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UKRAINE ON THE EVE OF ELECTION YEAR: PUBLIC DEMAND, POSITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS, OUTLINE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

(Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre)

Year 2019 is not going to be easy. Apart from challenges caused by Russian military aggression against Ukraine, the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for March and October will be the main internal political factors further aggravating the situation in the country.

The 2019 elections will take place in a challenging environment. First of all, this concerns the ongoing war with Russia, which will try to influence the elections results in efforts to bring loyal political leaders and parties to power in Ukraine. Other negative aspects include the society's disappointment with current government, coupled with low public support of its institutions, individual political leaders and pro-government political forces.

The nature and results of the upcoming election will be further affected by the division of supporters of Ukraine's European path and the political forces declaring the same course into two camps, depending on their attitudes towards the current government. The rise of radicalism in the activities of some opposition parties, as well as significant growth of populism are quite alarming trends in the Ukrainian politics.

Holding both elections in one year with brief interval between them is likely to escalate political struggle, which may result in reduced efficiency of the government with further suspension of the reform processes in anticipation of successive change of the President, the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers.

The results of 2019 elections should give answers to the following key questions: will Ukraine continue its European integration course approved by the people of Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity? Will newly elected institutions continue reforms? Which political leaders and forces will assume responsibility for the reforms and their results? Answers to these questions primarily depend on the Ukrainian voters, as well as on candidates and political forces competing for public confidence.

The Razumkov Centre's project "Ukraine on the Eve of Election Year: Public Demand, Outline of the New Government, and the Future of Reforms" aims at exploring current sentiments of citizens who will cast ballots on the one hand, and analysing readiness of political actors and suitability of their political "supply" for society's "demand" on the other. By doing so, the project is set to outline the new Ukrainian government and its potential policies.

The analytical report consists of four sections.

The first section summaries public opinion about current situation in the country and the prospects of its development; presents citizens' views of the reforms implemented since 2014; explores ideological and political orientations of voters and their attitudes towards political actors (potential presidential candidates and political parties), electoral processes and motivations.

The second section explores political preferences of the Ukrainians, their attitudes towards policy alternatives, "political proposals" in various spheres, as well as variations in voters' preferences depending on their socio-demographic characteristics, geopolitical orientations, visions of preferred development vectors and models of social organisation.

The third section studies political positioning of the leading candidates and political parties ahead of the election year; examines the content of main programmes and their compliance with voter expectations; and outlines possible scenarios of further development of political situation depending on the presidential race results.

The fourth section provides general conclusions about the peculiarities of political processes in 2019, consistency of the "political supply" with people's "political demand", assessments of future configurations of key government institutions and their policies, as well as the impact of the above factors on Ukraine's future development.

1. UKRAINIAN SOCIETY ENTERING THE ELECTION YEAR

The 2019 elections will take place in the environment that has been shaped by controversial events and processes of 2014-2018. This has resulted in negative attitudes towards many issues. For example, rising expectations of positive changes after signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the start of European integration reforms were replaced by disappointment caused by a sharp decline in living standards of most Ukrainians. The surge of patriotic sentiments at the outset of Russian aggression has gradually eroded into the “war fatigue” or “ignorance”. The trust in the new government formed in 2014 has transformed into total distrust and even hostility towards it.

In this context, people’s choices in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections will largely represent a synthesis of how they assess the on-going situation, their preferred future for the country and what they expect from different political actors, candidates and parties that are to compete in the upcoming elections. The Razumkov Centre carried out several public opinion surveys to measure public opinion about these issues. The survey findings are summarised in this section.¹

1.1. SITUATION INSIDE THE COUNTRY: ASSESSMENTS AND OUTLOOK

The society has been **predominantly critical about the country’s development**. Vast majority of the respondents (71%) believe that the course of events in Ukraine took the wrong direction, while only about 12% of the respondents see positive dynamics. 17% of those polled found it difficult to answer.

It should be noted, however, that the prevalence of negative views is typical of Ukrainian society; recorded since early 2015, these attitudes are not that different from the results of similar surveys conducted in 2005-2009 and 2011-2013 (see Diagram 1).

The data above suggests that all peak points with sharp decline in the number of negative assessments and the growth in positive ones correlate with the shift of power or, rather, change of key officials – president and to the lesser extent – prime-minister. The opinion that events develop in the right direction prevailed in the first half of 2005 and in June 2010. In March 2014, one could also see a strong positive trend, which, however, never reached a comparable level. It is possible that people’s views were affected by the Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the onset of armed conflict in the Donbas region.

Most respondents in all regions and across all surveyed social groups believe that the course of events in Ukraine took wrong direction. Regional differences are insignificant with Ukrainians living in the East being most critical of the country’s dynamics.²

Material status is the most significant factor, and wealthier respondents are more likely to appreciate the country’s direction. Young people and respondents with higher education are slightly more likely to positively assess the current course of events compared to older respondents and persons without higher education.

Comparing the current situation in Ukraine with 2013,³ the respondents were **fairly positive about only two sectors – the country’s defence capability and its international image**. Specifically, more than 45% of the respondents noted Ukraine’s enhanced defence capability, and almost 32% mentioned its improved international image.

Instead, **many other spheres received generally negative responses**. The respondents were more sceptical about the prices and tariffs as almost 90% of them felt that the situation worsened. Also, the vast majority of the respondents negatively perceived changes in the country’s economic situation, the levels


¹ Baseline survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 21-27 June 2018 in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The sample included 2,021 respondents aged 18+ years. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

Findings of other Razumkov Centre studies (conducted independently or in collaboration with the partners), as well as surveys of other Ukrainian social research institutions were used in this report – see references.

² For the purposes of this report, the following regional distribution of oblasts shall apply: **West**: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Chernivtsi oblasts; **Centre**: city of Kyiv, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts; **South**: Mykolayiv, Odessa and Kherson oblasts; **East**: Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.

³ 2013 was selected as a baseline year for comparison because it was the last year of Ukraine’s relative stability on the one hand, and the year of maximum consolidation of Viktor Yanukovich’s authoritarian rule – on the other.

Diagram 1: Generally speaking, do events in Ukraine develop in the right or wrong direction?
% of respondents



of stability, confidence in the future, financial status of their families, health care, wages, crime, pensions, social security and protection, citizen attitudes towards the government and the government's attitudes towards its citizens and the situation in the country in general.

Almost half of the respondents (45%) noted negative changes in education and the observance of the rule of law by civil servants.

Relative majority of the respondents did not notice any changes in the level of democracy, freedom of speech, the observance of citizen rights and freedoms in general, and inter-ethnic relations. Additionally, more than half of the respondents reported no change for the Ukrainian or Russian-speaking populations, ethnic and religious minorities (see Diagram 2).

Residents of the East and the South are more likely to view changes negatively in all spheres of life compared to Ukrainians living in the West and the Centre. The share of positive responses among younger citizens with higher income and higher level of education is generally larger than among less well-to-do, less educated and older Ukrainians. Also, the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic

Ukrainians tend to assess changes slightly more positively compared to Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians. The only exception is the issue of prices and tariffs, where all the respondents alike have negative attitudes irrespective of the region or social group.


Almost half of the respondents fully or partially agree (10% and 39% respectively) with the statement that after the shift of power in 2014 Ukraine became closer to joining the EU. More than one-third of the respondents partially (23%) and fully (15%) disagree with this statement. The remaining 14% could not answer this question.

At the same time, only 17% of those surveyed agree that reforms implemented in Ukraine over the past four years meet the needs of the majority of Ukrainians, while 69% disagree with this statement. 14% found this question difficult to answer.

The statement that the level of democracy and observance of political and civil rights and freedoms in Ukraine has increased after 2014 was supported – fully and partially – by 29% of the respondents. Instead, more than half of the respondents (56%) did not agree with the statement, and 15% could not find the answer.



Diagram 2: In Ukraine, how has the situation changed in the following spheres compared with 2013?
% of respondents



Only 25% of the respondents would agree to a temporary decline in living standards for the sake of further economic reforms and enhanced defence capability of the country, while 56% have the opposite view (see Diagram 3).

Most residents of the Western and Central Ukraine, and relative majority of those living in the South believe that **Ukraine became closer to joining the EU after a change of government in 2014**. Most respondents in the East share the opposite view. Approximation to the EU was confirmed by the majority of young respondents and middle-aged citizens. The respondents with higher education and higher income, as well as Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to notice that the country is getting closer to joining the EU. Moreover, rural residents are more optimistic about this process compared to those living in the cities.

Completed reforms are **hardly perceived as meeting the needs of the majority of Ukrainians**, as most respondents across all regions share negative attitudes towards them – from 69% in the West to 89% in the South. Wealthy respondents were the only social group where the share of positive attitudes prevailed (the sum total of responses “agree” and “rather agree” was 49%, while the answers “rather disagree” and “disagree” amounted to 39%).

As many as 42% of the respondents in the West and 33% in the Centre noted a **better functioning democracy after 2014** (the sum total of the responses “agree” and “rather agree”). Instead, Eastern oblasts had the highest proportion of those (76%) who see the lack of progress. Again, persons with the highest income were the only social group where positive views of the democracy development prevailed. Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are more likely to negatively perceive the progress of democracy compared to Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians.


Readiness to accept temporary decline in living standards in exchange for successful reforms and enhanced defence capability is more pronounced among the residents of the Centre and the West, and less visible among those living in the East. Men are more willing to sacrifice the quality of their lives. Also, Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are more unanimous in their unwillingness to sacrifice their living standards for the sake of reforms and better defence capability of the country than Ukrainian-speaking respondents and ethnic Ukrainians.

Generally, the majority of citizens negatively assess the well-being of their families and the economic situation in the country. At the same time, the level of well-being of the respondents' families is perceived somewhat better (see Diagram 4).

Diagram 3: Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents



Diagram 4: How would you assess the situation in Ukraine in the following areas?
% of respondents



Assessing the financial situation in their own families, 16% of the respondents barely make both ends meet, not having the money even to buy necessary products. Other 41% can afford only food and essential inexpensive goods.

Compared to 2008 and 2014, the shares of these responses have been growing. Meanwhile, the number of those who had enough to live on but found it rather difficult to buy durables such as a refrigerator or furniture has declined (36%).


Also, there is a visible plunge – from 14% to 5% – in the share of the respondents who live a comfortable life but are not yet able to make major purchases (e.g. an apartment, a car). The proportion of those who can afford virtually anything is very insignificant (0.3%) (see Diagram 5).

Eastern regions have the highest proportion of those who barely make a living (26%) and the smallest number of wealthy residents (1.5%). Material status tends to improve with better education. Younger respondents are somewhat better well-to-do than the oldest ones; the latter (aged 60+) make up the largest proportion of those who are on a tight budget (31%). Also, the number of respondents who barely make a living is slightly higher among ethnic Russians than among Ukrainians.

26% of the respondents believe that they have personally benefitted from signing of the Association Agreement and the establishment of a free trade zone with the EU, while 29% feel they have lost. However, almost half (46%) of the respondents could not answer this question.

The majority or relative majority of the respondents across all regions failed to decide upon whether they have benefitted or lost from signing of the Association

Diagram 6: Have you personally benefitted or lost from Ukraine's signing of the Association Agreement and the establishment of a free trade zone with the EU?
% of respondents



Agreement and the establishment of a free trade zone with the EU. Slightly more respondents in the West and the Centre believe to have benefitted from these changes, while more respondents in the East and the South feel that they have lost. Assessments vary considerably depending on the material status of the respondents: the higher is their income, the more likely they are to see personal benefits from the signing of the said agreement.

Also, young people and the respondents with higher education are more likely to believe that they have gained from the agreement, while the respondents aged 50+ and citizens with secondary education would rather say that they have not. Again, the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are generally more pessimistic in their assessment than their Ukrainian-speaking counterparts and ethnic Ukrainians.

Most respondents (66%) do not seek restoration of the Soviet Union. Still, 11% would like this to happen. Additional 22% also would want the Soviet Union back but understand that it is unrealistic. These results virtually did not change compared to November 2016 (see Diagram 7).

Diagram 5: What is your family's financial situation?
% of respondents





Diagram 7: Do you seek restoration of the Soviet Union?
% of respondents



Relative majority of the respondents would not like to return to pre-2014 Ukraine. 31% of them answered “no”, and 17% – “more likely no than yes”. Instead, options “yes” and “more likely yes than no” were chosen by 20% and 18% of the respondents respectively. Other 13% of those polled could not answer this question. Again, these results are virtually identical to those found in the survey from November 2016 (see Diagram 8).

The vast majority of the respondents across all regions of Ukraine do not want the Soviet Union back. Yet, that is something that many residents of Eastern and Southern Ukraine want (over 40%). Older and less well-off citizens are more likely to support bringing back the Soviet Union. Also, this desire to revive the Soviet past is more widespread among the Russian-speaking citizens and especially among ethnic Russians. Respondents with higher education are less likely to see the Soviet Union revived compared to their less educated compatriots.

The distribution of answers to the second question demonstrates similar peculiarities. Only 21% of the respondents in the West would like to return to pre-2014 Ukraine, but the proportion of people sharing this idea increases to 41% in the Centre and exceeds 50% in the South and East (the total of responses “yes” and “more likely yes than no”). The idea of returning to Ukraine before 2014 is more popular among senior citizens, low-income persons, the Russian-speaking residents and ethnic Russians. Rural residents are less likely to support this return compared to city dwellers. The impact of educational factor is also notable as the desire to return to the past diminishes with better education.

Having compared the respondents’ answers to the last two questions, we found a **significant correlation between nostalgia for the Soviet Union and willingness to return to pre-2014 Ukraine** (Spearman’s ρ is 0.455⁴). Therefore, more than 22% of the respondents simultaneously expressed their willingness to return to “Ukraine before 2014” and to revive the Soviet Union.

Most citizens of Ukraine demand change.

Specifically, 60% of those polled believe that the country needs changes and only 4% want to preserve the status quo. In addition, 16% of the respondents think it would be better to return to pre-2014 times, while 20% could not answer this question.

Diagram 9: What does the country need today the most?
% of respondents





Diagram 8: Would you like to return to pre-2014 Ukraine?
% of respondents



⁴ Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ) in a non-parametric measure of statistical dependence between the rankings of two variables. Its values ranges from 1 to -1, where “1” denotes perfect direct correlation (links) between two variables, “-1” denotes perfect inverse correlation, and “0” means no correlation.

In the regional context, changes are requested by the vast majority (West and Centre) and relative majority (South and East) of the respondents. Instead, about quarter of Ukrainians living in the South and the East think it would be better to return to pre-2014 times. This idea found much less supporters in the Centre and virtually no supporters in the West. Unlike citizens aged 50+, young people are more likely to seek changes and less likely to support the idea of bringing back the pre-2014 situation. Similarly, the idea of returning to the past diminishes with the respondents' financial status. The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are generally more open to change and less supportive of the country's return to pre-Maidan era, while the Russian-speaking people and ethnic Russians share the opposite view.

Most citizens of Ukraine support the country's accession to the EU. Specifically, more than 75% of the respondents are ready to participate in the referendum on the EU membership if it is held in the near future. 14% of those polled rejected their participation and 11% failed to decide.

51% would have voted in favour of Ukraine's accession to the EU, including 66% of those expressing their intention to participate in the referendum.

Diagram 10: If a referendum on Ukraine's EU membership was held in the near future, would you participate in it?
% of respondents





Diagram 11: If you participated in a referendum on Ukraine's EU membership, how would you vote?
% of respondents



Most respondents in all regions and across all social groups expressed their readiness to vote in the referendum. It is noteworthy that this readiness mostly depends on the respondents' financial status.

Attitudes towards the EU membership in the regions vary. Specifically, most Ukrainians living in the West (77%) and the Centre (59%) would vote in favour of the country's accession to the EU, while the shares of supporters and opponents of this step in the South are almost identical (32% and 33%, respectively). Most of those living in the East oppose the idea of the EU membership (54% vs 24%). Also, the share of the EU membership supporters is generally higher among young people, citizens with higher education and higher income.

One can clearly observe the impact of the language factor as 61% of the Ukrainian-speaking citizens are ready to support the EU accession (compared to 36% of the Russian-speaking respondents). The same is true for ethnic Ukrainians (54%) and ethnic Russians (38%).

Only relative majority of Ukrainians support the NATO membership. Should a relevant referendum took place any time soon, 72% of the respondents would participate in it. 16% have no such an intention, and 12% are yet to decide. 41% are ready to support Ukraine's joining NATO, including 66% of those expressing their readiness to vote.

Diagram 12: If a referendum on Ukraine's NATO membership was held in the near future, would you participate in it?
% of respondents






Diagram 13: If you participated in a referendum on Ukraine's NATO membership, how would you vote?
% of respondents



Most respondents in the West and relative majority of the respondents in the Centre are ready to support Ukraine's joining NATO. In contrast, relative majority of Ukrainians in the South and most residents of Eastern regions will vote against the NATO membership. Better financial well-being and higher education level significantly increase the likelihood that the respondent will support the NATO membership. Also, the NATO support is much more pronounced among the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians compared to their Russian-speaking counterparts. Ukrainian women are somewhat less likely to support joining NATO than men.

Almost half of Ukrainians (48%) consider the European model of social development more attractive than the Russian model, and only 5% of the respondents think otherwise. 11% of those polled view both models as equally attractive, while for 25% of the respondents none of them is good.

Diagram 14: Which model of social development seems more attractive to you?
% of respondents



The European model of social development prevails over the Russian one in all regions, but the level of support varies. 73% of the respondents in the West find it more attractive, but this support further reduces from the Centre (55%) to the South (31%) and to the East (25%). Meanwhile, the maximum support for the Russian model reaches 9% in the East.

In this regard, financial factors and age are particularly important: wealthy and young respondents are more likely to support the European model of development. Similarly, the support for the European model among the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians is considerably higher than among the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians. Also, the European model has won somewhat greater support among the respondents with higher education, as well as among rural residents.

48% of the respondents believe that Ukraine should integrate into the European Union, and only 9% support joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). 30% of the respondents support neither of these options, while 13% did not shape their opinion on the issue.

Since 2014, the level of support for the country's European integration remains rather high (close to 50%).⁵ Meanwhile, staying outside any of the above-mentioned economic unions is becoming a popular alternative to the EU membership (see Diagram 15).

While the EU membership remains the most popular course for the West and the Centre, the idea of non-alignment with either the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union finds increasingly more supporters in the South and the East. Most of those who support Ukraine's membership in the EAEU can be found in the East (17%). Wealthier respondents are more likely to support the EU membership and less likely to pursue the country's joining the EAEU or non-alignment with either bloc. Also, the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians generally favour the EU membership, while the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are more likely to support Ukraine's non-alignment.

Speaking about the **government policy on the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts**, a relative majority of the respondents (40%) support the official recognition of their occupation and further isolation until Ukraine re-establishes control over these territories.


More than 26% of the respondents favour granting a special status to the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, amnesty for the members of separatist movements who did not commit serious crimes, and elections prior to re-establishment of formal control over these territories by Ukraine. About 33% of the respondents could not answer this question (see Diagram 16).

The respondents' answers demonstrate significant regional variations. People in the West and the Centre generally support the isolation of occupied territories until they are recaptured by Ukraine, while those living in the East are more likely to support special status, amnesty and elections.

The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are notably more active in supporting isolation if compared to the Russian-speaking respondents and ethnic Russians. Also, men are more likely than women to support isolation of the occupied territories.

The Ukrainian citizens' expectations for the nearest future (2-3 years) are quite reserved. At the same time, the respondents are quite unanimous in assessing the prospects of their families' well-being and Ukraine's economic outlook. The share of those expecting changes for the better in the family and in the country are almost identical (24% and 25% respectively); some expect the situation to deteriorate (31% each); and some believe that the situation will not change (27% each)⁶ (see Diagram 17).

Diagram 15: Which integration course should Ukraine take?
% of respondents



⁵ We used findings of the previous Razumkov Centre surveys (2011-2015) and the studies of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (2015-2017), which, however, offered different formulations of questions and answer choices. For example, instead of EAEU they used the Customs Union listing its member-states (Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and others).

⁶ Further analysis confirmed that citizens' expectations about their families' well-being are closely linked to their expectations from the country situation in general (Spearman's ρ is 0.739). Therefore, 76% of the respondents gave identical answers to both questions.

Diagram 16: If a referendum included questions about possible actions of the Ukrainian government with regards to the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which options would you support?
% of respondents





Diagram 17: How the situation will change in the following areas in the upcoming 2-3 years?
% of respondents



Pessimistic expectations are the highest in the East, where 40% of the respondents expect the situation to worsen. Instead, the level of pessimism is the lowest in the West (21%). Moreover, the share of positive expectations among those living in Western parts of Ukraine is the highest among other regions – 29%.

Similarly, wealthier respondents, young people and persons with higher education demonstrate higher levels of optimism, while the least optimistic are low-income citizens, respondents aged 50+ and those who received only general secondary education. The Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians are also more pessimistic in their expectations.

While speaking about Ukraine's ability to address the existing problems and difficulties, the respondents remain rather optimistic. For example, at least 19% of them believe that Ukraine will be able to overcome the existing problems in the next few years. About half of the respondents think that it can become a reality in the long term. And only 18% of the respondents think that Ukraine will be unable to address them altogether⁷ (see Diagram 18).

The absolute or relative majority of the respondents in all social groups expect that the existing problems and difficulties will be addressed in the long run.

Regional variations are insignificant. About quarter of the respondents in the West and the South expect to overcome difficulties already in the nearest future; slightly more respondents in the Centre and in the East believe that these problems will be addressed in somewhat longer term. The level of scepticism is the highest in the East, where 25% of those polled believe that Ukraine is unable to resolve the existing problems and difficulties.

Of particular significance is the financial status of respondents: wealthier respondents are more likely to trust in Ukraine's ability to address all problems, including in the years to come.

The respondents' thoughts about Ukraine's future prospects are indirectly confirmed by the answers to the question about their intention to emigrate. **Most of the respondents (63%) have no intention to leave Ukraine.**

⁷ People's confidence in the country's ability to overcome the existing problems and difficulties has a significant correlation with the faith in the reforms' success (Spearman's ρ is 0.445).

Diagram 18: Is Ukraine able to overcome the existing problems and difficulties?
% of respondents





Diagram 19: Do you have an intention to leave Ukraine?
% of respondents



Instead, 13% of the respondents are to seek temporary employment abroad and to return as soon as the situation improves in Ukraine; 7% would like permanent residence abroad even if they fail to practice their profession; 6% intend to leave the country, but it has nothing to do with the lack of opportunities in Ukraine. 11% of the respondents could not formulate their answers. The situation did not change compared to April 2017 (see Diagram 19).

Most respondents in all regions (from 59% to 72%) do not intend to leave Ukraine. If compared to other regions, citizens living in the West and in the Centre were more likely to seek temporary employment abroad and to return home as soon as the situation improves.

Age-specific variations are significant. With age, even fewer respondents intend to leave the country. Of particular concern is the fact that the share of young people aged 18-29 who think about leaving the country (47%) exceeds the number of those who plan to stay (38%). At the same time, most respondents across all other age groups (from 53% to 86%) have no intention to leave Ukraine.

1.2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORMS

Following the Revolution of Dignity, the new government announced comprehensive reforms in Ukraine to implement the Association Agreement, and in broader context – to foster the country's European integration as its primary goal. To this end, special state and public institutions were established, including the National Reforms Council, and publicly declared reform course has never been questioned even amid major political crises. Progress in implementing reforms has been repeatedly recognised by Ukraine's international partners, including the EU governing bodies.⁸

At the same time, Ukrainians are generally reserved or critical of the reforms. **The level of public awareness about reforms in different spheres is quite low.** For example, the share of citizens claiming to be “fully aware” of the on-going reforms range from 10-11% (health sector reform and de-centralisation) to 2% (financial sector reform). Instead, most respondents are totally “unaware” of the financial sector reform (72%), the state property management reform (66%),

⁸ See EU report: Ukraine makes important progress in its reforms but more needs to be done in particular on the judiciary and fight against corruption. – European Commission, 9 November 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6322_en.htm.


de-regulation and entrepreneurship development (64%), public administration reform (62%), tax reform (57%), energy independence programme and energy sector reform (56%).

About half of the respondents (49-51%) know nothing about the national security and defence reforms and transformations in the agricultural sector. Close to 40% of those polled are “unaware” of the law enforcement and judicial reforms; about 30% know nothing about the leadership renewal and lustration, the police and

educational sector reforms, de-centralisation and local governance reforms. On the other hand, the number of those who have never heard of the health sector reform is the lowest – 13% (see Diagram 20).

The researchers found no significant regional differences in the levels of public awareness about specific reforms. Wealthier citizens and persons with higher education demonstrate slightly better awareness of the reforms. Young people showed the poorest knowledge of reforms among all age groups.

Diagram 20: Assessment of public awareness about reforms and government actions in certain areas,⁹
% of respondents



⁹ The diagram does not contain the answer “did not answer” because in each of the proposed options it did not exceed 0.5%.


While assessing **the impact of reforms and government actions in various areas on their personal situations, most respondents (55-76%) reported the absence of such influence** in all areas excluding the health care.

Slight prevalence of positive responses over the negative ones concerns de-centralisation (23% vs. 20%) and local self-governance reform (20% vs. 15%). Reforms in the national security and defence sector

gathered almost equal shares of positive and negative reaction (17% vs. 19%). The police reform had a positive impact for 17% of the respondents, while 24% had the opposite opinion.

In other sectors one can observe a predominantly negative reaction to the health sector reform as 57% of the respondents think that it has had negative effects (see Diagram 21).

Diagram 21: Citizen opinion about the impact of reforms and government actions in various areas on their personal well-being,¹⁰
% of respondents



¹⁰ The diagram does not contain the answer "did not answer" because in each of the proposed options it did not exceed 1%.

Leadership renewal and lustration. Differences in responses here primarily depend on the level of education and material status, as wealthier and more educated respondents are more likely to appreciate the positive impact of the reform. Unlike other regions, people in the East are much more likely to perceive purge and lustration as having negative impact on their personal situations. The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are somewhat more positive about the reform impact compared with their Russian-speaking counterparts and ethnic Russians.

Judicial reform. The number of respondents criticizing the impact of the judicial reform is slightly higher in the East compared with the Centre and the West. Differences in answers also depend on the level of education and income, with wealthier and more educated people being more positive about the reform impact. Ethnic Russians are more likely to negatively perceive the reform than ethnic Ukrainians.

De-centralisation and local self-governance. Eastern regions have the highest proportion of respondents who see a negative impact of the reform on their personal well-being. Differences also depend on the material status and people with higher income are generally more positive about the reform. The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians as well as rural residents are more likely to welcome the de-centralisation reform.

Public administration reform. The reform has triggered more negative reaction in the East compared with other regions of Ukraine. As with other reforms, their positive perception increases with people's wealth.

De-regulation and entrepreneurship development. Differences in responses depend on the level of education and material status (the wealthier the respondents are, the higher is the likelihood of their positive perception of the reform impact; also, the respondents with secondary special and higher education are more likely to see negative impact of the reform compared with persons with general and incomplete secondary education). Ethnic Ukrainians somewhat better view the reform than ethnic Russians.

Law enforcement system reform. Differences depend on the material status, as wealthier respondents are more likely to view the reform impact positively. In contrast, the respondents with higher and secondary special education are more likely to negatively perceive the reform than persons with incomplete and complete secondary education. The respondents in the East were the least positive and the most critical about the impact of law enforcement reform (the balance of responses is -29%). The same negative balance can be viewed in the South (-14%), the Centre (-11%) and the West (-3%). Ethnic Russians are more likely to view the reform impact negatively.

Reforms in the national security and defence sector. Positive views of the national security and defence reform prevail in the West and the South (balance of responses +11% and +7% respectively), with negative assessments dominating in the East (-21%). Differences also depend on the material status with wealthier respondents being more positive about the reform impact. The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians view the reform more positively than ethnic Russians.

Health sector reform. Negative opinions about this reform dominate in all regions, but the regional balance

of positive and negative responses varies significantly from -18% in the West to -46% in the Centre, -60% in the South and -68% in the East. Differences also depend on the material status with wealthier respondents being more positive about the reform impact. Similarly, young people have slightly better attitudes towards the reform impact compared with the respondents aged 50+. Also, the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to view the reform positively in contrast to the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians.

Tax reform. The reform generated much more negative reaction in the East compared with other regions of Ukraine. Differences in responses depend on the material status, as wealthier respondents are more likely to appreciate the positive impact of the reform. Ethnic Ukrainians have somewhat better view of the reform than ethnic Russians.

Energy independence programme and energy sector reform. People living in the West have somewhat better attitudes to the reform impact compared with the South and the East. Differences also depend on the material status with wealthier respondents being more positive about the reform impact. Ethnic Ukrainians have better view of the reform than ethnic Russians.

Ukraine's promotion in the world. Here one can observe significant regional variations. The balance of positive and negative responses reaches +20% in the West and +11% in the Centre, dropping to -3% in the South and to -15% in the East. Differences in responses also depend on the material status with wealthier respondents being more positive about the reform impact. Similarly, young people have slightly better attitudes towards the reform compared with the respondents aged 60+. The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians view the reform impact more positively than the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians.

Agricultural sector reform. Despite negative balance of responses regarding the impact of the reform across all oblasts, one can still observe certain differences, for example -11% in the West and -38% in the East. Other differences concern the material status – wealthier respondents traditionally tend to be more positive about the reform impact. Ethnic Ukrainians have slightly better view of the reform than ethnic Russians. The share of negative responses among rural residents is also higher than that among city dwellers.

Educational sector reform. Here one can also observe notable regional differences. The balance of responses remains positive in the West at +4%, further dropping to -11% in the Centre, -23% in the South and -40% in the East. Differences in answers also depend on the level of education and income, with wealthier and more educated people being more positive about the educational reform impact. Ethnic Ukrainians have better opinion of the reform than ethnic Russians.

State property management reform. Ukrainians living in Western and Central regions are more likely to view the reform impact positively, while residents of the East are the most critical about it. The biggest differences in responses here depend on financial status, as respondents with higher income are more likely to appreciate the positive impact of the reform. Certain regional differences also exist. Ethnic Ukrainians have a somewhat better opinion of the reform than ethnic Russians.

Financial sector reform. Assessment of this reform in the West is slightly better than in the South and the East. Other differences concern the financial status – wealthier respondents are more positive about the reform impact. As in many other cases, ethnic Ukrainians have better attitude towards the reform than ethnic Russians.

Police reform. Certain regional differences do exist, as the balance of positive and negative responses approaches to 0 in the West and the Centre, dropping

to -10% in the South and to -26% in the East. Young people have better attitudes towards the reform impact compared with the respondents aged 50+. Other notable differences are linked to the material status – the wealthier the respondents are, the higher is the likelihood of their positive perception of the reform impact. The respondents with incomplete or complete secondary education tend to perceive the reform impact more negatively. Ethnic Ukrainians have better opinion of the reform than ethnic Russians.

Having compared findings of the survey with the data collected in March 2015¹¹ we can see that notable changes occurred only in several areas.

The share of positive responses concerning de-centralisation and local self-governance reform has increased noticeably from 11% to 23% (with the proportion of negative views also growing from 15% to 20%). Similarly, attitudes towards the energy independence programme and energy sector reform have also improved as the share of negative responses dropped from 46% to 32%.

At the same time, Ukraine's promotion in the world gained fewer positive reviews (from 29% to 20%), while the share of negative responses about the health sector reform has increased significantly (from 34% to 57%) (see Diagram 22).


It is noteworthy that the **respondents' assessments of the impact of reforms depend significantly on the level of their awareness**.¹² Those who are well aware of specific reforms are much more likely to view their impact as positive. As the respondents' awareness decreases, we observe the increasing share of those who either do not feel the reform impact or consider it negative.

If the share of citizens who know nothing about de-centralisation and local self-governance reform but view it positively makes up only 5%, then the share of reform supporters increases to 26% among those who are partially aware of it and exceeds 60% among those who are well aware of this reform. The same is true about the health sector reform: its impact is seen as positive by 3% of those who are unaware of it, by 9% of those with partial knowledge, and by 28% of the respondents who are well aware of the reform. These numbers for the educational sector reform are 3%, 14% and 46%; for the police reform – 3%, 18% and 57%, etc. (see Diagram 23).

These findings show that efforts to inform the Ukrainian citizens about the content and expected results of reforms have been insufficient.

The negative effects of reforms on personal well-being, the lack of positive influences, as well as insufficient information are among the reasons for people's negative perception of several priority reforms. For example, the respondents demonstrate predominantly negative attitudes towards education, health care, pension, land, judicial and police reforms as well as the upcoming efforts aimed at mass privatisation of state enterprises (see Diagram 24).

Diagram 22: Impact of ... on personal well-being*, % of the respondents




* Figure does not show the option "Did not answer" as the number of such answers to each of the questions did not exceed 1%.

¹¹ Citizen assessment of the situation in Ukraine and the reform status, attitudes towards politicians and social institutions, electoral ratings. Results of the Razumkov Centre's survey, http://old.razumkov.org.ua/upload/1427287523_file.pdf.

¹² Only reforms that at least 8% of the respondents are well aware of the reforms that were taken into consideration.

Diagram 23: Impact of ... on personal well-being (by awareness)*.
% of respondents




* Figure does not show the option "Did not answer" as the number of such answers to each of the questions did not exceed 1%.

Also, the respondents were asked to express their attitude towards some reforms currently implemented in Ukraine (specifically, education, health, pension, land, judicial and police reforms, as well as planned mass privatization of state enterprises). Negative

attitudes towards all these reforms dominate over the positive ones, as they are disapproved by relative majority of the respondents, while health and pension reforms are unpopular among absolute majority of Ukrainians.

Diagram 24: A number of reforms are underway in Ukraine.
Based on your current knowledge, what is your attitude towards these reforms?
% of respondents



* This option was absent in the 2017 questionnaire.

Educational sector reform. Assessment of this reform is characterised by significant regional differences. The balance of positive and negative attitudes in the West is -3%, further dropping to -19% in the Centre, to -24% in the South, and to -53% in the East. People's attitudes depend on their material status with poorer respondents being more critical about the reform. The respondents under 40 years old are slightly more likely to treat the reform positively compared with those aged 60+. The respondents with higher or secondary special education tend to be more negative about the reform than those with incomplete or complete secondary education. Also, the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are generally more critical about the educational reform than their Ukrainian-speaking counterparts and ethnic Ukrainians.

Health sector reform. Attitudes towards this reform in different regions also vary significantly. The balance of positive and negative attitudes is -21% in the West, -53% in the Centre, -67% in the South, and -73% in the East. Notable differences also depend on the material status: respondents with lower income are more negative about this reform. Also, people with secondary special education are the most critical about the health sector reform. The same attitudes are more widespread among the respondents aged 50+ than among young people. Women are also more likely to criticize the reform compared with men. The Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are generally more negative about the reform than the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians.

Pension reform. While assessing this reform, the respondents remain largely negative, albeit with notable regional differences. The balance of positive and negative attitudes is -28% in the West, -51% in the Centre, and about -65% in the South and the East. Differences also depend on the material status with respondents with lower income having more negative attitudes towards this reform. Negative attitudes also prevail in the group of respondents aged 50+, especially if compared with younger respondents. Ethnic Russians are somewhat more critical about this reform than ethnic Ukrainians.

If compared to October 2017, one can observe a substantial reduction in positive attitudes towards these critical reforms (we lack relevant data on the police reform). Moreover, the share of respondents who are critical of the health care and education sector reforms has increased significantly, exceeding 60%.

This persistent growth in citizens' negative attitudes towards reforms that are fundamental for the economic development (privatisation and land reform), or shape the social system (education, health and pension, as well as judicial and police reforms) is an alarming trend. In the long run this may undermine the support for the country's European integration, for which these reforms were intended.

These sentiments can be felt in how the respondents see the future of the on-going reforms.

Land reform. Regional differences can be also observed in people's attitudes towards this reform. The balance of positive and negative attitudes in the West, the Centre and the South ranges from -26% to -36% and drops to -60% in the East. Notable differences also depend on the material status with respondents with lower income being more negative about this reform. With age, the respondents become increasingly more negative in their attitudes towards the land reform. The respondents with secondary special education tend to be more critical about this reform, especially if compared with persons with higher education. Rural residents are more likely to criticise this reform compared with urban residents, and so are ethnic Russians who are less likely to appreciate this reform compared with ethnic Ukrainians.

Judicial reform. Region-wise, the balance of positive and negative attitudes is about -25% in the West and the Centre, -36% in the South, and -46% in the East. People's attitudes notably depend on their material status with poorer respondents being more critical about the reform. Similar negative attitudes are also more widespread among senior citizens compared with younger respondents. Ethnic Russians are more likely to give negative opinions about this reform compared with ethnic Ukrainians. In contrast, city dwellers are more positive about the reform than their rural counterparts.

Planned mass privatisation of state enterprises. The balance of positive and negative attitudes towards privatisation ranges from -25% in the Centre to -35% in the West and to -50% in the South and the East. Poorer respondents are more likely to have negative attitudes towards this process. Ethnic Russians are somewhat more critical about this reform than ethnic Ukrainians.

Police reform. The balance of positive and negative attitudes is only about -2% in the West and the Centre, dropping to -18% in the South and to -37% in the East. The biggest differences in attitudes yet again depend on material status, as respondents with higher income are more likely to appreciate this reform. The Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are generally more negative about the reform than the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians.

As many as 52% of the respondents generally disagree with the statement that the Ukrainian government should continue implementing reforms in full compliance with the requirements of Ukraine's international partners, while only 31% of respondents supported this statement.

Also, almost half of the respondents (47%) agree that the Ukrainian government should immediately stop implementing current reforms and partners' recommendations, use inner resources to promptly elaborate the strategy of Ukraine's national development, and to commence it as quickly as possible (33% disagreed with this statement).

The idea of the Ukrainian government continuing with the reforms but making necessary adjustments to recognise past mistakes and taking into account the national specifics even if these run counter to

the recommendations of Ukraine's international partners best resonates with the public. 65% of the respondents support this idea, while only 21% oppose it. Interestingly, the smallest number of respondents chose "hard to say" option (see Table 1).

Absolute or relative majority of the respondents across all regions fully or partially disagree with the statement that the government should continue implementing reforms in full compliance with the requirements of Ukraine's international partners. The largest share of those opposing this idea is in the East 68%. The proposal to immediately stop implementing current reforms, disregard partners' recommendations and elaborate Ukraine's own development strategy was particularly popular with the Ukrainians living in the East (64%), the South (60%) and the Centre (43%). In the meantime, most respondents in the West (51%) oppose this statement.

The proposal to continue with the reforms making necessary adjustments to recognise past mistakes and taking into account the national specifics even if these run

counter to the recommendations of international partners gained the strongest support in all regions. Specifically, 48% of the respondents in the East, 75% in the South, 65% in the Centre, and 80% in the West supported it.


Citizens' attitudes towards the future course of reforms in Ukraine combine faith, hope and disbelief in almost equal shares. About one-third of the respondents believe in the success of reforms in Ukraine (7% are confident, and 26% believe in reforms but have some doubts). Almost 34% of the respondents generally do not believe that reforms will succeed but still have a lingering hope. 27% of the respondents have no confidence in reforms altogether (see Diagram 25).

Interestingly enough, such distribution of opinions is typical for all regions of Ukraine, although the number of optimists is somewhat lower in the East. Citizens with higher education and better material status, as well as Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians are relatively more optimistic about the outcomes of reforms. The situation virtually did not change compared with previous studies.

Table 1: Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents

	Agree	Partially agree	Partially disagree	Disagree	Hard to say
The Ukrainian government should continue with the reforms but make necessary adjustments recognising past mistakes and take into account the national specifics even if these run counter to the recommendations of Ukraine's international partners	21.3	44.0	13.4	8.1	13.3
The Ukrainian government should immediately stop implementing current reforms and partners' recommendations, use inner resources to promptly elaborate the strategy of Ukraine's national development, and to commence it as quickly as possible	21.1	26.3	21.3	12.0	19.3
The Ukrainian government should continue implementing reforms in full compliance with the requirements of Ukraine's international partners	6.9	23.5	26.1	25.5	18.1

Diagram 25: Do you believe in the success of reforms in Ukraine?¹³
% of respondents



¹³ Findings of studies by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in collaboration with the Razumkov Centre (2015, 2016) and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (2017).

While assessing the future prospects of Ukraine, relative majority of citizens (39%) see it as a highly developed, democratic and influential European state, and their share remains virtually unchanged compared with 2005 and 2016. 18% of the respondents believe that Ukraine will take a special development path, for example like China.

Smaller proportions of the respondents think that Ukraine will forever remain a “third world country” or end up as an underdeveloped appendage to the West (7% each).

Since 2005, the share of respondents who saw Ukraine as an underdeveloped appendage to Russia has dropped significantly from 10% to just 1% (see Diagram 26).

Roughly 58% of the respondents in the West, 40% in the Centre and slightly less in the South and the East see Ukraine as a highly developed, democratic and influential European state.

Compared with other regions, people living in the East are much more likely to see Ukraine taking its own development path (25%); many of them also fear that Ukraine will forever remain a “Third World country” (14%). Quite a lot of the respondents in the South (27%) found it difficult to answer this question.


The respondents under 40 years old are more likely to see Ukraine’s European future than those who turned 60. The same is true for differences between the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians on the one hand, and the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians on the other, as well as between rural and urban residents.

1.3. POLITICAL VALUES AND ORIENTATIONS, ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL ACTORS, ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR

Peculiarities of citizens’ political culture¹⁴ including their interest in politics, political orientations and values¹⁵ play a significant role in shaping their attitudes towards specific policy areas and political actors (political parties, electoral candidates at different levels).

The citizen’s interest in politics remains low as only 6% of the respondents reported being very interested in this matter, with additional 32% being rather interested in political processes. Other respondents showed little (42%) or no interest (16%) in politics.

