Abstract. The article assesses, among other things, preparation of Ukraine's energy sector for the autumn-winter period of 2026/27 and beyond, taking into account two interrelated government decisions: increasing the annual quota for new renewable energy projects to 1,000 MW, and a competition for the construction of 1,322 MW of new generating capacities. The main conclusion is that both decisions have the right strategic logic, while their practical effect will depend not on nominally declared megawatts but on the implementation deadlines, investor interest, funds, grid connection, fuel availability, physical protection, and coordination with regional energy system needs.

Ukraine is moving from the logic of merely restoring destroyed capacities to a more sustainable, decentralized and manageable architecture of the power system. However, 1 GW of RES does not equal 1 GW of guaranteed capacities in the evening peak hours, and 1322 MW of competitive shunting generation does not equal automatic readiness for the 2026/27 winter. In winter, not the announced volumes will be decisive but the available capacities, protected infrastructure, backupping of thermal generation units, payment discipline and the state’s ability to synchronize several tools in one energy sustainability programme.

1. Two solutions — one strategic goal

The government has created two tools for strengthening the power system. The first one is an increase in the annual quota for new renewable energy projects to 1 GW. It rests on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated April 1, 2026 No. 298-r, and the increase in the quota to 1 GW is reflected in the amendments made by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated May 27, 2026 No. 508-r. Support should be provided through a market premium mechanism based on auction results.

The second tool is a separate competition for the construction of 1,322 MW of new generating capacities, launched by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated May 22, 2026 No. 488-r. Its goal is to enhance the energy system resilience and to cover the capacity deficit after Russian attacks on the energy infrastructure.

Both solutions are rational. RES should increase the green generation base, reduce fuel dependence and give a long-term investment signal. New shunting generation capacities should cover power shortages during peak hours, balance the system, and enhance the resilience of regions most affected by the destruction of thermal generation capacities and networks.

The key question is not whether these solutions are needed, but whether they will be properly coordinated. If RES auctions, BESS, shunting generation, cogeneration, distribution system operator plans, physical protection, and city heating maps are implemented separately, the systemic effect will be lower than expected. If they are combined in a single regional resilience logic, Ukraine will get not just more megawatts, but a more resilient power system.

2. 1 GW renewable energy support quota: an important step, not replacing guaranteed capacities though

The updated annual renewable energy support quota for 2026 includes 700 MW of wind generation, 50 MW of solar generation, 100 MW of solar generation combined with energy storage, and 150 MW of other renewable energy sources, including biomass, biogas, and small hydropower. The emphasis on wind generation makes sense given the winter generation profile and the need to diversify the renewable portfolio.

However, 1 GW of renewable energy does not equal 1 GW of guaranteed capacities in the evening peak hours. Wind generation is weather-dependent, solar generation has low availability in the evening, while biomass, biogas, and small hydropower are of limited effect. Therefore, new RES projects should be planned not only based on lowest prices, but also taking into account their system value: location, impact on deficient nodes, possible combination with BESS, generation profile, and the ability to reduce load on the grid.

3. Competition for 1322 MW: Transition to Managed Sustainability

The competition for 1322 MW of new generating capacities has a different logic than RES auctions. Its goal is not just to add electricity to the system, but to obtain capacities that can operate during critical periods. According to the published conditions, the facilities must be activated in less than 30 minutes, continuously operate for at least 16 hours, have frequency restoration reserves and physical protection of the second level.

Support should be provided only during specific morning and evening peak hours. This approach is correct, as it stimulates not just the construction of capacities but their availability, when the system needs them most of all. This shifts the discussion from “how many megawatts to build” to “what capacities are actually available, managed and protected”.

At the same time, the competition does not guarantee the result automatically. The investors will evaluate not only the premium level but also the risks of military destruction, the cost of second-level protection, access to gas, connection terms, payment reliability, tax and currency risks, as well as the possibility of concluding long-term contracts for electricity, heating and balancing services. The interest of investors will be the first practical test for the realism of this mechanism.

