Results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service with support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office Ukraine on November 9–15, 2023.

The face-to-face poll was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Trannscarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions — only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities).

The poll was conducted by the method of stratified multistage sampling with random selection at the first stages of sampling and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was held as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2022 respondents over the age of 18 were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

RELIGIOSITY, TRUST IN THE CHURCH

Although with the beginning of full-scale Russian aggression, the share of citizens who identify themselves as believers increased from 68% at the end of 2021 [1] to 74% in November 2022, in November 2023 the share of believers decreased to 70.5% (and now does not statistically differ from the level of 2021).

Traditionally, the level of religiosity is higher in older age groups (in 2023, the share of religious people is the lowest in the group of 18–24 years — 55%, while in other age groups it makes from 65% to 78%).

Women are more religious, compared to men (78% and 62%, respectively). The share of believers among villagers (75%) is higher than among city residents (68%).

There is a significant difference between the declared religiosity and self-attribution to a specific religious community. Membership in a religious community was reported by only 24% of respondents (however, in 2021, there were 21% of them, in 2020 — only 16%). The share of members of religious communities is higher among residents of the Western regions (46%). In the Centre, they make 18%, in the South — 13%, in the East — 12%.

The church is trusted by the majority of Ukrainian citizens. However, compared to 2010, when the level of public trust in the Church reached its maximum (72.5%), now it is lower — 59% [2]. Residents of the Western (72% of respondents) and Southern (69%) regions trust the Church most of all. In the Central regions, 54% trust it, and the lowest trust in the Church is recorded in the Eastern regions, where only a relative majority of respondents (47%) trust it, which is only 7% higher than the share of those who do not trust it.

CONFESSIONAL AFFILIATION

The distribution of religious affiliations of citizens has not seen significant changes in recent years: the majority of respondents identified themselves with Orthodoxy (61% in 2023); the number of followers of Greek Catholicism (11%) is significant, as well as those who called themselves "just Christian" (that is, they consider themselves Christian but do not associate themselves with a specific Christian denomination — 11%).

Other denominations and religious trends (Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Judaism, etc.) have a smaller number of adherents. In 2021, the share of those who do not belong to any religion recorded during the entire period of the Razumkov Centre surveys was the highest (19%), but after the start of the full-scale war (in 2022), their share decreased to 12%; in 2023, it made 13%.

Confessional self-determination bears distinct regional specificities. The largest number of Orthodox is recorded in the Central regions (72%). In the South, they make 66%, in the East — 56%.

In the West of the country, the share of Orthodox is 45%, while 40% of residents in this region called themselves Greek Catholics. Compared to other regions, significantly fewer people in the West of the country called themselves "just Christian" (3.5%, in other regions — 14%). In the Western and Central regions, fewer people do not identify themselves with any religion (respectively, 8% and 10%) than in the Southern and Eastern regions (respectively, 18% and 24%).

Just as the number of believers increases with age, the share of Orthodox believers increases from 44% among young people aged 18–24 to 67.5% among those in the age of 60 and older (while the share of believers of other denominations and religions in age groups does not statistically differ). The younger the respondents are, the greater is the number of those who do not belong to any religion (from 9% among those in the age of 60 and older to 27% of the people under 25).

INTERCHURCH RELATIONS

In contrast to fairly stable confessional attachments, noticeable changes are taking place in the confessional self-determination of Orthodox believers, due to both the change in the organizational structure of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and the impact of Russia's full-scale aggression on public consciousness.

Before 2018, three large Orthodox denominations were legal and active in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC(MP)), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). During 2010-2018, the number of faithful of UOC(MP) was steadily decreasing (from 24% in 2010 to 12% in 2018), while the number of faithful of UOC-KP, on the contrary, increased (from 15% in 2010 to 29% in 2018).

In December 2018, UOC-KP and UAOC merged into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which in January 2019 received a Tomos certifying its autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

However, in 2020, the number of believers of the OCU was smaller (20%) than of UOC-KP in 2018, which reflected kind of disorientation of many believers in their church identification after the statements of the UOC-KP Patriarch Filaret who withdrew his signature from the decision creating OCU and announced the restoration of UOC-KP. At that time, the number of citizens who called themselves "just Orthodox" (that is, Orthodox not belonging to any of the Orthodox churches) increased from 23% in 2018 to 27% in 2020 (another 1% did not know which Orthodox Church they belonged to). However, as soon as in 2021 the share of those who reported loyalty to OCU reached 24%, in 2022 — 36%, in 2023 — 42% of all respondents.

After the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the share of those who reported loyalty to UOC(MP) decreased significantly (from 13% in 2021 to 6% in 2023).

In recent years, the share of those who consider themselves "just Orthodox" has also significantly decreased — from 27% in 2020 to 13% in 2023.

In 2023, the share of OCU believers was the largest in the Central regions (52%). In the South, they made 40%, in the West — 36.5%, in the East — 31%. Faithful of UOC(MP) in the Western and Central regions make 4% of all respondents, in the Eastern — 8%, in the Southern — 11%. The number of "just Orthodox" is the lowest in the West (4%), in other regions — 15-16%.