Diagram 26: How do you see the future of Ukraine?
% of respondents



¹⁴ For more detail on the political culture of Ukrainians see “Political Culture and Parliamentarism in Ukraine: Current State and Main Problems”. Information and analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre, – The National Security and Defence journal, 2017, No. 3-4, p.2-111.

¹⁵ See the results of public opinion survey “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Value Orientations” – The National Security and Defence journal, 2017, No.1-2, p.3-61.

Despite the forthcoming elections, these indicators did not change much over the past year. The level of interest in politics traditionally increases with age of the respondents; better education and higher income also contribute to the growing interest. Also, men are much more likely than women to have interest in politics.

29% of the respondents find it difficult or very difficult to decide upon their own stance on political issues; for 44% it is sometimes easy, and sometimes not; and 16% find this task easy or very easy. 11% of those polled could not answer this question.

While answering the question about the most **desirable system of government for Ukraine**, almost half of the respondents (49%) mentioned democracy. In contrast, 18% believe that the authoritarian regime may be preferable in certain conditions. 17% of those polled did not care much about the country's form of government, and another 16% found this question difficult to answer.

Residents in different regions and representatives of various social groups demonstrate significant variations in their responses. More than 60% of the respondents in the West view democracy as the most desirable form of government for Ukraine; this view is shared by roughly half of those living in the Centre and the South, and only by 37% in the East. Instead, quite notable proportions of people in the East and the Centre (26% and 20%, respectively) believe that the authoritarian rule may be preferable to democracy under certain circumstances.

The Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians demonstrate higher level of support for the democratic system compared with the Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians. The support for democracy is also slightly higher among the respondents under 50 years old; the same is true for the respondents with higher education.




Compared to September 2017, Ukrainians express certain disappointment with democracy, although it has not transformed yet into increased popularity of the authoritarian regime (see Diagram 27).

The largest decline in the popularity of democracy along with the growing support for authoritarianism was observed in 2009. There had been two immediate causes for that, namely the mounting conflict between the branches of government (particularly the president and the prime-minister) and social consequences of the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009.

Afterwards the level of public support for democracy grew in 2010-2012 – the period of formation and strengthening of President Yanukovich's authoritarian regime – and remained relatively stable during 2015-2017 even despite economic difficulties and immense political turbulence. **This may be the evidence that Ukrainians have been developing a persistent, value-based attitude towards the democracy, which**

Diagram 27: Which of the following statements would you rather agree with?
% of respondents



also serves as a safeguard against the spreading support for authoritarian methods during the election campaigns.

When faced with **dilemma between freedom and civil rights on the one hand, and material wealth on the other**, relative majority of the respondents (34%) expressed their readiness to sustain some material difficulties for the sake of personal freedom and civil rights guarantees. Instead, 28% of those polled would rather give up some of their rights and civil freedoms. Other 38% failed to make this choice (see Diagram 28).

In all regions the share of respondents willing to endure certain material difficulties for the sake of personal freedom and guarantees of all civil rights exceeds the proportion of those who are ready to give up freedom. However, these differences in the South and the Centre are insignificant. Many respondents in all regions (from 30% in the Centre to 48% in the East) could not answer this question. The respondents with better financial well-being are more likely to suffer material difficulties in exchange for the rights and freedoms. One can also observe the nationality-specific differences, as ethnic Ukrainians are more likely than ethnic Russians to endure material hardships for their freedom.

Understanding of the values of equality and freedom in Ukrainian society is quite peculiar. On the one hand, most respondents share a liberal approach to understanding the equality, as 51% of the respondents generally agree that equality primarily means equal opportunities and equality of all people before the law. Instead, 37% tend to believe that equality is all about the equality of income, living standards and social status for all.


On the other hand, most citizens (53%) would prefer living in a society where everything is regulated by the state, but with no excessive social inequality. Only about a quarter of respondents (26%) would like to live in society of individual freedom with everyone bearing personal responsibility and fending for oneself. 21% did not answer this question.

Even among those who share the liberal concept of equality, as many as 48% would like to live in a society regulated by the state but relieved of excessive social inequality. At the same time, the share of those who viewed equality as equal opportunities, and the share of the supporters of individual freedoms society have decreased since 2014 (see Diagram 29).

Diagram 28: Which of the following statements is more appealing to you?
% of respondents



Diagram 29: Which of the following statements in each pair would you rather agree with?
% of respondents



The equality of income is somewhat more popular in the East rather than the West. Men are more likely to pursue equal opportunities, while women prefer the equality of income. Respondents with higher education are more likely to appreciate the equality of opportunities.

The society of individual freedoms is the most appealing to Ukrainians living in the West, and the least popular in the South and the East. Instead, social equality is the preferred option in the East; it is less popular in the South and the Centre, while people in the West mostly reject it.

Respondents with better financial status are more supportive of individual freedoms. In contrast to older respondents, young people are more likely to prioritise personal freedoms and less likely to pursue social equality.


Men, as well as the respondents with higher education, tend to be somewhat more supportive of individual freedoms than women and respondents with secondary education.

The Russian-speaking citizens and city dwellers are slightly more inclined to support social equality compared with Ukrainian-speaking respondents and rural residents.

Presidential Elections: Electoral Motivations, Candidate Requirements, the Vision of Key Tasks of the Potential Head of State

Presidential elections in Ukraine traditionally stir a substantial interest and generate high voter turnout. As of August 2018,¹⁶ as many as 70% of citizens were fully or rather confident about their future participation, while 23% would not vote, either fully or partially. 7% of the respondents could not answer this question (see Diagram 30).

Diagram 30: Do you intend to participate in the elections of the President of Ukraine?
% of respondents




People's readiness to participate in presidential elections ranges from 61% in the East to 73% in the West. In the age groups, this readiness increases with age, from 63% of the youngest respondents to 74-75% in the oldest age groups. The largest proportion of those (19%) who are confident in their non-participation is also found among the youngest respondents. The share of those who are ready to vote among the Russian-speaking voters is somewhat lower than among the Ukrainian-speaking respondents (64% vs 73%).

The absence of a candidate worthy of voting for is the most cited motive for non-participation (30%). Other reasons were significantly less popular among the respondents (see Diagram 31).

Two-thirds of the respondents (66%) believe that the country needs new political leaders, that is, politicians who have not held the office yet.

Diagram 31: Why aren't you going to participate in the elections of the President of Ukraine?*
% of those who are not planning to participate in the elections




* Respondents were free to choose several relevant options.

¹⁶ Based on the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in collaboration with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 16-22 August 2018 in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The sample included 2,019 respondents aged 18+ years. Theoretical sampling error – 2.3%.

A quarter of the respondents think that current politicians are efficient enough (see Diagram 32).

Diagram 32: Does Ukraine need new political leaders (meaning politicians who haven't held the office yet)?
% of respondents




The demand for new politicians is more pronounced in the West and the Centre (72% each) than in the South (66%) and the East (53%), where many citizens (37%) believe that current politicians are sufficient. If the demand for new politicians among the youngest voters reaches 74% of the respondents, then among those aged 60+ it makes up 60%. The Ukrainian-speaking citizens also demonstrate stronger demand than the Russian-speaking ones. However, despite these differences, the request for new leaders prevails in all regions and across all surveyed social groups.

If compared with past situations, the share of Ukrainians, who demand new leaders, significantly exceeds figures of 2013 (54%), when this demand was articulated by only 28% of the respondents, while 37% believed that the existing leaders had been sufficient.¹⁷ This may be the evidence of the society's disappointment with leaders who came to power following the Revolution of Dignity.

At the same time, the problem with new leaders is still relevant, as only 29% of the respondents see new political leaders to choose from, while 70% do not see any.


Moreover, this ratio is typical of all regions, age, educational, linguistic and prosperity groups. The share of those who see the potential leaders amounts to 39% among the wealthiest respondents. At the same time, more than 60% of the respondents across all groups do not see any new leaders.

Diagram 33: Do you see any new political leaders?
% of respondents



The lack of new leaders is further confirmed by the answers to the question about who people see as such leaders. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (8%) and Volodymyr Zelenskyi (6%) were two of the most frequently mentioned personas. 65% of those polled did not name anyone (see Diagram 34).

Diagram 34: Can you name a person who you see as a new political leader?*
% of respondents




* Open question. Respondents were asked to pick up to 5 names. Above are the names of political leaders mentioned by at least 0.5% of the respondents.

Being offered a list of potential candidates, only 62% of the respondents were able to select a candidate, while 3% would have voted for somebody else. 35% did not make their choice or would not participate in the elections.¹⁸

Speaking of those who named a specific candidate, only 37% consider their choice as final, while 60% can still change their minds (see Diagram 35).

Diagram 35: How conclusive is your choice of the candidate?
% of those who named a specific candidate



This situation is typical for all regions. Across all age groups, the smallest share of those who have made their final choice is observed among the youngest voters (27%), and the largest – among voters aged 50+ (42-43%).

¹⁷ See "Political Parties and the Party System of Ukraine in the Eyes of Citizens" – Transformation of the Party System: the Ukrainian Experience in the European Context (edited by Yu. Yakymenko), Kyiv: the Razumkov Centre, 2017, p.203.

¹⁸ For a list of candidates, see the link below: <https://dif.org.ua/article/za-pivroku-do-viboriv-reytingi-kandidatuv-i-partiy-motivatsii-viboru-ochikuvannya-gromadyan>.

The main reasons for the respondents to vote for a particular candidate **include the affection for his/her personality and ideological closeness (36% each).**

These are followed by the candidate's vision of overcoming the economic crisis and ensuring economic growth (26%); ability to bring peace to the Donbas (21%); and being able to propose a strategy for the country's future development (see Table 2).

Table 2: Why did you decide to vote for this particular candidate?*
% of those who named a specific candidate

This candidate's personality is attractive for me	36.4
This candidate's ideas and proposals are close to me	36.0
This candidate has the vision of overcoming economic crisis and bringing economic growth to the country	26.0
This candidate can bring peace to the Donbas	21.4
This candidate has the best strategy for the country's future development	19.5
This candidate will be able to curb corruption and get corrupt officials punished	18.1
This candidate will care for such people as myself	16.7
This candidate has the best team of professionals capable of ensuring development and order in the country	14.7
This candidate belongs to the political party that I support	13.2
This candidate will be able to unite people in all regions and overcome the split in the country	12.4
I consider this candidate as "lesser evil" compared with others	12.0
This candidate has already done a lot for Ukraine	11.6
This candidate is the least involved in corruption and other indecent activities	8.4
This candidate is "fresh blood" that the current government needs	8.0
This candidate is respected all over the world	7.9
This candidate will be able to repel the Russian aggression, ensure Ukraine's independence and security	6.6
This candidate will achieve Ukraine's joining the NATO and make important steps towards the European integration	6.5
This candidate may have the majority in the future Verkhovna Rada and therefore influence its decisions	6.1
This candidate will be able to fix relations with Russia	4.1
This candidate will be able to bring Crimea back to Ukraine	3.9
This candidate will ensure lifting of parliamentary immunity and removing privileges of MPs	3.7
I always support this candidate	3.2
Other reasons	2.5
Hard to say	0.4

* Respondents could pick up to 5 relevant options.

Personal liking, closeness of ideas and proposals, and vision of overcoming crisis are the top three motives across all the regions. The fourth most popular reason was the ability to bring peace to the Donbas (the East and the Centre), ability to overcome corruption (the West) and to propose a sound development strategy for the country (the South). The fifth place in all regions, excluding the South, was given to the strategy of the country's future development (the South prioritised the team of professionals).


Overall, the top five motives – although with insignificant variations in order – are typical for an absolute majority of the respondents among all the groups.

In the short list of qualities that may have the biggest impact on people's choice, top three include **personal qualities of a candidate (57%), his/her previous activities (43%) his/her programme and proposals (40%).**

These three qualities were the most popular in all regions and across all the age, education and linguistic groups. At the same time, the candidate's programme and proposals are slightly less important for those living in the West. Also, unlike older age categories, the youngest voters consider the candidate's previous activities somewhat less significant.

All other positions were mostly disregarded by the respondents. If we look at some "technological" electoral factors, the most influential in terms of shaping people's choices include taking part in public debates (18%), having the team of associates (14%), advice from people whom the respondent trusts (12%), and to a lesser extent – media publications (8%), the presence of compromising materials (7%) and visual propaganda, e.g. posters (4%) (see Diagram 36).

Diagram 36: Which of the following will have the biggest impact on your choice of the candidate?*
% of respondents



* Respondents could pick all relevant options.

Therefore, **key motive for a voter to support a particular candidate is the personality factor, through which people primarily perceive the candidate's programme and proposals.** Previous activities can obviously be a defining characteristic of the candidate's personality, which are inseparable from other qualities. This should be taken into consideration in assessing the electoral chances of candidates whose past activities were not linked to politics or public administration.

Most citizens believe that the main candidates running for the Presidential office should participate in head-to-head debates: 38% consider them mandatory, and 34% – desirable. 28% of those polled would have definitely watched such debates; 44% of the respondents would join them if debates were interesting and meaningful (see Diagram 37, 38).

Diagram 37: Do you think top-rated presidential candidates should participate in head-to-head public debates, including on TV?
% of respondents





Diagram 38: If such debates take place, would you watch them?
% of respondents



According to the respondents, **top five topics for presidential debates** should include: the vision of achieving peace in Donbas, ways of liberating the occupied territories and their re-integration; priority issues that the newly elected president will try to address; the country's development programme during the candidate's presidency and beyond; ways to improve the quality of life of Ukrainians; and ways to curb corruption.

These debate topics were mentioned by the largest proportions of the respondents in all regions and across all age, educational, prosperity and linguistic groups. Although wording of some of these topics is too broad, they essentially can be reduced to three key issues: ways to achieving peace; economic development and prosperity; and curbing corruption (see Table 3).


Table 3: Which topics of presidential debates would be the most interesting?*
% of respondents

How to achieve peace in the Donbas? How to liberate the occupied territories and ensure their re-integration in Ukraine?	43.9
Which priority issues will the candidate try to address in the first place if elected?	40.6
The country's development programme during the candidate's presidency and beyond	35.8
How to improve the quality of life of the Ukrainians?	34.8
How to curb corruption in Ukraine?	33.6
How to achieve economic growth?	30.0
How to make medicine more accessible for people?	29.8
How to bring Crimea back?	16.3
How to stop migration from Ukraine?	14.8
What to do with oligarchs?	12.9
Staffing policy: who does the candidate plan to appoint to key government positions in case of his/her win?	9.2
How should the educational sector reform be?	7.7
Foreign policy: which direction should Ukraine move – towards European integration or back to Russia and CIS?	7.7
Outlook of Ukraine's EU membership	6.8
In the candidate's opinion, which system of government and public administration structure would be the best for Ukraine?	6.5
Outlook of Ukraine joining the NATO	6.3
What constitutional changes should be made?	4.9
Other topics	1.0
Hard to say	11.3

* Respondents could pick up to 5 relevant options.

Ukrainian society has considerable doubts about fairness of the upcoming elections. Relative majority of citizens (40%) view them as “not very fair”. 29% of those polled expect “totally unfair elections”, 15% – “mostly fair”, and only 1.5% – “totally fair” (see Diagram 39).


Diagram 39: How fair will the upcoming elections of the President of Ukraine be?
% of respondents



The share of Ukrainians expecting totally or mostly fair elections is almost three times smaller in the South and in the East compared with the West, and two times smaller than in the Centre. This proportion among the Russian-speaking citizens is two times smaller than among the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians.

Despite these rather pessimistic thoughts about fairness of the upcoming elections, the overall expectations are generally optimistic, as 34% of those polled expect significant or certain improvements, 30% think that the situation will not change, and only 11% believe that things will worsen significantly or slightly (see Diagram 40).

Diagram 40: How will the upcoming elections of the President of Ukraine change the situation in the country?
% of respondents



Individual regions demonstrate similar trends. Most optimists can be found in the South (39%) and in the Centre (38%), as their number decreases to 34% in the West and 26% in the East. The distribution by age groups is mostly identical. Ukrainians with higher education, better financial situation, and the Ukrainian-speaking citizens are somewhat more optimistic than other groups.

Parliamentary Elections: People's Ideological and Political Orientations, Electoral Motivations, Selection Criteria for Political Parties

In terms of political self-identification, most Ukrainians view themselves as centrists. While placing their views on the “left–right” scale from 1 to 10, the respondents scored an average of 5.2 points. Specifically, 58% of those polled have chosen “5” and “6” right in the middle of the scale. 23% of the respondents define themselves as left wing, and 18% – as right wing.

In the West, the respondents generally place themselves closer to the “right” (5.9 points) if compared to other regions. The supporters of the centrist views constitute the majority – either absolute or relative – in all regions of Ukraine. The share of respondents who associated themselves with the right ideological spectrum is much higher in the West (35%) than in the rest of Ukraine. Instead, Eastern, Southern and Central regions have higher representation of “centrists” and “leftists”. The Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians are more inclined towards the left ideology compared to the country average, while rural residents are slightly more likely to support the right-wing views.

If compared with the 2006 public opinion survey, one can observe a certain shift to the right:

the number of “left-wing” citizens has increased from 18% to 23% and the number of “right-wing” citizens decreased from 26% to 18%. Interestingly enough, the party system underwent opposite changes, as during this period some previously influential left-wing parties, e.g. the Socialist Party or the Communist Party of Ukraine, have gradually abandoned the political stage for various reasons (see Diagram 41).

None of the ideological and political courses enjoys the overwhelming support of Ukrainians. For example, 17% of the respondents chose the national-democratic course; 8% supported social and democratic ideology, and 4% preferred liberal order. Other ideologies, such as socialist, environmental, national-radical, as well as policy aimed at reunification of Ukraine with Russia, each gained 3% of supporters (see Table 4).

Compared to other regions, more respondents in the West associate themselves with the national and democratic ideology, while there are more supporters of the social and democratic course in the East and the Centre.

Roughly half of the respondents in all regions (49% in the West, 55% in the Centre, 54% in the South, and 51% in the East) could not associate themselves with this or that ideological and political course.

Speaking of the age groups, young people are the least knowledgeable in terms of various ideological and political orders (31%). Men generally better navigate through these ideological and political currents than women and are more likely to support the national and democratic ideology. The respondents with higher education, the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians, as well as rural residents are more likely to associate themselves with the national democrats, while the Russians tend to support social-democratic ideology and communism.

Compared to 2011, when Ukraine's party system looked fundamentally different, we observe a significant reduction in the share of people supporting the communist ideology and political course aimed at reunification with Russia. Instead, there is an increasing share of supporters of the social-democratic ideology.

During the entire period under study, the supporters for the national and democratic order remains relatively high but following the sharp growth in 2014 after significant changes in the party system, its share dropped to the 2011 levels.

Similarly, after brief reduction in 2014 the total share of the respondents unable to describe their ideological orientation returned to the 2011 level (over 50%).

Only 40% of the respondents who were able to express their specific ideological and political course believe that Ukraine has a political party, whose practical activities are in line with this course. 39% of those polled believe that there are no such parties. Compared to 2011 and 2014, the share of positive responses has decreased by one-third against the growing number of negative responses. Moreover, this state of affairs characterises people's attitudes towards current composition of the country's party system, already deeply renewed in 2014 (see Diagram 42).

Diagram 41: In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on a scale from 1 to 10, where “1” stands for “the left”, and “10” stands for “the right”?





Table 4: Which ideological and political course best fits your views?
% of respondents

	November 2011	November 2014	November 2016	June 2018
National-democratic	15.4	26.2	17.4	16.6
Social-democratic	4.3	9.5	7.5	7.7
Liberal	2.2	1.6	2.3	3.8
Socialist	2.3	2.2	2.8	3.2
Environmental ("the greens")	2.6	3.1	2.9	3.0
National-radical	2.3	4.5	4.4	2.9
Political course aimed at reunification of Ukraine with Russia	9.7	4.4	2.1	2.8
Christian-democratic	1.3	2.1	3.1	2.3
Communist	5.4	3.3	1.6	1.6
National-communist	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.9
Other	1.8	0.7	1.8	2.5
None	13.2	6.6	15.5	9.6
I am clueless about political courses and trends	28.6	21.3	25.0	24.0
Hard to say	10.3	13.5	13.1	19.1
REGIONS				
	West	Centre	South	East
National-democratic	27.8	12.7	13.2	13.9
Social-democratic	2.5	9.7	5.3	10.1
Liberal	2.5	5.7	4.1	2.3
Socialist	0.8	2.5	4.1	6.2
Environmental ("the greens")	4.0	1.8	5.3	2.8
National-radical	4.7	2.8	1.2	2.3
Political course aimed at reunification of Ukraine with Russia	0.6	1.0	6.6	5.4
Christian-democratic	5.5	2.3	0.4	0.6
Communist	0.4	1.7	2.5	2.1
National-communist	0.2	1.0	0.4	1.7
Other	1.7	3.4	2.5	2.1
None	9.1	8.3	9.5	12.2
I am clueless about political courses and trends	21.4	28.8	19.8	20.8
Hard to say	18.6	18.3	25.1	17.6

Diagram 42: Is there a political party in Ukraine, whose practical activities are in line with your ideological and political views?
% of respondents



In contrast to other regions, fewer people in the East believe that Ukraine has a political party whose practical activities are in line with their ideological and political views; more than 54% of the respondents believe that there is no such party. This viewpoint is largely shared by those who consider themselves the poorest. Unlike ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians are more likely to complain about underrepresentation of their ideological and political views in the Ukrainian political spectrum.


If parliamentary elections occurred in Ukraine any time soon, only 31% of the respondents would be ready to choose from the parties currently represented

in the Parliament. Instead, almost 40% of those polled are going to look for alternatives among the new parties. Another 29% of the respondents are yet to decide (see Diagram 43).

The Ukrainians living in the Centre are the most likely to choose from current parliamentary parties, while most of those living in the East would look for alternatives among the new parties. With age, the respondents become increasingly more supportive of the mainstream parties represented in the Parliament.

The dynamics of responses (for reference we used the surveys of the Sociological Group "Rating", which

Diagram 43: If parliamentary elections occurred in Ukraine any time soon, you would..., % of respondents



included this question in polls since 2012),¹⁹ suggests **gradual reduction in the share of voters who are ready to support current parliamentary parties.**

Increase in the share of those seeking alternatives among the new parties is another important trend. Specifically, in April and June 2018 the proportion of people who would prefer voting for new political forces significantly exceeded the share of those disposed towards supporting “old” parties.

This situation is a logical outcome of the drop in public support for the top government institutions in 2014-2018; poor ratings of party activities, both parliamentary and non-parliamentary (according to the Razumkov Centre’s survey in September 2017, twenty of the most active political parties scored only 1 to 2.9 points on the scale from 0 to 10, where “10” was the maximum positive score)²⁰; and the growing demand for new political forces and leaders.

In addition, the growing expectations from new political forces are predetermined by remarkable intensification of processes within the party system, introduction of new “political projects” by individual political leaders, negotiations about unification of ideologically related political parties “in favour” of certain presidential candidates that are actively covered in the mass media.

However, despite significant criticism of the existing parties, **a notable proportion of voters (36%) believe that Ukraine does have political parties and movements that can be entrusted with power.** Meanwhile, roughly the same share of the respondents (40%) have the opposite opinion.²¹

Diagram 44: Are there political leaders in Ukraine today who could effectively lead the country? % of respondents





Diagram 45: Are there political parties and movements currently existing in Ukraine that could be entrusted with power? % of respondents



Therefore, in Ukraine both old and new political parties have chances to enter the Parliament, while the size of their potential constituencies is roughly the same.

In the meantime, the situation of pro-government parties is notably less favourable. Only 8% of the respondents are rather loyal to these parties, whereas the opposition parties enjoy the support of twice as many respondents (16%) (see Table 5).

¹⁹ Findings of studies conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating”. See “Social and Political Moods of Ukrainians: New Challenges” – Sociological Group “Rating”, April 2018, <https://ratinggroup.ua/download.php?id=282>.

²⁰ See “Political Culture and Parliamentarism in Ukraine: Current State and Main Problems”. Information and analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre, - The National Security and Defence journal, 2017, No. 3-4, p.6.

²¹ The survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in collaboration with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 16-22 August 2018.



Table 5: You hold affection for political parties that are...
% of respondents

	March 2007	December 2009	May 2011	April 2012	November 2014	May 2015	November 2016	June 2018
Pro-government	17.3	15.1	15.5	18.7	27.2	15.3	11.9	8.1
Oppose the government	17.2	17.8	19.4	26.4	6.1	8.4	11.4	15.9
Neither pro-government nor opposition	10.2	10.2	8.7	7.5	9.3	10.6	12.4	11.0
The party's opposition or non-opposition does not matter for me	23.8	31.3	24.2	19.4	27.4	34.1	34.4	30.3
I support no party	17.5	13.9	22.3	19.8	15.0	17.4	17.3	19.0
Hard to say	14.0	11.7	9.9	8.1	15.0	14.1	12.7	15.7

Residents of the Eastern regions are somewhat less likely to sympathize the pro-government parties. Young people are less likely to support the opposition parties than the respondents aged 50+. Similarly, the respondents with better material status and higher education would rather support pro-government parties. The same is true with the Ukrainian-speaking citizens.

Compared to 2014, the share of supporters of pre-government parties has shown triple reduction, while the number of those supporting the opposition has increased. However, just like in the past, most respondents do not declare their preferences and affiliations considering the pro-governmental or oppositional nature of the parties.


In contrast to attitudes towards the authorities, **geo-political orientation of a particular political force comes to the fore for most respondents (69%)**.

In particular, 30% of those polled prefer political forces advocating for Ukraine's European integration (which, however, has considerably less support than the integrational course towards the EU – 48%).


28% are ready to support political forces calling for Ukraine's special path of development based on its national specifics (this proportion largely coincides with the level of support for non-alignment with the EU and the EAEU).

11% support political parties standing for restoration of relationship with Russia and for Ukraine's integration into Eurasian space (9% support Ukraine's joining the Eurasian Economic Union) (see Diagram 46).

Diagram 46: Which political forces would you rather support (have a liking for)?
% of respondents



Support of political forces depending on the respondent's intention to vote for or against Ukraine's accession to the European Union



Additional 18% reported that these issues did not affect their liking for political parties, while 14% of the respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

Most respondents in the West (51%) give preference to political parties that pursue European integration of Ukraine. In other regions, this support reduces to 35% in the Centre, 17% in the South, and only 10% in the East. Instead, rather substantial proportion of people living in the East favour parties that call for Ukraine's special path of development (33%), as well as parties seeking to restore relations with Russia (26%).

With improving material status, the respondents become increasingly more supportive of pro-European parties.

Young people, ethnic Ukrainians, as well as the respondents with higher education are somewhat more likely to approve pro-European parties, if compared to senior citizens, the Russian-speaking people, ethnic Russians and respondents without higher education.

The analysis of party sympathisers among the citizens who would have voted for Ukraine's accession to the EU at the referendum found that 54% of them declared support for the parties advocating for the European integration. At the same time, 21% of pro-European respondents supported parties that call for Ukraine's special path based on its national specifics.

Similarly, the party proclivities of the opponents of Ukraine's EU membership are by no means homogeneous. Relative majority of those who would vote against the Ukraine's accession to the EU (38%) support political parties calling for the country's special path of development. The second largest share of these respondents (28%) are likely to support parties seeking restoration of ties with Russia. For the remaining one-third of the respondents, this question is either irrelevant, or difficult to answer.

These data suggest that **Ukraine's electoral field still holds a niche for political parties that can be supported by citizens with different geopolitical orientations. These are the parties that call for a special path of the country's development based on its national peculiarities.**

The fact that most Ukrainians have never read the party programmes confirms the lack of people's interest in politics. 61% of the respondents reported never reading these documents. Moreover, the proportion of those who have never read party programmes has dropped since September 2017 from 44% to 39%²² (see Diagram 47).

Only 26% of young respondents have ever read a political party programme, but this proportion increases to 40% among the respondents aged 40+. Men are more likely to read these documents than women. Also, the share of the respondents reading these party documents increases with the level of education. The poorest respondents rarely read the party programmes compared with other citizens.

Of those, who did read the political programmes, 58% believe that they differ from each other, while 42% think that they are basically identical (this ratio virtually did not change since September 2017) (see Diagram 48).

Diagram 47: Have you ever read the programmes of political parties?
% of respondents





Diagram 48: Do the programmes of various political parties differ from each other?
% of those who have read the party programmes



The national television (78%) and the Internet (50%) are the main sources of information about political processes in Ukraine. These are the sources that most respondents mentioned in their answers to the question "Which are the sources where you usually get information about the latest events in the world, in Ukraine, in your regions, and so on?"²³ Only 6.4% of the respondents have used "specialized" sources more than once a month, e.g. party newspapers, while 70% have never read them²⁴ (see Diagram 49).

68% of the respondents confirm their intention to participate in the elections (the total of responses "I will definitely participate" and "I will most likely


²² Here we must point out the other side of the problem: the presence or absence of own programmes, and their availability in open sources.

²³ Based on the survey jointly conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Razumkov Centre and the "SOCIS" firm from 30 August to 9 September 2018. The sample included 10,005 respondents aged 18+ years in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. See "Social and Political Situation in Ukraine. The Presentation of Data" – KIIS, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=783&page=1&t=3>.

²⁴ Based on the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 22-27 September 2017 in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The sample included 2,008 respondents aged 18+ years. Theoretical sampling error – 2.3%.

participate”). 24% of those polled do not plan to vote, while 9% are yet to decide on their participation.²⁵


Diagram 49: Are you going to participate in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?
% of respondents



The proportion of citizens willing to participate in the parliamentary elections ranges from 69% in the West to 59% in the South. People's readiness to vote across different groups increases with age, from 60% in the youngest group to 72% of the oldest group. 29% of voters aged 18-29 have no intention to participate in the elections. The number of those willing to vote is slightly higher among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens if compared to the Russian-speaking respondents.

The most frequently cited reasons for non-participation in the parliamentary elections include the absence of a decent party that is worth voting for (mentioned by 19% of those who are not planning to vote) and doubts about the fairness of elections (17%) (see Diagram 50).

Diagram 50: Why aren't you going to participate in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?*
% of those who are not planning to participate in the elections




* Respondents were free to choose several relevant options.

60% of the respondents have chosen a specific party from the suggested list; 4% selected the “other party” option; 17% have not decided yet, and 19% would not vote.²⁶

Among those who made a choice, 39% believe that their selection is conclusive; 47% currently give preference to this party but may change their mind, and 14% do not consider their choice final and can change it anytime.

This means that more than 60% of those who would have chosen a specific party today may not vote for it in the parliamentary elections. If we add a considerable number of Ukrainians who have not made up their minds, it becomes essentially useless to predict the election outcomes.

Diagram 51: How conclusive is your choice of the party?
% of those who named a specific party



The largest share of respondents (45%) who consider their choice final and conclusive live in the South; also, there are fewer people in this region who do not rule out changes in their choice (54%). The proportion of those who made a conclusive decision increases with age – from 26% among young voters aged 18-29 to 46% in the group of 60+ years. Moreover, as many as 72% of the youngest voters can change their choices. Differences by other categories are insignificant.

²⁵ Unless noted otherwise, the data here and below are based on the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in collaboration with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 16-22 August 2018.

²⁶ For the list of parties under review see <https://dif.org.ua/article/zapivrokudoviborivreytingikandidativipartiyimotivatsiiviboruochikuvannyagromadyan>.

While describing motives for their choices, most respondents reported that they liked ideas and proposals of these parties (48%) and they liked the party leaders (44%). Other reasons (the party expresses interests of other people like myself; the party is the “lesser evil” compared with others; the party has good chances to overcome the 5% threshold; the party has people who I would like to support, etc.) were mentioned by 10% to 20% of those polled.

Table 6: Why are you leaning towards this particular party?*
% of those who named a specific party

I like their ideas and proposals	47.9
I like their leaders	44.0
This party expresses interests of other people just like myself	19.6
This party is the “lesser evil” compared with others	15.0
This party has good chances to overcome the 5% threshold	10.8
This party has people who I would like to support	10.3
I have already voted for this party in the past elections and it did not disappoint me	9.9
This is new party, and our politics needs makeover	7.8
This party is supported by people who I respect and trust	7.1
In fact, I picked this party accidentally	1.3
Other	0.1
Hard to say	0.9

* Respondents could pick up to two relevant responses.

In all regions alike, positive attitudes towards ideas and proposals, as well as good feelings about the leaders are top two reasons for supporting political parties. Yet, these motives are less popular with people in the East. As for the age groups, the ideas and proposals of political parties are much more appealing for the respondents aged 50+ (over 50%) than for the youngest category of voters (40%). For wealthier people, parties with their proposals, ideas and leaders are somewhat less important than for other categories of citizens, but the former are much more likely to support the “lesser evil” criterion (26% vs 16% in other groups).

It is necessary to note that both political proposals (ideas, party programme, etc.) and the leaders have

long been the drivers behind people’s choices. During 2012 and 2014 elections, for example, voters’ affection for the party leaders (49% and 62%, respectively) and appreciation of the party platforms (37% and 24%) basically shaped their choices.

If in 2014 one could observe the ever-increasing significance of the leadership factor, then today it gradually gives way to ideas and positions. This can be linked to the voters’ displeasure with current party leaders, the lack of “new leaders”, and the demand for new policy agendas caused by disappointment with reforms.²⁷

The type of electoral system will be essential for the outcomes of the parliamentary elections. **As of today, relative majority of respondents (34%) view the proportional system with open party lists as the best electoral system for Ukraine.**

Meanwhile, 15% of the respondents support the current option – mixed system with closed party lists; 14% would prefer the majoritarian system, and 5% would rather have the proportional system with closed party lists.

There exist significant regional differences in this regard, as the public support for the proportional system with open party lists is much higher in the West and the East, compared to the Centre and the South. Younger voters are less likely to support the system with open lists compared to other age categories, while the share of those who could not answer this question among them is the highest. The most disadvantaged respondents support open lists more often than other categories of citizens. Also, men are more likely to support the proportional system with open lists than women, and so are the Ukrainian-speaking citizens compared to the Russian-speaking ones.

Since September 2017, the popularity of mixed and majoritarian systems has somewhat decreased and more respondents find it difficult to answer this question (from 24% to 29%).

The issue of altering the electoral system for 2019 parliamentary elections in 2019 remains open. At the moment, the chances of preserving the existing electoral system in Ukraine look better than the likelihood of introducing the system with open party lists.

Table 7: Which system of elections to the Verkhovna Rada do you think is the best for Ukraine?
% of respondents

	September 2017	June 2018
Proportional system with open party lists (people vote for specific parties and mark the most appropriate candidates from this party)	34.5	33.8
Mixed system with closed party lists (part of MPs are elected based on closed lists, where parties determine the candidates’ order, and the other part of MPs are elected in majoritarian districts)	17.2	14.6
Majoritarian system (all MPs are elected in majoritarian districts without voting for the party lists)	16.1	13.8
Proportional system with closed party lists (parties approve the lists of candidates and determine their order, while people vote for entire lists of specific parties)	5.2	5.1
Other	3.4	3.9
Hard to say	23.6	28.7

²⁷ See “Political Parties and the Party System of Ukraine in the Eyes of Citizens” – Transformation of the party system: the Ukrainian experience in the European context (edited by Yu. Yakymenko), Kyiv: the Razumkov Centre, 2017, p.226-227.

2. CITIZENS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN VARIOUS SPHERES

The anticipated changes in key government institutions are the main peculiarity of the 2019 electoral processes. This renewal of institutions that jointly define the country's political course and ensure its implementation – the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers – will occur through democratic elections, where the visions of the state policy in different spheres put forward by presidential candidates and political parties will compete for voters' support.

As noted above, the principal aspect of the election campaign, the content of “political supply” by candidates and parties has been essential for voters, along with personal qualities of political leaders. It is particularly important in the context of growing populist trends in both Ukrainian and global politics and greater focus on current “moods” of the electorate rather than long-term societal needs.

Given the critical attitudes of the public towards reforms, this situation presents a serious challenge for Ukraine. Which political forces will garner greater support in the upcoming elections? Will they get a mandate from the majority to carry on with the European integration reforms? These questions remain open. Therefore, the Razumkov Centre has initiated a dedicated study to identify the political priorities of Ukrainians in various spheres.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To identify political preferences, the respondents were asked to “locate” a political party that they are likely to support in the parliamentary elections between two alternatives on the 11-grade rating scale.¹ Policy alternatives have been grouped into four blocks: (1) foreign and domestic policy, security; (2) economy; (3) social policy; and (4) humanitarian policy.

The opposite alternatives in blocks “Foreign and domestic policy, security” and “Humanitarian policy” were formulated based on the existing political approaches to relevant issues in present-day Ukraine. Policy alternatives in the questions included in the blocks “Economy” and “Social policy” were based on the “left–right” scale. In addition, questions in the block “Humanitarian policy” implied alternative answers that match the political parties' positioning on the “libertarian–authoritarian” scale (also known as *GAL-TAN* scale).²

For analytical purposes, the respondents' answers within ranges “0–3”, “4–7” and “7–10” were grouped to enable more visual representation of the citizens' political preferences.

First, (Subsection 2.1.) the researchers analysed the distribution of respondents' answers by regions and by socio-demographic criteria.

Second, (Subsection 2.2.) the analysis focused on the distribution of answers in certain social groups defined on the basis of their peculiar geopolitical and socio-political orientations. Criteria for forming these groups included the most distinct disparities in public opinion specifically regarding people's geopolitical orientation, their attitudes towards the historic past and the future course of development, assessments of the country's and their own situations, future prospects and the like.

Our hypothesis was that the representatives of these groups may share some common features in supporting specific policy alternatives, which may serve as a basis for their further voting for real parties offering relevant alternatives.

And finally, (Subsection 2.3) the researchers explored political priorities of the respondent groups based on two criteria (vision of the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's development and attitudes towards the reforms). These groups can be viewed as potential constituencies for hypothetical political forces united by common dominant features (e.g. “Euro-integrationists – Euro-sceptics”, “reformists – conservatives”). We also analysed political preferences of citizens depending on their readiness to vote for potential presidential candidates and political parties (potential electorate).

¹ The analysis is based on the respondents' answers to the question “Where on the 0 to 10 scale should a political force that you would support in the elections be located?”, where people were asked to decide upon alternative political proposals (statements) in various spheres. The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 21–27 June 2018 in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The sample included 2,021 respondents aged 18+ years. Theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

² See R. Bakker at al. Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. – Party Politics, 2015, Vol.21(1), p.143–152, <https://ches-chapelhill.expertsurvey.squarespace.com/>; J. Rovny, J. Polk, The Other Dimension: Contents, Connections and Sources of Party Competition Along the Socio-Cultural Dimension in Europe. CERGU'S WORKING PAPER SERIES 2013:3, https://cergu.gu.se/digitalAssets/1463/1463562_2013-3.pdf.

By compiling the survey questionnaire, the Razumkov Center used ideas on the issues outlined in the publication: Wheatley, Jonathan (2012). Using VAAs to explore the dimensionality of the policy space: experiments from Brazil, Peru, Scotland and Cyprus. International Journal of Electronic Governance, 5(3/4):318–348. https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/95094/1/Wheatley_Int_J_Electronic_Governance_2012.pdf.

2.1. POLICY PRIORITIES IN VARIOUS SPHERES: REGIONAL AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC SPECIFICS³

► Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security

The questions concerning foreign policy orientations and the ways of resolving the conflict in the East reveal significant social divisions. Within suggested dilemmas, none of the alternatives has been supported by at least half of the respondents.

Relative majority of the respondents (46%) are ready to endorse a political force that promotes Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future. The share of respondents who support a union with Russia and Belarus is 23%.

A question of choice between the NATO membership and non-bloc status, as well as the issue of relations with Russia (seeking reconciliation or keeping tough stance) divides society into three relatively equal parts (supporters of each alternative and those undecided), but in general the support for joining the NATO and staying tough in relations with Russia is somewhat higher (37% each).

Quite controversial are citizens' views on the ways of resolving the conflict in the East, with relative majority supporting the return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia (43%), which is almost twice the number of those supporting a military approach. About one-third of the respondents remain "between two extremes".

Also, 43% of those polled support bid for peace only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society, whereas the share of those seeking peace "at all costs" is 28%.

Almost half of the respondents (47%) stand for a unitary system of government and consider granting

special status to regions unacceptable; meanwhile, 24% support the possibility of autonomy of certain regions.

Relative majority of the survey participants (41%) favour increased expenditure on the Armed Forces, their strengthening and development, rather than reduction of expenditure (21%), although the proportion of those with "neutral" position is also significant (38%).

In general, the Ukrainian society hardly supports centralization or authoritarian approaches. Quite the contrary, only 10% of those polled support scaling up of the central government's functions, whereas 56% advocate for the delegation of powers from the centre to local self-governments and support de-centralisation.

Also, 54% of the respondents are supportive of greater public control over the law enforcement agencies, while only 12% approve greater accountability of these agencies to the state.

As many as 52% of the respondents think that any restrictions on political rights and liberties for the sake of political stability are inadmissible, while only 14% would support such restrictions. Also, 45% believe that any restrictions of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression, with 17% having the opposite opinion.

As for possible changes in the balance of power between the President and the Parliament, most Ukrainians remain conservative, as 45% are not ready to support either increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the entire executive branch and restricted presidential powers on the one hand, or increased role of the President on the other. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who support strengthening of the Verkhovna Rada's role is considerably larger at 35% vs 19%.

Although Ukrainian society at large clearly prefers the European vector of integration, there still exist considerable regional differences in this regard. Specifically, vast majority of the respondents in the West and the Centre support Ukraine's accession to the EU, whereas relative majority of those living in the East favour the EAEU. In the South, the shares of supporters of both courses are quite large, but "neutral" position still prevails.

