

A letter to the reader

In 2000, the Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political studies (UCEPS) begins issuing a new magazine «National Security & Defence». Its title reflects the subject of our studies: political, economic, social, military, environmental and other aspects of Ukraine's national security.

This will be a monthly publication printed in Ukrainian and English. We intend to acquaint the readers with our analytical reports, bulletins and articles, to monitor threats to Ukraine's national security, and to present political analysis, forecasts and comments on topical issues.


Some issues will be devoted to specific subjects and will deal with complex problems of national significance. The first number is entirely devoted to military reform in Ukraine. Future subjects will include international and economic priorities of Ukraine, raising Ukraine's authority, the establishment of civil society, overcoming poverty and unemployment, and the strategic development of the power sector in Ukraine.

Future issues will present the results of community studies and public opinion polls. The UCEPS sociological service extends throughout Ukraine; at our request, foreign polling centres canvass public opinion in other countries.

The magazine is intended for a professional audience. It is circulated among heads and executives of government agencies, people's deputies, influential politicians and businessmen, scientists, lecturers, experts employed in non-governmental analytical centres, as well as among employees of foreign embassies and representative offices.

UCEPS, being a non-governmental organisation, counts on fruitful co-operation with Ukraine's state power bodies. In each issue we shall present our own expert assessments, forecast future developments, and propose concrete decisions intended to improve the situation. Our experts do not know the answers to all questions, but they are highly qualified, competent and experienced. Five years of operation on the domestic market of analytical products have proven that the ideas of UCEPS experts deserve attention.

We shall do all we can for readers of «National Security & Defence» to obtain the magazine free of charge. We are especially grateful to the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine for its support for the first issue. UCEPS also invites other sponsors; through consolidated efforts, we may solve many problems.



Anatoliy GRYTSENKO
President, Ukrainian
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The publication of the analytical report «Military Reform in Ukraine: The Start, or Another False Start?» presents the second attempt by UCEPS experts to launch a broad public discussion of military reform. The first attempt was made in May, 1996, when UCEPS, under the guidance of O.V. Razumkov, prepared the analytical report «Ukraine's Armed Forces: the problems of reform and the present situation». The report came to the notice of experts, but the executive power was not ready to accept the proposals put forward by a non-governmental analytical centre at that point of time. There was no public discussion of the plans for military reform, and only a few suggested measures were implemented. As a result, the situation developed just as badly as we had predicted, and Ukraine was unable to avoid the forecasted mistakes. Shall we be cleverer this time?

The Military organisation of Ukraine is in deep crisis. Today this does not pose a serious threat to Ukraine's security, as large-scale military aggression seems unlikely in the next 5–7 years. However, if the present tendencies in society, national economy and attitude towards the military on the part of the state and general public persist, and the departmental approach to military reform overpowers this process, Ukraine may lose its sovereignty in the future. Its Military organisation will be unable to strongly defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats.

While substantiating the need for military reform, we consciously put internal factors in the first place: the Military organisation in its present structure and strength is too expensive for the Ukrainian economy. They say that there are no funds for reform. This is true, but if there were enough funds to maintain the Armed Forces, reform would not be necessary. UCEPS experts argue that Ukraine will not be able to ensure the adequate level of combat readiness and technical equipment of so numerous Armed Forces even in 20–30 years; not only the defence budget but also the entire state budget will be insufficient for this purpose.

The situation requires an adequate response from the state leadership. Superficial measures are not needed, but resolute and dynamic military reform. That's why UCEPS in its report concentrated not on the achievements (quite a few), but on the shortcomings and weak points of the military sector.

Provided a strong political will exists, and the head of state is prepared to take radical decisions, military reform should start immediately, as this is vitally important, and there are pre-conditions for its successful achievement. We do hope that the answer to the question, made the headline of this report, will be positive.



MILITARY REFORM IN UKRAINE: THE START OR ANOTHER FALSE START?

Over eight years of independence, the Military organisation of Ukraine has been established. Military formations are now capable of executing their basic functions. Nevertheless, the performed analysis gives reason to state that they are still unable to defend Ukraine's sovereignty in the event of a serious military threat.

The Military organisation, in its present structure and strength, will remain inefficient and costly for Ukraine even after its economic revival. The structure, manpower and funding requirements of military formations should correspond the military threats, economic potential and priorities of nation-building. In our view, military reform in Ukraine should commence without delay.

In this report, UCEPS experts present an analysis of the current state of the Military organisation and the reasons that hampered reform, and propose their view on the possible ways to reform the military. The report consists of three sections.

Section 1

deals with the internal and external factors conditioning the need for military reform. The international situation is considered favourable for reform, that's why more attention is paid to the internal factors. We focused on the shortcomings of the military sector, rather than on its successes, to prove the urgency for resolute actions. Sources intended for public use give insufficient information on military issues, that's why the analytical report refers to expert assessments and comparative analysis based on foreign mass media.

Section 2

analyses the reasons that hampered previous attempts to reform Ukraine's power structures. We paid due attention to objective difficulties, such as unfavourable starting conditions, the poor system of civilian control over the military, resource limitations, etc. At the same time, UCEPD experts made emphasis on the subjective reasons: the underestimation of a scientific approach to reform, frequent changes in the leadership of the power structures, personnel and financial disproportions, and inadequate information support for reform.

In Section 3,

we put forward concrete proposals regarding the organisation of the preparatory stage of military reform, and present our idea of the model of the reformed military. Reform preparation is suggested to be conducted in three stages: determination of political targets and basic data; drafting of the Concept of military reform; and development of the programs of power structures' reforming. We propose the parameters for the new Military organisation, and the content of the specific steps to be made within the framework of reform. UCEPD experts estimate target-oriented expenditures on military reform to be equal to 1.0-1.5% of the GDP.

Pre-conditions for gradual reform do exist in Ukraine. It is important that decisions be based on realistic assessment, limited resources be channelled towards the solving truly priority tasks, and the difficulties of reform not last long.

1. WHY DOES UKRAINE NEED MILITARY REFORM SO BADLY?

Ukraine's Military organisation has gone through a complex period of evolution from an unsystematic conglomerate of separate parts to a relatively workable integrated structure¹. The military sector of Ukraine has long been in a state of permanent crisis. None of the power structures has sufficient resources. We make no mention of steady progress: the military sector of Ukraine has been unable to keep its head above water, i.e., it is degrading. At the same time, even the present level of funding of the military puts a heavy burden on the state. On the other hand, the national interests of sovereign Ukraine must be protected from military threats, and state policy should be supported by military means. The imbalance between what is desired and what is available is so evident now, that one cannot but take notice. Nor is it today that this imbalance emerged: Ukraine has been at least six years behind with profound military reforms². But — better late than never...

1.1. THE NECESSITY FOR MILITARY REFORM: DOMESTIC DIMENSION

Military organisation is a part of Ukrainian society. Its reform is a very important element, but only an element of the more general process of social reform in Ukraine (consolidation of civil society, economic and social revival, administrative reform, etc.). Experts of the UCEPS assume that Ukraine should balance the structure, numerical strength and material needs of military formations with possible military threats, economic potential and general priorities of nation-building. Some measures should be taken urgently, some others should be designed today and implemented gradually, within three or five years. What Ukraine cannot afford is further temporising: despite some progress in various directions, the general situation is deteriorating.

Listed below are some internal factors that stipulate the necessity of reform of Ukraine's Military organisation and its individual elements.

The Military organisation is structurally excessive

Military formations are developing on their own, without proper co-ordination on the national level. Each power structure creates its own (self-contained) subsystems of command and control, logistics, maintenance, military education and training, acquisition, and defence research. This process continues, although it was clear from the beginning that such an approach is incorrect and costly. Moreover, it is impractical, if we take limited resources into account. Today, this is clear even to people who have little to do with the military business. Let us cite several examples of narrow-minded selfish approaches placing an extra burden on taxpayers.

Basic training of an Army lieutenant coincides by 80-90% with that of a lieutenant serving in the Border Troops, the former National Guard or Internal Troops. Nevertheless, each service keeps its own higher educational establishments. This retention is inefficient, as the number of students there is limited. As a result, assets

¹ The term «Military organisation» was legislatively fixed on January 16, 1997. The «Concept (Fundamentals of State Policy) of the National Security of Ukraine» determined its content and basic functions: «Military organisation of the state, including Ukraine's Armed Forces, Security Service of Ukraine, National Guard of Ukraine, Internal Troops, bodies and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Border Troops of Ukraine, military units of the Ministry of Ukraine for Emergency Situations and Protection of the Population against the aftermath of the Chernobyl Disaster, other military units established in accordance with Ukraine's Constitution, shall ensure the defence of Ukraine, protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, counteract external and internal military threats, and fight organised crime; ensure protection of population in case of catastrophes, natural disasters, dangerous social conflicts, epidemics, etc.» **Experts of the UCEPS took part in the development of the draft Concept of the National Security of Ukraine.**

² Discussion is ongoing as to what term defines those processes more precisely: formation, development or reform? Indeed, while in 1992 the Armed Forces had to be created, other structures existing at that time (such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs) required reforming. In our view, such disputes should be left aside: all military formations have been formed, they are able to perform their basic functions, despite some clear limitations. Hereinafter, we use the terms «reforming» and «reform».



are diffused, none of the military schools can develop normally: technical facilities are not renovated, the scope of research, rationalisation and invention are decreased, and advanced methods of education are introduced slowly.

Ukraine maintains two military fleets: the Navy (incorporated into the Armed Forces) and naval units of the Border Troops. Both fleets operate in the same water area, each of them has more than 100 ships and an air component. As a result, the two fleets lack funds even for fuel, let alone combat training.

Each power structure is keeping its own supply bases, where almost identical stocks of fuel and materiel are stored. This results in extra budget expenses, excessive manpower, and sub-optimal schemes of cargo movement³. *According to UCEPS experts, liquidation of excessive structures would make it possible to reduce budget expenditures by at least 100-150 million Hryvnias in just two years (not counting the value of saved assets).*

The Military organisation is functionally insufficient

What should have happened, happened: similar duties are performed by different agencies, while others are left to no one. For instance, both the Armed Forces and the Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry of Emergency perform the tasks of land mine clearing, grant assistance to the population in case of emergency, and perform search and rescue operations. Both the Armed Forces and Border Troops control airspace and sea borders, and protect Ukraine's economic area. At the same time, there is no single agency in Ukraine to deal with illegal migration, although this menace is real: in 1992, 148 illegal migrants were detained in Ukraine, in 1997, there were 10,700, and last year, the number of illegal migrants reached 14,000!

The Constitution guarantees the protection of rights of Ukraine's citizens abroad, but none of the state bodies (including power structures) is able to accomplish this task. The USA considers this mission a national priority, so the US Armed Forces employ units capable of conducting special operations on the territory of other countries, thousands of miles from US territory. Assets required to create such forces and to maintain their combat efficiency exceed Ukraine's defence budget tenfold.

The Concept of Ukraine's national security has the task of population protection against the possible use of

weapons of mass destruction. Today, Ukrainian military formations are unable to accomplish this task. There are no reliable attack warning and reporting systems; the number of shelters, means of personal protection, drinking water reserves, food supplies, medicines and vaccines is insufficient; rescue services and specialised medical institutions are underdeveloped.

Therefore, the structural excessiveness of the Military organisation does not facilitate the performance of all its vital functions⁴.

The Military organisation is overmanned

It counts a million men, or, maybe, somewhat less — it's hard to say precisely. Exact data of the total numerical strength of military formations is inaccessible for rank-and-file individuals and for non-governmental analytical centres⁵. One of the main reasons is the confidentiality of such information in Ukraine, unlike NATO countries, where taxpayers are given data on the strength of the armed forces⁶.

Another reason lies in the «slyness» of departmental statistics. Even figures approved by the Verkhovna Rada cannot serve as a basis for serious estimates. The point is that the actual strength of the manpower considerably (by 10-20%) differs from set ceilings. For instance, the maximum strength of the Armed Forces was set at a level of 310 thousand servicemen, but, in accordance with expert estimates, today the Armed Forces of Ukraine total less than 275 thousand militaries — quite a difference! The situation with other power structures is very much the same.

Government officials often cite figures that cannot be compared at all. When speaking of the manpower, one estimate gives the number of military personnel only, the other, civilian personnel, too; some quote only the number of military personnel (with or without civilians) maintained at the expense of the state budget, while others give the total number, account for men kept at the expense of contractors. We should add that figures are presented by different people under different circumstances, with different dates, usually without necessary explanations (actual manpower or that of the staff list). Even for experienced experts it is not easy to make accurate estimates⁷.

The third reason is of an organisational nature. In theory, personnel data might be obtained from the General Military Inspectorate attached to the President of Ukraine, as it is the body entrusted with keeping the head of state informed about

³ The establishment of unified logistics and maintenance systems for all military structures was stipulated by the «State Program for Construction and Development of Ukraine's Armed Forces through the year 2005» (stage one, 1997-99). However, this problem has never been solved, as selfish departmental interests were too strong. **UCEPS experts don't know whether the President of Ukraine is aware of this: at a meeting of the Ministry of Defence Board on 23.11.99 he announced the accomplishment of tasks of the first stage.**

⁴ Another question is whether it is expedient to direct military formations towards unattainable ends and undefended declarations, even those stated in the Constitution of Ukraine?

⁵ The UCEPS experts are uncertain if officials of the Government, Presidential Administration, the Verkhovna Rada and Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council know *exact* data on the numerical strength of *all* military formations. Neither are we aware of any *such* figures made public by government officials in mass media.

⁶ The fact that the White Book «Ukraine's Defence Policy» has not been published for over three years seems symbolic. President Kuchma's instructions on its annual publication (beginning from 1997) have been fulfilled neither in 1997, nor in 1998 or 1999. **The UCEPS experts were involved in preparation of two sections of the draft White Book «Ukraine's Defence Policy — 1997».**

⁷ This might be explained by attempts to conceal sensitive information, and to deceive potential enemies. However, Ukraine, on a regular basis, gives *more complete and exact information* to its foreign partners than to its own citizens (including deputies of the Verkhovna Rada).



the situation in power structures. In reality, however, the situation is different. First, not all components of the Military organisation of Ukraine are subject to inspection⁸, so their total strength is hardly known to General Sobkov's agency. Second, the Military Inspectorate does not publish even available incomplete information. Unfortunately, after the replacement of GMI leadership, information on the status of military structures is no longer regularly reported to the country's leaders: the President, the Prime-Minister, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) of Ukraine, and the Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The UCEPS expert estimates were made on the basis of the following data: manpower ceiling of military formations, as approved by Parliament; data submitted by Ukraine to international organisations; figures made public by representatives of military structures at briefings, seminars and conferences, and in mass media; press-releases of power structures; estimates made by Ukrainian and foreign experts, etc. Presented below is the estimated manpower of the main military formations of Ukraine.


taken out of the economic sector, don't produce anything and pay no taxes. Such a situation should be corrected.

The serious disproportion in the development of military formations becomes evident

To a certain extent, this situation may be explained. Indeed, the criminalisation of society, organised crime, emergency situations, illegal migration, drug trafficking and terrorism turned into the most serious threat to the national security of Ukraine. Large-scale external aggression against Ukraine seems improbable. This influenced the priorities: the Security Service, Internal Troops and the National Guard are much better funded, Armed Forces and Civil Defence Troops are financed at a lower level, and Border Troops get the last drop⁹.

These expense figures, per serviceman (this index is often used by experts), may seem to lead to the opposite conclusion (see page 6). One should take into account, however, the vast scope of routine missions effectively accomplished by Border Troops and Civil Defence Troops, the intensity of combat duty and other important factors: it becomes clear that they indeed get what's left.

Manpower of Ukraine's military structures in 1999



In general, according to expert estimates, one in 50 Ukrainian citizens is serving (is employed) in power structures, most of them wear military uniform and bear arms. If we don't take into account children, elderly people and women, one in 20 Ukrainians may be called a serviceman. That's too many, and not only because maintenance of a numerous army requires huge sums of money: it's no less important for the state that hundreds of thousands of capable, healthy and educated people are


The Civil Defence Troops are budget-funded at a level of 30-40% of the required amount; almost one half of fuel is supplied out of «emergency rations». Given further funding at the present level, the Ministry for Emergency won't be able to form the number of efficient units stipulated by the plan in case of a serious hazard, and those units won't be able to accomplish designated tasks. Ukraine has the sad experience of the containment of the Chernobyl accident. Shall we draw the conclusion?

⁸ If we proceed from the definition of the Military organisation given in the Concept of Ukraine's National Security, more than 10 military structures may be counted. Meanwhile, the General Military Inspectorate (GMI) takes into account just six of them (after the liquidation of the National Guard — only five): the Armed Forces, Border Troops, Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry for Emergency, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and State Communication Troops of the Security Service of Ukraine. Numerous bodies and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, important structural departments of the Security Service (military intelligence, military counterintelligence), State Guard Department, units subordinate to the National Space Agency of Ukraine, structures of Tax Militia, Customs Service, military units attached to ministries and agencies, have been left out.

⁹ These issues are thoroughly reviewed in an article by a UCEPS expert O. Havrylenko «Does Ukraine Need a New Military Doctrine?» — *Zerkalo Nedeli*, June 12, 1999, p.1, 3. The article is reprinted in this edition.



Expenditures of the state budget of Ukraine in 1999 per serviceman



The situation in the Border Troops is still more disturbing. From the very beginning they were equipped with communication means, radar stations, special equipment at a level of 50-60%. Over eight years a considerable portion of that equipment has run its service life and should be written off. The technical condition of ships and aircraft will sharply deteriorate in the years to come. According to expert assessments, some 70-75 Border Guard ships will require repair in 2000. Available funds are insufficient to pay for utilities; frontier guard cantonments more increasingly experience cut off heat, water, gas and electricity supply lines. *It should be stressed that Border Troops, unlike other military formations (where only some forces are allocated for combat duty), are day and night combat-ready. They perform combat missions 24 hours a day. UCEPS experts assume that the head of the state should take a political decision as to the priority funding of Border Troops.*

Not only general figures and priorities of funding of power structures give reason for concern. There is an evident disproportion between the monetary allowances of servicemen in different military formations. For instance, an operational commissioner of the Security Service of Ukraine gets base pay¹⁰ equal to that of an Army division commander, a senior operational commissioner is paid the same as an Army corps commander, and the base pay of a section head in the Security Service exceeds the base pay of the Defence Minister. Official salaries in the State Guard Department are equally high: a serviceman of the lowest category (guard officer) gets base pay equal to that of an air mobile brigade commander. In our view, such an imbalance in monetary allowances is unacceptable.

Until now, functions and manpower ceilings of military formations have not been properly defined¹¹

The definition of functions of military formations lies in the competence of the Verkhovna Rada. After the Constitution was adopted in 1996, no special laws regulating functions of power structures have been developed. Laws on military formations adopted earlier specify duties in different ways: those of the Civil Defence Troops, Border Troops, Internal Troops and the Security Service are described more or less clearly, while for the Armed Forces the same is presented in too generalised a manner. This hampers processes of strategic planning, distribution of manpower and hardware, and drafting of operation plans.

It is clear that the definition of a mission, such as «Defence of Ukraine», allows substantiating manpower of 100 thousand and 900 thousand men with equal success; it's only a question of the imagination of the military. If the mission is defined more precisely, such as «organisation and conduct of a defensive operation in case of a limited military conflict with a neighbouring state», with the list of such states to be specified by a separate directive, such political directions would give reason for scenarios and calculations. The UCEPS experts see the experience of Great Britain and Canada useful and acceptable for Ukraine. In those countries, the functions of armed forces are formulated more precisely. First, there are not three of them, as in Ukraine, but many more (20-30). Second, functions are determined both for wartime and peacetime. Third, they contain numerical indices. This provides good grounds and basic information for the military¹².

¹⁰ This refers only to base pay, supplemented with relevant bonuses (for special conditions of service, qualification, work with classified documents, etc.).

¹¹ Military formations' chain-of-command remains undetermined, even by the Constitution. Today Ukraine's President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces only.

¹² Functions of the Armed Forces are too general: they encompass (1) defence of Ukraine, (2) protection of its sovereignty, (3) territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders. In Great Britain and Canada those functions are defined more precisely. For instance, the White Book of the Canadian Government determines their character (containment of a low- or high-intensity conflict), composition of allocated manpower and equipment (number and classes of ships, warplanes, regiments and brigades), deployment readiness (24 hours, three weeks), duration of combat operations without reinforcements, etc. So, the Canadian military gets concrete initial information for planning. Exactly those indices serve as a basis to control the Armed Forces, which raises the responsibility of both military and civilians for the use of budget funds.



The Ukrainian Parliament has adopted laws on the general structure and numerical strength of military formations, but they don't cover all power structures. This process should be expedited, with more attention paid to real figures and their substantiation.

Military organisation places a heavy economic burden on the state

None of the military structures is funded according to the planned amounts, as budget revenues are continuously disrupted. Continuation of this process will bring grave consequences. Every state needs more resources, but in Ukraine this problem is especially acute, given the depth of the economic crisis.

The amount of arrears is comparable to the amount of allocated funds. For instance, the Armed Forces keep living on credit, and the imbalance between needs and available resources is disastrous. The yearly indebtedness of the Armed Forces exceeds 1 billion Hryvnias, reaching 90% of the Defence Ministry budget. And this is only the documented debt. The so-called «accumulated debt» is 10-15 times larger¹³. At the same time, there are no reasons to speak of a sharp upsurge in Ukraine's economy in the near future. This means that **cosmetic changes won't help, military reform must bring radical solutions (in terms of both funding and reduction of manpower of military formations)**.