4. Why coordination between RES, BESS, shunting generation and heating is needed

Both government decisions can have a positive effect only on the condition of systemic coordination. RES reduce the need for fuel and generate additional electricity. BESS smooth out the generation profile and can transfer part of the energy to deficit hours. Shunting generation provides peak coverage, reserves and rapid system response. Cogeneration combines electricity and heating, which is especially important for large cities with centralized heat supply.

Therefore, the true goal of these projects is not just to increase generation but primarily to form a sustainable, manageable and protected energy system that can withstand shocks, cover the basic deficit, pass winter consumption peaks and support life in the cities. This requires a regional matrix of decisions: where to build RES, where BESS is needed, where cogeneration units are needed, which boiler houses and pumping stations need backupping, which substations should be protected as a priority.

5. General assessment of preparations for the autumn/winter period of 2026/27

Preparation for the autumn/winter period of 2026/27 is taking place in three main areas: repair and partial restoration of large thermal generation capacities and heat-and-power plants; construction of distributed gas generation and cogeneration facilities; increasing the resilience of heat, water, electricity supply networks and critical infrastructure.

Strategically, this approach is correct, since Ukraine can no longer rely on large centralized power plants alone. Massive Russian strikes have shown that the power system stability depends not only on the volume of installed capacities but also on the dispersion of generation, backupping of critical nodes, the speed of repairs, equipment reserves and market payment discipline.

The most vulnerable are big cities with centralized heating, front-line regions, industrial centres and facilities dependent on continuous operation of pumping stations, water utilities, heating points and substations. So, preparation for the winter should be assessed not by nominally declared megawatts but by the actually available capacities during peak hours and the ability of the infrastructure to operate after repeated strikes.

6. Methodological assumptions of the scenario assessment

The scenarios in this article are an expert assessment, not an official forecast. They reflect the likely amount of capacities that can not only be declared or contracted but actually commissioned, connected, fuelled, protected, and operated during peak hours by early November 2026.

This is why the assessment divides four concepts: stated capacity, contracted capacity, physically commissioned capacity and reliably available capacity during peak hours. The fourth indicator is decisive for the winter.

7. Impact of new price caps from May 1, 2026

On April 23, 2026, the NEURC made a decision to revise price limits on the electricity market. From May 1, 2026, the maximum price of UAH 15,000/MWh and minimum price of UAH 10/MWh have been set for the day-ahead market and intraday market; for the balancing market, the maximum price is UAH 17,000/MWh, minimum — UAH 0.01/MWh.

This decision is good for shunting generation using gas, as it partially covers the high cost of production during peak hours. However, the price cap alone does not create a complete investment model for cogeneration. Cogeneration has a dual economy: electricity is sold on the market, and heat is sold at tariffs that are often politically set and do not cover the full cost of gas and capital expenditures.

The new tender partially removes this shortcoming due to a support mechanism, but it only covers projects that will pass competition and meet power and protection requirements. Therefore, in parallel, a separate fast model is needed for smaller municipal cogeneration facilities, operated near boiler houses, pumping stations, hospitals and heating plants.

8. Debts and payment discipline as a systemic risk

The debt problem has two interconnected aspects: the electricity market, and the natural gas/heating sector. For new cogeneration units this means the risk of the generator formally having the right to sell electricity at a high price, but actually receiving funds with a delay or not in full.

In the heating sector, the key problem is the debts of municipal heat supply companies for gas. According to Ukrinform referring to DiXi Group, as of May 30, 2025, the debts of municipal heat supply companies and water utilities for energy resources totalled UAH 124.2 billion, in that, municipal heat supply companies’ debts for gas — UAH 111.7 billion. In 2026, public estimates indicated about UAH 150 billion in debts of heat supply companies, heat-and-power plants and thermal electric stations for natural gas, more than 80% of that — overdue.

Municipal heat supply companies themselves are often seen as basic sites for cogeneration, but their financial capacity is limited by old debts, foreclosures, low liquidity and dependence on local budgets. Without separation of old debts from new cogeneration projects, utility sites will remain technically useful, but financially weak partners.

