Mykhailo Fedorov |
13.3 |
11.2 |
23.6 |
7.6 |
32.5 |
11.8 |
6.7 |
|
Denys Shmyhal |
24.4 |
27.2 |
25.0 |
3.9 |
4.9 |
14.6 |
-22.7 |
* The difference between the share of those who trust, and those who do not trust
What is your opinion on holding national (presidential or parliamentary) elections before the end of the war?
|
Positive |
28.2 |
|
Negative |
55.6 |
|
Not sure |
16.3 |
Do you believe in the victory of Ukraine against Russia?
|
Yes |
60.0 |
|
Mostly yes |
23.0 |
|
Mostly no |
6.2 |
|
No |
5.2 |
|
Not sure |
5.6 |
In your opinion, when will victory be? % of respondents who believe in the victory of Ukraine
|
By the end of this year |
19.5 |
|
In 1-2 years |
39.2 |
|
In 3-5 years |
14.8 |
|
No sooner than 5 years |
5.4 |
|
I won't live to see it |
2.0 |
|
Other |
0.5 |
|
Not sure |
18.6 |
What would you personally accept as a victory in this war? % of respondents who believe in the victory of Ukraine
|
The war's termination, even if the Russian army remains on the territories it has captured and held since February 24, 2022 (parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Donbas) |
8.1 |
|
Driving Russian troops back beyond the borders as of February 23, 2022 (certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain occupied, along with Crimea) |
16.6 |
|
Driving Russian troops from the entirety of mainland Ukraine, excluding Crimea |
7.5 |
|
Driving Russian troops from all of Ukraine including Crimea, re-establishing borders as of January 2014 |
37.8 |
|
Annihilating the Russian army and promoting revolutions/separatist movements within Russia itself |
17.5 |
|
Other |
1.5 |
|
Not sure |
11.1 |
In your opinion, which of the following is more likely to result in peace in Ukraine?
|
Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia |
29.1 |
|
Permission from Western countries to use their weapons without restrictions to destroy targets within Russia |
46.9 |
|
None of the above |
14.6 |
|
Not sure |
9.4 |
In August 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched an offensive into the Kursk Oblast in Russia. What is your opinion of the fact that Ukrainian troops are now conducting combat operations not only in Ukraine but also within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation?
|
Positive |
57.6 |
|
Negative |
19.6 |
|
Neutral |
7.0 |
|
Not sure |
15.8 |
DYNAMICS AS COMPARED TO PREVIOUS SURVEYS
Generally speaking, in your opinion, are events in Ukraine developing in the right or wrong direction?
|
|
December 2021 |
September – October 2022 |
February – March 2023 |
July 2023 |
September 2023 |
December 2023 |
January 2024 |
March 2024 |
June 2024 |
August 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
In the right direction |
20.3 |
51.0 |
60.6 |
52.1 |
48.7 |
45.3 |
40.6 |
37.7 |
32.9 |
39.8 |
33.4 |
|
In the wrong direction |
65.5 |
27.8 |
21.0 |
26.8 |
30.5 |
33.2 |
38.0 |
38.7 |
47.4 |
37.1 |
48.0 |
|
Not sure |
14.2 |
21.3 |
18.5 |
21.1 |
20.8 |
21.5 |
21.4 |
23.5 |
19.6 |
23.1 |
18.6 |
In your opinion, is Ukraine capable of overcoming the current problems and difficulties?
|
|
December 2021 |
September – October 2022 |
February – March 2023 |
July 2023 |
September 2023 |
December 2023 |
January 2024 |
March 2024 |
June 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
Capable of overcoming within the next few years |
17.7 |
40.6 |
49.4 |
42.7 |
38.0 |
32.2 |
32.8 |
30.5 |
29.0 |
30.3 |
|
Capable of overcoming in the more distant future |
54.4 |
42.6 |
35.9 |
41.7 |
43.4 |
45.3 |
42.2 |
45.9 |
45.9 |
46.3 |
|
Not capable |
17.6 |
5.2 |
3.4 |
6.4 |
8.6 |
7.2 |
9.0 |
10.5 |
11.3 |
10.9 |
|
Not sure |
10.3 |
11.6 |
11.3 |
9.2 |
10.0 |
15.3 |
16.1 |
13.2 |
13.8 |
12.5 |
In your opinion, how well has the government coped with solving problematic issues in the listed sectors since February 24, 2022?