In the opinion of the head of the Parliamentary Committee on national security and defence H.Kriuchkov, in recent years the State budget provides defence expenditures that do not cover even 50% of the


minimum requirements of the Armed Forces. Even those funds are not allocated in full. Maintenance of the Armed Forces has crossed the «red line», where collapse begins. Unless the attitude to funding of defence requirements changes radically, after the year 2005¹⁴, almost 20 basic types of weapons will run out their service life. In Kriuchkov's opinion, in 2000, defence expenditures should be no less than 3.5 billion Hryvnias. According to the MoD estimates¹⁵, the minimum requirements of the Armed Forces amount to 4.6 billion Hryvnias. Instead, *the Government plans to assign the Ministry of Defence only \$240 million in 2000 (calculations presented in section 2). That money won't be enough to keep even one division in accordance with NATO standards.*

Combat readiness of military formations remains low

Air, naval and field training are improving very slowly. The number of «unready» and «partly ready» units is not decreasing. The reasons for that include the poor technical condition of equipment and the inadequate provision of material resources. There are other reasons, too: efforts of commanders (and limited resources) are often channelled not to ensure better combat training, but to arrange demo events, especially those conducted under international co-operation plans.

Three years ago President Kuchma assessed the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in the following manner: «Out of 191 mechanised and tank battalions, none is ready to perform combat missions ... only three Air Force units were assumed ready, 25 — partly ready, and 17 — not ready to perform assigned combat missions»¹⁶. Unfortunately fur-

Defence expenditures in 1999 per serviceman, \$



¹³ This refers to delayed terms of re-equipment (minimum requirements — 9 billion Hryvnias), housing for the military (3 billion Hryvnias), curtailment of reservist training (hard to assess, but quite a considerable amount of money), etc. These problems are examined by S. Chornous: «Hi, Army, New Year is coming!» — *Ukrayina Moloda*, December 2, 1999, p. 4.

¹⁴ The term for completion of the State Program for construction and development of Ukraine's Armed Forces.

¹⁵ R. Tkachuk. «What will fiscal year 2000 bring us?» — *Narodna Armiya*, October 14, 1999, p. 5.

¹⁶ «Ukraine does not need «troops for fun» but fully fledged Armed Forces». President Kuchma's speech at an extended meeting of the MoD Board on December 13, 1996 — *Uryadovyi Kurier*, December 17, 1996, pages 3-4. It should be noted that the Armed Forces were then better funded than today: some \$700 million were allocated to defence.



ther similarly accurate assessments of combat readiness have been unavailable in mass media. The situation seems to be improving: according to the MoD, in 1999, 5000 command post and field exercises were held, of that, 36 divisional exercises, some 200 brigade, regimental and similar level exercises, over 500 battalion and similar level exercises, some 600 company exercises, and over 3500 platoon field training events. 30-50% of the units performed combat firing practice¹⁷. These are important figures. But it would be interesting to know *the increase in number of combat-ready battalions and squadrons. What are the new reduced terms of regiment, division, and corps deployment? How much time does it take to deploy a squadron, a regiment, an air division to dispersal airfields?* Such information is inaccessible. Instead, the military is trying to impress Parliament with thousands of kilometres long imaginary queues of the Armed Forces vehicles, hundreds of rail cars carrying daily rations for servicemen, tons of fuel required to start up all engines of the Armed Forces, and with other exotic pictures. Real life is less impressive, but the military lives that life daily.

Combat training is getting more and more relative, exercises are held on maps and in classrooms, firing practice is mainly conducted from static positions. But how can it be different, if military units get only 5-15% of the required fuel? *It's become normal in Ukraine that combat training is held with limited use of equipment and personnel, restrictions are imposed that make full-scale training impossible, exercises and training are held at permanent bases, mainly without the use of vehicles.* Given all that, it's unfortunate when a colonel writes: «Despite the absence of fuels and lubricants, divisions, brigades, regiments perform full-scale training, and bear the full combat load»¹⁸. A similar unrealistic assessment was presented in a report by the commander of one of the best regiments at parliamentary hearings. Whom do they take us for? Maybe, they don't believe in the sincerity of people's deputies and in their ability to improve the situation in the Armed Forces¹⁹. But the military sector must be reformed, and this goal may be reached by joint efforts only.

Flying practice of Air Force airmen in 1999 totalled 29,769 hours, which is 13% more than in the previous year²⁰. Seems not to be that bad, but how can we compare that figure with flying practice in the Soviet era, when just one regiment of the Kharkiv aviation school flew more than 20 thousand hours a year? According to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief General V. Strelnykov, only

the principal crews are ready to perform combat missions (approx. 40%). At the same time, he made it clear that the combat training plan in 1999 was 99% completed²¹. How can those two figures coexist? Maybe, Air Force plans are as relative as combat training?

Flying crews on combat duty are relatively well prepared, but if we compare their training not with Ukrainian pilots who «fly» mainly on foot on taxiways, but with their colleagues in neighbouring countries (Turkey, Belarus, Russia), pilots are beyond comparison. *Ukraine operates more than 900 aeroplanes, but can hardly select 10-15 pilots able to perform combat missions at night, in bad weather conditions, on the level of NATO standards. Why does Ukraine need such a huge fleet of warplanes if it has no funds to train pilots?*

The condition of weapon systems and equipment is unsatisfactory

Out of 543 army helicopters, only 35 can fly²². Less than 40% of Air Force aircraft are in good repair now, and in 2003, there will be only 15-25% of them. In the Air Defence Forces, some 50% of SAMs and two-thirds of radar stations are obsolete. Practically all naval ships need dock repair. In the Army 80% of vehicles are not equipped with batteries. 40% of APCs of the former National Guard have been in operation for over 15 years. In the State Communication Troops and Internal Troops 60-80% of radio stations and communication equipment ran out their service life. Information about 16 new types of military equipment being adopted by the Armed Forces²³ gives no grounds for carefree calm. It's good news, but sums allocated on purchases are too scanty.

Experts know that if weapon systems are not re-equipped at a rate of 4-5% a year, all talk of efficient armed forces should be dropped. Given the present strength of military units, re-equipment would mean the purchase (full modification) of 45 aircraft, 10 ships, hundreds of tanks and IFVs, and several thousand trucks a year. **In order to maintain the fighting power of the Armed Forces in their present composition, at least \$2-3 billion should be spent on the purchase and maintenance of weapons and equipment annually²⁴. According to NATO standards, Ukraine should spend \$5.5-7.5 billion a year²⁵ on those weapons, which equals the country's annual budget! Given this disastrous imbalance between needs and capabilities, cardinal decisions must be taken.**

¹⁷ S. Zhurets. «The Army for the State, not Vice Versa». — *Den'*, December 7, 1999, pages 1,4.

¹⁸ V. Shevchuk. «The Power of Steel and Fire». — *Sukhoputni Viyska Ukrayiny*, December 11, 1997, p. 4.

¹⁹ The military has grounds for that: during parliamentary hearings there were more officers and generals than people's deputies in Parliament. It also demonstrates attention to the acute problems of the Armed Forces.

²⁰ N. Lysytsia. «Uneasy but substantial gains». — *Narodna Armiya*, November 16, 1999, p. 3.

²¹ UNIAN, December 10, 1999.

²² UNIAN, August 17, 1999.

²³ UNIAN, November 13, 1999.

²⁴ V. Kovalskyi. «Technical equipment of Ukraine's Armed Forces: Assessment and Forecast». — Kyiv, NISS, 1995, p.22.

²⁵ Experts compare the combat potential of Ukraine's weapons with that of the Greek or Spanish armed forces.



Ukraine has already reached the «red line» where the uncontrolled loss of weapons and equipment's operability began

This happened in 1997-98. Today 70% of weapon types require capital repair; 40-50% of equipment is obsolete. For most of it there are no spare parts; they are not produced in Ukraine, and in some cases their production in other CIS countries has also ceased. The share of more or less modern types of arms and equipment does not exceed 30%, but even they lag behind the best foreign systems. Every new year widens this gap. Practically all weapon systems need lengthy maintenance or factory repair, an extension of service life and serious modernisation. That requires billions of Hryvnias, which are unavailable. So, the work is constantly delayed for an indefinite term. Starting from 2002-2003, Ukraine can forget about planes, helicopters and air defence systems: all of that expensive hardware will be suitable only for an open-air museum. Further delay is becoming dangerous.

The crisis of the military-industrial complex has not been overcome

There hasn't been and there isn't a closed cycle of production of most defence equipment types in Ukraine. In 1990, the share of closed-cycle production processes was estimated at 18-20% of the USSR level; today this figure dropped to 5-7%. Hopes for the creation of closed cycles of weapon production remained unjustified; at the same time, ties with former partners were almost lost. We were successful in some sectors only (artillery, armour, missiles, ships, electronic systems). In the USSR, Ukraine's share in the military-industrial complex output comprised 17%, and 1840 enterprises and research centres employing 2.7 million people worked continuously. According to estimates by the Parliamentary Committee on national security and defence, today the output of Ukraine's military-industrial complex does not exceed 4-5% of the 1990 level. The number of defence enterprises dropped five-fold, the number of employed fell almost seven-fold. Until now, the Ukrainian government has no scientifically substantiated program for the defence sector's restructuring²⁶. If we keep going this way, only export-oriented enterprises will survive, and not those satisfying the needs of Ukraine's Military organisation.

The preparation of reservists has been terminated, the reserve component has become imaginary and exists on paper only

The quality of the reserve component is constantly deteriorating, as reservists with Afghan experience trained in the Soviet Army have become older. They are replaced by a much less prepared contingent. No training assemblies for reserve officers have been held since 1992. At

least 70-80% of reservists lost their practical skills and cannot perform assigned duties without extensive training. This means that in case of a threat, combat readiness norms will not be met, and the preparation of units for combat operations will require many more resources than planned. Wonders never happen: saving in peacetime means economic and human losses at war.

The low level of mobilisation readiness calls into question the execution of planned events in a threatening situation

Unfortunately, mobilisation readiness is not ranked among the most vital indices used to assess operational results of commanders and executive power bodies. We should frankly admit that this work abounds in simplified approaches, conventionalism, unreality and irresponsibility. Mobilisation plans do not pay proper attention to the actual level of personnel training (including that of reservists), the provision of material resources, the technical condition of arms and equipment, and the specificity of transitional society. *Planners realise that during a special period their plans will be impractical. Over seven years, not a single mobilisation exercise was held in Ukraine, training is confined to demonstrations only. Commanders at all levels have no practical skills of operation in a period of tension. The same refers to executives responsible for mobilisation. The situation is further aggravated by endless reforming: in the Armed Forces alone, 2500-3000 reorganisation events are held annually! This complicates the planning of notification, recruitment, and the dispatch of mobilisation resources, unit formation and training.* According to expert estimates, the replacement of one or two elements in the chain «regiment — division — corps — operational command — General Staff» requires 3-4 months to amend mobilisation plans. In the end result, there is a great deal of paperwork. The lack of stability impacts quality, resulting in indifference and irresponsibility.

Ground is not organised properly. Wartime mobilisation facilities are obsolete, and their maintenance is heavy a burden to enterprises. Engineering facilities are designed for the production of outdated hardware. According to assessments made by the Parliamentary Committee on national security and defence, in Ukraine, mobilisation expenditures per capita in 1997-98 were six times less than in the Russian Federation, let alone NATO. The problem has reached the President of Ukraine: on November 23, 1999, Leonid Kuchma instructed the Government and the General Staff to complete development of the mobilisation plan before the end of the year. It's very important that this work be co-ordinated with military reform, as manpower reduction should be accompanied by an increase in national mobilisation capabilities. Otherwise, the national defence potential will be threatened²⁷.

²⁶ V. Shekhovtsov, R. Bodnarchuk. «Ukraine's defence industry complex: status and prospects of development». — *Stratehichna Panorama*, No. 3-4, 1998, p.138.

²⁷ The importance of this problem was stressed by the former Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces General A. Lopata in his article «Optimistic Illusions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief» — *Ukrayinska Hazeta*, January 6, 2000, p. 8.



The level of some supplies threatens the possible execution of basic functions by the Military organisation

Normally, funds allocated for the purchase of fuel are enough to provide for delivery of foodstuffs and to support combat duty. The result is that combat training plans are chronically disrupted, emergency rations are used, and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) not produced in Ukraine are taken out of long-term stocks. All this poses a serious threat during a crisis. The inability of the military to pay for electricity leads to cutting off military sites (more than a thousand such cases are recorded). Along with the lack of POL, it may lead (or has already led) to the loss of combat efficiency of units, including units on combat duty. The situation with food supply for the Armed Forces is also critical: in many cases there are no stocks in the units. At the same time, the MoD Main Logistics Department continues its experiments with military uniforms, where changes are introduced practically every year. *Indeed, the uniform is becoming more attractive and convenient, but is it a priority, given our limited resources? Maybe the funds should rather be channelled towards the medical support of servicemen, funded miserably low at 3-5% of the required amount?*

The infrastructure has become a burden for the Armed Forces, and its condition is disturbing

Almost 70 cantonments earmarked for transfer to local authorities are to be funded out of the 2000 defence budget. The MoD maintains some 20 thousand km of utility networks, 50 thousand buildings, and over 1600 boiler houses. More than 60% of utility networks, boilers and pumps have run out their service life. *Is it reasonable to keep this infrastructure on the Armed Forces balance, or on the balance of the state?*

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have long ago turned into an army of workers and peasants. The prestige of the active duty remains low, and the quality of recruits is deteriorating

Today more than 18 thousand men are evading military conscription²⁸, despite the fact that some 90% of conscripts are either released from duty or enjoy postponement rights. The educational level of the youths is becoming lower and lower, and the same refers to their health: one in four soldiers has not finished high school, approximately 72 thousand conscripts are confirmed unfit for military service in peacetime (and God only knows

why: because of their poor health or bribery). The priorities, goals and values of the youths have shifted: before joining the Armed Forces, 51% of young people regularly consumed alcoholic drinks, and 25% have experimented with drugs. 70% of conscripts are physically unfit even by the lowest standards²⁹. 78% of questioned regular officers acknowledge the deterioration of the conscripts' quality³⁰.

The Armed Forces elite — Officers Corps — produces a generally negative assessment of the military service

Approximately 57% of officers and warrant officers describe their condition as close to apathy or depression. The reasons for that include poor material status (39%), the situation in the Armed Forces (38%) and public attitude to the Armed Forces (36%). The main reasons for the negative perception of the situation in the Armed Forces named by the military were: lack of social protection (45%), loss of the moral value of military service (25%), and mistakes of the military leadership (23%). Today, only 20% of officers feel satisfied with their service; instead, 60% of those polled see no prospects for their further service, 66% don't believe in any positive changes within two or three years. *What is disturbing is that 66% of servicemen don't want their children to become professional officers.*

The social dimension of military formations gives reason for deep concern

The low morale and poor psychological condition of servicemen may be explained by the impoverishment of their families and the absence of any chance to get an apartment in the next 15-20 years. Monetary allowances do not allow officers to keep their families, and they are forced to look for extra earnings. More than 80% of officers describe the living conditions of their families as «below average» and «low», 54% haven't bought any consumer durables over the last 3-4 years (such as a TV set, furniture, a refrigerator, etc.). One-third of officers' wives are unemployed, and in some garrisons this figure reaches 52%³¹. Cantonments and outstations house «a great many educated, qualified citizens — former servicemen and their dependants, and 60% of them are unemployed»³².

In the Armed Forces there are more than 60 thousand homeless officers, and in all military formations their number totals 100 thousand³³. Every year another 4500 young officers join the Armed Forces, and they also need housing³⁴. In general, one in four officers of the Armed Forces is provided with

²⁸ UNIAN, September 20, 1999.

²⁹ Radio «LIBERTY», July 21, 1999.

³⁰ Cited hereinafter are results of the research conducted under the supervision of military sociologist Colonel O. Razumtsev.

³¹ O. Razumtsev. «The Army does not believe in a military threat» — *Mizhnarodna Bezpeka*, No. 1, 1999, p. 75.


³² Extract from the Minister of Defence report at a congress of officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, July 13, 1999.

³³ UNIAN, December 2, 1999.

³⁴ In the above-mentioned article, General A. Lopata stated that we «train 17 thousand officers a year». Unfortunately, the author did not elaborate whether he was speaking about regular officers or reservists.



Dynamics of personnel reduction in Ukraine's Armed Forces, thousand servicemen



a dwelling (much lower than the country average), and among those serving in rural areas, one in six officers has a flat.

Regular officers see the Armed Forces as a «number of people organised into relevant structures and united only by their social status of military servants» (28%), or as a «number of people organised into relevant structures presenting remnants of the Soviet Army» (34%). Some 55% of those questioned assess the situation in the Armed Forces as «poor» and see cardinal changes necessary, 31% of the military sees no prospects for improvement. It's no wonder that over 70% of the Armed Forces servicemen describe the attitude of the central authorities to the Army as «indifferent», while 10% call it «hostile and scornful». The inadequate level of social protection provokes crime and corruption, especially among officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Border Troops.


There is substantial disproportion in power structures' manning

The sharp reduction of manpower, erroneous structural changes, the ungrounded introduction of higher ranks for

most regular positions — all this leads to a serious imbalance. The share of officers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (28%)³⁵ is almost three times higher than the optimum figure (10-12%) for armies manned on the basis of conscription. The number of soldiers and sergeants in the Armed Forces is equal to the number of generals, officers and warrant officers. For every Ukrainian soldier (cadet) there is one officer or warrant officer. Such an army cannot be efficient, it is excessively consuming and poorly controlled.

Another problem is a disproportion in the officers' corps. It is clear that the number of junior officers (lieutenant — captain) should be much higher than that of senior officers (major — colonel). In Ukraine this pyramid is built «upside down». This is especially evident in the Civil Defence Troops: the share of senior officers (over 70%) is more than two times bigger than the share of junior officers. *The situation looks paradoxical: officers in Ukraine are in plenty (as compared to soldiers and sergeants), but their number is insufficient (the shortage of lieutenants in all military formations reaches 30-40%).*

Distribution of servicemen in Ukraine's Armed Forces in 1999, by categories



³⁵ UNIAN, March 31, 1999.



The Army still operates a bulky and consuming command and control system inherited from the Soviet Army. With a strength of 180 thousand men there are 13 divisional and five corps headquarters, whereas the 500-thousand strong US Army (three times bigger than the Ukrainian Army) is controlled by only 10 divisional and four corps headquarters.

The National Guard structure was very characteristic in this regard. The formation of 19 thousand servicemen had four (!) divisions, four separate brigades, 16 separate battalions and a signal regiment. Experts know that a standard modern division numbers 15-17 thousand men. «Dwarfish» divisions and brigades are formed in Ukraine to satisfy the ambitions of colonels and generals concerned not about combat efficiency of troops but about the number of stars on their shoulder straps. Regrettably, neither the Government, nor the General Military Inspectorate, the NSDC staff or the Verkhovna Rada says anything against it. The problem of the manning disproportion was addressed in a special Directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (December 1997), but the situation hasn't improved; rather, it worsened.

The transition of the Armed Forces to manning on a professional basis happens slowly and does not lead to a rise in combat effectiveness

There are only 28 thousand men serving in the Armed Forces on a contractual basis, and other military formations employ another 11 thousand such servicemen. Replacement of conscripts is not an easy task: only 10% of contract soldiers occupy positions vital for combat effectiveness, such as squad leaders, tank and IFV crew commanders. Another 90% prefer to serve on more comfortable administrative and logistic positions.

High fluidity of officers

does not favour the mastering of official duties and their efficient performance. Today, one in four officers and generals of the Armed Forces occupies his position for less than a year, some 40% — no more than two years. Promotion without additional education, training and evident positive results creates serious problems in manning. According to expert estimates, more than 50% of regiment and brigade commanders, deputy regiment commanders and battalion commanders are unfit for further promotion by their age and education. Every year 1700-2000 young (below 30) officers leave the Armed Forces. Compared to 1992, staffing of lower officers' positions fell from 90% to 60%. More than 3000 positions of platoon leaders remain vacant, while this link is immediately related with training of soldiers. Military reform is impossible without sound personnel policy.

Qualifications of many generals and officers remain low, which hampers reform

Exercises held on maps, without the involvement of troops lead to a loss of command skills. Theory is developing slowly, let alone the practical mastering of new achievements in the science of warfare. The Armed Forces lack skilled officers at an operational-tactical and operational-strategic level. More than 100 officers occupying responsible posts — regiment and brigade commanders, deputy division commanders, deputy corps commanders, staff officers of services and operational commands — don't even have an operational-tactical education³⁶. In NATO armies those positions are manned exclusively by officers with an operational-strategic education. Why don't we employ the experience of our partners, which is useful and acceptable for Ukraine? In the National Defence Academy of Ukraine, officers study as much as two years, whereas in the USA — no more than 10 months! Maybe, this is the reason for the incomplete manning of officers' positions at operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels?

The system of officer training is ineffective and uneconomical. Training of civilian specialists for the military sector never began

The military education system employs more than 10% of the total armed forces' manpower. Even minimum requirements of educational institutions cover 20-25% of the defence budget. A unified system of military training for all military formations has not been created; it exists on paper only.

Cadets in Ukraine are trained for five years — even developed Western countries cannot afford this. The level of instructors fell critically low: only 16% have an academic education, 66% have been lecturing for less than two years, and only 5% — five years and more³⁷.

An especially disturbing situation emerged regarding military detachments (departments, sections, institutes) of civilian universities. Speaking with 10-15 students who have gone through military chairs would be enough to identify the points of concern. They are plenty: barefaced bribery, professional incompetence, baculine discipline and an arrogant attitude to young people. *According to UCEPS experts, military divisions of civilian universities should be in the focus of Ukraine's law-enforcement bodies.*

Defence research is on the brink of collapse

It has long been funded in the last turn. What is disturbing is that Ukraine, unable to support the Armed Forces today, doesn't think of their future. While in 1992 almost 72% of expenditures on defence R&D were channelled to fundamental research, in 1999, this figure

³⁶ In other military formations the situation is very much the same.

³⁷ P. Pyatybrat. «Personnel training: problems and prospects» — *Narodna Armiya*, July 24, 1998, p.3.



dropped to 0.01%³⁸. In 1995, 133 design bureaus and research institutes performed 600 research and development assignments; last year only 19 research establishments worked for the military-industrial complex³⁹. Despite all shortcomings, the military science potential remains rather high. Unfortunately, the subject of research sometimes loses contact with the actual requirements of the Armed Forces. Besides, military scientists are often used for «scientific substantiation» of decisions already taken at a higher level.

Internal factors show that resolute actions of authorities need to be aimed at the further reduction of the manpower of military formations, the provision of really required funds, the strict setting of priorities, and enhancement of civilian control over the military. Those actions must be resolute but well thought-out. Ukraine won't make it without strong Military organisation, its security will always be threatened. And the cost of erroneous decisions is too high.

1.2. THE NECESSITY FOR MILITARY REFORM: EXTERNAL DIMENSION

Military organisation should reliably protect Ukraine's national interests from military threats. Threats existed in the past, and will surely remain in the next millennium. But the more efficient Ukraine's Armed Forces are, the less military threats there will be.

Ukraine's Military Doctrine (1993) has long ceased to meet the new realities and hampers reform in the military sector. Since its adoption, significant changes occurred on the international arena

External factors providing for the necessity to reform Ukraine's military sector are thoroughly examined in an article by a UCEPS expert⁴⁰ (reprinted in this edition). So, this section will touch upon the subject only briefly, with emphasis on factors beyond the scope of the above-mentioned publication.

Ukraine has no allies; moreover, it doesn't have a single reliable partner

Ukraine's leadership repeatedly stresses the non-allied status of Ukraine and absence of intentions to join either NATO or the Tashkent Treaty. In the present situation, it's the only correct solution. However, from the military point of view, the country remains vulnerable. In case of a threat from outside, Ukraine might in theory rely on military assistance from the Russian Federation or the USA (depending on the source of the threat).

The problems of the uncontrolled proliferation of WMD and international terrorism have become first priority

Terrorism using biological weapons might be a very serious threat for Ukraine. The assessment of the possible aftermath shows that the consequences would be disastrous for the Ukrainian population. The state has neither facilities nor means to prevent or contain the danger; neither has it the resources for their creation. The efforts of several countries should be combined for the creation of effective preventive mechanisms.

Confidence-building measures trusted by Ukraine in the early '90s appeared ineffective,

especially in a period of growing tension. Neither UN, nor OCSE or international regimes of control are able to stop an escalation of hostilities. However, Ukraine continues to consciously observe signed agreements. Partner countries regularly obtain information about the structure and numerical strength of Ukraine's military formations, weapon systems, location of military units, etc. Ukraine also gets similar information. However, there is a certain doctrinal problem here.

The point is that publication of military information creates no threat for NATO members. The alliance presents a real power capable of defending its interests against any encroachments. At the same time, *excessive «transparency» in the military sector⁴¹ creates problems for the defence*

³⁸ V. Badrak. «The magnificence and misery of the defence sector» — *Zerkalo Nedeli*, July 17, 1999, p.4.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ O. Havrylenko. «Does Ukraine need a new military doctrine?» — *Zerkalo Nedeli*, June 12, 1999, p.1.3.

⁴¹ It's not a matter of the limited access to information about the Ukrainian Armed Forces for Ukrainian citizens and world public. On the contrary, for this purpose Ukraine's government should annually publish the White Book «Defence Policy of Ukraine». But would it be sane to give our partners too detailed information, such as the exact coordinates of military sites on the territory of Ukraine, the missions of military units, their chain of command and other sensitive information?



of Ukraine. Ukraine, which has no allies, does not participate in defence unions and has no resources to maintain a strong army; it is entirely «transparent» in the military respect. Today this policy is justified, but will it be justified in the future⁴²? If Ukraine is determined to keep out of military blocs for the long term (more than 10 years), the expediency of comprehensive «transparency» may be questioned. Today this problem should be addressed at least by experts and be realised in partner countries⁴³.

The military and political instability in the region remains high

In-depth reasons that once provoked the aggravation of conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, Yugoslavia, Karabakh, Chechnya and Cyprus, persist. One cannot rule out the escalation of those conflicts in the future, threatening Ukraine's interests.

The difference in views and even a contrary military and political orientation of nearby countries are becoming more and more evident

The expansion of NATO, the accelerated break-up of the CIS, shrinkage of the Tashkent Treaty, Russia's union with Belarus, the establishment of GUUAM, the struggle for the Caspian energy resources and for influence in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea — all those factors will significantly impact the balance of power in the region and will determine the nature of relations between Ukraine and other countries. There are also trends in Russia's relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan unfavourable for Ukraine.

The aggravation of «cold peace» relations between Russia and the USA, the Tashkent Treaty and NATO remains likely. A conflict between the two strategic partners would complicate Ukraine's relations with more than 20 countries.

The military potential of neighbouring countries remains high. The reduction in numerical strength is compensated by new weapons, and a higher number of professional soldiers

The availability of substantial military potential (see Table) in the case of a change of political orientation by governments of nearby countries may threaten Ukraine's military security. Such a development cannot be ruled out.

Manpower of armed forces and defence budgets in 1999⁴⁴

	Numerical strength of the armed forces (servicemen)		Defence budget (estimate)	
	1000's of men	% of population	\$ million	% GDP
USA	1489	0,55	283100	3,2
Russia	1200	0,82	4500	2,7
Turkey	797	1,21	10100	5,7
France	421	0,71	38100	2,8
Italy	391	0,69	22000	2,0
Germany	334	0,41	31400	1,5
Great Britain	218	0,37	37200	2,6
Greece	205	1,92	5800	4,9
Spain	155	0,51	7400	1,4
Poland	187	0,48	3430	2,2
Hungary	61	0,60	900	1,6
Ukraine	275	0,54	430	1,4

Assessing the general military-political situation, one may state that there is no direct military threat to Ukraine today. UCEPS experts consider large-scale aggression against Ukraine in the next 5-7 years unlikely, too. This gives Ukraine a chance to focus on the reform of its Military organisation. However, potential military threats exist, and a trend toward their strengthening is evident. Further postponement of reforms would be a political mistake.

The formation of joint peacekeeping units is an important confidence-building factor in relations with neighbouring countries

There are some notable successes in this direction: a Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion has been formed, and a joint engineer battalion «Tisza» is to be established, involving Hungary and Romania. A joint peacekeeping battalion of GUUAM countries and a joint naval force with Turkish participation are to follow. The very existence of such units creates more confidence in relations between member countries, thus lowering the level of potential threat.

However, the role of joint peacekeeping units as the solution for defence tasks should not be overestimated. While acknowledging financial priorities, one should realise the limitations intrinsic to those units. Today they mainly serve as a symbol of co-operation with NATO (by the way, not a cheap symbol, if compared to other Armed

⁴² Other non-bloc countries (Sweden, Finland) stick to non-traditional principles of defence policy. Thousands of ammunition and weapon depots are scattered throughout their territory, to enable the conduct of prolonged defensive operations, exhausting the invader. Military depots are safely concealed. Sea approaches are secretly mined, too. Activation (battle setting) of mines along the shoreline will occur in case of a real threat of invasion. Such actions are not covered by international regimes of control, as non-bloc countries haven't signed the CFE treaty.

⁴³ It is worth noting that some foreign experts consider those arguments credible (D. Austin. NATO Expansion and the Baltic States. — Conflict Studies Research Centre, February, 1999, p.8).

⁴⁴ UCEPS experts made those assessments on the basis of statistical information from NATO, Russia, the CIA, and estimates of foreign experts published in mass media.



Forces units). Sufficient imagination will be necessary to be able to say that joint peacekeeping units will be a prototype or the kernel of the future Ukrainian army.

Furthermore, Ukraine should actively use the experience of servicemen who took part in peace support operations. Over 10 thousand men went through «hot spots» — almost enough to man a division. It is important that most peacekeepers are professional soldiers serving on a contrac basis. *In the opinion of UCEPS experts, the valuable experience of Ukrainian peacekeepers would be more useful in Internal Troops rather than in the Armed Forces.* The reason is clear: they've received professional skills for internal conflict containment (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), and not for classical military operations.

Ukraine insufficiently employs the useful experience of modern armies

A characteristic example is the formation of three operational commands in the Armed Forces. Indeed, international experience proves the credibility of regional operational commands. A similar structure of command is employed in the USA and NATO. Such a system was time-tested and proved efficient. The effectiveness of regional operational commands is, to a large extent, conditioned by their *joint* nature. This means the incorporation of all arms (land, air and naval forces) necessary for conducting operations in the area of responsibility. At first, Ukraine seemed to be going the same way, but later it returned to the beaten track. As a result, operational commands in Ukraine never became *joint*. Moreover, they were subordinated not to the General Staff (or the Minister of Defence, like in the USA), but... to the Army command. There is nothing but nonsense: there will be no separate army operations in modern warfare. The worst thing to happen (and is certain to happen, in case of a crisis) is the loss of control over forces for a more or less lengthy peri-

od when hostilities start. The Armed Forces command will have to introduce a new system of command and control, and it will be done not in a calm, peaceful situation, but under war conditions (as in 1941). More attention should be paid to the experience of advanced countries, and improper decisions should be promptly corrected.

Ukraine voluntarily assumes too many obligations but never fulfils them

This affects the country's image. At the first stage of participation in the Planning and Review Process (1995-1997) Ukraine undertook to achieve 14 interoperability objectives of its units⁴⁵ with NATO forces, but achieved only one! At the second stage (1997-1999) Ukraine's commitments were still higher: 27 interoperability objectives. In the result 11 goals were achieved, for the rest, the term was extended by another year. What should we expect from the third stage?

«Military tourism» at the expense of NATO countries causes the endless disappointment of foreign partners. Too often delegations include absolutely unfit and incompetent Ukrainian representatives. At the same time, the USA, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany and other NATO countries regularly grant considerable funds to finance Ukrainian participation in international events (the United States alone allocated \$2.5 million in 1997 and \$2 million in 1998).

In general, international military co-operation is developing rather actively, hundreds of events are held every year, but there has been no qualitative change. Unfortunately, Ukraine kept by Western partners got used to its humiliating role. Meanwhile, international military co-operation should consolidate the image of our nation.



⁴⁵ Units earmarked for participation in the «Partnership for Peace» events.



CONCLUSIONS

The Military organisation of Ukraine is in deep crisis. Today this does not pose a serious threat to Ukraine's security, as large-scale foreign military aggression seems unlikely in the next 5-7 years. However, if the present tendencies in the society, national economy and attitude to the military on the part of the state and general public persist, Ukraine may lose its sovereignty in the future. Its Military organisation will be unable to strongly defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats.

Today's military, political and strategic environment of Ukraine is completely different from what it was four years ago (when the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was formulated), and especially eight years ago (when the Military Doctrine of Ukraine and the Concept of development of military formations were drafted).

The Military organisation in its present condition is too expensive for the Ukrainian economy. With its current structure and numerical strength, it will be unacceptable even after the economic crisis. Even in 20 or 30 years Ukraine won't be able to ensure an adequate level of combat readiness and technical equipment of such a large army.

The arguments cited in this section lead to the conclusion that Ukraine truly needs military reform. The situation requires an adequate response on the part of the highest state leadership. Cosmetic measures are not needed, but resolute and dynamic military reform. That's why UCEPS experts consciously focused on the shortcomings and weak points of the military sector, rather than on its successes. Today we should move from talks of reform to its implementation.

Ukraine should define priorities in order to keep the balance between the desired goals and available possibilities. The Military organisation should not be excessively strong, as it frightens neighbours, exhausts the economy and hampers social development. The Military organisation should not be too weak, as this provokes military conflicts. The Armed Forces should support the political, economic and diplomatic mechanisms of Ukraine's national policy. Will it happen in 7-10 years? That depends on today's decisions of the national leaders.



2. REASONS THAT HAMPERED MILITARY REFORM IN UKRAINE

The overall success of reform will, to a great extent, depend on a sound analysis of previous experience. It is necessary to both select the direction of reform and to avoid the repetition of mistakes. When critically assessing the experience gained, one will easily notice that a selfish departmental approach to reform of power structures prevailed over cautious and inconsistent attempts to introduce a systematic nationally minded approach.

In recent years, the process of reform used to begin at individual agencies and spread «bottom-up». It corresponded to the realities of the time. On the one hand, military and political points of reference were unclear and became feasible only two or three years ago, with the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution and the Concept of National Security of Ukraine. It was impossible to set the course of reform without clear political aims⁴⁶. On the other hand, the *fundamentals* of reform were underestimated. This especially refers to the real condition of military units, the assessment of their capabilities and limitations, and available resources, proceeding from the priorities of national progress. Finally, the fact that reform should be based on certain scientific principles (methods), detailed analysis and concrete calculations, was not thought over properly.

Two groups of reasons hampering achievement of the desired result may be distinguished. The first group covers reasons that were constraining reform as far back as at the stage of development of its main directions (concept) and the drafting of the program of reform. Another group covers factors that affected its implementation. Among all military formations of the Military organisation, the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development through the year 2005 was drafted more professionally. It will be used to illustrate the main reasons that hampered reform.

2.1. PROBLEMS WHICH EXISTED AT THE STAGE OF CONCEPT AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

- Initial limitations

- Low level of foreign assistance

Unlike other post-communist countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states, that began to reform their armies with active NATO assistance, Ukraine didn't get such assistance. For evident reasons, Russia was trying to hamper military construction in Ukraine. In 1991-92, the USA, Great Britain and other NATO members looked at Ukraine, with a million-strong army and a mighty nuclear potential, with caution. Ukraine's partners were ready to go no further than issue general declarations of support for its independence and demand immediate nuclear disarmament. Ukraine was not ready to define its priorities either.

- There were no mechanisms for strategic planning, formation of the defence budget and protection of national interests by military means

When Ukraine gained independence, it had no National Security and Defence Council, no Ministry of Defence, no General Staff of the Armed Forces, and no Armed Forces themselves, along with other military formations. Neither had Ukraine a scientific and analytical infrastructure to support strategic planning. Ukraine's military-industrial complex presented just an element of the USSR complex, it was not self-contained and was 96% dependent on supplies of parts from abroad. Capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine were limited, given their republican subordination (within the USSR) and the routine practice of the outflow of the best specialists to Moscow.

⁴⁶ These issues were thoroughly examined in a study by a UCEPS expert: A. Grytsenko. Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: a System Emerging from Chaos. — HARMONIE PAPER no.1, Groningen, The Netherlands, Centre for European Security Studies, 1997, 55p.



National priorities were evidently shifting as time passed:

from the control over military formations and the establishment of formal signs of national sovereignty in 1991-92, to problems of the economic survival of the nation in the years that followed. The mighty internal potential of Ukraine rapidly disappeared due to the absence of effective economic reforms: in 1991-95, GDP dropped by almost 50%. If, in the first two years of independence, the military sector was among the main priorities, later, in the absence of a direct military threat, other sectors, such as the political, economic, social and energy sectors, appeared in the focus of the authorities and public. Polls showed that from mid-1994, problems of personal welfare (76%), food prices (39%) and unemployment (22%) were the most pressing. Citizens were no longer concerned about the defence potential of the state: it occupied last, or second last place, and was considered important only by 1% of respondents.⁴⁷

Absence of national legislative experience

Acts adopted in the first years of independence were declarative, politicised, and sometimes naive. Elements of the Military organisation were not defined even in principles, the functions of the military formations forming it were not specified. Neither the Concept of Defence and Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces (1991), nor legislation defined the concrete functions of the Armed Forces. Later, this resulted in the narrow-minded resolution of national defence issues in the interests of separate agencies. For instance, then, legislative acts did not even lay a conceptual basis for the creation of Ukraine's Navy. As a result, attempts to commission a missile cruiser, or submarine continued. The necessity for ships of that class is doubtful, while the maintenance expenses are inadmissible for the state. This hampers the development of the Navy and Armed Forces as a whole.

The Military Doctrine was adopted in 1993, two years after Ukraine gained independence. It reflected the euphoria and inexperience of that time. Instead of concrete, basic data, the Military Doctrine only contained general (acceptable for any state) tasks, and a long list of good intentions and priorities not supported by resources. What's the use of such provisions in that still valid document: «... priority should be given to precision guided weapons of increased power, intelligence, airspace defence, electronic warfare, missile forces, air force and air mobile units, advanced types of surface ships and submarines»? According to UCEPS experts, support for only those «priorities» will require \$80-200 billion in budget funds. The recurrence of such gigantomania and irresponsible declarations is present in reports and accounts even now⁴⁸.

Ukraine's Military Doctrine must presents a system of views of Ukraine's political leadership on the prevention of military conflicts, the preparation of the country for defence against possible aggression, military construction in general, and the use of the state's Military organisation to defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats. The present doctrine has never accomplished those tasks and has not become a document «obligatory for state and local authorities, and Ukrainian citizens». And this is the basic document for reforming the military sector!

The number of both civilian and military specialists is insufficient for the execution of large-scale tasks

Some officials were trying to solve vital national problems, but they didn't possess the knowledge, experience and understanding for their responsibility for the proposed solutions. Key nominees were often unfit to do their jobs. For instance, in 1994, the Department of the Armed Forces Construction and Development was formed within the General Staff. The idea was good, but it was badly implemented. In our opinion, the man in charge, General D. Umanets, was incompetent and couldn't staff the Department with qualified professionals. The Department was issuing ungrounded proposals (schemes, concepts) and was later disbanded.

As far as civilian experts of the MoD are concerned, we'll mention three key figures: Defence Minister V. Shmarov, Deputy Defence Minister (Armament) A. Dovhopolyi, and Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the General Staff O. Urban. A civilian Deputy Minister of Defence (Military Policy and International Co-operation) never took office. Until now, only A. Dovhopolyi remains in the MoD⁴⁹.

Generally speaking, reforms were hampered by an absence of the state building experience, a poor legislative basis, an extremely generalised definition of political aims, a lack of professionals and a relic mentality. Initial limitations conditioned the lack of coordination in the development of military formations over the following years.

● Political limitations

The country's top leadership did not manage to initiate systematic reforms of Ukraine's Military organisation

For years, the branches of power were struggling for their powers and focused on the constitutional process.

The military sector was not among the main priorities in this struggle for powers; all activity was concentrated on the subordination of military formations, rather than the actual situation and the direction of reforms. That's why Ukraine's Constitution does not specify the Military

⁴⁷ Ukrainian Political and Economic Index (June 1995, p.1; December 1995, p.1).

⁴⁸ Materials sent by Ukraine to NATO headquarters regularly reproduce the declarative provisions of the obsolete Military Doctrine. Western partners are used to them and read them with a restrained smile.

⁴⁹ Civilian specialists in the military sector should be specially trained. The best form of training would be short-term (2-3 months) courses at the National Defence Academy of Ukraine. It has long been ready to accept students: curriculum plans were worked out, and the annual training of two groups of 15-25 persons each was planned. However, there have been no applications from the Government's staff, Verkhovna Rada, National Security and Defence Council, Presidential Administration, ministries and agencies.



organisation of the state properly. Meanwhile, the settlement of disputed issues was set aside.

Continuous distrust and sometimes hostility between the legislative and executive authorities presented another political factor hampering reform. The possibility of Parliament blocking all attempts at military reform made the Government search for roundabout ways of reforming the military sector. As a result, the Verkhovna Rada until recently, was actually excluded from the reform process. A situation emerged where the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was adopted by a Presidential Decree. But those who had engineered such a device (though absolutely lawful) did not account for important legal and political consequences. The Program (as a file of papers) was formally approved; so what? Legal and material support was needed for its implementation, and the intricate device hit back at its designers. Didn't they know that the structure, manpower ceiling and functions of the Armed Forces (the parameters forming the kernel of military reform) are to be approved exclusively by the Verkhovna Rada? Similarly, only Parliament is authorised to take a final decision as to the scope of budget funding. The reforms skidded.

As far back as May, 1996, UCEPS experts forecasted such developments⁵⁰. The military also spoke about this: «The present abnormal situation, when legislative power bodies reduce the scope of defence expenses exclusively on grounds of economic expediency without any specification or concrete definition of the tasks of the Armed Forces ... leaving the Ministry of Defence to deal with problems alone, requiring not a departmental, but a national approach, should be done away with⁵¹». In our view, people's deputies should be involved in working out the program of reform at its early stages, in order to avoid a repetition of this situation.

Nobody bore personal responsibility for reformation of the military sector

Each military formation was developing concepts and programs for itself; Government involvement in the process was minimal. For instance, when in 1996 the Interdepartmental committee for military reform was finally established, it was headed not by the Prime Minister or by the Secretary of the National Security and

Defence Council of Ukraine (as the essence of reform demanded, if reform was really to be interdepartmental), but by the newly appointed Defence Minister. Nobody else was willing (and ready) to assume responsibility for the solution of complex military problems. Will there be any volunteers today?

The system of civilian control over the military⁵² hasn't been fully created yet

Elements of the system superior to the military formations, such as state power bodies, public organisations, non-governmental analytical centres, and mass media, exist in Ukraine, although their influence on those processes should be stronger⁵³. At the same time, another important element of the system, providing control from inside the Army, should be established. We mean the institute of civil servants at responsible posts, presently unavailable. *Real changes may be expected only when (a) civilian administrators are well informed of the real situation in the Armed Forces; (b) they have mechanisms to influence the internal operation of military formations; (c) responsibility of civilians for the development of power structures and their competence in military issues are sufficiently high.*

Today, the situation remains complex. The military has itself developed the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development, worked out the necessary bills, and now, it has to finance military reform at its own expense. The Verkhovna Rada now sets annual ceilings of «earnings» (208 million of Hryvnias of in 1999). Those targets are met before schedule, and the military proudly reports to Parliament that the Law «On Economic Activity in the Armed Forces of Ukraine» is working⁵⁴. The Ukrainian military economists are evidently inspired by the Chinese experience⁵⁵. *In the opinion of UCEPS experts, this experience is outdated and absolutely unacceptable for Ukraine. The negative sides of the commercialisation of the Chinese Army (smuggling, corruption, abuse of power) made the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China take a decision to stop the commercial activity of companies established by the military. Business activity may provoke corruption and abuse in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The MoD should remember the unfortunate experience of military commerce in the first years of Ukrainian independence.*

⁵⁰ The Armed Forces of Ukraine: Problems of Reforming and the Present Situation. — Analytical report of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kyiv, May 1996, p.36.

⁵¹ V. Radetskyi. «Military Security as the Basic Element of Ukraine's National Security». — *Narodna Armiya*, November 1, 1996, p.1.

⁵² The intention to establish democratic civilian control over the military in Ukraine has been declared in a number of international documents, and in the Concept of the National Security of Ukraine.

⁵³ For instance, such a potentially effective structure of civilian control, as the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, might play a more active role in the determination of the strategy of reform of the Military organisation. Until now, NSDC meetings have been addressing important but accessory military problems (such as storage of ammunition, the future of strategic bombers, and dispatch of peacekeepers abroad). Doctrinal problems of military-political and military-strategic importance haven't been reviewed by the NSDC.

⁵⁴ S. Chornous. «Hi, Army, New Year is coming!» — *Ukrayina Moloda*, December 2, 1999, p. 4.

⁵⁵ In 1998, the Chinese Army owned over 15 thousand commercial enterprises, including 1,500 hotels, 400 pharmacies (which produced 10% of all medicines), and enterprises of the military-industrial complex. The aggregate turnover of the military business was estimated to be equal to 3% of China's GDP.



● Organisational reasons

Reforming of the Military organisation lacked co-ordination on the national level

The body entrusted with the duty of interdepartmental co-ordination — the National Security Council of Ukraine (since 1996 — the National Security and Defence Council, NSDC) — became influential only after Volodymyr Horbulin was appointed its Secretary in 1994). The General Military Inspectorate attached to the President of Ukraine became fully operational at the end of 1996. The Military organisation, as a whole, until 1997, had not been defined (and seen) as an integral system. With the exception of one unsuccessful study, nobody set a task to reform the *Military organisation* at the national level, nobody defined limitations concerning the manpower ceiling and funds, nobody assessed the aggregate potential of the *Military organisation* or the specified functions of its separate elements. Only in 1996-97, the expediency of unified logistic systems, education, etc. was addressed at the national level. However, nothing has changed, and the efforts of separate agencies were not consolidated. The only exception was a wisely engineered and rapidly introduced unified system of medical support for all power structures (General V. Bilyi). Only in the summer of 1997, the General Staff of the Armed Forces was defined as a body co-ordinating the application of the Armed Forces and other military formations in wartime, and the first strategic exercise «Redut-97» was held.

There were some attempts to work out programs of reform in the narrow circle of experts within the framework of military formations

The State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was drafted with the limited involvement of experts of other government agencies immediately dealing with national defence. The potential of the MoD research centres was not adequately used. Most of the tasks relating to program development were entrusted to the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff headed by General M. Palchuk. This Directorate employed many qualified experts in the strategic planning of the application of forces. Unfortunately, they had no experience with strategic planning of armed forces *development*. Furthermore, the Directorate continued to exercise its vast routine duties. As a result, the team did not (and was objectively unable) to work out a comprehensively substantiated program.

The development of the State Program did not involve people's deputies of Ukraine and representatives of non-governmental (public) organisations. For this reason,

many constructive proposals and important ideas that could improve the program were left out. Moreover, at the implementation stage, the MoD failed to obtain proper and timely legislative support, as people's deputies always viewed documents prepared without their participation with natural caution. And lobbying of the Army by the military men among members of Parliament proved ineffective.

The legislation did not specify the requirements as to the essence of state programs, the procedure of their formation, and the mechanisms of co-ordination, adoption and funding

The draft Law «On State Programs» has gone no further than the draft stage for several years now⁵⁶. The only regulatory document partly governing those issues is «Regulations of the State Scientific and Technical Programs» (the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 796 of October 10, 1995). However, these Regulations are outdated. Due to the absence of defined requirements for the content and procedure of state programs, in most cases, administrators set unrealistic deadlines for their development. This results in the insufficient quality, poor substantiation and further revision of projects, in addition to causing a delay.

The State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was prepared in 1995-96. Unrealistic terms were set and put off several times. The executors were presenting a product of poor quality, and the situation repeated itself. Less than two months were allotted for the final revision of the project. In the «best» traditions of Soviet-style rush-work, a team comprised of the General Staff generals and officers submitted a version of the program. At first, it was severely criticised by the head of state, but two weeks later... it was approved by the National Security and Defence Council headed by the President of Ukraine. *In our opinion, it's better not to make haste at the target definition phase, but to give enough time for the substantiation of important decisions, and to ensure balanced funding of the program; otherwise, everything will have to be done all over again, but under worse starting conditions (skinflints pay twice).*

Favourable conditions were not created for large-scale and responsible work relating to the development of state programs

Normally, developers are not released from their principal duties⁵⁷. The efficiency of their work is often limited by unsolved background problems (poor transportation facilities, communication, office machinery, information support, leisure conditions, etc.). All those issues may seem minor, but they determine the overall result.

⁵⁶ UCEPS experts have prepared concrete proposals as to its revision.

⁵⁷ For instance, at the last stage of development of the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff General V. Fomin was appointed Head of the MoD Working Group. However, he was not released from his official duties. Furthermore, the fact that General Fomin had been serving with the General Staff for only several months was not accounted for.



• Methodological reasons

The programs of reforms were developed without concrete basic data, such as military-political, economic and other targets and limitations

The Constitution had not been adopted yet, and there was no Concept of the National Security of Ukraine. There was (and there still is) no Concept (strategy) of the military security of the state. Under such circumstances, *the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was deemed failure. The fate of the State Program for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment, developed for so long and now being prepared for adoption, may be the same.*

Scientific studies and methodological principles of program formation, available at that time, were not taken into account

Relevant materials were prepared by the General Staff Research Centre and reported personally to General O. Zatynaiko. However, the then head of the General Staff was sure that drafting the program required only the strong will of the leadership, and the readiness of its executors to

work day and night. As a result, scientifically ungrounded measures meant to reform the Armed Forces appeared unbalanced, as far as their targets, terms, funds and final results were concerned.

The experience of military reform in advanced countries was not taken into account

Democratic countries have worked out effective mechanisms which could be useful for Ukraine. Military reforms are engineered and implemented under the direct (and not only under the general) supervision of civilian leaders of the state. Programs of reform are developed by small groups of skilful intellectuals, assisted by numerous support teams, and by leading research centres. The Government regularly publishes the White Book on Defence in order to ensure support for reform on the part of the open (the taxpayers). Regular open (!) parliamentary hearings on military issues make MPs aware of the urgent problems of the army and encourage their participation in the solution of those problems. Cyclic planning of budget expenditures on defence (for example, on a five-year basis) also promotes the stability of military programs. This experience deserves the attention of Ukrainian reformers.

2.2. PROBLEMS AT THE STAGE OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Despite all its deficiencies, the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development became an important stage for nation-building in Ukraine. If compared to the Ministry of Defence, other ministries (including «civilian» ones) have far more modest results in the strategic planning of the development of their areas of responsibility. The military produced the best result they were able to at that time. Unfortunately, this result proved insufficient to ensure successful reform. Cited below are the main factors that hampered military reform at the stage of implementation of the approved programs.

• Limited resources

Financial resources allocated from the state budget were insufficient even to sustain the Armed Forces

Indeed, this situation was expected and should have been accounted for at the program development stage (if resource limita-

tions are not taken into account, a document cannot be termed a program). However, this was not done, and six months after the Program was adopted, talks of its shifting terms began. The figures cited below show that in 1997-99 (the first stage of reform) the Government substantially curtailed funding of the military sector. This further complicated the situation, and the MoD could only afford actions requiring no, or few funds.

Unfortunately, the draft budget for 2000 creates no basis for optimism either. According to the MoD estimates⁵⁸, maintaining the Armed Forces at their present strength will require no less than 4.6 billion Hryvnias (*we consider this figure to be understated*). The Government suggests the allocation of only 2.1 billion Hryvnias. After deducting around 570 millions Hryvnias in arrears due to the MoD (by offsetting this sum), and another 200 million Hryvnias supposed to be «earned» by the Armed Forces, **the 2000 budget earmarks 1.3 billion**


Funding of Ukraine's Armed Forces

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Defence budget, % of GDP	2,4	1,57	1,46	1,8	1,9	1,35	1,35	1,4

⁵⁸ R. Tkachuk. «What will fiscal year 2000 bring us?» — *Narodna Armiya*, October 14, 1999, p. 5.



Dynamics of funding of Ukraine's Armed Forces, \$ million



Hryvnias for defence. Given the present Hryvnia exchange rate (5.5 Hryvnias/\$), it comprises some \$240 million, and the Hryvnia is unlikely to rise in the year 2000. Furthermore, the Armed Forces have always been actually funded below budget figures. If we proceed from the trend presented below, in 2000, the Ministry of Defence may obtain as little as \$180-200 million.

The structure of the defence budget did not correspond to reform requirements

Analysis shows that funding of reforms was in no way accounted for in the budget: one can scarcely await reforms in a situation where the Government plans to spend over 80% only on the sustainment of the Armed Forces.


For instance, the reduction of manpower is an important element of military reform. According to the estimates produced by General M. Matiukh, reduction of the Army costs 1.5-2 times more than sustaining the same number of personnel⁵⁹. Overall expenditures decrease only with time.

However, no additional funds were allocated on the reduction of manpower. Such expenditures were not even planned.


A comparative analysis of the structure of defence budgets of Ukraine and NATO countries (see Diagrams) also demonstrates some trends.

First, Ukraine spends unjustifiably few funds (only 4%) on the acquisition of equipment. NATO countries allocate a four-five times larger share of their defence budget for this purpose. Second, the development of new weapon systems in Ukraine is underfunded: whereas NATO countries spend some 10% of their defence budgets on R&D, on the average, Ukraine spends only 3%. Finally, the diagram shows that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are mostly spending the military budget on food: personnel expenditures account for 70% of allocated funds. A serious approach to reform would require a correction of those relations, irrespective of the budget value. What matters for the definition of reform priorities is not the absolute figures of expenses (in Hryvnias or in Dollars), but their relationship.

Typical structure of NATO countries' defence budget




Structure of Ukraine's defence budget in 1999



⁵⁹R. Drapak. «The principle of the manning of Ukraine's Armed Forces remains mixed». — *Narodna Armiya*, April 2, 1999, p.1.



1999 defence expenses per capita



Though it may seem strange, but *budget limitations and the delay in reform give us an opportunity to escape many mistakes*. For instance, the implementation of projects for the establishment of operational-territorial commands (nine, seven or five of those were proposed, and each time «reformers» were confident of the valid grounds for their proposals) would have brought extremely negative results. How much money would have been wasted in early 1996, had the military begun to implement those ideas⁶⁰?

C. Donelly, advisor to NATO's Secretary General, assessed the results of the insufficiently considered reforms underway in post-communist countries with extreme scepticism: *«If a country spends 1.6% of its GDP on defence, and can only field two battalions of competent troops, then doubling the percentage of GDP spent will not be seen as a credible solution»*⁶¹.

With present levels of funding, Ukraine's Armed Forces are degrading very quickly. How can one hope for any improvement if last year every Ukrainian citizen spent less than \$9 on defence? The economic situation gives no reason to count on anything more than that. For the current year, this figure will barely exceed \$4-5 (the cost of a pair of cheap slippers). One should keep this in mind when speaking of possible «peace dividends» of Armed Forces reduction.

Financial indices may be improved, and the methods are known: economic growth (as a pre-condition of the military reform), a more determined reduction of manpower (at least by a third in Ukraine), and the more efficient and properly targeted use of allocated funds. Moreover, **an absence of funds alone is sufficient evidence for the necessity of reform**: «Opponents to military reform argue that there are no funds for reforming effectively. However, the lack of funds proves the need to reform the expensive «machinery» of the Armed Forces. When funds are sufficient, there is no need for reform»⁶².

● Personnel limitations

Frequent replacements of the heads of power structures created an adverse effect on reform

It's worth noting that almost half of all officers (49%) see the lack of stability in the Armed Forces' command as a «factor hampering the process of reform». Over eight years of Ukraine's independence there were four ministers of defence, five chiefs of the General Staff, three ministers of internal affairs, four heads of the Security Service and three heads of the State Border Security Committee (see below).

Ministry of Defence	General Staff of the Armed Forces	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Security Service	State Border Security Committee
K. Morozov V. Radetskyi V. Shmarov O. Kuzmuk	H. Zhyvytsia V. Sobkov A. Lopata O. Zatyanaiko V. Shkidchenko	V. Vasylyshyn V. Radchenko Yu. Kravchenko	Ye. Marchuk V. Malikov V. Radchenko L. Derkach	V. Hubenko V. Bannykh B. Oleksiyenko

⁶⁰ A. Lopata emphasised the political aspect of the problem: «The main achievement of our state is that it did not create operational-territorial commands... This would have brought break-up not only of the Armed Forces but of Ukraine as a whole». (*Ukrayinska Hazeta*, January 6, 2000, p.8).

⁶¹ C. Donelly. «Defence Transformation in the New Democracies». — *NATO Review*, no.6, 1996, p.7.

⁶² S. Rogov. «Security of the state and the military reform». — *Krasnaya Zvezda*, November 23, 1996, p.3.



The turnover of staff did not encourage the mastering of official duties and long-term planning, and made continuity in administration impossible.

A subjective approach to decision-making often prevailed over other arguments. Unfortunately, boards of power ministries, all collegial advisory bodies, failed to put a stop to wrong decisions. For example, the system of military education of the MoD has gone through changes in subordination of educational establishments four times over five years.

● Insufficient information support and propaganda of reform

The State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was developed as a confidential document, and after adoption, it was stamped «classified»

It's quite possible that the developers wanted to escape criticism this way. Such a possibility was mentioned by the Military Attache of the Netherlands in

1992, Defence Minister K. Morozov	Educational establishments are taken out of the control of the Services and transferred to the Military Education Directorate of the MoD
1994, Defence Minister V. Radetskyi	Educational establishments are taken out of the control of the Military Education Directorate of the MoD and transferred to the Services
1996, Defence Minister V. Shmarov	Educational establishments are taken out of the control of the Services and transferred to the Military Education Directorate of the MoD
1997, Defence Minister O. Kuzmuk	Educational establishments are taken out of the control of the Military Education Directorate of the MoD and transferred to the Services

Indeed, every time, the declared purpose of re-subordination was the optimisation of the command-and-control structure, better officer training, savings of budget funds, etc⁶³. What system of control over educational establishments will be proposed next?

The merger of Air Force and Air Defence into a single service (Air Defence Forces) and their further division into two separate services also dealt with subjective approaches on the part of the commanders who suggested those decisions. Even today one cannot be sure that the decisions as to the military education system and the Air Force and Air Defence were correct.

Ukraine G. Timmer: «I've got the impression that there is either no such plan, or its quality is very low... The Dutch Army has no secrets from its people and from the international community. This may be one of the reasons why it took only eighteen months to make our Army professional»⁶⁴.

The experience of other countries proves the importance of information and propaganda support for reform⁶⁵. Unfortunately, limited information about reform plans (especially in 1994-96), and the absence of broad public debate led to a lack of interest in military reform among Ukrainians. At the same time, the reformation of state structures won't be successful without public support, as reforms require significant taxpayer funds. When the public is aware of the purpose and directions of reforms, and confident of their usefulness, even so-called «unpopular» steps may enjoy public support.

⁶³ The permanent curator of the system of military education of the MoD in the course of four contradictory reforms was First Deputy Minister of Defence General I. Bizhan.

⁶⁴ V. Voroniuk. «Holland stands for greater openness of military contacts with Ukraine». — *Den'*, November 27, 1999.

⁶⁵ Few people know that the program for the US Armed Forces transition to professional manning was close to failure. The reasons included a sceptical attitude to reform on the part of the public and the unpopularity of the army in American society. The situation was saved thanks to a propaganda campaign unleashed by the military in mass media. Within a short period, Americans were convinced of the expediency, economic and social effect of the proposed reform. As a result, the latter received public support and was successfully completed.



2.3. HOW TO ESCAPE MISTAKES IN THE COURSE OF REFORM?

In order to find an answer to this uneasy question, UCEPS experts conducted a broad study. It covered (a) the analysis of the national experience of the establishment and reformation of power structures in 1991-2000; (b) the analysis of the experience of strategic and defence planning in more than 20 countries; (c) familiarisation with Ukrainian and foreign studies in the field of systems analysis and target-oriented program planning acceptable for implementation in Ukraine. On the basis of this study, the methodology for the formation of state programs of construction and development of Ukraine's Military organisation was worked out.

One of the elements of this methodology is the generalised algorithm⁶⁶ of military reform in Ukraine, presented in the Diagram. The main conclusions drawn on the basis of an analysis of this algorithm are as follows.

First. The reason for military reform (the starting point of the algorithm — see Diagram) may be explained by one of the following factors: a change in the strategic goals of the nation building, and the political priorities of the country's leadership; severe financial limitations; the emergence (forecast) of new military threats; development of essentially new types of weapons and methods of combat operations; a change in the balance of forces in the region (military blocks, allies, etc); the inability to accomplish basic functions and missions with forces-in-being; the accelerated outdateding of weapon systems.

Second. Today, most countries begin military reform with the purpose of *reducing the defence budget* and channel budget funds toward solving economic and social problems. In European countries, armed forces are being reformed in connection with the transition to *volunteer force* (due not only to military, but also to economic and social reasons). Democratic states regularly make a thorough (*top-down*) analysis of their military structures, to check the efficiency of the use of budget funds, assess the combat efficiency of the army, and identify problem areas. This is normally done when new leadership takes power. In the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, reforms envisage the *gradual reduction of manpower, and bringing its structure and the level of training into compliance with NATO standards*.

Third. Given the Ukrainian situation, several directions of reform may be combined, as shown by the Diagram: «top-down», when new

political goals and priorities are formulated, and doctrinal principles change; «bottom-up», when the efficiency of forces-in-being is increased by means of organisational arrangements, without a considerable increase in expenditures; «budget-driven», when the Army is reduced under pressure of economic problems; «threat-oriented», when the structure, composition and numerical strength of the Army change, proceeding from the necessity to protect national interests from new threats. Such a combination makes it possible to organise preparatory work simultaneously by different expert groups. In our opinion, the results (requirements, manpower ceilings, etc.) might be co-ordinated within the framework of the Commission on military reform, to be established by a decision of the President of Ukraine.


Fourth. Even brief acquaintance with the algorithm would be sufficient to see that it is impossible to work out a concept (and especially a program) of reform without prior analysis of the priorities of national development, identification of concrete limitations and targets (manpower ceiling, funding limits), assessment of the ability to accomplish basic functions and missions with available manpower and equipment (not in general, but in detail), threat assessment, etc. Unfortunately, those obvious things were not comprehended in Ukraine; their importance was called in question both in 1992, when Ukraine's Armed Forces were to be created on the ruins of the Soviet Army, and in 1995-96, when the State Program of Armed Forces Construction and Development was drafted. After adoption of the Constitution (1996) and the Concept of the National Security of Ukraine (1997), the top segment of the algorithm became more or less clear. The threat assessment, the potential of national science and the military-industrial complex, the economic situation, and the efficiency of international security mechanisms became more realistic. In our opinion, preconditions arose in Ukraine for drafting the Concept of military reform within a relatively short term.

Fifth. At different stages of the reformation (balancing of the system) the problem of the choice between several *alternative decisions* arises. At the highest political level, the choice lies in the determination of priorities and strategic goals of the state; the search for possible allies and strategic partners; the definition of the directions and the

⁶⁶ Based on the results of R. Lloyd: «Strategy and Force Planning Framework». — Strategy and Force Planning, Newport, US Naval War College, 1995, pp. 1-14.



ALGORITHM OF MILITARY REFORM IN UKRAINE



degree of co-operation with international organisations in the field of security; manpower ceilings for the entire Military organisation and each military formation; the scope of budget funding and logistic support. Such background data for conducting military reform is to be approved by the head of state, as those issues are beyond the competence of the military. The Concept of military reform cannot be worked out and reasonable amendments to the Military Doctrine cannot be prepared without this data. Ukraine learned this lesson as far back as 1996.

The problem of choice arises at the level of the military formation, too, when it appears (see Diagram) that it is unable to accomplish certain functions. If the consequences could be serious (the risk is high), changes are required; in this case, alternatives should be generated. Of course, the choice would be simpler after the necessary calculations and definition of criteria for comparison.

Sixth. The diagram shows that reform preparation is an *interactive* process. It suggests *feedback* for adjustment, if the required level of combat efficiency cannot be provided within the set limits. Adjustment may be performed at different levels.

At the military formation level, there should be a search for more effective options of force development (new proposals as to the structure, manpower, co-ordination, methods of training, etc.).

At the doctrinal level, the balance between what is desired and what is available may be regained by the introduction of new doctrines, accession to military blocks, equipment with essentially new weapon types, removal of funding limitations, settlement of conflicts mainly by political or diplomatic means, etc.

If all those measures fail to ensure the protection of national interests against military threats, a decision may be taken at the top political level relating to the change of strategic goals and state priorities. Normally, such feedback is rarely workable (mainly during period of deep transformation of society, in the event of war, or a cardinal change in the international situation).

Seventh. The assessment of power structures' capability to perform assigned functions, the assessment of the risk of their non-performance and the consequences thereof, the choice between alternatives and substantiation of modifications — all those actions envisage *obligatory calculations!* This does not mean the exclusion of qualitative assessments and the substantiation of obvious things. The point is that reforming a huge structure (over a million people, tens of thousands of units of costly hardware, hundreds of cantonments, etc.) cannot be based on the verbal opinion by several experts. The cost of erroneous decisions is too high, that's why leaders of the state should not set unrealistic terms for drafting the Concept (and, moreover, the programs) for military reform.

The performed analysis shows that even in developed countries, such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, the USA and France, under conditions of stability and in the absence of radical changes, it takes 6-8 months to work out a concept of reform of the armed forces. The creation of the program takes another 10-12 months. In general, the entire planning process takes 16-20 months. There are no reasons for hoping that Ukraine would be able to engineer a military reform much faster, although there are some possibilities for reducing this period.

CONCLUSIONS

Unfavourable starting conditions, along with political, financial, personnel and other limitations, have objectively hampered military reform in Ukraine. Many background factors were left unaccounted for during the development of relevant programs. That's why their implementation under tough budget limitations hasn't brought the expected results.

According to UCEPS experts, preconditions for the successful military reform exist in Ukraine. Over the last several years, there was much discussion among experts and scientists, and in mass media. A consensus has been reached on many important issues of military reform; the priorities and lines of reform are clear. Many people understand that reform of the Armed Forces and military reform are not the same; that reform (including personnel reduction) requires significant funds, and «peaceful dividends» will become feasible somewhere in the future; that none of the military formations can and should reform themselves. The necessity for a systematic approach to the reform of the Military organisation of Ukraine is now clear to both experts and state leaders.

If we proceed from objective indices (economic potential, availability of resources, condition of military formations, etc.), starting conditions for military reform are worse today than they were in 1996, let alone 1992. At the same time, subjective factors are more favourable today: Ukraine has accumulated vast experience; the problems and the means for their solution are better comprehended; more pragmatic officers are employed in governmental structures; there are reasons to count on the assistance of foreign partners; finally, President Kuchma once again was trusted by the nation.

Provided there is a strong political will and the head of state is prepared to take radical decisions, military reform shall occur, as this is vitally important, and there are conditions for its successful implementation. But if that will is enough for settling tasks only, it is better not to take up the job at all. Another false start would only result in a diffusion of funds and complete loss of confidence in state leaders on the part of the military.



3. CONCRETE PROPOSALS AS TO MILITARY REFORM PLANNING IN UKRAINE

It's quite probable that a political decision on military reform in Ukraine has already been taken. President Kuchma even set such a task (in general) on November 23, 1999, at a meeting of the MoD Board. If the head of state really assumes this objective to be a priority, it is time to move to the creation of effective mechanisms capable of providing for its practical implementation.

The algorithm presented in the previous section defines the sequence of planning military reform in Ukraine. UCEPS suggests three stages for the same.

In the first stage, the working group should prepare a draft of the basic Presidential Decree «On Military Reform». Apart from political targets, the Decree should provide for the establishment of an interdepartmental Commission on military reform, entrusted with the duty of co-ordinating all future activities.

In the second stage, the Concept of military reform and the revised version of the Military Doctrine should be worked out. Drafts of these important documents should be discussed at a special meeting of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. After the introduction of the necessary changes, the Concept of military reform may be enacted by a Presidential Decree, while the Military Doctrine should be approved by the Verkhovna Rada.

In the third stage, the departmental programs of power structures' reforming and interdepartmental (functional) programs, outlining common measures to be taken in all military formations, should be drafted on the basis of the Concept of military reform.

We estimate the duration of the first stage to require 20-30 days, the second stage — 2-3 months, and the third stage — 5-6 months. This way, the planning may be completed in 8-10 months, and practical steps can be taken afterwards.

The complete cycle of military reform planning in Ukraine			
	End result	Duration	Staff
Stage 1	Decree of the President of Ukraine «On Military Reform»	20-30 days	Working group (7-9 persons)
Stage 2	The Concept of military reform, revised version of the Military Doctrine, 2001 budget targets	2-3 months	Commission on military reform (40-50 persons)
Stage 3	Departmental and functional programs, concrete figures of the 2001 budget, targets for the following 3-5 years	5-6 months	Commission on military reform, ministries and departments, committees of the Verkhovna Rada

It is clear that some problems require an immediate solution. Furthermore, a number of important decisions have been sufficiently prepared over the recent years. Relevant actions should be taken promptly, before the completion of the entire planning cycle. It is important that their direction not run contrary to the general strategy of reform. For the same reason, the implementation of some points of the previously adopted programs (such as the «State Program for Construction and Development of Ukraine's Armed Forces through the year 2005») should also be agreed to by the Commission on military reform in advance.

• An analysis of the experience of reforming advanced armies and of our own gains and failures leads us to the conclusion that military reform should be based on certain principles. In the following section we tried to define those principles.



3.1. PRINCIPLES OF REFORM OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY ORGANISATION

According to UCEPS experts, the military reform in Ukraine should be based on the following principles:

♦ *the use of non-forcible means for conflict resolution.* Hostilities are easy to commence but difficult to cease. Most problems cannot be solved by military means at all. Priorities may include the strengthening of the political, diplomatic and economic components of Ukraine's state policy; the military strength presents the last argument. The functions of the power structures should not be excessively great;

♦ *the strengthening of democratic civilian control over the military sector* is an important pre-condition for the effective use of budget funds, protection of human rights within military formations, and generally, a guarantee of steady social progress. The military needs a mechanism for presenting its problems to the attention of government officials and legislators, while it remains concentrated on purely military issues. The present situation, where commanders spend 70-90% of their time solving supply and funding problems is abnormal; their main duty is combat training;

♦ *the rejection of gigantomania and stereotypes of the past, and realism in assessments* (of military threats, available resources, the efficiency of international confidence-building measures, the reliability of partners, Ukraine's influence on European processes, etc.);

♦ *economic acceptability of the Military organisation* that should not turn into an insurmountable obstacle for the economic revival of Ukraine;

♦ *priority development of capabilities designed for the identification of threats and early containment of conflicts.* Given the limited combat readiness of troops and low mobilisation capabilities, priorities in the development of Ukraine's Armed Forces should include (a) an increase in the potential of military intelligence, and (b) development of rapid deployment forces capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on the enemy and thereby containing an escalation of aggression. In our view, a fully-fledged air mobile brigade, capable of fighting in border areas within 48 hours (or attacking targets on enemy territory, if necessary), would be more useful for the man in charge of an operational command, than a «dwarf» Army corps short of resources;

♦ *the evasion of structural excessiveness.* The liquidation of duplicate structures will make it possible to reduce budget expenses and to raise the effectiveness of the command and control system;

♦ *fully-fledged use of manpower and equipment.* Most military structures should be entrusted with several functions; this will help save budget funds. Estimates exist demonstrating that if the multiplicity of functions was not adopted as a baseline principle of strategic planning in Great Britain, the strength of its Armed Forces and the country's defence budget would rise by 90-100%;

♦ *the sufficiency of manpower and equipment for the execution of functions:* military formations should not be reduced below the level where they would be unable to perform designated functions, even when accounting for a multiplicity of functions;

♦ *the maximum preservation of effective military units and non-acceptance of a decrease in combat efficiency of troops in the course of reform.* First, reorganisation arrangements should be diminished. Second, they should be so planned that at each stage of reform the combat efficiency of military formations rises (or, at least, does not fall);

♦ *the channelling of assets released as a result of the reduction of ineffective units towards the solution of priority tasks.* For instance, the de-commissioning and sale (even for scrap) of costly and obsolete Navy ships will make it possible to strengthen coastal missile units and the marines;

♦ *co-ordination of the results at each stage of reform:* unless the programs of reform are properly co-ordinated (balanced), the desired result will not be achieved. What will be the use of acquiring (leasing) new helicopters for an air mobile brigade if there are no trained pilots, technicians and ground equipment to support their sorties?

♦ *the build-up of mobilisation potential* is an important pre-condition for the reduction in manpower of the regular armed forces. Without efficient reserves, one can scarcely hope for a victory in a prolonged military conflict;

♦ *a more efficient use of the Armed Forces' potential in peacetime.* Generations invested billions of dollars in the construction of the Armed Forces. It would be ineffective and insane to use the potential of the Armed Forces in wartime only. The unique capabilities of the Armed Forces would help Ukraine's Government to solve many prob-



lems. For this purpose, the internal functions of the Army should be legislatively expanded⁶⁷;

♦ *uniform standards for social guarantees of all power structures.* The disproportion in military allowances and the generally insufficient social protection of personnel do not encourage honest work, affect combat readiness, and provoke the outflow of qualified specialists from the power structures;

♦ *the implementation of world experience acceptable to Ukraine:* only a few aspects of the development of Ukraine's Armed Forces are unique, and require unique approaches; application of foreign experience would save time and money;

♦ *the gradual provision of interoperability with the armed forces of partner countries* would be necessary for conducting joint peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other military operations;

♦ *the obligatory review of alternative options:* only in some exceptional cases the solution is evident and requires no additional substantiation. Meanwhile, «brainstorming», generation of more or less equal alternatives and their comparative analysis according to established

criteria with a subsequently agreed solution present the usual elements of reform planning;

♦ *«First think of your Motherland, then of yourself.»*

This principle, which was ideologically substantiated in the Soviet era, is obligatory for *public servants* in all democratic countries. All of the Commission members, and especially the heads of military structures, must abide by it⁶⁸. The readiness of the latter to give priority not to departmental (personal), but to national interests, determines the efficiency of the Commission and the fate of the reforms proposed by it.

Presented below is the essence of each of the three stages of military reform planning, along with concrete proposals of UCEPS experts as to reform directions. Some proposals were formulated in the first two sections of the report. Of course, we do not know the means for the solution of all the problems (and no one does). In this section, we present (a) the substantially grounded proposals of UCEPS experts, and (b) possible solutions that should be reviewed, along with other alternatives, for a final decision after their thorough examination by the Commission.

3.2. PRELIMINARY PREPARATION FOR MILITARY REFORM

The preparatory stage begins with the establishment of a working group and ends 20-30 days later, after the Presidential Decree «On Military Reform» is signed. The Commission on military reform, created pursuant to this Decree, would co-ordinate all further activities. The proposals of UCEPS experts as to organisational fundamentals, the preliminary stage, and the essence of the above-mentioned Presidential Decree are presented below.

• Proposals regarding organisational arrangements

The first step should be the formation of a working group intended to prepare a draft of the basic Presidential Decree «On Military Reform», and later, to become the kernel of the Commission on military reform (hereinafter referred to as the «Commission»). In our view, the working group should include 7-9 prominent experts in the field of military strategy. They must be qualified system analysts, possessing previously employed experience in state power bodies, capable of analysing and strategically comprehending the problems, well aware

of the present condition of military formations, acquainted with the experience of the reformation of foreign armies, and possess the fundamentals of target-oriented planning. The working group should be headed by an individual appointed by the President of Ukraine, and the former should later head the Commission.

Personalities are very important for reform success. In our opinion, **the choice of candidacy for the post of the Commission chairman will be of decisive importance.** The official status and the official duties of the Commission chairman (especially with respect to the heads of the power structures), and the level of confidence in his (her) personal relations with President Kuchma will be very important for the success of military reform.

The Commission is to be chaired **by a person enjoying sufficient powers to instruct ministers (heads of agencies) to ensure the prompt preparation of the required references, information, analytical and other materials; to sign contracts with research establishments for conducting target-oriented studies; to hold consultations with representatives of foreign states and international organisations, etc.**

⁶⁷ These issues are examined in the article by a UCEPS expert A. Grytsenko: «Is it possible for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to perform internal functions?» (published in this edition).

⁶⁸ For instance, in Great Britain, members of a similar Commission suggested the liquidation (reduction) of structures, where they ... were employed. Can one find a better illustration for this principle?



UCEPS experts think that the Commission chairman should have the personal qualities required for the organisation of the work of a professional team. He should be adaptable to new ideas, find a common language with representatives of different branches of power, and able to achieve compromise in conflict situations. The chairman of the Commission should be pragmatic, possess the experience of high-level administration and management, and have ties with the power structures, as well as Ukrainian and foreign research centres. *UCEPS experts insist that the chairman of the Commission should be released from all other official duties. If the latter is impossible, the deputy chairman in charge of the routine activities of the Commission should be nominated.*

• **Proposals as to the format of the basic Decree of the President of Ukraine**

The Decree of the President of Ukraine «On Military Reform» should contain a general assessment of the present situation in the Military organisation (the necessity for reform); political targets and requirements as to its desired status; political targets and the limitations impacting the selection of possible reform directions; the terms and procedures for the development of documents: a draft Concept of military reform, a revised version of the Military Doctrine and the programs for the power structures' reformation. The Decree should also set organisational fundamentals for the Commission's work. Annexes thereto should contain Regulations of the Commission, its personal composition, and powers of the chairman and Commission members.

The President of Ukraine should make his political choice on fundamental issues **defining the targets for military reform. Presented below are some questions relating to the strategic choice to be made by the head of state.**

Will Ukraine further stay out of military blocs, or is its accession to a defence union imminent? Shall we, in the event of a threat, count on military assistance from the strategic partners of Ukraine, and if so — who are those partners? Given the defensive character of the Military Doctrine, does the President allow for the possibility of preventive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy if his readiness for aggression is evident? How will the Armed Forces be manned in 3-5 years, and later on, in 7-10 years? What principle will be laid as the basis for defence regarding dangerous directions — the priority development of mobile forces for the prompt advancement of troops from their present bases, or large-scale re-deployment for the creation of new permanent formations? What will be the mobilisation priorities: should we rely on numerous regular Armed

Forces, with a small reserve component, or on smaller Armed Forces, supported by a well-trained ready reserve component? Should we preserve the present significant disproportion in the Armed Forces' manning, such as the excessive number of officers and the deficiency of soldiers (in reliance on the replenishment of units with reservists and continuation of using «spare» officers in the event of heavy losses, rather than on sufficient manning for the effective employment of units in a critical period)? Should we adhere to the unachievable priorities of the military-technical policy established in the present Military Doctrine, or set more modest targets? Shall we order numerous cheap weapon systems of Ukrainian origin, or purchase (lease) single expensive foreign complexes?

What Ukraine needs today is not great expectations, but an unbiased assessment of its capabilities. Otherwise, not only the present military budget, but also the entire state budget would be insufficient to accomplish the set tasks. An objective analysis shows that the list of functions and specific duties, which may be entrusted to the military formations, appears limited. Confidence will appear, however, that the Military organisation of Ukraine will be able to accomplish them⁶⁹.

The solution for those and other problems should be formulated in the form of political targets and limitations, assumed as the basis for military reform planning. UCEPS experts propose their own view on the essence of some of those problems.

• **Proposals as to the content of the basic Decree of the President of Ukraine**

Within the framework of drafting the basic decree of the President of Ukraine, UCEPS experts put forward the following proposals:

Foreign policy

Ukraine's non-allied status should be retained for the following 10-15 years. Available opportunities for co-operation with NATO and partner countries within the framework of the PfP program should be used to the maximum possible extent. Special attention should be paid to military-technical co-operation with NATO and the CIS countries. For the effective operation of joint peacekeeping units, Ukraine should interact with all neighbouring countries, and partake in peacekeeping operations held under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE, taking into account budget limitations. Peacekeeping units should include units of the Armed Forces, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry of Emergency. More attention

⁶⁹ Just one example: the stocks of materiel, kept at army depots and bases of the State Committee on Material Reserves, are not unlimited. In the event of a crisis, they should be used for mobilisation of the Armed Forces, military operations and supply of the population. According to expert estimates, the available resources will be sufficient to contain aggression in one direction only, provided the war will last no more than 30-40 days. Proceeding from the possibility of combat operations in two operational-strategic directions, the stocks should be replenished even today. Meanwhile, there are no funds, and they are unlikely to appear in the near future. In such a situation it would be a mistake to abide by the present Military Doctrine's provision of the necessity for all-round defence. The plans of containment of aggression on the part of a coalition of countries, such as NATO, taught at the National Defence Academy of Ukraine, also seem adventurous.



should be paid to the interoperability of Ukrainian troops with the units of partner countries. Within the framework of international military co-operation programs, Ukraine should assume only feasible obligations, and guarantee their unconditional fulfilment.

The numerical strength of military formations

The general number of military personnel of all power structures, as per the peacetime staffing list, should not exceed 300-320 thousand men⁷⁰. The peacetime manpower ceiling of the Armed Forces should be set at 200-220 thousand men, including 150-170 thousand militaries and 50 thousand civilians.


Manning

Before 2005, the Armed Forces should substantially complete the transition to manning on a contract basis. Conscript service should only remain in the Army. Women should be employed more actively. Beginning from 2001, the term of conscript service should be reduced to 12 months⁷².

The structure and the functions of the military organisation⁷³

The following services should be created in the Armed Forces: (a) united Naval Forces, combining the present Navy and the Naval Forces of the Border

Manpower of Ukraine's Armed Forces, in Thousand of Servicemen



The Concept has set the manpower ceiling of four structures (the Armed Forces, the Civil Defence Troops, the National Guard and the Border Troops) at a level of 0.8-0.9% of the Ukrainian population. Therefore, of the total strength equal to 400-450 thousand men, 330-380 thousand men fall into the Armed Forces

The number of trained reservists should be raised at the expense of the servicemen dismissed as a result of the reduction of military formations, restoration of planned reservist training, and reduction of the term of conscript service. In wartime, the Armed Forces should number 500-550 thousand servicemen to be combat ready in 4-6 months. Before 2005, a Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces, numbering 100 thousand men, should be created as part of the mobilisation reserve, with a readiness term of two or three weeks.⁷¹

Troops; (b) united Air Force, combining the present Air Force and the Air Defence Forces into a single service. The internal functions of the Armed Forces should be extended, encompassing counteraction to terrorism and separatism. The possibility of the transfer of the Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry of Emergency under the command of the Ministry of Defence should be evaluated⁷⁴. Proceeding from the manpower ceiling of the Armed Forces, four or five mechanised divisions should be left in the Army in peacetime.

⁷⁰ UCEPS experts are certain (see section 1) that today we can't do without radical solutions, both concerning the funding and the reduction of the strength of troops. The further existence of the Military organisation, in its present structure and strength, will lead to its degradation.

⁷¹ Apart from higher mobilisation readiness, the creation of the ready reserve of the Armed Forces will make it possible to reduce the strength of the regular Armed Forces, and to use funds more efficiently. It will also lead to better employment of the skills of retired servicemen, and create more jobs in former garrisons.

⁷² This will raise the prestige of the military service, reduce negative occurrences (service evasion, irregular relations, desertion, abuse at military registration and enlistment offices), provide social justice (as more youths will serve in the Armed Forces), and complement the reserves. The reduction of the term of conscript service falls in line with the European model.

⁷³ UCEPS experts support the decision of the President of Ukraine regarding the disbanding of the National Guard (we put forward such a proposal as far back as 1996). Additional measures are needed for the unification of parallel structures and the introduction of the principle of multiplicity of functions for the use of troops.

⁷⁴ Some experts suggest transition of the Tax Militia and some structures of the Border Troops to the subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. In our view, the Commission should decide on those proposals.



The maintenance and support of the Military organisation

Within a year, unified subsystems of logistics, military education and training, and defence research should be introduced in all military formations. Through the year 2010, preference should be given to the modernisation of military hardware, rather than the acquisition of new weapon systems. Events provided in the programs of the power structures' reformation should be funded by separate budget articles, at a level of 1.0-1.5% of the GDP. Through the year 2005, priority funding of the Border Troops, the Armed Forces, antiterrorist units of the Security Service, and the intelligence services should be ensured. Beginning from 2001, not less than 2.5% of the GDP should be allocated toward national defence. Starting from 2005, 10% of the defence budget should be allocated for the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces. Starting from 2002, the budget should be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada based not on the audit, but on the

functional principle, and the draft 2001 budget should include the article «The operational and combat training of troops (forces)». The acquisition (modernisation) of military hardware should account for not less than 20% of the defence budget⁷⁵. The possibility of leasing foreign military equipment by the Armed Forces and other military formations should be considered within the framework of programs of bilateral co-operation with Great Britain, the USA, Germany and other countries.

The Decree of the President of Ukraine should also clearly state the following: with the start of military reform planning, the execution of events provided by earlier programs should be co-ordinated with the Commission, as those measures should not run contrary to political targets set by the head of state and the strategic directions of reform put forward by the Commission.

3.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY REFORM

At this stage, the principal tasks are the circumstantiation of the political targets set by the President, and preparation of the basic data for the development of the power structures' reform programs. The desired status of the Military organisation, the concrete parameters of separate military formations and the directions for reform should be substantiated in detail. Within 2-3 months, the Commission should prepare drafts of the Concept of military reform and of the revised version of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine.

- **Proposals regarding the work organisation**

In our view, 40-50 experts⁷⁶ should be enlisted to work out the Concept of military reform. They must be prominent specialists in specific areas (the military sector, intelligence, international relations, Ukraine's legislation, international law, planning, Ukraine's economy, budget and finance, industry, the military-industrial complex, information technologies, science, education, the social sphere, etc.). The Commission should employ 2-3 national-level experts in strategic planning.

All power structures, the General Military Inspectorate, ministries and agen-

cies, the staff of the Government, the Verkhovna Rada, the National Security and Defence Council, and the Presidential Administration should attach their experts to the Commission; there should be people's deputies, scientists, experienced and able retired military and government officials, as well as representatives of non-governmental analytical centres, private business, and mass media.

- **The Commission requires adequate support for its activities**

Full-time experts should be released from their principal duties for 10-12 months, and should work under the supervision of the Commission chairman. The Commission should be granted access to information from all available sources, and provided with secure communication facilities. We suggest that the existing network of analytical structures, established at all military formations of Ukraine, should be used for this purpose under the auspices of the General Military Inspectorate⁷⁷. Scientific and methodological support should be granted for the development of the Concept of military reform and relevant programs.

⁷⁵ Otherwise, in three or four years, the combat efficiency of troops will drop below the admissible level.

⁷⁶ Efficient work requires not high-ranking government officials who won't be able to work in the Commission on a regular basis, but qualified experts and executors. This should be taken into account at the stage of preparation of the basic Presidential Decree, as the Decree is supposed to name the Commission's members.

⁷⁷ V. Sobkov. «The role and place of the General Military Inspectorate attached to the President of Ukraine in the structure of the Military organisation of Ukraine». — *Nauka i Oborona*, No. 4, 1999, p.11.



The transfer of the US Armed Forces to contract military service is an interesting example of successful military reform. For the development of a detailed plan of transition to professional armed forces, on March 27, 1969, President Nixon established a special commission (known as the Gates Commission). It employed 15 civilian experts who represented American companies, leading universities and research centres. Former Defense Secretary T. Gates at that time chaired the Executive Committee of «Morgan Guarantee Trust». Ex-CINCEUR, retired General A. Gruenther, and the widely known A. Greenspan, the present Head of the Federal Reserve Bank, were its members. Commission members reviewed the subject on an individual basis, and held regular meetings. The Commission was supported by a permanent staff consisting of two parts: the analytical staff (38 persons) and the administrative staff (12 persons). There were only three active duty officers (a navy captain and two lieutenant-colonels) there. The Commission was consulted by the RAND Corporation and two military research centres. After eight months of work, the Commission submitted a 200-page report with its conclusions and detailed calculations to the US President.

The Draft Concept of military reform prepared by the Commission should be reviewed at a meeting of the NSDC of Ukraine. After that, the President should issue a Decree on the beginning of the development of programs for the reform of power structures.

• **Proposals regarding the format of the Concept of military reform**

The Concept of military reform presents a system of views on the strategic goals and functions of the Military organisation, its future model (structure and characteristics), principal means to achieve set targets, available resources and limitations.

The Commission should assess the military threats to Ukraine's national interests and define the complete list of functions providing for defence against those threats. Given the capabilities of military formations, each power structure should be assigned its area of responsibility (strategic goals and functions)⁷⁸. The Military organisation's command and control system, suitable for the solution of defensive and other missions, should be defined.

Afterwards, each military formation should assess the sufficiency of available manpower and equipment for the accomplishment of the functions within its area or responsibility. Proposals as to structural changes and the increase in the combat efficiency of troops should be put forward. The potential of the military-industrial complex and research centres (the order book, the production

capacities, the new projects of weapon systems' modernisation and development, and mobilisation potential) should be examined. The manpower targets, the amount of funds and material resources established by the Commission as the basic data for planning purposes should be defined more precisely. All assessments and proposals should be submitted to the Commission for co-ordination, verification of their compatibility, sufficiency, and prevention of redundancy⁷⁹.

Calculations performed at this stage will make it possible to move to the **definition of the directions of military reform**, i.e., the development of a set of events intended to gradually bring the Military organisation and its elements into compliance with set targets. In order to provide for better management of those activities, the Commission should appoint executives in charge of separate segments of reform. UCEPS experts see the expediency in earmarking 12 principal directions: the general structure of the Military organisation (military formations, government structures); the structure of military formations; C²; legislative support; financial support; logistics; personnel (manning, military education and training); combat training and mobilisation readiness; military research and the military-industrial complex; capital construction; the social support; international military co-operation.

• **Proposals as to the content of the Concept of military reform**

The functions of military formations

should be specified as concretely as possible, setting quantitative parameters; for instance: strategic deployment of the Armed Forces in one of the operational-strategic directions to contain aggression of a neighbouring country; participation in peace support operations involving one mechanised battalion of 400 men, one air squadron, one field hospital, a police force of 100 men, and a rescue unit of 40 men; liquidation of the aftermath of emergencies (one nation-wide emergency and two regional emergencies at a time); maintaining of a 24-hour alert quick reaction force comprised of one air mobile brigade, three bomber squadrons, a naval task force, etc. Through such formulation of functions, it will become possible to calculate the manpower and supply requirements of military formations. **UCEPS experts suggest that in the absence of such substantiation, the Verkhovna Rada should approve neither the general structure nor the manpower ceilings, or budget funds allocated for military formations.**

Civilian control over the power structures

Military reform should be planned and implemented under the direct (not only general) supervision of the civi-

⁷⁸ This work need not start from the very beginning, as it has mostly been completed. UCEPS experts produced their own assessment of military threats, formulated the list of functions of the Military organisation, and prepared proposals as to their distribution among separate power structures. The area of responsibility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been specified in detail, too.

⁷⁹ At this stage, an expert evaluation is performed, and the Draft State Program for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment is amended. The document should be approved in a single package with the other programs.



lian leaders of the state. The Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine should much more actively participate in determining the reform strategy. The individual (the executive, the authority) in charge of military reform in Ukraine should be nominated. Presented below is the list of proposals of UCEPS experts regarding the consolidation of civilian control over the military sector.

- ◆ *A legislative basis should be created* for encouraging military reform (the present legislative basis hampers reform). Civilian control should not be confined to obtaining information about the situation in the Armed Forces; it should envisage Parliament's responsibility for the Military organisation's functioning. Within 2-3 months, draft Laws «On the National Security of Ukraine», «On the Military Organisation of Ukraine», the new version of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, Laws «On the Defence of Ukraine», «On the Armed Forces of Ukraine», «On the Security Service of Ukraine», «On the Border Troops of Ukraine», «On the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine», and other legislative acts should be worked out. They should be adopted right after approval of the Concept of military reform in Ukraine.

- ◆ *The institute of civilian servants* at key posts of power structures should be established. Civilian heads of power structures, their deputies and first deputies, heads of directorates and main departments (logistics, maintenance, finance, administration, education and training, research, international co-operation, etc.) should be appointed. *The plans for the regular training of civilian specialists*, occupying posts in state bodies and involved in the settlement of defence issues, *should be worked out immediately*, with the aim of practical implementation of that proposal. The necessary conditions for their training have been created in the National Defence Academy of Ukraine⁸⁰.

- ◆ **In future, only a civilian should be appointed the Minister of Defence of Ukraine. At present, while the Defence Minister is a military man, a post of First Deputy Minister of Defence (Military Policy) should be established, and filled by a civilian⁸¹.**

- ◆ *Regular open parliamentary hearings of military issues should be arranged*; the information and analytical support for the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada should be improved, to provide for its better substantiation.

- ◆ *There should be a broad public debate on the military reform issues*, involving the Government, independent experts, non-governmental analytical centres and mass media. Strategically, this will be an important fac-

tor for the establishment of civil society in Ukraine; and in the short run, this will help the Commission on military reform to identify new approaches and to set the directions for reform more conscientiously.

- ◆ The White Book «Ukraine's Defence Policy» should be published annually, as envisaged by instructions of the President of Ukraine in 1997.

The Military organisation's chain of command

UCEPS experts suggest that the efficiency of command and control would be enhanced by the following measures:

- ◆ The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces should be a member of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine;

- ◆ NSDC meetings should review doctrinal plans of the Military organisation's development, the directions for reforming individual military formations, and the ways for the upturn in the defence industry; budget proposals for the funding of power structures should be examined annually in order to correct the disproportion in the funding of individual military formations, and to provide for the accomplishment of priority tasks;

- ◆ The legislative and material basis for the establishment of the wartime Supreme Command Headquarters should be laid down;

- ◆ The Chief of the General Staff (or the Minister of Defence, if this post is occupied by a military man) should be appointed Commander of the Armed Forces;

- ◆ The number of deputies to the heads of military formations should be reduced. In the MoD, there should be two First Deputy Ministers: a civilian (Military Policy) and a military (the Chief of the General Staff), and five Deputy Ministers (Armaments, Logistics; both preferably civilians, and three Commanders of the Services; all — militaries). Presently, the Minister of Defence has twice as many deputies, and only one of them is civilian;

- ◆ *Each military formation should form joint mobile command and control posts* for liaison officers representing other military formations, representatives of the central bodies of state power, local authorities, and public organisations. In the event of a crisis, irrespective of its nature (destruction of river dams, technogenous accidents, regional social conflicts, a pandemia of a dangerous disease, a terrorist act involving grave consequences, or a threatening border conflict), the basic components of forces should be prepared in advance for the quick formation of the required contingent and command and control bodies, depending on the situation⁸²;

⁸⁰To create a reserve of civilian specialists, their training in short-term courses (2-3 months) might commence as soon as April-May 2000.

⁸¹ The post of a Deputy Minister of Defence (Military Policy and International Co-operation) was instituted; however, it was not intended to be filled by a civilian only, and the post has remained vacant since its establishment. Proceeding from the experience of democratic countries, the First Deputy Minister of Defence (Military Policy) should be entrusted with the following functions: the preparation of proposals as to military policy, planning of the Armed Forces' development and employment, manning, and social protection of personnel; interaction with the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and other authorities; the co-ordination of international military co-operation; the organisation of interaction with political parties, non-governmental analytical and research centres; the co-ordination of the public relations activity of the MoD; the co-ordination of drafting legislative acts on military-political issues, etc.

⁸² Ukraine may partially use the experience of the creation of mobile command posts designated for the deployment of Combined Joint Task Forces of NATO partners.



♦ *Operational Commands (OCs) should be transferred under the supervision of the General Staff of the Armed Forces*⁸³. All units of all the Services within the OC area of responsibility should be directly subordinate to OC commanders, meaning both administrative and operational control. The forces of the united Navy should be put under the control of the Southern Operational Command⁸⁴;

♦ *The responsibilities and powers of the Operational Commands and the Commands of the Services should be divided more distinctly* (for instance, as in the USA or NATO). The Commands of the three Services should be responsible for the development of basic documents (field manuals, directives) for the engagement of troops (forces); the formulation of requirements regarding the development and acquisition of military hardware; manning, personnel training, etc. Meanwhile, OC Commanders should concentrate on the preparation of troops (forces) for combat missions in their area of responsibility.

Mobilisation readiness

Along with the reduction of the regular Armed Forces, the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces should be formed. Within a two-year term, the First Category reservists should be evaluated, in order to determine the expediency of their enlistment in the newly formed reserve component. Before 2005, the strength of the Ready Reserve should reach 100 thousand men. It should be fully equipped with military hardware, requiring minimum training time, such as trucks, APCs, simple engi-

neer equipment, small fire arms, grenade launchers, portable SAMs, mortars, etc. At training, the priority should be given to low-level tactical exercises (at a squad, a platoon, or company level at the most)⁸⁵. The Ready Reserve should be assigned some functions of logistic support for the regular Army in wartime. This will enable the peacetime Armed Forces to concentrate on the training of combat and combat support units.

Ukraine should conduct an inventory inspection of the mobilisation potential of *industrial enterprises*. The production lines and facilities, (a) not used over the last 10-15 years, or (b) intended for production of weapon systems earmarked to be de-commissioned in 7-10 years, should be de-commissioned too. The released assets should be channelled towards reforming the system of mobilisation preparedness of the national economy and the organisation of Ukraine's territory.

Priorities of the development of the Military organisation

Here, we present some proposals. Taking them into account at the planning stage would make it possible to raise military units' readiness for the accomplishment of their primary functions.

♦ The *priorities* should include: military intelligence; quick reaction forces (air mobile troops, the marines, army aviation, special forces); antiterrorist units of the Security Service of Ukraine; mobile units of the Civil Defence Troops of the Ministry of Emergency; communication and information systems of the Border Troops, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Armed Forces (partly at the expense of the assets allocated for the State Program for Ukraine's Information System Development).

♦ More attention should be paid to combat training in the mountainous and urban areas⁸⁶.

♦ *Outdated* weapon systems, unfit for modernisation or excessively expensive in maintenance, should be de-commissioned. The assortment of arms, equipment and supplies should be diminished; *basic weapon types* (primarily of Ukrainian origin) should be defined for commissioning with all military formations within the next 5-10 years.

♦ The missile cruiser, the submarine, and ships whose repair and operation is economically inexpedient (over 60% of the entire fleet, according to expert esti-



⁸³ As we've already mentioned, they are presently subordinated to the Army Command.

⁸⁴ Therefore, the Northern Operational Command (Chernihiv) and the Western Operational Command (Lviv) will consist of two components (Army and Air Force), and the Southern Operational Command (Odesa) will comprise three (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

⁸⁵ Such approaches give the opportunity to organise the training of an efficient reserve component without excessive spending, and ensure its high degree of readiness for employment in a critical period.

⁸⁶ This issue was specifically addressed in an article by a UCEPS expert: L. Polyakov. «Is the field the only soldier's academy?» — *Narodna Armiya*, August 18, 1999, p.3.



mates) should be taken out of the Navy. The released funds should be directed towards the development of surface ships of the corvette class, fast missile boats and amphibious assault ships.

♦ The preparation of forces and equipment intended for protecting the population against weapons of mass destruction should be resumed. This refers to the alarm systems, specialised medical units, rescue teams, the network of shelters and warehouses housing all types of stocks, etc. An inventory of *individual protection means* intended for the population should be made with their further replacement with modern facilities in mind.

Funding

Within a three-year term, a *cyclic* (for instance, five-year) *process of planning* of the development of military formations should be introduced. The *defence budget* structure should be brought into compliance with reform priorities. Within 3-4 years, the share of R&D expenditures should reach 10-15%. Value added tax on sponsor assistance ren-

dered by Ukraine's regions for the development of the Navy in accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine from 1994 should be cancelled. All available mechanisms of state regulation should be used to support enterprises performing military orders, building houses for the military, rendering services, material, financial and other assistance to military formations. The possibility of introducing a special *army tax* until the complete cessation of conscript service should be examined⁸⁷. Garrisons abandoned by the military in the course of reform should be taken off the MoD balance⁸⁸. In peacetime, some logistic functions should be assigned to *civil contractors*; if we count direct and indirect expenditures, this will also help save money.

In our view, these proposals are sufficiently grounded and may be accounted for in the draft Concept of military reform. Many of them may be implemented even prior to the end of the complete planning cycle; the other will require further discussion in the Commission at the program development stage.

3.4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAMS FOR REFORMING POWER STRUCTURES

• Proposals as to organisational arrangements

At the final stage of the planning process, two kinds of programs should be developed: (1) departmental reform programs for every power structure, and (2) functional programs for reforming supply and support sub-systems relating to the entire Military organisation (logistics, maintenance, personnel, social insurance, military research and education). The departmental programs should be worked out by all military formations and agreed to by the Commission. Functional programs should be drafted by the Commission.

The Verkhova Rada's support for the reform plans is critical: without the legislative support and adequate funds, none of the programs will be implemented. This process will require regular consultations and discussions on the baseline proposals in the parliamentary committees, and co-ordination with the parliamentary agenda, proceeding from the necessity for timely adoption of the relevant laws.

• Proposals regarding the programs' format

Each program must contain a list of concrete measures designed to provide for the gradual transition of a military formation (Military organisation support sub-system) from its present status to the specified desired condition. The programs should set deadlines for the planned events, requirements for the end results, the necessary resources, and the individuals responsible for execution of the items⁸⁹.

The stages of the programs should be determined with account of the schedule of basic events, available and earmarked resources, and the technical compatibility of the expected results.

Each program should be *evaluated* in real terms, with a detailed cost estimate calculated for the following year, and a forecast for the next 3-5 years. The agreed programs should be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for drafting next year's budget. The overall amount of the expenditures should not exceed the limits set by the basic Decree of the

⁸⁷ A tax in the amount of \$2000-3000 might be imposed on the parents of youths reluctant to serve in the Armed Forces. Apart from the social justice (less than 10% of young people are performing their «honourable duty», while the rest work or study), it would partly solve the problem of funding the Armed Forces. Presently, this «tax» is often paid in the form of bribes to medics sitting in the commissions and employees of the military registration and enlistment offices.

⁸⁸ In Canada, a decision to shut down a military base is taken on the basis of the following criteria: its impact on the ability to conduct operations (including assistance to the local authorities in case of emergency); the impact on the combat training of troops; the possible decrease in combat readiness; consequences for the local economy; the environmental impact, etc.

⁸⁹ UCEPS experts have developed the methodology (a set of principles and concrete methods) for the formation of state programs, with its total volume exceeding 100 pages. It sets 13 criteria for assessing the completion of the programs, practical recommendations, etc. Those issues were beyond the scope of this analytical report.



President of Ukraine⁹⁰. In order to ensure target spending, each program should be enacted by a special budget item.

• Proposals regarding the programs' content

UCEPS experts suggest that at the program formulation stage the Commission should pay attention to the following proposals.

Combat training

Proceeding from the nature of the military threats and budget limitations, the *minimum required* number of units (crews) should be specified, and for those units all conditions for *fully-fledged* combat training should be created. Precisely those efficient units will form the kernel of the renovated military formations, while a diffusion of funds will provoke only an imitation of combat training. Commanders at all levels should see combat training as their main priority, while demos and economic activity should be secondary. An effective system of *material incentives for military men who have progress in combat training* should be implemented. The Armed Forces and the Internal Troops should actively popularise the experience of servicemen who took part in *combat actions and peacekeeping operations*.

Personnel policy, manning and staffing

The success of military reform will be impossible without deep reform of the manning and staffing system⁹¹. Beginning from 2003, all sergeants should serve only on a contract basis. The disproportion between the number of soldiers (sergeants) and officers, and between the number of junior and senior officers should be removed. Relevant standards should be approved by a directive of the President of Ukraine (the Supreme Commander of Ukraine's Armed Forces) for each military formation (and, separately for each Service). The organisational structure of all military formations should be revised in order to strengthen combat units at the expense of the excessive echelons of command (given the new numerical strength of the Armed Forces). Perhaps the rank of brigade general should be introduced for the positions of the division chief of staff — the head of

a department at military formations' commands⁹². All quantitative limitations on the admission of females to military schools should be removed. The statutory requirements for the top echelon of command (division commander and higher) should be worked out and approved. Measures should be taken in order to stop the outflow of young officers, and to raise the significance of a contract (as far as the obligations of the state to an officer are concerned).

Military education and training

The term of cadet study should be confined to four years. The admission of students to the National Defence Academy of Ukraine should be expanded at the expense

of officers of the Internal Troops, the Border Troops, the Security Service, and the Civil Defence Troops, selected to be involved in the execution of defensive tasks. The term of the operational-tactical and operational-strategic level officers' training should be reduced to one year. The practice of the pre-planned deficiency of junior officers' admissions to military schools should be

terminated. The problem of the deficiency should be resolved by calling up reserve officers. An extraordinary proficiency rating of officers serving with military detachments (departments, sections, institutes) of civilian universities should be performed.

The social support

In order to shorten the queue for quarters, all possible non-traditional means should be used (certificates, provision of construction materials, liquid shares, land plots, credits, etc.). Priority should be given to military servants dismissed due to the reduction in force. The disproportion between the monetary allowances of servicemen in different military structures should be removed. Non-monetary incentives should be provided for servicemen (for special merit, for time-in-service, in connection with retirement, for military men honoured with the highest governmental awards). The mechanism for the incentive of the Ready Reserve should be provided (a contract, monetary, and other forms of remuneration, privileges).



⁹⁰ Whenever necessary, corrections are made as per the algorithm of military reform planning (see Section 2).

⁹¹ See the article by a UCEPS expert L. Poliakov: «Cadre reform will lay the groundwork for the development of Ukraine's Armed Forces». — *Narodna Armiya*, July 25 and 26, 1997, p.3.

⁹² This will lead to better differentiation between the (excessively numerous) positions now filled by colonels, and will raise the prestige of the Colonel rank (presently too low). Today, the rank of colonel corresponds to a great many staff positions: «senior officer», «group leader», «deputy section leader», «section leader», «deputy head of a department», «head of a department». The difference in their basic pay is negligibly small.

CONCLUSION

The Military organisation is an important asset of Ukraine's statehood. Ukraine's independence cannot be guaranteed without efficient military formations and the proper co-ordination of their activities; otherwise, the state will always remain vulnerable to military threats.

The present transitional status of Ukrainian society and the deep economic crisis considerably complicated the consolidation of the Military organisation. Lack of resources makes it impossible to maintain the required combat efficiency, and hampers reform of power structures. Meanwhile, the delay of reform only aggravates the situation. Funds may be drained, as before, or invested into the development of really effective power structures. The second option seems more promising.

National interests cannot be protected without radical solutions regarding the reduction of the manpower of military formations and related difficulties for the military. It is important that the decisions be based on realistic assessments, and limited resources be channelled towards solving of truly priority problems, so that the difficulties of reform do not last long.

In determining the directions of reform, Ukraine should not search for a unique Ukrainian way: dozens of countries have gone down this road. We should learn from our own and others' mistakes, and actively spread the present positive foreign experience of military reform.

Scientific substantiation of the Concept of military reform and the programs of power structures' reform is a pre-condition for the success. The effective organisation of reform preparation is equally important. The establishment of the workable Commission on military reform, the creation of proper conditions for its activity, constant attention and support from the President of Ukraine, and close interaction with the Government and the Verkhovna Rada will ensure reform's success.

Strengthening of civilian control over the military, broad involvement of non-governmental structures and the public will make it possible to determine the course of reform and provide public support for the authorities.

Ukraine has an opportunity to outline the reform of the Military organisation within a short period of time, and to begin implementing its main priorities as soon as in 8-10 months. However, if we want relevant expenditures to be accounted for in the 2001 budget, the planning process should begin right now. UCEPS experts, along with other non-governmental organisations, are ready to contribute to the accomplishment of this important national task.





DOES UKRAINE NEED A NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE?^{*}

By Oleksiy HAVRYLENKO

Yes, it does, otherwise in several years Ukraine may be left without armed forces. In the first quarter of 1999, Armed Forces were allocated just \$50 million, or \$1 per each citizen of the country. I am not a hawk, and I realise the priority of economics, social and environmental problems, but we cannot live the same way any further. Ukraine needs a new Military Doctrine, as the old one doesn't work. Antiseptically formulated tasks, good wishes, priorities not backed with resources (from the 1991-92 viewpoint) — all that remained on paper; the life went in a different direction. The Military Doctrine was adopted six years ago. During these years, many changes have occurred in the world, on Ukraine's borders and in the internal life of the country. They made up the «critical mass» that cannot remain unanswered. It is not so important what a new document will be called (doctrine, strategy, concept) and who will adopt it, the Parliament or the President. Another thing is important: that the leadership of the country soberly assesses the new situation and offers society a real mid-term plan for military construction.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Recent years demonstrated the poor efficiency of the collective security system based on the United Nations Organisation. In two cases it doesn't work at all: when a suggested decision by the Security Council is opposed by the United States, the UN donor and the world leader, and when vital interests of Russia and the USA clash. Such a situation is certain to emerge in case of a military threat to Ukraine. Therefore, we should not rely on the UN: any decision of the Security Council will be blocked either by the USA or by Russia.

Ukraine pledged to observe international laws of war and international humanitarian law. A relevant provision is stated in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. Ukraine, being a civilised nation, such a provision is certainly justified. However, over the past six years we made sure that war has little in common with conventions and treaties. In Chechnya, Tajikistan, Abkhazia and Transdnistria conventions and treaties were violated by underdeveloped nations. In Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan it was «advanced democracies» that infringed war conventions. Force was used in violation of the UN Charter. Vital civil objects and cultural valuables were destroyed barbarously. Missiles hit embassies and hospitals, trains and buses; both combatants and non-combatants were killed. Leaflets calling for the non-fulfilment of orders issued by a legitimate government were disseminated, contrary to the principle of civilian control over the military. Prohibited cluster bombs and projectiles with depleted uranium core were used. Chemical plants and oil refineries were destroyed, thus provoking environmental disaster. Finally, mi-

litary assistance was rendered to unlawful military formations, caught in terrorism and drug trafficking. The voices of international judges somehow got lost in the general chorus. Ukraine should analyse recent military conflicts and learn a lesson, i.e., get an idea regarding future wars.

By the time the Military Doctrine was adopted, Ukraine had its tactical nuclear weapons moved to the Russian Federation and had taken a decision to destroy strategic nuclear weapons (this «voluntary» decision was officially fixed in January 1994). The Military Doctrine reads: «Ukraine links the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons located on its territory with the adequate actions of other nuclear states and the granting by them and the world community reliable guarantees of its security». It was free to see things this way, but nothing resulted from the adequate actions and reliable guarantees. The «guarantees» did not extend far enough to go beyond the framework of provisions of available documents (of the UN and OSCE), which means that we were deprived of nuclear weapons for nothing.

Nevertheless, in 1993 we were looking into the future with optimism. The USA and the Russian Federation were agreeing on ceilings of warheads within the framework of the START-2 treaty. There was confidence that START-3 and START-4 would follow. Talk of France and Britain possibly joining the process of nuclear disarmament and of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe were heard. How young

^{*} This article was published in ZERKALO NEDELI, 12 June 1999, p.1,3.



and naive we were! The honeymoon in relations between the USA and the Russian Federation had long passed. Russia never ratified the START-2 treaty. The USA is ready to step out of the ABM treaty unilaterally. In 1999 Europe and Asia are the arena of wars involving five nuclear states (Britain, the USA, France, India and Pakistan). It is worth noting that in the centre of Asia two nuclear countries are engaged in a military conflict, and nuclear weapons haven't become a deterring factor for them so far. In 1993 the situation looked different.

The world is witnessing dangerous and, maybe, irreversible change. «Threshold» nations, possessing economic, scientific and technological capabilities, as well as some signs of political will for the production of weapons of mass destruction, became the focus of attention. The threat of the proliferation of chemical, nuclear and biological weapons is a very serious problem.

First, there are more than twenty «threshold» nations. Experts name Algiers, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Peru, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zaire.

Second, some of the above countries already possess stockpiles of deadly weapons (only Israel makes no secret of it).

Third, biological weapons turned into the most dangerous weapon, often called the «nuclear bomb for the poor». Their production is hardly detectable by technical surveillance means, and verification of laboratories doesn't produce the desired result either: traces may be removed within hours; deadly viruses, bacteria and toxins may be easily moved a long distance. The main thing is that *no country in the world* today is able to safely protect its army, let alone its population. But the National Security Concept of Ukraine sets this target, doesn't it?

Fourth, political entities not controlled by states and governments began to play their own game. These are militant organisations of a national liberation, religious, criminal, drug and terrorist nature. The character of their fanaticism, end objectives, sources of funds and channels for getting up-to-date arms, intelligence and communications equipment are of no importance. Another thing matters: fanatics are ready to die and to take innocent people to the grave. Terrorist acts recently committed in the USA, England, Japan, Russia, the FRG, Italy, Turkey, Namibia, Georgia, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Algiers (in all cases with unprecedented cruelty, and in some countries — with the use of chemical and biological materials) serve as a very serious warning for Ukraine.

Fifth, the territory of Ukraine is within the effective range of carriers operated by some «problem» countries. And it is of no importance that we have nothing to share with them. The war in the Balkans demonstrated that even Americans, aiming at Yugoslavia, managed to hit Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Finally, the same Balkan war led many to the same dangerous conclusion: only weapons of mass destruction can deter great powers from a temptation to punish those who are «disobedient». It is worth noting that this view is shared by representatives of many parties and even by those at opposite poles of the political spectrum, such as Kriuchkov (Communist Party of Ukraine) and Korchynskyi (Ukrainian National Assembly). In my opinion, the benefit of such a conclusion is doubtful for Ukraine, as great powers may punish with other than military means.

New developments on the international scene made many countries look at military issues differently. A new strategic concept has been adopted by NATO. The reform of the West European Union is planned. China and Russia began to revise their military doctrines, so did many CIS countries. The Israeli defence doctrine is undergoing significant change. Others will follow, and I hope to see Ukraine among them.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND ON UKRAINE'S BORDERS

In 1993 great expectations were placed on confidence-building measures in Europe. The exchange of data on the strength of armed forces and weapon systems, advance notification about movement of troops, mobilisation of reservists and exercises; the possibility of prompt verification of military sites — those and other mechanisms of «transparency» are truly needed. They allow for bating requirements on the combat readiness of armed forces, allocation of less manpower and equipment for combat duty, and prompt removal of suspicions in relations with neighbours. Unfortunately, the experience of recent years demonstrated the limited efficiency of such mechanisms. They don't work exactly

where they are really needed — in the period of conflict conception and development. In the event of aggravation the «open sky» gets closed. International commitments were ignored by Russia (the build-up of forces in Chechnya in 1995-96), Turkey (when preparing military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party on Iraqi territory), USA and NATO (deploying forces in Albania and Macedonia). Russia made an attempt to inspect American forces — and was refused. Ukraine didn't even try. That's why we should not recklessly rely on «transparency» mechanisms; strong intelligence should be built, otherwise Ukraine will lose the most important initial stage of war.



Ukraine did not manage to escape the «buffer» zone and appeared sandwiched between two military blocs: NATO on the south-west and Tashkent Treaty on the north-east.

Russia and Belarus are already forming a joint regional force, creating a common defence infrastructure, and developing a joint military doctrine. Russia renders military assistance, supplies arms and equipment. President Lukashenko set a task: the power of the Belorussian Armed Forces must be doubled within a two-year period. In the framework of the Russian-Belorussian union, joint programs or weapons development through the year 2001 and military-technical co-operation through the year 2005 have been worked out. Not all plans will become reality, but all this gives reason for thought.

The military potential of the Tashkent Treaty dropped by approximately 10% after the withdrawal of three key members: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan. If this leads to weaker control over the southern borders of the former USSR, a new flow of illegal migrants, drugs and weapons will sweep over Ukraine. Russia will try to consolidate the reduced military bloc by all means. On the 20th of May, 1999 in Yerevan, at a meeting of the Council of CIS Defence Ministers, Russia proposed to develop an allied strategy of the Tashkent Treaty member nations. Participants backed this Moscow proposal. The Yerevan meeting also discussed the composition and principles of creation of presumably «allied troops (forces) in the regions (areas) of collective security with the purpose of collective defence». It was especially stressed that this refers not to the collective air defence system, already operational; allied land forces are planned. Therefore, a military bloc is actually being formed, bearing signs of a collective defence system. Pressure is exercised on Ukraine from the north-east, and it is increasingly difficult to maintain balance.

The balance of forces on the south-west has also changed dramatically. Against the background of decreasing combat potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia and other CIS countries, the armies of Turkey, Romania, Poland and NATO became much stronger. The alliance reached the western borders of Ukraine and, possibly, will go further east, bypassing Ukraine's territory. After the first wave of expansion the ratio of forces between NATO and Russia reached 5:1. The alliance received 12 additional divisions and some 200 airfields, and NATO's electronic surveillance facilities are now located on our western border. NATO is building up its military potential, making up for reduced manpower at the expense of more efficient weapons systems.

Turkey has the most battle-worthy armed forces in the region. It is not invited to join the European Union, the military controls the state, as before, the consolidation of civil society is moving slowly, and NATO's influence on our southern neighbour will weaken. Turkey continues to build up its military power: it is earmarked for acquiring \$150-billion worth of weapons over 30 years. All jokes apart.

Romania was refused accession to NATO. This may occur after the year 2002, although changes are possible. For Ukraine, that's bad news, as the desire to join NATO

made Romania sign at least some treaty with Ukraine. Contacts with the heads of Romanian parliamentary committees show that territorial claims to Ukraine are neither conjectures nor fantasy. The Romanian position is clear: Ukraine needed a treaty — Ukraine got it; as far as disputed borders are concerned, it's a subject for future agreements, and Ukraine was promised nothing.

It is clear that the Russian Black Sea fleet will be based on Ukraine's territory for decades. This factor is both stabilising and destabilising for the Black Sea region, depending on who is assumed a potential enemy (Turkey, Romania, or Russia).

It is yet unclear what will come out of GUUAM, a non-formal regional organisation uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova: a belt of security or a new hotbed of conflicts? Recent members of the Tashkent Treaty, now members of GUUAM, make no secret of their aspirations to join NATO. Azerbaijan is ready to go further and sooner than other countries. Russia strongly reacted to the formation of GUUAM. The usually affable Foreign Minister Ivanov did not conceal his irritation and spoke in strong words. Karaganov suggested a «sharp revaluation of relations with some CIS countries that actually made a choice in favour of NATO». This snide remark refers to us, too. In the event of signs of military co-operation within GUUAM, pressure on Ukraine will increase.

The rapprochement of three of Ukraine's GUUAM partners with NATO, the strengthening of Turkey in the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, and forcing the Russian Federation out of those regions — all this creates an entirely new military, political and strategic environment, fraught with new conflicts. Ukraine cannot but notice such a change.

Military opposition is increasing just hundreds of kilometres from Ukraine's borders: around Armenia, in the Balkans and on Cyprus. Despite a lull in Kosovo, the danger of aggravation persists. Inter-ethnic conflicts, involving Ukraine's neighbours, have not been liquidated in Transdnistria (Moldova, Russia, Romania), or in Abkhazia (Georgia, Russia, Turkey), in Karabakh (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey). Those regions remain potential hotbeds of military conflict.

Ukraine plans to form five joint peacekeeping units with its neighbours. This is a new important tool for maintaining regional security. However, peacekeeping battalions will not ensure the solution for the main tasks of defence and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for the future Ukrainian army. Besides, Ukraine's selectivity in choice of partners (we co-operate with Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but refuse to form joint peacekeeping units with the Russian Federation and Belarus) conceals some potential for conflicts.

The new strategic concept of NATO gives reasons for concern. The alliance will conduct military operations beyond its area of responsibility; it will act without the UN mandate; it doesn't rule out first use of nuclear weapons, neither does it give up the idea to place nuclear weapons near Ukraine's borders. If the military doctrine



of the Russian Federation copies those provisions, we will find ourselves in a difficult situation.

Russian Defence Minister I. Sergeev considers that the new NATO strategic concept «will make Russia revise many provisions of its defence». Among the possible innovations are repudiation of first use of nuclear weapons, and the declared right to deliver not only a return nuclear strike or counter-strike, but also a pre-emptive nuclear attack (and we may see the degree of improvisation of the Kremlin's master at decision-making). On the 29th of April Russia's Security Council discussed the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. One cannot rule out that the

Russian Federation will rely mainly on tactical nuclear weapon more actively than before. This is dangerous for two reasons. First, in the '80s nuclear projectiles, bombs, torpedoes and tactical missiles were considered the main destabilising factor in Europe, as the authority to use them was assigned to division commanders, and because of the contemptibly short warning time. Second, statements on the increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons are heard across the Atlantic, too. American experts suggest the delivery of nuclear strikes even on non-nuclear targets (such as plants producing chemical and biological weapons). God help them stop before it's too late.

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DOMESTIC ARENA

Generally speaking, Ukraine's government does not need armed forces: it is trying to save on them. Such a conclusion is made possible after examination of the structure of budget expenditures, as submitted to the Parliament. In the first quarter of 1999 \$50 million were remitted for sustainment of the Armed Forces. That's the cost of keeping one US Air Force detached squadron, while our Minister of Defence is supposed to maintain all Armed Forces and even undertake military reform (!). \$500 thousand were allocated for acquisition of weapons and military equipment. This money would be enough to buy several air-to-air missiles or one «Tomahawk» with an expired service life (a new one would cost twice as much). \$200 thousand were allocated on capital construction in the Armed Forces — the price of a «hut with an elevator» on the outskirts of Kyiv. Last year the situation was also disturbing, but not that bad: the above articles of expenses totalled \$140 million, \$850 thousand and \$620 thousand, respectively. The trend is evident.

None of the power structures was financed in the planned volume, as the collection of budget revenues was frustrated. When everyone is in need, available funds are distributed in accordance with priorities. And so it was this time. However, two things are of interest. First, none of the power structures was funded above the average level of budget expenditures. In the first quarter the annual budget was executed at a level of 17.6%, the Internal Troops obtained 17.1%, the National Guard — 16.6%, the Security Service — 16.4%, the Armed Forces — 12.9%, and the Border Troops — 10.8% of the planned yearly amount. This means that the military is off the list of government priorities. Second, the distribution of funds among separate power structures is very interesting. The government financed the «National Defence» budget item at a level of 51.5% of the quarterly plan, the

Border Troops — 43.6%, the Internal Troops received 72.1% of the planned amount, the National Guard — 72.2%, and the Security Service — 82.3%. Everyone may draw a conclusion without difficulty. What is difficult is proving that Ukraine is not building a police state.

How will the military sector be financed in the future? In the current year no improvement can be expected — elections, you know! Ukraine is not Slovakia, where candidates may be registered in April, and the President is elected as soon as May, without any disturbances. Ukraine needs a larger scope: the election campaign lasts six months, irrespective of who is elected, the Parliament speaker or the President. However, there are not only elections, election expenses and short-term economic decisions; there is also the external debt of Ukraine. Before November, over \$900 million are to be repaid to creditors. And what happens after the elections? The Army will be cast loose: the new government will have to find more than \$1.5 billion, otherwise Ukraine will go bankrupt by April. If we want to avoid default, we'll have to give more than 70% of budget revenues. Or to take new loans. A permanent financial crisis is foreseen for the next five years, too: over that period, Ukraine will have to repay approximately \$10 billion of foreign debt. Ukraine reached the red line where national stability (including that of the Armed Forces) depends on Western creditors more than on the deeds of its government. When the present Military Doctrine was being written, the situation was different; we had a different idea of the prospects of economic progress and defence sector development. Today, we are in an entirely different situation, and to develop the plans of military construction would be far from enough.



Quarterly defensive R&D funding at a level of 0.58% of the yearly plan may be called a mockery of the domestic military-industrial complex. Of course, equipment may be purchased abroad, but in the first quarter, only \$500 thousand, or 2.09% of the annual plan were allocated for acquisition of military equipment. One used tank may be bought with this money.

Hopes for closed-cycle domestic weapons production were not justified to the extent we foresaw in 1992-93. We have no funds of our own, ties with Russia are breaking apart (as is the economic potential of the Russian Federation), in the West, nobody welcomes competitors, and co-operation with «trouble» countries presents a big problem (the strong are on the alert). For this reason, even unique, world-level designs will hardly be welcomed. In the best scenario, we can sell advanced weapons to someone else, but our own Armed Forces cannot afford to buy them.

Over the last six years, the property structure and social system, as such, changed dramatically. Once entirely state-owned, industrial and transportation enterprises, public catering outlets, communication offices, design institutions, air carriers, rescue services — all that creates a basis for preparation of the territory and population for war — changed. Today, the above entities represent mainly joint-stock companies, private firms, joint ventures or even foreign enterprises. Their directors are indifferent to the mobilisation plans of the state, especially when they are not paid for this. When the alarm sounds, it may appear that a gas station or a flea market has been built in place of a transportation enterprise (intended for the movement of important military cargo) assigned to a military conscription office. And even if a transportation enterprise still exists, it operates passenger «Gazelles» and «Toyotas» instead of «KAMAZ» and «URAL» heavy trucks. Obsolete production lines still remaining at former

defence enterprises bring losses that are reimbursed by no one. In the first quarter, Ukraine's government allocated \$160 thousand for preparation activity of the branches of the national economy. This is less than insufficient: this is nothing.

They say, ties between society and the Army have weakened over the recent years. This is not true. Unfortunately, direct ties are active. Illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, violence, disintegration of moral values, infectious diseases — all the ailments of a degenerating society are sweeping over the Armed Forces as regularly as drafts, in spring and autumn. The Armed Forces possess a powerful training, educational and healing potential, but their «filtering» capabilities are not unlimited. In the economic sector, ties are also on the rise: economic crime (characteristic of the civilian sector) did not bypass the Armed Forces, especially the officers' corps.

The issue of feedback is more complicated. The system of the military and patriotic education of the population, and especially of Ukraine's youth, has fallen apart. Love for the homeland, pride in the nation, respect for state institutions (including the Armed Forces), readiness to defend the country and to die for it, if necessary — all that has been devalued, and sounds to be a relic of the past. Why defend such a state, why waste one's youth in such an army, what for and especially for whom to give one's life? Such cynical and pragmatic questions may be refuted, and those curious may be criticised in anger, but one should agree that there is something rational behind those questions. And it is another link tying the people to the Armed Forces. Military men are still holding on in this situation. The Army doesn't revolt; neither does it go into the streets. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff somehow manage to move on reform. But their resources are exhausted, and breakdown is imminent.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY SECTOR OF UKRAINE

The strength of Ukraine's Armed Forces dropped two-fold after the Military Doctrine was adopted. Weapons became six years older; most of them ran out their service life and are no longer operational. Some weapon systems are still operational. This is a natural process, independent of our will. Somewhere in 2003-2005, one will barely remember that Ukraine once was the 3rd strongest military power. Such was Ukraine at the time of the development of its Military Doctrine. This fact alone leaves no doubt that the doctrine needs amending.

The present doctrine contains a valuable thought: «The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is a basis for its military construction, it rests upon the analysis of the geopolitical situation in the world and long-term scientific forecasts for its development». Unfortunately, those words

were nothing more than words. Ukraine never commenced its military construction. Experts are tired of repeating that construction of the Armed Forces and military construction are two different things. Construction of the Armed Forces has also been suspended. The steps of the 10-year program that required no funds have mainly been completed. To go on further, money is needed, but there is no money at hand, and it is unlikely to appear.

The combat training of troops is forcibly curtailed. Last year's plan of combat vehicle driving in the Army was fulfilled by just 4-7%. More complex exercises, provided by field manuals and instructions, cannot be conducted. The morale of military men is falling, their material status does not encourage good service performance. The prestige of military service in society is low, especially among the youth.



The combat training of reservists is also decreasing forcibly. We must honestly admit: Ukraine no longer has a system of preparation of efficient military reserves that can back the doctrinal provisions of 1993. The old system has been destroyed (and the process began not in 1991, but with the very beginning of «Perestroika»), and a new system has never been built. And without allocation of the required funds to the Ministry of Defence, we won't be able to create a new system for a long time. This fact should no longer be left unnoticed behind the huge number of dismissed military men employed in the civilian sector.

The training of civilian specialists for the military sector never began, although they work in the presidential staff, in the Parliament, the government, and have to take crucial decisions. It is four years now that our executives do not want to attend courses in Ukraine's National Academy of Defence opened especially for them.

What concerns the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence most? Not mastering new equipment, the improvement of combat readiness standards or the introduction of new operation planning elements. The military doesn't know how to make ends meet and to obtain budget funds provided by the law. But in this struggle the military department is always the loser. Ukraine's defence budget, the strength of its Armed Forces and the priorities of weapon systems' development are determined by the Ministry of Finance. Of course, we must be realists. But if important decisions are taken by the Ministry of Finance only, that means that something is wrong with our state system. Under such circumstances, the only duty of the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff is to take painful decisions on what military body should be cut tomorrow and which one will hold until the day after tomorrow. Such decisions result in very grave consequences. They are not easy to take, given the obsolete Military Doctrine (that in reality determines few things) and the State Program of Armed Forces Construction (entirely deprived of financial backing and, therefore, impractical), and in the absence of the State Program for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment. We have last year's macroeconomic forecast (stating that financing won't improve for the next 5-7 years) and two fresh propaganda programs: the governmental program «Ukraine-2010» and the parliamentary «Ukraine-2015». The two projects are promising everything for everyone, but for some time in the future, when their developers retire. Meanwhile, we have to live today.

Let me cite two extracts illustrating the gap between the Military Doctrine and real life, to prove my words. «... priority should be given to precision guided weapons of increased power, intelligence, airspace defence, electronic warfare, missile troops, air force and air mobile units, and advanced types of surface ships and sub-

marines». Those are priorities only! It's high time to tell the truth to the military and the whole nation: it's a mere gamble, unfortunately, fixed in a serious parliamentary document. Such a list of priorities may be implemented by one nation in the world only, and even that nation cannot do so in full volume. The listed items cost not tens, but hundreds (!) of billions (!) of dollars (!) Ukraine needs to be more modest; it shouldn't make the world laugh at such documents, especially in the third millennium.

Another extract from the Military Doctrine: «Ukraine's Armed Forces will be equipped with unified automated command, communication, electronic and fire control systems ... throughout Ukraine's territory a single information space will be established». A nicely worded dream-like objective. In reality, everything is different: neither «equipped», nor «established». Funds are lacking even to pay wages and telephone bills. Therefore, all «unified» projects remain on paper. Politicians should not set targets before the military if they are not backed with funds, as it undermines trust in the state authorities.

The situation looks still more complicated because of the number of military formations and the duplication of their functions. Ukraine's National Guard operates marines, army aviation, and air defence units. This is a joint large military formation that enjoys priority funding. Why such a luxury against the background of the poverty-ridden Armed Forces? Why not transfer the National Guard under their control? And the functions of the National Guard going beyond defensive functions may be fulfilled by the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ukraine maintains two fleets, and the one operated by the Border Troops is better equipped than Ukraine's Navy. Something is wrong here. The country's economy is unable to keep several «armies» with a total strength reaching one million; in such conditions, none of the power structures will ever truly become strong. The National Security and Defence Council, the General Military Inspection — those presidential structures must say their weighty word.

By the way, a few words about presidential structures. The strategic planning of application of forces of different departments for the defence of the country is co-ordinated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the highest national level, co-ordination is vested in the National Security and Defence Council. Why not introduce a new NSDC member — the Chief of the General Staff — to impart a new impetus to military construction? This won't require additional funds, but the word «defence» in the Council's name would become more meaningful. The issue may be solved after the elections, when the President signs a decree on the new NSDC composition. Such a decision by the head of state would be backed by the military.



WHAT QUESTIONS SHOULD THE MILITARY DOCTRINE ANSWER?

The Military Doctrine is a system of views of Ukraine's political leadership on the prevention of military conflicts, the preparation of the country to defend against possible aggression, military construction as a whole, and the use of the state's military structure to defend Ukraine's national interests against military threats. The present doctrine has not accomplished those tasks and has not become a document «obligatory for state power bodies, institutions, self-administration authorities and Ukrainian citizens».

In the new conditions, the military threat should be re-evaluated and formulated as specifically as possible. The objectives, possibilities and limitations in Ukraine's co-operation with NATO, and the Tashkent Treaty, within the framework of GUUAM, and with its powerful strategic partners, first of all the USA and Russia, should be defined more precisely. The efficiency of international procedures (of arms and armed forces limitations, confidence building measures, non-proliferation of weapons and high technologies, peace enforcement) should be critically assessed, as well as their limited capabilities of prevention and the settlement of military conflicts in our region.

Requirements as to the basic parameters of the Armed Forces should be correctly defined and co-ordinated with the objectives and capabilities of the state. The Armed Forces should not be excessively strong, as this frightens neighbours and provokes counter-action; the Armed Forces should not be too weak, as it threatens our independence; the Armed Forces should not be too expensive, as it ruins the economy. Balance should be maintained. If calculations are based on the number of soldiers per kilometre of the border, the length of the shoreline, the population and the territory, Ukraine will need Armed Forces of approximately 500 thousand men. Today Ukraine's Armed Forces are 25% smaller and continue to decrease, but they remain inadmissible for the country. In general, Ukraine's power structures are almost twice as large, and reduction is less evident. Ukraine has two navies. Ukraine maintains two armies, one for defence and the other for the solution of internal tasks. Maybe we are destroying the balance? And, finally, it is not strength, or not strength only, that is important. Yugoslavia and Iraq had rather

strong and well-equipped armies, and so what? Were they able to oppose a serious enemy? They didn't even try to.

The leadership of the country should not avoid principle decisions and delicately ignore the problems of strategic choice.

First choice: do we rely on our own forces or turn to strategic partners for military assistance? We won't be able to keep an all-round defence. I remember that Leonid Kuchma more than once sceptically assessed a provision in the Military Doctrine for the «necessity of the organisation of effective defence in all directions».

Second choice: given the Military Doctrine, shall we plan only the repulse of an invasion, or do we envisage a possibility for preventive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy, if his readiness for aggression is evident? If so, what will comprise the basis of our strike forces: bombers, land or sea-based operational-tactical missiles, mobile special forces?

Third choice: how will the Armed Forces be manned in the future, by conscription, by contract or on a mixed basis, and if so, what will be the ratio? This is not an idle question, as indices set in the State Program for Armed Forces Development have not been achieved. By the way, all European nations increasingly stick to higher professionalism and the reduction of conscripts' terms of service.

Fourth choice: what principle will be laid as the basis for defence regarding dangerous directions — the priority development of mobile forces for the prompt advance of troops from their present bases, or large-scale relocation for the creation of new constant formations? What would be more efficient and cheap?

Fifth choice: shall we rely on efficient and numerous Armed Forces, or maintain weaker Armed Forces able to build-up reserve components rapidly? This second option was chosen by Finland. That country spends only 1.8% of the GDP on defence, but is able to mobilise and arm almost all its adult population within 72 hours.

Sixth choice: shall we equip the Armed Forces with numerous relatively light, cheap arms requiring minimum training, or with single samples of sophisticated and expensive battle systems? The issue requires a political solution. Ukraine is able to manufacture all types of small arms, grenade launchers, light artillery pieces, IFVs, tanks,



self-propelled air defence systems, light high-speed boats, mines and missiles. Such an approach will bring jobs, independence from foreign deliveries, and savings of budget funds. If we stick to the second option, I am afraid that the Armed Forces will get nothing at all over the next 10 years, or will receive an unfinished cruiser or (God forbid) aircraft carrier, swallowing money and bringing no real benefits. It would be more profitable to produce sophisticated military equipment in co-operation with others and deliver it to foreign countries; perhaps this way we'll manage to collect funds for our Armed Forces. And if we again set the unrealistic task of «airspace defence» in the doctrine and distribute funds accordingly, we'll lose a bird in the hand trying to catch two in the bush. In 10 years we won't be able even to keep land area defence.

Seventh choice: shall we purchase new weapons systems, or modernise existing ones? Which option is more preferable for Ukraine? Perhaps we should lease used equipment (aircraft, ships) from Western countries? Even wealthier countries are not ashamed of doing this.

Eighth choice: is it better to have 5-6 divisions on paper or 3-4 efficient brigades, plus an effective reservist training system? Few politicians will give an honest answer, but without answers to these and other questions, Ukraine will go to nowhere. Leaders of the country should be aware of this.

An agreement on key issues between the branches of power, fixed in the Military Doctrine, would create a basis for strategic and operational planning that is reliable and clear for the military. If, for this purpose the Doctrine, is to be partly classified — alright, we should do this, proceeding from the priority of our national interests. The public portion of the doctrine should be large enough to solve two tasks: show our neighbours an absence of aggressive intentions on the part of Ukraine, and give a powerful impetus to a propaganda campaign in the country. Without support from the state (in a wide sense) and the public, the Military Doctrine won't become a basis of military construction. We've already learned this lesson.

Some people say that military issues are not the most urgent for Ukraine. We agree with this, but even in a normal situation they require constant attention. Today, the situation is extraordinary (and I tried proving this), so a powerful impetus is needed, a kind of «second

wind». Are there any preconditions for that? I think there are, though the political situation in the country is complicated. On the one hand, the Parliament requested the submission of amendments to the Military Doctrine within six weeks. This move might seem timely but gave grounds for concern: the resolution was adopted not after a detailed discussion of the obsolete provisions of the doctrine, but in the wake of emotion and anti-NATO hysteria, on the initiative of the Communist Party. If communists are eager to incorporate a few ideological postulates of a certain trend, it's an idle idea. If they want to work it out thoroughly, it's a false start. Serious decisions are not taken in a hurry. The Russian Duma once tried to hurriedly admit Yugoslavia into their union, and what came out of it? On the other hand, the presidential election campaign has begun. Opposite views will clash, issues of military construction will be discussed. It's not in the candidates' interests to escape answers; our military electorate is too large. Active military and civilian servicemen, military pensioners, workers of military enterprises, their dependants — millions of voters. They are literate people, not indifferent to politics and actively participating in elections. Who will get their votes?

Now on the procedural issues. The development of a new Military Doctrine is not the servicemen's business. The military, diplomats, and economists should submit information and perform the necessary calculations. The maximum that may be required from the military is a draft military-technical section of the Doctrine. Independent experts should be involved (including those previously employed in positions of executives), and the opinion of rank-and-file citizens should also be taken into account. The development of the entire document, its approval, the provision of funds, and control over execution lie in the competence of the political leadership. Everyone should do his business, and be responsible for it.

Once there was a slogan in the Pentagon's Strategic Planning Department: «It's time to think — we are running out of money». Meanwhile, their budget is 700 times larger than Ukraine's defence expenditures. It would be nice if that American slogan becomes the main slogan at Presidential elections in Ukraine. Thinking is the only thing no one will take away from us, and it is something we can do no worse than others!

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES TO PERFORM INTERNAL FUNCTIONS?

By Anatoliy GRYTSENKO

The issue of internal functions of the Armed Forces has been cause for much speculations. Those speculations arise from an inadequate comprehension of the problem and its excessive politicisation. The natural intention to rule out the possibility of Armed Forces involvement in punitive operations or for the change of the constitutional system brought about a situation where even intrinsic internal functions of Armed Forces, beneficial for the state, are not adequately defined by the legislation. Ukraine does not pay proper attention to the experience of other countries, which are increasingly more often forced to employ armed forces to oppose internal military threats. In order to escape possible adverse consequences and to ensure the legally grounded use of the Armed Forces, a revised version of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Laws «On the Armed Forces of Ukraine», «On the Use of Force for Execution of Official Duties», other legal acts, and plans of training of Armed Forces and other military formations should specially address the issue of the internal functions of Ukraine's Armed Forces.

SPECIFICITY OF INTERNAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Internal functions of the Armed Forces may be divided into «forcible» (related to conflicts) and «non-forcible». «**Non-forcible**» internal functions of the Armed Forces raise no questions; moreover, Ukraine's Armed Forces perform them quite successfully. Armed Forces assist state authorities and the population in case of natural disasters: evacuate the population from hazardous areas, render technical and military assistance, restore the civil infrastructure (lay pipelines, repair railways and motorways, build bridges, provide

emergency water and power supply), and eliminate the aftermath of technogenous accidents, such as the Chornobyl disaster. The Armed Forces are engaged in search and rescue operations in remote regions, in the mountains and at sea. Air Force units are used for environmental monitoring. The military performs the recycling of equipment, ammunitions and rocket propellants. Personnel of the Armed Forces assists the Ministry of Internal Affairs in maintaining order at large-scale events in Kyiv and other





big cities. The duty of mine clearing is vested with combat engineers. In 1999, alone filed engineers disposed 9539 ammunitions and surveyed 3050 hectares of land, expending 124 tons of fuel and 1500 kg of explosives. **The Armed Forces are not reimbursed for those activities** (while in the West disposal of a mine costs \$300).

The Armed Forces conduct research in the interests of the national economy, devise advanced dual-use technologies, train civilian specialists, and educate the young generation. Those duties may also be seen as internal functions, and no one will oppose their validity. **Therefore, Ukraine's Armed Forces regularly perform vital internal functions, and render assistance to civil authorities and the population. This activity is met with understanding and gratitude in Ukraine.**

The issue of «forcible» internal functions of the Armed Forces is more sensitive. This seemingly theoretical problem has become very acute in many CIS countries. «Forcible» functions do not rule out the use of arms. It refers to enforcement of the state of emergency; forcible establishment of quarantine to contain hazardous infectious diseases, to prevent mass epidemics, epizootic and epiphytic diseases; guarding of strategic and hazardous objects; counteraction to separatism; disarmament (liquidation) of illegal military formations; blockade of areas of possible

internal conflicts and separation of parties; fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. *The assessment of threats to Ukraine's national security gives grounds to state that the government and the Armed Forces must be ready to manage them. Even though today those threats may seem hypothetical (which is not true), tomorrow they may become feasible.*

The functions listed above are not the main functions of the Armed Forces; those duties are vested in other power structures. However, world experience shows that most such situations cannot be managed without armed forces. All states employ armed forces in case of an internal conflict related with illegal military formations, manifestations of separatism and terrorism, but in different ways. In the USA, Canada, Great Britain, Italy and France, legislation provides relevant preventive procedures and counterbalances, which make it possible to avoid undesirable consequences. In other countries, such as China, Turkey, Iraq, Russia, Libya, there are no such provisions. In some cases armed forces were used without any restrictions, which resulted in the uncontrolled employment of excessive force and numerous victims among the military and civilians. Ukraine should follow the example of Great Britain, the USA and Canada, where the problem of internal functions of armed forces was solved more successfully.

ARE THE ARMED FORCES READY TO PERFORM INTERNAL FUNCTIONS?

Ukraine's Armed Forces possess unique potential, which may and should be used for the benefit of the nation. They operate a secure command and control system, and have vast airlift and sea freight capabilities. No other agency is ready for prolonged operations without special preparation, using its own reserves, maintenance facilities, autonomous power units, etc. No other agency employs a full range of heavy weapons. They may be needed if manpower and equipment of the Internal Troops prove insufficient, for instance, to counteract illegal military formations. By the way, heavy weapons of the National Guard previously entrusted with internal functions are now transferred to the Armed Forces, and not the Internal Troops.

One should keep in mind another important factor. **Generations invested billions of dollars in the construction of the Armed Forces. Even today the state spends huge resources to sustain the Armed Forces. It would be a mistake if we don't try to use their capabilities to ensure stability for the benefit of the Ukrainian people.** Today this issue remains unsettled because of legal uncertainty and political reservations. At the same time there are reasons to assume that at least in three of Ukraine's regions preconditions for internal conflicts exist.

In case of the emergence of conflicts, as it happened in Georgia (Abkhazia), Moldova (Transdnistria), Azerbaijan (Karabakh), Tajikistan (armed opposition), Kyrgyzstan (terrorist raids), Uzbekistan (interethnic conflicts), Turkey (PKK), Great Britain (Northern Ireland), Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan), Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines (different manifestations of separatism), the head of the state will have to take all measures to protect national interests and the civilian population. The president will resort to the Armed Forces, but they will appear unprepared for execution of internal functions. Besides, other power structures have no tested mechanisms of interaction with army units. **The political consequences of unwarranted deaths, continuation of a conflict, and international criticism will be much more serious than possible emotional criticism in case of a prompt solution of the problem.** There will always be opponents, but if problems are solved on a solid legislative basis, accompanied with a supporting mass media campaign, criticism may be avoided.

Just two examples to prove the urgency of the problem. On the 19th of October 1998, a military unit in Georgia went out of control, and a rebel tank column advanced to Tbilisi. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze had



to take measures to restore control over the military, prevent a military coup, avoid victims among civilians, and ensure stable operation of the government and the safeguarding of hazardous sites. The President turned to the army, and the situation was back to normal. Legitimate power was protected, and young democracy was safeguarded. Would it be right to reproach Mr. Shevardnadze for his use of the Armed Forces for resolution of internal problems without legal grounds, using heavy weapons and aviation? In our view, the actions by the Georgian President were adequate. His decisions were backed by the Parliament, population and neighbouring countries. The problem, however, remains unsolved: in a different situation decisions may be wrong.

This example is based on real facts; the other one is hypothetical but, nevertheless, probable. Hollywood shot a number of movies (our audience is familiar with the «Epidemics» and the «Patriot»), assessing the readiness of the USA to oppose the use of biological weapons. This problem is important not only for the United States. In case of a threat of an epidemic (smallpox, typhus, etc.) the military would be able to help the population, and this assistance will not be confined to vaccination. Tough (or seemingly tough) measures will be needed to establish and maintain quarantine in affected areas. The movement and contacts of tens of thousands of infected people will be restricted to protect millions. The area will be fenced with fixed and mobile checkpoints, traffic bars

and barbed wire, using even the threat of arms. **The actions of the military will surely be «forcible», but there is no other way to contain epidemics. Armed forces should be prepared for such resolute actions, in co-ordination with other state authorities and military formations.** It's interesting to note that the USA conducted a number of such exercises and admitted that the state was not yet ready to safely protect Americans against biological weapons. Ukraine may either take account of foreign experience or continue fruitless politically-minded discussions and hope that the danger will pass. God helps those who help themselves.

For years public opinion polls steadily confirm the high confidence of the population in the Armed Forces (up to 40%). The army enjoys the unprecedented support of the public, as compared to other government agencies. It's an important additional reason to employ armed forces for the execution of internal functions. *It's a paradox that Ukraine's Armed Forces, deprived of any legal right to interfere in internal conflicts on their own soil, have already performed internal «forcible» functions in other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR mission) and Yugoslavia (KFOR mission). Some 10 thousand Armed Forces men gained valuable experience of participating in peace support operations — almost a division of professionals trained not at computer-simulated exercises but in real conflicts. It would be a mistake not to use their skills.*

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

At first blush, «non-forcible» internal functions of the army don't require legal substantiation, but this is not true. At least the issue of reimbursement of extra expenditures incurred by the Ministry of Defence must be settled. And execution of «forcible» functions by the Armed Forces has found no legal definition at all. An analysis of documents demonstrates a gradual change of views (from the romanticism of the first years of independence to today's realism and pragmatism), a better understanding of the nature of internal threats, and the readiness to accept the experience of other countries. That gives hope.

But what do we have in legislation? **The Military Doctrine «prohibits use of the Armed Forces for the accomplishment of political tasks on own territory»** (hereinafter italicised by the author). According to the Law «**On the Armed Forces of Ukraine**», «issues of Ukraine's Armed Forces application for execution of missions not related to national defence *shall be settled exclusively by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and in cases provided by the Law of Ukraine «On the State of Emergency» — by the President of Ukraine*». The Law «**On the State of Emergency**», in its turn, provides that «in case of the introduction of the state of

emergency ... when a natural disaster, epidemic, epizooty, accident or catastrophe endangers the life and health of the population and requires urgent and extended rescue and restoration activity, *the President of Ukraine may enlist military units of Ukraine's Armed Forces for participation in that activity*». The limitation is evident: the Armed Forces may perform only rescue operations and restoration work, and only after an introduction of the state of emergency.

The Parliament made the first real step towards legal definition of internal «forcible» functions of the Armed Forces three years ago, when the «Concept (Fundamentals of National Policy) of the National Security of Ukraine» was adopted in January 1997. **It provided that «The Military organisation of the state, including Ukraine's Armed Forces ... shall counteract external and internal military threats; fight organised crime; ensure protection of the population in case of dangerous social conflicts, epidemics, etc.»** Unfortunately, no further steps have been made: over three years we haven't seen the law properly specifying the functions of the Armed Forces. Today those functions are too general and vague. They cannot be used as a basis for strategic planning, distribution of manpower and equipment, and for the planning of combat training.



Executive authorities haven't worked out such a bill either. Draft revised versions of laws of Ukraine «On the Defence of Ukraine» and «On the Armed Forces of Ukraine» may be seen as a very careful step in this direction. They are set to name «other functions», not related with the basic assignment of the Armed Forces. Those functions may be executed in case of the introduction of the state of emergency (martial law), for accomplishment of tasks of area defence and civil defence. However, those novelties won't radically solve the problem in question.

International legal aspects of the problem are more or less settled by the «Code of conduct with respect to military-political aspects of security» adopted at the Budapest OSCE summit (1994). **The Code doesn't object to the use of armed forces for internal «forcible» functions, but the international community opposes the excessive use of force:** «If internal security tasks cannot be accomplished without the use of force, member countries will ensure that its use be proportionate to the necessity of forcible actions». Ukraine has signed the document and should abide by it.

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

Given limited funds, the Armed Forces leadership is not encouraged to accomplish additional tasks without proper resources. Heads of other military formations will object «penetration» of the MoD into their area of responsibility, they are concerned about the possible redistribution of functions (and, consequently, manpower ceilings and funds) between military structures, even with the purpose of the liquidation of excessive ones. This is natural, but one should keep in mind the following: **the issue of functions of military structures is a political issue. All reasonable proposals and recommendations of the military should be taken into account, while those issues should be finally settled not on the departmental (MoD, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Emergency, Security Service, Border Troops), but on the national level.**

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine will be revised in the near future. In our opinion, its new version should not contain provisions *banning the use of the Armed Forces for the execution of political tasks on own territory. This wording is too general.* Indeed, use of the army for the overthrow of a legitimate government and to change the constitutional system should be banned, but the present doctrine prohibits the execution of other important tasks as well, inasmuch as such tasks may be termed political. Among them: counter-acting separatism, protection of territorial integrity, the constitutional system, and the rights and freedoms of citizens. For performance of those functions, military activity on own territory cannot be ruled out. The experience of our neighbours proves this. **We should not bury our head in the sand, like an ostrich; the problem must be solved before it's too late. Then conflicts will be few.**

PREFERABLE WAYS OF CO-ORDINATION

For execution of internal functions, the Armed Forces' role should be secondary, and their units should be subordinate to the ministry (agency) in charge. **Depending on the conflict's character, the mission of its localisation might be entrusted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (internal social conflicts, activity of illegal armed formations, encroachment on the constitutional system), Ministry of Emergency (natural and technogenous disasters), State Border Security Committee (border violations by separatists in border regions) or Security Service (terrorism).**

In case of the expansion of an internal conflict, the leading role of the Armed Forces (as the case was in Dagestan after several days of the Ministry of Internal Affairs operation) should not be ruled out. Exactly for this mission the Armed Forces, the Ukrainian government and the population in general are less prepared. The absence of the special joint training of the Armed Forces and other power structures (under their command) for the purpose of internal conflict localisation causes concern. We pay no attention to the experience of our neighbours (Romania, Russia, Turkey) where such training is conducted on a regular basis.



DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM WILL REQUIRE POLITICAL WILL

Legal regulation of the issue of internal functions of Ukraine's Armed Forces would bring benefits, such as more efficient and better co-ordinated elimination of the aftermath of emergencies, the prompt localisation of possible internal conflicts, the establishment of armed forces as an institute of stability within the state, and the experience of co-operation between the Armed Forces and other power structures agencies, central and local authorities. Finally, the possibility to use the Armed Forces exclusively on legal grounds, under strict civilian control, would promote the international reputation of Ukraine.

The issue raised is complex and versatile. Today, thoughts of internal functions of the Armed Forces may be psychologically unacceptable. This is natural in a situation where most citizens do not trust the government. But we have what we've got: this government (elected by the people!) will decide the complex problems of the society. We do not suggest turning Ukraine into a police state. We do not suggest putting the Army above the state. On the contrary, strict limits should be set. But they should be set; we cannot any longer

hope that the problem will be solved of itself. Unless raised issues are regulated by the law, and reliable preventive mechanisms are created, the head of the state may be tempted to solve complex internal problems with the Army's backing. This cannot be allowed. Neither should we pretend that Ukraine is immune to internal conflicts. In this context our proposals should be heard by those who are working out (or at least should be working out) the draft of the new Military Doctrine.

And, finally, two important observations. **First**, the experience of Ukraine and other countries proves that the public trusts even-tempered and well-trained professionals rather than 18 year-old youths that may easily be provoked to use arms. The former are drafted to man Ukrainian peacekeeping units operating under the auspices of the UN, or to fight terrorists in Chechnya. So, the gradual transition to professional Armed Forces remains a priority. **Second**, without strong feedback and the establishment of civil society in Ukraine, we will have problems, irrespective of whether country leaders respect the law or violate it.

