What common denominators regarding issues of democracy and international partnership does our society have now, a few days before the fourth anniversary of the start of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war?

The answer is prompted by the results of a recent public opinion poll conducted by Razumkov Centre jointly with the Kyiv Security Forum. Its results are commented on by the Deputy Director of the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service, Mykhailo Mishchenko.

Any government in Russia tends to implement the ideals of autocracy

— What distinguishes Ukrainians from Russians?

— Russian writer and part-time radical nationalist ideologist Alexander Prokhanov answered the question of a Russian journalist: “What makes a Russian man to fight?” — “Boredom, a Russian man can’t not fight, it’s the law of Russian fate.”

Actually, boredom is not some specific Russian feeling, but only in Russia has “great boredom” been elevated to the rank of ideological motivation for an aggressive war. With the help of war, the “Russian man” is trying to escape from Russian everyday life, which he can no longer bear.

Let me add that the war is used by the ruling regime in Russia to strengthen the grip of power. The goal of Putin’s regime is not just to win the war. If the war with Ukraine is over, but Putin’s regime survives, Russia will try to fight again and again and again.

In due time, the occupation of Crimea (called by the Russian propagandists the “Crimean consensus”) and the war in Syria fulfilled their social function in terms of uniting the Russian ruling elite and society. Now this function is to be performed by the full-scale war in Ukraine.

Ideologically, the Russian ruling elite cannot offer any other goal than expansion and conquest of territories.

— So what is the main mental difference between Ukrainians and Russians?

— Traditionally, the concept of freedom for centuries contradicted the socio-political system of Muscovy, then Russian state, escape was the only way to freedom (for example, they fled to the Don).

Political mythology, like political ideology, is of great importance

The living political myth in Ukraine is a Cossack myth, idealization of the Cossack past with its democratic traditions. The political myth of Russia is traditionally built on autocracy. Any government in Russia tends to implement the ideals of autocracy, even now.

The power of the military in Ukraine is mainly seen as a means of protecting the democratic system, not as an alternative to it.

— Let's proceed with the poll results. On the issue of democracy, which is alien to Russian society: 66% of Ukrainians agreed that “democracy is the most desirable type of state system for Ukraine”. “Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than a democratic one” — this answer was given by 13%. “It doesn’t matter whether the regime in Ukraine is democratic or not” — 14%, “hard to say” — 6%. Why democracy is not supported by 80-90%?

— Here we also should look at the dynamics of this indicator. If we take the pre-war period, in June 2021, 54% of respondents believed that democracy was the most desirable type of state system for Ukraine; now — 66%. This indicator reached all-time high in May 2023 — 73%. Excluding the spike, we see a general upward trend of this indicator.

It's a very high indicator, given that only 13% believe that an authoritarian regime can be better than a democratic one under certain circumstances. Before the war, in June 2021, 24% believed so.

— The answers to the question if Ukraine is a democratic state are interesting. 24% of respondents said so. 49% of those polled believe that Ukraine is not a fully democratic state, but it is moving towards democracy. 19% are convinced that Ukraine is not a democratic state and is not moving towards democracy; “hard to say” — 9%.

— It is important to look at the dynamics of this indicator, too. In June 2010 (the beginning of Yanukovych's rule), 12.5% ​​of respondents considered Ukraine to be a fully democratic country, in June 2021 — 18%, now — 24%. That is, we see that although war imposes restrictions on democratic procedures, this indicator is growing. But the relative majority believes that although Ukraine is not a fully democratic state, it is still moving towards democracy.

And the number of those who believe that Ukraine is not a democratic state is practically stable, except for 2023: then, there were fewer of them, now they make 19%. The situation where a part of citizens believes that the country's system is undemocratic is observed in all democratic states (being one of the manifestations of democracy).

— Answering a direct question about changes in the state of democracy after the start of a full-scale war, 41% of respondents said that in their opinion, the level of democracy in Ukraine is now lower than before 2022. What is the reason?

— Let us immediately note that the share of those who believe that it is the same as before the war, or even higher than before the war, is 42%. That is, about half of respondents believes that the level of democracy is the same or higher, and half believe that it is not.

The martial law itself imposes restrictions on democracy. They can be enshrined in law, or they can be informal.

— In the poll, you found out how good different types of political system are for our country. A system with a strong leader, independent of parliament and elections, was called good by 62% of respondents (37% consider it bad). Opinions about the military rule are 33% and 66%, respectively. A democratic political system gained 90% and 9% of votes. That is, people want democracy and authoritarianism at the same time?

— If we compare with 2017, the share of those who believe that a political system where the military or a military regime rules is good has increased. In 2017, there made 12%, now — 33%. However, the majority considers such a system to be bad.