|
|
Very well |
Rather well |
Rather poorly |
Very poorly |
Not sure |
|
Economy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
6.8 |
37.9 |
40.0 |
5.5 |
9.8 |
|
August 2023 |
4.0 |
28.4 |
44.7 |
14.4 |
8.5 |
|
September 2024 |
2.4 |
21.3 |
44.9 |
24.3 |
7.1 |
|
Country's defense |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
25.4 |
56.4 |
11.0 |
2.2 |
4.9 |
|
August 2023 |
18.1 |
50.5 |
20.7 |
5.0 |
5.7 |
|
September 2024 |
8.1 |
39.2 |
31.9 |
15.1 |
|
|
Anti-corruption strategies |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
4.1 |
19.5 |
44.5 |
21.3 |
10.7 |
|
August 2023 |
2.3 |
11.5 |
39.0 |
40.1 |
7.0 |
|
September 2024 |
1.6 |
10.5 |
34.9 |
47.2 |
5.8 |
|
Crime prevention |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
4.9 |
33.3 |
35.6 |
11.7 |
14.5 |
|
August 2023 |
3.7 |
25.9 |
38.4 |
19.5 |
12.5 |
|
September 2024 |
2.2 |
20.5 |
38.0 |
27.9 |
11.4 |
|
Social protection and pension benefits |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
8.6 |
44.0 |
28.8 |
8.2 |
10.4 |
|
August 2023 |
8.6 |
38.9 |
30.3 |
12 |
10.2 |
|
September 2024 |
5.5 |
32.8 |
32.9 |
21.0 |
7.8 |
|
Healthcare |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
6.2 |
47.6 |
30.3 |
5.7 |
10.3 |
|
August 2023 |
6.0 |
43.6 |
34.3 |
9.7 |
6.5 |
|
September 2024 |
3.7 |
43.5 |
30.9 |
16.6 |
5.2 |
|
Education |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
6.3 |
49.5 |
24.1 |
5.4 |
14.7 |
|
August 2023 |
6.8 |
43.6 |
26.1 |
8.1 |
15.4 |
|
September 2024 |
5.3 |
45.1 |
24.9 |
13.4 |
11.3 |
|
Energy supply |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
18.0 |
61.6 |
12.9 |
3.4 |
4.0 |
|
August 2023 |
15.6 |
60.5 |
15.7 |
4.1 |
4 |
|
September 2024 |
9.4 |
45.8 |
25.1 |
14.4 |
5.2 |
|
Foreign policy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
26.0 |
48.7 |
12.5 |
3.0 |
9.8 |
|
August 2023 |
14.3 |
50.7 |
18.3 |
5.7 |
11 |
|
September 2024 |
11.2 |
39.0 |
23.6 |
14.8 |
11.4 |
|
Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
3.7 |
25.0 |
37.3 |
10.8 |
23.2 |
|
August 2023 |
2.6 |
15.7 |
39.4 |
25.1 |
17.2 |
|
September 2024 |
2.9 |
13.3 |
37.4 |
31.5 |
14.9 |
|
Country's recovery |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February–March 2023 |
5.6 |
32.3 |
26.7 |
9.1 |
26.2 |
|
August 2023 |
3.5 |
23.0 |
37.0 |
14.8 |
21.6 |
|
September 2024 |
2.8 |
23.8 |
32.1 |
23.6 |
17.6 |
What is your level of trust in the following social institutions?