9. Investment interest: the first test of the two tools for realism

The key uncertainty for both government decisions is not just in the regulatory framework, but in the real willingness of investors to take on military, market and regulatory risks. Confidence in the market premium mechanism, predictability of settlements, access to funding, the possibility of connection and limiting imbalances will be critical for RES auctions. For shunting generation, access to gas, construction schedules, payments guarantees, cost of protection and risk of repeated damage to facilities are decisive.

If these issues are not resolved before tender procedures and financial closure, the state may receive less actual MW than expected by politicians. Therefore, success should be measured not only by the number of submitted applications but also by the share of projects that have passed financial closure, concluded accession contracts, have confirmed equipment, fuel contracts, physical protection schedules and a clear model of electricity and heat sales.

10. Problems of the current cogeneration model

• Revenue model. A cogeneration project depends on the hourly electricity price, heat tariff, gas price and payment discipline. This is not enough for bank funding; long-term instruments are needed — payment for available capacity, contract for difference, premium to market price or a separate model to support highly efficient cogeneration.
• Gas and heat components. If gas is purchased at market prices and the heat tariff remains politically restrained, the heat component does not cover real costs. Under such a model, cogeneration becomes profitable only at very high electricity prices or in presence of additional compensation.
• Creditworthiness of municipal heat supply companies. Municipal heat supply companies can be useful platforms for cogeneration, but they cannot always be independent investors. They need a model under which a new project is legally and financially protected from old debts.
• Connection to networks. For cogeneration, quick decisions on connection points, power delivery schemes, parallel operation modes with the network and technical conditions are critical.
• Heating priority map. Cogeneration should be introduced where it really reduces the risk of heat losses: at large boiler houses, pumping stations, hospitals, water utilities, heating points and other critical consumers.
• Physical protection. The requirement of second-level protection is correct from the security viewpoint, but it significantly affects the implementation time, capital costs and the need for centralized co-financing.

11. Realistic introduction of distributed gas generation by November 2026

The official target for distributed generation is much higher than the capacities that can be realistically commissioned by the beginning of November 2026. The reason is not only in the availability of equipment but also in the schedules of funding, delivery, installation, connection, conclusion of gas contracts, testing and protection.

Basic assessment: By November 2026, Ukraine is likely to have about 350-450 MW of actually operating new or restored distributed gas-fired generation capacities. This is useful but insufficient to make up for the losses of large thermal generation facilities and protect big cities from the risks of heat and electricity shortages.

12. Restoration of large heat and power plants/thermal electric stations by November 2026

In the case of large heat and power plants/thermal electric stations, three concepts should be distinguished: restoration of specific equipment, restoration of part of generating capacities, and full restoration of nominal capacities. By November 2026, full restoration of the most damaged large facilities is unlikely. Partial restoration of individual units or aggregates necessary for heat supply, peak coverage, and system stability is more realistic.

Reuters reported in May 2026 on plans to repair the Trypilska TPP and Centrenergo’s preparation for privatization, but at the same time noted the scale of destruction of thermal generation facilities, military risks, and timing uncertainties. This confirms that repairs to large heat and power plants/thermal electric stations remain necessary, but cannot be the sole reliance in the winter.

Basic assessment: by November 2026, approximately 0.8–1.1 GW of large thermal generation/heat-and-power plant capacities can be partially restored or maintained. The actual availability of these capacities in winter will depend on repeated attacks, fuel reserves, network conditions, facility protection, and personnel readiness.

13. Risks for big cities with district heating

Big cities highly dependent on district heating require separate analysis. For them, not only the shortage of electrical capacities is critical, but also the ability to maintain operation of boiler houses, heat-and-power plants, pumping stations, heating points, water utilities, and hospitals. Interruption of power supply to pumps or substations can quickly transform an electrical shortage into a heat, water, and social crisis.

Therefore, in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Zaporizhia and other large centres, priority heating maps are needed: where exactly cogeneration units, BESS, backup diesel generators, mobile boiler rooms, heat pumps and substation protection will give the greatest effect. Communities should be guided not by the quantity of procured equipment but the number of critical facilities that can operate autonomously after repeated strikes.