Regional polarisation around the NATO membership is even greater. If most respondents in the West (vast majority) and the Centre (relative majority) support Ukraine's accession to NATO, then around half of those living in the East and the South prefer the non-bloc status.

The question of Ukraine's policy regarding Russia produced almost identical response. Most respondents in the West and the Centre support tough stance on Russia, calling for cutback in political and economic ties with this country. Instead, the majority of those polled in the East and relative majority of people living in the South would rather seek reconciliation with Russia along with strengthening of relevant political and economic ties.

Similarly, there is no regional consensus on the ways of reintegrating temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Vast majority of residents of Eastern and Southern regions welcome peace talks and arrangements with Russia, while relative majority of the respondents in the West are more likely to support de-occupation by military means. Opinions of those living in the Centre are rather ambiguous with 38% supporting peace talks and compromises with Russia, 37% not supporting either solution, and 25% calling for the use of military force.

Quite illustrative is the regional distribution of the "price" that people are ready to pay for peace. Almost half of those living in the East seek peace at all costs, while most respondents in the West and the Centre are ready to accept peace only on terms acceptable for Ukraine. Significant proportions of Ukrainians living in the South support both options.

There exist notable regional differences in people's attitudes towards the idea of granting special status to certain regions (which is one of Russia's key demands). In the East, relative majority of respondents are ready to support this possibility, whereas most respondents in

³ People's attitudes towards policy alternatives are reviewed in order presented in the survey questionnaire.

Table 1: Where on the 0 to 10 scale should a political force that you would support in the elections be located?*
% of respondents

Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	Did not answer	Average score	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	22.5	30.2	46.3	1.0	6.1	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	34.4	27.1	37.1	1.3	5.2	Ukraine's NATO membership in the foreseeable future
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	31.1	30.7	37.2	1.0	5.3	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
Return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	43.2	33.4	22.5	0.9	4.1	Return of temporarily occupied territories by military means
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	27.7	28.2	43	1.1	5.7	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	35.2	44.5	19.3	1.0	4.4	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	52.3	32.9	13.8	1.0	3.5	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation	56.0	33.1	9.9	0.9	3.2	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	23.7	28.2	47.3	0.8	6.1	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	54.2	32.9	11.9	1.0	3.3	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	20.8	37.5	40.6	1.1	5.8	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

* In this 11-grade scale "0" means maximum support for the position to the left, and "10" – full support for the position to the right.

the South (relative majority), the Centre and the West (absolute majority) stand for Ukraine as a unitary state.

Absolute majority of people living in Western Ukraine along with relative majority of respondents in the Centre and the South favour increased funding of the Armed Forces for their further strengthening and development, while residents of the Eastern regions hold opposite opinions with 40% of them calling for reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces and 42% being neutral (that is, support neither option).

Relative majority of the Ukrainians in the East and the South would rather see increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada and reduced powers of the President, while people in the Centre and the West remain rather moderate (which should be understood as maintaining a *status quo*).

In the meantime, most respondents across all regions support the reduction of the central government's functions along with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments and de-centralisation.

Similarly, vast or relative majority of the respondents in all regions would not tolerate restrictions on citizens'

political rights and liberties even in exchange for political stability.

Moreover, most people across the country do not support such restrictions even in conditions of external aggression.

Quite unanimous is the regional support for greater public control over law enforcement agencies.

Therefore, Ukrainian society is further polarised by the regional criterion in the matters of foreign policy and security. Quite often there is no inter-regional consensus even in areas with clear advantage of either alternative (e.g. European integration, de-occupation and acceptable terms of peace, special status of certain regions, etc.)

Speaking about the domestic policy, however, one can observe inter-regional consensus on the democratisation of public life and prevention of government's repressive practices, which is evidenced by consistent support for re-distribution of state powers in favour of local self-governments, unconditional observance of political rights and liberties, and greater public control over law enforcement agencies.

► Economic and Social Policy

In the economic policy matters, the Ukrainians are more likely to rely on the state regulation mechanisms rather than market instruments.

59% of the respondents approve active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control, and only 11% support market de-regulation. More than half of the respondents (54%) are likely to support national manufacturers in imposing heavy duties on imported goods instead of free competition in the domestic market. Furthermore, 59% support extending the agricultural land sale moratorium.

More than half of those polled (54%) favour reducing housing and utility tariffs through subsidies to suppliers over targeted subsidies to low-income users (given the market value of services).

Although a moderate position was the most popular among the respondents (42%), slightly more of them support increasing wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening of *hryvnia*, rather than accept “freezing” payments.

Critical attitudes towards recommendations of Ukraine’s international partners (namely, the EU, the US and the IMF) remain prevalent, as 54% of the respondents allow for their implementation unless these recommendations run counter to public needs and moods in the country.

Most citizens appreciate the state support for SME development in contrast to large businesses (45% vs 17%).

As for the priority sectors of the economy, somewhat more respondents put their hopes on the development of traditional industries (metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry and agriculture) as opposed to the priority development of new industries and technologies (IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnology, etc.) However, many respondents (39%) are hesitant, viewing both as equally important.



The respondents’ answers regarding alternative approaches in social policy clearly signify the demand for the state’s central role in the life of society and in provision of public goods.

The overwhelming majority of the respondents (75%) believe that the state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age; two-thirds (67%) support the idea of the state bearing full responsibility for the social security system and guaranteeing free provision of each and all medical services (60%).

Close to 50% of the respondents settle for tax hikes so that the government could increase expenditure on health care, social security and education, while only 15% share the opposite opinion.

In general, citizens are more willing to pay higher taxes in exchange for free social services from the state instead of paying low taxes with social services provided at people’s own cost and expense; at the same time, 48% of the respondents were quite moderate, supporting neither alternative.

The idea of “re-distribution” is quite popular. Most respondents (63%) support the active role of the state in re-distributing public goods and helping to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. 62% of those polled are supportive of introduction of the progressive taxation, so that people with higher income pay higher taxes.⁴

Roughly half of the respondents (52%) favour protection of interests of low-income citizens rather than those of skilled labourers with middle income – “the middle class”. There is also a clear focus on protecting the rights of employees rather than employers (72% of supporters).

Most Ukrainians (69%) agree with the idea that salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and other bureaucrats should be based on average pay in Ukraine.

When asked about the best ways to fight poverty (increasing social support for people with low wages or increasing the price of labour and hence – salaries), the respondents could not prioritise any of the alternatives, forming three roughly equal groups (two of them supporting either option and another group hesitating over their choice).

Therefore, one can observe a paradox, in which citizens do not trust the state and its institutions⁵ on the one hand but seek the state’s social support on the other. They want it to be active not only in the economy, but also in re-distribution of public goods in favour of more disadvantaged populations.

⁴ These opinions generally correlate with the above-mentioned willingness of 53% of the respondents to live in society, which is regulated by the government but has no excessive social inequality.

⁵ The Ukrainian citizens’ confidence in public institutions. Results of sociological study – The Razumkov Centre, 2018, http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/socio/2018_06_press_release_ua.pdf.



Table 2: Where on the 0 to 10 scale should a political force that you would support in the elections be located?
% of respondents

Economy						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	Did not answer	Average score	
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	46.4	37.6	15.1	0.9	3.7	Privatisation of state-owned companies; priority development of the private sector
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	58.9	29.3	11.1	0.7	3.0	Government non-interference in the economy (de-regulation) and price control; total market regulations
Extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land	59.1	26.9	13.2	0.9	3.0	Introduction of the free sale of agricultural land
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	53.5	32.4	13.1	1.0	3.3	Free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market
Predominant state support for large national companies	16.5	37	45.2	1.4	6.2	Priority support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	54.2	36.7	8.1	1.1	3.2	Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	38.9	38.9	21.3	0.9	4.3	Ukraine is to accelerate its economic growth only through active development of new industries and technologies – IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnologies, etc.
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	36	41.8	21.2	1.1	4.4	Inflation prevention and hryvnia stabilisation even at the cost of “freezing” of wages and pensions
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	62.3	28.1	8.6	1.0	2.9	Introduction of equal taxation for all citizens regardless of their income
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	36.5	47.7	15.0	0.8	4.2	Tax system, in which a person pays low taxes but receives social services at his/her own expense
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	52.3	33.9	12.8	1.0	3.4	Protection of interests of the “middle class” – skilled labourers with middle income
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	34.7	31.5	32.9	0.9	5.0	Fighting poverty by increasing the price of labour and hence – by raising salaries
Social Policy						
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	53.6	19.2	26.3	0.8	3.8	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	59.8	21.4	18.1	0.7	3.1	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance

* In this 11-grade scale “0” means maximum support of the position to the left, and “10” – full support of the position to the right.

Table 3: Where on the 0 to 10 scale should a political force that you would support in the elections be located?
% of respondents

(continued)

Social Policy						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	Did not answer	Average score	
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	75.1	18.8	5.3	0.8	2.1	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	63.0	27.6	8.3	1.1	2.8	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of "income levelling"
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	72.4	22.4	4.3	0.9	2.3	Strengthening the rights of employers in relations with employees. Empowering employers, including in hiring and firing of employees
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even at the expense of tax hikes	49.5	34.5	15.0	0.9	3.6	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	14.0	16.0	68.9	1.0	7.6	Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be staterun	66.9	23.9	8.1	1.0	2.5	Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be served by private companies

* In this 11-grade scale "0" means maximum support of the position to the left, and "10" – full support of the position to the right.

Absolute majority of the respondents in all regions favour the government's active role in managing economic processes (in contrast to market de-regulation) with the highest support for such regulation reported in the South, reaching 75%.

Vast or relative majority of the respondents across all regions stand for protection of national manufacturers through introduction of heavy duties on imported goods, and favour extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land.

Also, scaling up of the public sector of economy as opposed to privatisation enjoys rather high support in all regions, but while this idea is shared by about half of the respondents in the South, the East and the Centre, people in the West tend to be more moderate.

The majority or relative majority of the Ukrainians in all regions generally support the idea of reducing tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of budget subventions. At the same time, in the West the proportions of those supporting this tariff reduction and the policy of targeted subsidies under the market value of services are almost equal.

If relative majority of those polled in the East and South are willing to increase wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and hryvnia's fall, then most residents of the Western and Central regions hold middle ground (which should be viewed as a compromise between the level of salaries and financial stability).

Absolute or relative majority of the respondents in all regions agree that the priority should be given to public needs and moods inside the country, rather than recommendations of the EU, US or IMF. Interestingly, public support for this approach in the West is even higher than that in the Centre and the East.

The idea of government supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (as opposed to large businesses) found vast support in the West and relative support in the Centre, whereas in the South and in the East this opinion is slightly less popular, with relative majority leaning towards more neutral position.

It is no surprise that the vast majority of people living in the East and the South believe that the national economy should build on the traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery and mining industry and agriculture – which prevail in these regions. Meanwhile, this approach is notably less popular in the West and the Centre, where most respondents prefer balanced development of both traditional and new industries (IT sector, robotics, artificial intelligence, nano- and biotechnologies, and the like).

The opinion that state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age is dominant across all regions of Ukraine.

The idea of the social security system to be owned by the government is equally popular in all regions, with



the lowest support in the East (60%) and the highest – in the West (87%).

People's willingness to receive totally free health services from the state also dominates in all regions. Nonetheless, there is also a growing support for the state-guaranteed package of free medical services combined with paid services and voluntary health insurance, which increases westwards.

About half of the Ukrainians in all regions would support increase in taxes for better funding of health care, social security and education. At the same time, about one-third of the respondents oppose significant tax hikes and hold moderate position.

Again, almost half of those polled in the South and the East support introduction of higher taxes in exchange for free social services, while people in the Centre and the West are less likely to share this approach, with most respondents in these regions seeking balance between the level of taxes and availability of social services.

Most respondents across all regions of Ukraine support introduction of progressive taxation.

Also, the Ukrainians in all regions expect the government to accept active role in re-distributing public goods and helping to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor.

Vast or relative majority of the respondents in all regions want the state to protect interests of low-income citizens in the first place.

Also dominant across the country is the public support for the government's focus on protecting the rights of the employees rather than employers.

Linking salaries of top government officials to the average pay in Ukraine is very popular idea in all regions. Interestingly, it had the fewest supporters in the East (close to 51%), and most – in the West (83%).

While deciding on the best way to fight poverty, relative majority of those living in the South and the East prefer increasing social assistance to the population, whereas the respondents in the West and the Centre lean towards increasing the price of labour and hence – raising salaries.

As one can see, inter-regional contradictions on most socio-economic issues are either non-existent, or very insignificant.

Residents of the East and South are somewhat more consolidated in their "leftward" economic approaches. They can be distinguished by their readiness to endure high taxes in exchange for broader social support from the state and sacrifice the stability of hryvnia for higher salaries and pensions. For them, the best way to overcome poverty is to increase the state social assistance.

Instead, people living in the Centre and especially in the West demonstrate higher demand for the government support of SME. For them, the best recipe against poverty is to increase the price of labour.

► Humanitarian Policy

Ukrainian society and political system are traditionally characterised by high relevance of socio-cultural division, which reveals itself in society's polarisation over a number of humanitarian policy issues – the language issue (e.g. the status of the Russian language and the state policy in this area); different interpretations of the history of Ukraine (e.g. the "unity of the Slavic people", attitudes to the Soviet legacy); understanding and evaluating nationalism and its role in the history of Ukraine.⁶

Findings of the survey indicate that the language-related division still shows signs of polarisation. Specifically, most respondents (56%) stand for the preservation of the Ukrainian language's status as the only state language. Also, 49% favour the state protection of the Ukrainian language with additional privileges (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and television, and the like).

As for decommunization, the situation is uncertain, as 36% of the respondents would like to stop this process, 30% want it to continue, and another one-third of those polled remain undecided.

The national identity clearly outweighs the cosmopolitan idea of a universal community sharing common values. 48% of the respondents believe that someone's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is primary for every person, and only 15% consider the nationality secondary. It should be noted that in March 2017 more than 90% of citizens viewed themselves Ukrainians by nationality.⁷

Around 35% of the respondents would support maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians. 44% of the respondents would rather uphold the current level of rights of national minorities

Instead, the demand for multiculturalism is notably lower, as only 19% of those polled approve of the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities, and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society; similarly, only 10% support scaling up the rights of national minorities. At the same time, relative majority of the respondents (46%) remain neutral on these issues, supporting none of the alternatives.

⁶ Yu. Yakymenko. 2012 Parliamentary Elections: The Impact of Social Divisions and Electoral Strategies on the Prospects of the Party System Development – 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, scientific research, Kyiv: I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, 2013, p.69-70.

⁷ See Basic principles and means of the formation of a common identity of the Ukrainian citizens – the Razumkov Centre, 2017., http://razumkov.org.ua/images/Material_Conference/2017_04_12_ident/2017-Identi-3.pdf.

The respondents were also asked to consider a number of socio-cultural dilemmas that go beyond the usual cultural policy and imitate the division into “left-wing liberal” and “conservative” values typical for Western societies (*GAL-TAN*).

The socio-cultural choice between rural archaism and urban (post)modernism clearly contrasts with the level of urbanisation. Despite the fact that over 67% of the respondents live in the cities or townships (generally matching the level of urbanisation in Ukraine), only 10% of them prioritise the development of cities as the hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values. In contrast, 51% prioritise the development of rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values.

The hegemony of “traditional values” materialises in people’s attitudes towards some liberal practices that are common in Western democracies. In particular, less than 4% of the respondents would agree that same-sex marriage (partnership) should be legal; instead, 77% support the protection of traditional values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman.

Also notable is the people’s minimum support (5%) for de-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs, while 74% would welcome strict drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession.

The status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages still has a potential to stir up conflict. Preserving the status of Ukrainian as the only state language is unconditionally supported in the West and the Centre and rejected in the East (only 10% of support). Instead, the idea of granting the status of the state language to Russian has significant support in the East (65%) and is not accepted in the Centre and the West. In the South, both options are supported by one-third of the respondents.

Most Ukrainians in the West and the Centre stand for the state protection and support of the Ukrainian language, whereas people in the East have quite the opposite opinion (only 8% support), thinking that all languages should be treated equally instead (67%). The South is rather uncertain in this regard, still leaning towards the ideas supported in the East.

Decommunization is another marker of regional differences. Continued decommunization has a majority support only in the West (65%). Instead, most of those living in the East (59%) want this process to stop. Ukrainians living in the South are leaning towards the East, whereas people in the Centre are generally uncertain.

The vast majority of respondents in the West and the East, as well as the relative majority in the Centre, believe that a person’s belonging to a certain nation rather than global community should be of primary importance. As for the residents of the Southern regions, their opinions

Relative majority of the respondents (47%) are supportive of the government’s hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved and reintroduction of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity. In general, the public tends to believe that the growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime, although 42% of the respondents (relative majority) did not give a clear answer.

Secularist ideas prevail in Ukraine on the relations between the state and the church, with 49% of the respondents advocating for the equality of all denominations and churches in their dealings with the state, while only 16% would support the state offering some privileges to certain denominations. Also dominant is the people’s support for the significance of environmental protection, even if this impedes economic growth. Only 18% are ready to forgo the environmental aspect in exchange for accelerated economic growth.

Therefore, Ukrainian society in its socio-cultural orientations leans towards traditionalism and even cultural nationalism, rather than globalism and multiculturalism. It categorically rejects the legalisation of non-traditional marriages and recreational drugs and seeks more strict and uncompromised fight against crime. At the same time, despite a rather high level of religiousness, Ukrainian society does not want a merger of church and state, and despite social and economic hardships, it is not ready to give up on the environment for the sake of progress.

divided into three nearly equal parts (supporters of either alternative and “moderate” respondents).

Relative majority of the respondents in the West, the South and the Centre assume moderate positions between supporting the rapprochement of cultures of national minorities with Ukrainian culture and preserving their identity. As for the East, there is equally strong support for assimilation policies (45%) and neutral position (45%).

In the West, most citizens favour maintaining the current level of rights of national minorities, while in other regions about half of respondents hold the middle position between keeping the existing rights and expanding them.

Priority development of the cities has won relatively small support across all regions, even the most urbanized ones. Vast or relative majority of the Ukrainians in all regions encourage the development of rural communities.

It is safe to say that the issue of conditional protection of traditional values demonstrates citizens’ conservatism in all regions. The idea of allowing same-sex marriages is extremely unpopular across the country.

Absolute majority of the Ukrainians in all regions support the state’s tough drug control policy. The idea of de-criminalisation of drug use and possession has gained no notable support in any region.

Most respondents in the East (56%) and relative majority of those polled in other regions of Ukraine welcome

Table 4: Where on the 0 to 10 scale should a political force that you would support in the elections be located?*
% of respondents

Humanitarian Policy						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	Did not answer	Average score	
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	55.8	17.8	25.5	1.0	3.6	Granting the status of second state language to the Russian language
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	48.6	21.5	29.2	0.7	4.2	All languages should be treated equally by the state
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	48.6	33.0	17.6	0.8	3.7	Current reformation of the system of secondary education is a positive phenomenon, as the extension of the term of schooling to 12 years, changes in the content of education and relations between a teacher and students brings the Ukrainian school closer to the European norms and standards of secondary education
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	16.0	34.2	49.0	0.9	6.5	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with the state
Decommunization should stop	35.8	32.1	29.7	2.4	4.7	Decommunization should continue
The state's hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	46.9	32.0	20.3	0.8	3.9	The state must earnestly ensure the civil rights of all citizens, including perpetrators of crime
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	77.1	18.7	3.6	0.7	1.7	The state's recognition of people's right to same-sex marriage (partnership)
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	34.5	46.2	18.7	0.7	4.4	Support for the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities; and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	43.7	46.0	9.5	0.8	3.6	Scaling up the rights of national minorities
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	51.1	37.6	10.1	1.2	3.3	Priority development of cities (urbanisation) as hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	17.7	32.3	49.1	0.8	6.3	Maximum attention to environment protection, even if it impedes economic growth
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	48.2	36.2	14.8	0.8	3.7	All people belong to universal community sharing common values, while nationality is secondary
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	40.6	33.9	24.8	0.7	4.3	Preventing the revival of death penalty for any crimes
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	74.0	19.9	5.3	0.8	2.0	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	39.0	41.9	18.0	1.0	4.2	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	16.6	37.4	45.2	0.7	6.2	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression

* In this 11-grade scale "0" means maximum support of the position to the left, and "10" – full support of the position to the right.

a hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved. At the same time, people's support for unfaltering observance of rights of all citizens, including criminals, grows both in the East and in the West.

The idea of reviving death penalty for the most serious crimes is rather popular among the respondents in the East (vast majority), the South and the Centre (relative majority), whereas opponents of such a decision have relative majority only in the West.

Also, relative majority of the respondents in the West, and vast majority of those polled in other regions tend to link the growing number of immigrants in the country with increase in crime. As the same time, relative majority of residents of the Centre and notable proportions of the respondents in other regions are undecided on this issue.

Vast majority of the Ukrainians in the West and relative majority in other regions speak for the equality of all denominations and churches in their relations with the state. The position of the respondents in the East is mostly neutral.

Similarly, the priority of the environment protection policy over accelerated economic growth is largely supported in the West with relative support in other regions. And again, citizens living in the East remain mostly undecided.

Most respondents in the East and the South, and their relative majority in the West and the Centre favour the previous system of secondary education.

Therefore, the region-specific polarisation becomes visible in the issues that are traditionally seen in the epicentre of political "identity wars". These include the status of the Russian language and the level of state support for the Ukrainian language, as well as attitudes to the historical heritage (in this case it concerns supporting or not supporting decommunization).

Significant regional differences – although with no signs of polarisation – can be found in the issues somehow related to interethnic relationships (the importance of belonging to a nation, the national minorities policy, and the perception of immigrants).

And finally, largely consensual in the regional context are the issues reflecting a collision of the "left-wing liberal" and "right-wing conservative" values in their most peculiar manifestations (the choice between urban modernism and rural archaism, recognition of same-sex marriages, legalisation of recreational drugs, civil rights of criminals, relations between the state and the church, the choice between environment protection and economic growth). Against this backdrop, quite unexpected are significant regional variances in terms of possible reintroduction of death penalty.

Socio-demographic peculiarities of people's attitudes towards policy alternatives

Age distribution

For most questions, the researchers recorded statistically significant differences between various age groups, but these differences are of negligible importance.

The NATO membership is more popular among the youngest respondents, while the oldest citizens are more likely to support Ukraine's non-bloc status. Vast majority of young people support the EU accession, while the oldest respondents would rather support Ukraine's joining the EAEU.

Also, most respondents aged 18-49 are likely to support tough stance on Russia, while the oldest respondents would rather seek reconciliation with this country. Similarly, the oldest respondents largely support the return of occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia. This approach also prevails among other age groups, although with fewer supporters.

Relatively popular across all age groups is the support for establishing peace in the East of Ukraine only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society. At the same time, the oldest respondents tend to be the most ambivalent in this regard.

Across all age groups, relative majority of the respondents remain quite moderate regarding re-distribution of powers between the Parliament and the President. Meanwhile, in contrast to younger people,

the respondents aged 50 years or over are somewhat more likely to support the increased role of the Parliament and restricted functions of the President.

The respondents aged 40+ are somewhat more consolidated in their willingness to increase government expenditure on health care, social security and education.

For relative majority of the respondents aged 50 years and older, the best scenario of poverty reduction is increasing social support, while relative majority of respondents under 50 would rather see the increasing price of labour. Also, older respondents (50+) are unanimous in their support of:

- Scaling up the public sector of economy;
- Active role of the state in managing economic processes;
- Extension of the moratorium on the sale of land;
- Support for national manufacturers by imposing heavy duties on imported goods;
- Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation;
- High taxes in exchange for free social services;
- Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions;
- Provision of all medical services free of charge;
- Ongoing state guarantees for pension provision;
- Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods;

- Protecting the rights of employees before employers;
- Protecting the rights of low-income citizens;
- Preserving solely state social security system.

With age, the respondents become increasingly more likely to appreciate traditional industries.

Among the youngest respondents (18-29 years), the number of decommunization supporters is somewhat higher than that of its opponents. In other age categories the situation is opposite, especially among the senior citizens.

The youngest respondents are also less likely to believe that the growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime. The younger the respondents, the lower is the likelihood of their support for pre-reform system of education.

The respondents who turned 40 years of age mostly prioritise the development of rural areas as the centres of traditional culture. The majority of young people also share this approach.

The respondents aged 50 years and older are the most unanimous in their protection of traditional family values and the primary importance of each person's belonging to a certain nation.

Gender distribution

Under this criterion, the researchers found several statistically significant differences of limited importance.

Unlike women, **men** are more likely to support the following: Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO; tough stance on Russia; recapture of the occupied territories by military means; increased expenditure on the Armed Forces. They are also somewhat more likely to approve the increasing price of labour as a priority way to prevent poverty; continued decommunization; reintroduction of death penalty; and decriminalisation of the use and possession of recreational drugs.

In contrast, **women** are more likely to support the return of occupied territories through peace talks. They also lean towards supporting the priority protection of interests of low-income citizens and the state guarantees of decent living standard for citizens who worked during their entire working age.

Distribution by financial status

To explore the respondents' opinions depending on their material wealth, we used the answers to the question "What is your family's material situation?" It should be noted, that the largest in numbers are the group of citizens who "can afford only food and essential inexpensive goods" (41%) and those who "have enough to live on, but it is quite difficult to buy durables" (36%). Only minor differences were found between these two categories of respondents regarding certain issues.

The respondents who are somewhat better well-off ("in general, have enough to live on, but it is quite difficult to buy durables") are more likely to support the following: Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO; privatisation of state-owned companies and the government's non-interference in economic processes; "freezing" of payments to prevent inflation; the educational sector reform; the state's providing some privileges to certain denominations and churches.

Instead, less financially successful respondents ("can afford only food and essential inexpensive goods") are somewhat more likely to support the state's active role in managing economic processes; extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land; priority development of traditional sectors of the economy (heavy industry, agriculture, etc.); protection of rights of employees and those of low-income citizens; totally free health services and solely state-owned social and pension provision; equality of all denominations and churches in their relations with the state; protection of traditional family values; environmental protection; tough drug control policy. These respondents are also somewhat more cautious about immigrants and prefer the pre-reform system of education.

Suitable for analysis are additional two categories of respondents – those who "barely make both ends meet" (16%) and those who "live a comfortable life but still unable to make major purchases" (5%). One can observe fundamental differences between these categories in terms of their view on many things.

Specifically, the majority of the **poorest respondents** support Ukraine's membership in the EAEU (39%); non-bloc status (51%); reconciliation with Russia (48%); establishment of peace in the East at any cost (40%); poverty prevention through increased social support (55%); reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services by means of subventions to service providers (66%); totally free health services (76%); equal treatment of all languages by the state (46%); and ending decommunization efforts (49%). These respondents also prefer the old educational system (66%) over the new one.

Instead, most of the **wealthiest respondents** support Ukraine's accession to the EU (71%) and the NATO (56%); tough stance on Russia (62%); establishment of peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society (62%); poverty prevention through increased price of labour (40%); targeted subsidies for housing and utility services (45%); the combination of guaranteed package of free health services and compulsory health insurance (40%); the state protection and support of the Ukrainian language (68%); continued decommunization (54%). In addition, they are mostly supportive of the current educational system reform (42%).

Distribution by educational level

The respondents with higher education are somewhat more likely to support Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO, as well as tough stance towards Russia; establishment of peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society and increased expenditure on the Armed Forces.

Also, **the respondents with higher education** are more unanimous in supporting the equality of all religious denominations and churches, and sometimes are more likely to believe that the growing number of immigrants is linked to increased crime levels.

The respondents without higher education generally tend to support the expansion of the public sector, the government's active role in managing economic processes and greater protection of the national manufacturers through high import duties. Also, these respondents are more unanimous in their belief that all health services should be free, while the state must guarantee a decent standard of living for pensioners and also help to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. The salaries of senior government officials should be based on the average pay in Ukraine.

Respondents without higher education are more unanimous in supporting the priority development of rural areas of Ukraine as the centres for preserving traditional lifestyles and values.

Respondents with higher education generally see the increase in the price of labour as the best way to reduce poverty, while **the respondents without higher education** would rather support increasing social assistance to the population.

Distribution by the language of communication

Significant differences between groups by the language used (we analysed the categories of those who speak Ukrainian and Russian at home) are primarily related to issues that outline the *political and cultural division* in society (see above).

In particular, the Ukrainian-speaking respondents predominantly support the Ukraine's accession to the EU, whereas the Russian-speaking Ukrainians do not demonstrate any distinct opinion regarding the integration vector. Also, relative majority of the Ukrainian-speaking respondents prefer the NATO membership, while most of those who speak Russian favour Ukraine's non-bloc status.

Almost half (48%) of the Ukrainian-speaking respondents support a tough stance on Russia, while the relative majority of their Russian-speaking counterparts would rather seek reconciliation with Russia (44%).

Among the Ukrainian-speaking population, only a relative majority supports returning the temporarily occupied territories by means of peace talks and compromises (40%), with significant proportion supporting the military scenario (28%). Meanwhile, most Russian-speaking respondents support the political-diplomatic way of resolving the conflict.

The Ukrainian-speaking respondents unambiguously support the idea of establishing peace only on terms that

are acceptable for Ukrainian society, while the Russian-speaking respondents are extremely ambivalent in their opinions, with relative majority (37%) supporting the idea of reaching peace at all costs.

The Ukrainian-speaking citizens generally consider it unacceptable to grant special status to certain regions of Ukraine, while the overall position of the Russian-speaking population is uncertain.

Almost half of the Ukrainian-speaking respondents welcome the increased expenditure on the Armed Forces, while those who speak Russian remain generally undecided.

As expected, the most radical differences in views of the Ukrainian and Russian-speaking respondents concern the language issue, as the absolute majority of those who speak Ukrainian at home support Ukrainian as a single state language in the country (73%) and call for the provision of relevant state protection and support for this language (65%).

The Russian-speaking respondents are more moderate in their responses, yet their relative majority supports the idea of granting Russian the status of the second official language (47%) and believes that the state should treat all languages equally (49%).

The Ukrainian-speaking respondents are mostly undecided about the process of decommunization, with a small dominance of those who support its continuation (39%), while almost half of those who speak Russian want this process to stop (47%).

There also exist significant distinctions in some economic issues. Specifically, most Ukrainian-speaking respondents appreciate the government's support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (54%), as opposed to large businesses; instead, the Russian-speaking citizens are more unanimous in supporting the national economy based on traditional industries (48%). As for other issues, statistically significant, yet minor, differences exist.

The main lines of socio-political division

Having compared the pairs of equal correlations between the respondents' answers to each question in this section, we have identified a set of dilemmas (foreign policy, security and socio-cultural), where the responses consistently correlate with each other (the Spearman's correlation coefficient at 0.291 (minimum), and 0.458 (mean)).

These dilemmas include:

- Ukraine's accession to the Eurasian Economic Union – accession to the European Union;
- Ukraine's non-bloc status – the NATO membership;
- Seeking reconciliation with Russia – tough stance on Russia;
- Regaining control over the temporarily occupied territories through peace talks – by military means;
- Establishment of peace in the East at all costs – only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society;



- Possibility of granting the special status to certain regions – preservation of the unitary state;
- Reduction of expenditure on the Armed Forces – increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces;
- Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language – granting Russian the status of the second state language;
- The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language – equal treatment of all languages by the state;
- Ending decommunization – continuing decommunization.

A set of these interlinked correlations outlines socio-political split which can be hypothetically called a political and cultural division.

The main division of political forces will likely to occur along this line. It should be noted that for most dilemmas **the patriotic and pro-Western “pole” remains dominant**. In other words, the escalation of political and cultural division during the elections would be more beneficial for those who will be able to convincingly speak from the patriotic and pro-Western viewpoint.

Likewise, we can identify the **socio-economic** division presented by the following dilemmas:

- Scaling up the public sector of economy – privatisation of state-owned companies;
- Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control – government non-interference in economic processes;
- Extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land – introduction of the free sale of agricultural land;
- Support for national manufacturers – free competition of domestically produced and imported goods;
- Health services should be free – all citizens should be provided with a guaranteed package of free health services;
- Decent quality of life after retirement for all those who work – citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age;
- The state helping to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor – non-interference of the state in the process of re-distribution of public goods;
- Protecting the rights of employees – strengthening the rights of employers (the Spearman's correlation coefficient is 0.251 (minimum), and 0.412 (mean)).

The extremes in this division are very uneven as **the supporters of the state regulation and social guarantees clearly dominate**.

This means that the division of political forces along this socio-economic line has not been the case. However, the opposition or at least forces not associated with current government have greater flexibility in socio-economic issues, as they normally do not bear responsibility for recent social and economic woes.

2.2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLICY ALTERNATIVES DEPENDING ON THE CITIZENS' SENTIMENTS AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

As noted above, public sentiments will certainly affect people's choices in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, shaping their perceptions of individual political actors and defining their attitudes towards the content of political proposals.

In view of this, it seems expedient to explore possible impact of citizens' sentiments and political orientations on their attitudes towards policy alternatives in different spheres. To analyse these policy preferences⁸ we identified groups of citizens who selected different answers to the number of questions that characterised their vision of the situation in the country, their attitudes towards the historic past, their political (including foreign policy) positioning and the like.

► Internal situation and political sentiments

Situation assessment (the course of events develops in the right or wrong direction)

In most cases, the vast or relative majority of the respondents in both groups supported identical alternatives or did not give marked preference to either one. **The opposing alternatives have never gained the support of the majority of respondents in both groups.**

Unlike another group, the Ukrainians who view **the events as developing in the right direction** demonstrated stronger support for the following alternatives: the NATO membership, tough stance on Russia; peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society; increased expenditure on the Armed Forces; and continued decommunization.

In turn, those who believe that **the course of events in Ukraine took the wrong direction** are more likely to support the following alternatives: return of temporarily occupied territories only by peaceful means; priority focus on public needs and moods rather than external recommendations; reliance on traditional sectors and industries; targeted subsidies; increased social expenditure; previous educational system; and reintroduction of death penalty.

Seeking to return to pre-2014 Ukraine

Similarly, the vast or relative majority of the respondents among those **who would like to return to Ukraine before 2014 and those who would not want this to happen** supported identical alternatives for most issues or did not give marked preference to either one.

The majority of the respondents in both groups **supported the opposing alternatives** for the following issues: the NATO membership; attitudes towards Russia and decommunization.

In contrast to another group, those who **would like to return to pre-2014 Ukraine** demonstrated stronger

⁸ For more on the research methodology see Section 2.1. of this report.

support for the following alternatives: return of temporarily occupied territories only by peaceful means; scaling up the public sector of economy; reliance on traditional sectors and industries; increased salaries and pensions; tax system with higher taxes and free social services; and reintroduction of death penalty.

The citizens who **would not like to return to the time before 2014** showed stronger support for the following: Ukraine's accession to the EU; peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society; preservation of unitary state system; increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces; the state protection and promotion of the Ukrainian language.

Seeking to restore the Soviet Union

The vast or relative majority of Ukrainians among those **who would like to restore the Soviet Union and those who opposed this idea** supported identical alternatives for most issues or did not give marked preference to either one.

The majority of the respondents in both groups **selected the opposing alternatives** for the following issues: Ukraine's accession to the EU or EAEU; the NATO membership; attitudes towards Russia; the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and relevant government policy.

Those **reminiscing of the Soviet Union** demonstrated stronger support for the following alternatives; return of the temporarily occupied territories only by peaceful means; increased influence of the Parliament on the Cabinet and restricted presidential powers; scaling up the public sector of economy; reliance on traditional industries; increased salaries and pensions; tax system with higher taxes and free social services; increased social support; pre-reform system of secondary education; ending decommunization; hard-line approach to combating crime; and revival of death penalty.

Instead, the respondents who **would not want the Soviet Union restored** provided stronger support for the following alternatives: peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society; preservation of unitary state system; increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces.

Intentions to leave Ukraine

There are no distinguished differences between the citizens who intend to leave Ukraine (26%) and those who are not planning to do so (63%).

► Geopolitical orientation

Attitudes towards the European integration (the Ukrainians who would vote for (51.2%) or against (28.6%) such integration at the imaginary referendum)

Opposite positions. Vast or relative majority of the respondents in each group selected the opposing alternatives for the following issues:

- Accession to the EAEU – accession to the EU;
- Non-bloc status – the NATO membership;
- Reconciliation with Russia – tough stance on Russia;
- Peace in the East at all costs – peace in the East only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society;
- Possibility of granting a special status to certain regions – preservation of a unitary state system;
- Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces – increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces;
- Suspending decommunization – continuing decommunization;
- Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language – granting Russian the status of the second state language;
- The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language – equal treatment of all languages by the state.

Identical positions. Most respondents in both groups demonstrated unanimity in supporting the following alternatives: limiting the central government's functions and de-centralisation; greater public control over law enforcement agencies; active role of the government in managing economic processes; further extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land; priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; introduction of progressive taxation; the state-guaranteed living standards for pensioners; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor; protection of rights of employees; salaries for top government officials based on average pay in Ukraine; protection of traditional social values; primary importance of a person's belonging to a nation; tough drug control policy.

Close positions. More than 40% of the respondents in both groups supported the following policy alternatives: prevention of restrictions on political rights and liberties; support for national manufacturers; free health services; the state-run social security system; equality of all denominations and churches; and priority development of rural areas.

Similar distribution of responses (*with certain insignificant quantitative variances on some issues*) is also typical for the respondents who would support **the NATO membership at the referendum (40.5%) and those who would vote against it (37.9%)**.

Most respondents in these groups hold the **opposite views regarding the NATO membership and attitudes towards Russia**. Significant differences exist regarding the state's attitude towards Ukrainian and other languages, as well as decommunization. Differences in all other issues are less visible.



The same is true about people's preferences based on their responses to the question, whether they **have benefitted (25.5%) or lost (28.9%) from signing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.**

This distribution, however, has some peculiarities. Unlike their counterparts in another group, the majority of the respondents (either vast or relative) **among those who reportedly benefitted from this process**, support the increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch. They are less likely to support the expansion of the public sector, while advocating for the development of SMEs and emphasising the need for economic growth through new industries and technologies. They are more cautious about higher salaries and pensions given the inflation risks and are less prepared for the tax system with high taxes. They would rather increase the cost of labour instead of greater social support. They are also less critical about the educational sector reform and share more liberal views on combating crime, national minorities policies, death penalty, migration and the like.

However, while exhibiting pro-Western and anti-Russian foreign policy orientation and more liberal approaches to certain issues of economic, social and humanitarian policy, most respondents in this group still favour more active role of the state in managing political processes, extending the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land, support for national manufacturers instead of free market competition, introduction of progressive taxation, free health services, and the state's involvement in re-distribution of public goods – **just like the majority of those who reportedly lost from the European integration.**

This fact suggests that leftist and egalitarian approaches are deeply rooted even in groups which have benefitted from the Association Agreement, and which, in theory, should be more interested in Ukraine's continued European integration course.

The distribution of responses of citizens with different geopolitical orientations concerning economic and social policy alternatives revealed certain correlation between them.

In contrast to the EAEU supporters, those who seek the EU accession are significantly less likely to support alternatives typical of the "left-wing" political spectrum.

Therefore, the correlation of support of the most indicative alternatives by the EAEU and the EU supporters was as follows: scaling up the public sector of economy – 66% vs 37%, respectively; active role of the state in managing economic processes – 76% vs 51%; extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land – 74% vs 53%; support for national manufacturers – 70% vs 48%; high taxes with free social services – 56% vs 27%; active role of the state in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor – 77% vs 55%. Apparently, the latter were more likely to choose liberal alternatives.

Similar differences in the distribution of answers to the same questions were observed between the supporters and opponents of the NATO membership, as well as between those who welcome a tougher stance in relations with Russia and those seeking reconciliation with this country.

Therefore, it is possible to assume a peculiar interrelation between geopolitical orientations and attitudes towards social and economic policy: the pro-Western and anti-Russian factors are more linked to liberal approaches, while the Russian vector is related to socialist agenda.

As for the humanitarian policy issues, the most evident are the links between the respondents' geopolitical orientations and preferences regarding the status of languages, the language policy and decommunization, as noted above.

The analysis of responses to the questions in the "libertarian-authoritarian" scale (*GAL-TAN*) also revealed some peculiarities.

Majorities in both groups are "on the same page" concerning many issues, there are still some substantial differences in the degree of their support for relevant alternatives. For example, only 41% of the EU supporters and 65% of those favouring the EAEU appreciate the government's hard-line approach to combating crime. The same is true about reintroduction of death penalty (35% and 60%) and belief that the increasing number of immigrants is the cause of crime (39% and 51%).

Responses to these same questions demonstrate comparable differences between the supporters and opponents of the NATO membership, as well as between the supporters and opponents of the tough stance on Russia, **suggesting the link between pro-Western political orientations and somewhat more liberal views of the Ukrainians.**

► Vision of the country's future

Based on the answers to the question "What does the country need today?" all respondents can be divided into three groups: "the supporters of change" (those who think the country needs changes – 61%), "the conservatives" (those who want everything to remain as it is – 4%) and "the supporters of restoration" (those who prefer returning to pre-2014 times – 16%).

Foreign And Domestic Policy, Security*				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	⇒	=	⇐	Ukraine's NATO membership in the foreseeable future
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	⇒	=	⇐	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
Return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	=	=	⇐ ⇐	Return of temporarily occupied territories by military means
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	⇒	=	⇐	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	=	=	⇐	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation**	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	⇒	=	=	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	⇒	=	=	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

* The table uses the following symbols: **arrow** direction – alternative used by the majority of the respondents in this group; **two arrows** – alternative is supported by more than 50% of the respondents in the group; **one arrow** – alternative is supported by relative majority of the respondents who outnumber the supporters of another alternative by at least 15%; **equal sign** – relative majority of the respondents in the group have chosen middle position, or the difference between the supporters of either alternative is less than 15%.