|
|
July – August 2021 |
June 2024 |
September 2024 |
|||||||||||||
|
|
do not trust* |
trust** |
not sure |
trust-distrust balance*** |
do not trust* |
trust** |
not sure |
trust-distrust balance*** |
do not trust* |
trust** |
not sure |
trust-distrust balance*** |
|
|||
|
Armed Forces of Ukraine |
24.8 |
68.3 |
6.7 |
43.5 |
7.7 |
90.0 |
2.1 |
82.3 |
5.9 |
91.5 |
2.6 |
85.6 |
|
|||
|
State Emergency Service |
28.7 |
61.4 |
9.9 |
32.7 |
15.8 |
78.9 |
5.3 |
63.1 |
12.4 |
83.1 |
4.4 |
70.7 |
|
|||
|
Volunteer organizations |
25.1 |
63.6 |
11.3 |
38.5 |
13.8 |
81.1 |
5.1 |
67.3 |
13.7 |
80.3 |
5.9 |
66.6 |
|
|||
|
Volunteer units |
33.4 |
53.5 |
13.1 |
20.1 |
13.2 |
79.6 |
7.2 |
66.4 |
12.3 |
79.5 |
8.2 |
67.2 |
|
|||
|
National Guard of Ukraine |
36.0 |
53.6 |
10.4 |
17.6 |
18.9 |
75.4 |
5.8 |
56.5 |
18.5 |
74.4 |
7.1 |
55.9 |
|
|||
|
State Border Guard Service |
34.3 |
55 |
10.7 |
20.7 |
22.9 |
70.6 |
6.5 |
47.7 |
23.4 |
69.8 |
6.9 |
46.4 |
|
|||
|
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) |
49.7 |
37.5 |
12.7 |
-12.2 |
29.4 |
60.7 |
9.9 |
31.3 |
26.1 |
63.6 |
10.3 |
37.5 |
|
|||
|
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine |
˗ |
˗ |
˗ |
˗ |
31.5 |
60.8 |
7.6 |
29.3 |
29.1 |
62.8 |
8.1 |
33.7 |
|
|||
|
Clergy |
26.3 |
63.5 |
10.3 |
37.2 |
25.5 |
63.3 |
11.3 |
37.8 |
26.8 |
62.5 |
10.6 |
35.7 |
|
|||
|
Civil society organizations |
37.4 |
47 |
15.5 |
9.6 |
31.3 |
56.5 |
12.2 |
25.2 |
29.3 |
58.8 |
11.8 |
29.5 |
|
|||
|
National Bank of Ukraine |
60.1 |
29.1 |
10.9 |
-31.0 |
42.4 |
48.1 |
9.4 |
5.7 |
39.4 |
50.2 |
10.4 |
10.8 |
|
|||
|
National Police of Ukraine |
52.9 |
38.5 |
8.5 |
-14.4 |
43.2 |
49.1 |
7.8 |
5.9 |
41.4 |
49.8 |
8.8 |
8.4 |
|
|||
|
President of Ukraine |
57.6 |
36.2 |
6.2 |
-21.4 |
42.7 |
49.6 |
7.7 |
6.9 |
44.5 |
48.5 |
7.1 |
4.0 |
|
|||
|
Head of your city / town / village |
33.6 |
57.1 |
9.3 |
23.5 |
43 |
50.6 |
6.4 |
7.6 |
44.7 |
47.4 |
7.9 |
2.7 |
|
|||
|
Local council of your city / town / village |
37.8 |
51.4 |
10.7 |
13.6 |
45.6 |
44.8 |
9.6 |
-0.8 |
45.9 |
44.6 |
9.4 |
-1.3 |
|
|||
|
Ukrainian social media |
45.8 |
45.4 |
8.9 |
-0.4 |
50.2 |
41.2 |
8.6 |
-9 |
48.1 |
44.6 |
7.3 |
-3.5 |
|
|||
|
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) |
40.1 |
31.7 |
28.1 |
-8.4 |
38.7 |
39.2 |
22.2 |
0.5 |
34.4 |
42.4 |
23.2 |
8.0 |
|
|||
|
Commercial banks |
70.7 |
18.2 |
11.1 |
-52.5 |
57.8 |
29.0 |
13.2 |
-28.8 |
54.9 |
29.3 |
15.8 |
-25.6 |
|
|||
|
Trade unions |
54.8 |
21.2 |
24.0 |
-33.6 |
49.2 |
24.7 |
26.1 |
-24.5 |
46.1 |
25.9 |
28.0 |
-20.2 |
|
|||
|
Prosecutor's Office |
71.1 |
17.8 |
11.1 |
-53.3 |
63.7 |
25.6 |
10.6 |
-38.1 |
62.6 |
23.2 |
