Erdogan — Putin meeting. What happened, and what will follow?

August 10, 2022

The other day, Tayyip Erdoğan and the Kremlin criminal met again, which effectively marked a rapprochement of Turkey and Russia.

Last fall, Tayyip Erdoğan forced the Turkish Central Bank to reduce the interest rate to 14%, but this move triggered an uncontrolled fall in the lira rate, and at the beginning of August, 2022, inflation reached 80%, being an anti-record for the last twenty-four years.

The Turkish currency is so weak that inflation will only grow in arithmetic progression due to the continued payments in dollars for imported goods. Since buying dollars for liras creates an additional demand for foreign currency, it puts pressure on the rather low exchange rate of the Turkish lira.

The current state of the Turkish economy is so critical that any delay in anti-crisis action can trigger mass protests in Turkey and lead to Erdogan's resignation. This scenario makes official Ankara increasingly concerned, since the current strategy of crisis management through introduction of mutual settlements with Saudi Arabia in national currencies has not brought a tangible effect.

Because of this, Tayyip Erdoğan, contrary to the position of the entire civilized world, decided to conciliate the terrorist state that is no less interested in cooperation with Turkey.
The crisis especially aggravated against the background of a sharp reduction (compared to the first half of last year, by 38%) of supplies from China. Apparently, companies from the Middle Kingdom decided to limit its sales to Russia (that is not even among its top 10 trading partners), fearing sanctions and, accordingly, the loss of European and US markets.

Under such circumstances, it is extremely important for the terrorist state to establish parallel imports, and for Turkey — to act as a logistics hub and receive liras for exports.

Their interests also coincide in the oil and gas sector. On the one hand, Russia wants to make up for its lost share in the European gas market by boosting deliveries to Turkey and receiving roubles for the supplied resource. On the other hand, official Ankara wants to become a Mediterranean gas hub. Therefore, Russian gas supply may increase from 26 to 40 BCM in 2023, using TurkStream to its full capacity.

In addition, official Ankara and the Kremlin criminals probably agreed on investment in the Turkish oil transportation and oil refining infrastructure. For Turkey, such an agreement means investments and additional inflow of foreign currency in the national economy, while for Russia, it is an opportunity to bypass the EU embargo due to the change of the origin of hydrocarbons.

Trade is also to rise in the transport sector — Turkey plans to purchase more than 200 Russian-made fire-fighting aircraft. Within the framework of this contract, Russia may be provided with deficient equipment, including microcircuits and gas turbine engines, which are absolutely necessary for reliable operation of the energy infrastructure of the terrorist state.

In general, beginning of payment for goods in national currencies will let the two states effectively bypass the SWIFT system and reduce the risk of its disconnection, which may be the reason behind a deal on the Russian banking system operation in Turkey.

In addition to the economic aspect, the Turkish leader, most likely, agreed with the Kremlin criminal on the beginning of a military operation against the Kurds in Northern Syria in exchange for a mediating position in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Maksym Bielawski

Leading Expert, Energy Programmes

Born in 1986 in Zhytomyr oblast


Zhytomyr State Technological University (2008)

Ph.D in Technical Science (2010)

Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas (2012)

Author of 17 patents and 100 scientific works

Work Experience:

2008 – 2011 — Operator of Gas Infrastructure Units, Controller of Gas Transmission System in Rivne Division of PJSC "Ukrtransgas"

2011 – 2017 — Leading Engineer, Deputy Head of Press-Service, Head of Public Relation Department of PJSC "Ukrtransgas"

2017 – 2018 — HR Director of PJSC "Maine Gas Pipelines of Ukraine", Advisor to the Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine

2021 — Director of Integrated Communications of NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine"