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
UKRAINE-NATO: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES

In the system of Ukraine-NATO relations, which is democratically oriented system, it is possible to identify three main subjects. The first one is the official power structures of Ukraine and NATO, which directly exercise the co-operative process. The second subject constitutes of the population of partner-countries which pays the price of maintaining the authorities, and for whose benefit the official structures co-operate. And the third is the mechanisms of civil society that link the authorities and the people, and serve to control the authorities and to form the public opinion, particularly in this case — of the Ukraine-NATO co-operation.


In the first part of the magazine we give the floor to the representatives of the official structures of Ukraine and NATO, who were invited to participate in the traditional round table by correspondence organised by Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies.



Borys Tarasyuk,
Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine




Volodymyr Horbulin,
Advisor to the
President of Ukraine



Roman Zvarych,
People's Deputy of
Ukraine



Vadim Grechaninov,
President of Atlantic
Council of Ukraine



Christopher Donnelly,
Special Advisor to NATO
Secretary General for
Central and Eastern
European Affairs



Natalie Melnychuk Gould,
Head of the NATO
Information and
Documentation Centre
in Ukraine



Marco Carnovale,
Deputy Head, NATO
Eastern Europe and
Crisis Management Section,
Political Affairs Division



The UCEPS experts offered the following questions to the participants of the round table:

1. What are the most important achievements of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO?

2. What problems impede more effective co-operation between Ukraine and NATO?

3. What major priorities and strategic directions of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO for the next 5-7 years should be chosen?

In our opinion, the proceeding answers are of significant interest, since they are provided by those high-ranking officials and experts, who are directly involved in the decision-making process on the issue of Ukraine-NATO co-operation.

THE MOST IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO

Borys Tarasyuk. Ukraine's national interests in relation to NATO are determined by taking account of the important role played by the North Atlantic Alliance in maintaining world peace, stability, and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, and in the creation of a new security system in Europe.

Ukraine established its first contacts with NATO in the fall of 1991. Starting in 1992, when NATO Secretary General M. Woerner visited Kyiv for the first time, our ties became regular, and our co-operation reached the level that made it possible to conclude a unique bilateral agreement — the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO, signed on the 9th of July, 1997.



Only three years have passed after the signing of the Charter, but that was enough to prove the mutual benefits of our co-operation. Its consistent development is beneficial for everyone: for Ukraine, its partners, and European security as a whole.

For regional security, co-operation between Ukraine and NATO turned into a vital factor of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

First and foremost, the development of our co-operation largely contributed to the strength-

ening of the atmosphere of mutual trust in the region. As far as bilateral contacts are concerned, this is demonstrated by the active development of good neighbour relations between Ukraine and neighbouring countries — NATO members and applicants — and by the concluded basic bilateral documents that allowed for the successful resolution of some inherited disputes, and therefore became an important pillar of regional stability.

Regarding multilateral co-operation, an important contribution to the trust and mutual understanding in the region was our joint participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP).

Against this background, the joint participation of Ukraine and NATO in the stabilisation of Southeast Europe (in the past — in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, at present — in Kosovo), was very effective. By the way, it is namely this Yugoslav province that will soon become the arena for the first operations of the Ukrainian-Polish battalion, which may well become an important element of regional security, and bring experience that is unique for our region. We hope to see the development of this experience within the framework of the Ukrainian-Hungarian-Romanian-Slovak engineer battalion, the BLACKSEAFOR, etc.

To be sure, Ukraine-NATO co-operation has special significance for the regional security also in terms of the constructive peacekeeping role played by Ukraine in the settlement of so-called 'frozen' conflicts on the territory of the former USSR.

For NATO, the development of partnership with Ukraine means, in the first place, the strengthening of security and stability in Central Europe, since the Alliance found a reliable, predictable, and stable partner in our state that pursues a consistent foreign policy.

Of special significance for NATO is the vast economic, scientific, and military-technical potential of Ukraine. The developed defence infrastructure of our country is of practical interest for the Alliance, particularly for exercising peacekeeping activities, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations involving Ukraine. As is known, one of Ukraine's training ranges — the Yavoriv range — was officially designated a PfP training centre.

NATO and individual Allies are also interested in the development of co-operation with Ukraine as a country possessing high technologies and a powerful military-industrial complex, and show great interest in co-operating with our



country in the field of scientific research, the upgrading and development of new weapon systems, aircraft, etc.

We should also mention our active co-operation in the field of civil emergency management. In 1999, Ukraine was among the first to extend assistance to the earthquake-stricken NATO member — Turkey. In the current year, our country assisted another new member of the Alliance — Hungary — in overcoming the aftermath of the flood.

And finally, it was thanks to the active and efficient co-operation with Ukraine that NATO obtained another important result along with security benefits — significant experience in taking the opinion of partner countries into consideration when strengthening regional security.



As far as Ukraine is concerned, I would like to emphasise several important aspects.

First of all, it is very important that our co-operation contributes to Ukraine's active participation in the building of a new European security system. Such co-operation, and in particular, the participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers in multinational peacekeeping contingents IFOR/SFOR/KFOR, and in joint military PfP exercises, is conducive to the fighting effectiveness and combat readiness of Ukraine's Armed Forces.

It is both important and significant that NATO countries are granting essential financial

assistance and logistic support to Ukrainian peacekeeping units accomplishing their mission in Kosovo.

Co-operation with NATO provides for obtaining uninterrupted actual information on the experience of NATO members in reforming and building modern national armed forces, so useful in the process of reforming our Armed Forces.

Of important practical significance was our co-operation in the field of civil emergency management. Thanks to the mechanisms of such co-operation, Ukraine obtained essential assistance from NATO and Alliance members when a Ukrainian aircraft crashed near the "Macedonia" airport in Thessaloniki, Greece in December, 1997, and during the elimination of the aftermath of a flood in Trans-Carpathia in November, 1998. The absolute majority of the countries that rendered their assistance were NATO members or partners.

Significant results were also achieved in co-operation in the field of arms and defence technologies research and standardisation. Ukraine's participation in military hardware tenders held in NATO member and partner countries, such as Greece and Turkey, plays a very important, stimulating role.

Special significance is attached to our co-operation in the field of science and language training. In 1999 alone, more than 300 Ukrainian representatives took part in almost 250 different events (conferences, seminars, and symposia), organised by the Alliance. Within the framework of NATO's scientific programme, 250 winners were chosen for participation in the joint development of projects involving Ukrainian scholars; Ukrainian researchers were awarded 480 scholarships and NATO grants. As of today, the amount of the Alliance's funding of Ukrainian scientists' participation in the NATO "Science for Peace" Programme amounts to nearly \$1 mln.

Therefore, the Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO can be described as a practical, substantial process, constantly and dynamically developing in the interests of both sides.

Volodymyr Horbulin. Politically, the establishment of close relations between Ukraine and the Alliance has strengthened the guarantees of Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Through co-operation with this influential organisation, Ukraine actually, not verbally, became involved on a practical basis in the processes of constructing a new pan-European security architecture, and overcoming and preventing conflicts in Europe. Jointly with



NATO and other countries, Ukraine participates in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo. Over 6000 Ukrainian servicemen gained experience from such actions. Furthermore, the development of a distinctive partnership with 19 NATO nations has balanced the western and eastern directions of Ukraine's foreign policy, and contributed to its multi-vectored orientation.

Militarily, co-operation with NATO was conducive to Ukraine employing the experience of the most developed countries in the organisation of national defence, the building of up-to-date armed forces, the introduction of democratic civilian control in those spheres, etc. Ukraine's Armed Forces obtained (from the U.S., Great Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, France, and other NATO countries) significant diversified assistance (consulting, technical, financial, etc.) for their reforming and drawing closer to commonly accepted European models. Joint military exercises are conducted under the Partnership for Peace Programme, involving 27 partner countries.



It is worth noting that by developing co-operation with the Alliance, Ukraine began its movement toward the main goal — integration into Europe. It is no secret that Ukraine's relations with NATO are developing more actively than with the EU.

NATO, in its turn, found in Ukraine a reliable, influential, and active partner interested in the promotion of stability and democratic values, the prevention of threats in Central and Eastern Europe, and on the entire European continent.

Our co-operation with NATO also brought some positive results for the strengthening of regional security. Let me cite just one example. Co-operation with NATO was one of the main factors that made it possible to conclude famous treaties with Poland and Romania, and in this way settle complex problems of the recognition of the borders of our young state, through normal, peaceful, and civilised means.

Roman Zvarych. Despite Ukraine is not formally integrated within the trans-Atlantic system

of collective security based on NATO membership, at present, we already have certain advantages determined by our co-operation with this powerful bloc. In the first place, it is worth stating, that taking into consideration the present-day geopolitical realities, and the key role played by Ukraine in the post-Soviet space, it is unlikely that Brussels (and Washington, all the more) will agree to "give" Ukraine to Russia. Military exercises conducted within the framework of PfP, are definitely of great significance with respect to the combat readiness of our Armed Forces, and their adaptation to the Western military models. At the same time, these exercises are also important in the political sense, since NATO is visibly demonstrating that Ukraine has a certain "immunity" status, although we do not officially fall under the well-known Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Vadim Grechaninov. In the first place, co-operation with NATO gives Ukraine another assurance of its national security. This is not a matter of security guarantees — NATO cannot extend such guarantees to Ukraine, for we are not a party to the Washington Treaty. But the fact that the Ukraine-NATO Charter contains clause 15 providing for the creation of a so-called 'crisis management mechanism' for Ukrainian-NATO consultations, in cases where Ukraine sees a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security, gives our state a sufficient assurance in this respect.

Fortunately, there has been no reason for such consultations for the last three years. It can be assumed that one of the reasons for this lies in the existence of a possibility of such "crisis management mechanism" as a guarantee of regional security in general, and Ukraine's national security in particular.

NATO benefits from co-operation with Ukraine are of somewhat imaginary, declared nature, like providing for the pro-Western course in nation-building.

There are also some direct effects of Ukraine's direct co-operation with NATO. They concern the extension of meaningful relations between different agencies of Ukraine and NATO countries. It should be stressed that the most noticeable progress has been reached within the framework of co-operation with Ukraine's Ministry for Emergencies.

Christopher Donnelly. Without doubt, the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, and the establishment of the two NATO offices in Kyiv are the most important achievements in our co-operation. These events opened the way for increased dialogue and meaningful work.



As a result of the above, Ukraine's participation in PfP has grown to be substantial. In 1999, participation included approximately 180 activities, including nine exercises — one hosted by Ukraine. More than 230 Ukrainian officers took part in PfP events. Planned for this year are 150 activities.

There has also been a joint initiative to improve planning and co-ordination on the Individual Partnership Programme. This has resulted in a reduction in the number of events planned for this year, but with a stronger focus on supporting co-operation objectives — quality, not quantity.

A demonstration of this successful co-operation is seen in Ukraine's participation in the NATO-led peace support operations from 1995. Additionally, Ukraine's immediate contribution to KFOR indicates that this long-term commitment will continue. The deployment of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion will further strengthen this commitment.

Natalie Melnychuk Gould. While cordial and constructive relations were already developing between NATO and Ukraine before the July 9, 1997, signing of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Charter for the past few years has brought some particularly notable highlights to the relationship.

Demonstrating a mutual desire and commitment to further co-operation and understanding between NATO and Ukraine, many precedent-setting high-level visits occurred over this past year. In March 2000, the first ever session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at Ambassadorial level took place in Ukraine. The NATO Chairman of the Military Committee travelled to Ukraine, and Ukraine's Prime Minister met with the Secretary General of NATO in Brussels.

NATO continues to express its ongoing appreciation to President Kuchma and the Ukrainian Government in their continued efforts to contribute to shared stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notable are Ukraine's contribution to IFOR, SFOR, KFOR — both the existing helicopter detachment and the forthcoming deployment of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion to Kosovo in July 2000. It is indeed difficult not to note the significant work being carried-out by the ever busy Ukrainian helicopters and their pilots in Kosovo. Additionally, the March ratification of the PfP Status of Forces Agreement by Verkhovna Rada has assisted both Ukraine and NATO in participating in their various countries joint exercises.

While these are only a few of the recent, significant achievements of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO, we anticipate further open dialogue and work on mutually important issues in the future.



Marco Carnovale. NATO and Ukraine have developed an extensive programme of consultation and co-operation over the last several years. Since the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the following can be highlighted as the major achievement:

- ✦ a series of reciprocal high-level visits, including several visits by the Political Committee and a visit by the North Atlantic Council to Kyiv in March this year;
- ✦ a wide-range of consultations on security-related matters of common interest;
- ✦ co-operative programmes in the field of economics, including several seminars and a programme for the retraining of retired military officers in foreign languages, which has already produced some fruits with students finding jobs in the civilian sector;
- ✦ co-operation in the field of information, with a leading role played by the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine; this is aimed at providing correct information about NATO throughout Ukraine, and thereby overcoming lingering Cold War stereotypes about the Alliance;
- ✦ co-operation in the field of defence reform and the Ukrainian participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme, for which the Joint Working Group, established in 1998, and NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv play a crucial role;
- ✦ co-operation in the field of Civil Emergency Planning, with several exercises as well as real-life co-operation in the case of floods in the Kharkiv and Trans-Carpathian regions;
- ✦ co-operation in the field of armaments.



Perhaps most important is that NATO and Ukraine have built a friendly, constructive relationship of co-operation, which would have been unthinkable ten years ago. The major achievement of the last decade has been a change in mentality (which is still on-going) and this benefits not only NATO and Ukraine, but regional security for all Europe.

PROBLEMS THAT IMPEDE MORE EFFECTIVE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO

Borys Tarasyuk. To be sure, in any dynamic co-operation process, problems arise that require their solution, and Ukraine-NATO co-operation is not an exception. In my opinion, there are some problems that require mutual attention.

First and foremost, there remain mutual prepossession and psychological stereotypes inherited from the Cold War era. This is also much supported by the lack of information of Ukrainian citizens regarding NATO. However, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian population's interest in NATO is rising every year. For instance, according to a public opinion poll conducted by the 'Democratic Initiatives' Foundation in 1996, 45% of the population would like to have more information about NATO, in 1998, that number rose to 51%, and in 1999 — close to 60%.



Considering such a tendency, I see it as very important to intensify activity aimed at spreading unbiased information about NATO actions, and Ukraine's co-operation with the Alliance and its concrete results, particularly in the non-military and scientific spheres, in the field of emergency planning, social adaptation of retired servicemen, etc.

Furthermore, there are negative factors of a purely economic or technical nature that hinder

the development of more effective Ukraine-NATO co-operation, one way or the other.

For instance, Ukraine lacks experts with a good command of NATO's official languages. However, the situation is changing for the better. For instance, in 1999, an agreement was signed between the National Co-ordination Centre of Social and Professional Adaptation of Retired Servicemen, established under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and NATO, providing for Alliance funding of teaching 100 Ukrainian servicemen English, French and German at language course departments at the Alliance Francaise, Goethe Institut, and the British Council in Ukraine. Together with that, the number of Ukrainians studying foreign languages outside Ukraine at NATO specialised language courses is constantly growing.

Those examples demonstrate that the emerging problems should be resolved, and only by joint efforts. I am convinced that thanks to the unity of our efforts, the difficulties and impediments can, and will, be overcome.

Volodymyr Horbulin. First of all, the development of more effective co-operation between Ukraine and NATO is to a certain extent impeded by the psychological factor.

On the one hand, for forty years, our people were brought up in the spirit of hatred toward the West, and especially toward NATO, forming an image of the principal external enemy of our country and a potential aggressor. That's why its aftermath will be felt for some time to come, especially when taking the Kosovo crisis into account. On the other hand, some of our western partners are also as yet unprepared to significantly expand and deepen our ties, particularly due to the fact that in their relations with Ukraine, they are constantly keeping Russia in mind, expecting its negative reaction. Meanwhile, even in Russia, changes are taking place, and Russian officers are serving at NATO headquarters.

Secondly, even a greater impediment to the development of Ukraine-NATO co-operation are so called structural and operational factors. The point is that today, the existing general structure of Ukraine's Armed Forces, their formations and units, operational and combat planning procedures, administrative, logistic, and other support, significantly differ from standard NATO structures and procedures.

Thirdly, the sadly limited economic, above all, the financial capabilities of our country, and its Armed Forces, are also among the factors impeding the development of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO.



Roman Zvarych. In analysing the relations between Ukraine and NATO, it is worth remembering one decisive factor: Ukraine's geopolitical position on the map of Central and Eastern Europe. It is worth considering this factor not only in the regional policy, but also within the broader European (possibly Trans-Atlantic) context. Western political and military strategists recognise that Ukraine occupies a key position both as a country that can definitively determine the structure of the new Europe and, in particular, the architecture of Trans-Atlantic collective security. Such forecasts regarding Ukraine in the future world order are conditioned by several factors.

In the first place, in the political sense, the further consolidation of a Europe of sovereign nation-states will depend, to a large extent, on Ukraine's political ability to act as a bridge between the democratic West and the Russian Federation. The latter to this day is not able to come to terms with its lost status as a global superpower, which explains Moscow's inadequate reaction particularly with respect to NATO expansion.

Secondly, from an economic point of view, the country's significant industrial potential, rich black soil, numerous population, and multi-branched infrastructure, are all factors which logically pull us toward bilateral and multilateral trade relations with developed and less developed countries of the world. An important factor, especially in the area of economic security, is Ukraine's position on the crossroads of various transport (especially energy) corridors. We have not yet properly used this potential.

Thirdly, in the area of national security and military co-operation, Ukraine is not only playing the role of a political buffer in the complex dialogue between Russia and the West, but also occupies an important position as stabilising ballast in the rough seas of regional processes taking place within the post-Soviet space.

Our geopolitical position simultaneously has its advantages and disadvantages. Ukraine is not capable of independently ensuring its national security, independent of the so-called "Russian factor". And clearly, in today's uni-polar world, in which the "generous hegemony" of the U.S. is unquestionable, no European country is capable of taking on this assignment. A collective security system exists for this purpose on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Taking into consideration the cold opposition between Russia and NATO and, especially, the uncompromising position of Moscow regarding the membership of former republics of the USSR within the Alliance, Ukraine cannot look forward



to NATO membership in the near-term future. Meanwhile, agreeing to be pulled into Russia's orbit on the basis of the completely unreliable Tashkent Treaty would mean closing the door to Europe and, especially, to the European Union.

On the other hand, it is convenient to a certain extent for the West to keep Ukraine at a distance or, at least, slow down the pace of Ukraine's integration into the Trans-Atlantic system of mutual (collective) security. The modern-day dialectic of international relations dictates one paradigm: Ukraine's growing closer to Europe can lead to a deepening of Russia's isolation and, in its turn, to growing xenophobic tendencies on the part of the Russian population. These sort of tendencies would also be harmful to Ukraine. This leads to the conclusion that Ukraine can integrate into European structures, particularly of a military-political nature, only by pulling Russia along with it. The game is not simple, since the "aggressive wounded tiger" syndrome in Russia can result in unforeseen destabilising consequences. Nevertheless, it is definitely worth playing the game.

Vadim Grechaninov. I believe that the main impediment is the inadequacy of planning of co-operation activities on the part of Ukraine's MOD. In 1994-1995, when we laid down the guidelines for co-operation with NATO within the framework of the PfP Programme, we suggested MOD to be the main player. We considered it primarily important that the largest military structure of Ukraine masters more streamlined and cheap NATO standards.

Unfortunately, the way things are done in Ukraine's MOD, where slogans matter more than concrete deeds, is the main obstacle for military co-operation with NATO. I suggest it to be the main reason for the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's comment made at the end of May, regarding the absence of reforms in Ukraine's Defence Ministry: reform of Ukraine's Armed Forces was stipulated by both the Ukraine-NATO Charter of 1997, and the subsequent State Programme for Ukraine-NATO Co-



operation up through 2001. Indeed, no noticeable changes in the Armed Forces have been seen so far, with promises and slogans prevailing.

Christopher Donnelly. The major problem rests in the differences in cultural backgrounds — Western value system which has remained stable versus the old "Soviet" value system which is in a state of rapid change. Consequently, Western methods, which have evolved to deal with stable value systems fail when they attempt to deal with value systems in rapid and fundamental transition. This results in NATO and Western representatives experiencing great frustration because their point of view or explanations are not understood or are rejected, and co-operative plans and programmes which seem necessary and logical from the western point of view cannot be made to work properly. The essence of the problem is a lack of cross-cultural understanding.

A second problem is the difficulty in translating high-level support into effective action due to a lack of an overarching strategy on how military co-operation in PfP relates to the big picture of defence reform.

A significant part of the problem is financial. Trying to do with limited resources, including qualified personnel who may not have the necessary linguistic expertise, and a lack of dedicated funds for co-operation work.

Natalie Melnychuk Gould. As clearly stated in the first response, the NATO-Ukraine relationship is significant for identifying issues of mutual interest which may be addressed jointly and more effectively together than alone. Developing additional effective mechanisms and reducing barriers to NATO-Ukraine co-operation remains a priority.

The end of the Cold War has seen all of our countries embark on extraordinary restructuring and reduction of our armed forces. We are all moving towards modernized, mobile, flexible and more effective armed forces' capabilities, while simultaneously reducing costs to our taxpayers. NATO supports Ukraine's desire to restructure and notes that implementation would be a noteworthy step towards developing an efficiently modernized and reduced Armed Forces. In order to meet its own national security interests, NATO anticipates Ukraine will take part in more PfP exercises (such as the successful "Cooperative Partner" Odesa exercise including 17 countries), and will send more officers to NATO PfP training programmes.

Marco Carnovale. Resource constraints are of course a problem in Ukraine as much as in most other partner countries, and, indeed, in

many Alliance members as well. Allies bilaterally, and NATO as a whole, are doing a lot to overcome financial constraints and help Ukraine to take advantage of various possibilities for co-operation with NATO. The help, which several Allies provided to make it possible for Ukrainian contingent to continue to participate in KFOR, is one such case.

Another constraint is political: until recently, major political forces in Ukraine, including in the Verkhovna Rada, were sceptical about co-operation with NATO. This seems to be less of a problem in recent months, as testified by the Rada ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement, which will allow Ukraine to continue to take full advantage of PfP, including through exercises in the Yavoriv PfP training centre and elsewhere on Ukrainian territory. Allies welcome the more co-operative political climate which is emerging, though it is clear that much needs to be done to win the hearts and minds of many Ukrainians who are not yet persuaded of the benefits which co-operation with NATO brings to their country.

Finally, a problem which Ukraine and NATO are working to solve together is that of implementation. Experience so far has proven that NATO and Ukraine, together, need to place more emphasis on quality and less on quantity in their co-operation, so as to make the best use of available resources.

MAJOR PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO FOR THE NEXT 5-7 YEARS

Borys Tarasyuk. In developing co-operation with NATO, Ukraine sets itself a number of tasks. First of all, we are aiming to ensure reliable guarantees of Ukraine's state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of its state borders. Secondly, we intend to use the mechanisms of such co-operation in order to ensure favourable conditions for democratic transformation and economic progress of Ukraine as an integral part of an indivisible Europe. Thirdly, we channel our co-operation toward strengthening regional stability and interstate relations, based on the principles of neighbourliness and mutual trust.

As far as practice is concerned, I believe that this co-operation should focus on several promising directions, to mention the most significant.

First, continued co-operation in the field of military reform in Ukraine, through the exchange of information and the experience of democratic control over the armed forces and



defence structures, defence planning, defence policy and strategy; the reform and development of Ukraine's Armed Forces.

Second, it is worth intensifying co-operation aimed at providing compatibility with NATO members and partners, in particular, through the expansion of co-operation in the military and military-technical sectors, participation in joint military exercises, peacekeeping operations and educational programmes.

Third, further development of co-operation in the field of civil emergency planning should be provided.

Fourth, special attention should be paid to the deepening of co-operation with the NATO Information and Documentation Centre and NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine.



Fifth, we should continue active support for the participation of Ukrainian scientists in joint projects under the NATO 'Science for Peace' Programme involving NATO members and partner countries, etc.

I do not draw a line under the list of co-operative activities important for both Ukraine and the Alliance. I do believe that through practical measures, we will achieve the desired results, and take an important step toward strengthening Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic co-operation.

Volodymyr Horbulin. I believe that over the next 5-7 years, the strategic directions of Ukraine's co-operation with NATO should be interaction in the political, military and scientific spheres, in civil-military relations, and in the fields of armaments, civil emergencies, and peacekeeping operations.

In all of the mentioned spheres, we should attach priority to the transfer from ordinary co-operation to partnership, and in the political and

military-technical spheres — to a truly distinctive partnership. Of course, this can be achieved only under conditions of a stable yearly increase in the funding of NATO co-operation activities on the part of our state, among other factors.

Roman Zvarych. Of course, Ukraine cannot be complacent about the current state of affairs, especially with respect to the issue of ensuring our national security. Since our fate is to be "outsiders" in the exclusive club of NATO member-states, then we are placed in a position, to a certain extent, of conducting a policy independent of Brussels and Moscow. (By the way, our Foreign Ministry demonstrated such independence in the situation related to the Kosovo crisis).

It is also worth taking into account the fact that the NATO bloc has still not completely defined the role and place in the 21st Century for itself. NATO was created within the confrontational environment of antagonistic relations between two military blocs. In a bipolar world, where both sides were armed with a nuclear arsenal that made it possible to destroy each other several times over, it was necessary to conduct a delicate policy of balance and deterrence. The dialectic of these Cold War relations was dictated by the strategy of the so-called "mutually assured destruction". The confirmation by Western leaders that NATO was of an exclusively "defensive" character was not altogether true. For example, the well-known strategy of "forward defence", developed by NATO strategists in the '70s, had contained clear offensive elements.

This, however, is all in the past. Today, NATO is being transformed (although the plan for such a transformation has not been developed, let alone approved). The tasks now are different. Potential threats are of a purely different character, and with altogether different roots. Today, for example, the problem of "localisation" is becoming more of a priority (in the military sense) within the context of unforeseen regional or ethnic conflicts; that is, quick reactions to such unexpected "explosions" with the goal of their "containment", and finally bringing them under control over time. The conflict on the Balkan Peninsula demonstrated that NATO is not sufficiently prepared to undertake such a task. In this respect, Ukraine's Armed Forces can become a valuable and reliable partner. And again, by taking part in such peacekeeping operations, and involving itself in foreign conflicts which, at first glance, have nothing to do with our own national interests, Ukraine is actually ensuring its own national security, establishing itself as an unofficial participant in the overall system of Trans-Atlantic security.



And finally — taking into account, in the first place, the fact that NATO has not yet resolved the fundamental issue of its transformation and, secondly, Ukraine's key geopolitical position, we have the possibility of deciding the future of this important and powerful military-political Alliance. In order to achieve this, we need to conduct a policy, which could be called "asynchronous". That is, the kind of policy that does not completely set up the outdated paradigms of the past, but whose general principles also do not go contrary to the interests of the bloc or of its individual members. Without going into details, this sort of policy would come down to helping NATO in its transformation from a military-political bloc of countries with a common political culture and mutual security interests, into a broad-based political-military alliance capable of developing differentiated types of strategic military partnership and co-operation. This sort of model, in its time, had been proposed in some articles of Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski. The first step in this direction was the start-up of PfP. Within such a structure, it was possible to discuss the broad complex system and architecture of collective security, which could involve both Ukraine and Russia. (Some statements made by the newly elected Russian President Putin indicate that it is possible that Russia does not exclude such a possibility). Therefore, it would be possible to realistically begin the creation of a "security zone" which would include, at the very least, all of Europe and the North American continent. With time, models could be developed for spreading such a security system over Eurasia and the Pacific, with differentiated types of military partnerships. And the main thing is that in this way, Ukraine could become that determining factor about which Western strategists talk, having gained for itself the possibility of promptly resolving future tasks related to national security.

Vadim Grechaninov. We should gradually move from tactical co-operation to mastering NATO's strategic standards. I mean the transfer to and the introduction of NATO-type operational-strategic structure of arms and services in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as a civilian Ministry of Defence as a state-political body in charge of operational control of the Armed Forces. This should provide for the following:

- ❖ The Minister of Defence should be a political figure.
- ❖ The Chief of the General Staff should be a career military officer, Commander of the Armed Forces, and the principal military advisor to the President (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and the Minister of Defence.

The Armed Forces and other military formations should more actively introduce and implement principles of democratic civilian control, and transparency for the public.

Christopher Donnelly. Priorities should be focused in two areas: first, to implement a cross-cultural programme for both Ukrainians and NATO representatives to enhance understanding and build trust.

Second, establish an information strategy, both for internal and external purposes to help educate societies on the need to rebuild and restructure as well as assist in the processes of reform, e.g. developing a creditable justice system to combat crime and corruption.

Natalie Melnychuk Gould. Our major priority is to continue working together to shape future peace and to adapt to meeting mutual challenges and risks. The focus of the NATO - Ukraine relationship on civil-emergency planning, furthering our Science Programmes, economic security, military reform and information remain a priority. NATO Allies are committed to develop and implement Ukraine's plans for developing the Armed Forces it needs to meet the challenges of the future, and to the future use of the Yavoriv PfP Training Centre made possible by the passage of SOFA.



We will continue promoting complimentary co-operation through the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, the NATO Liaison Office, and the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform to achieve the goals of our Work Plans, Action Plans and other agreements which Ukraine and NATO develop jointly.

Marco Carnovale. Taking advantage of existing mechanisms for co-operation should be our common goal in the coming years: the Charter; the four Memorandums of understanding on information, civil emergency, on the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv and on armaments co-operation; the two NATO offices in Kyiv, working on information and on PfP and defence reform; the Ukrainian Mission



to NATO; the Ukrainian partnership staff elements are adequate tools with which to pursue co-operation. This will benefit NATO because it will contribute to consolidate a belt of stability around its periphery. It will also benefit Ukraine, as the kind of reforms which need to be implemented to co-operate with NATO are first and foremost beneficial to Ukraine itself: these reforms are vital steps toward creating a new defence establishment, under civilian and democratic control, which will serve the new security needs of the country and contribute to the construction of a modern and democratic Ukraine.

Another priority should be to ensure that co-operation between Ukraine and NATO is not, and is not seen to be, construed against any third party, and first of all against Ukraine's neighbours. Co-operation with NATO must not be an

alternative, but rather a complement, to good neighbourly relations for Ukraine. NATO membership is not on Ukraine's agenda, nor on NATO's, and it would be premature to consider that as a short- or even medium-term goal, though according to Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty it can't be excluded, in principle, for the longer term.

Thus, in the opinion of the participants of the round table by correspondence, the relations between Ukraine and NATO create certain guarantees for the national security of our country. There are gradual changes happening in the mentality of Ukrainians, from which benefit not only NATO and Ukraine, but European security in general.

Among the main internal obstacles to the development of relations with NATO, the participants of the round table name imperfect mechanisms of partnership and limited financial capability of Ukraine. As well, the political limitations are listed, such as noticeable political forces in our country, namely in the Verkhovna Rada, which have sceptical, and, sometimes, hostile view of co-operation with NATO.

The external limiting factor is the negative position of Russia towards Ukraine's co-operation with NATO.

It is worth noting not only the sincerity, but also the specific nature of the given answers. UCEPS experts consider it as a positive sign that Ukraine and NATO can overcome the current difficulties and proceed to the qualitatively new level of co-operation in the near future.



UCEPS SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

HOW MUCH OF NATO DO UKRAINIANS WANT?



*Andriy BYCHENKO,
Director, Sociological Service,
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None other than fate has placed Ukraine between the two strongest European centres of power that also happen not to be the best of friends — NATO and Russia. Given the situation, Ukraine intends to build its security by keeping to the non-alliance principle. At first glance, this policy seems to serve two masters, but in reality, it's non-viable. It has become clear that our country cannot stick to this position very long, and Ukraine will be in a position to either take someone's side, or risk being torn apart, as happened repeated times in the past.

Strengthening co-operative ties with NATO offers Ukraine one of the few possible options for ensuring its national security. But are Ukrainians themselves willing to take this opportunity as their western neighbours are doing, or do they have something else in mind and, namely, what?

Between May 26 and June 4, 2000, sociological service of Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies polled 2005 citizens aged over 18 in all of Ukraine's regions. The main aim of the survey was to find out the population's attitude toward NATO, and Ukraine's relations with this Alliance.

Having reviewed the "vox populi", we decided to present some ideas on the forms, depth of, and reasons for and against the development of Ukraine's relations with NATO.

SO, THAT'S WHAT YOU ARE, "COMRADE NATO"!

First of all, let's see how Ukrainians perceive NATO.


At present, **nearly half of Ukraine's population (46.2%) perceives NATO as an aggressive bloc** (*Diagr. "What do you think NATO is, first and foremost?"*). This has not always been the case. For instance, according to the "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation, in January, 1997, only 17.3% of Ukrainian citizens considered NATO

to be an aggressive bloc¹. Ukrainians' opinion was very much affected by NATO actions in Kosovo last year. Evidently, the average Ukrainian was not entirely convinced that the main purpose of the NATO action was to defend Albanians, rather than punish "disobedient" Serbs.

Only 8.6% of those polled considers NATO actions to be a forced, but necessary measure to protect Kosovars, and only 8.5% suggests that military intervention was needed to stop

¹ Ukraine and NATO: the attitude of Ukraine's population toward NATO. — The Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation. — January, 1997.

What do you think NATO is, first and foremost?
% of the polled



Yugoslavia's aggressive policy. By contrast, 33.6% of polled Ukrainians sees NATO actions in Yugoslavia as acts of aggression, while another 19.3%, as war crimes against the civilian population. 14.1% of those polled remained neutral, as they were certain that neither NATO nor Yugoslavia should be blamed for the conflict, but the UN, which appeared unable to resolve the situation through peaceful means.

The reason for such assessments probably lies not in a specific attitude toward Yugoslavia, but in the fact that, according to the majority of respondents, NATO had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state (even for purposes of resolving humanitarian problems). This view is shared by 55.1% of those polled. Only 11.9% of respondents believes that NATO has such a right, and 26.1%, that NATO should have such a right under a UN mandate. Perhaps, if KFOR spared no efforts to protect Serbs from Albanians, as NATO did last year to protect Albanians from Serbs, more Ukrainians would believe in the Alliance's peaceful intentions.

After Kosovo, even in the most pro-NATO inclined Western Ukraine, as much as 29.8% of respondents considers NATO to be an aggressive military bloc. It is interesting to note that on this issue, pro-NATO Western Ukraine does not significantly differ from the pro-Russian Crimea, where 32% holds the same opinion. Only 15.3% of Crimeans believes that Ukraine should never join the Tashkent Treaty, while among all Ukrainians, this view is shared by 42.2%. When choosing between Russia and NATO, Crimeans are probably motivated by their traditional pro-Russian sentiments, rather than by hostility toward NATO.


To be sure, the attitude of Ukrainians toward NATO is conditioned, among other things, by the heritage of Soviet anti-NATO propaganda, and the sympathy of some regions toward Russia's tough stance. This is confirmed by the fact that

the most hostile perception of NATO (56.1%) was demonstrated in the 'proletarian' Russian-speaking East of Ukraine, where more than 60% spoke out in favour of restoring the USSR², and almost three-fourths (73.1%) of the population name a Russian and CIS orientation as the country's main foreign policy priorities.

The remainder of Ukraine's citizens, 53.8%, or the majority, does not consider NATO to be an aggressive bloc. 21.5% of the polled sees NATO as a defence alliance, and 16.5% is certain of NATO as a peacekeeping organisation. And their position is not without grounds. Indeed, how could the better-off (than Ukrainians) Czechs, together with the Poles and Hungarians, join NATO for purposes of entering a so-called "aggressive bloc"? It is hard to believe that the purpose for so doing was to threaten their neighbours with aggression. And a dozen of our western neighbours, not to mention the Baltic states, are doing their best to become NATO members — are they so attracted by its aggressiveness?

Another 15.8% of those polled could not decide how they perceive NATO. It is likely that for these people military problems are not among the main priorities. Their number almost coincides with the number of those who suggest the main guarantor of security in Europe not to be the defensive union (NATO), but the economic union (the EU) — 15.2%.

Leading institution for ensuring regional security in Europe,
% of the polled



If we speak about *ensuring European security*, only 4.1% of Ukrainians sees NATO as its main guarantor (*Diagr. "Leading institution for ensuring regional security in Europe"*). A majority of our compatriots entrusts this mission to the United Nations Organisation (39.3%) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (24.8%).

Therefore, Ukraine's population is not yet convinced with the idea within the State

² Results of the poll held by the UCEPS sociological service between January 25 - February 5, 2000. On the whole, 2010 citizens aged over 18 were polled in all of Ukraine's regions.



Programme of Ukraine-NATO Co-operation through the Year 2001 that "Ukraine sees NATO as the most effective structure of collective security in Europe, and an important element of the pan-European security system".

Such a low rating for NATO among regional security organisations is probably the result of the fact that only 10.5% believes in NATO's desire to defend Ukraine in the event of aggression, or the threat of aggression. Slightly more than a third (37.5%) of respondents believes that NATO would defend Ukraine if it were its member, while roughly the same number (36.9%), that it would not.


In this context, the population's position regarding Ukraine's possible accession to NATO is clear. Half (50.6%) of respondents considers that Ukraine should never join NATO, a quarter (23.4%) said that it should join the Alliance in 5-10 years time, and 9.3% of those polled responded that Ukraine should join NATO within 10-15 years.

It is interesting to compare these data with the opinion of experts questioned by UCEPS at one of its recent "round tables". The polled experts, mostly representatives of the highest echelons of the executive and legislative branches, and leading scholars in the field of national security, gave the following responses: 41% — Ukraine should never join NATO, 15% — Ukraine should join NATO in 5-10 years, another 44% — in 10-15 years. Quite likely, those

polled were mostly experts who often visit the West and see all of NATO's benefits with their own eyes (*Diagr. "Ukraine should join NATO"*).

So, the general picture is such, that even after the allied operation in Kosovo, which was unpopular in Ukraine, almost two-thirds (59%)

Attitude of Ukrainian citizens to NATO enlargement,
% of the polled




of the country's elite and one-third (32.7%) of its population support NATO membership. If NATO is successful in enforcing peace in the Balkans, and the process of the European Union's enlargement does not cut Ukrainians from the West, this percentage will probably rise.

It should be noted that Ukrainians treat NATO quite differently from Belorussians and Russians. Only 8.2% of Belorussians believes that Belarus should ensure its security by joining NATO³. In Russia, only 19% of respondents names their country joining the Alliance a priority, while the share of those that consider NATO an aggressive bloc is higher in Russia (56%) than in Ukraine⁴.

The process of NATO enlargement also met with mixed assessments among respondents. 21.0% of those polled considers that this process means the strengthening of a democratic security system in Europe, and is beneficial for Ukraine. Another 7.3% sees this process as favourable, or the one that would help emancipate Ukraine from Russia. Almost half of our citizens gave a negative assessment of this process. 19.6% of those polled considers NATO enlargement to be an unfavourable process, as it would strengthen Ukraine's dependence on the West. Almost as many — 19.5% — fears that as

Ukraine should join NATO,
% of the polled



³ Grigoriev I. Citizens of Belarus are for reforms, but without a shock. — *Vremia MN*, May 6, 2000, p.4.


⁴ Russian poll of urban and rural populations. — The "Public Opinion" Foundation, Moscow, March 9, 2000.

a result of NATO enlargement, Ukraine can be drawn into opposition between Russia and NATO. At the same time, only 7% of those polled sees an immediate military threat in NATO enlargement.

TEMPTING, BUT PRICKLY...

Although NATO does not extend any security guarantees to Ukraine, it offers many opportunities for strengthening its security. To co-operate with Ukraine and other countries, NATO initiated the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). Within the framework of this Programme, each of the 27 partner nations is free to choose any events to its liking from a broad list of co-operative programmes. Those who are willing to do so, can improve their combat tactics, hold seminars, learn languages, or train in peacekeeping operations (*Diag. "Dynamics of Ukraine's co-operation with NATO"*). And all this for almost nothing, as the Alliance has covered nearly all of the expenses connected with Ukraine's participation in PfP events.


Dynamics of Ukraine's co-operation with NATO



However, we failed to employ those vast opportunities properly. There was a desire to bite off more than we could chew: over the last four years, Ukraine regularly planned to take part in around 300 events, but implemented roughly half of that amount with the same regularity (*Diag. "Ukraine's implementation of Individual Partnership Programme events"*), as our organisational capacity appeared to be beyond our capabilities. It was indeed difficult preparing the necessary documents, finding the right people, and allocating expenses (in those instances when NATO requested the Ukrainian side to cover at least part of the costs).

On the other hand, co-operation within the PfP framework was slowly but surely becoming more meaningful. For instance, at present, the

Ukraine's implementation of Individual Partnership Programme events, % of planned number



Ministry of Defence, which in 1995-1996 employed just one officer to deal with NATO (Lieutenant Colonel P.Kanana, who would toil like a workhorse), now operates an entire section staffed with qualified officers. Designated sections also work within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as other agencies.

It should be noted that today, few events fail because of the fault of the Ukrainian side. This year, the number is no longer a goal in itself; fewer events are planned, namely, those needed to strengthen national defence and provide interoperability with NATO for purposes of improving co-operation. An important precedent was established: at a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission in Brussels on May 10 of this year, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Colonel General V.Shkidchenko, for the first time spoke in English. Greater attention is now paid to foreign language lessons at Ukraine's military schools.

Provided that the vast experience already gained (*Table "Ukraine's co-operation with NATO in figures"*) is used effectively, good prospects exist for such forms of co-operation as interaction for eliminating the aftermath of emergencies, the participation of Ukrainian officers in the work of allied staffs (Russian officers are already there), NATO-led peacekeeping operations, military-technical co-operation, the retraining of retired officers, the employment of Ukrainian transport aircraft for military airlift operations, etc.

However, the public is not yet adequately informed about co-operation with NATO within the PfP framework (*Diag. "Awareness of citizens of Ukraine's participation in the events of NATO Partnership for Peace Programme"*).


It came as a surprise that more than half of polled Ukrainians (53.4%) was unaware of NATO Partnership for Peace Programme. Another 8.6% of respondents does not know that Ukraine is a party to this Programme, while 38%



Ukraine's co-operation with NATO in figures, 1994-1999

Events within the framework of PfP	nearly 600
Ukrainians involved in PfP activities	over 5000
NATO grants to Ukrainian scholars	nearly 500
Ukrainian scholars granted financial assistance for seminar participation and other events	over 700
Ukrainians trained in NATO courses	over 800
Retired servicemen trained in language courses (Kyiv, Rivne, Sevastopol, Uzyn)	100
Joint weapon systems projects	over 50
Ukrainian servicemen who took part in NATO-led peacekeeping operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR)	nearly 6000

Awareness of citizens of Ukraine's participation in the events of NATO Partnership for Peace Programme, % of the polled



are aware of that fact. Among those who know what the PfP is, the attitude to it is mainly positive. Almost half (45.8%) of those believes that participation in this Programme strengthens Ukraine's security, and a third (35.2%), that such participation has no effect on our security. Only 9.4% is inclined to believe that such co-operation weakens Ukraine's security.

Most (56.2%) of those who are aware of NATO Partnership for Peace Programme believes that joint military exercises within this programme's framework raises the combat efficiency of Ukraine's Armed Forces. 24% of respondents doesn't think that such exercises in any way influence the combat efficiency of our Armed Forces, and 9.6% suggests that they undermine their combat capacity.

The survey's results demonstrate that people familiar with the PfP Programme are mostly positive toward NATO. That is, the more people know about PfP, the better their attitude toward

it. This, therefore, makes the conclusion possible, that if Ukrainians were better informed about the assistance rendered by NATO to Ukraine, they would be less critical of the Alliance.

It is interesting to note that peaceful Ukrainians attach priority to the non-military aspects of Ukraine-NATO co-operation in the scientific (27.8%) and political (21.9%) fields. Military and technical co-operation is assumed to be a priority by 15.2% of those polled, while only 4% believe the same to be the case with military co-operation. The remaining 15.3% holds to the opinion that Ukraine should not develop any forms of co-operation with NATO.

However, there are no reasons for optimism thus far: primarily those co-operative forms are usually being chosen that don't cost Ukraine anything. The answers given to the question regarding funding sources for Ukraine-NATO co-operation demonstrate the lack of a consensus concerning this issue. Respondents' views were divided almost equally. 23.1% is satisfied with Ukraine's "consumerism". These people believe that funds should be provided mainly by the Allies, as is the case today. 22.1% suggests that Ukraine should finance its own participation, and 20.3% — that NATO funds should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Another 17.3% of those polled has a special opinion: they are convinced that Ukraine should not co-operate with NATO at all.

Despite some evident achievements, the experience of several years of Ukraine-NATO co-operation, unfortunately, proves the firmness of the Soviet bureaucratic heritage and its traditional suspicion of foreigners. Every once in a while, someone will say that something is "bugged" in computer classes being presented to

us, and at the right moment, all the information is transmitted to a satellite, or somewhere else... However, this suspicion does not prevent making requests of NATO for money, or travelling abroad at NATO expense. And the political winds also change at times, as well: either a Ukrainian battleship returns home after travelling halfway for an international exercise, or 240th peacekeeping battalion returns from Bosnia for unclear reasons. Meanwhile, the State Programme of Ukraine-NATO Co-operation through 2001 clearly states that "Ukraine's strategic goal is the fully-fledged integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and full participation in the system of pan-European security". If we declared such a strategic (!) goal, then we probably should not spare any efforts toward its achievement. Or is it the case that we don't care about the end result?

...AND NOT TO RUSSIA'S LIKING

The role played by Russia in Ukrainians' attitude toward NATO should not be overlooked. 63% of those polled said that Ukraine should take Russia's stance into account with respect to Ukraine-NATO relations, while only 26.4% believes that Russia's position should be disregarded.

More than a third of respondents (37.6%) is convinced that relations between Russia and NATO will be tense for the next five years. 13.2% of Ukrainians agrees that in the five years to come, Russia and NATO will establish friendly relations. 9.9% believes that within that period of time, Russia will seek NATO membership, 6.1%, that the Alliance will want to see Russia in its ranks, while 4.6% suggests that Russia's accession to NATO will be desired by both Russia and NATO.

Russia itself⁵ is evidently hostile to Ukraine's co-operation with NATO. "Do you understand what NATO's presence in Ukraine means? It means that an hour after the start of hostilities, the Northern Caucasus will be cut off," prophesied A.Solzhnitsin⁶. Those sentiments are echoed by the Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral V.Komoedov in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*: "Such a "game" cannot but bother Russia... Face to Europe means back to Russia". Unfortunately, a jealous attitude toward

Ukraine's striving for European integration and drawing closer to NATO is inherent for the majority of Russians. Among factors seen by Russian experts as those most negatively affecting the attitude of Russians toward Ukraine, the 'further deepening of Ukraine's co-operation with NATO' occupies the first position: this opinion is shared by 84% of those polled⁷. At the same time, Russians tend to forget that the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation provides for much more effective mechanisms of co-operation with NATO for Russia, than the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine does for Ukraine. In particular, the Russia-NATO Act provides for the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, while the NATO-Ukraine Charter only provides for consultations. Should not what is good for the goose also be good for the gander?

As the Kosovo events became a kind of watershed in the attitude of Ukrainians toward NATO, the same is true on the attitude of Russians toward Ukraine-NATO co-operation. Before the events in Yugoslavia, Russians looked at Ukraine-NATO co-operation mostly with contemptuous alertness. And after Ukraine refused to join Russia's boycott of NATO, their attitude became clearly hostile. This hostility was openly expressed during high-level meetings and in mass media, where statements such as "The extension of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO presents a *potential threat* for Russia" were heard⁸. Or they would again emphasise "the objective need for liquidating NATO, as the last largest relic of the 20th Century"⁹. The Martinet style of simplicity and specificity, just so as not to forget.

However, there are forces in Russia which realise the fallacy of this stance. For instance, the ex-Foreign Minister A.Kozyrev stated that "If we continue measuring our relations with Ukraine by the stupid yardstick of its rapprochement or non-rapprochement with NATO and the West as a whole, we will increase the dependence of both countries on the West, and lock ourselves in 'Asiaopa'"¹⁰. The usefulness of Ukraine's and Russia's joint movement toward Europe was supported by the vice-speaker of

⁵ When speaking about Russia's position, Moscow's voice is normally meant, mistaken for the opinion of the whole Russian state. Meanwhile, the voice of sacked and miserable Russian regions goes mostly unheard.

⁶ Kirillova S. The Patriarch and his adherents. — *Stolichnye Novosti*, May 23-29, 2000, p.11.

⁷ Chaly V., Pashkov M. International image of Ukraine: the view from Russia. — *National Security and Defence*, 2000, No.3, p.61.

⁸ Yuriev I. An ally or a geopolitical rival? — *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, October 29, 1999, p.4.

⁹ Kliuchnikov V. At odds with the times. — *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 12, 1999, p.3.

¹⁰ Kozyrev A. The road to Kiev lies via London. — *Vremia MN*, April 25 - May 1, 2000, p.5.



Russia's State Duma V.Lukin who spoke at an international seminar "Ukraine between Russia and the West. The strategy into the 21st Century", held in Kyiv on June 19-20, 2000.

Russians tend not to believe Z.Brzezinski, who told Russia's *Komsomolskaya Pravda* newspaper that "It would be a blessing for the whole world, including America, if Russia transforms into a modern, prosperous, democratic, non-imperial state", since he is in favour of NATO enlargement. Meanwhile, NATO is trying to convince Russians of the need for building partnership relations. The Alliance's Secretary General Lord Robertson spares no efforts in repeating: "We see Russia not as an enemy, but as a partner"¹¹. Nevertheless, they have failed to convince Russia of their sincerity. Indeed, Russia seeks equal rights with NATO in the resolution of European security issues, while NATO continues talking about "partnership", instead of "equality"...

The thesis of "equal rights" (without mentioning responsibilities) sounds good, if one forgets that the GDP of "Great Russia" is close to that of the "small Netherlands" (let alone France, once so loved by ourselves as a point of reference), and about the social rights of its citizens, Chechnia, and other similar things. But Russia has failed to convince Europe and the U.S. that nuclear missiles alone present a sufficient argument for *being respected*. This may be enough to cause *fear*, especially in the "near abroad", but in Europe, "fear" and "respect" are not the same.

There is a noticeable gap between Russia's ambitions to play a leading role in international security, and its real abilities to back those ambitions. Until Russia sobers up (turns into a democratic and non-imperial state), Ukraine will not feel safe. The West is more attractive for Ukrainians than the East. More than half of those polled (55.1%) believes that we should, first of all, seek EU membership, and only 5.2% give priority to NATO. Another 10% believes that NATO and the EU should be of equal priority. 17.9% of respondents is sure that Ukraine should strive for neither the EU nor NATO. This means that for Ukrainians, the EU is the most desired goal, as they associate their economic prosperity with this organisation.


What does the West, represented by Mr. Brzezinski and Lord Robertson, mean for Ukrainians? For us, it normally means if not an ideal (especially after Kosovo), then freedom, democracy, wellbeing, and the real protection of human rights.

And what can we associate Russia with? Ahem... Russia, most likely, means: (a) the heroism of a great people permanently paying for the sins and drawbacks of its unworthy leaders; (b) a nation as poverty-stricken as we are, but more conceited, and lucky enough to sit on oilfields; (c) afflicted with a sense of inferiority, awkwardly attempting to prove its greatness; (d) endlessly searching for a national idea in the shadows of the Russian soul, etc.

What are those in Russia who don't care about the position and the intentions of Ukraine counting on? Are they hoping to frighten us by their military power, or by cutting the gas pipeline? Isn't it the fear of an inadequate response on the part of the 'great neighbour' that makes Ukrainians so cautious about Russia's position? How would Russians appreciate such a perception of their country? Or are they really hoping to ensnare Ukraine into the pro-Moscow Tashkent Pact? As it is not ripe enough to join it voluntarily.

Although Ukrainians are worried about Russia's stance regarding relations with NATO, the attitude of the public to Ukraine's accession to the Tashkent Treaty, led by Moscow, is approximately as cool as to joining NATO: 42.2% of respondents believes that Ukraine should never join this bloc; 26.5% suggests that this should occur in 5-10 years; 4.4% — in 10-15 years. It is natural that experts are still more reserved about Ukraine joining the Tashkent Treaty...

Ukraine should join the Tashkent Treaty,
% of the polled




Regarding the most vital question for Ukraine of Russia-NATO relations, a third of those polled (33%) believes that in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO, Ukraine should stay as neutral as possible. 18.3% of respondents suggests that Ukraine should be a

¹¹ See: Soloviov V. The Alliance and Russia have co-ordinated their positions. — *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 24, 2000, p.5.

mediator in conflict settlements, and 15.7% — that Ukraine should think about who to take sides with, proceeding from its national interests. 23.7% of those polled suggests unconditional support for Russia, 3.2% — for NATO.

Ukrainians, therefore, although sympathetic with the “western way of life”, are unprepared to fight for it — they would be happy to somehow stay away from the contradictions between Russia and the West, and not to take sides with anyone. Maybe things will become settled one way or another...

Problems that bother Ukrainian citizens



NONE OF OUR BUSINESS... WILL WE GET AWAY THIS TIME?

At present, the majority of Ukrainians is not concerned about the prospects of co-operation with NATO but, above all, about economy problems. For instance, answers to the question about the most urgent current problems named primarily economic problems: the general deterioration of the standard of living (this problem worries 60.9% of respondents); delayed wages, pensions, and other payments (59.1%); the overall economic situation (57%); unemployment (49.1%). Political and defence issues are much less important. For instance, Ukraine's relations with Russia worry 8.1% of those polled, the decline in the country's defence capabilities — 4.1%, while the possibility of joining NATO — 2.4% (*Diag. "Problems that bother Ukrainian citizens"*).

When asked a direct question about the desired alternative of coexistence with NATO which would best suit Ukraine's interests, almost half of those polled (45.6%) suggests that Ukraine should choose a non-allied, neutral status. 11.7% would like Ukraine to join NATO together with other CIS countries, and 15.4% supports unconditional NATO membership. Ukraine's joining the Tashkent Treaty, as an alternative to NATO, was supported by only 7.9% of respondents, while 5.4% is irreconcilable regarding NATO. It is worth noting that Ukrainians are becoming more positive about neutrality: in 1997, only 22.7% of citizens spoke out in favour of the country's neutral, non-allied status¹².

It seems that out of the three possible foreign policy orientations — the West, the East, or neutrality (non-alliance) — Ukrainians are tempted to choose non-alliance (“it's none of my business”). They have nothing against improving their wellbeing, together with the West, but the latter (in the form of the EU) tends to put up barriers for the “poor”, and these attempts sometimes look insane. Meanwhile, some that are ‘just like us, but without the prehensile tail’, Estonians, for example, and others — managed to unite around a simple, clear, and exclusively national idea. They organised themselves, and are no longer strangers in Europe. We were not capable enough, and that's why we are “not” willing to. We do have our “own” pride.

Neutrality by itself could be a possible way out for us. Our Declaration of State Sovereignty announced our intention of becoming neutral. There are people in our country who sacredly believe in such a possibility, and propose taking immediate steps toward real neutrality¹³.

¹² Ukraine and NATO: the attitude of Ukraine's population to NATO. — The Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation, January, 1997.



But this depends not only on our will. True (permanent) neutrality should be fixed in international treaties. The state should obligate itself not to participate in military conflicts between other countries, not to join military blocs and alliances, not to allow foreign troops and military bases on its territory (sic!). Permanent neutrality must be recognised by other countries.

Given our situation, we can talk ourselves hoarse declaring our neutrality, but won't get it, since its recognition requires that the main players in the region agree to Ukraine's neutrality, as was the case with Austria and Switzerland, or we should be rich, like Turkmenistan. Or united and determined to retaliate, like Finland and Sweden. Are we?

All neutral countries in Europe are clearly pro-Western. Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland are active participants of the PfP. There is no hesitation on their part, as on ours. Our hesitation already sandwiched weak, divided Ukraine between pressure from the East, and the West. We are trapped like a chased wolf. The space for manoeuvring is becoming increasingly narrower.

In this connection, rhetorical questions arise: Will Russia, whose population is dying out and destroying itself through drinking (the average level of strong drink consumption is almost double the level of degradation¹⁴), give up its attempts to reintegrate a 50 million-strong, mostly Slav region? Is Russia building naval bases for the Black Sea Fleet on its own territory in order to move it from the Crimea in 17 years (when the term of its stationing on Ukraine's territory expires)? Will the West risk quarrelling with nuclear Russia for 'undecided' Ukraine?

In current situation, Ukraine's ability to maintain its security is degrading at such a rate, that the first timid manifestations of economic recovery may be too late to stop this degradation. Maybe we should not wait while our Eastern "brothers" or "sisters" take us with their bare hands without asking our opinion, and decide by ourselves?

Because our own history proved repeatedly that hesitation won't bring any good. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's banner once bore the letters "EK MJIO", that is, a Cyrillic abbreviation for His Royal Highness... And what came out of this?

SOME CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING GLOOMY REFLECTIONS

For Ukrainians, NATO is: (a) a seemingly aggressive bloc which, for unknown reasons, does not pose any threat to Ukraine; (b) an alliance of democratic and rich countries unwilling to help Ukraine in the event of aggression against poor, half-democratic Ukraine. Consequently: (c) we do not entrust European security to the Alliance, and (d) our desire to join NATO is not very strong. At the same time, even a slight inclination toward joining NATO among Ukrainians is much stronger than among our Eastern Slavic neighbours — Belorussians and Russians.

Therefore, *the attitude toward NATO on the part of Ukraine's population is rather contradictory*. Ukrainians are clearly sympathetic to the "western way of life", but unprepared to fight for it; they would like to stay away from any disputes between Russia and the West, and not take any sides.

The most positive attitude toward NATO is demonstrated by those who know more about it (experts and people aware of the PfP Programme). Those who know less about NATO's activities are more negative, and sometimes hostile to NATO. Such an attitude is evidently based on poor information about NATO in the Ukrainian press, and mainly anti-NATO materials of Russian mass media which are much more accessible to the average Ukrainian than Western mass media.

No good will come of our "multi-vectored foreign policy". We should decide on our orientation, and not within the trite frame of reference — West or East, NATO or Russia. We should proceed from the values that are necessary for us: democracy, human rights and freedoms, wellbeing. Application for NATO membership is a formal question. The essence is the sincere readiness to strengthen co-operation with NATO.

NATO presents opportunities, but cannot maintain a country: it should finally rise and invent mechanisms for co-operation. Of course, it would be better for Ukraine to move toward NATO together with Russia, but we cannot wait forever while Russia becomes ready for that.

The availability or, rather, the non-availability of funds should not be the decisive factor


¹³ Pavlenko A. Ukraine, non-allied and neutral... — *Narodna Armiya*, May 30, 2000, p.6.

¹⁴ Vodka and Centralization, Shaken Not Stirred. — *STRATFOR.COM*, June 8, 2000, p.1.

in our co-operation with NATO. If we want to be reckoned with, we should demonstrate our ability to reform the economy and the defence sector, since it is not enough to declare the neutrality that is so dear to us: it should be secured.


As far as the “multi-vector foreign policy” proclaimed by Ukraine is concerned, this phenomenon can be said to be traditional for Ukrainians: one should recall the classic play “Chasing two hares”. The desire to grasp everything is understandable, but everyone knows how the literary masterpiece ends. To be sure, there are no grounds for counting on better

results in the political “masterpiece”. Unfortunately, examples do not only exist in literature: in Ukraine's history, there were instances where our ancestors hesitated when an alternative was available, wasted time and, finally, were forced to do what external circumstances demanded: there was no more choice left, for others made their choice, and not we. If we are prudent, we should learn from mistakes, rather than repeat them. Now, we still have a choice, and should make it. Such an opportunity will not last forever, and if we don't make a decision, others will do so instead.



UKRAINE - NATO RELATIONS: EXPERT'S VIEW

UKRAINE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR



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Three stubborn facts influence Ukraine's place in the world at large. The first is that Ukraine is a new state. Its state institutions are still relatively weak, especially in promoting the basic laws and policies required to establish long-term economic, political and social well-being. Politically, Ukraine is in fact a highly competitive oligarchy, mitigated by important democratic and pluralistic features such as elections and a diverse (but not fully free) press. The competing factions in this oligarchy are primarily concerned about the division of wealth and power, not overall economic or social good. Like other post-Soviet states, this kind of politics is highly personal and corrupt.

Ukrainian civil society is weak, permitting the state to function as it does without a reliable check on its actions. Only at election time is this state of affairs subject to overhauling from below, which is why the past parliamentary and presidential elections are times of high anxiety for the Ukrainian establishment. This preoccupation with state-building and elite competition pushes even basic foreign and security policy considerations to the back burner, as well as delays the reforms needed to ensure that western-oriented policy inclinations have deep roots in Ukraine at large.

The second fact is that Ukraine is a divided society. The source of this division is not as many analysts feared—the ethnic divisions between Russians and Ukrainians. Rather, the main sources of division are political, economic

and regional. Only Ukrainian sovereignty is securely established throughout the country. For some, this sovereignty is the realization of a life-long dream. For others, it is simply an established fact to be reckoned with, like the weather. Most other basic issues about state and society in Ukraine remain unsettled, from private property and basic social issues to cultural and geopolitical orientation. Mercifully, these divisions do not mirror ethnic ones, and many of them also reflect not deep conviction but a high degree of uncertainty and misunderstanding in the population at large. These divisions reveal that the squabbling that goes on among factions in the Ukrainian foreign policy community over NATO or CIS integration takes place against a still unformed national, political and geopolitical identity for the country as a whole.

A third fact is that Ukraine remains "in-between" geographically. The enormous geopolitical changes that helped to give birth to an independent Ukraine have nevertheless left it as a key state in between Russia and NATO- or EU-Europe. This geography matters a lot. Consider what Poland's post-1989 fate might now be if the Soviet Union had not fallen or Belarus and Ukraine did not become independent. No doubt, the Poles would still have found ways to reform internally and to move westward, but Poland's ambitions were aided greatly by the disappearance of a significant border with a strong eastern neighbor opposed to Poland's integration with the West. Ukraine, potentially, has such a neighbor. This geographic link should not require the



West to treat Ukraine and Russia as linked in all matters, but some sort of link exists and does matter. The West's Ukrainian policy cannot be conceived without regard for geography. Ukraine cannot act without taking Russia into account, Poland no longer has to.

These stubborn facts suggest several conclusions about Ukraine as an international actor in the next decade.



❖ These facts suggest, first and foremost, that Ukraine is embarked on a long and potentially unstable transition. This transition stretches out the time line for defining Ukraine's place in Central Europe, or the former USSR or Europe as a whole. Ukraine will remain a state likely to muddle through, unable and unwilling to define itself once and for all as either an European or Eurasian state. The great danger is that these facts and the West's indifference could result over the next several years in Ukraine's peripheralization from the European mainstream. Indeed, many politicians in Ukraine and in the EU are glad of a situation in which Ukraine is not qualified for membership in Europe's main institutions. It relieves both sides from serious policy decisions. Yet the constraints and delays affect both ambitious western-oriented policies and leftist visions of deep integration with Russia or the CIS. Indeed, the notion that any drift away from Europe is necessarily a movement toward Russia is wrong. The left, various economic, political and ethnic interests in the East and South and other groups constrain Ukraine's European choice, but other economic, regional and ethnic interests equally constrain efforts to pursue an "Eastern" or "Russian" choice.

❖ The major factors affecting Ukrainian foreign policy are internal ones. Internal divisions and economic problems become more urgent than any foreign policy problem short of major war. These factors also rob Ukraine of the ability

to bring real resources to the table. They are more important in the making and sustaining of a European-oriented policy, because this policy requires sustained Ukrainian political and economic reforms. Sustained Europeanization requires sacrifice. small, western-oriented foreign policy elite cannot "sneak" the country into the EU.

❖ Russia remains Ukraine's most important external influence. The need for normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations is obvious, both for Ukraine itself and for European stability. Significant progress has been made toward this end with the 1997 Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Fleet Agreement. Yet this work is unfinished. Without such a normalization, given the basic political, economic and military advantages Russia enjoys, a fairly significant power gap is likely to emerge, one based on Russia's size, natural resources, economic potential and military power. Such a gap has, in the past, been fatal to Ukraine's independence. Yet, so far, Russia's own internal economic and political troubles have made it difficult for Moscow to use its economic, political, ethnic or military influence in a productive way. To date, this basic incapacity of the Russian state has been as much of a factor in Russia's Ukrainian policy as the pragmatism of the Yeltsin government. Yet long-term Russian incapacity is neither likely nor a stable basis for normalized Russian-Ukrainian relations. Russian-Ukrainian relations cannot simply continue down the same road without a more thorough normalization of national identities and ambitions on both sides and the prospect of at least some serious integration into the European and global systems.

❖ Ukraine's relations with its neighbors (Poland, Romania and GUUAM partners) play more and more important role in the region. These relations are part of the larger pattern of fragmentation within the former USSR and diversification of ties with states outside the former USSR. GUUAM initially brought four CIS states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) together to oppose revisions to the flank limitations in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Now joined by Uzbekistan, it seeks deeper cooperation on security and energy issues. Polish-Ukrainian relations have blossomed into a full blown strategic partnership. Romania and Ukraine have eliminated or at least mitigated potential sources of conflict in the bilateral relationship, opening the way to genuine cooperation in this part of Central and Eastern Europe. These new diplomatic patterns provide a counterweight to pressures from Russia, but their real test is whether they can act positively together on a more ambitious agenda.



❖ Ukraine's relations with the West have entered a difficult stage. Though the notion of Ukraine's strategic importance is more widespread than ever, many in the West have turned to other criteria — political and economic reforms. Investment conditions, the death penalty or the treatment of individual western businesses — as the measuring stick for judging Ukraine and Ukraine's long-term place in the West. And by such measures, Ukraine's progress is not substantial. **Ukraine's basic success in muddling along and its failure to inspire Western confidence in near-term improvement to create in major western countries a view that current conditions inside the country and between Russia and Ukraine will somehow remain as they are without substantial western efforts.** There is comfort in this notion because it means the West can postpone hard decisions about Ukraine's place in core western institutions. Yet such an approach ignores the positive role western engagement has played in sustaining positive trends within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia. Though the West played no formal mediating role in issues other than denuclearization, the shadow of the West continues to fall directly on Ukrainian internal and foreign policy. Both Russia and Ukraine understand their actions

have consequences for the Europe and West as a whole. If the West signals to both countries that they are permanently allied to the periphery, it would surely remove an important prop for the muddling through mat many in the West now take for granted. An extended cycle of Ukrainian internal economic and political stagnation and Western neglect of Ukraine would alter the factors that make the current situation tolerable within Ukraine and less dangerous for Ukraine's neighbors. It would exacerbate economic deprivation in the country as a whole, particularly along crucial ethnic and regional fault lines, such as Crimea. Western disengagement from Ukraine would also remove a support for stable Ukrainian-Russian relations. A peripheral and stagnate Ukraine would increase the danger that NATO and EU would find themselves facing an uncertain and unstable frontier.

Given these facts, what is lacking is a western strategic consensus on Ukraine that recognizes both a common interest in Ukrainian stability and independence and fashions a transitional strategy that recognizes this interest and the reality of Ukraine's current shortcomings. Such a strategy would recognize that Ukraine currently falls short of making a serious claim on membership in either NATO or the European Union. Yet it should not close the door to long term membership. It should not decide now, once and for all, Ukraine's (or Russia's) place in Europe. Indeed, it should recognize that the deepening of the existing lines of division within Europe is a sign of failure. A Western strategy of transitional period should concentrate on coordinating disparate economic and technical assistance, expanding aid to Ukrainian civil organizations political parties, especially in the center, encouraging military reform and security integration and sustaining western engagement in Ukraine and Ukrainian-Russian relations. The West needs to realize that, with regard to Ukraine, it is still riding of events which occurred in 1989-1991. These events gave the West the unprecedented opportunity to refashion a security order in Europe that has at least the chance to eliminate the sources of major war on the continent but this opportunity also imposes the heavy responsibility of seeing this work through to the end. And that work remains unfinished as long as Ukraine is adrift.





NATO RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE: PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS



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The U.S. and NATO pursue close relations, bilaterally and multilaterally respectively, with Ukraine, and Ukraine wants substantive and close relations in return — while recognising the importance of constructive relations with its eastern neighbour. Given the pressures from both East and West, Ukraine's leaders have performed an admirable balancing act — perhaps the only realistic course given the circumstances. While Ukraine's relations both with the U.S. and NATO have made great strides since 1991, putting substance into its relationships with the West has been difficult and spotty at times, particularly in certain sectors. Further, Ukraine's slow progress in reforming its economy and defence establishment has proven frustrating to western policy makers and institutions. Though this paper focuses on major aspects of NATO-Ukraine relations, it should be remembered throughout that the U.S. is a NATO Ally, and has often been *primus inter pares* for Ukraine-related issues. This paper aims to provide a fresh look at the development and character of NATO-Ukraine relations, particularly aspects in the security/military realm, assess the current situation, and suggest ways for moving forward¹.

UNDERSTANDING UKRAINE

Newly independent Ukraine inherited a great deal from the former USSR, and not much of it good.

In terms of military power, Ukraine inherited SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs, strategic bombers with nuclear cruise missiles, and a host of tactical nuclear weapons. As well, it inherited some 40 per cent of the former Soviet Union's armed forces in both soldiers and equipment, including 6,000 tanks and 1,400 combat aircraft. That equipment is now ten years older, ten years of too-little maintenance and virtually no modernisation.

Ukraine also inherited the legacy of a centralised political system, command economy, oversized military, etc., but its experience with these structures was not in developing or organising them based on Ukrainian national interests, but in

implementing decisions made elsewhere and based on others' interests — and with a 'glass ceiling' restricting Ukrainian participation at top levels.

Thus, from independence, Ukraine had to start from scratch to develop expertise in designing and managing foreign policy, economic stabilisation and reform, defence/military affairs, social welfare and development programmes, and every other area critical to the smooth running of a sovereign state — including intra-governmental prioritisation, planning and co-ordination. Indeed, Ukraine has had to try to define itself and its own interests as a sovereign state; a process best described even today as a "work in progress".

UKRAINE STEPS FORWARD

Ukraine was the first Former Soviet Union country to join PfP, in February 1994, and when the Alliance made space available for

¹ I do ask the readers to remember that the views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the U.S. Government.



Partners to establish a political and military presence at NATO, Ukraine took advantage of this new aspect of the Partnership. Ukraine also sent a liaison officer to the Partnership Co-ordination cell in Mons², and in January 1998 added a Military Representative to its Mission at NATO. Ukraine also joined the PARP, adopting a number of basic Interoperability Objectives (15 IOs in 1995, and 28 in 1997) for those forces it had earmarked for possible participation in PfP activities, and in 1999 identified additional capabilities as its PARP Partnership Goals as potential contributions to real-world NATO-led operations. These included capabilities or forces for air transport, headquarters augmentation, NBC defence, and combat/combat service support units.

Just being willing to provide limited information on its Armed Forces (such as that entailed through PARP) is, in itself, progress. Clearly, **Ukraine's military/defence leadership have a long way to go toward leaving Cold War-reminiscent secrecy behind, but such is essential if they want substantive help from beyond their own borders. It is equally clear to me now that this lack of transparency has been a hallmark of Ukraine's military 'co-operation' relations.**

On 1 June 1995, President Kuchma visited NATO and announced his desire to raise NATO-Ukraine relations to a higher level. This was followed that September by a visit of Foreign Minister Udovenko, for a 16+1 meeting with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to discuss European security issues. Such high

level meetings have continued. During this same period, Ukrainians attended a wide variety of PfP activities, including military exercises — and hosted a number of exercises on her own soil — and were particularly active in the area of disaster relief and civil emergency planning. Consultations also covered such areas as economic security, defence industrial restructuring, downsizing and conversion, retraining of retired military officers, research and technology, and scientific and environmental issues. Ukraine also worked with NATO in peace-keeping operations, contributing forces to IFOR, SFOR and to the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia. More recently, it has contributed a helicopter transport squadron to the NATO-led KFOR in Kosovo, and sent relief teams to both Greece and Turkey in 1999 when those nations were rocked by earthquakes — just as NATO nations organised assistance for Ukraine's trans-Carpathian region after serious flooding in November 1998.

Relations reached a new plateau and gained added impetus in July 1997, with the signing of the "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine" on Madrid Summit of NATO heads of states and governments. This Charter also established the NATO Ukraine Commission which would meet at Ministerial level (summit level if agreed) at least twice each year to assess the overall relationship and suggest ways to improve or further develop co-operation between Ukraine and the Alliance. That Commission met on April 24, 1999 at summit level in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Washington DC. Allies reaffirmed support for Ukraine's "sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and the principle of inviolability of frontiers". For his part, Ukraine's President reaffirmed Ukraine's determination to continue efforts toward "democratic political, economic and defence reforms as well as to pursue its goal of integration in European and transatlantic structures"³.

UKRAINE'S PLACE

The January 1994 Brussels Summit's declaration by heads of state and government notes, "we believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapons-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability"⁴. It should be remembered (and Ukraine no doubt does) that the "likewise" in

² Its task is to help to plan and co-ordinate Ukrainian participation in PfP's joint military activities.

³ For both quotes, see: NATO Press Communique NUC-S (99)68, April 24, 1999.

⁴ Issued by the NATO Office of Information and Press, Para 20.

the sentence just quoted refers to the several preceding sentences regarding Russia. **Every ministerial communique since then, by both foreign and defence ministers, has had similar language regarding Ukraine's importance to European "security and stability," language always placed right behind language on Russia⁵.**

One problem is, such words repeated often enough are seen as both obligatory (by Allies) and meaningless (to Ukraine) — unless the words are matched by substantive practical Co-operation by both sides. Another problem is the message this repeatedly sends to Russia; i.e., our relationship with you is more important than that with Ukraine. It at least implies a recognition of Ukraine as being within Russia's "sphere of influence", but also casts Ukraine as one of the West's answers to limiting Russia's possible ambitions as a "great power". This approach only serves to build suspicion and competition, not the partnership and Co-operation so often hailed in official pronouncements.

In my opinion, the reality is that for NATO, as for the U.S. bilaterally, Ukraine has always been a secondary concern, worked in rough parallel to relations with Russia but always two steps behind and never being recognised as truly important, in its own right, outside that competing context. That attitude needs to change.

All this has not meant a lack of activity in NATO's relations with Ukraine. In fact, NATO has been willing to meet Ukraine at least

halfway on most issues or desires. In May 1997, NATO opened an Information and Documentation Centre in Kiev to make information about the Alliance more widely available to Ukrainian citizens⁶.

At the December 16 (1997) meeting of Foreign Ministers, NATO and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness, which included a provision for joint studies aimed at enhancing response capabilities regarding nuclear accidents. This culminated a rich vein of Co-operation between NATO and Ukraine in the area of Civil Emergency Planning, begun in 1992 under the NACC⁷, and which has continued through today. At this same meeting they also agreed to **establish a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR)**, and approved a NATO-Ukraine Workplan for 1998. In 1998, **Allies agreed, albeit reluctantly, to Ukraine's wish to have a NATO Liaison Office in Kiev to help Ukraine improve its participation in PfP.** This office has both a civilian head and a military officer advisor⁸.

For its part, in 1997, Ukraine established the State Interagency Commission on Co-operation with NATO, and set up the PfP and Peacekeeping Co-ordination Centre in the General Staff. As well, it established partnership co-ordination sections in the various services and regional commands. Also, special interoperability programmes were set up for units earmarked for NATO-led operations.

More recently, Ukraine has been very active in NATO's Science Programme, garnering collaborative research grants, computer networking infrastructure grants, and a variety of other Science for Peace projects. It has also taken advantage of projects and consultations with a variety of other committees, including the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Joint Medical Committee, and Industrial Planning Committee.

JOINT WORKING GROUP ON DEFENCE REFORM

The JWGDR merits detailed discussion, as defence reform was seen by all Allies as perhaps



⁵ See, for example, the communiqués from foreign and defence Ministerials in Luxembourg on May 28, 1998, in Brussels on June 11, 1998, on December 8, 1998, on December 17, 1998, as well as the Summit Communiqués from Madrid (July 1997) and Washington (April 1999).

⁶ Keeping this Centre operational has been a problem, however, as the first director died in an auto accident, the second was fired after several months, and a third (current) director was not in place until mid-1999. Thus, during the turmoil surrounding NATO's air campaign against Serbia, the office was not operational.

⁷ Kalchenko V. Ukraine-NATO Co-operation in CEP. — *NATO Review*, Autumn 1998.

⁸ Military person was appointed in 1999, while civilian manager could not be found till January 2000.



the most important and needful subject for Ukrainian consultations with NATO. A U.S. initiative, the JWGDR was seen as a way to stop 'whittling at the edges' and get to the roots of Ukraine's need for military reform at the macro-level — really, to help Ukraine jump start a process perceived by the West as completely stalled, if indeed it had ever amounted to more than attrition in place. Once agreed by the NATO-Ukraine Commission at December 17, 1997 ministerials, Allies hoped the JWGDR could work at the strategic level to provide guidance and direction to the largely tactical level activities that were the mainstay of NATO-Ukraine relations. Without strategic-level reform, the usefulness (even appropriateness) of those activities was called into question.

For the Allies, the macro-question was simple — what do you need and want to reform and how can we help?



From my perspective, without answering that question the Ukrainian MOD/GS stuck to pushing tactical activities — dealing with topics for which many PfP activities already existed, or for which PARP was designed. The terms of reference for the JWGDR gave the MOD/GS plenty of maneuvering room as they mention consultative activities regarding: civil-military relations; defence planning and resource management; and military education. Other areas could be added as mutually agreed. Had articles such as UCEPS' analytical report "Ukraine's Armed Forces: current state and problems of reforming"⁹ been available or known to Westerners trying to understand the

situation, more progress could have been made. As it was, the profound nature and scope of Ukraine's need for defence reform, including the fact that the "armed forces" refers only to those assets/personnel controlled by the MOD and not to the militaries controlled by a variety of other ministries, was little understood by outsiders.

Though the JWGDR was envisioned as a mechanism to spur and help Ukraine's efforts at macro-level defence reform, **results have been largely disappointing.** Disappointment, even frustration, was perhaps exacerbated given the importance Allies attached to the issue and since the JWGDR seemed to get off to an auspicious start. Even at its first meeting however, hosted on March 2-6, 1998 by the U.S. at the Marshall Centre in Garmisch, it was clear that **the MOD/GS had its sights set much lower than did Allies** — or at least was working from very different definitions.

Indeed, over the next year the MOD/GS resisted holding JWGDR events on macro-issues such as force planning, preferring instead to continue discussions on officer retraining, resource management, civil-military relations, etc. Though many Allies considered this to be mere duplication of existing PfP or PARP activities, they also realised the futility of trying to "force" the agenda. The JWGDR plodded on, and **Allies became more convinced that the MOD/GS was not serious on the subject of defence reform;** rather, that it was content to attrit the military over time while maintaining its own bloated and ineffective structures. On the other hand, briefings by Ukrainian representatives claimed that reform was ongoing as funding allowed. That is, it wasn't that they were unwilling, simply unable.


In mid-1999 Lieutenant General Kuksenko, Ukrainian Military Representative to NATO, briefed NATO on the "Practical Aspects of Military Reform in Ukraine". In that presentation, he said a "new principal proposal is to *increase JWGDR role in Ukraine to the appropriate state level, as the sphere of its activity includes a number of issues, which are within the interest not only for the Ministry of Defence.* That is why, at the joint sessions in future, we will wider (sic!) involve experts of the state bodies, which provide and co-ordinate military reform in Ukraine. *The results of our work should be concrete recommendations to the higher military-political leadership of the country*"¹⁰.

⁹ Analytical report "Ukraine's Armed Forces: current state and problems of reforming". — Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kyiv, May 1996.

¹⁰ Statement circulated to Allies at the May 20, 1999 meeting of the MC/PS with Ukraine. Italics added by the author.



Since General Kuksenko's briefing however, there has been little progress to note on this issue.



Progress has been made however, under extremely difficult financial circumstances, and needs to be highlighted. Current reform plans, such as they are, recognise political, economic, social/humanitarian, legal, as well as purely military aspects of reform and restructuring. **The importance of professional education was recognised early on and by early 1999 hundreds of officers had completed professional academic courses in Europe and North America**¹¹. While gross numbers are only one factor, Ukraine's MOD-controlled military has been reduced by more than half since 1992, and the number of officers in senior ranks is finally falling. An NCO academy was opened July 1, 1999, with significant help from the U.S., and a training programme was started with U.S. assistance to develop military-economic expertise within the General Staff.

Toward greater interoperability of units identified under PARP, improvements have also been made in key areas such as organisation and processes of command and control, logistic sustainability, supply standards, aircraft IFF equipment, air traffic control procedures, and language/staff training. This may not sound all that impressive to the West. One should recall however that in the 1997 assessment of PARP Interoperability Objectives agreed in 1995, a comment applied to explain lack of any progress for virtually all IOs was that there was no structure or organisation with

the responsibility to implement changes. **Given its starting point, Ukraine's progress really is noteworthy.**

Whether Ukraine now intends to move forward with broad based defence reform is unclear. Finances are no better now than five years ago, and over the last several months, Ukrainian authorities have sent mixed signals. In late 1999, President Kuchma reportedly issued a general directive for broad-based defence reform¹². This was followed 29 February by a visit to Kiev of Secretary General Robertson, Allied Ambassadors to NATO and the Chairman of the Military Committee for a NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting. Touted by the press as "a major step toward closer links between the western alliance and the former Soviet state seeking integration into European structures"¹³, this meeting may have been seen by some Allies as more a matter of going through the motions. Contributing to this was the now widely circulated UCEPS study "Military Reform in Ukraine: The Start, or Another False Start?" — copies of which had been provided to all Allies on February 11 — and which according to one contact "caused quite a stir". With defence reform naturally high on NATO's agenda, this comprehensive study cast Ukraine's need for/and lack of defence reform in stark relief — and included a variety of specific recommendations for change. **Foreign Minister Tarasyuk himself characterised Allies as "critical of Ukraine's record of reforming the Armed Forces"**¹⁴. **He didn't say they were wrong.**

Kuchma's directive? One source told me the tasking had rolled downhill to the MOD, and thence to the General Staff. If it did go to the MOD/GS, then it makes sense that little would happen in the near term as any serious recommendations for reform would considerably impact the size (jobs) and make-up of those staffs. **Asking any organisation to reform itself is problematic at best.** It may be recalled from the U.S. own experience that the Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 is more widely known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act — named after its Senate sponsors and not after the Secretary of Defence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the time.

¹¹ This and other areas of progress were briefed by Major General M.Dzubak, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, at the Bi-national Commission meetings on January 25-26, 1999, in Eglin, FL, USA.

¹² See: Military Reform in Ukraine: The Start, or Another False Start? — UCEPS analytical report, *National Security and Defence*, 2000, No.1, p.28.

¹³ Solovyov D. Ukraine Hosts Top NATO Officials, Eyes Closer Ties. — Reuters, http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20000229/wl/ukraine_nato_1.html.

¹⁴ Ling Ch. NATO Urges Military Reform in Ukraine. — Reuters, March 1, 2000, http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20000301/wl/ukraine_nato_2.html.



UKRAINE ADMITTED SOME PROBLEMS AND ASKED FOR HELP

Though Ukraine, various Allies, and corporate NATO itself regularly touted Ukrainian participation in PfP (and continue to do so), the actual track record did not always match the rhetoric. In fact, Ukraine's poor participatory habits had tarnished its image within the Alliance. Ukrainian officials recognised and then admitted their lacklustre participation during the first visit to NATO HQ by the State Interagency Commission for Co-operation with NATO on November 18, 1997.

Mister Horbulin, head of the Commission and Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, addressed Allies to "convey our concern on the status of implementation of the Ukrainian IPP and the quality of our participation in PfP". After reviewing the objectives of its workplan for 1998, priorities for the Armed Forces Co-operation through PfP, and 1997 exercises in which Ukraine participated, Horbulin went on to discuss why Ukrainian implementation of the 1997 IPP had been "chaotic and fragmented and was not objective-driven". Among the nine reasons he cited for this were: **acute problems related to the transitional period of establishing statehood; lack of experience and mechanisms for developing and implementing such programmes; incom-**

plete structures for co-ordinating participation by the military districts, armed forces and services; no nationally integrated programme to provide training for participation, including language training and staff procedures; and, scarce resources (financial and human).

Horbulin then presented Allies with an opportunity. He asked assistance in developing a "new, modest and meaningful IPP which will enable us to concentrate on the most vital, crucial and important aspects of achieving interoperability". He also called for "the establishment of a team of dedicated experts" to assess the situation and provide practical recommendations to help develop roadmaps to interoperability, first for units/elements earmarked for PfP participation, and then to *"help us devise the programme of reforming and modernising the entire Armed Forces."* Horbulin humorously added that "we know that NATO is a classical Mr 'Niet', first to reject the idea outright and then to reconsider after a while". Sadly, Mr Horbulin was wrong. In fact, **such requests for help were seen by many Allies not as opportunities but as embarrassing episodes of a sovereign nation admitting its inaptitude.**

Horbulin visited NATO again in late 1998, to brief Allies on the "State Programme of Ukraine's Participation with NATO for the period until 2001" which had been approved by Presidential decree on November 4, 1998. Ukraine's previous engagement with NATO had been largely dominated by activities of the Ministry of Defence/General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Ministry for Emergencies. This new programme envisioned participation by a much wider group¹⁵. Admitting that all of the activities could not happen at once, Horbulin explained that individual activities would be built into future IPP's and NATO-Ukraine Workplans. While this point seems obvious, how it translated to Allies is not.

What the Programme represented was potentially unprecedented openness and transparency, with the possibility of contact with all the ministries involved in Ukraine's basic nation-building efforts, including its continuing transition to democratically based institutions and a market economy. In a later presentation, the Programme was described as providing "for the establishment of direct contacts among branch ministries, agencies and institutions of Ukraine

¹⁵ Full text was circulated to NATO and Allies, and was "welcomedas a tangible signal of Ukraine's commitment to a productive relationship with NATO" in the Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, issued at the Foreign Ministers meeting on December 9, 1998. See: *NATO Review*, Spring 1999, p.26.



and relevant NATO structural divisions"¹⁶. This was a truly golden opportunity, not just for corporate NATO, but for each Ally to expand Co-operation and help Ukraine to find its way to closer integration with the West. Among Allies, including the U.S., however, the reaction was mixed at best. Allies welcomed the new Programme, and encouraged Ukraine to set priorities for areas and activities. Unfortunately, since Horbulin had said implementation would be through the annual IPP and Workplan, where the primary responsibility for making proposals lay with the Partner, Allies considered that the ball was still in Ukraine's court — and largely took a wait-and-see approach. **Instead of being seen as a matrix that NATO and individual Allies could use to take the initiative in helping Ukraine to accelerate its progress, it was regarded more as a nice sounding wish list. In this way, another key opportunity was allowed to slip away.**

ATTEMPTS TO ENHANCE UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION

It is somewhat ironic then that **by early 1998 there was a sense among Allies that NATO-Ukraine relations were drifting from a lack of serious engagement by Kyiv** (that Kyiv might hold a reciprocal perception was not appreciated). For this reason, a workshop was convened in Washington April 8-9, 1998, co-sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defence Project. The event brought together 50 policy experts, high-level government officials and academic scholars from the U.S., Ukraine and NATO to develop specific recommendations for both short and long-term measures to broaden and deepen NATO-

Ukraine relations. The recommendations focused naturally on economic and defence reform, noting **in particular the need for multi-year strategic plans, priority setting and assessment mechanisms**. While stressing as full as possible participation in PfP and other programmes, the workshop report also calls for implementation and follow through on reforms.

Recommendations voiced at the workshop were not all directed at what Ukraine should do. Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S., Yuri Shcherbak, gave an impassioned closing address which called on NATO, the U.S. and all Allies to do their part as well. For instance, he pointed to restrictions preventing Ukrainian high-tech products from entering U.S. and EU markets. In a return to irony, he said **there was often the impression that the Charter had become the end of a process rather than a platform for even more meaningful Co-operation in the future, and he called on NATO to develop a "clear-cut and detailed concept of interaction" with Ukraine — including how Allies can co-operate with Ukraine in the military-technical area to take advantage of Ukraine's existing but stagnating military industrial capabilities. Both sides then called for a more strategic approach, but in the months to come that was not aggressively pursued by either side. Too often, such events become "one off" with the expectation that someone else will follow up.** Recommendations developed at the workshop need to be dusted off, updated and put into action¹⁷.

Other attempts were made to encourage Ukraine to implement more of its IPP activities. Also, the point was made that it was not PfP participation that was ultimately important; rather, it was PfP application that Allies looked for. The numbers game, both numbers of events listed in an IPP and numbers of events actually attended, while an important indication of seriousness attached to the programme, was a side issue. Another aspect stressed regarded Ukraine's low attendance rate at course slots set aside for it by the NATO (SHAPE) School in Oberramergau, Germany. **Last minute no-shows, too late to offer the slots to another Partner nation, were particularly troubling. As well, Ukrainians who did attend such courses too often turned out to be the wrong people to send. That is, they had no experience or responsibility in the area to be discussed, did not have the requisite language**

¹⁶ From a briefing entitled "Presentation of the National Programme of Co-operation between Ukraine and NATO for the period up to the year 2001". Presented at the January 25-26, 1999 Bi-national Commission meeting in Eglin, FL, USA.

¹⁷ Carter A., Miller S., Sherwood-Randall E. Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership between Ukraine and NATO. — Preventive Defense Project, 1999, Vol.1, No.3.



skills to participate effectively, or were there for another reason such as tourism and shopping. Apparently, this continues to be a problem, witness Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's comments at the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Brussels on December 19, 1999. He said that Ukraine "must send the best-qualified people to every meeting or training session with NATO"¹⁸. I know of no other Partner for whom such comments are felt necessary.

A third aspect stressed was the importance of Kyiv using at least some token amount of its own resources as a show of commitment to the relationship. By late 1999, many of issues regarding Ukraine's approach to PfP had not been resolved. From a pure numbers standpoint however, the IPP for 2000 is at least an improvement over that for 1999 — which listed a whopping 295 activities.

FINANCIAL WOES DETRACT FROM UKRAINE'S IMAGE

Ukrainian authorities repeatedly pushed for the Alliance to establish a budget line item specifically to cover Ukrainian costs not already covered by the PfP Funding Policy. For example, Ukrainian costs to participate in JWGDR and NATO-Ukraine Commission activities (e.g., to attend Ministerial sessions) were not covered. Allies proved unwilling to go this far, particularly as PfP was originally established as a "pay as you go" programme, with a generous 80 per cent of Partner costs covered by NATO common budgets as an interim measure to ensure maximum participation. Allies knew as well that the U.S. covered the remaining 20 per cent of Partner costs via its Warsaw Initiative programme.

More than that however, Allies grew weary of the requests for funds because this was supposed to be a "distinctive" relationship that was valued and supported by both sides — particularly given the fact that Ukraine was already the most subsidised of all Partners. However, requests for additional funding continued. For example, for visits of Ukraine's State Interagency Commission on Co-operation with NATO, Ukraine sought subsidies for transportation and lodging costs. In this case, NATO did make funds available through NATO's Office of Information and Press, which has its own outreach budget. JWGDR activities, also not covered by the PfP funding policy, received similar, exceptional subsidies. Finally, though Ukraine offered several capabilities to the KFOR operation, it needed help both with deploying to theatre and sustaining operations once there.

In my opinion, the subsidy issue should not be allowed to adversely affect the relationship — it is a transient issue, while the relationship is for the long haul. What should be part of the way ahead is to start to make funding subsidies conditional and targeted. That is, subsidise activities only if they directly support specific plans for change or improvement. Other activities should be self-funded.

Allies regularly urge Ukraine to prioritise; there's no better way to encourage this than to stop paying their way for extraneous events that are largely repeats of events attended in the past. For its part though, Ukraine must learn to approach this sensitive subject with greater sophistication — and preferably on a one-on-one basis behind closed doors — making it easier for one or another Ally to provide the help requested, when helping is appropriate.

IS UKRAINE STILL IMPORTANT TO THE WEST?

The answer to this question depends, as usual, on whom you ask. President Clinton said, "Ukraine is a nation critical to our vision of an undivided, peaceful democratic Europe"¹⁹. If you consult INSS' 1999 *Strategic Assessment*, the answer appears to be "no". Ukraine is mentioned only in passing, with the lion's share focus on other "transitioning" states (i.e., Russia, China and India)²⁰. Even when mentioning "integrative measures" made possible in the permissive climate of the mid-1990s,

¹⁸ For full text of remarks see: www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991215_talbott_nuc.html.

¹⁹ This was part of the President's comments just before the NUC Summit in Washington, April 24, 1999. See: www.nato50.gov/text/99042504.htm.

²⁰ INSS most recent product is disappointing in many regards, including its generalities not backed up with detail. Could and might, without some notion of likelihood, may be helpful to those hoping for more force structure, but are less useful to policymakers. It's prognosis that the future is "up for grabs", while always true, is a case in point. Least helpful, however, is its reinforcement of the old-think, great-power approach. Fresh thinking and a fresh approach are needed.



INSS mentions NATO Enlargement, PfP, the EAPC and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council — but not the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine²¹. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1996 and as recently as mid-1999²², presented Ukraine more in terms of a spoiler to a rejuvenated Soviet Union than as a potential anchor and positive influence for regional stability.

Interestingly, an independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine is rarely discussed in terms of its positive impact on the 50 million citizens who live there. A politically stable, economically sound Ukraine, which is a good neighbour and trading partner, with a defence establishment reformed to provide a properly sized/structured/capable military, is what's best for Ukrainians. That it's also a Ukraine where any future thoughts of empire by Russia become moot should be a subsidiary issue. Helping Ukraine "be all it can be" would also answer a multitude of other security concerns for the region as an added bonus. The focus however needs to be on what is good for Ukraine.

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH NATO

First, a general comment. Both sides perceive the other as not taking the relationship seriously. Ukraine has asked for help and not

received that help. NATO's focus is on defence reform and sees little real commitment by Ukraine in that area. **Both sides need to be more realistic in recognising that desires and expectations for the relationship are not the same for each side.** These differences need to be openly discussed, while recognising that a forced agenda will not be a shared agenda.

Second, a change of attitude is needed. Ukraine is not a problem to be solved, but an opportunity to be embraced. As part of this more optimistic outlook, all Allies should better appreciate the progress Ukraine has made instead of focusing on the slow pace of change, or the lack of change in some areas. Another, and perhaps **more fundamental, shift in approach would entail asking what Ukraine wants to be, as opposed to what Allies want Ukraine to do or be.** That is, what can the Allies do across the spectrum to help Ukrainians to realise that future? This might mean a relationship much less defined and measured in security or military terms, with assistance aimed more at helping Ukraine to build a civil society and strong economy, and translating to projects that improve the daily lives of ordinary citizens. This should lead to greater security, albeit by the back door, but a security more sure of enduring since it would have much more healthy roots.

Allies, and particularly the U.S., must stop thinking about Ukraine in terms of deliverables due every six months for Ministerials. Those are necessary in their own way, but too great a reliance on them as ends to themselves has contributed to the too superficial relations of today — broad but shallow. At least part of the fresh thinking should include a rejection of the current habit of holding one relationship hostage to progress in another relationship. Co-operative, constructive relationships require no apology or compensatory offering to any third party. Rather, they serve as models of opportunity for third parties. In that regard, **relations with Ukraine should be dragged out from under the NATO/Russia (and U.S./Russia) shadow.**

Non-governmental programmes are also part of the solution. UCEPS's study on military reform, which all Allies now have, has largely answered the "what's the problem?" question. This comprehensive study, complete with recommendations for reform, should be the basis

²¹ Ibid, p.13.

²² Brzezinski Z. *Ukraine's Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space*. — *Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*. — Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1998, p.3-8. See also: *Ukraine's Two Minds*. — *The Economist*, June 5, 1999, p.30.



for future discussions between Allies and Ukraine's defence/military leadership — and present an opportunity for the JWGDR to finally do meaningful work *if that is what the MOD/GS wants*. Interestingly, the study calls for an interdepartmental Commission on military reform which would be established by Presidential decree, supported by an executive level Working Group and headed by a Chairman with broad implementation powers. The focus now needs to be on developing plans to implement change and on how Allies can assist.

Ukraine's leadership must be told that the current repetitive flurry of tactical activities which serve now as a substitute for substantive Co-operation in the area of defence reform will be curtailed until a truer foundation is laid — if Ukraine desires Co-operation in that area. I note that the problems highlighted in the UCEPS study had to have been largely known by the MOD/GS, yet those bodies did not share the information with Allies — much less ask Allies for help in developing and implementing solutions. Recall that the MOD/GS had trouble even sharing information on current troop strength. Rather, it fell to a think-tank made up of former defence, military and academic experts. Whether the MOD/GS will now get on board, even in the face of this expose, remains to be seen. And with Horbulin now replaced by Marchuk as Secretary of the NSDC, further top-level requests for assistance may now be a thing of the past (the recent request appears to have been retracted).

As this revamped aspect goes forward (hopefully), **Allies need to remember Ukraine's lack of experience;** it makes little sense to tell

them what they need to do in broad terms and then stand back to see how they do — and then be irritated when they don't perform to western standards. Also recall Mr Horbulin's request, as Secretary of the NSDC, for teams of experts to come to Ukraine. If there is a shortage of such experts (at least in terms of availability) on various governments' payrolls, **there is no shortage of such expertise now in the private sector. Such companies could be contracted to provide the defence reform expert advice which Ukraine so badly needs — and has requested repeatedly.** If corporate NATO does not want to take this on, individual or groups of Allies should step up. Partnering efforts, such as that with Poland, also merit continued and increased support as they can draw from experiences much "closer to home" regarding Ukraine's experience.

In the sphere of defence/military Co-operation, much more care and planning is needed than is now evident. **Programmes should be relatively few, but deep, and with measurable milestones met before continuing to the next stage.** More important, they must be directly related to Ukraine's own plans for streamlining and improving military forces (of all ministries) and the structures that support them. Absent such plans, focus on areas such as civil-military co-ordination and capabilities for disaster response, retraining programmes to steer military personnel into professions that will help to build Ukraine's dilapidated infrastructure, professional military education, and counter-proliferation, and help Ukraine to develop its military industry for regional markets²³.

All of these would be part of any rational plans that might be developed. **Reinforce success, and don't confuse willingness to consult or attend meetings as intention or commitment for action.** Continue the public information campaign begun in mid-1999, especially activities that inform and involve Parliamentarians, leading intellectuals and the media. Emphasise non-military aspects of co-operative activities, and the practical results therefrom. More important however will be using the detailed information now available on defence reform needs to shape IPPs, PARP plans, etc. to address the very real shortfalls. Condition future subsidies accordingly. Use that same information to insist on substantive work for the JWGDR, whatever committee will oversee it in the future.



²⁶ Some notable progress/deals have been made, including selling hovercraft to Greece and tanks to Pakistan, and Ukraine is contending for main battle tank contracts with a variety of nations.



Also, Ukraine (and the U.S., for that matter) needs to better understand NATO's roles and limitations (as prescribed by all Allies). In the partnership sphere, NATO has two main roles: provide a structured framework within which each Partner can decide and design its relationship with the Alliance and derive plans for internal change; and help to identify problem areas that need more work. If Ukraine wants the Alliance to go that step further with it, then **Ukraine's leaders must demonstrate a seriousness toward reform that has been lacking thus far.**

TIME MARCHES ON


While the West waits to see what Russia will become under President Putin, it should be busy helping nations around Russia to establish themselves as anchors of prosperity and stability in their own right. We need to think in terms of globalisation, where one nation after another becomes inextricably linked in mutually beneficial ways with not just its immediate neighbours but with nations around the globe. **The best way to solve the 'Russia problem' is to give it fewer and fewer alternatives to being a constructive member of a peaceful, globalised community, where the final wrong choice is to collapse under the weight of its own irrelevance. Helping Ukraine to make the right moves, establishing itself firmly, not as a cog in some new security architecture that perpetuates the old-think and baggage of times past, but as a productive and prosperous democracy, and eco-**



nomic partner, could prove to be crucial in this regard. Clinging to A-list and other Cold War mentalities is counter-productive, and sends the wrong message to all concerned.

Ukraine is still a "state in the making". It must find its own way forward, and while the responsibility for progress lies with Ukraine alone, it can draw from others' experiences in shaping its solutions. Friends of Ukraine cannot impose reforms, and should not try, but they should tell Ukraine's leaders and citizens the hard truth about the consequences of continued failure to act. When Ukraine asks for help, the West needs to find ways of lending that help. It may only be when Ukraine stops asking for advice and assistance that the West will realise it has missed out on a critically important opportunity. But by then it may be too late.

UKRAINE AND NATO: PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION



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The North Atlantic Alliance has become the most effective and workable union of democratic, highly developed countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO has shown itself capable of guaranteeing the security of its members, and adapting to new conditions. Today, this organisation plays a significant role in the military and political co-operation for European security. NATO is broadening its political functions while retaining its potential for performing its obligations of collective defence.

However, despite the successful resolution of ongoing and strategic problems, NATO's future is not without its problems. These problems will arise in connection with the further transformation of NATO. The first among them is the problem of NATO expansion, and its adaptation to new conditions of existence as a union of defence. Clearly, the reason for NATO expansion to the East is to achieve the goal of enlarging the zone of stability which will strengthen democracy in Central-Eastern European countries, and lead to the development of market relations within their national economies. But today, it is already evident that not all countries which have applied for NATO membership meet the criteria for membership. That's why NATO enlargement to the East will take place in waves. The result of the first wave of enlargement was the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The next wave of enlargement will begin after 2002, when Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania will probably be invited to join NATO. Undoubtedly, the problems of adapting their military equipment, command and control systems, and armed forces structures to NATO standards will arise. On the



other hand, NATO leaders will also face the problem of adapting these countries to the Alliance's military defence structures, and the problem of choosing a defence strategy.

Despite the large number of countries desiring to become NATO members, there are also countries that presently have no intentions of entering the North Atlantic Alliance as a defence union. Among them are Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Finland. The enlargement of NATO as a purely defence union can lead to the creation of "gray zones" of security which will engender a new geopolitical rivalries between regional powers.

Russia will remain a problem for some time ahead. As a result of the continued dialogue maintained with Russia, NATO managed to sign a Founding Act on mutual relations, co-operation, and security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Russia's position regarding NATO enlargement over the past years has undergone a

full transformation, during which period, Russia's leadership vacillated between three principal approaches: the Russian Federation's entrance into NATO in the long-term perspective; not permitting Alliance expansion to the East; and political bargaining, whereby a concession on the part of NATO is exchanged for an agreement allowing Alliance enlargement.

Thus, on December 20, 1991, Russia's President B.Yeltsin, in his address to foreign ministers of the NATO members, stated the country's readiness to examine the issue of Russia's entrance into NATO in the long-term perspective. Afterward, from 1994, Russia began seeing a threat to its own interests in enlargement, and began to act against such enlargement. After becoming convinced that NATO was not going to take such actions into account, Russia's leadership began bargaining policy, placing demands unacceptable to NATO.



It seems that today, Russia's new President, V.Putin, is beginning to consider the old Yeltsin strategy of relations with NATO, having gone the road of trial and error. Therefore, it can be stated that Russia will not move away from the old Yeltsin "hold-back strategy" applied to the Alliance in its eastward enlargement.

The Founding Act on the Mutual Relations, Co-operation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, which was signed in 1997, was the result of a compromise. Despite this, however, Russia continues to view NATO as its opponent, which is preventing it from renewing its dominant position in Eastern Europe, especially with respect to the Baltic states, Ukraine, and other CIS countries. Russia will use its co-operation with NATO, above all, to isolate these countries from co-operating with NATO.

Other challenges to NATO's future are the appearance of new threats, among which are: the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of terrorism, and inter-ethnic conflicts. It is not possible to deter these threats by conducting purely defensive measures. For such purposes, NATO is forced to take on new functions whose undertaking will require a whole array of measures of a political, diplomatic, and peace-keeping character. NATO is, therefore, up against the problem of uniting national and international defence and security functions within one organisation.

The combining of these functions will again place NATO in the position of strengthening the Alliance's political structures, monitoring conflict situations in Europe, finding an acceptable mechanism for receiving a mandate from the UN or OSCE for peacekeeping operations, as well as applying military force for this purpose on the territories of countries that are not members of NATO.

The other side of the problem of uniting defence and security functions is that it raises the issue of the extent of NATO enlargement. If NATO as a defence union stops at the western borders of the CIS countries, then as a security structure, it will not be able to look after the security problems of the CIS countries, such as those in Transdnistria or Abkhazia.

However, if NATO expands as a defence union and a security structure simultaneously, then the problem arises of the introduction of a varied NATO membership format, since some countries will emphasise their relations with NATO as a defence union, while others, as a security structure.

In contrast to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine has not submitted its application for NATO membership. However, even if Ukraine takes such a step, then chances are small that this application will be approved. The West's attitude toward Ukraine remains ambiguous. Ukraine is not a member of the European Union or the West European Union, and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Many Western Europeans do not accept Ukraine as a part of Europe. Furthermore, many officials think that closer relations with Ukraine even without these memberships will ruin already bad relations with Moscow. However, Washington understands that Ukraine with its geopolitical position is no less important for stability in the East European region than U.S. financial aid. That's why the U.S. is ready to provide any kind of support for Ukraine's continued independence.

In Brussels, there is an understanding that if Ukraine enters into a military union with Russia, the situation in Europe will change drastically, since this will require the large-scale forward deployment of significant Alliance forces in



Central Europe in the event that relations with Russia become strained. This forces NATO to view Ukraine as a key factor of stability and security in Europe.

It is evident that given Putin's leanings toward authoritarian rule and the militarising of society, relations between Russia and the U.S. and NATO will not improve. As a result, Ukraine's geopolitical role in Europe will grow, and with it, the attention paid to Ukraine by the West, the U.S., and NATO.

The difference between Ukraine's situation and position with respect to this issue and that of other CIS countries lies, above all, in that Ukraine is in a unique geopolitical situation within the context of NATO enlargement. Future NATO members line its western border, while on the East it borders on Russia, whose position with respect to NATO enlargement differs from the position held by Central and Eastern European countries, including Ukraine. It is namely because of this that many international documents, including those approved within the framework of NATO, the West European Union, and other European structures, define Ukraine as "a key country for European security".

Furthermore, the security environment of all Central and Eastern European countries, including Ukraine, is characterised by the similarity of their assessments of threats, challenges, and main priorities within this area.

NATO's eastward enlargement as a factor of stability is in line with Ukraine's main strategic interests which can be described in the following three points:

1. Integration into the European economic, political, and security structures. Co-operation with NATO will lead to this process.
2. Receiving reliable international security guarantees with the help of NATO.
3. Normalising relations with Russia by strengthening Ukraine's position within European structures with the help and support of NATO.

A neighbourhood of new NATO members on Ukraine's western borders opens new possibilities of integrating Ukraine into European security structures. Ukraine will have far better conditions for strengthening its position in Europe. A common border will lead to tighter co-operation between Ukraine and NATO, as well as other European structures. Furthermore, given this plan for enlargement, NATO will be extremely interested in keeping Ukraine independent, which will put it in a position of giving significant aid, political support, and assisting Ukraine in its joining political and economic structures.



Inasmuch as political interests are becoming priority factors for the enlargement of NATO for the sake of stability, the criteria for Alliance membership will be: the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the absence of territorial claims to neighbouring states, civilian control over armed forces, respect for the rights of national minorities and human rights, and democratic development. Stability and security on Ukraine's western borders will be reinforced as Central European applicant countries meet these requirements.

The understanding of the complexity of Ukraine's situation and the mutual interests shared by Ukraine and NATO has led both Ukraine's and NATO's leadership to choosing the **evolutionary** path of making Ukraine a part of the Euro-Atlantic security structure. The significance of this choice lies in the formula of the "special" relations between NATO and Ukraine. The strategic goal of such relations is Ukraine's full participation in the building of a new European security structure. This direction was determined as early as December, 1994 at a CSCE summit in Budapest, where a compromise formula was agreed to: its member countries could become parties to union agreements only to the extent of their evolution; that is, under conditions of NATO's transformation from a military-political bloc into a structure for ensuring peace and security.

Under conditions of NATO enlargement through the provision of stability in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine's relations with the Alliance should be developed according to the "partner-ally" formula. Making this formula a reality means the step-by-step transition from the country's recognised non-allied status to movement in the direction of NATO membership.

If NATO expansion means the simultaneous expansion of stability in Central and Eastern Europe, then Ukraine's wish to join this process is natural, given its desire to become part of the collective European security system. Relations with NATO as an ally will become possible with the Alliance's transformation into a European security structure. Given these positions, it is



worth noting that Ukraine has intentions of joining NATO in the future. But this requires time; a certain **transition period**. This is the timeframe during which Ukraine's western neighbours are becoming NATO members, while the Alliance itself will be transformed and become more open for co-operation in the formation of a collective, pan-European security system.

The transition period is also necessary for Ukraine due to internal reasons, and because of the country's geopolitical position. Ukraine's immediate entrance into NATO will lead to an increase in social-political tensions in the country, conditioned by the different geopolitical orientations of its eastern and western regions. To some extent, there still exist certain political-psychological barriers to accepting NATO as an ally among Ukraine's population (especially after the bombing of Yugoslavia) and the personnel of the Armed Forces. This is demonstrated by data of a sociological survey conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Studies regarding what Ukrainian citizens think about Ukraine becoming a member of NATO military alliance. Specifically, less than one-third of the survey participants (29%) support the idea of Ukraine's membership in this military bloc. Furthermore, every fifth respondent was against Ukraine's membership in NATO, while about the same number was unable to determine their stance on the issue at the time. The remainder, or 32%, gave no response whatsoever.



The obtained results are fairly logical from the point of view of the image of the NATO bloc which, until recently, was perceived in the mass consciousness of the Soviet people as a military threat. Although the Soviet Union is now only a historical fact, it is worth keeping in mind that consciousness is a fairly difficult thing to change within the short period of Ukraine's existence as an independent state, especially among the older generation. That's why it is not unusual that it is namely pensioners that made up almost one-third of the total number of opponents to Ukraine's membership in NATO.

Sociological polling of servicemen of Ukraine's Armed Forces shows that Ukraine's

entrance into NATO as a defence union was supported by 27%, while Ukraine's participation in peacekeeping operations as part of NATO armed forces was supported by 48%.

An analysis of the poll data by region demonstrates the regional distribution of responses. Thus, the northwestern (58%) and western (42%) regions of Ukraine showed the most support for Ukraine's entrance into NATO. In the capital, 38% of respondents voiced their approval for such a move, while the southwestern regions of the country and the Crimea gave the least support to the idea.

Poll results show that the most negative stance toward the idea of Ukraine joining the EU and NATO was demonstrated by the respondents who support Ukraine's union with Russia as one country; that is, those who essentially support the idea of reanimating a "renewed" Soviet Union.

At this time, Ukraine is not prepared to become a NATO member due to economic reasons, and because its system of civilian control over the Armed Forces is not in line with Western standards. The duration of the transition period, therefore, will be determined by the pace of NATO's expansion, and its transformation into a structure of pan-European security, Ukraine's internal readiness, and the political will to join the Alliance, as well as by the nature of Russia's foreign and military policy.

Ukraine's relations with NATO during the transition period should be termed as "special" relations. Only time will show to what extent will Ukraine be able to guarantee its security interests within the framework of "special" relations with NATO. But it is already understood that the Charter on the Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO opens broad possibilities for turning such interests into reality. It is also important that the Charter is signed independent of Russia's position on the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Charter defines the principles of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO, whose goal is to maintain peace, and strengthen stability and security in Europe.

With respect to guaranteeing security, aside from international guarantees of ensuring territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of the borders which are defined in this document, the most important factor for Ukraine is the support for its democratic development and economic growth on the part of NATO, as well as the right of Ukraine to turn to NATO for assistance and support in the event that its political independence stands threatened.

Present-day NATO demands to Ukraine fall into three main categories.

One: in co-operating with NATO, Ukraine should give priority to the most effective and



urgent projects which would help Ukraine plan allocations of funds for NATO-related events over a longer term, if Ukraine wants to bear its share of the partnership costs. **Two:** a quick and effective defence reform. This means modernising Ukraine's military potential, and raising the level of professionalism of its Armed Forces. This also means the further improvement in all fields, from its defence doctrine, to financing, logistics, and civilian control. All of this is needed in order to attain a higher level of compatibility with NATO. **Three:** Ukraine should conduct economic and political reforms capable of providing for the wellbeing of its people and stability, without which it cannot become a full-fledged member and a credible partner. The free market is the key aspect in Ukraine's process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Of the directions of co-operation between Ukraine and NATO established by the Charter, the following can be considered the most promising: active participation in the events of the political structures of NATO; active co-operation with NATO in crisis management; active participation of Ukraine's military contingent in NATO peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN and OSCE.

The expansion and deepening of military co-operation within the framework of the individual PfP Programme is another priority task. This Programme is aimed at standardising the command, control and communications with the goal of achieving uniform operative standards, developing a network of communication and military information exchange lines, co-ordinat-



ing defence policies and strategies, conducting more training programmes and peacekeeping exercises both on the country's own territory, and the territories of partner countries, and improving the system of civilian control over the Armed Forces.

The time needed for implementing the Charter's provisions will become the period for Ukraine's preparation for establishing "allied" relations with a new NATO, which is set to represent the structure of European security. But even with such relations, Ukraine is forced to concentrate on its *dominating self-defence* by relying on its own Armed Forces and national defence industry for ensuring its own security. Such limited responsibility on the part of NATO with respect to Ukraine's defence capabilities will be conditioned, above all, by the unwillingness of presenting a military threat for Russia, and provoking its military opposition.

THE FUTURE OF NATO-UKRAINE CO-OPERATION: A WESTERN PERSPECTIVE



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Merely one year ago, as Operation Allied Force was drawing to a close, the NATO-Ukraine relationship was in a state of disorientation, as well as disrepair. A major premise of Ukraine's foreign policy, indeed NATO's — "where there is NATO, there is stability" — seemed to have been ruptured by NATO's own actions. Yet today there is a purposefulness to NATO-Ukraine co-operation not seen since the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership at the July 1997 Madrid summit. There are also signs that hope is being balanced by sobriety. It is about time. No one will benefit if Ukraine's hopes are not understood in Brussels and if its illusions are not cured in Kyiv.

Lack of imagination on one side, illusion on the other account for the paradox which has characterised the relationship to this point: Ukraine's hopes in NATO have exceeded NATO's potential, yet NATO's actual potential has never been realised. The question, six years after Ukraine joined Partnership for Peace, is whether we have acquired enough maturity and wisdom to break out of this cycle and secure the benefits which our mutual interests demand. The question has not only become vital, it has also become urgent.

The first, but not the only reason for this urgency can be found in Russia. Russia's new Concept on Foreign Policy calls for a policy based on the "general capabilities and resources" of the state. Towards the West, this criterion demands conciliation. Towards Ukraine and

other former Soviet neighbours, it demands a policy which, in President Putin's words, is "clear", "specific", "cold", "more active" and "far tougher". Like Boris Yeltsin, Putin believes that Russia must be the "guarantor of peace and stability" in post-Soviet space. Unlike Yeltsin, he is displaying a determination to use "general capabilities and resources" — finance, energy, trade, not to say security services and armed forces — in a focused and coherent manner. **The worst nightmare for Kyiv is that Russia should be able to secure greater co-operation with the West and, at the same time, greater dominance over Ukraine. Understandably, many see the NATO-Ukraine partnership as a foil to this dominance, not to say an antidote to "Russo-centrism" in the West.**

This conclusion is reinforced by the second reason for urgency. In contrast to NATO, the European Union has only begun its process of strategic engagement with Ukraine and is doing so within a climate of continued scepticism. The fact that the EU, like NATO, is committed to enlargement does not mitigate this contrast. In fact it intensifies it. **Whereas NATO developed Partnership for Peace as a mechanism to ensure that enlargement would not create "new dividing lines in Europe", the EU's priority has not been to minimise the divide between members and non-members, but to deepen the integration of members. This priority, symbolised by the Schengen agreement on frontiers and borders, runs the risk of shutting Ukraine out of the emerging "greater**



Europe". Should this occur, the dynamics of EU enlargement and the aims of Russian policy would unwittingly coincide. Once again, many hope that the most powerful counter to these developments will be NATO.



The third and related reason is the economic and administrative reform begun by Prime Minister Yushchenko's Government. In the long-term, profound and sustained reform is only way to alter EU perceptions towards Ukraine, not to say the perception of ordinary Ukrainians towards their society and state. But these perceptions are unlikely to change in the short-term, and it is here that the danger lies. **For if the West does not respond to Yushchenko's reforms aggressively and effectively, they will cease to command political support. These needs intensify the pressures upon NATO to serve as Ukraine's primary vehicle for integration into the West.**

These are reasoned hopes, but not all of them are realistic. Could the defence and security reform initiated by President Kuchma in December 1999 make them more realistic? **The reform and development of Armed Forces and non-MOD military formations is not only of fundamental importance in its own right. It also speaks to NATO's core strengths. It addresses issues which lie at the core of Partnership for Peace and indeed — with respect to borders, customs, security, law enforcement and emergency services — are of growing practical importance to the European Union. For this reason, much depends on how well these programmes are conceived and implemented.**

CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

Some of the limitations of NATO-Ukraine co-operation are intrinsic, "objective" and unchangeable. Others are cultural, "subjective" and changeable with difficulty. Although NATO has vastly widened its definition of security since the Cold War era, it remains a security organisation. This is the objective constraint. There is much that NATO can do, and much that it has yet to do, to help Ukraine to devise a security system which strengthens democracy, diminishes the gap between state and society and increases Ukraine's "samostiynist" — its "ability to stand". But NATO cannot make Ukrainian goods competitive in European markets or decrease unemployment in Luhansk. From this obvious point, a less obvious but more critical one follows. **Not even an intimate and comprehensive NATO-Ukraine relationship will attract Western finance to Ukraine, let alone enable Ukraine to integrate with Europe in the terms that matter most — through business, trade and investment.** The Polish formula was economic transformation *and* security, with security being the dependent variable. NATO certainly makes a contribution to Ukraine's economy through retirement programmes for officers, Science for Peace and the transfer of several millions of dollars into localities where its troops exercise. **But unless Ukraine can replicate the Polish formula and engage the private economy of the West, most ordinary citizens will continue to ask, "What does NATO-Ukraine cooperation do for me?"**

Paradoxically, it is the subjective factors which are more difficult to come to terms with. The first of these is "geopolitics". In Ukraine as in Russia, geopolitical thinking underpins most discussion about security, and it is largely on geopolitical grounds that NATO's policies (e.g. enlargement) and actions (e.g. Kosovo) are assessed. To be sure, the West as a whole, and individual Western states, have geopolitical interests and even outside the NATO context (e.g. the Persian Gulf) have occasionally acted upon them. Yet the West does not have a geopolitical culture. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has deligitimised geopolitical thinking in the political and military establishments of the West. Even today, with Putin in Moscow, a war in Chechnya and a myriad of small, if not "Great games" surrounding the Caspian Sea, the dominant Western perspective remains liberal, internationalist and universalist.

This has a very direct bearing on the institutional culture with which Ukrainians interact at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons.



This culture not only fails to be geopolitical, to a bewildering extent it is apolitical. Yet this apolitical atmosphere is the product of a potent political reality. NATO is an Alliance of 19 remarkably diverse, intensely democratic and unmistakably sovereign states, and it is obliged to make decisions by consensus. **If the Soviet General Staff was, in Frunze's terms "the brain of the army", NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff could not be more different. They direct and command nothing. They are but the neutral and obedient servants of a highly decentralised authority. Those predisposed to view NATO as a Western style Warsaw Pact are not only bound to find this reality bewildering, but disappointing.**

What is more, the internal culture of NATO is intensely pragmatic. Whereas in the former Soviet Union "pragmatism" increasingly connotes unsentimental, or even unprincipled behaviour in pursuit of highly motivated ends, in Western bureaucratic circles it usually means the disposition to "solve problems", "act reasonably" and achieve practically minded tasks. Today, Ukraine's Individual Partnership Programme under Partnership for Peace and the wider NATO-Ukraine Working Plan contain over 100 such tasks. Bilateral defence programmes "in the spirit of PfP" contain many more (over 70 in the UK-Ukraine Programme alone). The Ukrainian participants in these activities are often moved to wonder whether there is a strategic purpose behind them. If, as the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership states, "Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole", then how is "a distinctive and effective partnership" supposed to strengthen the security of Ukraine or Europe? How is the programme of exercises, visits, exchanges and seminars intended to knit Ukraine into the "architecture" of Western

security? **If NATO is "serious about Ukraine", it should have clear and coherent answers to these questions.**

But in the pragmatic environment of NATO Headquarters — as well as in the national Ministries of Defence which conduct their own extensive bilateral programmes with Ukraine — the perspective can be quite different. **Here many believe that if Ukraine is "serious about NATO", it should implement the projects and "goals" which it has agreed to and in most cases proposed itself. If it is "serious about partnership", it should treat partners as partners, and not as outsiders.** Protocol and hierarchy should never take precedence over teamwork and problem solving. In a multinational enterprise, openness and communication are essential to effectiveness and trust. In a democratic enterprise, spontaneous discussion is the norm, lateral communication across national boundaries is mandatory, and the traffic of ideas from below is as important to policy-making as the flow of decisions from above. In a partnership of equals, each should do as much for himself as he expects others to do for him. If Ukraine is "serious about integration", these are the methods which will achieve it in practice.


In view of our respective histories, the remarkable thing is not that these differences exist, but that a sufficient body of people believe that common interests outweigh them. This belief reflects two significant realities. First, **whilst NATO might not have a "strategy" with regard to Ukraine, the vast majority of its member states recognise the West's stake in the future of a country which occupies the northern littoral of the Black Sea, which is a rear area of both the Balkans and the Caucasus, which borders two NATO countries (as well as Russia and Belarus), which is friendly to the West and, today at least, tranquil and stable.** Recent developments in Russia, the Caucasus and the Caspian only enhance that stake. Moreover, it is gradually becoming apparent that the area stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Caspian is becoming an interconnected region even if it is very far from becoming an integrated one. The second reality is, on the face of it, comparatively uninspiring: namely the emergence of a network of individuals and institutions which, in NATO parlance, have adopted their own "habits of co-operation". To be sure, NATO is held together by collective interests. Yet there are also divergent interests in the Alliance, some of them substantial. **It is these uninspiring habits** that have kept differences of national interest in bounds, despite an extensive menu of provocations, overt and subtle.



PROGRESS

Within recent months, signs of progress can be seen at six levels.

First, the core of Ukraine's commanders, officers and servicemen with NATO experience are being increasingly well exploited by Ukraine itself. As a case in point, Ukraine's new senior military representative to NATO, Lt. General A. Kalashnikov, former Deputy Commander of the Western Operational Command, has extensive PfP experience and has played an instrumental role in developing Yavoriv as a joint NATO-Ukraine training facility. No less significantly, the majority of Ukraine's newly designated contingent in Kosovo have already served in SFOR in Bosnia.



Second, and in the same spirit, Minister of Defence Oleksandr Kuzmuk used the occasion of the NATO Secretary General's visit to propose an initiative with significant consequences for military education. As presently envisaged, the Ministry of Defence will establish three blocks of NATO familiarisation courses for officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The first will be a course at the tactical level, the second at the strategic level, for officers on the staff course of the National Defence Academy. The third, more distinct block would be designed for other staff officers destined for NATO and Peace Support related posts at home and abroad. These initiatives have been complemented by highly successful visits of the NATO Defence College and NATO School to the National Defence Academy of Ukraine.

Third, Ukraine's long-standing wish for a reduction in the number of annual Ukraine-NATO and bilateral activities has indeed fulfilled the maxim "better fewer but better", rather than the dilution of effort which some in NATO had feared. Following a year in which Ukraine's implementation of **non-military activities** was

below 50 per cent, it has now risen to almost 65 per cent, and in the military sphere to a considerably higher level. Even sceptics in NATO HQ acknowledge the value of this improvement.

Fourth, and far more significantly, a legislative base now exists for deeper and more institutionalised co-operation. The first major obstacle was cleared when the *Rada* ratified the Status of Forces Agreement in March this year. This will allow troops from NATO to train in Ukraine by agreement and invitation — and, most critically, with full exemption from the visa and customs requirements which have dogged previous exercises and training activities. The first major exercise to benefit from these arrangements will be substantial: Co-operative Partner (18-30 June), involving the participation of over 4,000 troops from NATO member and Partner states. The second obstacle was cleared when the *Rada* authorised the deployment of the Ukrainian element of the Ukrainian-Polish battalion to the adjacent Polish area of the US sector in Kosovo. Although these forces have trained together for three years, the battalion has thus far been without legal standing in Ukraine. Even now, the Ukrainian element (256 out of a total of 800) in Kosovo will be defined as a separate national contingent.

Fifth, and perhaps most important of all, the National Security and Defence Council approved the State Programme of Armed Forces Development on May 30, 2000. The priorities of the Programme and its realism will rightly remain an object of scrutiny and a subject of argument by the analytical community. But the commitment of the Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Finance to finance the Programme makes it abundantly clear that it is more than a gesture. The Programme calls in the final stage for the Armed Forces to adopt European standards and organisation, including the replacement of divisions and regiments by brigades and battalions. Both NSDC Secretary Marchuk and President Kuchma emphasise that the Programme is an important component of Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Sixth, at the invitation of Secretary Marchuk, the Office of the NATO Secretary General has established an informal experts group which seeks to identify skills, capabilities and mechanisms in particular member states which might be worthy of study by Ukraine as it undertakes the transformation of its defence and security system in accordance with President Kuchma's December 1999 decree.

Yet despite these developments, the two seminal questions remain. Will NATO-Ukraine co-operation contribute to Ukraine's security? Will it bring Ukraine closer to Europe?



CHALLENGES AND POTENTIALS

The overwhelming challenge for Ukraine — and indirectly for NATO — is to ensure that "Armed Forces Development" produces a security system capable of addressing the challenges set out in Ukraine's National Security Concept of 1997. This concept has three essential merits: it is analytically coherent; it provides a realistic assessment of "main potential threats"; it provides a framework for matching ends to means.

Although the concept does not rule out the possibility of military aggression and general war, its clear preoccupation is the relationship between internal weakness, international pressure and threats to the integrity of the state. By listing the "creation of civil society" as the first of nine "priority national security interests", the authors of the document clearly imply that the major challenge for Ukraine is to ensure that its weaknesses do not become vulnerabilities: that local crises — be they economic, ecological, industrial or ethnic — cannot be exploited by actors with wider political or geopolitical aims. This plainly demands:

a) a rational and cost-effective division of labour between the Armed Forces and other power structures who need to interact in complex emergencies;

b) a high level of trust between central, regional and local governments, as well as those who command military units and other power structures;

c) a high level of knowledge on the part of these structures, such that the Armed Forces and other military establishments understand the non-military dimensions of security; and such that other arms of the state understand the defence aspects of their responsibilities;

d) a high level of transparency in the security sphere, so that there is no confusion as to *what* decisions are made, *where* they are made and *by whom* they are made;

e) a high level of congruence between state policy and operational practice: in short, a strict correspondence between official objectives, force structures, the training and education of servicemen — and an equally strict correspondence between these objectives and the informal loyalties, values and codes of practice of those who must carry them out.

For all this, the National Security Concept is only a framework, and the challenge is to implement it. Today the conditions in which it has to be implemented are far from favourable. This is because:

1) even under heroic assumptions about future economic performance, budgetary stringencies will impose draconian choices and severely restrict the "art of the possible" well into the mid-term;

2) many of Ukraine's senior military officers retain the operational-strategic biases of the Soviet military system and are extremely reluctant to accept that the main task of the Armed Forces should be to conduct "operations other than war";

3) many retain the Soviet era belief that the state must provide "sufficient" resources for defence, whatever defence planners deem these to be. This encourages "planning for all contingencies" and waiting for "political will" to emerge, rather than identifying clear and achievable priorities today;

4) Ukraine still suffers from the legacy of a political system which confined military-technical knowledge to the Armed Forces. This not only minimises the ability of civilians and political elites to "control" the military establishment; it minimises their ability to support it. To date, Ukraine's security system is not reinforced, as in stable European democracies, by consistent political direction, effective parliamentary oversight and in-depth civilian expertise.

If Ukraine seeks NATO's help in addressing these requirements and deficiencies, then at one level the absence of a NATO "strategy" towards Ukraine is a blessing. It allows Ukraine to select the areas in which co-operation and the sharing of experience and expertise is to take place. It is by design, not neglect, that the responsibility for drafting Individual Partnership Programmes under PfP falls to each Partner, rather than to NATO itself. The lack of a NATO "design" is an opportunity which, despite the progress cited above, Ukraine has yet to grasp, let alone exploit.

Yet even if NATO does not need a strategy, its lack of institutional knowledge is a deficiency. Although considerable expertise has been acquired by particular individuals in specific areas, the fact remains that **NATO and national defence ministries have not invested the time and effort to assemble a corps of long-term and well-placed specialists** who understand Ukraine as a whole. Such institutionalised outsiders could be a vital corrective to two of the more questionable biases in many programmes of co-operation. The first of these biases is that what enhances "co-operation" and "compatibility" enhances the security of the Partner country. The bias is questionable because **Ukraine requires a security system designed to reflect, and indeed overcome a**



problem which NATO members do not face: the weakness of state and society. The prime aim of such a system must be the integration of Ukraine, not integration with NATO. The second and related bias is that it is primarily national *Armed Forces* which are in need of transformation. Yet for the sake of democracy as well as security, the equally important, if not prior aim must be to develop civilian defence mindedness and expertise. In areas ranging from national defence to career development to parliamentary oversight to law enforcement and to the creation of a professional civil service, NATO and its member states can provide rich and useful assistance. But they can only do so if they understand Ukraine in its own terms.

Jointly, NATO and Ukraine face a further challenge. At the European Union's Helsinki summit, the European Council established the



framework for a Common Security and Defence Policy. In principle, this could be positive news for Ukraine as well as for NATO. Despite the EU's commitment to enlargement, the internal culture of the European Union continues to remain focused on economics, rather than security and on "deepening integration" rather than expanding influence. Will this now change? It is far from certain. But if it does, the EU will have a far greater stake in Ukraine's successful development than it has shown at present. Moreover, **a closer NATO-EU relationship will strengthen the EU's ability to provide practical assistance to Ukraine in the domain of security.**

President Kuchma's establishment of a commission under Secretary Marchuk to reform security structures outside the remit of the Ministry of Defence is an opportunity for the EU in its *own* interests to help Ukraine to establish secure borders, an enforceable and European-oriented customs regime, a cost-effective national security system and reliable (and largely uncorrupted) security services and law enforcement. Within recent weeks, the EU has already agreed, with NATO's encouragement, to contribute funds to the reform of Ukrainian border guards. To be sure, this is a small beginning, and it would be premature to predict whether it will lead to widening and sustained involvement in the reform of Ukraine's security structures. **The transformation of NATO-Ukraine co-operation into NATO-Ukraine-EU co-operation would be a development of profound importance. But unless it engages the will and imagination of political leaders, the project will remain the fantasy of intellectuals and experts.**

CONTACTS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO: THE VIEW FROM HUNGARY



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Ukraine's foreign and security policies are directed at maintaining close contacts with NATO at different levels. From the very beginning, Ukraine took part in North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) activities and, after 1997, in activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Ukraine has its own Individual Partnership Programme within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Programme and a special consultation mechanism according to the NATO-Ukrainian Charter. Besides that, Ukraine participates in the practical peacekeeping actions in Europe (Ukrainian soldiers have done a great job within the framework of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia). From 1991 (the moment of regaining independence), more than 10,000 military and civilian personnel took part in international peacekeeping operations.



Despite the positive tendencies, an evaluation of NATO-Ukrainian contacts remains clouded.

The population — partly retaining a certain nostalgia for the Soviet past due to the catastrophic economic conditions, and partly hoping for prosperity by recreating the unity of the Slavic nations — is divided on the question of choosing a Western or Eastern orientation.

A change of regime (in the Central European meaning of the word) has still not happened in Ukraine. Ukraine's society did not evaluate its own history, and political decisions are made under conditions of a permanent struggle between the Parliament and the Government without the necessary support from society. The multiparty system exists formally but, lacking traditions, it is unable to express the interests of society. During the nine years of state-building, the political elite did not use the potential dynamism of the regions of the multinational country, and refused to rely on the principals and practice of regionalism (at the same time, the state is hardly able to fulfil its job).

Despite the negative moments, especially when compared with other former Soviet republics, what deserves respect is that the executive power, led by a strong presidential function, established a stable Western orientation in the country's foreign and security policies over the last years.

Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, gained independence on December 1, 1991, and started a very active foreign policy. Diplomatic activity has been directed toward building and stabilising foreign conditions of independence. As a basic principle of foreign policy, the multi-vector approach was recognised: the system of democratic values (Western orientation and integra-



tion), and pragmatic contacts with former Soviet republics and other neighbours. On the basis of systematic work, Kyiv's achievement is that Ukraine has a so-called basic agreement with all neighbours as an international legal guarantee. In the relations that are potentially dangerous for historical reasons, the fact that the two most sensitive questions — the recognition of existing borders and the rights of national minorities — were regulated in the basic agreements is a great success.

Besides bilateral relations, Ukraine's security policy has attached great importance to the membership opportunities in international organisations, to activity in the UN and OSCE, to regional co-operation, and to the Central European institutions. Both the Council of Europe and the Central European Initiative invited Ukraine in 1995. Ukraine is one of the founders of the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Co-operation and of the Carpathian Euro-region.



Ukraine has a special balancing policy toward the CIS, recognising the Commonwealth as a temporary framework for the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has been protesting against rendering supra-state functions to the CIS, and has not taken performed such functions. Ukraine has not joined the CIS military organisation, and has been trying to implement military and technical co-operation on the basis of mutual benefits.

The Ukrainian Parliament passed *the Declaration of Independence* on August 24, 1991, and declared the country's neutral and non-allied status. Since Ukraine's Western orientation is clear, and practical steps were taken in the area of NATO co-operation, its neutral and non-allied status is constantly discussed. Yet it seems that the present political-legal state of the country is close to optimal: at this moment, **neither the Alliance, nor Ukraine is ready for Ukrainian NATO-membership**. Nevertheless, the declared principles are very useful against the efforts to reintegrate the country, and involve it in military co-operation with the CIS. **Today, Ukraine does not want to join any military alliance: one of them**

Ukraine does not wish to join, the other, it is not able to join.

The question of NATO contacts divides Ukraine's society. Leftist nostalgia for the Soviet past maintains strong positions in the Parliament. To neutralise them in the area of foreign policy, the President and the Government have made serious efforts.

The material conditions for future NATO membership are very bad. The defence budget in Ukraine for 1999 amounted to some \$450 million (which is less than the Hungarian defence budget). Taking into consideration that the number of personnel in the Armed Forces is 380,000, this sum is not enough to avoid the permanent decline. It is not enough even to ensure the necessary reduction of Armed Forces already decided on the political level. The territory of the country is larger than that of the three new NATO-members (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) together, which demands serious expenditures for meeting the Alliance's infrastructure requirements (looking in the mirror of future membership). The experts say that real membership in NATO within the short period could be imaginable if \$15-20 billion of investments were available in this area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO CONTACTS

The Ukrainian foreign minister signed the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace Programme on February 8, 1994, the same day as his Hungarian counterpart did the same. On June 19, 1995, the Individual Partnership Programme was also signed, containing details of Ukraine's participation. In this document, some 50 common NATO-Ukrainian activities were laid down, financed mostly by the United States. At this moment, the 1999-2000 Individual Partnership Programme is valid.

Over the last years, bilateral political and military contacts between Ukraine and NATO countries have improved as well. Within the framework of co-operation, Ukraine's Armed Forces have been supported both morally and materially, and personal and institutional contacts were established. Many Ukrainian officers could partake of educational opportunities in the Western countries. The experiment undertaken in those countries, as well as co-operation in the reform of the Armed Forces, will probably have considerable influence on the modernisation of the Ukrainian army (to be reduced to 375,000 by 2005).

On May 7, 1997, the NATO Information and Documentation Centre was opened in Kyiv, with its main task being bringing the Alliance and Ukrainian society closer.

Kyiv declared its readiness to co-operate in the defence industry field, including the common production of the newly developed air transport



plane AN-70. The Yavoriv military base (close to Lviv) was offered by the Ukrainian side as a regional international training centre (for organising PFP exercises and training multinational units).

THE NATO-UKRAINIAN CHARTER

It was impossible to realise NATO enlargement, and invite the countries of the first round, without giving unambiguous signs about the further contacts with two countries of key importance from the European security point of view: Russia and Ukraine. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it was unavoidable to take into consideration its legitimate claim not to be left within a certain "buffer zone" between the North Atlantic Alliance and Russia, as well as its consequent, coherent foreign policy, which was followed from the moment of regaining independence, and aimed at close contacts with Europe, and at integration to the fullest extent possible. Ukraine, having given up the idea of being a nuclear state, had moral basis for being offered a compromise solution. On July 9, 1997, at the Madrid NATO summit, the NATO-Ukrainian Charter was signed as a document fixing the foundations of bilateral co-operation, and fitting the interests of both the Alliance and Ukraine, as well as Russia.

The Charter expresses the special partnership between the Alliance and Ukraine, establishes a legal framework for further development of the relationship between the two sides. It symbolises that Ukraine wishes to develop more wide-range co-operation with NATO than is planned in the Partnership for Peace Programme. In this document, NATO countries pledge to support Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and they recognise that Ukraine's democratic development and economic prosperity play a key role in the stability and security of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the continent as a whole. They welcome that Ukraine, having completed nuclear disarmament,

was given security guarantees by all nuclear powers.

The document contains no direct security guarantees for Ukraine, but at the same time, the mechanisms for consultation and co-operation indirectly contribute to the political and military security of the Ukrainian state, and to the creation of advantageous conditions for her integration. The Charter helps Ukraine stay out of the grey zone of Europe as a consequence of the NATO enlargement, but rather, on the basis of the "open door" policy, allows it to have real chances for the further development of contacts with NATO.

For the practical co-ordination of common activity, the two sides created the NATO-Ukrainian Commission. The Alliance has regular contacts with Ukraine on the level of ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of defence, and chiefs of general staffs. Daily contacts are maintained by the Ukrainian liaison officer at NATO HQ (starting January, 1998) and a NATO liaison officer in Kyiv (starting September, 1998).

Within the framework of co-operation provided by the Partnership for Peace Programme and the NATO-Ukrainian Charter, several common working groups were established, with one of them assisting in military reform, especially in the education of officers and NCOs. NATO is expecting further improvement of civilian control over the Armed Forces as a crucial moment in the country's military reform. (It has already occurred once that the minister of defence was a civilian in Ukraine: Valeriy Shmarov; but at this moment, the post is occupied by a military person.)

In its co-operation with Ukraine, NATO above all emphasises the non-military risks, the so-called new-type challenges. In supporting Ukrainian reforms, it aims at improving the economy as the most significant factor of instability.

The contacts with NATO are of extreme political significance for Ukraine. The NATO-Ukrainian Charter defines the country as one of the Central European states, which is encouraging for the young state still fighting for survival in complicated conditions, both in its foreign and domestic policies.

NATO is also not indifferent to the Ukrainian factor. The country has geo-strategic significance in the area of both conventional military aspects, and the new-type challenges (migration, proliferation, drug trafficking, environmental security, etc.). Ukraine's status as a regional power, and the role it has played in the so-called "near abroad", make Ukraine important. The country's position in the security policy field can significantly influence the feelings of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and



the success of moving the stability zone eastward. The NATO-Ukrainian relationship, and Ukraine's constructive approach to NATO expansion, created advantageous conditions for Hungarian, Polish and Czech membership. The uncertain future of Belarus as an independent state, and the general crisis in Russia, improved the geopolitical significance of Ukraine even more.

Since NATO considers as its main task the maintenance of European stability, it considers the multinational, unstable, young Ukraine to be, at the same time, a potential partner and potential source of concern. On the territory of the country, there are religious, national and cultural borders, and separatism still exists. Therefore, for Ukraine, NATO is more of political, rather than military, importance. It fulfils the political function that assists the stabilisation of Ukrainian statehood, and conveys European values to Ukrainian society.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

The relationship between Ukraine and Russia is an important factor from the point of view of European security and stability, as well as of the further development of NATO-Ukrainian contacts.

It is clear that there is a certain amount of interdependence between the economies of the two countries, but for Ukraine, above all, it means a security, political risk. It is also clear that there is a significant difference between the approaches in Moscow and in Kyiv to the development of mutual contacts. The positions are different in connection with the future of the CIS and with the European processes as well. From a military point of view, the different interests are directly expressed by the fact that Ukraine, despite Russian political and economic pressures, did not join the military agreement signed in 1992 within the CIS framework.

Ukraine is trying to turn to Europe in the economic field as well. Unfortunately, the present level of the country's economic power is far from what is required for the further development of co-operation with the European Union (for example, for associate membership). Most security policy experts agree that Ukraine's security is threatened, foremost, in the economic field.

Aside from the principal disagreement, there are some significant practical problems in the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relationship. The high percentage of Russians in Ukraine and the disputed status of the Crimea, are continuing sources of tensions. From the Russian side, the status of the Sevastopol naval base is also continuously questioned.

On the other hand, the basic agreement

signed on May 31, 1997, is definitely a cornerstone in the development and normalisation of bilateral political relations (in that document, Russia guarantees Ukrainian territorial integrity, and the inviolability of common borders). It is also the case that article 6 of the agreement could be interpreted as an obstacle on Ukraine's path toward possible future NATO membership: one side cannot sign any agreement that is directed against the other side.



The division of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet, and the question of stationing a Russian fleet on Ukrainian "soil", required compromises that are very far from the original positions of both sides. Nevertheless, a paradoxical situation has been created: NATO found a prospective partner in Ukraine, while on its territory, Russian troops are located at least until 2017.

Ukraine's strategic importance is far more significant than that of the Baltic states. One may recall Moscow's categorical protests against the possible NATO membership of any Baltic country. One can also imagine that Moscow would like to keep its Western neighbour (Ukraine) as far from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as possible. Therefore, Russia must change before Ukraine can become an Alliance member. Today, it is highly unlikely that, despite Russian protests, either the Alliance or Ukraine will undertake the consequences of Ukraine's membership, Russia's increasing instability, as well as that of the entire European region.

THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND NATO-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

After the parliamentary elections in 1998, anti-Western positions increased among the members of Parliament. The political parties taking this position were always against the improvement of NATO-Ukrainian relations. They found real arguments in the Alliance's military actions in Yugoslavia.

Ukraine's society did not forget the anti-NATO traditions from Soviet times. The major part of the society did not accept the arguments



for bombing an independent, sovereign state. The Government's communication strategy, based on the theory that the Alliance is formed only for defending allied countries, failed. The leftists in Parliament started a very dynamic campaign, constantly attacking the officials responsible for the foreign and security policies, presenting the step taken by the Alliance without UN authorisation as a sign of its aggressive character. Ukraine's society was influenced in the same way by Russian mass media. Political forces preferring Western contacts were placed in the position of defending themselves. On April 23, 1999, parliament passed a decision condemning the NATO action against Yugoslavia.

The anti-NATO atmosphere in Parliament ended with a positive result as well: a law was passed on Ukraine's participation in international peacekeeping operations. (Another bill on the status of foreign troops in Ukraine was adopted in 2000 only after leftists lost their parliamentary majority).

According to public opinion polls, 63% of the population condemned the air strikes against Yugoslavia.

In general, the influence of the military operations on Ukrainian-NATO relations was negative. Even the Washington summit (April, 1999) could not change the situation, though a

willingness was declared to improve contacts with Ukraine.

THE FUTURE

The direction of Ukraine's security policy is mostly decided by the President, following a European orientation. From this point of view, the 1999 presidential elections were extremely important.

Ukraine is one of the key factors of the European security environment. Neither Central Europe, nor the continent as a whole, is indifferent to the orientation, and the economic and social stability of the country. Hungary is very much interested in the success of the democratic transition and economic transformation of our largest neighbour. Aside from the regional security aspects, there is one more important factor: the future of the Hungarian minority of 170,000 in the Carpathian region. Their fate is closely connected with Ukraine's stability and prosperity. Therefore, the relations between NATO and Ukraine have direct consequences for Hungary as well.

The fate of Ukraine is a strategic question for the Alliance, and for every allied country, but is more relevant for Poland and Hungary, the two NATO members neighbouring Ukraine. We welcome the strategic concept Ukraine-2010, which names among the geopolitical priorities of the country to be its integration both into the European and West European Unions, and the improvement of the special strategic partnership with NATO.

At the moment when Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic officially became NATO members, the three Prime ministers issued a common declaration. In that declaration, they committed themselves to support the "open door" policy, and to help all the regional countries to join the North Atlantic Alliance sooner or later.

As far as Hungary is concerned, we are deeply interested in having as many of our neighbours as possible in the same institutions that we joined (naturally, including Ukraine). This is a question of security, and a question of assisting Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. Both questions are of vital importance for Hungary.



MOSCOW AND NATO EXPANSION: READY FOR THE SECOND WAVE?



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If one were to trace the history of Moscow's reactions to NATO expansion and its 'ripple effects' for Russian foreign policy strategic developments since 1992, much light would be shed on the intuitive preferences that have and will continue to shape the decision-making process in Russia¹. Until very recently, in the mind's eye of the Russian Government, and increasingly of the general population, a new world order is emerging while their country stands by as helpless observer. Even the most outspoken nationalists were caught off guard as their mostly rhetorical predictions actually appeared to be coming true. A new world order characterised by a United

Nations diminishing in influence and NATO behaving as the world's policeman has forced Russian policy planners to re-think their place in the world. The UN Security Council had provided Russia with stature as a player in world affairs, but Moscow's veto may now have lost much of its value. The Founding Act signed between Russia and NATO in May 1997 failed completely as a substitute, because NATO, the Permanent Joint Committee (PJC) notwithstanding, is an organisation where Russian opinion has counted for little. At least that is how Russia's officials and media portrayed it².

Before 1999, few Russians believed that NATO's post-Soviet eastern relationships posed an immediate military threat to them, but expansion was nonetheless a threatening phenomenon. Political and military leaders in Moscow, including President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, regularly said that (undefined) "threats" to Russian security still existed. Already in October 1998, the new Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, made official the concept that there was a "red line" stretching from the Baltic states to Ukraine that NATO must not be allowed to cross. Even Sergei Stepashin (now Russia's Chief Comptroller), on replacing Primakov in May 1999, called NATO's air strikes in Yugoslavia a "strike against Russia". Until 1999, the Government in Moscow was more concerned about the possibility of isolation from



¹ Black J.L. *Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?* — Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

² Arbatova N. The Most Painful Lesson of the Resent Time. — *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 6, 1999, p.3.



Europe than it was of any military danger. Previous outbursts of anger and feelings of helplessness generated by specific Western action in the Balkans and against Iraq had been fleeting, in part because such actions were mandated by the United Nations. A real sense of danger emerged only after NATO began acting "out of zone" and behaving, according to many Russian observers, as "vigilantes" outside the framework of international law and the structures of the UN Security Council. The truth of such charges may be moot; but the fact that both Russia's political leaders and its general population came to believe them is significant³.

Publications by prominent American commentators, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Jan Nowak, were taken by some Russians as signs of a Washington-led conspiracy to isolate Moscow and undermine its influence in the CIS specifically and in Eurasia generally. Even though neither of these men have served in an official advisory capacity for some time, Brzezinski's "A Geostrategy for Eurasia" (October 1997) and Nowak's "What NATO Can Do For Russia" (19 April 2000) were interpreted as part of a pattern. The piece by Jan Nowak, former national security advisor and long time employee of *Radio Free Europe*, drew special ire⁴. His reference to the expanded NATO membership as an "important tool of constructive American influence in this [the Balkans] crucial region," and his call for a new wave of admissions to NATO, including Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, precisely to combat what he termed an "expansionist mentality among Russia's ruling elite" struck Russian observers as especially perverse. So did the treatment by *The New York Times* of an OP-Ed piece by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Ivanov called his essay, "An Extended Hand," but it was printed by the NYT as "Hand Extended as a Challenge," a

fact that Russian commentators interpreted as evidence of Russian "constructiveness" confronting U.S. "denial" in the form of recent speeches by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in support of amending the ABM Treaty⁵.

In the late 1990s, the publicity generated by proponents of NATO enlargement unwittingly revealed the nature of the dilemma faced by Russia. Panels, conferences, symposia, and dinner speeches on the subject of enlargement were common fare in NATO countries well before the actual admission of three new members. These proceedings were dominated by generals, admirals, senior bureaucrats, academics, and advisers to government agencies, many of whom had vested interests in the enhancement of NATO. There was astonishingly little public debate in the West on the subject of NATO per se, although the very reason for its founding had gone the way of the "Soviet threat". Even the Alliance's new Strategic Concept was greeted in the West with thundering silence. The Kosovo crisis hauled NATO back into the Western public eye, but by that time the contentious points were vastly different than they would have been a mere year beforehand.

During the limited discussion of expansion itself, NATO was portrayed by advocates as the sole safeguard of European and North American security, leaving little room for serious discussion of alternative security arrangements. Enlargement was defended, when necessary, in historical terms: bringing East and East Central European peoples back into Europe; in political terms: to ensure democratic development and European stability; in economic terms: wider markets; and in strategic terms: to put an end to "dividing lines" in Europe. In short, bringing light into darkness. But few of the explanations stood up very well under Russian scrutiny.

Assuming that the "reasons" were sincerely held to be true and worth acting upon for the most altruistic reasons, they still left room for striking contradiction even to Western observers. To name but a few: new dividing lines were, in fact, created in Europe, and the potential of such agencies as the OSCE, the WEU, and perhaps even the UN as security-providers were left on the wane as NATO's profile grew. Most importantly, the "reasons" for expansion were all too obviously driven directly and indirectly by NATO's attitude towards Russia.



³ The full text of NATO's Strategic Concept see: *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No.16, April 30 - March 6, 1999. In an accompanying commentary, Vadim Solov'ev and Vladimir Mukhin said that the RF Ministry of Defence was now forced to create a "geopolitical counterforce". See: Solov'ev V., Mukhin V. NATO Declares Readiness for "Global Actions". — *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No.16, April 30 - May 6, 1999.

⁴ On Brzezinski's "A Geostrategy for Eurasia" (Foreign Affairs, September-October, 1997, pp.50-64) see: Brutents K. Superpower Temptations. — *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, November 29, 1997, p.6.

⁵ See: Ivanov I. "A Challenge from Russia". — *New York Times*, April 24, 2000, and S.Merinov's response: Merinov S. Hand Offered as a Challenge. — *Rossiyskaia Gazeta*, April 26, 2000, p.1,7.



Russians, in their turn, asked why NATO continues to endure at all if the reason for its creation in 1949 — a Stalinist USSR — no longer existed. Russian strategists believed that the world was in danger of becoming unipolar, with NATO acting as an instrument for American global hegemony. They much preferred a multipolar world in which the prerogatives for international intervention lie with the UN or, in Europe, with the OSCE⁶. The dilemma, of course, is that Russia does not now have the means to serve as one of the "poles" in a multipolar world.

Moreover, Moscow's self-proclaimed sphere of influence is precisely what NATO appears now to be challenging. Peering out at the arguments for NATO expansion from behind the Kremlin wall, it is not hard to see why Russian analysts and nationalists worry that their country's influence on the Baltic and the Black Seas, in the Caspian basin, in the South Caucasus and even Central Asia might soon be greatly curtailed, even to the point of exclusion. Georgia has announced that it will apply for NATO membership by 2005 and **Ukraine, already neighbour to two NATO members, has greatly increased its bilateral relations with the Alliance, with which it has more than doubled its schedule of cooperative ventures.** It is not difficult to understand why some Russians interpret their rejection by the EU and the WTO as part of a larger process; nor can they help but judge NATO enlargement as a specific American attempt to keep them "in their place". Ignoring the consequences of such sentiments, no matter if their premises are false, was and is a strategic mistake made in much of the West.

There is an important psychological factor at play here. One cannot discount historical consciousness in any strategic debate. The rhetoric of conflict in former Yugoslavia is evidence enough of that. Russian philosophers and historians have pondered their country's place in Europe for centuries, many of them concluding from events of the Napoleonic era, the mid-century Crimean War, and the famous "Eastern Question," that Russia must expect rejection from a united Europe. Tsarist ideologies laid a firm basis for a "them versus us" approach to the world long before the Marxist-Leninists gave the idea a singularly official stamp. The explanation that NATO's growth is a continuation of an historical contest between East and West may not be a correct one, but to humiliated Russians it

still rings true.

The collapse of the USSR left Russians scrambling to resurrect their organic history from the dustbin into which the CPSU had cast it. Evidence that a slavophile vision lurked beneath the surface of even the most openly "westernising" groups emerged when the least aggressive opponent of expansion among Russia's major political leaders, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, warned that NATO's plans represent a psychological "rejection" of Russia. Yavlinskiy drew a parallel with Germany in 1919, as did Gorbachev. For obvious reasons, the image of a new version of *Drang nach Osten* comes quickly and readily to the Russian mind. The perception that NATO is at best indifferent to Russia's troubles, at worst delighting in them, is a psychological variable that has enormous implications for European security, and warrants far more careful analysis than it has received to date.



There have been political and economic consequences of NATO expansion in Russia as well⁷. The prediction that NATO expansion would compel (or allow) the Russian military-industrial complex to demand more subsidies, and persuade the General Staff to keep the "threat from Europe" a priority held true until late 1999. But even the new main threat, international terrorism, has a xenophobic ring to it. Though not much more so that the "rogue state" spectre raised elsewhere. The adoption of new military concepts, giving priority to nuclear deterrence and even an acceptance of the principle of first nuclear strike, was plainly a consequence of Moscow's inability to fund anything else. Nonetheless, the new concepts were justified to the public in part by the radically altered balance of power caused by NATO's expansion eastward. The long-awaited final approval of Russia's new military doctrine, in December 1998, was thrown to the wind when NATO attacked Yugoslavia. In May 1999, the RF military doctrine was placed under review once more, and a new, quite changed, version was signed as recently as April 2000. And it is purposely termed a document for the "transition period"⁸.

⁶ The communist media is filled with this type of analysis. For representative expressions from the Russian government press, see Kuznechevskii V. NATO Plans Cover Half the World. — *Rossiyskaia Gazeta*, April 16, 1999, p.4. Vanin G., Zhilin A. Balkan War Lessons Already Evident. — *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 10, 1999, p.6.

⁷ See, e.g., Guseinov V. "Rebirth" of NATO and Russian Security. — *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, April 16, 1999, p.4. (Major General Guseinov is a member of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council).