14.1 |
-39.4 |
|
|||
|
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) |
69.6 |
15.2 |
15.3 |
-54.4 |
62.0 |
23.9 |
14.2 |
-38.1 |
58.0 |
22.1 |
19.9 |
-35.9 |
|
|||
|
Government of Ukraine |
72 |
21.5 |
6.6 |
-50.5 |
72.8 |
21.6 |
5.6 |
-51.2 |
72.5 |
20.5 |
7.1 |
-52.0 |
|
|||
|
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office |
69.3 |
13.6 |
17.2 |
-55.7 |
63.0 |
21.6 |
15.3 |
-41.4 |
58.0 |
19.4 |
22.7 |
-38.6 |
|
|||
|
National Agency on Corruption Prevention |
69.6 |
13.2 |
17.2 |
-56.4 |
62.0 |
20.7 |
17.3 |
-41.3 |
57.4 |
19.2 |
23.4 |
-38.2 |
|
|||
|
Courts (judicial system in general) |
74.2 |
15.5 |
10.4 |
-58.7 |
73.4 |
17.1 |
9.5 |
-56.3 |
70.2 |
16.4 |
13.5 |
-53.8 |
|
|||
|
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine |
75.1 |
18.7 |
6.1 |
-56.4 |
76.2 |
19.3 |
4.5 |
-56.9 |
78.5 |
16.0 |
5.6 |
-62.5 |
|
|||
|
Political parties |
71.7 |
16.1 |
12.2 |
-55.6 |
77.5 |
14.2 |
8.3 |
-63.3 |
73.5 |
14.7 |
11.9 |
-58.8 |
|
|||
|
State apparatus (public officials) |
75.7 |
14.9 |
9.4 |
-60.8 |
78.5 |
15.7 |
5.8 |
-62.8 |
77.4 |
14.2 |
8.3 |
-63.2 |
|
|||
* total answers “do not trust at all” and “rather do not trust”
** total answers “fully trust” and “rather trust”
*** the difference between the share of those who trust, and those who do not trust
Do you believe that any of the current political forces can be entrusted with power in the post-war period?
|
|
July 2023 |
September 2023 |
March 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
Yes |
38.5 |
27.2 |
24.6 |
26.9 |
|
No |
41.3 |
48.6 |
51.8 |
53.7 |
|
Not sure |
20.2 |
24.2 |
23.7 |
19.4 |
In your opinion, which population group should the political force represent for you to entrust it with power in the post-war period? The respondent could choose multiple options
|
|
July 2023 |
September 2023 |
March 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
From the already existing political parties |
25.9 |
23.2 |
18.1 |
17.0 |
|
From business environment |
7.8 |
7.7 |
6.2 |
8.9 |
|
From civil society organizations |
18.5 |
19.1 |
18.6 |
19.0 |
|
From humanitarian or technical professionals (academics, teachers, etc.) |
17.2 |
24.6 |
20.0 |
21.4 |
|
From military personnel |
51.0 |
51.6 |
45.1 |
46.6 |
|
From volunteer environment |
24.4 |
29.6 |
21.5 |
23.6 |
|
Other |
3.2 |
3.5 |
3.3 |
4.5 |
|
Not sure |
17.6 |
17.1 |
22.9 |
22.5 |
To what extent do you trust the following politicians, public officials, and society figures?
|
|
Do not trust* |
Trust** |
Have never heard of them |
Not sure |
Trust-distrust balance* |
|
Davyd Arakhamia |
|
||||
|
February – March 2023 |
38.8 |
26.7 |
18.6 |
15.9 |