14. Cumulative effect for the winter of 2026/27

So, on paper, progress may look significant, but to survive winter, not the nominal megawatts will matter but the guaranteed availability of capacities during peak hours after possible repeated attacks. That is why physical protection, fuel, network connection, backup power supply for heating facilities and solvency of market actors become crucial.

15. KPIs by November 1, 2026

For preparation for the winter of 2026/27 not to remain a set of good intentions, it needs to be translated into a system of measurable indicators. By November 1, 2026, it is advisable to publicly monitor the following KPIs:

• how many MW of new generation capacities have not only been declared but contracted, funded, delivered, installed, connected and tested;
• how many MW of new shunting generation have confirmed contracts for gas, heat, electricity sales and reserves;
• how many facilities have received the second level of engineering protection or have an approved completion schedule;
• how many MW of RES are being commissioned in conjunction with BESS or other flexibility tools;
• how many boiler houses, pumping stations, water utilities, hospitals and heating stations have received backup power supply;
• how many large heat-and-power plants and thermal electric stations have returned not the rated but the actually available capacity during peak hours;
• what is the emergency reserve of transformers, pumping equipment, cables, gas modules and mobile boiler houses in the regions.

Such a dashboard should separate declared megawatts, contracted megawatts, construction readiness, network readiness, fuel readiness, protection, and actual availability. This will make it possible to avoid the illusion that a political decision automatically means the energy system's readiness for winter.

16. Policy recommendations

• To synchronize RES auctions, shunting generation competitions, BESS development, distribution system operator plans and city heating maps in a single regional resilience logic.
• To introduce a separate financial model for high-efficiency cogeneration: premium to the market price, contract for difference or payment for available capacity for facilities that increase city resilience.
• To settle municipal heating companies’ debts for gas and to create a mechanism that will allow using those utilities for cogeneration without carrying old debts to new projects.
• To provide for priority connection of cogeneration facilities, BESS and RES projects supporting critical heat and water supply, hospitals, transport hubs and other life support facilities.
• Not to confine this model to facilities above 10 MW: for large competitions, such a limit is logical, but for communities, a parallel fast track for 1–5 MW cogeneration facilities near boiler houses, pumping and heating stations is needed.
• To create standard cogeneration project packages for 1–2 MW, 5 MW, 10 MW and 20 MW with standard contracts, technical conditions, electricity and heat sales schemes.
• To finance physical protection of new generation facilities as a separate component of CAPEX, not leaving it solely to the discretion of the investors or communities.
• To create a separate monitoring dashboard for preparation for the winter of 2026/27: declared capacities, contracted capacities, construction readiness, connection, fuel, protection and actual availability during peak hours.

17. Final conclusion

The decision to support 1 GW of new RES projects and the competition for 1,322 MW of new shunting generation capacities have a common strategic goal — to strengthen the resilience of Ukraine's power system in wartime. The first decision creates a long-term investment signal for green generation, the second should make up for the deficit of manageable capacities at critical hours.

At the same time, for the winter of 2026/27, the short-term effect of these decisions will be limited. A significant part of the competitive, investment, construction and network cycle will fall on the second half of 2026 and beyond. Therefore, at the start of the heating season, resilience should be mainly provided by repairs, protection of existing capacities, backup power supply of thermal units, mobile solutions, emergency fuel and equipment reserves.

By November 2026, it is realistic to expect about 350–450 MW of new or restored distributed gas-fired generation capacities and about 800–1,100 MW of partially restored large thermal generation/heat-and-power plants. This can give a combined potential effect of 1.1–1.5 GW, but reliably available capacities during peak hours is likely to be lower, at around 0.8–1.2 GW.

Ukraine may therefore enter the winter of 2026/27 better organized, but not fully protected. It is critical that new RES, BESS, shunting generation, cogeneration, large heat-and-power plant and thermal electric station repairs, thermal unit backup and physical protection projects are implemented not separately, but as a single resilience programme. Without this, the country risks getting formally correct solutions but insufficient practical effect in peak winter periods.

https://razumkov.org.ua/statti/posylennia-stiikosti-energosystemy-plany-ta-realnist