⁸ For the full text of the RF Military Doctrine see: Military Doctrine of Russian Federation. — *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 12, 2000, p.3-4.



The ripple effects of NATO expansion to the East were all predicted long ago by a wide cross-section of Russia's politicians and journalists, and by many observers in the West. It was expected that Russia would struggle to maintain and strengthen the CIS, and construct contingency partnerships with China, India, and Iran. It was pointed out regularly that Russia's military reform, and the military-industrial programme, would be influenced by NATO decisions. No one doubted that NATO expansion eastward would have a powerful impact on the Russian political arena and on Moscow's political elite. In short, NATO's decisions about enlargement and "out of zone" policing activities were made in full knowledge that the Russian Government would be unpersuaded and angered. The degree to which anti-NATO and anti-American feelings would well up in Russia's public domain, however, was unexpected at both the government and pundit level in NATO countries. NATO's failure in this regard was inexplicable. There is a certain irony about the fact that the old Soviet image of a rapacious West has re-surfaced on Russian streets. This time, however, the public sentiment was more spontaneous than orchestrated.

NATO policy is by no means responsible for the overwhelming economic and political disarray that drives Russian grievance. Yet, as a result of its startling inability to understand Russian resentment of enlargement, NATO has provided a convenient target towards which angry Russians of all strata could vent their frustration, and this scapegoating will certainly occur again if the Russian economy does not improve and NATO, unswayed by Putin's conciliatory approaches, decided to initiate a new 'wave' of memberships.

The formal admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary is already ancient history. The next round of additional memberships in NATO will be of far greater importance to Russia than the current one, for it will bring the Alliance still closer to Russia's borders and may encompass former Soviet republics. The renewed discussion will be conducted in Russia under a new Government and a new President. This President has already overseen the ratification of START II and the Non-Proliferation Treaty — has re-affirmed the inviolability of the ABM Treaty. Moscow and Minsk have drawn closer together in their military co-ordination. Nuclear deterrence has been re-confirmed as the centre piece of Russian defence policy.

Compared to the wavering of Russia's Government and intransigence of its Duma during strategic debates in 1993 and 1997, President



Putin's approval into law of new concepts of national security and a military doctrine went astonishingly smoothly and quickly. He has a clear mandate to protect Russia's interests in what the Kremlin hopes will be a multipolar world. Moscow recognises that NATO has the right to admit any legitimate candidate, and that all legitimate candidates have the right to apply for admission. Nevertheless, Russia remains adamantly opposed to the entry of any former USSR republic into NATO, and act that Moscow officials consistently have said would prompt immediate and unilateral revision of the Founding Act. In light of the fact that Russia's relationship with the Alliance already was frozen for one year (March 1999 - March 2000), after NATO initiated its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, that warning must be taken as a promise. Granted, President Putin has not resorted to admonitions about a "red line on the map" (that is, the former USSR borders) beyond which Russia would not allow NATO to cross. But such words were commonly employed by Foreign Minister Ivanov, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov (the defence ministry's chief of department for international cooperation), and first deputy chief of the General Staff, General Valeriy Manilov.

Indeed, the terms of the renewed relationship were worked out only as recently as 10 May 2000, when Chief of the General Staff, Anatoliy Kvashnin, attended a PJC meeting in Brussels. In commenting on that session, General Manilov insisted that for the relationship to be fully restored Russia must be treated as "an equal partner" in conflict resolution. It remains to be seen if Putin can work these particular dilemmas out.

The new Russian President's approach to the NATO question so far has been encouraging. In addition to his perhaps flippant "why not?" response to a British journalist's query about the potential for Russian membership in NATO, Putin has taken a 'wait and see' view to events




his predecessor's Government would have reacted strongly against. To cite but one example: **In early March 2000 the Ukraine-NATO Commission (created in 1997) met for the first time on Ukrainian soil. Some Western (and Russian) observers saw this as a challenge to Putin's new assertiveness in foreign policy.** Yet his "why not?" statement came only a few days later. And the Kremlin's public reaction to the NATO

session in Kiev and its accompanying agreements on foreign troops on Ukrainian soil, protocols on joint military exercises, officer training, and NATO access to the Yavoriv training grounds, was quite relaxed in comparison with previous similar encounters.

The United Nations' Security Council is one of the stakeholders in any future discussion about NATO enlargement, for the UN's credibility as a forum in which international conflicts can be resolved has been rendered suspect by a stronger NATO. The future of the OSCE must be weighed into the bargain as well. An alternative to adding more members to NATO would be the regeneration of the PfP and the integration of Russia more fully into its undertakings. **For some countries, such as Ukraine, the PfP has facilitated greater integration with NATO specifically and Europe generally, while at the same time the government in Kyiv has been able to sustain peaceful and co-operative relations with Moscow.** Eventually the PfP could serve as a basis for a new, all European and North American security system. NATO as we now know it, dividing lines in Europe, and the final vestiges of the Cold War, might then fade away. A truly appropriate "geostrategy for Eurasia" could finally be found. Or is that merely wishful thinking?

UKRAINE'S CO-OPERATION WITH NATO: ARE THERE ANY GROUNDS FOR CONCERN? A VIEW FROM MOSCOW



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BEFORE KOSOVO, BEFORE WASHINGTON...

Ukraine-NATO co-operation had not directly and significantly influenced Russian policy toward Ukraine. At first glance, it would seem that a paradox exists in the situation where NATO issues, especially within the context of the North Atlantic Alliance's enlargement, which has already begun, are not only in the focus of Russia's foreign and security policy issues, but also impact Russian position with respect to many international problems. Regardless of the methods used to assess the damage that NATO enlargement has inflicted on Russia, it should be admitted frankly: Russia, too, harmed its own interests by treating the enlargement as item No.1 on its foreign policy agenda. The end result was that Russia failed to prevent new members from joining NATO, and simultaneously complicated the attainment of its most vital national priorities; most importantly, those connected with the country's internal stability and development which, in their turn, depend to a large extent on the progress of Russian-Western relations and their demilitarisation.

Emphasis on NATO enlargement could affect bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations, as Ukraine could not be Russia's ally with its tough anti-NATO policy. The Russian public's very special attitude toward Ukraine, namely, the perception of Ukraine as being fraternal with Russia in terms of its people and culture,

inevitably caused a very painful reaction, or a kind of jealousy of Ukraine's "flirtation" with the West, perceived by many as an anti-Russian act. Ukraine, in its turn, had justifiable fears of becoming hostage to the existing Russia-West opposition, which could weaken its positions both in the West and East alike. If that's the case, then why **didn't the "anti-NATO" wave affect official relations between Russia and Ukraine during the "first wave" of expansion?** There are several reasons for this.

First of all, Russia did not view Ukraine as a possible NATO member candidate (especially when taking into account Ukraine's non-allied status proclaimed in its Constitution). Furthermore, such a possibility, even if hypothetically acknowledged by Russia, would have expanded the problem of enlargement beyond the "first wave" discussion framework, which Russia, in any event, is wont to posit as a one-time problem. This alone would have lowered the tone of Russia's position, and could have given an impetus to furthering the enlargement process.

Furthermore, there were too many complex issues, especially the Black Sea fleet's division, whose resolution was of vital importance for Russia. These vital interests prevented Russia from taking the risk of allowing bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine to deteriorate by entering the latter on the list of its political opponents as a pro-NATO state or, at the least, placing a burden on Russian-



Ukrainian relations. Russia's policy within the CIS also required that it maintain partner, if not allied, relations with Ukraine.

Finally, how was it possible for Russia, while developing its co-operation with NATO, to voice its opposition to Ukraine's declared course toward expanding and deepening its relations with the North Atlantic Alliance according to the forms and organisational structures used as a basis for Russian-NATO relations? After the signing of the Russian-NATO Founding Act, Ukraine gained new possibilities for intensifying its co-operation with the Alliance. After the bilateral Charter was signed in Madrid in 1997, this co-operation was designated to a higher "distinctive partnership" level.

The present situation, however, makes evident that Russia's policy motives are changing, which could likely lead to a change in Russia's views on the development of Ukrainian-NATO co-operation.

Foremost, one should take into consideration the serious deterioration of Russian-NATO relations which, despite having thawed somewhat, have not yet recovered from the political crisis provoked by the Kosovo situation. The issue of the further prospects of those relations remains unresolved. There are two basic alternatives for their development.

RUSSIAN-NATO RELATIONS IN THE NEW SITUATION

The first, and most likely alternative, is the restoration of pre-Kosovo ties, but on a relatively smaller scale. Given Russia's sceptical attitude toward NATO proposals regarding the restoration of the earlier format of relations which, in Moscow's view, corresponds neither to present-day realities nor its interests, the field for future co-operation may appear rather narrow. In these relations, Russia will be governed by the need to interact and carry on a political dialogue with NATO, recognising its importance in the European security system. Such interaction, which would be largely depoliticised, and free of declarations, illusionary, and unrealistic expectations, will be based on pragmatic co-operation in the areas of mutual interest. In this respect, a revealing example is Russia's participation in KFOR, despite its frozen relations with NATO. It is also significant that the basic agreements regarding CFE treaty adaptation were achieved at the most critical moment of Russian-NATO relations, one week following the beginning of air raids on Yugoslavia.

Political relations will most likely be focused on 'squaring angles', rather than on forming a strategic partnership.

The second alternative is based on recognising the need for ensuring a higher level of political partnership and practical interaction. This approach suggests not only overcoming existing differences and coming to mutually acceptable compromises on the fundamental issues of European security, but also jointly determining promising directions for developing relations, including those of an institutional character. Up until now, Moscow has only expressed its dissatisfaction with the previous format of these relations, but failed to formulate its idea of the desired future targets of co-operation with NATO (*Russia's membership in NATO? Associate status relations? Restoration of the earlier dialogue format in accordance with the Founding Act? A general political dialogue, aimed at maintaining the requisite interaction in practical/operational issues? etc.*). If Russia and NATO manage to agree on the long-term course of their co-operative development, it will take on the nature of a joint political strategy, which implementation will provide for continual interaction development in moving toward a common goal.

When President V.Putin gave a 'why not?' response to the question of the possibility of such membership, this was clearly beyond the limits of practical policy, but demonstrated Russia's openness to the broadest possible dia-



logue with NATO, and its potential readiness for developing relations at a higher level. Another signal that Russia is prepared to improve its relations with the West and NATO in order to achieve a qualitatively new partnership level was its proposal regarding the creation of a common tactical ABM system on, as V.Putin put it, a realistic, pragmatic, and technical basis.

It is evident that NATO, too, is close to understanding the need for changing to new mechanisms of co-operation with Russia, including possible mutual mechanisms. Provided that the political will is there, the possibility for gradually forming associative relations cannot



at all be ruled out, and can very much be assumed to be the target. But this will require that the partners (opponents) seriously modify their approaches toward the targets and contents of co-operation.

CONCLUSIONS FOR UKRAINE

It is clear that the above alternatives cannot be implemented in their purity, and that pragmatic relations between Russia and NATO will be far more complex and contradictory. However, they make it possible to predict the tendencies for their future development. **The prevalence of one of the two alternatives in Russian-NATO relations will not only influence their security policies, but also the positions of their other partners.** The second scenario — constructive upward trend co-operation — among other things, opens broader prospects for removing the present, confrontational dialogue between Russia and the West regarding NATO enlargement. This, in its turn, would reduce the imperative of candidate countries for joining NATO. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it would not face the acute dilemma of choosing between two opposing forces which, in turn, would allow it to follow the non-alliance concept, and develop relations with NATO and Russia at the same time.

Therefore, **the point is not whether Putin's Russia will stay with the "red line" thesis of enlargement, but rather, what its form and context will be.** If this is presented in the form of Russia's serious concern regarding being "squeezed out" of Europe and the European security system, then compromises are possible provided there is a qualitative improvement in the level of mutual understanding and partnership between Russia and NATO. And if this demonstrates the tough confrontation between Russia and NATO on key security issues with a relatively low level of interaction between them or, a kind of "forced co-operation", then the situation will encounter a new, and likely more serious political crisis, where the beginning of the new wave of enlargement turns the "red line" into the "black mark" on Russia-West relations.

In any event, **the key issue** in both cases for Russia, which appeared powerless to counter NATO enlargement, **is the issue of the limits of such enlargement.** For this reason, Ukraine's co-operation with NATO will inevitably be assessed by Russia within this context, taking into account NATO's proclaimed "open door" policy. Although Russia is evidently unwilling to draw attention to this problem, one which could transform the discussion of Ukraine's prospects for joining

NATO into practical policy, Ukraine itself refrains from specifying its strategy for integrating into trans-Atlantic structures. Despite these developments, **the problem of NATO enlargement is turning into a fundamental problem of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations.** The remaining uncertainty of Ukraine's position, especially in the event that new members are admitted into NATO, will place a burden on relations between Russia and Ukraine. This element of uncertainty extremely complicates the tasks of pragmatically providing for Russia's security and military building.



In the worst-case scenario, the situation will become most threatening for Ukraine, where the actual implementation of the "second wave" provokes a new, and possibly more acute crisis in Russian-NATO relations. In this instance, Ukraine's many-vector policy would prove to be completely non-viable. On the one hand, the development of relations with Russia would mean the countries drawing closer outside of the Bigger Europe, and Ukraine sharing the bitter fruit of Russia's relative isolation. On the other hand, Ukraine's westward drift, even if it were possible, would mean the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations. As a result, Ukraine would be placed in the situation of choosing between "bad" and 'very bad': either to evolve into the buffer zone between Russia and NATO, or move to the forefront of confrontation (not necessarily of a military character) between them. Given Ukraine's inability to integrate into the developed European market and the EU, this political (or military-political) risk would carry with it the possibility of the country's socio-economic regression.



At the same time, Ukraine is hardly capable of allying itself with NATO in the event of the possible new alienation process that could take place between the expanding North Atlantic Alliance and Russia. The West is perfectly aware that if that were the case, the strengthening of Ukraine-NATO ties would encourage the development of negative trends in its relations with Russia. The West is unlikely to pay such a price. **Up until now, the West, and NATO in particular, has more or less consistently adhered to the principle of a balanced development of co-operation with Ukraine and Russia, demonstrating a kind of "package approach".** Indeed, Ukraine at present is much more successful than Russia in developing contacts with NATO, but this is the result of Russia taking a deliberate time-out, rather than an advance on Ukraine's part. Thus far, the Alliance can use Ukraine-NATO co-operation to demonstrate the possibilities offered by the bilateral Charter (or by the Founding Act, in Russia's case). But this demonstrative counterpoising also has its limits. **If Russian-NATO relations are not intensified, NATO will have to limit its interaction with Ukraine, at least to the extent where it does not take on an anti-Russian appearance.**

All this demonstrates that Ukraine is no less objectively interested in specifying its relations with the West, and particularly with NATO, than Russia, and perhaps even more. Proceeding from the fact that Ukraine has no chances of becoming a NATO member or, more exactly, of being admitted to the Alliance, Ukraine would be a more attractive partner for both Russia and NATO if it declares the absence of such intentions, and confirms its non-allied status.

It goes without saying that Russia will be trying to avoid drifting away from the Bigger Europe, and, consequently, to escape situations where its relations with NATO might become a significant factor of deterioration of relations with western partners as a whole. It is also clear that Russia is extremely interested in the development of friendly and partner-like relations with Ukraine. No doubt, an improvement of Russian-NATO relations could resolve many problems, but if this is not the case, the situation should not be overly dramatised. Even if Russian-NATO relations remain cool, this won't mean an inevitable emergence of serious future crises in the European politics and in Russia's relations with the West. Such a danger does exist, as we have shown above, but probably, as a challenge to cope with. This can sound paradoxical, but the Kosovo crisis, although negatively impacting Russia's relations

with the West, also brought an evident positive result: it showed how much both sides are interested in avoiding aggravation of their contradictions and in the development of constructive co-operation.

Therefore, complications of Russian-NATO relations conditioned the necessity of their revision and reforming, proceeding from the sober assessment of mutual interests and realistic co-operation potential. In this connection, relatively new imperatives are becoming more and more evident in Russia's policy.

First of all, **the comprehension of the task of minimising the effects of contradictions with NATO on the content of relations with Europe is growing.**

Secondly, **there is a growing desire to make up for the present and future limitations in relations with NATO by developing interaction with the West in other areas, including in the security policy.** In this connection, the emphasis on intensifying Russian-EU partnership became more evident, including in the field of foreign and security policy, as well as the strengthening of potential of bilateral relations with European states. This was once again demonstrated by the results of the Moscow Russian-EU summit, and a tense schedule of V.Putin's visits to European capitals.

Both these developments are leading to a relative decrease in the importance of Russian-NATO relations in European politics. In such a situation, Ukraine can feel freer in its relations with both NATO and Russia. However, the "strategic choice of integration into European and trans-Atlantic structures", declared by Ukraine, leaves the issue of future goals of its practical policy open.

THE PROBLEM OF UKRAINE'S STRATEGIC CHOICE

As a process, related with the development of Ukraine's co-operation with western partners, this choice generally corresponds to the Russian course, more and more definitely aiming at gradual growing closer to the Bigger Europe. In this respect, the coincidence and strengthening of European vectors in Ukraine's and Russia's policies present factors of consolidation of their bilateral partnership and growing possibilities for their European movement. **It is absolutely evident that Ukraine is unable to go this way separately from Russia, all the more — opposing itself to Russia. The same refers to Russia, and this is demonstrated by the history of their relations with NATO.** In Ukraine, the opinion is being increasingly spread, that it's way to the West lies through Russia, which in some sense



opens (or, to the contrary, obstructs) this way for Ukraine. This has nothing to do with the alleged imperial ambitions of Russia, or its desire to play the role of the "big brother" — such are the objective geopolitical and economic realities. (Although Russia continues to see itself as the main Eastern partner of the West, and Ukraine has not yet finally got rid of its "little brother" complex). Probably, exactly this predetermination conceals the internal contradictoriness of the Ukrainian thesis of integration into trans-Atlantic structures.

In general, this process won't contradict Russia's interests, while it is in line with similar Russia's possibilities, that is, before Ukraine declares NATO membership as its direct long-term goal. But it is evident that this does not meet Ukraine's own interests: Ukraine will find a political enemy in Russia, and won't get any benefits in the West. Rather, the contrary situation will occur: the West will be forced to limit partnership with Ukraine, in order to avoid an imbalance with Russia, and a raise in conflict probability. Possibilities now offered to Ukraine within the existing format of relations with NATO (Charter of Distinctive Partnership, State Programme of Co-operation with NATO, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, PfP, etc.), would largely be blocked.

Russia's negative reaction would also be provoked by the change of the entire context of relations within the CIS. Today, Ukraine attempts to establish itself as an 'alternative leader' of the CIS, which is especially evident through its actions on the Southern flank, institutionally represented by the GUUAM. This development has already brought about a relative decrease in Russia's role, and weakening of one of the most important for Russia institutional elements of the CIS — the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. It is clear that breaking Ukraine, which is so important in the CIS, from Russia would be fraught not only with further erosion of Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space, but also with the break-up of the entire CIS. In other words, Primakov's "red line" is not only, and not as much a reflection of the political views of Russia's ruling elite; rather, it is an unbiased assessment of the consequences of possible appearance of NATO on Russia's western borders. And while in the Baltic countries' case it deals with Russia's possible reaction to the actual NATO enlargement, in Ukraine's case, such a reaction would go out as early as at the stage of "declaration of intentions".

Ukraine itself is unlikely to meet the requirements for NATO membership in the foreseeable future, the more so that there are no

officially formulated requirements: the NATO enlargement study (September, 1995) stipulated just a number of factors to be taken into account in course of enlargement. For some countries, such uncertainty may offer advantages on their way to NATO, but for Ukraine it can serve as a pretext for refusal from the Alliance membership negotiations. Even in the (hardly probable) case of recognising Ukraine capable of meeting all the obligations within the framework of NATO in practice, all NATO members will have to agree that its membership in NATO "will promote security and stability in the North Atlantic region". Can the radical negative shift in the entire context and climate of Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-NATO relations promote them? NATO countries are unlikely to give an affirmative answer.

Therefore, despite Ukraine is presently ahead of Russia in its relations with NATO, both countries are actually facing the same problem of defining future realistic aims and targets of such co-operation.

After Kosovo, Russia is unwilling to engage in "co-operation for the sake of co-operation", realising that it will not secure its national interests, on the one hand. On the other hand, such relations provide a favourable environment for the implementation of NATO policy, largely different from Russia's idea of the modern world and the future system of European security.

Is Ukraine ready to continue moving towards undefined targets for the sake of moving, without specifying the political ends of integration into trans-Atlantic structures? If so, this does not improve the flexibility of Ukraine's policy; rather, this creates a number of problems for both Ukraine and Russia.

Most Central and Eastern European nations declared NATO membership as their goal and are developing their co-operation with it correspondingly. They can participate in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in accordance with the NATO membership preparation plan, adopted by the Washington session of the NATO council in April, 1999. NATO employs a dedicated "feedback system", that provides a special mechanism for applicant consultation and assistance. For Ukraine (as well as for Russia) this means that they won't be able to continue co-operation with NATO (for instance, within the PfP framework) on equal footing with other countries. **The gap between the political declarations in favour of co-operation and real content of such co-operation will be getting wider.** (Exactly such a gap between political rhetoric and practical policy



in relations with NATO to a large extent determined the post-Kosovo crisis between Russia and NATO). Pressure to define national goals of practical co-operation with NATO will increase accordingly. For instance, if NATO membership is impractical, why does Ukraine need standardisation of weapon systems, combat training, military planning, procedures with NATO? **If Ukraine does not give answers to such questions, "pointless" co-operation with NATO can hit hard both Ukrainian and Russian national interests.**

In Russia, concern has been expressed over the character of Ukrainian-NATO exercises, whose scenarios, according to some assessments, as of anti-Russian nature. Some experts are worried that Russia's Black Sea fleet can become too "transparent" for NATO in the result of intense implementation of the Ukrainian-NATO Partnership Programme in the region. Such lines of tension largely appear, as a consequence of uncertain goals of Ukraine's co-operation with NATO. Does

Ukraine deliberately develop NATO standardisation programmes? Does it realise that this can seriously undermine the potential of Russian-Ukrainian military-technical and economic co-operation, and is fraught with Ukraine losing its capabilities in this sector? Meanwhile, Russian-Ukrainian co-operation in the field of weapon systems involves approximately 1000 enterprises on the Russian part alone. Among thousands of types of jointly developed defence systems, there are internationally competitive ones (special mention should be made of AN-70 military transport aircraft, now undergoing flight tests).

One way or another, today or tomorrow, **Ukraine will have to formulate its own view of its place in the system of relations between NATO and its partners.** At the present stage, probably, a "simple" question should be answered: **does Ukraine see itself as a NATO member?** Evidently, it will be much easier for the re-elected President Kuchma to give a definite answer, than it was for the "previous President". At the same time, political stabilisation in Russia as a result of a democratic transfer of power, and actual coincidence of the terms of governance of the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents create good prospects before the leaders of the two countries for the development of bilateral relations, and "squaring angles" on this path. **It would be shortsighted to postpone the definition and, possibly, the co-ordination of the positions on problems, whose "conservation" not only fails to remove their impact on bilateral relations, but also increases their possible destructive effect in the future.** It should be honestly admitted that one of such problems is the uncertainty of Ukraine's policy towards NATO, on the one hand, and Russia's virtual opposition to NATO, on the other.





ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO BACK OR, ON UKRAINE'S NON-ALLIED LIFE BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA



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Relations between NATO and Russia are an important factor influencing the military-political climate in Europe, where every country has its own views on how to best ensure its national security. For Ukraine, as yet a non-allied country, this "optimal" choice is both painful and complex. In defining its prospects, Kyiv is clearly taking account of the European balance of forces, relations with its neighbours, and its own capabilities. The last years have accustomed Ukraine to walking the shaky bridge between NATO and Russia, and trying to be liked by everyone at the same time. But this requires that one step be taken forward, and then, two back. This behaviour, it seems, is beginning to get on Ukraine's neighbours' and strategic partners' nerves...

WITH UKRAINE, THINGS ARE FINE. AND WITHOUT IT, THEY'RE ALSO NOT THAT BAD?

While Kyiv mulls over its geopolitical future, the behaviour of the non-allied country is being assessed by its neighbours from a pragmatic point of view. Poland is demonstrating the greatest interest in Ukraine's pro-Western and pro-NATO orientation. Of the new troika that joined the Alliance's ranks a year ago, only Poland borders on Russia (the Kaliningrad region) and Belarus, Moscow's most faithful satellite within the CIS.

According to a recent statement by Poland's Defence Minister Janusz Oniszkiewicz, "There are several issues of concern for Poland. What is important for us is the forms that military co-operation between Moscow and Minsk will take. When we were in the process of joining NATO, we stated that we do not see the need for posi-

tioning NATO military contingents and nuclear arsenals in Poland. That's why it would be very important to determine what kind of military integration will take place between the Russian Federation and Belarus, and whether this won't, at some moment, lead to the situation where Russian forces are stationed on Belorussian territory. Clearly, this would change the entire context of Russian-Polish relations"¹.

But where is the guarantee that after Belarus, Moscow will not harness Ukraine? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised that if Russia is going the way of reform and forming an open policy, and for relations between NATO and Russia take on a positive and evolutionary form — this will reduce the threat for Ukraine. With respect to Kyiv, Poland is prepared to take on the role of spokesman for Ukraine's interests within NATO, and also to include Kyiv in the Weimar group; that is, to draw it closer to two important European gravity centres — Germany

¹ Korotchenko I. Marshall Sergeyev is waited in Warsaw. — *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 6, 2000.



and France. But more outspoken politicians, such as the representative of the Sejm commission on international relations Czeslaw Bilecki, have a simple recipe for general calm, and advise Ukraine to join NATO. According to Bilecki, "There is no need to be concerned about Russian protests. Moscow always raises its voice prior to something taking place. This was the case with the first wave of NATO expansion. But when this actually occurred, Russia was unable to say anything. If Ukraine is included in the Euro-Atlantic security structure, this will mean the end of Russia's neo-imperialistic aspirations. If Kyiv does not take this step, then its undefined position will constantly provoke the intention to swallow Ukraine by a certain part of Russian politicians. Neo-imperialistic tendencies exist in those instances when there is something up for grabs."



While Poland's biggest headache is for Russia not to grow around it, in the Czech Republic and Hungary, Ukraine's geopolitical balancing is of less concern. However, despite stable political relations with Ukraine, tendencies for drawing dividing lines in some areas of activity in relations with Kyiv are evident, namely due to Kyiv's uncertain future in the traditional balance of power between NATO and Russia. Meanwhile, new NATO members, and those countries that want to join the Alliance during the second wave of expansion, are not, at this time, very eager to work with Ukraine on long-term defence industry projects, even those that only yesterday were considered by Ukraine to be secured, or at least very promising.

Six East European countries that participated in the Warsaw Pact are examining the idea of forming a mini-NATO; that is, an organisation that would allow these countries to co-ordinate the production and repair of Soviet-type military equipment². The idea is for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, as well as Bulgaria,

Slovakia and Romania, to supply one another with spare parts quickly, cheaply, and without relying on other nations. Experts of "the six" are in the process of preparing lists of available spare parts and components, and checking the requirements of their armed forces.

It is clear at first glance that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are excluded from the new joint co-operative production effort. Against this background, it is clear why Ukraine was not successful in promoting its version for upgrading the T-72 tank in Europe (the Ukrainian-French-Czech project), which is operational in the armed forces of all three new NATO members. This version, which was designated as PSP T-72MP, was based, to a large extent, on technology developed by Ukrainian firms. Europe's rejection of the AN-70 project, proposed by Kyiv and Moscow, and intended for the re-equipment of NATO member countries' air transport fleet, took place within this logical framework as well. Europe does not want to be a hostage to Kyiv's undefined military-political orientation, whose uncertainty is multiplied by Ukraine and Russia's economic instability.

A FRIEND AMONG STRANGERS, A STRANGER AMONG FRIENDS?

These are only the consequences. But how do we deal with the first cause — the traditional Ukrainian "beating about" between NATO and Russia? Where will the balance go this time?

Officially, relations between Kyiv and NATO have undergone no changes. There is a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme, and the Planning and Review Process (which aims at greater compatibility). In all, since 1994, over 5000 Ukrainian soldiers have been involved in PfP events. The NATO Information and Documentation Centre, and the liaison mission are active in Kyiv in order to speed up the process of co-ordinating and carrying out joint actions. The SOFA agreements, long-awaited by NATO, have been ratified by parliament. Now they define the status of foreign troops which come to Ukraine for joint exercises. The Yavoriv training ground is now viewed not so much as a centre for training NATO partner country units, but as NATO's own range. If this weren't the case, then the U.S. and Britain's yearly sponsorship of the range's equipment would have been for naught. The exercises on Ukraine's territory have turned into a common occurrence, even such nerve-trying ones for Russia as "Sea Breeze" on the Black Sea. In line for this year are "Cooperative Partner-2000", "Peace Shield-2000", "Cossack Steppe", and the first ever exercises on Ukraine's territory with NATO units practising dealing with natural disasters.

² INFO-TASS, Vega database, April 27, 2000.



The NATO-Ukraine Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) for 1999 has been 60% fulfilled. Kyiv believes this to be a high indicator, which corresponds to the level of co-operation envisaged at the time the programme was planned. The main feature of IPP-2000 is the decrease in the number of co-operative events with NATO, as quality is expected to be the emphasis. As far as the interoperability programme (PARP) is concerned, it is also far from being accomplished. Former Ukrainian Minister of Defence Kostiantyn Morozov, who up until recently worked in Brussels, gave the following explanation for these developments: "The economic situation and financial problems are having an affect on the ability to accomplish the interoperability goals. Ukraine chose these goals for itself in order to co-operate with NATO in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, of the 27 goals that Ukraine should have accomplished over the 1998-1999 period, only 11 were achieved. This achievement rate is simply unacceptable for us. But everything is determined by our financial capabilities"³. Yet, no one was prodding Kyiv in the back to choose 27 compatibility goals for units assigned to take part in NATO-led events. It was Kyiv who made the decision, and it chose relatively simple tasks within the PARP framework. But if it was not possible to achieve even half of what was planned, then what was the point of all that hoopla?



Less is mentioned about the future of integration into the trans-Atlantic structures. As the Minister of Defence Oleksandr Kuzmuk said while accompanying the President of Ukraine

Leonid Kuchma on a private trip to Novgorod at the beginning of May, "There is a state policy based on which Ukraine never stated it was ready for North Atlantic Alliance membership, and this is the main thing"⁴. While in Russia, it is obviously not polite for Kiev to say anything else concerning the strengthening of contacts with NATO. But anyway, whereas in 1999, it was planned to conduct 29 joint events between the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, over 50 have been planned for this year. Kyiv, after all, shared its strategic bombers with Russia, rather than letting them come under the American knife. The two navies co-operate through exercise engagement. And, as expected, for the first time, Ukraine's air defence units will take part in the exercises of the CIS Air Defence Forces code-named "Combat Concord-2000" at a range near Astrakhan, where earlier, Ukrainians had only been represented by observers.

But it is significant that against the background of Kyiv's activity on Russian territory, both NATO and the U.S. began calling for the country to conduct military reform according to the European model, and hinted that the country was overly militarised. Perhaps the West fears that should the idea of forming a Slavic union between Moscow, Kyiv, and Minsk be turned into reality, then Ukraine's significant military potential will strengthen Russia's position in the European theatre of war? Hardly. NATO's "defence" recommendations to Ukraine are those that it makes to all Alliance partners conducting military reform, but lack the resources for doing so. And each of them is looking to find the best possible balance between quantity and quality.

According to Oleksandr Kuzmuk, "Today, Ukraine cannot ignore the risk of an invasion of its territory taking place by the land forces of some bordering countries"⁵. It is difficult to imagine that he had Russia in mind, as it is knee-deep in Chechnya. There is also no sense in speaking of a NATO threat to Ukraine. At best, one can speak only of non-allied countries bordering on Ukraine.

The following are but a few examples from Ukraine's neighbours. According to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, by 2005, Romania can have no more than 1375 tanks, 2100 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 1475 artillery pieces, 430 combat aircraft and 130 helicopters. Romania's Armed Forces will be cut from 180 thousand men to 80 thousand⁶. Belorussia — 1800 tanks, 2600 ACV, 1615

³ Radio "Svoboda", June 8, 2000.

⁴ UNIAN, March 10, 2000.

⁵ Kuzmuk O. The development of Armed Forces is plan-oriented, entirely substantiated and transparent process for society. — *Narodna Armija*, February 24, 2000, p.4,5.

⁶ Dragsdahl J. NATO Resists Pressures To Militarise Central Europe. — BASIC Paper, No.28, July 1998.



artillery pieces, 294 combat aircraft and 80 helicopters. The strength of the Armed Forces - 80 thousand. Slovakia — 478 tanks, 683 ACV, 383 artillery pieces, 100 combat aircraft and 40 helicopters. Moldova — 210 tanks, 210 ACV, 250 artillery pieces, 50 combat aircraft and 50 helicopters.

At the beginning of the year, Ukraine's military numbered 310 thousand, with prospects for decreasing that number to 295 thousand within a five-year period. The country's arsenal contains 3877 tanks, 911 warplanes, and 237 attack helicopters. Even if the usual under-financing of defence needs is taken into account (this year, the Army's minimal needs will be only 40% met), the capabilities of Ukraine's Armed Forces are at present more than sufficient to effectively deter its non-NATO neighbours in the near future.

THE HAMBURG ACCOUNT FOR EUROPE

But is the emergence of military opposition in Europe between NATO and Russia possible within the near-term future, which would impact the security of all European countries without exception, and require a substantial flexing of their military muscle? Two years ago, a threat assessment prepared for NATO joint chiefs of staff stated that the risk of the revival of Russia's military might, which poses a danger to the Alliance's interests in Europe, is low. The assessment confirmed that Russia had neither the intention, nor possibility for carrying out an offensive operation. Even if Moscow's political leadership considered such a step, the entire preparation process would take three months for a regional war, or 18 months for an all-out war. These activities would not go unnoticed by NATO, and Russia would have little chance of success⁷.

But one year ago, other NATO analysts, in forecasting Russia's behaviour over the first ten years of the 21st century, recommended taking a look at Hitler⁸. And in particular, how, after 1933, a humiliated army was transformed into a mighty military force within a five year period, driven by the leader's strong political will. All that was necessary to achieve this was to breathe the spirit of faith into the officer corps, intensify scientific research, apply its successful gains to the military-industrial complex and, of course, achieve a political consensus within society.

In the last annual publication of the U.S. National Defence University, *"Strategic Assessment"*, Europe's military future within the NATO-Russia context is assessed for the near-

term in the following way. Russia wields potential in Europe equivalent to 45 divisions. The Alliance's potential in Northern Europe is measured as 22 divisions, while in the South, that number is 36. The Alliance's military leadership sticks to the strategy whereby its 58 divisions in Europe can simultaneously repel any act of aggression (in the scenario that the opponent relies on conventional weapons only) from both the East and the South. The Alliance's land forces will be supported by 3600 warplanes.

For purposes of conducting a war in Europe, Russia can, in the best case scenario, put forward no more than 25 divisions and 800 warplanes⁹. This is sufficient for accomplishing intra-CIS tasks. For the European theatre, this is enough for taking action only in one direction (which coincides with the Russian strategists' conclusions). Furthermore, Russia's financial possibilities deprive it of any chances for strengthening its fighting capabilities. Putin's first budget, in which the Russian military placed much hope, promises nothing nice for the generals. The draft budget-2001 of the Russian Federation provides 2.62% of the GDP for defence expenditures. This means that power structures will receive 30 billion roubles less than they get this year. This situation led the head of the Arms Department of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Anatoliy Sitnov to state that "The tasks that have been assigned to the Defence Ministry, given the level of financing, are impossible to accomplish"¹⁰. He emphasised that it was necessary "to draw the list of tasks to be accomplished or increase the military budget".

These realities demonstrate that the possibilities of a conflict erupting between NATO and Russia in the European theatre of war are small. If this were the case, Ukraine could be pulled into hostilities indirectly, whether through the Black Sea Fleet, or through the use of its airspace. As such, Ukraine has a unique opportunity to define its defence priorities, conduct radical military reform, and build a truly effective Armed Forces that correspond to the country's economic possibilities — an Armed Forces that would deter the enemy, if the generals don't forget about him, and not through the number of its personnel, but through the quality of its training and equipment. And this makes the following worth mentioning.

Two years ago, Commander-in-Chief Europe General Wesley Clark visited Poland where he discovered that the yearly flying practice of pilots flying MiG-29 and MiG-21 was only 40 hours, while the average number of

⁷ Red Alert. NATO Expansion and the Problem of a NATO Strategy. — Global Intelligence Update, STRATFOR.COM, March 15, 1999.

⁸ Priorities for a Turbulent World, — *Strategic Assessment*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999.

⁹ RosBusinessConsulting, June 6, 2000.

¹⁰ BBC Radio, May 19, 2000.



hours for the MiG-23 and Su-22 was 60. NATO has another standard for fighters — between 160 and 180 hours. “I have no use for pilots that fly so little”, declared Clark. I am certain that if he visited Ukraine today, we would be able to astound him even more, since it's unlikely that affairs in Ukraine are better than in Russia, where fighter pilots clocked in an average flight time of only three hours for the first six months of this year. Maybe that's why we aren't joining NATO? At least no one will ask us any unnecessary questions...

THE SECOND WAVE IN THE NAME OF NATO

And how will the second wave of NATO expansion effect Ukraine? At a conference organised in Vilnius, and dedicated to the role of NATO in European security, the three Baltic countries, as well as Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania took a fairly unexpected step by turning to NATO's leadership with the request that it accept all of them together during the next summit of the Alliance, planned for 2002¹¹.

NATO leadership is staying with its idea of further expansion. The aspiration of the second wave representatives to come under the Alliance's security umbrella is supported on a political level. But officially, neither NATO membership applications, nor, for that matter, repeat requests and the accomplishment of various programmes, obligates NATO to accept everyone who wants in. In all honesty, the second wave is too disparate in its countries' domestic economic situations, as well as in the state of their armed forces, and democratic traditions. The basis for the first wave of expansion was, above all, not the issues of the security of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It was the need to set a clear example capable of

demonstrating NATO's ability of transforming after the end of the Cold War, and confirm the mandate for its future existence.

Now the Alliance has the opportunity to assess its experience as an enlarged organisation, as well as other realities. And they are not in favour of enlargement. With 28 participants, the process of unanimously approving such a decision becomes significantly complex. This, naturally, will impact the Alliance's effectiveness. The contribution of the three new members has, as yet, not been strongly evident. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are still in the position of being the beneficiaries of trans-Atlantic security. The task of making their armies compatible with Alliance forces (applying PARP procedures to all armed forces, and not only those chosen to participate in the PfP, plus numerous STANAG provisions) proved itself to be relatively difficult, both technically and financially. Kosovo demonstrated that the Alliance does not have sufficient forces and resources to ensure full readiness in crisis situations. Europe should modernise its armed forces and narrow the gap in this area between itself and the Americans.

The effectiveness of “working on the mistakes” depends, as always, on money. Within this context, a very good example is given by the statement of NATO Secretary General George Robertson on June 8, 2000 based on the results of the North Atlantic Council meeting at the level of defence ministers. He called on all Alliance members to increase expenditures on security and defence. The need for additional funds for resolving NATO's internal problems can negatively affect the PfP and PARP co-operation programmes. Therefore, it is quite possible that the approach to choosing and conducting joint actions with “poor” partners, which earlier relied on the Alliance's sponsorship, will become much tougher. Clearly, this will also affect the productivity of Ukraine-NATO contacts.

It is likely that somewhere deep inside NATO's soul, it does not desire its own enlargement. But in that case, the threat of continued uncertainty in its future relations with its partners remains. This is objectively inconvenient for Brussels, for whom it is important to maintain control mechanisms over countries that want to come under the Alliance's security umbrella. Refusal from expansion can provoke these countries to increase militarising tendencies on their part on the basis that, once it is not possible to rely on NATO's assistance, then it is necessary to build defence in a completely different way.

The best way for Brussels to get out of the situation is to enrol the most promising countries, from a geopolitical perspective, with “easi-



¹¹ RosBusinessConsulting, June 8, 2000.



ly digestible” armies. That is, those countries who could adapt with fewer resources and efforts. The Baltic countries completely satisfy these criteria with their small armed forces, which have not been rebuilt as the former Warsaw Pact countries' armies, but were created virtually from scratch. The Alliance's leaders have stated their support for the inclusion of the Baltic countries into NATO more than once. Furthermore, Strobe Talbott recently called on Russia to stop issuing “harsh statements” regarding the three Baltic republics, and begin efforts for establishing more constructive relations with them¹².

According to Russian diplomats, “One cannot close one's eyes to the threat of NATO expansion to the East, and this tendency needs to be fought against”¹³. But Moscow did not back those last words with actions in response to the first wave of NATO expansion. Moscow's 'arsenal' consists only of two-edged methods of breaking existing arms control agreements. But going down that road is more expensive.

In the year 2002, NATO can announce the optimal formula. That NATO's doors will remain open for everyone. In order to soften the blow of disillusionment for the losing partners, the Alliance should conduct a more pliant policy both within the PfP framework, and by creating new initiatives, supporting the interests of co-operation with NATO or “through NATO”.

With events unfolding in this way, Ukraine could, for example, attempt to change NATO's attitude toward the informal GUUAM association, which unites Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan,

Moldova, and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Kyiv tried establishing relations with NATO not only according to the formula, “NATO members plus Ukraine”, but also according to the plan “NATO members plus GUUAM”.

“NATO's position differs from the one that we anticipated. The Alliance is maintaining a cautious attitude toward such separate grouping as, for example, 19 plus GUUAM. They, naturally, haven't rejected this proposal, which we have voiced more than once. But they also don't want to create a precedent that would “atomise” their relations with partners of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. This organisation functions on the basis of the equal rights of all its participants in their dialogue with NATO. The Alliance believes that the issues resolved within the GUUAM format can be presented by one country, Ukraine, for instance, either according to the 19+1 formula, or within the format of the Ukraine-NATO Commission. Among other NATO member countries, Turkey supports GUUAM's activities, and if necessary, can represent Ukraine's interests during consultations with NATO within the context of the tasks of the GUUAM forum”¹⁴.

Presently, the United States is also showing its interest in GUUAM. In April, the U.S. decided to allocate \$37 million for strengthening the border regime in GUUAM countries¹⁵. For example, Georgia's border service will use \$2 million of this money for strengthening the Chechen sector on the Russian-Georgian border¹⁶. Later, a seminar was conducted in Washington with the participation of GUUAM country ambassadors to the U.S. The forum 19+5 (NATO plus GUUAM) was mentioned at this seminar, among other things¹⁷. The discussion also covered the possible participation of other countries in GUUAM.

It is possible that NATO's help for the sake of strengthening GUUAM's position will turn out to be its main investment which will reanimate Kyiv's faith in its idea, and if not now, then in the future, will assist in finding a more or less safe path between NATO and Russia. For Russia, who also accepts the “informal five” with no particular amount of enthusiasm, Ukraine's self-realisation within the GUUAM framework will be less harmful than its membership in NATO. Although clearly, a third scenario remains. The one that is most convenient for Russia...



¹² Speech delivered by the First Deputy of Minister of Foreign Affairs O.Avdeev on the Russia's State Duma session, — May 15, 2000.

¹³ Zgurets S. Three-teethed Eagle, or military parallels in the life of strategic friends. — *Den*, April 12, 2000, p.3.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Radio "Svoboda", April 12, 2000.

¹⁶ RosBusinessConsulting, May 25, 2000.

¹⁷ "GUUAM and the Geopolitics of Eurasia" seminar, March 17, 2000, Washington, D.C. — WWW.GUUAM.ORG

NEUTRAL AUSTRIA AND NATO: POSSIBLE MODEL FOR UKRAINE?



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HISTORICAL PRECONDITIONS

Despite the "Western" political system, Austria was only partly involved in West European economic integration; there was no official co-operation with NATO. NATO membership was not possible due to the political situation (the Cold War), and also because of legal impediments arising from 1955 documents known as the State Agreement and the Law on Neutrality. The Soviet Union kept a close eye on Austrian politics, and sharply criticised everything that it thought was a violation of neutrality. This position had a significant influence on the formation of Vienna's foreign policy up until the end of the '80s.

PUBLIC OPINION ON NEUTRALITY AND NATO

According to an opinion poll held by the Association of Social and Scientific Research in the summer of 1998, **only 29% of respondents believe themselves to be "well-informed" about NATO; 66% indicated that they feel themselves to be "inadequately informed"**. That's why society's view is heavily influenced, for example, by whether the questions posed either do or don't provide additional information about NATO.

The following basic tendencies can be deduced from the at times mutually contradictory results of the conducted social survey¹:

- ❖ a majority did not, and does not, exist in Austrian society that desires Austria's entry into NATO;

- ❖ in direct correlation to Austria's neutrality, NATO, as an alternative, is still rejected by an obvious majority of the individuals polled;

- ❖ the overwhelming majority of the population believes that neutrality is worth retaining.

- ❖ as a member of the EU, Austria can remain neutral, in line with society's dominant conviction;

- ❖ some surveys show the preponderance of those who believe that Austria will join NATO, despite public opinion.

The spectrum of positions of Austrian political parties with regard to neutrality and NATO basically corresponds to the public opinion. The most powerful political force in Austria, *The Social Democratic Party of Austria*, came out strongly against Austria's accession to NATO at present, as well as in the foreseeable future. It is supported by *the Greens. Austrian Freedom Party*, the second largest political force in the country, in its 1997 programme asserts that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the concept of neutrality has lost its function as a "dominating principle of Austria's foreign policy". According to the party's position, Austria should become a full-fledged member of NATO, "a European security system should be

¹ Giller J. Sicherheitspolitische Diskussion und öffentliche Meinung. Darstellung und Interpretation empirischer Daten zu aktuellen Fragen der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik. Wien 1999; Die Meinungen der Österreicher zu Neutralität, Sicherheit und NATO in Diagrammen und Tabellen. Eine Information des Militärwissenschaftlichen Büros. Wien, 1999.



created in co-operation with NATO". *Austrian National Party*, presently the third strongest party in terms of influence, also stands for Austria taking part in the "formation of a common European Security and Defence Policy"² and NATO membership.

AUSTRIA'S CO-OPERATION WITH NATO

Austria is an associate member of NATO's North Atlantic Assembly. **It became the 25th participant in the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), and an observer at the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.**

In October, 1995, the Austrian unit took part in a PfP exercise for the first time. The most important exercises within the PfP format with Austria's participation were "Cooperative Osprey'96", in the United States (43 Austrians), "Cooperative Adventure Exchange'98", in Slovenia (260 Austrians), and "Cooperative Guard'99", in the Czech Republic (50 Austrians). However, Austrian participation in the PfP is centred not only on military exercises, but also on various training courses, seminars, conferences, and the like.



Austria took part in the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina led by NATO since the end of 1995. In the beginning, 300 military personnel comprised the Austrian contingent, which later was gradually reduced to 54. The largest contingent (480 soldiers) of Austria's Armed Forces abroad is its component of the NATO-led Kosovo Force.

It is worth mentioning, that **Austria was in no way involved in NATO actions against Yugoslavia.** At a Berlin summit at the end of March, 1999, Federal Chancellor Klima, as all other heads of EU member countries, agreed

with the declaration that laid out the "understanding of the military attack against Slobodan Milosevic"³. But Austria, relying on its domestic legislation (especially the law on military cargo), closed its airspace to NATO aircraft headed toward Yugoslavia. This step drew dissatisfaction from NATO and the U.S.

DISCUSSION ON THE ESTIMATED COST OF JOINING NATO

Based on its defence spending indicator (0.8-0.9% of the GDP), Austria is in last place among EU countries, not counting Luxembourg. Austria spends significantly less on its Army than other neutral and non-allied countries, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland.

Debates on possible expenditures connected with NATO membership are politicised, with proponents decreasing the sum, and opponents increasing it. The Greens, in their "Presentations on Alternatives", calculate the additional costs of joining NATO at a minimum of 8.97 billion schillings, as a result of which the military budget would reach 29 billion schillings a year. Erich Reiter, a Commissioner on strategic studies of the Ministry of Defence (a NATO adherent), demonstrated to the contrary that defence expenditures after Austria's entry into NATO would directly increase by only 900 million schillings a year. He also believes that savings would be greater than costs as a result of membership, if longer term calculations are taken into account⁴.

NATO proponents also back their position with the argument that new NATO members who joined in March, 1999 — Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — are much poorer than Austria, but they are prepared to take the financial costs of membership upon themselves. They believe that this is less costly than a reliable defence based only on their own resources.

All in all, Austria will come out in favour of a broad and omni-lateral relations and effective co-operation between the EU and NATO. Austria will develop its ties with NATO based on its own security needs, and its full and equal participation in Europe's security system. The new Government in its entirety supports decisions taken at EU summits held in Cologne (June, 1999), and Helsinki (December, 1999) with respect to the issues of the development of Common Foreign and Security Policies of the EU⁵. Today Austria is ready to make an "adequate" contribution toward the formation of this potential. According to Scheibner, Austria can

² Das neue Grundsatzprogramm der Volkspartei. Antrag des Bundesparteivorstandes. Bundesparteitag der Volkspartei, 22 April 1995.

³ *Profil*, 1999, No.13, S.118.

⁴ Reiter E. Die Kosten eines eventuellen NATO-Beitritts. Eine Kostenschätzung des Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung. Wien, Februar 1998, S.50.

⁵ Cameron F. The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Past, Present and Future. — *Contemporary European Studies*, 1999, No.7, p.79-82.



assign between 1,500 and 2,000 men toward the planned EU military formation numbering 60,000 men.

All of these plans are faced with a number of specific internal and external problems. First of all, it is not possible to forget about the legal status. The Law on Neutrality can be abolished or amended by a two-third Bundesrat majority, which would require the consent of Government and SDPA positions. And only then will it be possible to conduct a nation-wide referendum on this issue. It is not difficult to foresee the will of the population — it will still be set on neutrality for some time to come.

Due to the above-indicated reasons, Austria will not become a NATO member within the foreseeable future. At the same time, it is clear that after the end of the Cold War, and in connection with the new state of affairs in Europe, the content of neutrality has also changed dramatically.

UKRAINE AND THE AUSTRIAN EXPERIENCE

One cannot ignore the fact that the situations in Ukraine today, and in Austria in 1955 are very different. Despite this, Austrian experience with respect to neutrality can be useful for Ukraine. Neutrality can serve as a useful political mechanism only during the transition period, when the country's orientation has not been definitively formed, or when its leadership, as a result of a set of external and internal reasons, cannot choose this orientation freely.

Internationally recognised neutrality would probably be the most acceptable way out for both the majority of political forces in Ukraine, and for the world community. But the precondition for independent activity in foreign and domestic



policies lies in how Kyiv itself precisely establishes its interpretation of the country's neutrality. The last would, under any circumstances, become a double-edged sword in relations with Russia. On the one hand, Kyiv could use its neutrality in order to counter pressure from Moscow regarding integration into the CIS and in the military sphere. On the other hand, Moscow would wage a propaganda war with respect to any contacts between Ukraine and NATO, pointing to Ukraine's neutrality, as the USSR once did with respect to Austria.

For a significant part of Ukraine's society, neither Ukraine's final "departure" to the West, nor turning to Russia, are acceptable. In Ukraine, it is virtually impossible to come to a public consensus regarding one of these "extreme" alternatives. NATO will not accept Ukraine, and judging from all statements made by Brussels officials, its membership in the EU is not on the agenda either. And this last thing is probably not only the result of economic conditions, but also of the fact that **Ukraine's importance for European stability and security has not yet entered the consciousness of Western politicians and public.**