-12.1 |
|
May 2023 |
45.7 |
18.1 |
19.3 |
16.8 |
-27.6 |
|
July 2023 |
49.0 |
21.5 |
15.9 |
13.6 |
-27.5 |
|
September 2023 |
54.2 |
19.2 |
15.5 |
11.2 |
-35.0 |
|
December 2023 |
57.3 |
18.4 |
12.0 |
12.2 |
-38.9 |
|
January 2024 |
58.1 |
14.0 |
14.6 |
13.2 |
-44.1 |
|
June 2024 |
61.9 |
14.6 |
14.0 |
9.6 |
-47.3 |
|
September 2024 |
60.3 |
13.7 |
14.9 |
11.1 |
-46.6 |
|
Maryana Bezugla |
|
|
|
|
|
|
December 2023 |
58.5 |
7.7 |
27.2 |
6.6 |
-50.8 |
|
January 2024 |
65.8 |
6.9 |
18.6 |
8.7 |
-58.9 |
|
June 2024 |
68.1 |
9.0 |
16.8 |
6.2 |
-59.1 |
|
September 2024 |
64.4 |
9.9 |
17.6 |
8.2 |
-54.5 |
|
Yuriy Boiko |
|
|
|
|
|
|
July – August 2021 |
73.0 |
17.8 |
3.0 |
6.3 |
-55.2 |
|
February – March 2023 |
81.6 |
6.0 |
6.5 |
5.9 |
-75.6 |
|
May 2023 |
77.0 |
6.1 |
8.6 |
8.4 |
-70.9 |
|
July 2023 |
76.0 |
9.8 |
6.6 |
7.6 |
-66.2 |
|
September 2023 |
82.2 |
6.8 |
6.5 |
4.6 |
-75.4 |
|
December 2023 |
81.3 |
6.1 |
6.8 |
5.9 |
-75.2 |
|
January 2024 |
78.2 |
5.5 |
8.6 |
7.6 |
-72.7 |
|
June 2024 |
76.9 |
9.1 |
8.1 |
5.9 |
-67.8 |
|
September 2024 |
79.3 |
4.5 |
9.8 |
6.3 |
-74.8 |
|
Iryna Vereshchuk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
December 2023 |
38.8 |
40.1 |
11.2 |
10.0 |
1.3 |
|
January 2024 |
42.0 |
33.6 |
12.6 |
11.8 |
-8.4 |
|
June 2024 |
49.3 |
27.8 |
12.9 |
10.1 |
-21.5 |
|
September 2024 |
52.3 |
26.7 |
10.5 |
10.5 |
-25.6 |
|
Danylo Hetmantsev |
|
|
|
|
|
|
December 2023 |
33.4 |
20.4 |
35.6 |
10.6 |
-13.0 |
|
January 2024 |
32.6 |
20.2 |
34.3 |
12.9 |
-12.4 |
|
June 2024 |
40.0 |
19.8 |
30.1 |
10.1 |
-20.2 |
|
September 2024 |
38.8 |
16.1 |
34.1 |
11.0 |
-22.7 |
|
Andriy Yermak |
|
|
|
|
|
|
July – August 2021 |
58.5 |
10.3 |
22.6 |
8.6 |
-48.2 |
|
February – March 2023 |
36.0 |
40.6 |
8.1 |
15.3 |
4.6 |
|
May 2023 |
40.0 |
37.5 |
7.6 |
15 |
-2.5 |
|
July 2023 |
41.8 |
37.8 |
7.8 |
12.6 |
-4.0 |
|
September 2023 |
52.8 |
29.1 |
7.4 |
10.8 |
-23.7 |
|
December 2023 |
54.3 |
29.7 |
5.9 |
10.1 |
-24.6 |
|
January 2024 |
55.5 |
25.2 |
5.7 |
13.6 |
-30.3 |
|
June 2024 |
63.9 |
19.5 |
5.7 |
11.0 |
-44.4 |
|
September 2024 |
61.9 |
21.3 |
5.2 |
11.6 |
-40.6 |
|
Volodymyr Zelenskyy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
July – August 2021 |
61.0 |
32.6 |
0.4 |
6.1 |
-28.4 |
|
February – March 2023 |
9.9 |
84.9 |
0.5 |
4.7 |
75.0 |
|
May 2023 |
11.0 |
83.5 |
0.3 |
5.1 |
72.5 |
|
July 2023 |
13.6 |
80.8 |
0.6 |
4.9 |
67.2 |
|
September 2023 |
18.6 |
74.8 |
0.1 |
6.5 |
56.2 |
|
December 2023 |
23.4 |
70.7 |
0.3 |
5.6 |
47.3 |
|
January 2024 |
24.5 |
69.0 |
0.1 |
6.5 |
44.5 |
|
June 2024 |
37.8 |
53.8 |
0.2 |
8.2 |
16.0 |
|
September 2024 |
41.5 |
51.2 |
0.0 |
7.3 |