The majority (59%) of respondents reported that the relations between the faithful of different churches and religions in the area where they live are calm. Another 8% described them as friendly. In 2022, compared to 2021, the share of those who called them conflict-like increased from 3% to 6%, tense — from 5% to 14%, but in 2023, compared to 2022, the assessment of their conflict character and tension decreased (3% of respondents called them conflict-like, 8% — tense).

13% of respondents in the Centre, 12% in the West, 10% in the East, and 0% in the South reported conflicts or tension in relations between the believers of different churches.

The vast majority (71%) of respondents fully or largely support the ban on the activities of religious organizations and associations, managed from the state engaged in military aggression against Ukraine (13% do not support it). Such support is expressed by the absolute or relative majority of residents of all regions (from 49.5% in the South to 80.5% in the West of the country).

Answering the question: "On what conditions should the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate) operate?", only 4.5% of respondents answered that it should operate on the territory of Ukraine without any restrictions, 3% — that it should operate on the territory of Ukraine without restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 9% — that it should act without restrictions, but only on the condition that it declares autocephaly and completely breaks the canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 12% — that it should join the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

The majority (55.5%) believes that the activity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) should be banned in Ukraine.

Residents of the East and South (8% and 11%, respectively) more often than residents of the Centre and West (3% and 2%) believe that UOC(MP) should operate on the territory of Ukraine without any restrictions. Residents of the South more often than residents of other regions believe that it should operate without restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (8%), or that it should act without restrictions but only on the condition that it declares autocephaly and completely breaks the canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (20.5%). Easterners more often than residents of other regions answer that it should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (17%).

The majority of respondents in the Western (74%) and Central (57%) regions and the relative majority in the Eastern (40%) and Southern (34%) regions believe that the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) should be banned in Ukraine.

Among the faithful of UGCC, 93% believe that the activities of UOC(MP) should be banned, as do 66.5% of the OCU believers. This opinion is shared by 48% of "just Orthodox", 38% of "just Christian", and 36% of those who do not belong to any religion.

Among the faithful of UOC(MP), 38% believe that it should operate on the territory of Ukraine without any restrictions, 5% — that it should operate without restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 19% — that it should act without restrictions but only on the condition that it declares autocephaly and completely breaks the canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), 24% — that it should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and 2% — that its activities should be banned in Ukraine.

71% of the polled citizens fully or mainly support the termination of the lease agreement between the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra National Reserve and the Holy Assumption Monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in March 2023 (11% did not support it). Such support was reported by from 46% of respondents in the South to 86% in the West of the country, the majority or a relative majority of representatives of all religious and church groups (except the faithful of the UOC(MP), among whom 22% supported it, and 66% did not).

65% of respondents believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Merely 4% suggests that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stand for peace and against war, and only 8% believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow do not have a definite stand regarding the war in Ukraine.

The majority or relative majority of residents of all regions (from 47.5% in the East to 82% in the West of the country) are convinced that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Only a small share of respondents in all regions (from 1.5% in the West to 9% in the South) is sure that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow stand for peace and against the war.

The majority or relative majority of representatives of all religious and church groups, with the exception of the faithful of the UOC (MP), agrees that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The latter remain divided: among them, 25% believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support Russia's aggression against Ukraine, 23% — that they stand for peace, against war, 14% — that they do not have a definite stand on the war in Ukraine, and the relative majority (37.5%) are undecided, hesitate to answer this question.

SURVEY RESULTS IN TABLES

(data in the tables are percentages)

Regardless of whether you go to church or not, who do you think you are?

* West: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions;

Centre: Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions;

South: Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson regions;

East: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk regions. The "regional affiliation" of the respondents was determined by the region of their residence before the beginning of full-scale Russian aggression (that is, before February 24, 2022).

Do you belong to a specific religious community (parish)?

Which religion do you identify yourself with?

Which Orthodox church do you identify yourself with?

To what extent do you trust the Church?

How would you describe the relations among believers of different churches and religions in the area where you live?

On what conditions do you think the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate) should operate?

What do you think about prohibition of activities of religious organizations and associations, managed from the state engaged in military aggression against Ukraine?

In March 2023, the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra National Reserve terminated the lease agreement with the Holy Assumption Monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). What do you think of this decision?

What do you think of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in the Russo-Ukrainian war?

[1]. Comparing the results of the latest poll with previous surveys, one should take into account that the polls in 2000 and 2010 were carried out in the whole territory of Ukraine, in 2014 — in all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 — in all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

[2]. The data on trust in the Church are based on the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on September 21–27, 2023, as part of the "Engage!" Public Activity Promotion Program, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact in Ukraine.

The face-to-face poll was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Trannscarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions — only in the territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and free of hostilities). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the poll was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

2016 respondents over the age of 18 were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/riven-religiinosti-dovira-do-tserkvy-konfesiinyi-rozpodil-ta-mizhtserkovni-vidnosyny-v-ukrainskomu-suspilstvi-lystopad-2023r