Moreover, among those who believe that a system ruled by the military or a military regime is good, 87%, that is, the vast majority, also consider a democratic political system to be good. Only 13% consider it to be bad. So, in times of war, the military rule is mainly seen as a means of protecting the democratic system, not as an alternative to it.

The same applies to a strong leader independent of parliament and elections. Among those who consider such a system to be good, 90% also consider a democratic political system to be good. That is, having a strong leader during a war means “ensuring the victory of democracy.”

We are for a complete break with Russia

— You asked: “Which conditions do you consider to be the minimum necessary for a peace agreement with Russia?” 28% of respondents stand for liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops in the borders of 1991, 32% — for liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops in the borders of February 24, 2022. Why do we have such figures?

— The answer to this question did not mean the conditions under which a peace agreement should be made, but rather the conditions for the start of peace talks. If we compare it with 2024, 51.5% believed that the minimum condition, that is, the point for starting negotiations, should be the liberation of Ukraine in the borders of 1991. Now — 28%. This is due to the government’s opinion, that negotiations should begin now. The relative majority believes that the starting point for negotiations should be the liberation along the 2022 line.

— You also asked: “Do you consider a military victory of Ukraine in the war with Russia possible? Do you believe in it?” 59% consider it possible, 18% don't.

— On the one hand, there was a question: “Do you believe in victory?” 74% said, they do. 16% don't. But in response to the question whether people consider a military victory possible, there are fewer of them — 59%.

Obviously, some of those who believe in victory hope for other (not purely military) methods of achieving victory — an economic blockade or the collapse of the ruling regime in Russia.

On NATO, US, peace and the EU

— The answers to the question “If it were up to you to decide, what would you be ready to cede during negotiations with Russia?” are interesting. Ukrainian territories — 8%, pro-Western vector of free development of Ukraine — 10%. However, 62% are not willing to give up anything; it was hard to answer for 19%.

— Not willing to cede any of the above — 62%. This figure has practically not changed since June 2024: then, they made 61%. 14% were ready to cede the pro-Western vector of free development of Ukraine in June 2024, now — 10%. 8% were ready to cede Ukrainian territories in June 2024, now — also 8%.

— “After Ukraine’s victory or cessation of hostilities, will you support a complete break of all relations with the Russian Federation, including a complete ban on entry of Russian citizens into Ukraine?” — 55% of respondents answered “yes”, 23% answered “rather, yes”.

— That is, in total, 78% of citizens support it, and 14% don't. Such is the general attitude to Russia and its citizens. We also conducted a survey in which we asked citizens of Ukraine to assess their similarity with citizens of the neighbouring countries in terms of character, customs, and traditions on a scale from 0 to 10, where “0” meant nothing in common with the respondent in character, customs, and traditions; “10” meant that they are as similar as possible in character, customs, and traditions to the respondent. Ukrainian citizens assessed their proximity to Russian citizens on this scale on average at only 1.4 points.

— Another question: “What do you consider as the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security?”. NATO membership was mentioned by 42% of citizens, neutral status — by 14%, bilateral and multilateral agreements with partner countries — by 29%.

— Compared to 2023, support for NATO membership as the best way to ensure security has noticeably decreased. Then, 65% believed so, now — 42%. In contrast, the share of those who consider bilateral and multilateral agreements with partner countries to be the best guarantee of security has increased from 14% to 29%.

— “Which state or union of states should lead the support for Ukraine in the war with Russia?”

— 41% of respondents mentioned the European Union. The United States of America is the second most frequently mentioned country — 26%.

— “Which countries do you consider reliable, and which ones unreliable as security guarantors?”

— The most common answer is that the security guarantees from the EU as a whole are the most reliable. 62% believe that the European Union will adhere to the guarantees and will be able to protect Ukraine. NATO went second — 55%; the United Kingdom third — 49%, the US — 44%.

— Respondents were also asked: “Do you think Russia is going to attack one of the NATO countries?”. They believe that it is definitely going to — 26%, maybe so — 43%, not going to — 13%, hard to say — 17.5%.

— The vast majority — 69% — assumes that Russia may attack one of the NATO countries, and only 13% reject such a possibility. At the same time, the majority of both those who have a positive attitude and those who have a negative attitude towards NATO admit such a possibility (but among those who have a completely positive attitude to NATO, their share is much higher than among those who have a completely negative attitude to it). 75% of those who have a completely positive attitude towards NATO admit such a possibility; among those who have a completely negative attitude to it — 54%.

— Are Ukrainians optimistic about our present and future?

— We have no other way out, except for the Victory — because people do not believe that peace can be achieved in any other way.

https://razumkov.org.ua/statti/u-nas-nemaie-inshogo-vykhodu-nizh-peremoga