9.7 |
|
Vitalii Kim |
|
|
|
|
|
|
May 2023 |
14.7 |
62.7 |
10.6 |
12.1 |
48.0 |
|
July 2023 |
12.9 |
71.1 |
7.8 |
8.3 |
58.2 |
|
September 2023 |
18.0 |
64.1 |
9.1 |
8.8 |
46.1 |
|
December 2023 |
17.0 |
64.7 |
8.9 |
9.4 |
47.7 |
|
January 2024 |
21.3 |
58.0 |
9.7 |
10.9 |
36.7 |
|
June 2024 |
32.5 |
45.8 |
10.2 |
11.4 |
13.3 |
|
September 2024 |
34.4 |
45.8 |
7.0 |
12.8 |
11.4 |
|
Ihor Klymenko |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February – March 2023 |
16.9 |
27.2 |
42.5 |
13.3 |
10.3 |
|
May 2023 |
16.2 |
21.6 |
48.1 |
14.1 |
5.4 |
|
July 2023 |
17.2 |
32.0 |
38.2 |
12.6 |
14.8 |
|
September 2023 |
22.1 |
25.7 |
40.9 |
11.4 |
3.6 |
|
December 2023 |
21.0 |
30.8 |
35.8 |
12.3 |
9.8 |
|
January 2024 |
22.8 |
27.9 |
35.8 |
13.5 |
5.1 |
|
June 2024 |
31.5 |
23.6 |
33.3 |
11.6 |
-7.9 |
|
September 2024 |
33.7 |
20.5 |
33.1 |
12.7 |
-13.2 |
|
Vitaliy Klytschko |
|
|
|
|
|
|
July – August 2021 |
64.2 |
25.6 |
0.6 |
9.6 |
-38.6 |
|
February – March 2023 |
27.5 |
57.9 |
1.6 |
13.0 |
30.4 |
|
May 2023 |
34.8 |
48.4 |
1.3 |
15.5 |
13.6 |
|
July 2023 |
35.5 |
47.7 |
2.4 |
14.4 |
12.2 |
|
September 2023 |
39.5 |
43.7 |
2.5 |
14.2 |
4.2 |
|
December 2023 |
45.2 |
40.0 |
1.2 |
13.6 |
-5.2 |
|
January 2024 |
43.6 |
39.2 |
1.2 |
16.0 |
-4.4 |
|
June 2024 |
45.3 |
40.9 |
1.0 |
12.7 |
-4.4 |
|
September 2024 |
46.8 |
39.1 |
1.8 |
12.2 |
-7.7 |
|
Vasyl Maliuk |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February – March 2023 |
14.7 |
24.7 |
49.2 |
11.3 |
10.0 |
|
May 2023 |
14.9 |
26.4 |
46.5 |
12.3 |
11.5 |
|
July 2023 |
15.5 |
33.1 |
39.9 |
11.6 |
17.6 |
|
September 2023 |
20.9 |
33.8 |
34.7 |
10.6 |
12.9 |
|
December 2023 |
20.8 |
41.1 |
27.1 |
11.1 |
20.3 |
|
January 2024 |
22.2 |
40.1 |
28.7 |
8.9 |
17.9 |
|
June 2024 |
24.6 |
37.9 |
26.9 |
10.6 |
13.3 |
|
September 2024 |
27.0 |
36.2 |
26.5 |
10.2 |
9.2 |
|
Mykhailo Podoliak |
|
|
|
|
|
|
February – March 2023 |
19.2 |
59.5 |
12.1 |
9.2 |
40.3 |
|
May 2023 |
24.1 |
50.7 |
11.0 |
14.1 |
26.6 |
|
July 2023 |
24.5 |
52.1 |
13.0 |
10.3 |
27.6 |
|
September 2023 |
30.3 |
44.6 |
14.0 |
11.1 |
14.3 |
|
December 2023 |
29.4 |
51.6 |
10.0 |
9.1 |
22.2 |
|
January 2024 |
32.2 |
44.4 |
12.0 |
11.5 |
12.2 |
|
June 2024 |
42.1 |
35.8 |
10.4 |
11.5 |
-6.3 |
|
September 2024 |
39.9 |
35.1 |
11.7 |
13.2 |
-4.8 |
|
Petro Poroshenko |
|
|
|
|
|
|
July – August 2021 |
75.5 |
17.6 |
0.4 |
6.3 |
-57.9 |
|
February – March 2023 |
64.8 |
24.4 |
0.1 |
10.7 |
-40.4 |
|
May 2023 |
73.1 |
17.1 |
0.5 |
9.4 |
-56.0 |
|
July 2023 |
70.7 |
19.7 |
0.5 |
9.1 |
-51.0 |
|
September 2023 |
73.1 |
16.9 |
0.7 |
9.4 |
-56.2 |
|
December 2023 |
74.2 |
18.2 |
0.7 |
6.9 |
-56.0 |
|
January 2024 |
69.8 |
18.7 |
0.3 |
11.1 |
-51.1 |
|
June 2024 |
67.1 |
24.2 |
0.3 |
8.3 |
-42.9 |
|
September 2024 |
68.3 |
22.8 |
0.6 |
8.3 |
-45.5 |
|
Serhiy Prytula |
|
|
|||
|
July – August 2021 |
56.5 |
21.8 |
8.9 |
12.9 |
-34.7 |
|
February – March 2023 |
21.7 |
65.0 |
2.5 |
10.8 |
43.3 |
|
May 2023 |
29.3 |
55.8 |
2.9 |
12.0 |
26.5 |
|
July 2023 |
31.3 |
55.0 |
4.0 |
9.6 |
23.7 |
|
September 2023 |
35.2 |
51.3 |
2.8 |
10.7 |
16.1 |
|
December 2023 |
33.5 |
54.8 |
3.6 |
8.1 |
21.3 |
|
January 2024 |
33.2 |
54.3 |
2.6 |
10.0 |
21.1 |
|
June 2024 |
47.0 |
40.8 |
1.8 |
10.4 |
-6.2 |
|
September 2024 |
46.1 |
42.2 |
1.9 |
9.7 |
-3.9 |
|
Ruslan Stefanchuk |
|
|
|||
|
February – March 2023 |
27.4 |
34.7 |
22.6 |
15.3 |
7.3 |
|
May 2023 |
33.7 |
26.9 |
23.1 |
16.3 |
-6.8 |
|
July 2023 |
35.6 |
31.0 |
20.1 |
13.3 |
-4.6 |
|
September 2023 |
46.0 |
24.6 |
17.8 |
11.5 |
-21.4 |
|
December 2023 |
41.4 |
27.8 |
18.1 |
12.7 |
-13.6 |
|
January 2024 |
50.5 |
23.1 |
14.8 |
11.6 |
-27.4 |
|
June 2024 |
63.8 |
17.5 |
9.4 |
9.4 |
-46.3 |
|
September 2024 |
53.1 |
18.0 |
17.3 |
11.5 |
-35.1 |
|
Yulia Tymoshenko |
|
|
|||
|
July – August 2021 |
72.2 |
19.9 |
0.8 |
7.2 |
-52.3 |
|
February – March 2023 |
75.7 |
13.2 |
0.7 |
10.4 |
-62.5 |
|
May 2023 |
80.4 |
8.7 |
0.6 |
10.3 |
-71.7 |
|
July 2023 |
78.0 |
10.4 |
1.2 |
10.3 |
-67.6 |
|
September 2023 |
82.1 |
10.8 |
1.0 |
6.1 |
-71.3 |
|
December 2023 |
84.6 |
8.1 |
1.0 |
6.3 |
-76.5 |
|
January 2024 |
80.5 |
11.0 |
0.5 |
8.0 |
-69.5 |
|
June 2024 |
80.0 |
12.9 |
0.7 |
6.3 |
-67.1 |
|
September 2024 |
78.6 |
13.5 |
0.6 |
7.3 |
-65.1 |
|
Rustem Umerov |
|
|
|
|
|
|
September 2023 |
20.9 |
25.1 |
31.7 |
22.4 |
4.2 |
|
December 2023 |
21.8 |
35.2 |
23.1 |
19.9 |
13.4 |
|
January 2024 |
27.2 |
33.2 |
19.4 |
20.2 |
6.0 |
|
June 2024 |
41.2 |
28.0 |
14.6 |
16.2 |
-13.2 |
|
September 2024 |
40.6 |
29.3 |
14.7 |
15.4 |
-11.3 |
|
Denys Shmyhal |
|
|
|||
|
July – August 2021 |
69.1 |
10.6 |
7.7 |
12.5 |
-58.5 |
|
February – March 2023 |
30.2 |
51.6 |
3.7 |
14.5 |
21.4 |
|
May 2023 |
39.3 |
36.1 |
5.9 |
18.8 |
-3.2 |
|
July 2023 |
37.9 |
41.4 |
6.9 |
13.8 |
3.5 |
|
September 2023 |
44.3 |
36.4 |
5.7 |
13.6 |
-7.9 |
|
December 2023 |
42.4 |
38.4 |
7.0 |
12.2 |
-4.0 |
|
January 2024 |
44.7 |
34.0 |
6.6 |
14.6 |
-10.7 |
|
June 2024 |
57.3 |
27.1 |
3.5 |
12.1 |
-30.2 |
|
September 2024 |
51.6 |
28.9 |
4.9 |
14.6 |
-22.7 |
* total answers “do not trust at all” and “rather do not trust”
** total answers “fully trust” and “rather trust”
*** the difference between the share of those who trust, and those who do not trust
Do you believe in the victory of Ukraine against Russia?
|
|
August 2022 |
December 2022 |
February – March 2023 |
July 2023 |
December 2023 |
January 2024 |
March 2024 |
June 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
Yes |
76.9 |
78.5 |
79.6 |
79.4 |
63.3 |
62.3 |
59.5 |
53.0 |
60.0 |
|
Mostly yes |
14.6 |
14.7 |
13.6 |
13.8 |
24.8 |
22.5 |
23.4 |
26.9 |
23.0 |
|
Mostly no |
2.9 |
1.9 |
2.1 |
1.6 |
3.8 |
5.0 |
6.4 |
7.2 |
6.2 |
|
No |
1.2 |
1.2 |
1.4 |
1.7 |
1.6 |
3.5 |
4.4 |
5.0 |
5.2 |
|
Not sure |
4.4 |
3.7 |
3.3 |
3.5 |
6.5 |
6.7 |
6.4 |
7.8 |
5.6 |
In your opinion, when will victory be? % of respondents who believe in victory of Ukraine
|
|
August 2022 |
February – March 2023 |
July 2023 |
January 2024 |
March 2024 |
June 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
By the end of this year |
31.2 |
49.9 |
35.4 |
19.7 |
21.9 |
23.8 |
19.5 |
|
In 1-2 years |
34.3 |
25.9 |
37.8 |
39.8 |
34.5 |
37.7 |
39.2 |
|
In 3-5 years |
7.1 |
7.4 |
8.9 |
14.0 |
16.7 |
14.6 |
14.8 |
|
No sooner than 5 years |
2.1 |
1.1 |
1.2 |
3.2 |
4.2 |
4.6 |
5.4 |
|
I won't live to see it |
1.7 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
1.1 |
0.8 |
1.3 |
2.0 |
|
Other |
0.5 |
0.2 |
0.5 |
0.3 |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
|
Not sure |
23.1 |
15.0 |
15.9 |
21.8 |
21.3 |
17.5 |
18.6 |
What would you personally accept as a victory in this war? % of respondents who believe in victory of Ukraine
|
|
August 2022 |
September – October 2022 |
December 2022 |
February – March 2023 |
July 2023 |
January 2024 |
March 2024 |
June 2024 |
September 2024 |
|
The war's termination, even if the Russian army remains on the territories it has captured and occupied since February 24, 2022 (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Donbas) |
3.1 |
6.0 |
3.3 |
4.6 |
5.2 |
3.6 |
6.2 |
7.7 |
8.1 |
|
Driving Russian troops back beyond the borders as of February 23, 2022 (certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain occupied, along with Crimea) |
7.4 |
8.1 |
6.2 |
4.6 |
9.0 |
13.0 |
10.7 |
13.8 |
16.6 |
|
Driving Russian troops from the entirety of mainland Ukraine, excluding Crimea |
8.7 |
4.2 |
8.0 |
4.4 |
5.7 |
7.4 |
8.6 |
7.7 |
7.5 |
|
Driving Russian troops from all of Ukraine including Crimea, re-establishing borders as of January 2014 |
54.7 |
43.9 |
54.1 |
46.9 |
52.6 |
38.1 |
45.5 |
41.8 |
37.8 |
|
Annihilating the Russian army and promoting revolutions/separatist movements within Russia itself |
20.4 |
26.6 |
22.4 |
30.8 |
20.8 |
27.3 |
23.1 |
17.5 |
17.5 |
|
Other |
0.4 |
0.9 |
0.3 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
1.5 |
1.6 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
|
Not sure |
5.3 |
10.4 |
5.6 |
7.6 |
5.5 |
9.1 |
4.3 |
9.5 |
11.1 |