** Grey colour highlights policy alternatives that are directly relevant to specific reform areas.

The Table confirms that a majority of respondents in both “the supporters of change” and “restoration” groups tend to support the opposing positions regarding the EU and NATO membership, relations with Russia, ways to achieve peace in the East. Moreover, “the supporters of

change” tend to support a unitary state and increased expenditure on the Armed Forces, while “restoration” supporters support the return of the occupied territories via peaceful means and increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada. Conservatives remain undecided on these issues.

Economic and Social Policy				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Privatisation of state-owned companies; priority development of the private sector
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Government non-interference in the economy (de-regulation) and price control; total market regulations



Economic and Social Policy				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Introduction of the free sale of agricultural land
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market
Predominant state support for large national companies	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒	Priority support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Ukraine to accelerate its economic growth only through active development of new industries and technologies – IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnologies, etc.
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	=	=	⇐	Inflation prevention and hryvnia stabilisation even at the cost of “freezing” of wages and pensions
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Introduction of equal taxation for all citizens regardless of their income
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	=	=	⇐	Tax system, in which a person pays low taxes but receives social services at his/her own expense
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	=	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Protection of interests of the “middle class” – skilled labourers with middle income
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	⇐	=	⇐	Fighting poverty by increasing the price of labour and hence raising salaries
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of “income levelling”

Economic and Social Policy				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Strengthening the rights of employers in relations with employees. Empowering employers, including in hiring and firing of employees
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even if this requires tax hikes	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be served by private companies

In most issues of economic and social policy, absolute and relative majorities in all three groups demonstrate unanimity in supporting “left-winged” alternatives. The exceptions include raising salaries and pensions, types of tax system, priorities in supporting

low-income citizens vs “middle class”, and approaches to fighting poverty, where the “supporters of change” and the “conservatives” tend to be more moderate than the “supporters of restoration”.

Humanitarian Policy				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇒	Granting the status of second state language to the Russian language
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇒	All languages should be treated equally by the state
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Current reformation of the system of secondary education is a positive phenomenon, as the extension of the term of schooling to 12 years, changes in the content of education and relations between a teacher and students brings the Ukrainian school closer to the European norms and standards of secondary education
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with the state
Decommunization should stop	⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	Decommunization should continue
The state’s hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state must earnestly ensure the civil rights of all citizens, including perpetrators of crime

Humanitarian Policy				
	Supporters of change	Conservatives	Supporters of restoration	
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state's recognition of people's right to same-sex marriage (partnership)
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	=	⇐	⇐	Support for the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities; and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	⇐	=	=	Scaling up the rights of national minorities
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Priority development of cities (urbanisation) as hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒	Maximum attention to environment protection, even if it impedes economic growth
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐	All people belong to universal community sharing common values, while nationality is secondary
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	⇐	⇐	⇐	Preventing the revival of death penalty for any crimes
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	⇐	=	⇐	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	⇒	=	⇒	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression

Speaking about policy alternatives in the humanitarian sphere, the supporters of change and restoration hold opposite positions with regards to the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language and relevant government policy, as well as the issues of decommunization. The researchers found no significant differences among the groups regarding all other issues.

If we consider only two largest groups – the “supporters of change” and the “supporters of restoration” – inconsistencies between the majorities in each group would become evident in the following:

- Ukraine's accession to the EAEU or the EU;
- Non-bloc status – the NATO membership;
- Seeking reconciliation with Russia – tough stance on Russia;

- Establishment of peace in the East at all costs – only on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society;
- Possibility of granting the special status to certain regions – preserving the unitary state;
- Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language – granting the status of the second state language to the Russian one;
- The state protection and support of the Ukrainian language – equal treatment of all languages by the state;
- Suspending decommunization – continuing decommunization.

This further confirms the above conclusion that political and cultural division is the main socio-political “split” of Ukrainian society.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORMS

Of particular interest is the distribution of citizens' preferences concerning policy alternatives directly linked to the on-going reforms.

De-centralisation. The proposal to "limit the central government's functions by delegating greater powers to local self-governments; to proceed with de-centralisation" is supported by the majority (absolute or relative) in all three groups. The highest support is observed among the "supporters of change" (60%) and "supporters of restoration" (59%); among the "conservatives" the support is lower (42%).

Privatisation. The proposal to "privatise state-owned companies; ensure priority development of the private sector" is not supported by majorities in any group. Only 17% of the "supporters of change" favour this course of events as opposed to 44% among those, who support the opposite approach – "to scale up the public sector of economy; to undertake re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies". As for the "supporters of restoration", this correlation is 12% and 60%, respectively. Somewhat greater support for privatisation is observed among the "conservatives" (25%), but 44% would still prefer another alternative.

Land reform. Similarly, the proposal "to introduce the free sale of agricultural land" failed to gain the majority support in any group. Instead, the opposite approach – extending the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land – is largely approved by the "supporters of change" and "conservatives" (58% each) and by the "supporters of restoration" (68%).

Social benefits transformation. Instead of targeted subsidies on housing and utility services (current approach), most respondents in all groups give preference to the opposite approach – "Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers". Slightly

higher support for the subsidy programme can be seen among the "conservatives" (33%) and the "supporters of change" (29%).

Health sector reform. The currently implemented option within the health care reform (the state-guaranteed package of free medical services and compulsory or voluntary health insurance) is not popular with majorities in all groups (maximum support (22%) was found among the "supporters of change"). Instead, the support for guaranteed provision of totally free medical services ranges from 55% among the "supporters of change" to 75% among the "supporters of restoration".

Educational sector reform. Most responders in all groups (relative majority of the supporters of change" and "conservatives" and absolute majority of the "supporters of restoration") give preference to pre-reform system of education with its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements. Instead, current transformation of educational system was approved by 21-22% of the "supporters of change" and "conservatives", and 8% of the "supporters of restoration".

Attitudes towards recommendations of Ukraine's international partners. In all groups, absolute or relative majority of those polled (56% of the "supporters of change", 42% of the "conservatives", and 64% of the "supporters of restoration) picked the option "Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above". The alternative – "Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine" – was slightly more attractive for the "conservatives" (21%), while the level of its support in other groups did not exceed 5-7% of the respondents.

► Policy preferences depending on geopolitical orientations of the parties that are likely to gain public support

Based on the responses reflecting the respondents' favoured political parties with different geopolitical orientation – the European integration of Ukraine

(30%), Ukraine's special path based on its national specifics (28%), and restoration of relations with Russia (11%), we identified three groups of respondents – "*Pro-European*", "*Special path*" and "*Pro-Russian*".

Distribution of answers is presented in the table below.

Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	Ukraine's NATO membership in the foreseeable future
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
Return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Return of temporarily occupied territories by military means
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society



Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	=	⇐	⇐	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Economy				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Privatisation of state-owned companies; priority development of the private sector
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Government non-interference in the economy (de-regulation) and price control; total market regulations
Extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Introduction of the free sale of agricultural land
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market
Predominant state support for large national companies	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	=	Priority support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	=	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Ukraine to accelerate its economic growth only through active development of new industries and technologies – IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnologies, etc.
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	=	⇐	⇐	Inflation prevention and hryvnia stabilisation even at the cost of "freezing" of wages and pensions
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Introduction of equal taxation for all citizens regardless of their income
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	=	⇐	⇐	Tax system, in which a person pays low taxes but receives social services at his/her own expense
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	=	⇐	⇐	Protection of interests of the "middle class" – skilled labourers with middle income
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	=	=	⇐	Fighting poverty by increasing the price of labour and hence raising salaries

Social Policy				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of "income levelling"
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Strengthening the rights of employers in relations with employees. Empowering employers, including in hiring and firing of employees
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even if this requires tax hikes	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be served by private companies
Humanitarian Policy				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇒ ⇒	Granting the status of second state language to the Russian language
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇒ ⇒	All languages should be treated equally by the state
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Current reformation of the system of secondary education is a positive phenomenon, as the extension of the term of schooling to 12 years, changes in the content of education and relations between a teacher and students brings the Ukrainian school closer to the European norms and standards of secondary education
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	=	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with the state
Decommunization should stop	⇒ ⇒	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Decommunization should continue

GAL-TAN Scale				
	Pro-European	Special path	Pro-Russian	
The state's hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state must earnestly ensure the civil rights of all citizens, including perpetrators of crime
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	The state's recognition of people's right to same-sex marriage (partnership)
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	=	⇐	=	Support for the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities; and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	⇐	⇐	⇐	Scaling up the rights of national minorities
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Priority development of cities (urbanisation) as hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	=	Maximum attention to environment protection, even if it impedes economic growth
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	All people belong to universal community sharing common values, while nationality is secondary
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Preventing the revival of death penalty for any crimes
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	=	⇐	⇐	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression

The tables above illustrate discrepancies between the supporters of pro-European and pro-Russian parties on the issues of the EU and NATO accession; positions towards Russia; terms of establishing peace; decommunization; the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and the government attitude towards languages.

The differences are less pronounced when it comes to other issues (i.e. economic and social policy).

Speaking about the supporters of a “special path” parties, these lack a clear opinion on “conflicting” issues, whereas their vision of other issues echoes the majority opinion in other groups.

Specifically, all three groups support on the following statements:

- Limiting the central government's functions and delegating greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation;
- Greater public control over law enforcement agencies;
- Extending the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land;
- Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above;

- Introducing progressive taxation – persons with higher income are to pay higher taxes;
- The state should guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age;
- Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor;
- Protecting the rights of employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions;
- Aligning pay for top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like with an average salary in Ukraine;
- Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run;
- Protecting traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman;



- Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORMS

De-centralisation. The proposal to “limit the central government’s functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; to proceed with de-centralisation” is supported by the majority of respondents in all three groups (53-61%).

Privatisation. The proposal to “privatise state-owned companies; ensure priority development of the private sector” is not supported by majorities in any group. 26% of the supporters of pro-European parties welcome it as opposed to 34% of those who support the other alternative. People in other two groups largely support scaling up the public sector of economy and re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies (56% and 54%, respectively).

Land reform. Similarly, the proposal “to introduce the free sale of agricultural land” failed to gain support of the majority in all groups. The largest support (24%) for this reform is found in the group of supporters of pro-European parties. Instead, the opposite approach – extension of the moratorium on the free sale of agricultural land – is largely approved by the supporters of pro-European parties (53%), the supporters of the “special way” parties (68%), and by the supporters of pro-Russian parties (63%).

Social benefits transformation. Only the group supporting pro-European parties has roughly equal shares of the supporters and opponents of this transformation. Most respondents in other two groups do not support targeted subsidies on housing and utility services – 40% and 43%, respectively. The alternative approach – “Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers” – is largely supported by 57% of those following the “special path” parties, and 71% of the supporters of pro-Russian parties.

Health sector reform. The currently implemented policy option within the health care reform (the state-guaranteed package of free medical services and compulsory or voluntary health insurance) is not popular with majorities in all groups (maximum support at 32% was found among the supporters of pro-European parties). Instead, the support for guaranteed provision of totally free medical care ranges from 47% (supporters of pro-European parties) to 63% (supporters of the “special path” parties) and to 71% (supporters of pro-Russian parties).

Educational sector reform. Most supporters of the “special path” and pro-Russian parties (55% and 58%, respectively) prefer the pre-reform system of education with its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements. As for the supporters of pro-European parties, 32% approve current educational reform, while 36% favour the previous system. The level of support in other two groups is only 13% and 8%.

Attitudes towards recommendations of Ukraine’s international partners. In all groups, absolute or relative majority of those polled (51% of the supporters of pro-European parties; 64% of the supporters of “special path”; and 58% of the supporters of pro-Russian parties) picked the option “Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above”. The alternative – “Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine” resonated with only 15% of the supporters of pro-European parties, while the level of its support in other groups was only 6%.

As noted above, the socio-economic division will hardly play the central role in shaping Ukraine's political space, as the supporters of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the supporters of the Russia-centred policy vector, and those seeking to return to pre-2014 times alike have common attitudes towards the economic and social policy. Moreover, these approaches have a clear "left-wing" colouring, including the government's interventionism and protectionism, equalising social justice, and the like. These could have been fuelled by low quality of life of most Ukrainians as well as their paternalistic and statist⁹ vision originating from Ukraine's Soviet past.¹⁰

Moreover, no significant differences exist between the political preferences of **Ukrainians who are likely to support either "old" or "new" (non-Parliamentary) parties**, narrowing down the competition to the one among new personas rather than new ideas.

As before, geopolitical orientations, the conflict with Russia and related agenda (the "price of peace" and the possibility of granting a special status to some regions), as well as socio-cultural issues (language, historical memory) are key polarising factors in Ukrainian politics.

Flexibility and predominantly leftist nature of people's policy preferences in social and economic sphere will generate "inconveniences" primarily for pro-European candidates and parties (that is, presidential candidates and political parties declaring their commitment to Ukraine's European integration course).

Relevant demands, coupled with negative attitudes towards key reforms that are set to continue in the upcoming year, will force political actors to exploit more socially popular slogans and promises in order to gain voter support and possibly to push ahead with certain unpopular – though necessary – measures.

This approach, however, entails the risk of rapid loss of confidence and public support after the elections: having taken over the government, these actors will be forced to act contrary to their promises, bound by Ukraine's international commitments regarding specific areas of reform. On the other hand, following the electoral moods, these candidates and parties may be



accused of "populism",¹¹ which has a negative connotation today – even though they could simply address their leftward political proposals.

These limitations will not apply to political parties declaring Ukraine's "special path" or advocating for restoring relations with Russia. Consequently, these parties will get certain advantages in the electoral race.

The nature of people's policy preferences in the spheres that undergo reforms may question their continuation in the future. Only de-centralisation has won support of most Ukrainians regardless of their political allegiances or attitudes to future reforms. Other important transformations, including privatisation, land market, health and education reforms do not enjoy popular support even among those who stand for persistent social changes or support pro-European parties.

Ukraine's foreign partners will have to recognise the fact that most Ukrainians, including supporters of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, do not favour unconditional implementation of external recommendations, especially the unpopular ones, promote greater focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine. Therefore, issuing an ultimatum demanding relevant changes may trigger an increasingly negative attitude towards external actors, political forces and government institutions that support these demands.

⁹ Ethatism (from the French *etat* – "state") is an ideology that considers the state as the highest result and the goal of social development. It is positioned as a counterbalance to anarchism.

¹⁰ For more detail on the impact of post-Soviet legacy on the processes in independent Ukraine see S. Kulchytskyi, M. Mishchenko, *Ukraine on the threshold of united Europe* – Kyiv, the Razumkov Centre, 2018, p.232.

¹¹ For more detail on the complex and multifaceted nature of populism see V. Yarema. *The Role of Populist Parties in the European Political Systems – Transformation of the Party System: The Ukrainian Experience in the European Context* (edited by Yu. Yakymenko), Kyiv: the Razumkov Centre, 2017, p.383-402.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF 2019 ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

The upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019 have become a powerful factor in energising public activity of political leaders – potential presidential candidates and political parties. Those who follow activities of leading political actors since early 2018 can observe how they gradually turn into targeted information campaigns, which should eventually transform into official campaigning (so far this concerns the presidential elections).

These campaigns enable field-testing of key messages and topics for the future presidential candidates to reach out to voters, while the results of various public opinion polls help to draft election programmes. The early start of “informal” campaigns prematurely electrifies the political situation and to some extent violates the letter of the electoral law, but at the same time it provides voters with an opportunity to get to know potential candidates, their views and proposals, and the candidates – to receive necessary “feedback” to refine, adjust or supplement their election proposals, if necessary.

This section explores the problem of matching the politicians’ “supply” with the voters’ “demand” ahead of two election campaigns. Based on the analysis of programme documents, public statements, media materials and the results of expert interviews, this section formulates preliminary¹ “political proposals” of potential presidential candidates and political forces that they lead.² As they cover key candidates’ viewpoints in different spheres, these “proposals” are then compared with expectations of their potential electorates, leading to a conclusion about their (in)consistency.

The section further explores possible outcomes of election campaigns, predicts the course of political processes between elections, and studies potential configurations of inter-party coalitions in the newly elected Parliament of Ukraine.

3.1. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: POSITIONING OF POTENTIAL CANDIDATES, CONSISTENCY BETWEEN “POLITICAL PROPOSALS” AND VOTERS’ EXPECTATIONS

In accordance with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution, adopted at the extraordinary session together with the Law “On Approval of the Decree of the President of Ukraine on Introduction of Martial Law in Ukraine” on 26 November 2018, the elections of the President of Ukraine will be held on 31 March 2019.³ Therefore, the official launch of the presidential

campaign (electoral process) falls on 31 December 2018. Judging from preliminary statements of intent, the presidential elections of 2019 attract an abnormally large number of candidates. For example, in early October 2018 the Committee of Voters of Ukraine has already reckoned 28 potential candidates,⁴ and the number of statements of intent to run for the presidency has been growing ever since.⁵

The results of public opinion polls conducted during 2018 make it possible to reduce the group of candidates with relatively high ratings.⁶ These include

¹ This preliminary nature is explained by the fact that pursuant to the Law “On the Elections of the President of Ukraine” (as amended on 1 January 2016), the registration of candidates ends 55 days prior to the day of elections. Therefore, before the start of the registration process all persons can be only considered as potential candidates. Accordingly, there will be no formal election programmes. The same applies to the political parties.

² In the expert environment there is a broad consensus about overall agreement or close proximity of positions of various political forces and their leaders.

³ The Law introduces martial law for the period of 30 days. If not extended, this regime does not affect the terms of electoral process in the country.

⁴ See CVU held an international conference “Money in politics: how political parties are preparing for elections”, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine website, 9 October 2018, <http://www.cvu.org.ua/eng/nodes/view/type:news/slug:vidbulasia-mizhnarodna-konferentsiia-hroi-v-polityi-k-polityni-partii-hotuts-do-vyboriv>.

⁵ For reference: 23 candidates were registered in the 2014 presidential campaign; 18 candidates – in 2010, and 26 – in 2004. See the Central Election Commission of Ukraine website, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua>.

⁶ Based on the results of the Razumkov Centre public opinion polls conducted on 21-27 June 2018.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland); Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent President of Ukraine; Anatoliy Hrytsenko, the leader of the Civil Position party; one of the leaders of diverse political forces with pro-Russian agenda (currently – Yuriy Boyko); Oleh Lyashko, the leader of the Radical Party of his name; Andriy Sadovyi, the leader of the “Samopomich Union” (Self-Reliance); Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, the public figure and the leader of “Okean Elzy” rock band; and Volodymyr Zelenskyi, the actor, producer and art director of Studio Kvartal 95.⁷

Peculiar positioning of potential candidates and preliminary content of their “political proposals”

Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine



Mr Poroshenko is highly likely to run for a second term as the only presidential candidate from the current government. Prior to official launch of the campaign, the President was in no hurry revealing the content of his election programme, limiting himself to several key messages intended for the national audience

and for certain target groups (servicemen and veterans of ATO/JFO, businesses). The content of these messages suggests that the programme will generally emphasise the importance of continuity of the policy implemented since 2014.

The “Army, Language, Faith” triad, articulated by President Poroshenko in his address to the Verkhovna Rada on 20 September 2018 as the formula of national identity⁸ and further placed on billboards, actually sets the ideological framework for the upcoming campaign that no candidate who seeks success at 2019 elections should try to surpass (apart from outspoken representatives of pro-Moscow political environment).

Positions of Petro Poroshenko regarding specific policy areas

➤ *Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:*

- Clear vision of geopolitical course: Ukraine’s own path away from the empire towards the EU and NATO, relying on the nation’s own strengths and resources;
- Constitutional enshrinement of Ukraine’s aspiration for the EU and NATO membership as a safeguard against possible abrupt change in the course of the state policy;
- Strengthening of the Armed Forces as a pledge of peace; transition to NATO standards;
- Re-integration of the occupied territories (parts of Donbas and the Crimea with the city of Sevastopol,

annexed by Russia) by political and diplomatic means, but on terms determined by Ukraine through negotiations;

- Recognition of limited capacity of the Minsk Agreements, however, with the assertion that they were still beneficial for Ukraine; no proposals for their replacement;
- Clear recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state.

➤ *Socio-cultural (humanitarian) policy:*

- Increased government’s focus on humanitarian (socio-cultural) policy with special attention to strengthening the status of Ukrainian language;
- Special attention to establishing the Ukrainian autocephalous church as one of the pillars of the national independence and consolidation of society.

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- Recognition of shortcomings of the existing constitutional distribution of powers, but no clear intentions to revise the *status quo*; emphasis on the European strategy that prescribes an algorithm for developing the parliamentary-presidential representative democracy;
- The need to continue and reinforce de-centralisation; intentions to introduce new constitutional amendments “to protect de-centralisation”.

➤ *Socio-economic policy, corporate social responsibility:*

- Unspecific changes in labour policy (with the focus on wage increase and job creation) and social protection and support (with the focus on subsidies policy);
- Articulated intent to continue de-regulation and improve tax legislation (including support for gradual introduction of the tax on withdrawn capital); urgent recommendation to raise salaries; promises to stop unlawful pressure of law enforcement agencies on business.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland)



As of December 2018, Ms Tymoshenko was the only real presidential front-runner, who conducted proactive and meaningful election campaign long before its official launch, thus balancing on the verge of violation of current legislation. Moreover, she consistently targeted various audiences with rather diverse messages.

⁷ Despite rather substantial public support, the latter two avoided clear statements about their participation prior to the beginning of presidential race.

⁸ See the Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “On the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine in 2018” – Official website of the President of Ukraine, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/poslannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-verhovnoyi-radi-ukrayini-pr-49726>.

Positions of Yulia Tymoshenko regarding specific policy areas:

➤ *Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:*

- Declaration of geopolitical course favouring Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, coupled with criticism of unspecified "external management";
- Recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state;
- Proposal to resolve armed conflict in the East by replacing the "Minsk" negotiations with "Budapest +" format;
- Recognition of denuclearisation in exchange for security guarantees as a "historic mistake" along with Ukraine's full right to demand global assistance for rebuilding Donbas and facilitating return of the Crimea; the need to reinstate the country's nuclear status was not emphasised;
- Offering herself as a negotiator for peace (without specifying the parties and grounds for such negotiations);
- Frequent claims that the war in the East continues as long as people cash in;⁹ promotion of the idea that the war can be stopped by a single decision of Ukraine's leadership;
- Creation of the professional army;
- Increased funding of the Armed Forces to at least 3% of GDP;
- Reparations from Russia in excess of €100 billion;
- Official recognition of all persons who were displaced from occupied territories of Donbas and the Crimea as a result of Russia's aggression as victims of armed conflict;
- Support for involvement of peacekeepers only on Ukraine's terms and along the state border line between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- Conclusion of a new social contract between the Ukrainian state and society – the Constitution of Ukraine with its adoption by the Constituent Assembly (a platform that brings together prominent public figures, constitutionalists, human rights advocates and people with creative thinking);
- Key provisions of the new Constitution:
 - Abolition of presidency with delegation of relevant powers to the collective body named the National Assembly of Self-Governance; transition to a parliamentary republic of the "chancellor" type;
 - Granting the right of legislative initiative to citizens; establishment of a two-chamber parliament with the National Assembly of Self-Governance serving as a second chamber;

- Granting the right of legislative initiative to all-Ukrainian associations (including the right to make proposals regarding government acts and appointments to executive bodies, the right to veto laws and government acts);
- Prevention of federalisation and preservation of a unitary state system;
- Introduction of two-round parliamentary elections with the 2% threshold in the first round. The party winning in the second round to receive 226 seats (the majority), with the remaining 224 seats to be distributed proportionally among other parties that overcame the 2% barrier. The leader of each party is eligible to become a chancellor;
- Abolition of the parliamentary immunity;
- Introduction of magistrates (justices of the peace) and the principle of election of the judiciary;
- Continued and reinforced de-centralisation along with the declaration on preventing federalisation.

➤ *Economic policy ("The New Economic Course"):*

- The economic strategy is based on "free enterprise as a driving force; harmonious mixture of a free market and interests of society; social protection of those in need";
- Abandonment of the resource-based economy; transition towards innovative protectionist model;
- Transition from oligarchic system to a social market economy with intensive entrepreneurship development;
- State support for private entrepreneurship, including farms;
- Extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land;
- Involvement of intellectuals and entrepreneurs in public administration;
- Reformation of monetary and exchange policy to ensure stability of the national currency;
- Revival of low interest lending policy for businesses;
- Development of education, science, quality health services and social guarantees for the population, including decent pensions;
- Introduction of health insurance to be covered by the employer via reduced taxes (for working people) or by the government (for those who do not work).

➤ *Additional economic issues:*

- Introduction of moratorium on round wood cutting;
- Liquidation of Naftogaz of Ukraine;
- Immediate (after winning the presidential race) halving of the natural gas price for the population and reduction of utility tariffs; the use of indigenously produced gas on people's needs.

⁹ See, for example, live stream from the All-Ukrainian Forum "The New Course of Ukraine" – "Batkivshchyna" website, 15 June 2018, <https://ba.org.ua/media-news/pryama-translyaciya-vseukra%D1%97nskogo-forumu-novij-kurs-ukra%D1%97ni-15-06-2018>.

Anatoliy Hrytsenko, the leader of the Civil Position party



Mr Hrytsenko is the only potential candidate who tried to clarify the ideological dimension of his policy by declaring his willingness to build a regime of “liberal-democratic values”.¹⁰ At the same time, he came up with an “enlightened authoritarianism”¹¹ – a model that should elevate the country to a higher

level of economy and democracy.¹² These attempts to combine liberal-democratic values with authoritarianism are the main peculiarities of Mr Hrytsenko’s political views.

Positions of Anatoliy Hrytsenko regarding specific policy areas:

➤ *Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:*

- Has no clearly articulated position regarding further relations with the EU, but believes that Western democracies should be Ukraine’s strategic benchmarks;
- Avoids clear declarations about the NATO membership because of doubts that we can “get there soon”; mentions “allied relations”;
- Opposes any debates about Ukraine’s possible reinstatement as a nuclear weapon state;
- Rejects the “Minsk” format of negotiations with Russia;
- Points at the existence of some new “peace plan”, elaborated by an informal international working group with his participation;
- Calls for the security sector and military reforms.

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- Recognition of the president elected by the nationwide vote (rather than a prime-minister or a chancellor) as a key figure in the state. It is the president who should form and personally lead the government;
- Adoption of the law on the impeachment of the President;
- Despite some positive changes, the judicial reform stumbles. This requires introduction of the principle of inevitability of punishment, imprisonment without amnesty and pardon for crooked judges with confiscation of property;
- Profound changes in the state based on the following three principles:
 - ♦ De-centralisation of government;

- ♦ De-monopolisation of economy;
- ♦ De-politicisation of security and law enforcement agencies;
- Introduction of the “principle of universality of local self-governance” (transferring lands to local self-governments that once owned them);
- Changes in the electoral system with no majoritarian component;
- Removal of oligarchs from politics and government.

➤ *Economic and social policy:*

- Banking sector reform;
- Fiscal (tax and customs) system reform;
- The sale of small loss-making enterprises through auctions instead of “large privatisation” during crisis;
- Introduction of the land market only after appropriate reforms; until then – moratorium on the sale of land with improved mechanisms and terms of lease;
- Support for the new Labour Code;
- Critical attitude towards current educational reform with recognition of the need for reforms in this area (the content not specified).

Shortly before the official launch of his campaign, Anatoliy Hrytsenko as the head of the Civil Position party has signed a memorandum “A Country of Equal Opportunities with Strong Economy” with the Ukrainian Council of Business (URB).¹³ It can be assumed that provisions of this document are consistent with the programmatic positions of Mr Hrytsenko as the presidential candidate.

Together with URB, the politician commits to facilitate reliable protection of the rights, freedoms and property of a free citizen, to build a strong middle class and active civil society, and to support robust communities as the basis for economically sustainable Ukraine, thus proclaiming 10 key principles:

1. Inviolability of property rights, resolute opposition to raider attacks.
2. Protection of economic rights and freedoms of citizens, both in Ukraine and abroad.
3. De-monopolisation of the economy, creation of equal terms for fair competition.
4. De-offshorisation and tackling the shadow economy, incentives for cashless society.
5. De-centralisation of government, strengthening of local communities’ economic base.
6. Effective and transparent public administration; accountability to society.

¹⁰ See “Hrytsenko: I support strong presidential model of government” – website of ZIK TV channel, 23 June 2017, https://zik.ua/news/2017/06/23/grytsenko_ya_pidtrymuyu_sylnu_prezydentsku_model_vlady_1120589.

¹¹ See “Anatoliy Hrytsenko: We should not be afraid of authoritarian regime” – portal of RBK-Ukraine, 25 April 2018, <https://daily.rbc.ua/ukr/show/anatoliy-gritsenko-nuzhno-boyatsya-avtoritarnogo-1524633586.html>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See “Anatoliy Hrytsenko has signed a Memorandum with the Ukrainian Council of Business” – Interfax Ukraine, 2 November 2018, <https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/political/542412.html>.

7. State support for the development of the national export capacities.
8. Energy saving, energy efficiency, development of alternative energy (renewables).
9. De-politicisation and de-commercialisation of law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies.
10. Resolute anti-corruption efforts based on efficient incentives and inevitability of punishment.



The leader of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko

True to his nature, Mr Lyashko started building his communication with potential voters based on slogans rather than content-rich programmatic documents.

Positions of Oleh Lyashko regarding specific policy areas:

➤ Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:

- The lack of clearly articulated position on future relations with the EU;
- Uncertain and ever-changing position on possible NATO membership;
- Restoration of Ukraine's status as a nuclear power;
- Rejection of the "Minsk" format of negotiations with Russia (with no alternative plans);
- Harsh anti-Russian rhetoric;
- Critical attitude towards "external management" and cooperation with the IMF.

➤ Socio-cultural policy:

- The main themes are in line with those articulated by President Poroshenko (army, language, faith or spirituality).

➤ The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:

- Elimination of dualism in the system of government; the President should be the head of the executive branch (consistent with Anatoliy Hrytsenko's position);
- Adoption of the law on the Impeachment of the President (consistent with positions of both Yulia Tymoshenko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko);
- Reduction of the number of MPs to 250; prohibition to stand for the Parliament more than two times; elimination of the "corrupt majoritarian system"; abolition of the parliamentary immunity and introduction of a procedure for recalling a deputy (partially consistent with proposals of Yulia Tymoshenko and Anatoliy Hrytsenko);
- Dismissal of all judges and prosecutors and filling vacant positions via competition or direct elections (elective judiciary is also among Yulia Tymoshenko's proposals).

➤ Economic policy

- The need for an "economic nationalism" policy;
- Active state interventions in the economy;
- Transformation of the state-owned banks into instruments of industrial policy;
- Prevention of agricultural land market;
- Ban on round wood exports (which runs contrary to the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement with the EU and relevant statements about intended continuation of the European integration policy);
- Lower gas prices and utility tariffs for the population (consistent with position of Yulia Tymoshenko);
- Increase in wages and pensions (funding sources not specified);
- Government price regulation for food products, medicines and the like;
- Proposal to recognise a farm as a basis of the agrarian system;
- Development of industrial parks;
- Prevention of sale of strategic state-owned enterprises;
- "Energy modernisation".

Andriy Sadovyi, the leader of the "Samopomich Union" (Self-Reliance), the mayor of Lviv



Founded by Andriy Sadovyi, the "Samopomich Union" was initially perceived by society as a response to clearly articulated demand for a "new political force" and "new faces" in politics.¹⁴ Therefore, Mr Sadovyi had all reasons to prove himself as a new quality political leader.

However, so far neither Andriy Sadovyi nor his political force were able to present some fundamentally new ideological and programmatic component or essentially new political practice. As a politician, Mr Sadovyi remains limited to the city of Lviv, which is obviously not enough to become a successful presidential candidate, while his political programme is yet to include messages resonating with the residents of industrial centres, towns and villages of the East and the South of the country.

Positions of Andriy Sadovyi regarding specific policy areas:

➤ Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:

- Ukraine's course towards the EU and NATO;
- Support for the introduction of martial law;
- Recognition of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state;
- Critical attitude towards the Minsk Agreements.

¹⁴ For more detail see "The party system of Ukraine before and after Maidan: changes, trends, public demand". Analytical report by the Razumkov Centre – National Security and Defence, 2015, No.6-7, p.34-47.

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- Abolition of the parliamentary immunity;
- Purge of government;
- Adoption of the Law on Elections based on the proportional system with open lists;
- Support for the civil service reform with competitive selection of all government officials and their de-politicisation;
- De-centralisation with the expansion of powers of local communities.

➤ *Social and economic policy:*

- Replacement of income tax with the tax on withdrawn capital;
- Fair price and tariff formation;
- Targeted social assistance;
- Transformation of land into assets (in other words, the introduction of land market);
- Antitrust policy;
- Prioritisation of high-tech solutions, engineering, advanced processing;
- Establishment of industrial parks;
- Support for privatisation with criticism of its current methods.

Certain points in Andriy Sadoovyi's narrative along with clearly articulated proposals suggest that he is perhaps the only candidate who understands the principles of liberalism. It is also worth noting that despite formal exit from the parliamentary coalition and sharp criticism of President Poroshenko and his political course, the "Samopomich" faction has actively supported the reform-oriented bills elaborated by the Cabinet and the coalition.

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, the public figure and the leader of "Okean Elzy" rock band



Mr Vakarchuk has repeatedly emphasised his lack of interest in the "highest office" but never rejected intentions to run for presidency. In late 2017 he made an unmistakably political public statement about 10 key steps of reform,¹⁵ listing the main areas of reform and inviting those concerned to share their ideas.

This rock star's statement is hardly innovative. Meanwhile, this peculiar "political sermonising" clearly targets educated young people, some of whom view Mr Vakarchuk as their likely political leader. The absence of a full-fledged political team, the lack of clear political and ideological position and the vagueness of manifesto do not preclude parts of society from accepting him in this role.

Positions of Svyatoslav Vakarchuk regarding specific policy areas:

➤ *Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:*

- Any opinions about Ukraine's foreign policy and geopolitical choice are yet to be articulated, but Mr Varkarchuk is known as a supporter of modern Western democratic models;
- Similarly, Mr Vakarchuk does not specify his vision of future relations with Russia or ways to establish peace, but demonstrates deep understanding of the fact that the Russian elite for the most part does not recognize Ukraine's mere existence as an independent and sovereign state;
- The need to reform the Security Service (no clarification).

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- The need to replace current electoral system with the proportional one with open party lists; the importance of reducing the role of oligarchs and their money in elections, and limiting the role of political advertising;
- Implementation of "genuine" reform of the civil service;
- Elimination of political lobbying and introduction of new rules of conduct for politicians; public demarcation of "red lines" (e.g. the Code of Ethics);
- Complete renovation of the judiciary with delegation of the main role in electing new judges to NGOs and international experts; elective judiciary via general elections is irrelevant.

➤ *Economic policy:*

- "Large privatisation" with phased introduction of the land market.

Potential candidate from pro-Russian political establishment (currently Yuriy Boyko and Oleksandr Vilkul)



There might be several candidates representing these forces. As of December 2018, this role could be equally claimed by Yuriy Boyko, Oleksandr Vilkul, Yevheniy Murayev, Vadim Novinskiy and to a lesser extent – Serhiy Taruta. The first three have good chances to demonstrate their political qualities as future presidential candidates, which can then be used during the parliamentary campaign.

Despite intense competition within this environment, these potential pro-Russian candidates do not have fundamental ideological differences. Therefore, each

¹⁵ See "Vakarchuk disavowed political ambitions but listed ten key points for Ukraine's development" – Ukrayinska Pravda, 10 December 2017, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/12/10/7165015>.

candidate's proposals will remain within predetermined framework aiming to achieve one goal – to regain past political influence.

Positions of a potential candidate from pro-Russian political environment regarding specific policy areas:

➤ *Foreign policy and security, geopolitical choice:*

- Reconciliation with Russia and restoration of economic relations;
- Support of a “non-bloc” status;
- Participation in integrated associations and unions led by Russia;
- Direct peace talks with Russia and pseudo-republics;
- Support of a peacekeeper mission;
- Doubts about the need of signing the Association Agreement with the EU.

➤ *Socio-cultural policy:*

- Granting the status of the second state language to the Russian language with the support of development of the Ukrainian language;
- Support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and rejection of autocephalic church in Ukraine.

➤ *The Constitution, the state structure, form of government, constitutional powers:*

- Introduction of parliamentary form of government with the transfer of main powers to the Prime Minister and substantial weakening of the President (consistent with Yulia Tymoshenko's proposals);
- Introduction of a two-chamber Parliament, with the general meeting of the Chamber of Representatives (35 persons) and the Chamber of Deputies (150 persons); election of the President in Parliament;
- Possibility of granting a “special status” to certain regions;
- Introduction of the governor elections, advisory local referendums and plebiscite;
- Changes in electoral law with introduction of the proportional system with open lists;
- Support for further de-centralisation.

➤ *Economic and social policy:*

- Termination of cooperation with the IMF;
- Halving the utility tariffs (consistent with Yulia Tymoshenko's narrative);
- Support for revival of the previous economic model;
- Restoration of state regulation of prices (consistent with Oleh Lyashko's proposals);
- Declaration of support for farming (partially consistent with Yulia Tymoshenko's proposals);
- Recognition of the country's unpreparedness for the introduction of land market;

- Banking system stabilisation;
- Liberalization of currency policy;
- Reformation of fiscal bodies;
- Improvement of the *Prozorro* system;
- Auction-based bidding for land plots in the cities.

Volodymyr Zelenskyi, an actor and art director of Studio Kvartal 95



Prior to the start of electoral process Mr Zelenskyi has consistently evaded the question about his possible participation in the presidential campaign. Since relentless criticism of the country's leaders and other high-profile politicians was in the centre of his creative work, many Ukrainians started to gradually perceive him as a potential presidential candidate.

Volodymyr Zelenskyi's positions and views on key policy issues and the country's geopolitical choice remain unknown; likewise, there were no signals of his willingness to collaborate with other political forces or leaders.

In general, the analysis of potential candidates' current political positions enables assessment of the current stage of “informal” campaign:

- Continuation of the current government's policy, including reforms, is only associated with the incumbent President of Ukraine – Petro Poroshenko;
- None of potential presidential candidates who view themselves as opponents to the incumbent President has publicly declared his or her intention to continue at least general course initiated by the current government in 2014;
- The candidates come up with quite serious changes in the model of government (e.g. the parliamentary or “chancellor” republic vs redistribution of powers in favour of the President), which is by no means a priority demand of their voters;
- Proposals of the presidential candidates – at least prior to registration of their election programmes – generally disregard the word “reforms”;
- None of the candidates has tried to specify the ways of achieving this or that goal taking into account the impact of both internal and external factors;
- The narrative of each potential candidate appeals to peacetime, which in itself creates a distorted picture of reality for potential voters.

Perhaps these reservations are of temporary nature and will disappear after the official launch of the campaign, the registration of candidates, the announcement of their programmes and the start of campaigning.

The voters' expectations from the potential presidential candidates

The Razumkov Centre's survey, discussed in detail in Section 2, made it possible to determine attitudes of citizens, who confirmed their intention to vote for a particular candidate in the upcoming presidential

elections, towards alternative policy proposals. By doing so, we can verify how these expectations of potential electorates match the candidates' political proposals.

Preferences of the electorate supporting specific candidates are summarized in the table below.¹⁶

Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security									
	Yuriy Boyko	Volodymyr Zelenskyi	Yulia Tymoshenko	Oleh Lyashko	Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	Anatoliy Hrytsenko	Andriy Sadovyi*	Petro Poroshenko	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	⇐	⇒	⇒	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	⇐	=	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Ukraine's NATO membership in the foreseeable future
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	⇐	⇒	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
Return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	=	=	=	Return of temporarily occupied territories by military means
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	⇐	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	=	⇒	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation ¹⁷	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	=	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	⇐	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Economic and Social Policy									
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	=	=	Privatisation of state-owned companies; priority development of the private sector
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Government non-interference in the economy (de-regulation) and price control; total market regulations
Extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Introduction of the sale of agricultural land

* Due to the small sample size the results are conditional.

¹⁶ The table uses the following symbols: **arrow direction** – alternative favoured by the majority of the respondents in this group; **two arrows** – alternative is supported by most respondents in the group; **one arrow** – alternative is supported by relative majority of the respondents who outnumber the supporters of another alternative by at least 15%; **equal sign** – relative majority of the respondents in the group have chosen middle position.

¹⁷ Grey colour highlights policy alternatives that are directly relevant to specific reform areas.

Economic and Social Policy									
	Yuriy Boyko	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	Yulia Tymoshenko	Oleh Lyashko	Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	Anatoliy Hrytsenko	Andriy Sadovyi	Petro Poroshenko	
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	Free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market
Predominant state support for large national companies	=	⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	Priority support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐	=	=	⇐	=	=	Ukraine to accelerate its economic growth only through active development of new industries and technologies – IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnologies, etc
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	⇐ ⇐	=	=	=	=	=	⇐	=	Inflation prevention and hryvnia stabilisation even at the cost of “freezing” of wages and pensions
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Introduction of equal taxation for all citizens regardless of their income
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	Tax system, in which a person pays low taxes but receives social services at his/her own expense
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	Protection of interests of the “middle class” – skilled labourers with middle income
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	=	⇒	Fighting poverty by increasing the price of labour and hence raising salaries
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	=	=	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	=	=	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of “income levelling”
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Strengthening the rights of employers in relations with employees. Empowering employers, including in hiring and firing of employees
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even if this requires tax hikes	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget

Economic and Social Policy								
	Yuriy Boyko	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	Yulia Tymoshenko	Oleh Lyashko	Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	Anatoliy Hrytsenko	Andriy Sadovyi	Petro Poroshenko
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐
Humanitarian Policy								
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	⇒ ⇒	=	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	⇒	⇐ ⇐
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	=	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒
Decommunization should stop	⇐ ⇐	=	=	=	=	=	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒
The state's hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐	=	⇐	⇒	⇐
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	=	=	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	=	⇐
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒	⇒ ⇒
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	⇐ ⇐
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	⇐	=	⇐	=	=	=	⇒	=

Humanitarian Policy									
	Yuriy Boyko	Volodymyr Zelenskyi	Yulia Tymoshenko	Oleh Lyashko	Swatoslav Vakarchuk	Anatoliy Hrytsenko	Andriy Sadovyi	Petro Poroshenko	
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	⇐	=	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	=	⇒	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression

By summarising the data in the table, it is possible to determine a number of policy alternatives supported by the majority¹⁸ of potential voters of all listed presidential candidates:

- Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control;
- Extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land;
- Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods;
- Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with said needs and moods;
- Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes;
- Protection of interests of low-income citizens;
- The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age;
- Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor;
- Protection of rights of the employees; empowering employees and their associations – labour unions;
- Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine;
- Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run.

Therefore, “classical” left or left-of-centre ideologies in the public consciousness easily combine with traditional conservative or near-conservative positions (e.g. support of traditional family values).

As for the worldview and geopolitical orientations, the followers of most potential candidates tend to

support the movement towards the EU. At the same time, the supporters of possible pro-Russian candidate often share their approaches to economic and social policy and, to some extent, humanitarian policy with the supporters of other candidates.

The fact that restoration of the government’s active role in managing economic processes and re-distribution public goods remains an important ideological position for most voters (regardless of their preferred candidates), suggests strong demand for the emergence of nationally oriented, pro-European, but at the same time left-of-centre or left (according to classical criteria) political forces and relevant political leaders.

In addition, larger parts of target audiences of each potential candidate favour strengthening the public control over law enforcement agencies, stand against the introduction of an open land market and support the “national manufacturer” (including through imposition of heavy import duties). They want policies to be oriented towards social needs and positions, rather than the unconditional implementation of international partners’ recommendations, and seek introduction of a progressive taxation.

Therefore, there is little room for manoeuvre for powerful liberal forces at the current stage of the Ukrainian society’s development. The situation may change only with the growing income and raising awareness of citizens over time, as well as with their greater involvement in public life.

Interestingly enough, among all policy alternatives linked to specific reforms, only de-centralisation is supported by followers of the majority of potential presidential candidates. Meanwhile, privatisation, free land market, as well as educational, health and social sector reforms (at least in their present form) failed to win the approval of supporters of any candidate. This raises the question of who and how will ensure the continuity of policy implementation in relevant areas.

¹⁸ Both absolute and relative.

POTENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THEIR ELECTORATES: CONSISTENCY BETWEEN POSITIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

Petro Poroshenko

Both rhetoric and actions of Petro Poroshenko as an incumbent President in the areas of foreign and security policy, geopolitical orientations and relations with the Russian Federation mostly comply with stances of his voters. As for the domestic policy, some Poroshenko's supporters would like increased influence of the President on the government. But Mr Poroshenko – at least verbally – does not seek changes in current balance of power. At the same time, the incumbent President is a strong supporter of further de-centralisation, while his potential voters are yet to formulate the dominant approach to this issue.

In socio-cultural sphere, Mr Poroshenko declares the course towards strengthening the national identity and consolidating society around the Ukrainian values (including traditional family values), which is in line with his voter's priorities.

As for the socio-economic policy, there are declarations of protecting the most vulnerable citizens on the one hand (e.g. persistent request to scale up funding of subsidies in the Law on the State Budget), and repeatedly expressed recommendations for businesses to raise salaries – on the other. The President also declared his intent to fundamentally ease doing business in the country, which can equally affect large companies and SME.

The President's views of the educational sector reform are likely to differ from his voters' opinions: although Mr Poroshenko has never made clear statements on the issue, the government, associated with his regime, supports the reform in its current format.

From the very beginning, the President took a middle ground in the policy of observing all requirements and recommendations of the West vs the policy of following public sentiments, demonstrating that he does not necessarily agree with all requirements of the Western partners (although his personal motivation may differ from that of voters).

The President has also made it clear that his vision of the government's role in re-distributing public goods is rather close to the moods of voters.

The narrative of this candidate does not clearly address the voters' expectations regarding lower tariffs and gas prices for the population, a course towards supporting the national manufacturer (at the expense of high import duties), the policies of guaranteeing free health and other services by means of increased taxes, and other socio-economic issues, where society feels vulnerable.

So far, the President did not respond to voters' demand for linking the salaries of top government officials with the average pay and an economic development model (building on the outdated previous model vs high-tech development).

The President indirectly identified himself as a politician who supports privatisation rather than growth of the public sector and increased role of the state in the economy.

Therefore, this candidate's "supply" fully meets the voters' "demand" in terms of foreign, security and socio-cultural policies, as well as the country's geopolitical choice.

As for the matters of socio-economic nature (for which the President is not formally responsible), the voters have not heard what they expected to hear.

Yulia Tymoshenko

The candidate's position on Ukraine's accession to the EU meets the voters' expectations. At the same time, Ms Tymoshenko's declarations about joining the NATO seem to be conditioned by political competition, as her voters have no clearly articulated demands in this regard. Similarly, the majority of Ms Tymoshenko's supporters lack clear position on the future relations with the Russian Federation.

One can hardly note any consistency between the politician's "supply" and the public "demand" regarding the "re-establishment of the Republic of Ukraine", which implies the new social contract, the new Constitution and the new form of government (a republic of the "chancellor" type). Potential voters of Yulia Tymoshenko have diverse opinions about these issues.

In the matters of socio-economic policy, Yulia Tymoshenko's proposals either fully meet or come very close to the voters' demands. This particularly concerns the declarations to immediately reduce gas prices and utility tariffs, and to support low-income citizens.

The candidate's positive attitude towards the educational sector reform is inconsistent with the opinions of most voters, yet they like Ms Tymoshenko's criticism of the "external management" of the country.

Implicit declarations about increasing the state's influence on economic processes and re-distribution of public goods also echo public sentiment.

The declarations supporting further de-centralisation are in line with the voters' expectations regarding the reduction of central government's functions.

Yulia Tymoshenko's tough stance on the prevention of sale of agricultural land is in full accord with voters' opinions.

It can be assumed that Yulia Tymoshenko's supporters are also impressed by her rigorous personal criticism of the incumbent President.

In general, one can observe a substantial correlation between the voters' views and Ms Tymoshenko's proposals (excluding positions on changes in the form of government, the new Constitution and the like).

Anatoliy Hrytsenko

The country's course towards the European integration is fully in line with the voters' views (although Mr Hrytsenko has not clearly spoken on this issue). Also, relative majority of this candidate's supporters welcome the idea of joining the NATO, but Mr Hrytsenko has not been clear about it yet.

The demands of his potential voters in socio-cultural sphere are rather clearly articulated – the Ukrainian language is the only state language that enjoys protection of its status. At the same time, public position of Mr Hrytsenko on this issue is still unknown.

Given the fact that Anatoliy Hrytsenko has repeatedly emphasised his liberal-democratic ideology, one should expect equivalent demands from his potential voters. Among his proposals, such things as de-politicisation of law enforcement agencies (meets popular demand) and prevention of any restrictions of political rights and freedoms of citizens are somewhat consistent with the defined ideological framework. At the same time, most potential voters will hardly support strengthening presidential powers (openly declared by Mr Hrytsenko).

Instead, this candidate's potential electorate wants the state to play greater role in the country's economy (contrary to liberal approaches) and provide stronger social support. The voters' demand to support domestic manufacturers is in sharp contrast to the declarations of liberal values and the content of the memorandum signed between Anatoliy Hrytsenko and the Ukrainian Council of Business. In general, most of Mr Hrytsenko's potential supporters favour left-wing approaches in economic and social sphere, rejecting privatisation, land and other reforms.

The demand for protection of traditional family values is the evidence of conservatism of this candidate's voters, rather than the stance consistent with liberal approaches.

Therefore, we can confirm significant inconsistencies between ideological and political orientation and policy proposals, declared by Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and the expectations of his potential electorate.

Oleh Lyashko

Oleh Lyashko's proposals exemplify responses to the demands of parts of society that rely on the government's social protection policy (including guarantees of free services) and its leading role in managing the national economy and re-distribution of public goods (including the state regulation of prices for essential goods).

The politician's position rejecting the sale of agricultural land and that of his potential voters are totally in sync.

Mr Lyashko's declarations and the demands of his electorate are largely consistent in the matters of socio-cultural policy – it particularly concerns the support and protection of the Ukrainian language. Oleh Lyashko and his supporters also share views on the protection of “traditional family values”.

At the same time, Mr Lyashko seeks to significantly strengthen the presidential powers and often shows a tough

stance on Russia, while his potential voters do not have clear positions on these issues. Just like his supporters, **Oleh Lyashko has no definite opinion on the country's geopolitical orientation, which can be regarded as a “match” between the politician and his electorate.**

Andriy Sadovyi

The positioning of Andriy Sadovyi in terms of consistency of his political “supply” with the “demand” of his future voters seems rather cautious and unclear. One of the few already declared positions that is fully in line with his electorate's sentiments concerns Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration course. The same is true about certain provisions in the socio-cultural sphere (primarily, the language policy).

Future voters would like their presidential candidate to maintain a tough stance on Russia (which basically complies with the statements made by members of Mr Sadovyi's parliamentary faction “Samopomich”), to promote active role of the state in managing the economy and re-distribution of public goods (which indirectly contradicts positions declared by Mr Sadovyi), and to extend the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land (which once again contradicts the positions of MPs from the “Samopomich” faction).

Support for traditional family values is fully consistent with the positions of Andriy Sadovyi and “Samopomich”.

Meanwhile, Mr Sadovyi's potential voters could not decide whether they supported the policy of targeted subsidies or wanted reduction of utility tariffs (as for the candidate himself, he favours targeted assistance to those in need and supports fair prices and tariffs).

Andriy Sadovyi declares his commitment to the de-centralisation policy, while his potential voters are largely uncertain in this regard. In general, the positions already declared by Mr Sadovyi are quite distant from views of his future voters. For example, this candidate is more likely to support liberal approaches in the economy (e.g. open land market), while his voters seek greater government intervention and social protection.

The candidate from pro-Russian forces

Positions suggesting partial or full consistency with voter expectations include the issues of geopolitical choice (focusing on cooperation with Russia and joining Russia-led integration structures), restoration of Ukraine's non-aligned status, reduction of central government's functions, de-centralisation and the possibility of granting a “special status” to certain regions, as well as establishment of peace in the East. Granting the state language status to the Russian language is another common position of the political proposal, requested by this social segment.

The voters in this segment of Ukraine's party system would also support the political weakening of the President with increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada (fully in line with programmatic approaches of leaders of the Opposition Bloc and For Life party).



These candidates seek restoration of the previous economic model, which is also consistent with their voters' aspirations. The country's unpreparedness for the introduction of the land market, declared by pro-Russian candidates, is in sync with their supporters' willingness to extend the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land.

The supporters of these political forces and candidates also approve increased role of the state in managing economic processes and re-distributing of public goods, along with the government's greater social support. In other words, a candidate from section of the political spectrum will easily "resonate" with his or her voters.

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk

The demand of this candidate's potential voters is largely identical to that of electorates supporting other candidates from the so-called "pro-European" segment.

This primarily includes a clearly articulated position on the country's geopolitical choice (movement towards the EU and NATO) and socio-cultural policy (support of the state status of the Ukrainian language), as well as protection of rights of the employees and low-income persons; protection of traditional family values; prevention of any restrictions on human and citizen rights; tough drug control policy; and greater public control over law enforcement agencies.

Slightly less important for these voters is the active role of the state in managing economic processes and re-distribution of public goods. Meanwhile, this electorate remains largely undecided about the model of economic development and social policy, the issues of the land market, national minorities and the like.

The proposal, articulated by Mr Vakarchuk, does not address these demands, let alone projections. His declarations are mostly about "good wishes" with no reference to the ways and means for achieving the goal. Neither these declarations clarify the candidate's vision of the geopolitical choice, the ways of achieving peace in the

East, or models of future relations with Russia. It is equally difficult to understand his vision of the government's economic and social model.

Positions that can be identified as a "match" between political supply and demand are the need for greater public control over law enforcement agencies (the SBU reform) and mandatory observance of human and citizen rights.

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk's position regarding importance of "large privatization" and the introduction of the land market does not find support in the majority of his potential voters.

Volodymyr Zelenskyi

So far, Mr Zelenskyi's political proposal was largely limited to mockery of the state leaders, prominent politicians and some influential business persons. His proposals regarding key policy positions are unknown – perhaps, they are still being developed.

In the meantime, his potential voters already have well-formulated political demands. For example, Volodymyr Zelenskyi's electorate supports the European integration course, further progress of de-centralisation, increased role of the state in managing the national economy, prevention of any restrictions on human and citizen rights, greater public control over law enforcement agencies, protection of rights of the employees, linking salaries of top government officials to the average pay, and tough drug control policy.

Somewhat less important for them is tough stance in relations with the Russian Federation, the achievement of peace in the East on the Ukrainian terms, scaling up the public sector of the economy, protection of traditional family values, and the policy of supporting the Ukrainian language. Mr Zelenskyi's potential voters are largely undecided on the model of economic and social policy.

However, this candidate is yet to offer a political proposal in response to formulated demand.

The main lines of division between the potential presidential candidates

The division between the above-mentioned potential candidates can be traced along several lines.

1. Pro-government candidate vs the candidates from multi-directional opposition forces

It is highly likely that Petro Poroshenko will emerge as the only candidate from current government. In this case, all other presidential front-runners without exception will oppose him, as each of them already emphasises his or her opposition either to political forces in power (the BPP – the People's Front coalition), or personally to the incumbent President.

2. The division by geopolitical orientation

In this context, we can distinguish between three groups of potential candidates:

- The candidates who are clearly poised for or at least declare the pro-European course. These are Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk;
- The candidates who give no clear signal of their intention to continue the pro-European course and suggest a "special path". These are Oleh Lyashko and possibly Volodymyr Zelenskyi;
- The candidates who build their messages on the attractiveness of integration with Russia. This group includes possible candidates from the Opposition Bloc, For Life and other pro-Russian forces.

3. Supporters of the parliamentary republic with strong Prime-Minister vs supporters of the presidential republic

The group of supporters of the parliamentary republic, where virtually all political power is held by

the Prime-Minister, includes Yulia Tymoshenko and representatives of political forces seeking cooperation with Russia.

Anatoly Hrytsenko and Oleh Lyashko are the main supporters of the presidential model, where the President heads the entire executive branch.

The incumbent President Poroshenko has already articulated his unwillingness to change the existing model. Other candidates did not make clear statements on this subject.

4. The division into the “old” and “new” politicians

Considering significant popular demand, this line of division will be quite visible during the elections, although not decisive.

Most politicians among presidential front-runners represent the established political system. These include Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine; Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”; Yuriy Boyko, co-founder of the Opposition Platform “For Life”; Oleh Lyashko, the leader of the Radical Party; Andriy Sadovyi, the head of the “Samopomich” Union; and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, the leader of the Civil Position party.

Despite different formal status or place in the present-day political system, all these candidates have a long history in Ukrainian politics, working in different positions and offices. Therefore, they are hardly perceived by society as “new faces”.

Some of these politicians may still get this status by contrasting themselves with others (primarily the representatives of current government) based on “substantive qualities” – corruption-free, honest, willing “to truly protect interests of ordinary people” and lacking any business interests.¹⁹ These emphases are particularly visible in Anatoliy Hrytsenko’s public rhetoric.

As for truly “new” politicians, there are only two of them among the above-mentioned candidates – Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk. Another one is Yevheniy Murayev, the leader of the party “Nashi” (Ours).

We believe that geopolitical differences will be the main division line between the candidates in the presidential campaign of 2019. It is highly likely that it will come down to a simple bipolar form – “The European Choice” vs “The revival of friendship with Russia”, as candidates promoting the special path will eventually have to choose between these two alternatives.

Attitudes towards the current government – or essentially to President Poroshenko – will be the second most important division line. It will segment the pro-European electorate, leading to formation of two “centres of gravity” – the incumbent President and the alternative candidate.

The third division line – the “new” and “old” politicians – will also segment the pro-European electorate, or its opposition part, to be precise.

Under these circumstances, one should expect the competition among the following three candidates seeking support of pro-European voters:

- 1) The pro-government candidate – the incumbent President;
- 2) The opposition candidate – the “old” politician;
- 3) The opposition candidate – the “new” politician.

The competition in another – conventionally pro-Russian electoral segment – will be personality-driven and significantly “restricted” by the Russia’s influence. This is why only one candidate will have chances to make it to the second round.

Considering high level of competition, the presidential elections are likely to be held in two rounds. Given current level of voter support, the “battle” for the second round will unfold either between two “pro-European” candidates representing different political segments, or between the pro-European and pro-Russian candidates.

3.2. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: MAIN ACTORS AND LINES OF INTER-PARTY DIVISIONS

The factors and conditions of inter-party competition in the upcoming parliamentary elections

Thus far, the inter-party competition in the run-up to the Verkhovna Rada elections largely replicates the pattern of the presidential race. Up to 10 political parties have chances to enter the Parliament with none of them having absolute advantage over competitors and thus cannot form a one-party government.

According to the public opinion surveys, over the past year several parties have consistently demonstrated good chances of overcoming the legally established election threshold of 5%. These include the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (BPP), the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom), the Civil Position, For Life, the “Samopomich” Union (Self-Reliance), the Opposition Bloc, the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko and the Servant of the People. Most recent surveys also demonstrate the proximity of “Nashi” (Ours) and UKROP parties²⁰ to the election threshold. Therefore, it is highly likely that the new Verkhovna Rada of 9th convocation will be even more fragmented than the current one.

However, the upcoming presidential elections can radically change the disposition of political forces, boosting electoral support and strengthening negotiating capacities

¹⁹ More on the Ukrainians’ vision of qualities of “new political leaders” in the Transformation of the party system: the Ukrainian experience in the European context (edited by Y. Yakymenko), Kyiv: the Razumkov Centre, 2017, p. 204-205.

²⁰ Monitoring of the electoral moods of Ukrainians. November 2018 – joint sociological survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Razumkov Centre and the Sociological Group Rating, http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/socio/2018_razumkov_kmis_reytyng.pdf.



for parties whose candidates will demonstrate fairly good results, and significantly reducing the electoral chances for others.

The completion of presidential race may catalyse unifications, as some parties nominate their candidates mainly to attract the voters' attention and create more favourable terms in future associations. These processes can play an important role for ideologically linked forces (e.g. within the "democratic opposition", as well as between pro-Russian and nationalist parties). And finally, the presidential elections can change the configuration of power in the state, including through re-grouping of forces in the current Parliament.

By the end of 2018, the **parties of the ruling coalition** (BPP and the People's Front) have rather questionable prospects in the context of elections.

Above all, this concerns the People's Front, which, according to public opinion polls, has very low voter support with virtually no chances of entering the Verkhovna Rada of 9th convocation.²¹

The election outcomes for BPP entirely depend on the success of its leader – the incumbent President – at the upcoming presidential election. The BPP will be able to retain strong positions in the next Verkhovna Rada only if Petro Poroshenko himself is re-elected for a second term. Otherwise, this party will have to fight an "uphill battle" to be able to enter the Parliament, while its representation can reduce significantly (if the party fails to overcome the threshold, it can be limited to the majoritarian deputies).

Therefore, the entire BPP's organisational resource focuses on strengthening position of its leader, communicating his messages to the audience, and gaining the necessary support in the Parliament.

The opposition forces remain divided into several diverse groups.

The democratic opposition, that is, the cohort of opposition-minded parties representing former participants of the Maidan and declaring commitment to national-democratic values, is the most sizeable group. It is also the most diverse and scattered one.

"Batkivshchyna", the top-rated political force over the past two years, continues to sharply criticise the government and the President in particular. At the same time, this criticism is mainly directed at the government's socio-economic policy. The party leader, Ms Yulia Tymoshenko, is determined to win the presidential race, admitting possible association with other political forces only as a senior partner.

The Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (hereinafter – the Radical Party) has recently intensified its opposition narrative against the government's social and economic policies and against activities of Petro Poroshenko,²² at

the same time echoing the President's patriotic messages on countering the Russian aggression and on church affairs. As of today, there is no information about possible association or at least rapprochement of the Radical Party with any other political forces.

The leaders of other two popular parties – the Civil Position and "Samopomich" – continue arranging proper coordination of efforts (at least during the presidential race) and sometimes use public statements and outdoor advertising with calls for unity in order to stimulate this process. The proximity of ideology is an additional incentive for their union, as both parties declare commitment to liberal-democratic values. However, the leaders of the Civil Position (Anatoliy Hrytsenko) and "Samopomich" (Andriy Sadovyi) conduct separate presidential campaigns, although refraining from harsh criticism against each other. Combating corruption is in the limelight of the public rhetoric of both parties.

Speaking of other political forces that can be identified as the "democratic opposition", the UKROP party has relatively better chances to be promoted to the "major league". Upsides of this party include its respectable results in the local elections of 2015 and well-developed party infrastructure.

In late 2018 *the far-right parties* ("Svoboda", the Right Sector, the National Corps and the like) have rather modest electoral positions. The agreement on joint presidential campaign, signed in March 2017, has *de facto* been thrown into disarray, as two most influential forces – "Svoboda" and the National Corps – failed to agree on a single candidate. By the end of 2018, only "Svoboda" has some chances of entering the Parliament, but they remain low without true unification of the far-right camp.

The parties targeting the remnants of the former Party of Regions and the Communist Party electorate have quite illusory chances to successfully delegate their representative to the presidency, so parliamentary elections are their main focus. Currently this political environment undergoes deep transformation, including the split within the Opposition Bloc, the formation of the Opposition Platform "For Life", and independent political "sail" of Yevheniy Murayev and his project "Nashi" (Ours).

Having serious political assets and organisational resources, each of these parties seek to fill one electoral niche. In addition, Serhiy Taruta's "Osnova" (Foundation) can claim plenty of votes in the East and South of Ukraine. Therefore, the goal declared by Viktor Medvedchuk, Vadym Rabinovich and Serhiy Lyovochkin (to monopolise the political representation of the Russian-speaking southeast) is currently out of reach – both due to inter-party competition and certain changes in the electorate's moods.

²¹ Nonetheless, this party has recently launched a series of outdoor advertising featuring its party symbols and portraits of its leader – Arseniy Yatsenyuk, showing no intention of rebranding.

²² See, for example "Lyashko suspects Poroshenko in conspiracy with Putin" – website of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, 28 November 2018, <http://liashko.ua/news/general/4911-lyashko-pidozryuye-poroshenka-u-zmovi-z-putinim>.

The newly created party “the Servant of the People” is a peculiar representative of the Ukrainian opposition. Its popularity entirely builds on the sitcom of the same name, produced by the Studio Kvartal 95. Comprised of the managers of the said studio, the party’s high council is chaired by Ivan Bakanov, the director of Studio Kvartal 95. However, the party’s informal leader

and key public figure associated with the Servant of the People is famous actor Volodymyr Zelenskyi who also plays the part of the president in sitcom. To date, little is known about the party’s political positioning, but it can be assumed that it will try to reach all citizens, who are disappointed with the existing political system and want to see new faces in government.

POLITICAL POSITIONS OF TOP-RATED PARTIES AND THE LINES OF INTER-PARTY DIVISION

Research methodology

To identify positions of political parties regarding the state policy alternatives in various spheres, we conducted **the expert survey**.²³ Since the experts’ assessments were quite controversial, we only considered the cases where the absolute majority of experts identically determined the party’s position on a particular issue (marked with arrows $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ in the table).

Findings of the expert survey were further supplemented with the summary of statements by political parties, their leaders and key representatives, monitored over the past 6 months (the parties’ positions identified through monitoring are marked with arrows $\leftarrow \rightarrow$).

Persuasions of the party supporters are indirect, but equally important indicators of the party positions on the political arena. Profound differences in the persuasions of voters of different parties make it rather easy to determine key issues that define the respondent’s choice favouring one or another political force. And vice versa, if opinions of the supporters of some party about the particular issue are uncertain or ambivalent, this means that the issue is not decisive for choosing this particular party.

The table uses the following symbols: **arrow direction** ($\leftarrow \rightarrow$) – an alternative favoured by the majority of respondents in this group; **two arrows** – an alternative is supported by most respondents in the group; **one arrow** – an alternative is supported by relative majority of the respondents outnumbering the supporters of another alternative by at least 15%; and **equal sign** (=) – relative majority of the respondents in the group have chosen the middle position.

The situations where the opposite positions of parties are confirmed by fundamental differences in the views of citizens who support these parties should be perceived as a sign of important inter-party division.

In order to maintain an acceptable level of error in statistical calculations, we selected only those parties that gained notable support of the respondents (over 2%) during the study. These include the Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (BPP), The All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (BAT), the all-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (SVO), the Civil Position (CP), For Life (FL), the “Samopomich” Union (SU), the Opposition Bloc (OB), the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (RPL), and the Servant of the People (SOP).

Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	Ukraine’s accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
	\leftarrow	\leftarrow		\rightarrow		\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	=	=	=	=	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	Ukraine’s NATO membership in the foreseeable future
	\leftarrow	\leftarrow		\rightarrow		\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	\rightarrow	=	=	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
		\leftarrow		\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	
Return of temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	\leftarrow	\leftarrow	=	=	=	=	\rightarrow	Return of temporarily occupied territories by military means
	\leftarrow	\leftarrow		\leftarrow	\leftarrow	\leftarrow		\leftarrow	\rightarrow	
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	\leftarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society
		\leftarrow		\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	

* Due to the small sample size the results are conditional.

²³ The survey was conducted from 25 October through 20 November 2018 with participation of academics and experts from the state and non-state research institutions, think tanks, NGOs and universities. Relevant questionnaires were distributed among 223 experts from 78 institutions and organisations; 92 of them returned filled questionnaires.

Foreign and Domestic Policy, Security										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	⇐	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	⇒	=	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
	⇐	⇐		⇐	➤	➤		➡	➤	
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐		➡	
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation ²⁴	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	⇐	⇐	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
	⇐	⇐		➡	➡	➡	➡	➡	➡	
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐			
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	⇐	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
	⇐	⇐		➤	➤	➡	➤	➡	➡	

Comparison of party positions on foreign and domestic policy and security

Clear division (and even polarisation) in the party system is primarily observed within the dilemmas of foreign policy orientation and armed conflict with Russia (specifically, Ukraine's accession to the EAEU vs the EU; Ukraine's non-bloc status vs NATO membership; reconciliation with Russia vs tough stance towards this country; peace in the East at all costs vs peace on terms acceptable for Ukrainian).

The positions of parties at both ends of this division usually rely on the absolute support of their "own" electorates. This suggests high electoral significance of this division, as well as its consistency and depth.

At the patriotic and pro-Western end of this division we find "Svoboda", BPP, "Samopomich", as well as the Civil Position. The most radical in this regard is "Svoboda", as overwhelming majority of its supporters also favour the return of the occupied territories by military means. The electorate of the Civil Position is less consolidated in supporting the NATO membership and tougher stance towards Russia. This points at somewhat lesser importance of said issues for electoral choices of this party's supporters.

"Batkivshchyna" and the Radical Party share the views of patriotic and pro-Western parties on some issues (e.g. the need to preserve the unitary state system of Ukraine), while the "Servant of the People", according to experts, has no clear position on any of the issues. Most supporters of "Batkivshchyna", the Radical Party and the "Servant of the People" are leaning towards patriotic

and pro-Western positions, although they remain rather ambivalent regarding certain policy dilemmas (e.g. non-aligned status, the NATO membership or attitudes towards Russia). At the same time, the supporters of "Batkivshchyna" and the "Servant of the People" are likely to favour the pro-Russian approach in terms of returning the occupied territories.

The pro-Russian end is represented by the Opposition Bloc and For Life. These parties clearly support the return of occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia, which meets expectations of vast majority of their followers (only "Svoboda" demonstrates strong alternative position among all parties under study).

The polarisation of parties, classified as patriotic and pro-Russian, is also observed in their attitudes towards reduced (or increased) funding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The division between parties advocating for abolition of the presidency (For Life) or restricting presidential powers and strengthening the role of the Parliament (the Opposition Bloc), on the one hand, and the "presidential" BPP on the other, has also translated into the opposite positions of their respective voters.

Based on the monitoring of political statements, the above division also involves "Batkivshchyna" on the one hand (its leader suggested abolishing the institution of the President and introducing a parliamentary republic of the "chancellor" type), and the Civil Position, the Radical Party and "Svoboda" on the other (their leaders publicly supported the expansion of presidential powers).

However, since these positions are not duly reflected in the persuasions of supporters of said political

²⁴ Grey colour highlights policy alternatives that are directly relevant to specific reform areas.

forces, this division should not be viewed as a configuring factor of electoral competition. As already noted, the relative majority of surveyed Ukrainians (45%) do not want the presidential powers either to increase or reduce. Recent polls also suggest that the constitutional reform is not among the society's priorities.²⁵

As for the remaining domestic policy dilemmas, the researchers did not find any clear signs of inter-party division.

Most supporters of all Ukrainian parties approve delegating greater powers to local self-governments and favour de-centralisation.

Economic and Social Policy									
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	← ←	← ←	=	← ←	← ←	← ←	=	=	=
	←			←		→			
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	←	←	=
	←	←		←	←				
Extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	=	←	←
	←	←		←	←		→	→	←
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	← ←	← ←	←	← ←	← ←	← ←	←	←	←
						←			←
Predominant state support for large national companies	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒
	→	←		→	→		→		→
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	←	=	←
		←			←			→	←
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	← ←	← ←	←	=	←	=	=	=	=
	←	←			←		→		
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	←	←	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
	←	←		←	←				
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←
	←	←							←
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	← ←	← ←	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	← ←	←	←	=
	←	←		←	←				
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	← ←	←	=	=	=	=	=	=	⇒
	←	←		←	←				

* Due to the small sample size the results are conditional.

²⁵ Monitoring of the electoral moods of Ukrainians. November 2018 – joint sociological survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Razumkov Centre and the Sociological Group Rating.



Economic and Social Policy										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇒ ⇒	=	=	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
	←	←		←	←		→	→		
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	⇐ ⇐	=	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance
		←			←		→	→		
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
	←	←		←	←					
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of "income levelling"
	←	←		←	←					
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Strengthening the rights of employees in relations with employers. Empowering employers, including in hiring and firing of employees
				←	←				←	
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even if this requires tax hikes	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐ ⇐	=	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget
	←	←			←					
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	⇒ ⇒	Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine
	→	→			→					
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	⇐ ⇐	Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be served by private companies
	←	←		←	←					

Comparison of party positions on economic and social policy issues

The alternatives within the social and economic policy dilemmas were based on the left-right scale (excluding government support for large national companies vs small and medium-sized enterprises, and priority sectors for the country's economic development). Taking into consideration the results of the expert survey and monitoring of political statements, we can categorise parties by their belonging to the left or right spectrum.

For convenience, we counted cases where we were able to record the party's left or right position within each of 18 suggested dilemmas. Each "left" position was

calculated as "-1", each right position as "+1", and the absence of clear position as "0". Based on this left-right criterion, the parties were arranged as follows: the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (-15), For Life (-14) and the Opposition Bloc (-14), "Batkivshchyna" (-11), "Svoboda" (-5), Servant of the People (0), the Civil Position (+1), "Samopomich" Union (+3), and Petro Poroshenko Bloc (+4).

Therefore, four clearly leftist parties, one left-of-centre, one conditionally centrist and three right-of-centre parties may enter the Ukrainian parliament. At the same time, it was impossible to identify clear positioning of one more centrist party – the Servant of the People – in all 18 suggested economic and social dilemmas.

Another conditionally right-of-centre party – the Civil Position – is not much different in this regard, as its leader, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, asserts that his party is committed to liberal-democratic values, including large privatisation and open land market, but calls these steps inappropriate under the present-day conditions.²⁶ In his communication with voters, Mr Hrytsenko emphasises the need to improve the mechanisms of lease of agricultural land instead of its privatisation.²⁷

Given the fact that most potential supporters of the Civil Position resist privatisation and the land market, the party apparently fails to adequately address its liberal-democratic orientation in economic matters. Similarly, programmatic documents of the Opposition Bloc, which actively criticises the government's privatisation programme and strongly opposes lifting of current land-sale moratorium, also refer to the new privatisation programme and the prospects of opening of the land market.²⁸

While comparing the parties' positions on various socio-economic issues, one can observe signs of asymmetric political division: on the one end, there are parties with the leftist, paternalistic agenda that criticise current government for its allegedly anti-social policy ("Batkivshchyna", For Life, the Opposition Bloc, the Radical Party). On the other end we see moderately liberal "Samopomich" (which currently has quite limited

support) and the "ruling party" (the Petro Poroshenko Bloc), which instead of winning the voters' support for their socio-economic programme still tries to emphasise the importance and relevance of policy implemented under current reforms.

This imbalance in the political supply can be explained by the dominance of popular demand for left-wing policies in the socio-economic sphere and largely negative perception of reform outcomes.²⁹ It is also remarkable that none of the economic and social issues reveal major contradictions between the electorates of various parties.³⁰ As a rule, the parties' leftist socio-economic approaches rely on wide support among their respective voters.

The potential electorates of the Opposition Bloc and For Life are most consolidated in supporting the left socio-economic decisions, as the majority of respondents in these groups are ready to pay high taxes in exchange for free social services from the state, while relative majority of them favour increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia.

Instead, those few right-liberal positions declared by the BPP, "Samopomich" and the Civil Position do not resonate with the majority of their potential voters or even run counter to their preferences.

Humanitarian Policy										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	⇒	⇒	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Granting the status of second state language to the Russian language
	⇒	⇒		⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	⇒	⇒	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	All languages should be treated equally by the state
	⇒	⇒		⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	=	⇐	Current reformation of the system of secondary education is a positive phenomenon, as the extension of the term of schooling to 12 years, changes in the content of education and relations between a teacher and students brings the Ukrainian school closer to the European norms and standards of secondary education
	⇐	⇐			⇐	⇐	⇒	⇒		

* Due to the small sample size the results are conditional.

²⁶ See "Anatoliy Hrytsenko: We should not be afraid of authoritarian regime" – portal of RBK-Ukraine, 25 April 2018, <https://daily.rbc.ua/ukr/show/anatoliy-gritsenko-nuzhno-boyatsya-avtoritarnogo-1524633586.html>.

²⁷ See "Anatoliy Hrytsenko simply explained the Chernihiv residents what Ukraine needs today" – the Chernihiv city portal *Gorod.cn.ua*, 7 May 2014, <https://www.gorod.cn.ua/news/gorod-i-region/54739-anatolii-gritsenko-rozpoviv-chernigivcjam-dostupnoyu-movoyu-sho-potribno-ukrayini-zaraz.html>.

²⁸ See The first steps of the Opposition Bloc towards recovery from crisis: restoring peace and reviving economy – website of the Opposition Bloc, <http://opposition.org.ua/uk/10-pershochergovikh-krokv-po-vikhodu-z-krizi.html>.

²⁹ See Sections 1 and 2 of this Report for more detailed analysis.

³⁰ This "harmony" is only disrupted by the support of targeted subsidies on housing and utility services, declared by the potential supporters of "Samopomich" Union. However, given the small size of this group (only 49 respondents), the definition of its position is rather conditional.

Humanitarian Policy										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	⇒	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with the state
		→							←	
Decommunization should stop	⇐	⇐	=	=	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Decommunization should continue
	←	←			→	→	→	→	→	
The GAL-TAN Scale										
	FL	OB	SOP	BAT	RPL	CP	SU*	BPP	SVO*	
The state's hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	⇐	The state must earnestly ensure the civil rights of all citizens, including perpetrators of crime
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	The state's recognition of people's right to same-sex marriage (partnership)
	←	←			←				←	
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	⇐	Support for the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities; and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society
		→							←	
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	⇐	=	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Scaling up the rights of national minorities
	→	→						←	←	
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	Priority development of cities (urbanisation) as hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values
					←					
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	⇒	Maximum attention to environment protection, even if it impedes economic growth
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	⇐	=	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	All people belong to universal community sharing common values, while nationality is secondary
									←	
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	⇐	⇐	=	⇐	=	=	=	=	=	Preventing the revival of death penalty for any crimes
								→	←	
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	⇐	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
									←	
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	⇐	⇐	=	=	=	=	⇐	=	⇐	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
									←	
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	⇒	=	⇒	⇒	=	⇒	⇒	⇒	=	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression
									←	

Comparison of party positions on humanitarian policy

The inter-party division in the humanitarian policy area concerns three major issues: the official status of the Russian language, exclusive government support and protection of the Ukrainian language, and (dis)continuation of decommunization. The division lines here are very similar to those related to foreign policy and security dilemmas.

The absolute majority of those who support BPP, “Batktivshchyna”, “Svoboda”, the Civil Position, “Samopomich” and the Radical Party, also endorse their respective parties’ positions on preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language along with its state protection and support. Conversely, For Life and the Opposition Bloc seek granting the status of the second state language to the Russian language, enjoying absolute support of their followers in this regard. Only the “Servant of the People” has no clear position on the language policy, while its potential voters do not give preference to any of proposed alternatives.

Speaking of decommunization, the inter-party polarization is not that obvious. For example, BPP, “Svoboda” and “Samopomich” are determined to continue decommunization, while For Life and the Opposition Bloc clearly want to stop this process. At the same time, the electorate of the Civil Position gives only relative support for decommunization, while those who back “Batktivshchyna”, the Radical Party and the “Servant of the People” are rather ambivalent.

Based on the expert survey results, one can also assume partial division of parties in terms of educational sector reforms (according to experts, BPP and “Samopomich” support this reform, while For Life and the Opposition Bloc seek restoration of the previous system). However, the electorates of both BPP and “Samopomich” have rather ambivalent attitudes towards these transformations, therefore it is unlikely that educational reform will play a key role in the election discourse of these parties.

As for the dilemmas of the “libertarian-authoritarian” dimension (*GAL-TAN*), the experts could not identify clear positions of most parties, while comparison of positions of their supporters did not reveal significant differences.

Some minor inter-party differences were found in the matters concerning ethnic minorities and state-church relations – specifically between BPP and “Svoboda” (conservative approach) and For Life and the Opposition Bloc (liberal approach). These differences, however, can hardly affect the positions of these parties’ supporters and are rather “contextual” (we believe that inconsistencies in ethno-political issues reflect the “language” polarisation, while different views of parties on the state-church relations, reported by experts, refer to recent events in Ukraine’s church life).³¹ Somewhat

different in this regard is “Svoboda”, which remains largely conservative in most issues of the “libertarian-authoritarian” dimension.

Therefore, the most significant line dividing the party system is the one that matches the political and cultural division of society (geopolitical choice, relations with Russia, language issue). The division of parties regarding socio-economic issues is significantly less pronounced. However, despite its asymmetry and weak right wing, this socio-economic differentiation is also very important considering its relevance for the general public.

3.3. POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF 2019: MAIN SCENARIOS

Key factors affecting the course of events during the presidential campaign

The time remaining until the first round of presidential elections leaves plenty of room for changes in the political situation that can significantly affect the positions of individual candidates and the political landscape in general. In addition to events directly related to the participants of presidential race and their environment (e.g. nomination of new and removal of old candidates, “unions” and “separations”, high profile acts and statements, corruption scandals and revelations, “leaks” and supportive speeches of opinion leaders, etc.), we can formulate two categories of more general events:

- 1) new aggressive moves of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; escalation of hostilities in Donbas; the rise of openly pro-Russian and separatist movements and organisations in Ukraine; aggravation of the global confrontation between Russia and the West; high profile conflicts on grounds of language, religion and history are the factors contributing to increased political and cultural polarisation in society;
- 2) rise in prices and inflation; growing utility tariffs; depreciation of hryvnia, the fall in real income and other signs of deteriorating economic situation; failures in the government’s social policy are the factors contributing to increased social and economic polarisation in society.

Increased polarisation on these grounds will have particular effect on the balance of power before elections.

Increased political and cultural polarisation:

- will contribute to consolidation and mobilisation of Petro Poroshenko’s electorate as the incumbent President is consistently viewed as a fighter against Russian aggression and a defender of national identity, who uses all powers and capabilities of the Head of State for these purposes;

³¹ It is about the process of formation of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

- will strengthen and “preserve” the electoral niche of a pro-Russian candidate, while decreasing his or her chances for the second round, let alone winning the elections;
- will erode the electoral base of Yulia Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleh Lyashko. This “outflow” of votes will be particularly beneficial for candidates with clearer and more convincing position on the issues of geopolitical choice and relations with Russia, as well as the language, religion and history;
- may negatively affect the positions of Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, who do not prioritize these topics in their political positioning.

Increased social and economic polarisation:

- will contribute to consolidation and mobilisation of supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Lyashko, as well as Yuriy Boyko and other pro-Russian candidates. In case of weakening of political and cultural polarisation, this may even help the latter to go beyond their “pro-Russian” niche;
- will narrow the electoral base of Petro Poroshenko, as the voters traditionally lay the responsibility for the socio-economic situation in the country on the highest office-holder;
- will likely improve the positions of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who can be hardly blamed for actions of current and previous governments;
- will have mixed effect on the positions of Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk: on the one hand, this expands their opportunities to criticise current government and pro-government candidates. On the other hand, announced commitment to more liberal policy in economic sector will limit these candidates’ opportunities to compete against the “left-wing” rhetoric of Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Lyashko and Yuriy Boyko.

Possible scenarios of events between the presidential and parliamentary elections

Before the official start of the election campaign and registration of candidates, any predictions of specific (personal) results of the presidential race, let alone the parliamentary elections, would be premature. However, a number of factors outline the general logic of the political process that does not depend on specific candidates. The most important of these factors is rather short timespan between the presidential and parliamentary elections (31 March – 27 October).

Under these conditions, the newly elected President will be strongly motivated to show voters the real results of his/her efforts in the first six months in the office and avoid any unpopular steps over this period to be able to gain voter support for his/her political force(s), create large pro-presidential faction in new Parliament, and implement his/her election programme in the next 4.5 years.

In the context of parliamentary-presidential republic, the current composition of the Verkhovna Rada can equally help the newly elected President in implementing his/her early initiatives and achieving rapid results ahead of parliamentary elections, or create serious obstacles, undermining the ratings of pro-presidential forces.

On the other hand, during this period one can expect a significant imbalance of legitimacy between the newly elected President and the “old” Verkhovna Rada. The “mandate of public trust”, granted by voters to the new Head of State, creates favourable environment for attacks on current parliamentary structure and allows pro-presidential political force to build its parliamentary campaign on the slogans of combating corrupt elites that currently control the Verkhovna Rada.³² Meanwhile, apparent cooperation with the unpopular “old” Parliament may cast a shadow on the image of newly elected President and make him/her vulnerable to criticism from “anti-oligarchic” standpoint.

Therefore, we can distinguish between two basic scenarios of the political situation between presidential and parliamentary elections – “cooperating” and “conflicting”.

The cooperating scenario. In this case, the newly elected President finds a common language with the majority of the deputy corps, obtains necessary votes for his/her initiatives (obviously linked to fulfilment of election promises) and demonstrates “rapid results” to voters, also showing his/her effectiveness, constructiveness and ability to lead the country out of crisis.

It is clear that in exchange for such support the newly elected President will have to form alliances with political elites already represented in the Verkhovna Rada, guaranteeing inviolability of their assets and spheres of interest, and possibly incorporating their representatives into a new system of government.

Since support of presidential initiatives over the critical first six months in the office is a kind of “advance payment” for further mutually beneficial cooperation, the success of this scenario directly depends on the new President’s “deal-making skills” from the viewpoint of current political elites. To increase the likelihood of this cooperating scenario, the President may (upon own initiative or at the behest of partners) choose to voluntarily

³² According to focus group discussions, the Ukrainians give only one year to the new government to prove its trustworthiness. For more detail see the material “*The Ukrainians about the Government, State Policy and Elections: Focus Group Discussions*” in this publication.

and convincingly restrict his/her own goals/capacities, thus guaranteeing the fulfilment of relevant commitments in the future (in the Game Theory this strategic move is called “commitment”).³³ This can be done through public formalisation of allied relations, conclusion of agreements and/or initiation of constitutional amendments to reduce presidential powers and increase the President’s accountability to the Parliament.

Given the nature of popular demand, the realisation of the cooperating scenario is likely to include rapid and radical socio-economic solutions of the left-populist nature.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that political partnerships created between the elections are mostly “alliances of convenience”.

The conflicting scenario. If the newly elected President for whatever reason fails to gain support for his/her “inter-election” initiatives from the majority of MPs in the old Verkhovna Rada, the optimal line of conduct would include defiant confrontation with the parliamentary majority, emphasis on own “non-system” and uncompromising position, and willingness to fight corrupt political elites and tycoons.

In this regard, the personnel issues may trigger the conflict between the newly elected President and the “old” parliamentary majority. Since pursuant to current legislation, the President needs the Verkhovna Rada’s consent to appoint and dismiss top officials from the presidential quota (the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prosecutor General, the Head of Security Service of Ukraine), the lack of support from the parliamentary majority will leave the new President with “hands tied” in terms of institutional influence. As a result, he/she will be forced to assume the role of the “opposition president”, appealing to the masses and the streets.

It is highly likely that realisation of the conflicting scenario will lead to internal destabilisation with the growing chaos in the state and intolerance in society. Its outcomes will essentially depend on the President’s personal charisma, his/her skills to mobilise a sufficient number of supporters, and ability not only to lose support of voters during the six months of confrontation, but to capitalise on the situation by bringing sufficient number of MPs from his/her political force to form the pro-presidential majority in the new Verkhovna Rada of 9th convocation.

Based on suggested baseline scenarios and four main types of candidates outlined in Section 3.1, it becomes possible to predict probable course of events in case of victory of one or another candidate.

Scenario A: The victory of a pro-government candidate (the incumbent President). In this case, the cooperating scenario is more likely. Such success of the incumbent President in extremely difficult race can convince significant parts of the political elite in his resilience and political skills. It will also confirm

the opportunity for the “ruling party” to maintain its position despite very low rating.

The formal parliamentary coalition in the current Verkhovna Rada is likely to continue, while the probability of resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers will be low, given the lack of necessary votes for the creation of new parliamentary coalition and the Cabinet. In the context of imminent parliamentary elections, it would be logical for the parties in the governing coalition to join forces in the framework of a “single national team”, geared towards cooperation with re-elected President and mutual public support.

As the negotiating capacity of the President and his political force will strengthen, the realisation of the cooperating scenario will primarily depend on the President’s readiness not to “overreact” following his victory, and on consent of the People’s Front to accept the new terms of partnership. Episodic cooperation of the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko with the governing coalition is likely to continue, while non-affiliated majoritarian deputies will also receive additional incentives to collaborate with the pro-presidential majority.

Given the President Poroshenko’s low approval rating, his re-election will discourage large parts of society for the benefit of the opposition politicians, who will start competing for the opportunity to spearhead protests and gain the upper hand in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The degree of confrontation will depend on the specific circumstances around the presidential race and many other factors.

The current government’s political course is unlikely to change; some adjustments will be made to better recognise the “left-wing” sentiments of the electorate in the socio-economic sphere.

Scenario B: The victory of an opposition candidate – the “old” politician. In this case, both cooperating and conflicting scenarios are equally possible. The newly elected President from the “democratic opposition” will not have his/her “own” large faction in the Verkhovna Rada. Therefore, assembling the loyal parliamentary majority will require coming to terms with significant numbers of MPs from the governing coalition. For its part, current composition of the Parliament in general and MPs representing the coalition in particular are interested in keeping their seats or at least in getting guarantees of inviolability for their assets and interests.

Therefore, despite the intensity of public confrontation, the “new” President and the “old” Parliament will have plenty of room for negotiations and compromises. Moreover, an experienced and well-connected politician will be able to gain support for his/her initiatives even without resorting to formalisation of partnerships with the forces that publicly oppose the President.

If the new President’s programme centres around the problems that are relevant for overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, such as the need to improve the socio-economic situation in the country, virtually any

³³ See Jack Hirshleifer. Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment. URL: <http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp799.pdf>.

parliamentary group will be able to occasionally support realisation of this programme with no reputational losses. However, this will also mean that the newly elected President and his/her political force will be receiving the largest political dividends.

And this brings up the key issue of “commitment” to secure guarantees for the President’s ad-hoc partners for the period after the parliamentary elections. However, both “commitment” options are quite tricky. Public formalisation of allied relations between the President from the “democratic opposition” and representatives of the current ruling coalition (or the pro-Russian camp) involves reputational losses for both sides and increases the risk of parties failing to fulfil their obligations. Restricting presidential powers or increasing accountability to the Verkhovna Rada seems to be a more reliable guarantee, but its practical implementation through constitutional amendments before the parliamentary elections is impossible.

If the newly elected President fails to gain support from the parliamentary majority for implementing his/her inter-election goals, the situation is likely to take the conflicting course.

The coalition in the Verkhovna Rada may continue to exist in its current format or collapse without formation of the new coalition. As a result, the Cabinet will operate with the “acting” status until the new Parliament is elected and the new Cabinet of Ministers is formed.

The question of the new government’s political course will remain open; it will be determined by the nature of relations “the President – the Parliament / the Cabinet”. If these actors are able to cooperate, then the political course may be adjusted in accordance with the election programme of the new President. In case of a confrontation, however, there is a risk of sharp decline in government’s performance and the emergence of prerequisites for the political and socio-economic crisis.

Scenario C: The victory of an opposition candidate – the “new” politician. This option is similar to the previous one but entails higher likelihood of the conflicting scenario. In this case, it will be more difficult for the newly elected President to find sufficient support in the current Parliament – simply because he/she does not have “own” faction. If the majority is reshaped to meet the needs of the new President, the reputational risks from formalisation of allied relations will be much higher for this Presidents than for any “old” politician (given the specifics of the electoral base).

On the other hand, the conflicting scenario allows the newly elected President representing the “new” politicians to roll out a loud and successful campaign based on anti-corruption, anti-elite, or anti-oligarchic narrative. The confrontation between the “old” Parliament and the “new” President will not require either effective domestic policy decisions or deep proficiency in international relations from the latter. The only ability he/she needs is to persuade the public and garner media support.



If the “opposition president” is able to keep the record relatively clean at least till the end of the parliamentary elections and not to disappoint “his/her” voters, this President will gain additional advantages for his/her political force along with the opportunity to form a large faction in the Verkhovna Rada of new convocation.

At the same time, the newly elected President may face the risk of non-fulfilment of the election promises scheduled for the first several months in the office. Any attempts to “drastically accelerate or revise the reforms” may collide with the lack of support from the Parliament and the Cabinet, thus aggravating the confrontation between these government actors.

Consequences of this situation may include exacerbation of internal socio-economic problems, suspension of reforms and curtailment of support by Ukraine’s international partners. It is obvious that parts of society will personally blame the President for these woes, which will also have a detrimental effect on the voters’ support of his/her political force.

As in the previous scenario, the coalition in the Verkhovna Rada may continue to exist in its current format or collapse without formation of the new coalition. The Cabinet will operate with the “acting” status until the new Parliament is elected and the new Cabinet of Ministers is formed. Similarly, the new government’s political course will be determined by the nature of relations “the President – the Parliament / the Cabinet”.

Scenario D: The victory of a pro-Russian candidate. This course of events is very unlikely, but it still deserves our attention. Since most factions in the current Verkhovna Rada are located on the other side of political and cultural division, the newly elected President will have no parliamentary support. This suggests the conflicting scenario. Being in the opposition to the new President, the parliamentary majority will receive additional motivation to consolidate, ensuring effective control over the government. Even if the coalition retains the current format or undergoes some changes, its new composition will still be in the opposition to the President.

The victory of the pro-Russian candidate will trigger radicalisation of patriotic segments of society, thus strengthening political and cultural polarisation. In the event of escalation between the President and the Verkhovna Rada, the parliamentary majority may initiate legislative decisions to restrict the President’s influence

on the national security agencies (the Security Service, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Armed Forces) and on the country's foreign policy.

Realisation of this scenario entails a direct threat of confrontation between major government institutions and the emergence of prerequisites for political and socio-economic crisis.

Outlines of possible coalitions in the Verkhovna Rada of 9th convocation

As noted in Section 3.2, the results of the parliamentary elections and ensuing alignment of forces in the Verkhovna Rada are hardly predictable due to multiple internal and external factors that can strongly affect the political situation. The following considerations are largely based on assumptions.

The history of previous election cycles shows that the candidates' advancement to the second round of presidential elections usually gave their respective parties fairly good results in the parliamentary elections (see Diagram). One can expect the recurrence of this trend, while short period between the elections should theoretically maximise this effect. The competition in the second round is also likely to affect the balance of powers in the Verkhovna Rada of the next convocation.


Keeping this in mind, let us consider the most probable dispositions and configurations of the parliamentary forces within scenarios A, B, C and D.

Scenario A continued: The political and cultural division between the pro-presidential faction and the pro-Russian forces will play a dominant role in the Verkhovna Rada of next convocation, while the "democratic opposition" will present an additional division line (generally similar to current configuration of the Parliament). Following the formation of pro-presidential coalition, the current course of reforms will continue, although its intensity is likely to decline. Alternative scenario suggests the absence of a stable majority and fragmentation of the Parliament along with the loss of the government's efficiency.

Scenario B continued: The Verkhovna Rada of the next convocation will have a new and large pro-presidential faction forming the basis for parliamentary majority. It will be opposed by fragmented groups, including "predecessors" from the current coalition, the remnants of the "democratic opposition" and some pro-Russian forces. The likelihood of continuing the current course of reforms is low. Instead, the state policy vector will be aimed at short-term improvement of people's financial situation.

Scenario C continued: The President-oriented political force representing the "new" politicians will enter the Verkhovna Rada of next convocation. The line of division between the "new" and "old" politicians will become crucial (at least for the period of formation of parliamentary coalition and the first parliamentary sessions). The fate of reforms is unpredictable, as the new government

Diagram: The impact of results of presidential elections on the outcomes of the following parliamentary elections



* Meaning the party overcame the parliamentary election threshold for the first time.

can equally continue the reform efforts or undertake blatantly populist steps.

Scenario D continued: The Verkhovna Rada of next convocation will see the dominance of political and cultural division. Oriented towards the newly elected President, the pro-Russian parties will be able to substantially improve their positions, but still be in a minority. They will face the opposition from fragmented majority made up of the parties representing the patriotic electorate. Given the confrontation between the pro-Russian president and the parliamentary majority, the issue of reforms will recede into the background. The parties will refrain from taking risky steps in the social and economic sphere.

4. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Ukrainians are generally unhappy with the situation in the country. Most citizens believe that, *firstly*, the country is moving in the wrong direction, and *secondly*, the situation has deteriorated in most spheres of social life since 2013, with the exception of Ukraine's defence capability and its international image.

These assessments, however, do not transform into a desire to return to pre-2014 times, let alone the restoration of the Soviet Union. Likewise, negative attitudes to current situation did not change public opinions regarding Ukraine's course towards European integration. Most citizens support the country's accession to the EU, consider the European model of social development more attractive compared with other models (this model prevails over the Russian one in all regions), and admit that during 2014-2018 Ukraine became closer to joining the EU.

Unsatisfactory financial conditions of most citizens that deteriorated over this period is the main reason for negative perception of the situation in the country. It is no coincidence that the share of positive responses among the citizens with higher income, better education and younger age is larger than among less well-off, less educated and older respondents. At the same time, we should not ignore such reasons as taking Western development vector and breaking off ties with Russia, as well as promoting Ukrainian tradition in the socio-cultural sphere, which are relevant for some groups of Ukrainians.

This thesis is further confirmed by the fact that residents of the East and the South are more likely to view changes negatively in all spheres of life compared to Ukrainians living in the West and the Centre. Also, the Ukrainian-speaking and ethnic Ukrainians tend to assess the situation slightly more positively compared to Russian-speaking citizens and ethnic Russians. The only exception is the issue of prices and tariffs, where all respondents alike have negative attitudes irrespective of the region or social group.

Most respondents do not feel that reforms meet their interests and will not tolerate a temporary decline in living standards for the sake of further reforms and enhanced defence capability of the country. At the same time, the majority of citizens do think that they have lost from Ukraine's European integration course, while about quarter of Ukrainians feel that they have already benefitted from it.

Most Ukrainians remain rather optimistic about the country's ability to overcome the existing problems and difficulties but believe that it will not occur any time soon. Also, most citizens associate changes in their families' welfare with changes in the country as a whole. Most Ukrainians do not intend to leave the country, but the

spread of emigration ideas among young people is quite alarming.

While assessing the impact of reforms in the country since 2014, most Ukrainians report the absence of such influence on their personal situations. At the same time, one can observe the dominance of negative responses over the positive ones regarding most reform areas, with the exception of de-centralisation and local self-governance reforms.

People's assessments of the impact of reforms significantly depend on the level of awareness about them. Those who are well aware of specific reforms are much more likely to view their impact as positive. With the reduction of awareness, we observe the increasing numbers of people who either do not feel the reform impact or see it as negative.

The citizens demonstrate predominantly negative attitudes towards educational, health, pension, land, judicial and police reforms, as well as planned mass privatisation of state enterprises. Negative attitudes towards reforms that are fundamental for economic development or shape the basic systems of society may in the long run undermine the support for the country's European course.

Despite being rather sceptical about current achievements, most citizens still believe or at least have not lost hope in the success of reforms. Therefore, most Ukrainians are ready to support continuation of reforms, but only after making necessary adjustments to recognise past mistakes and taking into account the national specifics even if these run counter to the recommendations of Ukraine's international partners.

The majority of Ukrainians see the future of their country as a highly developed, democratic European state. The second most popular vision of Ukraine taking a special course of development, for example, like China, is more widespread in the East and the South.

Overall, the democracy is viewed as the most desirable system of government for Ukraine. This may be the evidence of most Ukrainians developing a value-based attitude towards the democracy, which also serves as a safeguard against the spreading support for authoritarian methods of rule.

Most Ukrainians are not ready to give up some of their personal rights and freedoms in exchange for material wealth. At the same time, understanding of equality as equal opportunities and equality of all people before the law coexists with the willingness to live in a society where everything is regulated by the state, but with no excessive social inequality. Individual freedom is of greater value among young Ukrainians, while equality is the choice of older citizens.

Most citizens plan to participate in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. At the time of the survey, however, only the minority of voters have decided on the candidates and parties that they will support. The Ukrainians have doubts about fairness of the upcoming elections. Yet the overall expectations from elections are rather optimistic.

The main motives for voting for specific presidential candidates include their personal qualities and programmes, and for parties – personalities of their leaders and political proposals. Other important reasons for choosing candidates include the ability to bring peace to Donbas, ability to overcome corruption and availability of the future development strategy.

Ukrainian society exhibits notable demand for new leaders and new parties. However, many voters believe that current politicians are sufficient. There are no new leaders and parties in Ukraine enjoying support of significant parts of society. Relatively more popular among voters is the proportional system with open lists.

Most Ukrainians view themselves as centrists, although in recent years one can observe certain left-side shift in public opinion. Most citizens do not identify themselves with specific ideological and political courses. The most popular ideologies were the national-democratic and social-democratic. Only 40% of those who were able to express their ideological and political course believe that Ukraine has a party, whose practical activities are in line with this course.

In the upcoming parliamentary elections, about one-third of voters would choose from the parties currently represented in the Parliament; almost 40% of those polled are going to look for alternatives among the new parties; another 29% are yet to decide. Therefore, in Ukraine both old and new political parties have chances to enter the Parliament, while the size of their potential constituencies is roughly identical.

Geopolitical orientation of a particular political force comes to the fore for most Ukrainians. Almost one-third of respondents prefer political parties advocating for Ukraine's European integration; roughly the same share of voters is ready to support political forces calling for Ukraine's special path of development based on its national specifics; 11% support political parties standing for restoration of relationship with Russia and for Ukraine's integration into Eurasian space. The opposition parties enjoy greater popularity than the pro-government ones, but this factor is of minor significance for most Ukrainians.

More than half of Ukrainians who would have voted for Ukraine's accession to the EU at the referendum declared their support for the parties advocating for the European integration. At the same time, 21% of pro-European respondents supported parties that call for Ukraine's special path based on its national specifics.

People's level of interest in politics remains low, most Ukrainians have never read the party programmes. Television and the Internet are the main sources of information about political processes in Ukraine.

According to results of focus group discussions, the Ukrainians may restore confidence in the government, if it proves its commitment to the rule of law and equality of all before the law; punishes representatives of the previous government and/or proxies of newly elected authorities; fulfils its promises and reports regularly to citizens. Also, people can give the new government just one year to prove its trustworthiness.

In Ukrainian society people remain divided based on their geopolitical orientations and other socio-cultural differences. In particular, the main differences in the positions of most residents of different regions concern issues of Ukraine's geopolitical choice (the EU and NATO membership), relations with Russia, ways to resolve conflict in Donbas, the language issue and decommunization. All these differences give grounds to consider the socio-cultural division as the main division for the present-day society. The same issues remain polarising factors for the Ukrainian politics.

The study has found a high level of correlation between the foreign policy, security and humanitarian policy issues: the pro-Western orientations correlate with pro-Ukrainian approaches in the language policy and decommunization, while the pro-Russian ones correlate with alternative positions, which fully corresponds to the socio-cultural division, traditional for the Ukrainian society.

In its current state, Ukrainian society is characterized by demands for improved social protection, increased role of the state in economic and social processes, negative perceptions of reforms and privatisation processes – these are common for many categories of citizens. Support of pro-Western geopolitical orientation by most Ukrainians somehow coexists with the leftist and paternalistic attitudes towards the economy. This confirms that the socio-economic division is not a key for Ukrainian society.

At the same time, there exists certain interrelation between geopolitical orientations and positions regarding socio-economic policy, as pro-Western and anti-Russian factors are more closely linked to liberal approaches, while orientation towards the Russian vector is of socialist nature.

Regardless of their geopolitical orientations or cultural differences, most citizens support de-centralization and delegation of greater powers to local self-governments along with increased public control over law enforcement agencies. Similarly, most Ukrainians would not tolerate restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties even in exchange for political stability and do not support such restrictions even in conditions of external aggression.

In the economic policy matters, the Ukrainians are more likely to rely on the state regulation mechanisms

rather than market instruments. Most respondents approve the active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control, while disapproving privatisation and introduction of land market.

Citizens' views on social policy approaches clearly signify the demand for the state's central role in the life of society and in provision of public goods (state pension provision and free medicine). Most respondents support the active role of the state in re-distributing public goods and helping to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. Many Ukrainians are supportive of introduction of the progressive taxation. There are no significant differences between regions in most socio-economic issues.

One can observe a paradox, in which citizens do not trust the state and its institutions on the one hand but seek the state's social support on the other. They want it to be active not only in the economy, but also in re-distribution of public goods in favour of more disadvantaged populations.

Critical attitudes towards recommendations of Ukraine's international partners (namely, the EU, the US and the IMF) remain prevalent, as most respondents allow for their implementation unless these recommendations run counter to public needs and moods in the country.

The study according to the "libertarian-authoritarian" scale shows that Ukrainian society in its socio-cultural orientations leans towards traditionalism and even cultural nationalism, rather than globalism and multiculturalism. It categorically rejects the legalisation of non-traditional marriages and recreational drugs and seeks more strict and uncompromising fight against crime. Such approaches are equally shared by Ukrainians in different regions irrespective of their geopolitical orientation.

Rather similar approaches to economic and social policy are typical for both enthusiasts of European integration and reforms, and for Euro-sceptics and "supporters of restoration". Likewise, there are no significant differences between political preferences of the Ukrainians who are likely to support either "old" or "new" (non-Parliament) parties, which narrows the question of new political forces' rising to power down to the competition between new personalities rather than new ideas.

Flexibility and predominantly leftist nature of people's policy preferences in social and economic sphere will generate problems primarily for pro-European candidates and parties. Relevant demands, coupled with negative attitudes towards key reforms will force political actors to exploit more socially popular slogans and promises in order to gain voter support and possibly to hush up certain unpopular measures, including those necessary for reforms and ongoing international support.

This approach, however, entails the risk of rapid loss of confidence and public support after the elections: having taken over the government, these actors will be often forced to act contrary to their promises,

being bound by Ukraine's international commitments regarding specific areas of reform. On the other hand, by following moods of the electorate, these candidates and parties may be accused of "populism".

These reservations and limitations will not apply to political parties declaring a "special path" of Ukraine or advocating for restored relations with Russia. Consequently, these parties will get certain advantages in the race.

The nature of people's policy preferences in the spheres that undergo reforms may question their continuation in the future. Only de-centralisation has won support of most Ukrainians regardless of their political allegiances or attitudes to future reforms. Other important transformations, including privatisation, land market, health and educational sector reforms do not enjoy popular support even among those who stand for persistent changes in society or support pro-European parties.

Ukraine's foreign partners will have to recognise the fact that most Ukrainians, including supporters of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, do not favour unconditional implementation of external recommendations, especially unpopular ones, preferring greater focus on public needs and moods within Ukraine. Therefore, any ultimatums by relevant foreign actors may trigger the increasingly negative attitude towards them and the political forces and government institutions of Ukraine that will support these demands and seek their realisation.

The results of public opinion polls conducted during 2018 make it possible to reduce the presidential front-runners to the following group: Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna"; Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent President of Ukraine; Anatoliy Hrytsenko, the leader of the Civil Position party; one of the leaders of diverse political forces with pro-Russian agenda (currently Yuriy Boyko has the highest rating); Oleh Lyashko, the leader of the Radical Party; Andriy Sadovyi, the leader of the "Samopomich Union" (Self-Reliance); Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, the public figure and the leader of "Okean Elzy" rock band; and Volodymyr Zelenskyi, the actor, producer and art director of Studio Kvartal 95.

The analysis of political preferences of people supporting specific presidential candidates has generally confirmed the logic of their distribution among all citizens. Key differences concern the issues of socio-cultural division, and those related to geopolitical positioning of presidential candidates.

Potential candidates declaring implementation of the European integration policy in total have more supporters than those declaring a course for rapprochement with Russia or avoiding clear statements regarding the future direction of their policies.

The views of supporters of different candidates show no fundamental differences in the matters of democratic

internal political structure, socio-economic policy and most humanitarian policy issues (with the exception of language policy and decommunization).

An important ideological position for most voters (regardless of their preferred candidates) is restoration at the government's active role in managing economic processes and re-distributing public goods. This points at the strong demand for the emergence of nationally oriented, pro-European, but at the same time left-to-centre or left (according to classical criteria) political forces and relevant political leaders.

At the same time, there is little room for manoeuvre left for powerful liberal forces at the current stage of the Ukrainian society's development.

Only de-centralisation is supported by followers of the majority of potential presidential candidates. Meanwhile, privatisation, free land market, as well as educational, health and social sector reforms (at least in their present form) failed to win the approval of supporters of any candidate. This raises the question of who and how will ensure the continuity of policy implementation in relevant areas.

Among all presidential front-runners, Oleh Lyashko and Yulia Tymoshenko demonstrate the highest level of compliance of their political proposals with the expectations of their respective supporters. The candidates from the pro-Russian side of the political spectrum can also easily achieve such compliance.

Political proposal of Petro Poroshenko, the incumbent President of Ukraine, matches the expectations of his supporters in the matters of foreign policy, security, socio-cultural strategies and geopolitical choice. At the same time, his position on many key issues (primarily in the socio-economic sphere) either has not been clearly articulated or runs contrary to his voters' expectations, which may have a direct impact on the election outcomes.

Significant inconsistencies exist between the ideological and political course, declared by Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and the expectations of his potential electorate. First of all, they concern economic and social policy. His potential voters have a demand for increased government's role in economic processes and re-distribution of public goods, as well as for the state's hard-line approach to combating crime and drugs, but there is no demand for both authoritarian trends in public administration and liberalisation of socio-economic policies.

Political declarations of Andriy Sadovyi also do not fully match expectations of his potential voters as this politician is leaning to more liberal approaches in the economy (including the land market issues), while his voters seek more active state interventions and social protection. Given the lack of clearly defined political proposals by Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and Volodymyr Zelenskyi, it is nearly impossible to assess the level of their compliance with the expectations of their potential supporters.

Both presidential and subsequent parliamentary elections will occur in the environment of intense yet fair competition throughout the country (with the exception of occupied territories). The influence of the "home region" factor for the election participants will continue to weaken.

The division between potential presidential candidates can be traced along the following lines: the pro-government vs the opposition candidate; candidates of various geopolitical orientations (pro-European, "special path" and pro-Russian); the "old" politician vs the "new" politician. Yet the main division line between the candidates in the presidential campaign of 2019 will be a geopolitical "bipolar" split – the European integration vs rapprochement with Russia. Other divisions (pro-government vs opposition, and "old" and "new") will be important for voters supporting the European course of Ukraine's development.

Considering high level of competition, the presidential elections are likely to be held in two rounds. The "battle" for the second round will unfold between the following main candidates – a candidate from the government (the incumbent President is expected to accept this role); the opposition candidate (the "old" politician); the opposition candidate (the "new" politician); and the candidate from pro-Russian political environment.

Given the current level of support for potential candidates, different combinations of the second round are possible, e.g. two candidates representing different segments of pro-European orientation, or the pro-European candidate vs the pro-Russian candidate (the likelihood of the second option is much lower).

Any winner of the presidential race (specifically one of pro-European candidates) will be immediately thrown in a situation that requires him/her to make a choice between possible loss of support from large parts of society due to the adoption of necessary but unpopular political decisions, or the loss of support from international partners due to refusal to follow specific agenda and ensure continuity in the reform process.

The inter-party competition in the run-up to the Verkhovna Rada elections largely replicates the pattern of the presidential race. Up to 10 political parties have chances to enter the Parliament with none of them having absolute advantage over competitors and thus cannot form a one-party government. Therefore, it is highly likely that the new Verkhovna Rada will be even more fragmented than the current one.

However, the upcoming presidential elections can radically change the disposition of political forces, boosting electoral support and strengthening negotiating capacities for parties whose candidates will demonstrate fairly good results, and significantly reducing the electoral chances for others, or alternatively encourage unions. Therefore, current alignment of forces is by no means final and can change drastically.

Polarisation in the party system is primarily observed within the dilemmas of foreign policy orientation and armed conflict with Russia (specifically, Ukraine's accession to the EAEU vs the EU; Ukraine's non-bloc status vs NATO membership; reconciliation with Russia vs a hard-line approach towards this country; peace in the East at all costs vs peace on terms acceptable for Ukrainian).

At the patriotic and pro-Western end of this division we find "Svoboda", BPP, "Samopomich", as well as the Civil Position. The most radical in this regard is "Svoboda". The pro-Russian end is represented by the Opposition Bloc and For Life.

The analysis of party programmes in terms of their socio-economic policy made it possible to identify the following parties that may enter the new Parliament: four clearly leftist parties (the Radical Party, For Life, the Opposition Bloc and "Batktivshchyna"), one left-of-centre ("Svoboda"), one conditionally centrist (Servant of the People) and three right-of-centre parties (the Civic Position, "Samopomich" Union, and Petro Poroshenko Bloc). However, self-presentation of some parties contradicts their positioning.

As a rule, the parties' leftist socio-economic approaches rely on wide support among their respective voters. Instead, those few right-liberal positions declared by the BPP, "Samopomich" and the Civil Position do not resonate with the majority of their potential voters or even run counter to their preferences.

Therefore, the parties' positions on various socio-economic issues demonstrate signs of asymmetric political division: on the one end, there are parties with the leftist, paternalistic agenda that criticise current government for its allegedly anti-social policy. On the other end we see moderately liberal parties with rather limited approval and the "ruling party", which instead of winning the voters' support for their socio-economic programme still tries to emphasise the importance and relevance of policy implemented under current reforms.

The inter-party division in the humanitarian policy area concerns three major issues: the official status of the Russian language, priority government support and protection of the Ukrainian language, and (dis)continuation of decommunization. The division lines here are very similar to those related to foreign policy and security dilemmas. As for the dilemmas of the "libertarian-authoritarian" dimension (*GAL-TAN*), the experts could not identify clear positions of most parties, while comparison of positions of their supporters did not reveal significant differences.

Therefore, the most significant line dividing the party system is the one that matches the political and cultural division of society (geopolitical choice, relations with Russia, language issue). The division of parties regarding socio-economic issues is significantly less pronounced. However, despite this asymmetry and a weak right wing,

this socio-economic differentiation is also very important considering its relevance for the general public.

Key factors affecting the course of events during the presidential campaign may include: (1) new aggressive moves of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, escalation of hostilities in Donbas and some other events contributing to increased political and cultural polarisation in society; (2) rise in prices and inflation, growing utility tariffs and some other events contributing to increased social and economic polarisation in society.

Increased political and cultural polarisation may contribute to consolidation and mobilisation of Petro Poroshenko's electorate; strengthen and "preserve" the electoral niche of a pro-Russian candidate, while decreasing his or her chances for the second round; erode the electoral base of Yulia Tymoshenko, Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Oleh Lyashko; negatively affect the positions of Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, who do not prioritize these topics in their political positioning.

Increased social and economic polarisation may contribute to consolidation and mobilisation of supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Lyashko, as well as Yuriy Boyko and other pro-Russian candidates; narrow the electoral base of Petro Poroshenko; likely improve the positions of Volodymyr Zelenskyi; and likely worsen the positions of Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, as their announced commitment to a more right-wing, liberal policy in economic sector cannot compete against the "left-wing" rhetoric of Yulia Tymoshenko, Oleh Lyashko and Yuriy Boyko.

Any candidate of the four "types" described above can potentially win the presidential race. Given the higher proportion of the pro-European electorate, one can expect the victory of one of the three "pro-European" candidates in any configuration of the second round of elections.

The situation between the presidential and parliamentary elections creates many opportunities both for the newly elected President and his/her party and for the parliamentary political forces; it will be used by all those involved to improve their chances in parliamentary elections. During this period, relations between the President and the Parliament can follow two scenarios – of cooperation and conflict.

Under the cooperation scenario, the newly elected President will try to find a common language with the majority of the deputy corps (e.g. by guaranteeing inviolability of their assets and spheres of interest, and possibly incorporating their representatives into a new system of government), thus obtaining necessary votes for his/her initiatives obviously linked to fulfilment of election promises. Given the nature of popular demand, the realisation of the cooperating scenario is likely to include rapid and radical socio-economic solutions of the left-populist nature. At the same time, it should

be borne in mind that political partnerships created between the elections are mostly “alliances of convenience”.

Under the conflict scenario, the newly elected President may be unable to obtain the majority support in old Verkhovna Rada for making official appointments from the presidential quota, and for fulfilling his/her election promises. Being deprived of necessary tools of institutional influence, the President will be forced to assume the role of the “opposition president”, appealing to the masses and the streets. An optimal line of conduct would include defiant confrontation with the parliamentary majority and emphasis on willingness to fight corrupt political elites and tycoons. It is highly likely that realisation of the conflict scenario will result in reduced efficiency of the government and internal destabilisation.

Depending on the type of a candidate winning the elections, there can be four main scenarios of events following the elections. In case of victory of a pro-government candidate the cooperating scenario is more likely. The current government’s political course is unlikely to change; some adjustments will be made to better recognise the “left-wing” sentiments of the electorate in the socio-economic sphere.

In case of victory of an opposition candidate – the “old” politician, both cooperation and conflict scenarios are equally possible. The question of the new government’s political course will remain open; it will be determined by the nature of relations “the President – the Parliament / the Cabinet”. If these actors are able to cooperate, then the political course may be adjusted in accordance with the election programme of the new President. In case of a confrontation, however, there is a risk of sharp decline in government’s performance and the emergence of prerequisites for the political and socio-economic crisis.

The victory of an opposition candidate – the “new” politician entails higher likelihood of the conflict scenario. In this case, the newly elected President will be able to roll out a popular campaign based on anti-corruption, anti-oligarchic narrative. At the same time, the President may face the risk of non-fulfilment of the election promises scheduled for the first several months in the office. Any attempts to “drastically accelerate or revise the reforms” may collide with the lack of support from the Parliament and the Cabinet, thus aggravating the confrontation between these government actors and triggering crisis.

The victory of a pro-Russian candidate is very unlikely. This situation suggests the conflicting scenario. Being in the opposition to the new President, the parliamentary majority will receive additional motivation to consolidate, ensuring effective control over the government. Even if the coalition retains the current format or undergoes

some changes, its new composition will still be in the opposition to the President. The victory of the pro-Russian candidate will prompt radicalisation of patriotic segments of society, thus strengthening social and cultural polarisation. Realisation of this scenario entails a direct threat of confrontation between major government institutions and the emergence of prerequisites for political and socio-economic crisis.

Depending on the outcome of the presidential race, it becomes possible to predict various combinations of the alignment of forces in the newly elected Parliament.

If the incumbent President wins, the political and cultural division between the pro-presidential faction and the pro-Russian forces will play a dominant role in the Verkhovna Rada of the next convocation, while the “democratic-opposition” will present an additional division line (generally similar to current configuration of the Parliament). Following the formation of pro-presidential coalition, the current course of reforms will continue, although its intensity is likely to decline. Alternative scenario suggests the absence of a stable majority and fragmentation of the Parliament along with the loss of the government’s efficiency.


In case of victory of an opposition candidate – the “old” politician, the Verkhovna Rada of next convocation will have a new and large pro-presidential faction forming the basis for parliamentary majority. It will be opposed by fragmented groups, including “predecessors” from the current coalition, remnants of the “democratic opposition” and some pro-Russian forces. The likelihood of continuing the current course of reforms is low. Instead, the state policy vector will be aimed at short-term improvement of people’s financial situation.

In case of victory of an opposition candidate – the “new” politician, the President-oriented political force representing the “new” politicians will enter the Verkhovna Rada of next convocation. The line of division between the “new” and “old” politicians will become crucial (at least for the period of formation of parliamentary coalition and the first parliamentary sessions). The fate of reforms is unpredictable, as the new government can equally continue the reform efforts or undertake blatantly populist steps.

In case of victory of pro-Russian candidate one can expect the dominance of socio-cultural division in the Verkhovna Rada of the next convocation. Oriented towards the newly elected President, the pro-Russian parties will be able to substantially improve their positions, but still be in a minority. They will face the opposition from fragmented majority made of the parties focusing on patriotic electorate. Given the confrontation between the pro-Russian president and the majority, the issue of reforms will recede into the background. The parties will refrain from taking risky steps in the social and economic sphere.

POLITICAL LEADERS ON THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS AND THE COUNTRY'S PROSPECTS

The Razumkov Centre has asked the leading public officials and politicians – the potential presidential candidates – to share their vision of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections and to assess significance of their outcomes for Ukraine's future. We are sincerely grateful to the politicians who responded to our request.¹



*Petro POROSHENKO,
the President of Ukraine*

– Ukraine enters the year when both presidential and parliamentary elections are to take place. How significant are these elections for the country? What are their main peculiarities?

In fact, we will have triple elections. Immediately after the presidential and parliamentary race the country will enter the campaign to elect local self-governments. And these elections are also crucial. *First*, de-centralisation redistributed financial resources for the benefit of communities, and the share of local budgets in the overall budget exceeds 50%. And *second*, our aggressive neighbour seeking loyal majorities in the representative bodies of several regions also hatches plans for our local elections. And this is not my political forecast but real intelligence data.

Russia's attempts to meddle in our elections is only part of the problem. The real problem is readiness of some political forces to play up to these attempts. And it's not about your proverbial fifth column. Unfortunately, even politicians who position themselves as pro-European and even anti-Russian do not mind "taking passes" from the Kremlin to pursue their narrow party interests. This became clear and obvious during discussions on the martial law, when the Ukrainian opposition and Putin spoke with one voice.

Certainly, we should not exaggerate the threat of pro-Moscow revenge, because the dominant social and electoral moods seemingly give no chances for the apparent Kremlin's protégé. But we should not underestimate the problem either. The enemy's technological arsenal is quite broad, and the story of the Trojan horse dates back three thousand years, which is enough to learn this lesson well.

Populism, which has risen to an unprecedented scale even by Ukrainian standards, is equally dangerous. Not long ago, one of the opposition politicians said that being a populist means serving the people. I disagree: being a populist means lying to people and fooling people. It means gambling on people's problems to take power at any cost.

But I believe in the wise choice of fellow Ukrainians, who will be electing not just the President, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, whose duty is to protect the country from Russian aggression, from Putin's attacks on our independence and on our very identity. They will be electing the national diplomacy strategist, who has to ensure favourable international conditions for achieving peace and restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity.

I will work hard to make sure that our choice in the presidential and parliamentary elections confirmed not some "new" but the European and Euro-Atlantic road that the country has been walking for five years.

As a pro-European government, we must conduct the most competitive campaign in Ukraine's history in full compliance with European standards and give no chance to revanche. The main goal today is not to lose the pace of reforms. Not to betray the nation and run to Putin with capitulation, as some suggest. Not to fail the Ukrainian state and all the accomplishments we have made over the past five years and paid a very high

¹ We sent our questions to Yuriy Boyko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Oleh Lyashko, Petro Poroshenko, Andriy Sadovyi and Yulia Tymoshenko. Below are the answers of those who responded to our request. The responses are translated close to the original style.

price for, but to ensure the unity of the Ukrainian people and give Putin no chances whatsoever to rupture our society.

– What does the future hold for Ukraine following the elections? What are the main tasks of the newly elected President and the Verkhovna Rada?

At the end of the year we observed the auction of generous promises. Some claim halving the price of gas. Others outvoice them with promises to reduce it by four times. Someone is probably preparing to vow free supply of energy or even pay extra for its consumption.

If we do not stop the populists' offensive and admit them to power, all the hardships that people went through in recent years due to Russia's military and economic aggression will be in vain. The populists' experiments will push the country towards new political and economic upheavals. Do we want to catch up with our successful western neighbours or quickly fall to the level of Venezuela or Zimbabwe? It is difficult to climb up but very easy to swoop down, just like the saying says, "It's as easy as rolling downhill".

The economy poorly reacts to slogans, while maintaining and accelerating the GDP growth and quality of life is only possible with responsible economic policy incompatible with simple solutions. We managed to get the economy out of crisis and achieve recovery. We almost reached the 4% growth. However, society needs not statistics but qualitative changes in the living standard. The latter derives from wages; wages mean jobs, while jobs are the result of investment growth. In turn, the size of investment depends on the business climate. Over the past five years, Ukraine has climbed 41 spots in the World Bank's Doing Business rating. But we are still in the middle of the pack, and reaching the top would not be easy, as it requires the launch of an anti-corruption court, privatisation, the land market and extremely responsible macro-financial policy. These are totally different steps than they traditionally promise during the elections. And after a forced pause in 2019 these decisions will have to be taken very quickly.

Speaking of the national security sector, the legislative and executive branches will have to join efforts to resume the defence reform and implement provisions of the new Law "On National Security" for improving the entire defence and security sector.

It would be premature to name a specific date of Ukraine's application for the EU membership, but I can definitely say that 2019-2024 as the period of difficult homework will be critical for meeting criteria of the EU membership – unless the next year's electoral cycle leads to the victory of pro-Russian revanchists and irresponsible populists. Obviously, I'm not going to stay

on the side-lines waiting for the winner. I am convinced that even a brief stop on the way to the European Union and NATO will automatically mean our return to the sphere of Russian influence.

Preventing such a scenario is a sacred duty of all Ukrainian patriots. I will do my best for this, but I count on society's support in this struggle as this is our common cause. This is the goal that should consolidate the entire society. We need a unified state and nation, united by the common goal – strong Ukraine among other European states, and strong Ukrainian nation among other great nations.



*Yulia TYMOSHENKO,
the head of the parliamentary
faction of All-Ukrainian
Union "Batkivshchyna"
(Fatherland)*

– Ukraine enters the year when both presidential and parliamentary elections are to take place. How significant are these elections for the country? What are their main peculiarities?

I believe that these elections are decisive for determining Ukraine's path not only in the coming years but in decades. Unfortunately, the room for manoeuvre grows narrow. Yet we still have a chance to escape that "grey zone", where most post-Soviet states ended up due to various objective and subjective circumstances. The delay in reforms helped to preserve and even strengthen the old social structures and practices, to undermine the democracy mechanisms, to spread corruption and to establish the crony oligarchic system and a "blackmail state", in which those in power subjugated the economy and society.

This model obviously failed to meet the challenges that Ukraine faced at the beginning of this century. This is why our country has already endured two revolutions. Unfortunately, the surge of civic activity that helped Ukraine to get rid of Viktor Yanukovich's regime and to survive the first years of war with Russia, could not fully demolish the foundations of this system, which eventually helped the oligarchic groups to restore this seemingly destroyed model.

The elections yet again open a window of opportunity for us. I sincerely hope that Ukrainians will take advantage of this chance, and the change of social development

vector will occur in a peaceful and democratic way, with no unnecessary losses.

Meanwhile, we must be aware that the crony government and its corrupt environment will certainly try to retain control over the country. It is already clear that the entire arsenal of politicking will be used for these purposes, including falsifications, bribery, electoral “pyramids” and the like. It is sad to admit, but these “political technologies” may be used on an unprecedented scale. This is why resistance to these manipulations and the victory of genuinely democratic forces, European in their values and practices, will be crucial for preserving Ukraine as a country and a nation-state.

– What does the future hold for Ukraine following the elections? What are the main tasks of the newly elected President and the Verkhovna Rada?

The future of Ukraine will largely depend on the general results of both presidential and parliamentary elections. I hope that these results will be positive for society. The next few years are going to be difficult. But citizens of our country have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to consolidate in the decisive moments of modern history. Let us recall the declaration of independence, both Maidans, or the volunteer movement that stopped Russian aggression. Therefore, I look forward to coming years with optimism.

First and foremost, the President and the Parliament will face the task of ending the war on Ukrainian terms, restoring territorial integrity, returning the occupied areas of Donbas and the Crimea, rebuilding and reviving the cities and villages destroyed by war. Other tasks will be equally important, including liberation of the economy, promotion of transparent commerce and restoration of public confidence in the government as such. The newly elected President, Parliament and local self-governments will definitely need to make management decisions as transparent and understandable to citizens as possible. Digital technologies, including tools similar to social media, will be very useful in this regard. The government’s digital transparency will involve citizens in the process of governance, as in Iceland or Switzerland, for example.

The tasks of strengthening the defence capability, curbing corruption, introducing the highest global standards in education, healthcare, environmental and social protection of those who cannot care for themselves are all interlinked, and their successful realisation depends on the effective partnership of the state and society. This is exactly the aim of the “New Course of Ukraine” – our party’s draft platform, designed by dozens of experts. It is a “living”, dynamic document, which continues to be elaborated online.



*Anatoliy HRYTSENKO,
the leader of Civil Position
party*

– Ukraine enters the year when both presidential and parliamentary elections are to take place. How significant are these elections for the country? What are their main peculiarities?

First, without exaggeration, the presidential elections in March 2019 will be decisive and determine whether Ukraine remains an integral and sovereign state, and whether we are able to counter and prevent the influence of pro-Russian forces on the Ukrainian politics.

Second, the presidential elections will define the economic scenario for our country’s future development. Currently there are two scenarios – stagnation and progress.

The first scenario drags the country down. It suggests continuation of current socio-economic course of the government, aimed exclusively at its own enrichment or profiteering of its cronies among businessmen and politicians. It involves policies, where replenishing of the budget occurs at the expense of ordinary citizens by raising excise duties, increasing gas prices or introducing additional taxes. Ukrainians do not see any opportunities. Such policies already caused decline of the national economy, triggered mass labour migration, contributed to the loss of control over strategic industries and enterprises, and increased dependence on external lenders and other countries. Unfortunately, today Ukraine follows this scenario.

The second scenario is progress. It implies development and rapid upward movement, elimination of oligarchic influence on politics and economy, the “green light” for fair businesses, genuine economic reforms and reduction of the shadow economy. The annual GDP growth should reach 8-10%.

The presidential elections will determine, which of these two scenarios Ukraine will follow. The election results will make it clear whether we should expect changes in the political class and see a person, who takes the office and starts working by sending clear message to the elites: the old approach is no longer acceptable. Now it is time to work for your country, for your people. The old system should become obsolete.

Speaking of the parliamentary elections, it is critical to activate “social elevators”, thus allowing all citizens

to become people's deputies and members of the government. And it is not about the ostentatious inclusion of popular figures in the list, but rather real opportunities for Ukrainians, who command respect and more importantly, have proper expertise to participate in public administration. The problem is that current elections system coupled with oligarchic rule hinder change in political power – this impedes any systemic changes, deep reforms and, ultimately, the country's sustainable development. Therefore, the Civil Position firmly and consistently advocates for the change of electoral law.

I understand that Ukrainians' disbelief in the possibility of change is already too deep. However, it is important that people come to vote and make their choice even despite their pain for the country. Even in the stormy 2014 the overall turnout across Ukraine was 50%, that is, every second citizen did not cast the ballot. In 2019 I want Ukrainians to vote. I want everyone to feel like real citizens.

– What does the future hold for Ukraine following the elections? What are the main tasks of the newly elected President and the Verkhovna Rada?

After elections, Ukraine will have to deal with all the problems that the current government has accumulated – war, external debt, poverty. Therefore, security, justice and economy should become priorities for post-election efforts.

Security means a separate peace plan for Donbas. The issue of lasting peace includes many components: political, diplomatic, security and economic. We need a decisive action to end war, we need peace for the benefit of Ukraine and the Ukrainians. This is one of the key tasks for the new government – both the President and the Parliament.

It is impossible to end war via military offensive – as soon as we start recapturing the Crimea and Donbas by force, they will lift sanctions on Russia and introduce sanctions against us. It is also impossible to settle the conflict in the Ukraine-Russia bilateral format. Talks with Putin will lead nowhere. The only option for Ukraine is a political and diplomatic approach with the involvement of external partners – the European states, as well as the United States, the United Kingdom and China. Persistent diplomatic pressure on Russia should go hand in hand with the increasing economic sanctions and the growing combat capability of the Ukrainian Army.

Security also means that people are not afraid to live in their country. Truce is not enough, even if it lasts a week or two. We need peace for decades so that country lived quietly, and we were able to bring back those who currently suffer. Initially from the occupied Donbas, and then – from the annexed Crimea.

The second priority is justice. It implies introduction of the anti-corruption package with the establishment of transparent and fair courts. The anti-corruption decisions should begin personally with the President. The law on the impeachment of the President must be adopted in the first place, regulating the procedure of his/her removal from the office. This step is essential for all future

presidents to understand the wickedness of going beyond the Constitution and morality.

In addition, the anti-corruption package should include decisions concerning the members of Parliament. You have pressed someone else's button during the vote? Please, leave. You do not attend sessions? Please, step aside. These are the basics.

The officials need to have incentives in the form of decent salaries, but only in conjunction with severe punishment for bribery. The second key thesis concerns judges, investigators and prosecutors. Punishment for unjust decisions and bribes should be reinforced – up to life imprisonment with no right to amnesty and pardon, and with confiscation of all property. I feel that immediately after adoption of relevant legislation all unscrupulous judges, investigators and prosecutors will start fleeing law enforcement bodies, realising the reality and unavoidability of punishment. This is how the system will start purging itself.

The third priority concerns the economy. Reducing poverty and addressing inadequate salaries and pensions is only possible through economic development. Therefore, combating corruption and creating conditions for Ukraine's economic development are interlinked.

How to make the economy stronger? We need to build a policy based on 10 key principles, such as protecting economic rights and freedoms of all citizens, ensuring the inviolability of property rights and countering raider attacks. This can be achieved after the banishment of corrupt officials from the judicial and law enforcement system. Restoration of fair trial automatically solves half of all problems related to the attraction of investments and economic recovery.

This also involves introduction of efficient and transparent government, since the authorities should not interfere and artificially complicate the life of businesses. This includes steps to pull Ukraine's economy out of shadow, its de-monopolisation and introduction of equal terms for fair competition – a level playing field for all. Large businesses can exist in Ukraine, but the oligarchy cannot. Businesses should work securely and legally, paying taxes in Ukraine instead of going to the Parliament in bunches, buying districts, paying huge bribes for the spots in the party lists, and blocking social elevators. This also involves de-offshorisation, because those in power cannot illegally hide their businesses abroad. This implies de-centralisation with strengthening of local communities' economic base, because this is the only way to boost small towns and villages, allowing them to control their own resources. This also involves energy saving, energy efficiency and development of renewables to finally become completely independent of the Russia's "gas needle". This means de-politicization and de-commercialisation of law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies, because they have to do their part investigating crimes and dealing with security issues rather than playing political games.

In other words, we need a whole set of measures to ensure the country's economic growth. And this issue concerns the Ukrainians as much as the war.

THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: EXPERT INTERVIEWS

Within the framework of the Project “Ukraine on the Eve of Election Year: Public Demand, Outline of the New Government, and the Future of Reforms”, the Razumkov Centre conducted a number of expert interviews in November 2018.

The goal of this activity was to collect the opinions, assessments and forecasts of experts from leading research institutions and universities about the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. Specifically, the experts spoke about possible scenarios after the elections, outlined electoral peculiarities and issues that are at heart of the political struggle as well as described factors affecting the citizens' choice.

Below are the experts' responses in alphabetical order.



Halyna ZELENKO,
Chief Research Scientist
I.F. Kuras Institute of Political
and Ethnic Studies
of the National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine

– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019 are inextricably intertwined. As the value of a seat in the Parliament has increased after the expansion of its powers in line with the 2004 Constitution and the restoration of the parliamentary-presidential form of government, most candidates will use the presidential race to field-test their election programmes and technologies, measuring chances in the parliamentary elections. There are also many dummy candidates.

Anyway, a long list of candidates makes the elections look ridiculous for the voters, downplaying the importance and decisiveness of this particular electoral cycle for the country's future development vector. After all, a triumph of either realists or populists defines the choice of methods that will be used to tackle very difficult problems, which will not disappear after the elections. As a result, the country will either maintain its pro-Western course or gradually return to balancing between the hypothetical collective West and Russia.

Although the victory of pro-Russian political actors in Ukraine currently seems impossible, some forces are open to reconciliation with Russia. Obviously, they will not pursue explicitly pro-Russian agenda, promoting socially sensitive topics instead – ending the war in Donbas, changing the negotiations format to de-escalate the conflict, reducing tariffs, returning to eastern markets – which is only possible by complying with Russia's demands.

It is clear that such promises will be in great demand in the country tired of war, instability and uncertainty. If these forces win, they will promote the ideas of strengthening the role of the state, reaching social agreement and peace, etc. By doing so they will pave the way for alleviating negative attitudes towards Russia as an aggressor, downgrading its decisive role in the war in Donbas and annexation of the Crimea, fuelling the terror from NATO membership and threats for Ukrainians' natural bilingualism. This, in turn, will create conditions for gradual resurgence of the Russian influence in Ukrainian politics in the medium term, which is exactly what Russia banks on by speaking about the change of power in Ukraine.

Although one should not expect a major change in the vector of country's development following the 2019 elections regardless of their results, they can still significantly affect the pace of Ukraine's realisation of pro-Western course and maximise de-politicisation of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, creating conditions for the revival of trade with Russia and the end of hot war in Donbas. However, such concessions may be fatal for Ukraine in the future.

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

Key topics of election campaigns did not change much since 2014, although their scope and intensity have increased. Top issues of 2014 included the war in Donbas and annexation of the Crimea, wide-eyed faith in the guarantors of Ukraine's security under the Budapest Memorandum and their ability to stop Russia, as well as anticipation of immediate rewards of Ukraine's pro-European policy (Mr Poroshenko has won specifically because voters viewed him as a person capable of doing so). Today, a number of thorny social issues have been added to the list.

As regards the war, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians nowadays have little doubt that the war in Donbas will end only upon the Russia's decision – either forced or deliberate, while reaching peace today is only possible on the aggressor's terms. Instead, Ukraine's pro-European policy is increasingly associated with the manpower outflow, “Euro-car plate” issues, stringent trade quotas, removal of natural resources and the like. Therefore, people's sympathies with populists and demagogues promising simple and quick solutions arise from their confusion and misreading of the fact that the European association is actually a “game changing” tool that introduces fundamentally different quality of politics and business, while visa-free travel and labour migration creates a competition between domestic and foreign businesses for skilled Ukrainian workforce, which, in turn, entails higher salaries and better working conditions.

Therefore, in addition to the above, hot topics in the upcoming elections will include tariffs, socio-economic policy and definitely the reforms. Topics for more specific constituencies will include languages, the rights of minorities and the church. Election campaigns themselves will be much more sophisticated and technologically advanced. Given the lack of new ideas and more importantly – Ukraine's extremely limited room for manoeuvre in both domestic and foreign policy, the political forces will not pursue big, ambitious goals. The campaigns will turn into “wars” of political consultants and technologists using all kinds of brutal means, populist ideas and demagoguery – see, for example, the current front-runner Yulia Tymoshenko's “New Course”, an extremely eclectic and risky programme in terms of realisation (have a cake and eat it).

– What are the main factors affecting the people's choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of 2019 elections?

Most people's choice will be determined by a “fat wallet”, although the value component will be also important for some voters. The main problem of the Ukrainians, however, is about the lack of awareness of who is responsible for what in the state, and “who is to blame”, which fuels the spread of populism and radicalism. They have this illusory faith “let's elect someone detached from oligarchic clans as a President, and the country

will change instantly”. They forget that presidential powers and functions in Ukraine are now seriously limited by the restoration of the parliamentary-presidential form of government, as well as by the de-centralisation reform, which striped the presidential structures of financial leverage at the local level.

The so-called “political matrix” is the main bottleneck; it has been developing for years after awfully unfair voucher privatisation and ensuing “seizure” of the state by political and economic groups (PEG), coupled with the passivity of society with its negative consequences. This matrix, which incorporates views of PEGs, resources, the quality of society (a system of values, low civic activity, awareness and responsibility, marked paternalism) and democratic tools adapted to the needs of PEGs, limits the policy space for any president, because it already “churns out” certain rules of the game. The radical use of law enforcement agencies or anti-corruption bodies will result in sabotage or even political deadlock.

Even if the radical or populist candidate wins the elections, his or her policy space will be still limited by this same matrix, which serves as a peculiar safeguard both for the breakthrough and obvious rollback or a change in the foreign policy vector. At the same time, the capacities of the future President will depend on the stability of pro-presidential majority in the Parliament or alliances of convenience (as in the current Parliament), reflecting the position of PEGs. Here one should harbour no illusions, because the next Parliament will be even more politically patchy, less professional, more populist, and most importantly – not bound by moral promises to Euromaidan, regardless of electoral basis.

The position of the West will also hold sway over the course of events, because any shift of power will not address the lack of money and necessary payments on external borrowings. So, continued collaboration with Western financial institutions or its curtailment will affect the country's political vector. Therefore, Ukraine is entering an extremely complicated electoral cycle, which will involve strong confrontations between the supporters of the European course and those who seek “easy solutions”, between the realists (backers of the “shock therapy”) and populists, which in any case will intensify radical sentiment in society. ■





Volodymyr KIPEN,
*The Head of the Institute
for Social Research and
Policy Analysis*

– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

The consequences of people's choices in 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections will be of crucial importance for the country. This is explained by peculiar chrono-politics of modern world and that of Ukraine as its part. Challenges and threats have almost reached their critical level. If the political class that will come to power fails to adequately respond to these challenges of time, then our future as a state and the nation may be in jeopardy. Therefore, the stakes in the upcoming elections are very high.

Changes in the country's development in terms of foreign policy vector are unlikely. Pro-Western orientation dominates both in the views of the ruling class and in public sentiments. Pro-Russian position is marginal and largely unpopular, and here one can expect only minor adjustments in the course. The likelihood of revenge of "former rulers" – even despite Russia's evident efforts to bring them to the fore of the Ukrainian politics – is negligible. Although many will pander to them or otherwise use them, their ability to influence the formation of the state policy will not change.

As for the internal vectors of Ukraine's development, the range of possible changes is significant, depending on the realisation of one of several post-election scenarios. If current political group remains in power, policy change will be minimal and limited to reformist declarations against significant simulated innovations.

In case of victory of (conditionally) democratic opposition, the country's course will undergo profound changes, although these novelties can range from radical populism to deep innovative breakthroughs.

In case of "lose-lose" scenario with a new shaky political balance and apparent strengthening of the conservative and pro-Russian forces, the domestic policy will resemble a weathervane in the ever-changing weather.

Each of these three scenarios brings about risks and downsides, although there are some positive sides. Despite signs of evolution, the first scenario increases the risk of

stagnation of the country and its political system, with possible undermining of its viability in the near future. At the same time, the ruling class will seek internal stability by balancing its own interests and the demands of critics from the opposition camp and civil society.

The second – breakthrough – scenario implies the risks of serious damage to relative social stability through radical innovations, political reforms and attempts to revise the strategy of internal development, as well as their sabotage by certain oligarchic and conservative groups. At the same time, it may pave the way for the policy of effective development and socio-economic advancement for better future of the country.

And the third – retarding – scenario not only increases the likelihood of stagnation and policy inconsistencies but opens the door for the former Party of Regions politicians and policies in certain areas. This situation may result in the preservation of relative balance and social order against the growing and increasingly more radical demands from active social groups and movements, ultimately leading to the new explosion. This is the most negative scenario, given the closed window of opportunities. Full revenge of pre-Maidan politicians is very unlikely; therefore, it was dropped from forecasting.

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

Key topics and issues in the heart of political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections will become a subject of fierce competition. After all, presenting one's own agenda as the most important one for the country is essential for the campaign's success. The information and media space will be full of various visions of the country's problems and the ways to address them. Not all of them will be truly important, relevant or realistic. The main threats in media discourse include the attempts to impose non-state, "alien" interests and recipes, as well as the wave of irresponsible populism in electoral promises.

The general topics – although with varying degree of prioritisation in the campaigns and with different solutions – include:

- Reforms – social changes – responsibility of the government – renewal of government;
- Social issues – salaries/income, price hikes, utility payments, people's safety and health;
- War – peace, NATO – EU;
- Corruption – combating corruption – de-oligarchization.

In May 2014 the situation in the presidential elections was fundamentally different. In post-revolutionary Ukraine people were euphoric after banishing the “criminal gang” and full of hopes to quickly and decisively address the main problems – renewal of power and return of occupied territories. In these circumstances, Petro Poroshenko “was on target” as an experienced pro-Maidan politician, successful businessmen independent of the oligarchs (“he won’t steal and will fight corruption”), a patriot with international diplomacy skills (“he will end the war quickly and victoriously”). This made him an indisputable favourite among other candidates and brought him to a convincing victory on the first ballot.

Today the situation is totally different. Society is sinking into despair; the war continues for the fifth year; life did not become easier; the government failed to curb corruption; people are very disappointed with changes (or their absence). The President’s glitter after the Maidan has faded, let alone his front-runner status. And now we observe heavy “trench war” between the candidates and the parties with its outcome unclear.

As for the 2014 parliamentary elections, Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s “People’s Front” with its radical-militaristic rhetoric and branding has struck the public’s nerve, outperforming even the presidential party. In 2019, this party will hardly repeat its past success. Electoral discussions will increasingly shift towards social and economic development programmes. At the moment, politicians and experts with the “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland) are the only ones offering the new content and meaning of the upcoming campaign through the projects “The New Social Contract” and “The New Economic Course”. Other players, apart from more or less decent but standard slogans on the billboards, are yet to introduce something substantial and systemic.

– What are the main factors affecting the people’s choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of 2019 elections?

The main factors affecting the people’s choice will include:

- Control over the television and PR campaigns;
- The government’s socio-economic activities to “placate” the voters; socio-economic situation on the eve of elections;
- Political situation on the eve of elections;
- The level and ways of Russia’s meddling.

One should not ignore possible effect of the “black swan factor” – an unpredictable situation or event that can agitate society, ignite the emotions and force many voters to change their views.

Unfortunately, while deciding on their political preferences, most voters largely disregard the content of the election programmes of presidential candidates

and political forces. This is traditional feature of the Ukrainian voters who tend to focus on personalities rather than ideas and programmes. Therefore, broad awareness-raising work in this area becomes essential; it can only be performed by the civil society institutions based on the principle of critical impartiality.

It is worthy to consider other risks typical for the Ukrainian elections – misuse of administrative resources and manipulations with the people’s will. These abuses may trigger widespread protests and new splits.

The risk of splits and internal shocks during the election campaign remains relevant. The acuteness of confrontation between the ruling political force (the Petro Poroshenko Bloc) and its main opponents, represented by Yulia Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland”, Anatoliy Hrytsenko’s “Civic Position” and the Opposition Bloc, surfaced long before the official launch of the election campaign. The radicalism in the political narrative is very high, and there are currently no reasons to expect reduction of tensions. The call of individual politicians and reputable public figures for civilised competition of ideas and programmes and for the unity of all democratic forces falls on deaf ears. Therefore, it is vital to redouble efforts of healthy forces in this area. ■



Oleksandr MAYBORODA,
Deputy Director
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of Sciences of Ukraine

– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

Fundamental changes are very unlikely due to invariability of leading actors in the Ukrainian political scene – they are either the representatives of big capital (oligarchs) or the “mercenaries” of big capital.

All previous election campaigns followed the same scenario – the government was the only one to blame for all woes, and its critics sought power with promises to “improve people’s lives”. Each new ruling elite acted exactly like its predecessors – dissipated the budget for own benefits and squandered the national resources. Aggravation of the situation in the country allowed old authorities or new opposition (which are often the same) to regain lost opportunities and to continue their activities. This is how the country was seized by oligarchs, who will remain the collective “owners”

irrespective of factions coming to power. Obviously, the evil impersonated by these tycoons may be lesser (keeping the reform promises and thus giving at least theoretical chance for a civilizational breakthrough), or greater (returning to the Eurasian swamp, fogged in the great-power toxin that distracts people from dreams of progress and prosperity).

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

The subject matter of discussions between contenders will not change. Having no significant economic and social achievements, the government will pursue the issues around humanitarian, moral and ethnic components of civilizational transition – democratisation, public order, fight against corruption, autocephaly, countering aggression – especially given the fact that the latter is for real, and many others.

The opposition will obviously play the card that the current government used to play when it was in opposition itself – economic crisis and impoverishment of the population. Criticism can be supplemented with the new development plans, but just like before, these might be nothing but pipe dreams. And it wouldn't be fair to blame only the opposition or the government, as the latter controls only a small portion of the economy and has no right to dictate to the private sector. The government, in fact, is able to publicly reveal the private capital's inability to create the knowledge economy, but no ruling group will ever go for it due to its oligarchic "ancestry". Any hope for arrival of true reformers who can deal with oligarchs independently and on equal terms is a delusion, insomuch as winning elections requires big money owned by these same oligarchs.

– What are the main factors affecting the people's choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of 2019 elections?

The contenders' financial capacities remain the main factor affecting the citizens' choice. Some candidates will espouse pro-Russian themes with an eye to the public narrative of low national dignity. Others will promote the national mobilisation against Russian aggression and retaliation.

Societal division based on the attitudes to Russia and the West emerged together with Ukraine gaining its independence and the need to choose its own geopolitical course. Now this division will become clearer. The topic is also important, because "improvement" in Ukraine is traditionally associated with the choice of a geopolitical patron rather than our own perseverance and consistency in the development of productive forces. This peculiarity of the national mindset has strongly influenced the Ukrainians' electoral behaviour throughout all years of independence. ■



Oleh POKALCHUK,
Advisor to the National Institute
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– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

Major changes in the Euro-Atlantic course are highly unlikely as this vector has been collectively defined by Ukraine's allies, and the country's failure to follow it will affect interests of large geopolitical players. It entails fulfilment of previous financial and economic commitments to global creditors, creation of favourable investment climate, as well as support for the internal social policy aimed at ensuring effective realisation of the first two points.

In theory, the internal colouring of Ukraine's political map may change significantly, but only if these transformations do not interfere with the country's external obligations. Moreover, these changes will be short-term, because collective commitments of all Ukrainian political players will eventually lead to the same common denominator – the EU and the NATO.

In an era of post-truth, one should not overestimate the electoral and plebiscite processes. With passions and emotions running high, elections perform a peculiar therapeutic function for the state, allowing society to let off steam. But it makes no sense to seriously discuss the election of an effective leader by masses in the 21st century. Instead, this choice will be made by the oligarchic groups seeking redistribution of budget flows, while the idealistic public creates proper scenery of fairness.

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

These are the church, the language and the army in no particular order. In fact, these are not the cornerstone topics, but they are the most sensitive ones. The 2014 elections prioritised the military topic in different variations. With the government gradually pushing civil society away from the reform and direct support of the Armed Forces, the sensitivity of this issue has altered but did not abate.

Having no solution beyond the sphere of social relations, the language issue will be artificially overstated and aimed at shifting the voters' attention to the transcendental sphere.

The question of church independence (Tomos of Autocephaly) is the most important one, as Russia already turns its propaganda "guns" towards this issue. The theme of a single Orthodox Church is truly unique in its historical significance and a positive factor for the Ukrainian authorities. This theme is already being used by the enemy in dozens of information and psychological operations aimed at development of violent scenario.

– What are the main factors affecting the people's choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of the 2019 elections?

The main conflict in the Ukrainian elections is the clash between Russian facilitators of "organised chaos" and conservative agents of "stabilisation". We should expect a complete degradation of any terms, the mayhem of memes and information viruses. New splits are unlikely, while five old ones (divergence in values, objectives, motivation, capacity and communication practices – the Ukrainian-Estonian study "A Route to National Resilience"¹) will be intensified manually. ■



Anatoliy ROMANIUK,
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– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

First of all, we should distinguish between the impact of the presidential race and parliamentary elections. The assessment of the presidential campaign outcomes has to recognise several factors. The first factor: Who will win – the incumbent President or the contender? The second factor: Which candidate will win – the one who relies on the electorate in the Western regions or focuses on voters in the East? And the third factor: Which political class will the winner represent – the "old" or the "new" one?

Answers to each of these questions suggest different scenarios of political development. But one can also assume that the above factors will not function as alternatives but work simultaneously, thus shaping complex combinations. Moreover, there might be some short-term effects that we will observe between the two election campaigns – these can affect either the outcome of parliamentary elections or emerge during the campaign.

First, we can predict the probable impact of the presidential race results on the parliamentary elections. It is fair to say that due to the short period between both campaigns the winner's party will have very good chances in parliamentary elections.

At the same time, political parties supporting unsuccessful presidential candidates will have several scenarios to follow. The parties, whose leaders invested heavily in the promotion of political forces, their slogans and programmes during the presidential race, can sustain and further improve gained results. The second group is made of the parties whose representatives pursued the presidency but lost. As a result, they may further lose the voter support. The third group includes the parties that either did not participate in the presidential race or supported the representatives / candidates from other political forces. These may face serious fundraising issues and problems with attracting the new / retaining the old voters, thus failing to gain proper or planned support.

Second, in the settings of semi-presidential system of government, the results of the presidential race and specifically the victory of a particular candidate, despite significance of this very fact, will be insufficient for a decisive control over the direction of Ukraine's development. Effective control requires the majority in the Parliament. Therefore, the value of the parliamentary election results will be commensurate – if not higher – with the value of the presidential elections in March 2019. It is easy to envisage the situation of "co-habitation", when the president faces the opposition of parliamentary majority made of the representatives of political forces other than his or her party. In this context, the victory of a particular presidential candidate can prompt consolidation of various parties to enhance the overall outcome either in supporting or opposing the winner.

Here we disregard the model, where the President and the parliamentary majority belong to the same political force (forces), which is a sign and an indicator of success. We are also aware of the fact that this will help saving the energy and resources in a struggle between different actors and institutions and create favourable political conditions for implementing

¹ For more detail see D. Teperik et al, "A Route to National Resilience: Building Whole-of-Society Security in Ukraine". Report by the International Centre for Defence and Security, 2018, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS_Report_A_Route_to_National_Resilience-Building-Whole-of-Society_Security_in_Ukraine_April_2018.pdf.



necessary reforms. On the other hand, it can provide additional elements of confidence for the ruling elite in establishing and maintaining arrangements for enrichment, manipulation, unaccountability and imitation of reforms

Therefore, the co-habitation model will encourage persistent competition not only between specific actors, but also between institutions (the Head of State, the Parliament and the Cabinet). Moreover, this model is capable of effectively limiting the arbitrariness of either political institution, while forcing political actors to seek compromises, which in itself is a tangible value in the country dominated by a “zero-sum game”.

And third, the presidency of an “old” politician will preserve the main trends of the party system development in Ukraine, equally increasing willingness of the “new” political forces to join efforts ahead of the parliamentary elections. Instead, the victory of a candidate from the “new” force will prompt fundamental changes the composition of key political actors over short period of time, thus significantly accelerating the development of this “new” force and contributing to its victory in the parliamentary elections later in 2019. Also, the presidency of the “new” politician can contribute to adoption of a new electoral law suitable for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Projections of the course of Ukraine’s development will depend on the outcomes of above conditions. It can be assumed that in case of “old” politicians (Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Boyko, etc.) coming to power, some modifications in the political course and its duration are possible, although radical fluctuations or changes are very unlikely. The limiting factors include the war in the East, annexation of the Crimea and past experience of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, as the ruling class will be wary of new “maidans”.

One should not expect rapid and radical reforms from these politicians, especially in the judiciary and in fight against corruption. Most likely, necessary reforms will be announced and even implemented, but the government will do anything to keep the reform content and outcomes under control. It is also likely that the reforms will be nothing but half-way measures or simply imitations. Instead, the rise of the “new generation” politicians (Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Andriy Sadovyi) gives more hopes for true reforms, including in critical spheres, mentioned above.

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

Many sociological research agencies and services traditionally include armed conflict in the East, low salaries and pensions, growing tariffs for utility services and prices for basic commodities in the list of key problems that concern Ukrainians. If there is no sharp and lengthy escalation at the front or unexpected exacerbation of relations with Russia during the pre-election and election period,² then socio-economic situation of citizens and the country will be the main topic of the presidential race. The acuteness of this problem will stimulate populism in most presidential candidates, and we will witness the competition of populists.

Creation of a single Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine has heightened potential for conflict. As the Church Unification Council is scheduled for November 2018,³ its decisions may trigger powerful processes in communities regarding their church affiliation. The questions of moving to another church or staying, consideration of worshippers’ positions in communities (A simple majority or unanimous decision? What should people rejecting the majority’s decision do?) and many other related issues provide breeding grounds for manipulations, provocations, rumours and the like.

Additional aggravating factors include the presence of radical nationalist organisations known for their ability for “simple and quick” actions and perceived as provocateurs by parts of society, as well as activities of certain groups acting on orders of the “third party” to ignite the situation (such as the spread of the “Russian spring” ideas in 2014 and later). The need to make a decision and the decision itself can radicalise the position of the faithful (both supporters of the single Local Church and their opponents) in different regions of Ukraine. Possible confrontation between the faithful in various regions will require clear definitions and positions from presidential candidates.

² Unfortunately, on 25 November 2018 an incident involving the Ukrainian Navy and Russian border guards took place near the Kerch Strait. As a result, the Ukrainian ships and sailors were captured, with some of them wounded. In response, on 27 November the Ukrainian government declared martial law in 10 oblasts of Ukraine for the duration of 30 days – Editor’s note.

³ Previously scheduled on 22 November 2018, the Unification Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church took place on 15 December – Editor’s note.

Combating corruption is another sensitive issue. This topic is “universal” for both pro-government actors and the opposition politicians. A hypothetical high-profile arrest of a top government official coupled with a broad media campaign, or an attempt to bring corrupt officials to justice can affect the electoral behaviour of many voters.

The course and trends of the election campaign suggest gradual intensification or even radicalisation of the assessments and rhetoric of the main presidential candidates, including criticism of their rivals. Given the peculiarities of the presidential race, the range of problems to be raised in the upcoming parliamentary elections looks futuristic.

– What are the main factors affecting the people’s choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of the 2019 elections?

What are the main factors affecting the people’s choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of 2019 elections?

The division of Ukraine into the “West” and the “East” will remain the primary dividing line in the presidential elections. However, contrary to rather popular, media-fuelled opinions about the country’s division into pro-Western and pro-Eastern Ukraine along the Dnipro river, the real demarcation allows for distinguishing between the “historical” regions (former parts of Kievan Rus, the Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian Empire), and the “new” regions (territories formed after the Russian Empire’s victory over the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire in late 17th century, and annexation of lands of the Zaporozhian Sich, the Crimean Khanate and parts of the Ottoman Empire).

The differences typical for these two macro-regions of Ukraine have directly evolved into socio-political division, which became particularly evident during the 2004 presidential race and subsequent parliamentary and presidential campaigns. The presidential campaign within the upcoming election cycle will feature the following confrontational issues: (1) the form of assessment and the level of protest against the performance of current government: it will be largely negative in the “new” regions, translating into their willingness to support alternative “agents capable of improving the situation”, with the Opposition Bloc likely winning high support; (2) creation of a single Local Church: the “new” regions will be less active/more neutral in the unification process, keep their affiliation with the UOC-MP and react negatively to the departure of faithful communities from the UOC-MP; (3) the “second state language” factor: it will likely play a minor role, although it can still be used in some contexts, given its sufficient mobilisation potential.

As for the parliamentary elections in October 2019, we can predict the growing mobilisation potential along the division between the “old” and “new” politicians and policies. This intensification is equally possible regardless of who becomes the President. ■



Vasyl YABLONSKY,
First Deputy Director of
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– What are the possible outcomes of choices made by the Ukrainians in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections? What is the likelihood of Ukraine changing its development vector following the elections?

Public opinion polls in the second half of 2018 show that a substantial share of Ukrainians (up to 30-35%) remain undecided who to vote for. These figures may give rise to uncertainty among the observers regarding future elections. However, regardless of political orientations and readiness to vote, most citizens stand for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration and restoration of sovereignty over the occupied Crimea and Donbas. Most Ukrainians also want anti-corruption policies to continue along with creation of prerequisites for economic growth and fair social policy.

In other words, Ukrainian society did not step back from its hopes and aspirations articulated during the Revolution of Dignity. Therefore, despite Russia’s attempts to meddle in our internal affairs and active use of populism by political forces and presidential candidates, one should not expect the country’s return to the past. On the other hand, it is too early to predict the government’s capacity to accelerate towards designated goals after the elections. At the end of the day, it will depend on the ability of political elites who climbed to power after the Revolution of Dignity to understand lessons learned four years ago.

– What topics and issues lie at the heart of the political struggle between the participants of the presidential and parliamentary elections? What are the main differences from the 2014 election campaign in this context?

Early presidential and parliamentary elections of 2014 were held at a time when most candidates – at least ostensibly – had shared commitment to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Important differences did exist, but these mostly concerned means rather than goals. Given the fact that

the government functioned as a “fire brigade”, the competition between political forces revolved around willingness to present themselves as the main defenders of the Revolution of Dignity. This has resulted in the first-ever formation of the constitutional majority by the parliamentary coalition. Unfortunately, this alliance did not last long due to misreading of the distance between the declared goals and reality, attempts to revive the practice of exchanging services and offices, and reluctance to accept responsibility for unpopular decisions.

Four years later, most political forces try to sell themselves as better alternatives to the incumbent President and the Cabinet. As a result, the President’s political course becomes the main target of information attacks, being the key topic for political debate. However, most of these critics, having worked in Parliament for four years, are now trying to diminish their role in the government’s collective mistakes and miscalculations and take credit for all the successes and victories.

For example, the economic situation in the country, specifically in terms of creating incentives for the growth in production and salaries, depends entirely on systemic decisions such as tax reform, land reform, privatisation, social security and pension system reform. The responsibility for slow progress of these areas should be equally shared by the executive (the Cabinet) and the legislative (the majority and the opposition in the Parliament) branches. Irrespective of the election results, all these key issues will remain in the agenda of the new President, Parliament and Cabinet. Other issues include the policy of resisting the Russian aggression, the liberation of occupied territories and the advancement towards the EU and NATO membership. Since these problems do not imply simple and easy solutions, most political forces will try to substitute meaningful discussions and the search for adequate responses with new promises and renewed criticism of the government. We hope that active civil society will eventually make the politicians stop playing their populist games, explain their true goals and intentions to the public, and also describe means of fulfilling their promises made in May and October 2019.

– What are the main factors affecting the people’s choice? How real is the risk of new rifts in society as a result of the 2019 elections?

Since the presidential race is mostly about the competition between individual politicians, a personal factor will play a crucial role. It is about the citizens’ readiness to support and trust a particular leader. People will assess the candidates’ words and actions through the prism of their own values and interests. And eventually, before casting a ballot, most citizens will try to answer the following questions: “Can this politician



do more for Ukraine (for people) as a President than other candidates?” “Is he (she) able to better protect Ukraine from Russia?” “Can this politician place the nation’s interests above his (her) own interests?”

The problem is that some citizens need affirmative answers to all of these questions, some are ready to support the “lesser evil”, and some may lack critical thinking, taking the candidates’ words for granted. As a result, there is growing risk that significant proportions of our fellow countrymen will make their choices based on the quantity and quality of the candidates’ presence in television or social media. However, in the present-day Ukraine it is impossible to lead the country or imitate such leadership with witty tweets, TV jokes or gloss. This detachment of candidates and political parties from real-life problems is the biggest threat of 2019 election campaigns. We can once again find ourselves in a situation when election promises curtail Ukraine’s cooperation with international financial institutions, discourage our Western partners from supporting Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression, and accelerate the capital outflow and “brain drain”.

On the other side of this threat is people’s apathy and disbelief in their ability to influence those in power through democratic elections. The growth of such public sentiments is one of major goals of Russia’s meddling in the Ukrainian elections of 2019. As one famous saying puts it, “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing”. And regretfully, there are enough candidates, whose words and deeds contribute to the spread of false idea of “dirty” nature of politics, adding to public indifference. Therefore, the main task of civil society is not only to keep a close eye on the government, but also to carefully educate citizens about the importance of their voting, as well as to teach them effective means of public control after the elections. If we can persuade the Ukrainians that they will gain more authority and opportunities after voting, we will be able to avoid many splits imposed from both the inside and the outside. ■

THE UKRAINIANS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT, STATE POLICY AND ELECTIONS: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Eight focus group discussions were held in June 2018 in the oblast and rayon centres across Ukraine, specifically in Dnipro, Kropyvnytskyi, Lviv and Mykolayiv, as well as in Zhydachiv (Lviv oblast), Novyi Buh (Mykolayiv oblast), Oleksandrivka (Kirovohrad oblast) and Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).

Each focus group brought together 9-10 participants (the total of 77). Focus group discussions involved the experts who directly work with people, understand public sentiments and influence public opinions in local communities – teachers and lecturers, health professionals, social workers, staff of cultural institutions, representatives of small and medium-sized businesses. All participants had higher education and relevant professional background; most of them were also involved in various public activities.

I. VISION OF IDEAL GOVERNMENT, EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA, PUBLIC DEMAND AND WAYS TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN RENEWED GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

What kind of government deserves people's confidence and support? In summary, ideal or effective government is something that we currently do not have in Ukraine. The first reaction to the question about such government was the rejection of its mere existence.



*"We don't believe in it" (Oleksandrivka);
"It doesn't exist" (Zhydachiv);
"It is something illusory" (Mykolayiv).*

These responses basically reject the presence of ideal government in Ukraine. As for the governments in other countries viewed as successful, the participants' answers can be interpreted similarly: *"Canadians and Germans have effective governments. If we skip the Western nations, then I would mention China and Singapore in the East" (Dnipro).*

In most cases, however, the focus group participants described the ideal government by contrasting it with current Ukrainian authorities.



"It is not about officials working for the sake of their own or someone else's business or money, but rather the government that works for an idea and serves the interests of people and the national development" (Lviv);

"It should work on behalf of the citizens instead of tycoons" (Novyi Buh);

"...government officials should work for us. But in reality, as soon as this person takes the office, you find yourself in the waiting line to see him, unsure whether he will listen to you. He talks down to you. And this concerns all government representatives,

from the President to the officials at all levels" (Novyi Buh).

"Good government should pass decisions for the good of people... rather than for its own benefit" (Pavlohrad);

"[Ideal government means] the absence of corruption" (Pavlohrad);

"Ideal government does not steal" (Zhydachiv);

"This is about the mayor who does not steal" (Lviv).

1. The participants provided rather general but quite clear characteristics of ideal (effective) government: **it should work for the benefit of people, listen to them and be aware of their needs.**



"...for the government to work for people, instead of people working for the government" (Novyi Buh);

"The government for people, not the opposite" (Mykolayiv);

"For me, ideal government means officials who are close to the people and understand their problems" (Dnipro);

"The government that hears its people" (Zhydachiv);

"The one that hears us, hears society, and complies with its requirements" (Novyi Buh);

"The government that cares for its people" (Oleksandrivka).

At the same time, the participants expressed doubts about the current Ukrainian government's ability to understand its people, as the gap between them is too deep – primarily in terms of living standards.



"With their wealth, the officials don't see our problems" (Oleksandrivka);

"How can this official with his hundred-thousand salary understand how I live on my ten thousand?" (Dnipro).

This is why the participants wanted the officials to live like most citizens do.



"... We will not have good education or healthcare or whatever until those in power receive education or medical treatment in our country... Or drive the same roads on the same cars" (Dnipro);

"As soon as they stay in our hospitals instead of receiving treatment abroad" (Mykolayiv);

"When our president takes a bicycle ride or walks to his office without bodyguards" (Oleksandrivka);

"Effective government? Well, what is our subsistence minimum? 3,700? Give it as a salary to the officials and make them use public transportation instead of motorcades... Or let's take the average pay – is it 6 or 7 thousand now? I think 10 thousand would be enough" (Dnipro);

"... for them to have salaries like we do" (Oleksandrivka);

"Maximum wage of an MP equals to two doctor's salaries, that's it!" (Mykolayiv).

By expressing these demands, the participants did not mean that **"the officials should be poor"**. Instead, they hoped that these measures would make the leadership seek better quality of life – for themselves and for other people too: *"For them to live like us – Should they be poor? – No. But if they step into our shoes, they would definitely want to raise the minimum wage" (Oleksandrivka).*

2. It is interesting to note that the participants' **demands "to work in the best interests of the people" often went hand in hand with calls for nationalisation** of national resources and/or strategic enterprises.



"To work for people? In means, for example, nationalising some natural resources, like amber..." (Lviv);

"First of all, we should return gas production, energy sector and other important industries to the state ownership to remove all those parasites. Yes, these should be nationalised!"; "All the natural resources should be owned by the state" (Kropyvnytskyi);

"Energy sector... power stations. I mean, if this industry is owned by the state, it will generate and bring money to the budget, helping to develop other industries. If these are privately-owned, there are no budget revenues and no chance to develop other industries... Apart from the energy sector, I would mention sea ports, heat and power stations, and so on. And land resources as well ..." (Lviv).

3. The cross-cutting analysis of the participants' responses revealed **people's irritation with blatant misuses by the government representatives** – from MPs to officials at all levels: *"All of a sudden, every MP has this awfully rich mother-in-law, a wife or an aunt..." (Mykolayiv).*

Another source of irritation is the officials' open impunity: *"Those guilty should be held liable, but in our country not a single one of them has ever been punished" (Dnipro).*

This is why the participants want the new government to punish its predecessors – "old" authorities, as well as the proxies of the new ruling elite – as one of the first steps in power.



"To punish the old [bureaucrats]" (Dnipro);


"To convict predecessors" (Lviv);

"To imprison two closest associates as the only incentive for them to start working" (Mykolayiv);

"To execute court decisions" (Zhydachiv).

At the same time, punishment is widely viewed as a factor for raising confidence in new government *"... they should regularly sentence different officials, and this will eventually bring order... This is how this government can win people's confidence" (Dnipro).*

This also defines one of the key markers of the government effectiveness – its commitment to the rule of law and equality of all before law.




"If the law applies to everyone, this should be enough"; "If the government demonstrates zero tolerance to violations of the law, if we see the government taking steps in this direction... this is the sign of a normal government and better future for us" (Dnipro);

"Effective government follows the rules and observes the law within clearly defined timeframes" (Dnipro);

"Common requirements for all as it is put in the Constitution – everybody is equal before the law. In this case the government will be effective. No one can avoid punishment if he violated the law" (Mykolayiv).

Equality before the law is a prerequisite for restoring confidence in government: *"When all officials are equal before the law", "Equality before the law is the primary condition" (Oleksandrivka).*

4. However, quality of life remains the main indicator of the government's effectiveness.



"Living standard. At least normal"; "When the quality of life improves" (Kropyvnytskyi);

"If people live better, it means the government is effective" (Mykolayiv);

"For people to live in prosperity" (Novyi Buh);

"When the government achieves an average income for at least 80% of the population... If it can do so by changing the system, it will be ideal government" (Oleksandrivka);

"Results. People's lives will improve"; "People will not leave Ukraine but come back from abroad and earn enough here" (Zhydachiv);

"We judge the government by the quality of life"; "The living standard is the main measure. We don't need all those monitoring things, studies, sociologists and the like, because the way how we live is the main criterion" (Oleksandrivka).

Of particular interest is the fact that **by discussing the quality of life, most participants mean earned income, salaries and wages**: *"We should not blame businesses – let them double their wealth, but what they need to do is to keep the living standard high... No one will pay you for nothing – I work for the private entrepreneur and I understand the situation... You have to earn your money. What I mean is that people have to have opportunities to earn enough" (Oleksandrivka).*

The discussion participants also mentioned **public safety**: *"...My effectiveness criterion is safety. I mean, walking down the streets and fearing nothing... Criminal situation always worsens with crisis. As soon as we have economic growth and stability, the crime shrinks" (Mykolayiv). In summary, ideal or effective government means "no depopulation, reduced crime and adequate salaries" (Oleksandrivka).*

5. Other demands and expected steps from the new government include:

- **Having a clear programme or plan of action and ensuring its consistent realisation; keeping the word and avoiding empty promises;**



"For the government to have some development strategy for a specific period" (Zhydachiv);

"As soon as they are elected, they have to meet people and listen to them. And also, to present some plans or development strategies" (Novyi Buh).

"The government promises to do something. Let it keep its word!" (Lviv);

"I wish they always fulfilled everything they promise. Instead, the entire population works for one person" (Novyi Buh);

"For their promises made on TV to fit in with the reality" (Kropyvnytskyi);

"If you are not sure whether you are able to do something, better keep your mouth shut" (Novyi Buh).

- **Introducing systemic reporting by the deputies; possibilities for their recalling;**




"I have an idea of how to influence them. The electoral law should include a provision on the right to recall a representative – if people see that he sits there passively and does nothing... The same should apply to local self-governments so that the locals or communities who elected this person were able to recall him. All deputies should be aware of this provision. Maybe, this will improve the situation... (Novyi Buh);

"They should present reports on a monthly or quarterly basis on what they have accomplished in line with their election programmes" (Dnipro);

"There should be some kind of quarterly reporting, instead of single 5-year reports"; "When the candidate runs for office, he announces his programme – I will do this, that and that... And if he fails to keep his promises – his election programme – we should be able to fire him"; "There should be a law on recalling representatives" (Lviv).

- **Competence.** While discussing different issues, the focus groups participants consistently emphasised the importance of the government to be professional, while people exercising power should be experts with relevant education and experience or involve narrow specialists in performing specific tasks;



"...The government should be competent. We don't need an uneducated prosecutor general or former X-ray technician as a minister of health"; "A person should have proper education and adequate experience. It is OK to have former doctor with a practical experience in health sector as a minister of health. The same is true for the minister of education. How can a person with no legal – let alone higher education – write laws?" (Lviv);

"They adopt laws that are technically and legally horrible. And they start amending them immediately. Look at the Tax Code – it has more corrections and revisions than the original text... The reason is the lack of professionals. I mean, they have to engage specialists instead of looking up to their preferences. We need professionals to do the job" (Novyi Buh).

- **Patriotism.** According to the participants, the government's patriotism has nothing to do with slogans or the language of communication. Instead, it is about confidence in one's own nation and hard work for its good;



"...The government should be patriotic and love its homeland. Many officials have mansions abroad, keep their money abroad, educate their children abroad. What patriotism are we talking about? They are just vampires who suck resources out of their own country and never re-invest in it... We should not blame businesses – let them double their wealth, but what they need to do is to keep the living standard high... What I mean is that people have to have opportunities to earn... We talk about villas, bank accounts, education and health services abroad – why not have them here? This is hardly patriotic"; "...what is the main reason? Those who keep their money in Switzerland, in Austria, in Australia, have no confidence in this country, they do not trust its laws, they are just scared..." (Oleksandrivka).

- For people to be effective in the government, the participants noted they should have **confidence in one's own capabilities, professional competence, and suitability for the mandate and tasks to be performed.**



“Do not run for office if you are unable to work. Do not occupy a position instead of someone who can do something” (Novyi Buh);

“How about this? A president assumes this government position and offers the programme with an obligation to fulfil it in 5 years. If he fails to implement 50-60% of the programme, he goes to jail for these same 5 years. I mean, you have to be a patriot to work there. Otherwise, what’s the point of seeking power?” (Oleksandrivka).

6. Judging from the participants’ statements, **most people realise that rapid improvements are hardly possible – even if there are politicians and political forces that are ready to work for the common good.** At the same time, the participants believe that it would be possible to see and understand the new government’s true intentions and abilities in one year. In other words, the new government has **to prove its trustworthiness within this term.**



“One year. It should be enough to verify the president” (Pavlohrad);

“One year maximum” (Dnipro);

“We should see everything in about a year” (Mykolayiv);

“Six months. I think we will see results in six months”; “We will see if they truly want to work in the people’s interests” (Novyi Buh);

“Six months are enough to demonstrate intentions” (Zhydachiv).

Interestingly, none of the focus group participants demanded immediate and profound changes from the new government within this short period. Instead, they emphasised the importance of **small steps made in the right direction, or minor changes that would slowly but consistently bring the country and all its citizens closer to a better future.**

It seems that this lack of hope for the future and overall stagnation with no changes for the better is the worst thing that may happen.



“I think if they undertake some small positive steps, make minor improvements but on a daily basis, this would make them an effective government. It’s terrible when everything stands still and you see no movement” (Dnipro);

“...at least some minor changes...” (Novyi Buh);

“If this new system fails within one year, then we have to go... I mean, it should support people, give them a little more – it is impossible to live on a pension of 1,500. I wish the government could reduce this negative environment in which people live, I wish people could afford a little more...” (Lviv);


“...It is hardly possible to make the difference in just six months. But if they fix some roads or make some improvements in educational or health sector, people will definitely notice that” (Oleksandrivka).

II. MODELS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CITIZENS

The debates around the proposed models can be viewed as a discussion on social-democratic and liberal approaches to political system, social policy and the overall ideology.

These models were directly discussed at 6 focus group meetings (excluding Kropyvnytskyi and Oleksandrivka). Voting in support of a particular model took place in 5 locations (excluding the Lviv oblast, where the process has been outtalked). Overall, 47 participants took part in voting; 38 of them supported the social-democratic model (high taxes and strong social policy).

1. More specifically, **most participants give preference to the social-democratic model, referring to the experience and practices of Scandinavian and North European democracies** – Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland (5 of 6 groups).



“I have been to Sweden and really liked how people lived there. True, they pay high taxes, but receive a lot from the government... We better pay taxes officially but expect something in return from the state. This will close the door to corruption and reinforce social support” (Mykolayiv);

“They have so-called socialism with human face” (Novyi Buh).

The participants expressed their readiness to pay high taxes, but to have guaranteed decent level of social security instead. Moreover, apart from health and educational services, pensions and social benefits, it should include other types of *common good* – road infrastructure, environment protection and the like (mentioned in other contexts).

It is noteworthy that the participants demonstrated adequate understanding of the fact that public funds are the taxpayers’ money and that taxes and the government’s social policy are interlinked, suggesting mutual responsibility of citizens and the state (government): *“We are the citizens. We are the ones who choose the government, which should be responsible to us. The state is us. Therefore, we are answerable to the state. How do we answer? We pay taxes. The state in turn is accountable to us. It is all about mutual responsibility” (Zhydachiv).*

At the same time, one or two participants in each group expressed rather liberal – if not libertarian – views (to cancel all social payments, including pensions – Kropyvnytskyi; to fully remove the state from all economic processes – Dnipro). As a rule, these were expressed by entrepreneurs – employers and self-employed citizens.



“...At this point we have to abolish pensions altogether as there are no sources left to cover them. They take money away from businesses saying that the companies are rich. But by doing so they reduce the country’s GDP” (Kropyvnytskyi).

"The smaller is the state within the state in Ukraine, the easier our lives will become. I mean the state regulations. The government should assume the role of one of the players. There should be two teams on the pitch, a team of referees and a team of fans. The government's involvement should diminish, allowing citizens to work as they like. And let the officials shoot each other" (Dnipro).

Other entrepreneurs and almost all employees favour social-democratic model, supporting reasonable presence of the state in the economy (as suggested by other contexts). In other words, they support rational state regulation of economic processes (including re-distribution) for the benefit of the entire society.

2. As for the practical introduction of social-democratic model in Ukraine, almost all participants were sceptical about it. *First*, high taxes can only be paid from corresponding (high) income, and the remaining after-tax amount should be sufficient for a taxpayer to meet his/her everyday needs, which is currently not the case in Ukraine.



"You cannot pay high taxes from nothing. They should raise social standard" (Zhydachiv);

"We have to have decent salaries" (Pavlohrad).

Second, the introduction of higher taxes is only possible with proper payment discipline: taxes are to be paid by each and every one, with severe punishment for tax evasion (the participants mentioned the exile to Siberia and even death penalty).



"Everyone has to pay taxes – those who earn 30 thousand, and those who make millions. If the head of Naftogaz earns a million, he has to pay part of this sum in taxes" (Zhydachiv);

"Open up all taxes! Open all businesses to finally make everyone pay their taxes!" (Novyi Buh).

The focus group participants also suggested introduction of the progressive taxation system for high and ultra-high income.

And *third*, the participants are not sure whether the current Ukrainian state (government) will be able (or willing) to control payment of taxes by *all*, and to use them for common good.



"...with these taxes, who can guarantee that they are not be used by the coterie or divided between them? I don't think our government... has control or has any idea of how to control it" (Pavlohrad);

"I wish we received everything that we pay, but we don't... Where do our budget money go?" (Dnipro).

III. ELECTIONS AND THE PARLIAMENT: ASSESSMENTS, ATTITUDES, PROPOSALS

1. Elections

Assessments. The participants' responses and statements reveal their controversial attitudes towards elections of representative bodies and local self-governments.

On the one hand, the focus group participants view the elections as a democratic and effective mechanism for changing power. They suggest holding them more frequently to strengthen the government's accountability, to increase responsibility and to look for "new faces" – young professionals who are (or were) not the part of the "system": *"We should replace the deputies and the government every two years" (Lviv);*

On the other hand, the participants are quite unhappy about the procedure and outcomes of the elections in their current form. Moreover, these complaints concern both candidates or political forces seeking power and voters themselves – their passivity, irresponsibility, low political and legal literacy and readiness to "sell" voices. In general, the participants mentioned the following shortcomings of the election process in Ukraine.

- **The impact of big capital and oligarchs on the elections (and on the government as a whole).**

High cost of campaigns was identified as one of the reasons for large businesses' involvement in electoral processes and their outcomes. Only very rich people, tycoons and/or business groups can afford election campaigns, thus bringing their proxies or agents to power. Meanwhile, this high campaign cost limits the ability of decent but poorer people to enter representative bodies;



"Our Verkhovna Rada is a big problem as it hosts many oligarchs and millionaires that run our country" (Dnipro);

"100-percent links between politics and business" (Oleksandrivka);

"...I think that decent government should have nothing to do with oligarchs. The problem is with the system: in order to come to power, one has to pay an immense amount of money" (Pavlohrad);

"How can we choose honest government in the situation, where a person has to pledge millions to become a candidate? – No matter how smart you are, you cannot get there without money" (Oleksandrivka).

- **Vote buying practices.** The focus group participants blame both the candidates / political forces participating in the elections and the voters themselves. Vote buying involves direct payments – money or goods ("votes for buckwheat") provided to voters, and indirect bribery – construction of roads, hospitals or schools, as well as local repairs and improvements, "courtesy of a specific candidate";



"They come over and distribute financial assistance to the elderly. At the expense of the budget, of course" (Dnipro);

“...We see how flawed our current electoral system is... People are wary of possible bribes. I think it is one of the worst systems ever” (Novyi Buh);


“I have noticed how this distribution of buckwheat from candidates always attracts many people” (Kropyvnytskyi).

Reasons for people agreeing to sell their votes include inadequate level of civic consciousness (“You should vote for the one who truly deserves it, rather than for a kilo of buckwheat and 200 hryvnias. People should be more responsible”, Oleksandrivka), and some carelessness in assessing the candidates’ actions (“This deputy came over and installed a sliding board for kids. Then he went to another village and did the same. And people start saying ‘Oh, what a great person he is!’”, Oleksandrivka).

Another reason is poverty that forces people – especially pensioners – to sell their votes. “...One of key problems is low quality of life. You cannot bribe a person who has plenty of food with a package of buckwheat. With proper quality of life no one will ever need a subsidy” (Dnipro).

The latter generates a number of rather exotic proposals, such as keeping pensioners away from ballot boxes:¹ “I have this proposal to disallow pensioners to vote altogether. I mean, many voters in Ukraine are old people who sell their voices in exchange for buckwheat” (Dnipro).

- **Parliamentary elections based on closed party lists.** The participants were almost anonymous in rejecting this type of electoral system, referring to two factors: *first*, most voters know nothing about the majority of candidates included in the lists, and *second*, the system allows the party leadership (or its sponsors) to bring loyal persons to power who will obviously act for their benefit;



“Who do we see in those lists? We don’t know most of those people”; “The lists hide persons that do not deserve to be in the Parliament” (Pavlohrad);

“Who nominated Parasiuk or Mosiychuk? Who actually voted for them?”; “Most of these people could sneak in the Parliament via party lists” (Kropyvnytskyi);

“...we vote for the party, but we don’t know much about those included in its list”; “Of course, we elect them... But we don’t know who they are” (Zhydachiv);

“If they are included in the party list, we have no idea who eventually gets a seat in the Verkhovna Rada” (Novyi Buh).

- **Non-transparent vote counting.** Judging from comments of the focus group participants (some of them served in district electoral commissions

during the previous parliamentary elections), the vote counting on the spot is rather honest, but they are bewildered by things that may happen to ballot bulletins on their way to Kyiv, and by oddly long counting of the national results. These and some other factors may fuel people’s distrust towards elections and their reluctance to vote.



“Here I trust people who perform vote counting... I cannot explain what happens next. Why they collect bags with these papers in Kyiv? Exit polls work effectively [in Europe] – they announce the election results in about 30 minutes after the closure of ballot stations. And in Ukraine we give them 30 calendar days to count things that we have counted here in just 2-3 hours. Maybe, to show these false results?” (Novyi Buh);

“When we start counting, they switch the lights out”; “This is why people avoid elections” (Novyi Buh).


In summary, these shortcomings contribute to mounting doubts about the elections as a mechanism for changing power and improving people’s lives. Specifically, people do not believe in their fairness, openness and transparency, in the possibility of nominating honest and decent, but poor candidates. All this leads to dwindling voter turnout, reduced voter activity and possibly to selling of votes.



“...I have never voted. In principle. I don’t see any sense in the elections” (Oleksandrivka); “About half of citizens ignore elections... Well, they just act irresponsibly” – “This is because they don’t believe in the outcome and in their ability to make the difference” (Novyi Buh).

Proposals. Keeping in mind the above weaknesses and deficiencies of the electoral system, the focus group participants suggested the following to improve the elections.

- **Elaboration of the Election Code: introduction of permanent rules, regulations and procedures for the elections at all levels.**



“I think we should start from updating our election law. We need the Election Code to finally determine the system, so it works flawlessly without adjustments tailored for every specific election” (Dnipro);

“First of all, we need to change our election laws”; “To pass a new law on elections” (Novyi Buh).

- **Electoral system: a party system for parliamentary elections; a majoritarian system for local elections.** As for the electoral system, the participants did not reach consensus. Some of them called for removal of the party-based approach,

¹ An electoral slogan of this type – “Hide your grandma’s passport!” – first appeared in Poland and later gained popularity in Ukraine.

while keeping the majoritarian voting system – the latter allows the voters to get to know all candidates and to be more responsible and sound in their decisions.



“We should get rid of all party quotas, lists and other stuff. We have the majoritarian system, where you know a man personally, you trust him and see the results of his efforts” (Mykolayiv);

“We must remove party lists and keep the majoritarian candidates. We know the person and therefore we vote for him” (Pavlohrad);

“The Verkhovna Rada is the main law-making body... but people who sometimes get seats are questionable... This electoral system is utterly inefficient. We need to reinstate the majoritarian system, so we know the candidates personally...” (Novyi Buh).

However, the idea of conducting parliamentary elections based on the party system – only with open lists – is somewhat more popular, as this approach also allows voters to make conscious choice. At the same time, the majoritarian system perfectly suits the local elections.



“I think we should remove the majoritarian system from parliamentary elections and keep parties. The parties, however, should open their lists for us to see who we vote for. These lists should be in every region, and people could climb up to the Verkhovna Rada. The one who earns more trust should be elected” (Dnipro);

“We should use the proportional representation with open party lists. Today we vote for parties but have no idea who is in the list. Therefore, the party lists must be open” (Zhydachiv);

“No, I don’t support the majoritarian system. I’d rather see party-based system with open lists”; “The lists should include people who we know in the regions” (Novyi Buh).

At the same time, it is necessary to curb corruption, including nepotism in parties and in the government in general: *“We have to halt nepotism. Relatives should not work together; it is totally unacceptable when a father is a leader of some party, and his son is the second in the list”* (Kropyvnytskyi). Corruption is the only issue, where the focus group participants unanimously suggested the most severe, and inevitable, punishment for those found guilty in corrupt acts.

2. The Parliament

Assessments. The focus group participants were very critical of the Verkhovna Rada’s current convocation. They often complained about the law-making efforts, which instead of protecting public interest and common good generally serve the deputies’ interests, while their laws harm people rather than harmonise public life.



“When I look at what they are doing, I have a feeling that everything is against us” – “They do everything out of spite” (Kropyvnytskyi);

“They make our lives even more difficult” (Oleksandrivka);

“MPs draft laws for themselves, not for people” (Zhydachiv).

The participants have little doubt that most MPs not only own businesses but have many sources of unlawful enrichment; many of them are involved in corruption and do not bother making up credible explanation for their wealth: *“All of a sudden, every MP has this awfully rich mother-in-law, a wife or an aunt...”* (Mykolayiv); *“All MPs are ‘lottery winners’ – how many times did Lyashko win? Every deputy can easily repeat the same story”* (Pavlohrad).

The participants are also seriously annoyed by the parliamentarians’ poor professional discipline – excessive breaks between plenary sessions, numerous episodes of MPs missing sessions without being penalised, violations of the rules of procedure during the voting, to name a few.



“We have 450 MPs, and many of them don’t show up for work” (Mykolayiv);

“When I am absent from work for 3 or more hours, I will be fired under Article 40, while MPs may skip three months!” – “...and are never held accountable” (Oleksandrivka).

But the main thing is that MPs are not only uninterested and uninvolved in ordinary people’s problems – they simply do not understand them, seemingly living in some parallel reality.



“Why don’t they care? Because they make a lot of money and do whatever they deem appropriate, plus corruption. These people simply don’t care as they live in some different space” (Pavlohrad);

“Do you know how our deputies work? They ask people to tighten their belts and to work even harder. As a result, people work, and MPs earn” (Zhydachiv).

The focus group participants have expressed firm belief that the said flaws of the Parliament (and the government in general) became persistent and self-contained, turning Ukraine’s highest representative and legislative body into a “fossilised” corrupt system that works for itself, serving its own interests and those of oligarchs. As one participant put it, this system *“...was created by President Kuchma, while others have further developed and modernised it... A system of nominations, a system of electing deputies, a system of corrupt prosecutors and judges...”* (Oleksandrivka). Currently this system encompasses all government institutions, where everyone covers each other’s back: *“The President and the Verkhovna Rada alike turn a blind eye to each other and continue doing their business...”* (Pavlohrad).

Moreover, this system penetrated the entire society, making true renovation of the government extremely difficult, while it is highly unlikely that “new faces” – honest and determined MPs – will be able to make a difference.



“We face the system, and one person cannot bring it down. We all live in this system” (Mykolayiv);

“This system absorbed all people and made us its elements” (Oleksandrivka);

“Whoever comes... will eventually become corrupt. I had some friends – they were just normal people until they became deputies...” (Pavlohrad);

“Today it doesn’t matter who takes the office. Sooner or later he will become one of them” (Oleksandrivka);

“Society has rotten to its core... After humble Havryliuk received his seat in the Verkhovna Rada, he became just like them – he already bought a car and everything...” – “What could he possibly do there?” – “Well, he is earning money just like other MPs” (Kropyvnytskyi).

Proposals. The participants of all focus groups have unanimously supported the proposals to reduce the number of people’s deputies, to cut their salaries and to abolish the parliamentary immunity. The latter is particularly important, as addressing this issue was identified as one of the preferred first actions of the new government.

- **Abolishing the parliamentary immunity.** People’s persistent demands in this regard suggest that they are extremely irritated by the MPs’ impunity, even despite multiple examples of their questionable – in terms of law – enrichment.



“First of all, I would reduce the number of MPs to 150. This would allow attracting true professionals with a good knowledge of laws, who would do something useful.

Because these deputies from Maidan – they are just ordinary people! What can they possibly decide in the Parliament? ; “To abolish the parliamentary immunity” (Lviv);

“To reduce the number of people’s deputies” – “At all levels!” – “And to abolish immunity, of course” (Mykolayiv);

“Let us reduce their number by 10 times!” (Kropyvnytskyi);

“To cancel parliamentary immunity and to reduce the number of MPs” – “To reduce the Parliament’s budget and expenditure” (Pavlohrad);

“We don’t need 450 MPs – they don’t work anyway and have vacations all year long” – “It would be better to use allowances for those 450 individuals on health care, education and social protection” (Oleksandrivka);

“The deputy corps needs to be reduced” – “And so are their salaries – to the minimum wage” – “Abolishing the parliamentary immunity is also critical” (Zhydachiv);

“...The first law to be adopted should deal with abolition of the parliamentary immunity. You know what kind of people seek seats in the Parliament – they are protected by all possible laws. If they are deprived of their immunity and become liable for their deeds, then our government will be totally different” (Novyi Buh);

“We must also include recalling of deputies along with mandatory MP reports” – “The impeachment law is also necessary” (Novyi Buh).

Only one participant expressed doubts about the expediency of complete abolition of the parliamentary immunity, as this would increase MPs’ vulnerability to possible insults by the opponents or ill-wishers.



“Deputy immunity? I am, so to say, both for and against it. If we abolish it, this person will become vulnerable. It can be framed at any moment” (Lviv);

“Is partial abolition possible?” (Lviv).

However, this opinion received neither further discussion nor support from the remaining focus group participants.

- **Reducing the number of the Verkhovna Rada deputies.** The participants offered various ideas about the proper size of the deputy corps, such as electing one or two MPs from each oblast or reviving the practice of MPs not working in the Parliament on a permanent basis but getting together only to adopt various legislative acts elaborated by the specialists: *“I think we don’t need the Verkhovna Rada at all. Instead we should hire highly skilled lawyers to draft laws. MPs’ task is to come together once in a while, vote and go home” (Oleksandrivka).*

Nonetheless, most participants agree that 150 parliamentarians would be absolutely sufficient for Ukraine. These MPs, however, must be very energetic, motivated and proactive, and have adequate education and experience for developing and adopting quality legislation: *“Just 150 people – but very active – and truly hard-working” (Lviv).*

- **Cutting the MPs’ salaries.** While discussing the appropriate level of remuneration for people’s deputies, the participants took the minimum or average pay as a basis or compared the deputy’s salary with that of a doctor (probably bearing in mind the idea of a qualified and responsible job). The demand to establish MPs’ salaries at this level was often explained by the fact that high salaries (and income) usually separate the deputies from reality and they stop seeing the needs of ordinary citizens. The lack of discipline and frequent absence from sessions suggested the introduction of an hourly rate.



"Maximum wage of an MP should be equal to two doctor's salaries, that's it! Not fifty-seven, but two – eat whatever you want and try not to fall ill" (Mykolayiv);

"Should the MPs' salary be ten or twenty times higher than that of a surgeon who performs operations day and night? Let alone the fact that MPs are often absent from work" (Oleksandrivka);

"...Today the average pay in Ukraine is 8.5 thousand. So, every parliamentarian should live on this money. But in reality, they easily spend hundred thousand every month and have no idea about how to live on 8.5 thousand" (Kropyvnytskyi);

"We should give them the average salary and see how they fare" (Pavlohrad);

"I would have reduced their salaries to the subsistence minimum and saw how they could survive... Or should we introduce some kind of hourly rate for them?" (Lviv).

- **Introducing the recall mechanism.** The focus group participants were very interested in providing the voters with the possibility to recall the elected officials. According to most participants, this recalling mechanism is in fact the only means of public control over the parliamentarians' activities; they believe that its introduction will force the deputies to be more responsible, to present systematic reports to voters and generally speaking – to work harder on the implementation of their election pledges.



"There should be a law on recalling people's representatives. If you fail – please step down" (Lviv);

"There should be the MP recall procedure" (Mykolayiv).

During the discussions it became evident that **the participants do not accept the so-called "political responsibility" of the parliamentarians, which may (or may not) occur once in five years, and more importantly, does not imply any sanctions for failure to fulfil the election promises, or for violation of moral and ethical norms, let alone the law.** This is why the participants demanded "consequences with personal losses" (Dnipro) for elected officials, including the President. Other – somewhat softer – ways to influence MPs included restriction of cadence to just one term in office with temporary ban for the next run.



"I would initiate this important project: The President or the MP takes the office with some election programme and pledges. In about a year he or she has to present a progress report. If this official is able to keep promises, then welcome back to the office and keep on working. If he or she fails, this means retirement!... and consequences with personal losses" (Dnipro);

"...To amend the election law to allow a person elected as a deputy to the Verkhovna Rada or some local council to work in this position for only 5 years, and that's it! And this person becomes eligible to run for office once again, say, in 10 years" (Novyi Buh).

- **Isolating oligarchs from the government; separating business from politics; renewing the government.** As noted above, the participants frequently pointed at the inextricable link between the Ukrainian authorities and business, as well as the government's dependence on big capital. As a result, the government often serves the interests of tycoons rather than society. It is worthy to note, however, that despite sheer displeasure with oligarchs, not a single participant has ever uttered a word about taking away their fortunes ("seize and divide"). Instead, the discussion focused on two issues: how to persuade them to invest in their own country, and how to isolate them from the power.



"What should we do with oligarchs? – Well, let them live – We should keep them separated from the government and ask them to mind their own business" (Dnipro);

"The government should be the patriot of its nation, rather than business, wealth and interests" (Oleksandrivka).

One possible solution is to prevent both oligarchs and "old" politicians (most of whom are the oligarchs' proxies and agents) from running for offices: *"I think we have to dissolve the entire Verkhovna Rada and prevent any involvement of oligarchs in the elections. Then we have to hold new elections and keep old politicians away" (Dnipro).*

However, when asked about how to achieve this in practice and whether this approach would be effective, the focus group participants could not find meaningful answers. Instead, their considerations about searching for the ways to bring the "new youth" or "new faces" to power stumbled across pessimistic remarks about the high cost of election campaigns and invincibility of the system, which is able to not only adapt new people to old practices, but also to formally produce new projects with old content. One dialogue was quite illustrative in this context. A participant pointed at the familiar situation, when any hopes for change associated with the elections shortly give way to disappointment: *"In the elections we support some new face. But very soon we become unhappy with who we elected and start talking about new people yet again".* And the other participant answered: *"The problem is that new faces are just the projects of old faces" (Kropyvnytskyi).*

The summary of statements by the focus group participants suggests that despite rather high levels of scepticism and disappointment, most of them still view the elections as a democratic tool for power change and hope for the rise of decent, honest people, who are "numerous in Ukraine" (Novyi Buh). They are ready to help the government to get rid of its current flaws and shortcomings: *"...We have to go out and say: we've had enough! We need changes, because there is no other way. We have to make politicians stay away from business. It will be very difficult, but what they do is just not right. We have to separate business from power. There are many other problems, but we have to do something, as it becomes unbearable to live like this anymore" (Oleksandrivka).*

POLITICAL PARTIES OF UKRAINE, IDEOLOGIES AND POLICIES: THE EXPERT SURVEY

The programmatic and ideological component of the Ukrainian parties' activities has always been difficult to explore for many reasons, as repeatedly emphasised in the Razumkov Centre's studies.¹ At the same time, the study of the parties' "political supply" becomes particularly relevant on the eve of the elections, as it allows assessing both the content of the future political course and its chances to be endorsed by voters. The main challenge for many participants of the 2019 elections in Ukraine is to find a balance between the needs of the nation's development and the demands of the electorate – a balance between "wishful" and "doable".

The expert survey was designed to assess the potential positions of the leading political parties in Ukraine² regarding policy alternatives in various spheres, identify their ideological positioning and determine the degree of relevance of various political issues for these parties. The assessment of the parties' political positions was based on the same questions that were used during the national public opinion survey.

First, it made it possible to gain a holistic view of the leading parties' positions regarding policy alternatives in various spheres, and second, to compare these positions (based on expert assessments) with related preferences of citizens, including potential supporters of these parties. Such a comparison may result in the verification of compliance of the parties' positions with the electorate's expectations.³

The Servant of the People party is considered separately from other parties due to its purely formal existence and the lack of any current political activity. It can be assumed that this party's characteristics were shaped under the influence of public (creative) activities of its leader – Volodymyr Zelenskyi and are largely viewed as "expectations".

The survey was conducted from 25 October to 20 November 2018 with participation of academics and experts from the state and non-state research institutions, think tanks, NGOs and universities. Relevant questionnaires were distributed among 223 experts from 78 institutions and organisations; 92 of them returned filled questionnaires (see the list).

Below is the summary of the survey results and the distribution of expert responses in tables and figures.

IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The experts put four parties in the "political centre" of the 10-point "left-right" scale – the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Fatherland), the Servant of the People, the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko and the Civil Position (4-6 points). Closer to the left (3-4 points) are the For Life party and the Opposition Bloc, while the "Samopomich" Union (Self-Reliance), the People's Front and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (6-7 points) lean to the right. The most right-wing party is the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (Freedom) (7.62 points).

In terms of ideological and political orientations, suggested in the survey, two of the most easily identifiable parties were "Svoboda" as the national radical party

(75% of the experts), and the Opposition Bloc as the party pursuing ideas of Ukraine's reunification with Russia (56%).

Relative majority of the respondents (39%) categorised the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (hereinafter the Radical Party) as another national radical party; the same share of experts labelled the For Life party as the one supporting the course of reunification with Russia.

Quite a few experts included other parties in different orientation categories. Specifically, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (BPP), the Civil Position, the People's Front, and "Samopomich" were identified as parties of liberal and national-democratic course; "Batkivshchyna" was equally marked as the liberal and social-democratic party.

¹ See, for example, Transformation of the Party System: The Ukrainian Experience in the European Context (edited by Yu. Yakymenko), Kyiv: the Razumkov Centre, 2017, p.106-109.

² The assessment included parties that have factions in the Verkhovna Rada of the 8th convocation, as well as the parties that according to recent sociological surveys have good chances to overcome the electoral threshold in the upcoming elections.

³ It is clear that these assessments are largely approximate and preliminary, as greater reliability requires the official positions (statements) of parties on relevant issues; moreover, these positions may change in the course of the campaign.

Most experts found it difficult to determine the ideological qualification of the Servant of the People party, while 10% of those polled identified it as a party of liberal ideology.

REFERRING PARTIES TO POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The experts were asked to determine, which of the following policy alternatives in different spheres would each party support, or to assert the party's uncertainty or the absence of a clear stance on this or that issue.⁴

In terms of Ukraine's geopolitical choice (joining the inter-state alliances, the NATO membership, attitudes towards Russia, the ways of resolving the conflict in Donbas, the cost of peace, possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions, funding of the Armed Forces), most experts have placed parties into two opposite camps – the Opposition Bloc and the For Life on the one side, and the remaining political parties on the other.

Speaking of the Radical Party, most experts recognised the absence/uncertainty of its position regarding the EU and NATO membership. As for the "Batkivshchyna" attitudes towards Russia, almost equal shares of the respondents noted both alternatives.

There is no clear division between parties on most domestic policy issues. Many experts believe that most parties are likely to support de-centralisation. As for the political structure, control over law enforcement agencies, human rights and political stability, one can observe differences not only between the pro-government forces and the opposition, but within the opposition itself (e.g. different approaches of the Civil Position and "Batkivshchyna" to strengthening parliamentarism or presidential power). Moreover, BPP, "Svoboda", the People's Front and the Opposition Bloc alike are generally viewed as parties supporting more authoritarian, "strong hand" approach.

Interestingly, the parties' division on economic policy issues is inconsistent with their geopolitical orientation. For example, the majority of experts (absolute or relative) identify BPP, the People's Front, the Civil Position and "Samopomich" as the parties supporting privatisation, whereas the Opposition Bloc, the Radical Party and "Svoboda" are seen as backers of stronger public sector of economy. While assessing "Batkivshchyna" in this regard, the expert opinions halved.

The absolute or relative majority of experts view "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", For Life, the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party as supporters of the state's active role in managing economic processes, while the parliamentary coalition parties, as well as the Civil Position and "Samopomich" are seen as forces favouring de-regulation and market mechanisms.

Almost identical division exists in relation to the sale of agricultural land, where the group of likely supporters includes the People's Front, BPP and "Samopomich", while the Radical Party, "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", the Opposition Bloc and For Life reject this idea. Most experts characterise the Civil Position as "uncertain"

in this regard. The same division applies to the issue of supporting national manufacturers vs promoting free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market.

The experts believe that only two political forces – BPP and the People's Front – will unconditionally support implementation of recommendations by Ukraine's international partners and donors, whereas all other parties are more likely to prioritize public needs and moods inside the country.

According to experts, "Samopomich", BPP, the People's Front and the Civil Position would rather support Ukraine's accelerated growth based on new industries, whereas the Opposition Bloc, For Life and the Radical Party are likely to rely on traditional sectors, including agriculture.

Most experts believe that "Batkivshchyna", For Life, the Opposition Bloc and the Radical Party would seek increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation, while BPP and the People's Front are more likely to support macroeconomic stability even at the cost of "freezing" of wages and pensions.

As for the social policy issues, most experts generally view the Radical Party, "Batkivshchyna", "Svoboda", the Opposition Bloc, and For Life as forces prioritizing protection of low-income citizens, while BPP, the People's Front and "Samopomich" are generally perceived as defenders of interests of the "middle class".

The absolute or relative majority of experts think that all Ukrainian parties – with the exception of BPP and the People's Front – would rather protect interests of employees before employers.

Similarly, almost all parties – excluding BPP, the People's Front and "Samopomich" – would support the state's active role in re-distributing public goods and narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor. Also, all parties (excluding the Opposition Bloc) would welcome the introduction of progressive taxation.

Judging from the expert opinions, "Batkivshchyna", the Radical Party, the Opposition Bloc and For Life are most likely to address social issues by fighting poverty via increasing social assistance (rather than the price of labour), by reducing utility tariffs through budget subventions to service providers (rather than targeted subsidies for users), by introducing totally free health care (rather than its reformed version), and by increasing social expenditure even at the expense of tax hikes.

The People's Front, BPP and "Samopomich" are viewed as supporters of alternative, more liberal approach, with the Civil Position joining this group as regards remuneration of labour and health sector reform.

Speaking of pensions, the absolute or relative majority of experts believe that all Ukrainian parties (again, with the exception of BPP, the People's Front

⁴ The Servant of the People is analysed separately.

and “Samopomich”) hold that the state must guarantee a decent living standard for working citizens and pensioners.

Having summarised the responses to these and other questions in the economic and social blocks, it becomes clear that experts generally recognise more liberal (right) orientation of BPP, the People’s Front, “Samopomich” and sometimes the Civic Position, while the Radical Party, “Batkivshchyna”, “Svoboda”, the Opposition Bloc and For Life are viewed as

supporters of more left-wing approach, which implies active involvement of the state in economic processes, its key role in ensuring social security and significant social expenditure.


At the same time, the division of political parties in terms of economic and social policy issues is not consistent with their “geopolitical” positioning, as many parties holding opposite views on Ukraine’s geopolitical course find themselves on the same side of socio-economic division.

COMPARISON OF PARTY POSITIONS CONCERNING SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY AND THEIR TYPOLOGY BASED ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE

Results of the expert survey make it possible to classify Ukraine’s political parties by their belonging to the left or right sides of the political spectrum based on their socio-economic positions. For convenience, we counted cases where absolute majority of experts noted the party’s left- or right-wing position within each of 20 suggested alternatives. Each “left” position was calculated as “-1”, each right position as “+1”, and

the absence of clear position as “0”. Based on this left-right criterion, the parties were arranged as follows: the Opposition Bloc (-14), Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (-13), “Batkivshchyna” (-10), For Life (-9), “Svoboda” (-2), Servant of the People (0), Civil Position (0), “Samopomich” Union (+2), Petro Poroshenko Bloc (+4) and the People’s Front (+4).

The left-right division of political parties based on their positions on socio-economic issues (the expert survey data)




Therefore, four clearly leftist parties, one left-of-centre, two conditionally centrist and two right-of-centre parties may enter the Ukrainian parliament. In the course of the expert interviews it was impossible to identify clear positioning of the two centrist parties – Servant of the People and Civil Position – in all 20 suggested economic and social dilemmas. Four other parties were not much different from them in this regard, as “Svoboda” had only 2 defined positions (both left); “Samopomich” Union also had 2 defined positions (both right). The Petro Poroshenko Bloc and

the People’s Front each had 4 defined positions (all right).

Also, the experts were asked to locate the parties in the left-right political spectrum. The results appeared to be quite similar to the above, however, with noticeable shift of most parties to the right. According to expert assessments, For Life and the Opposition Bloc were evident left-wing parties, while “Batkivshchyna”, the Radical Party, and Civil Position moved markedly to the right. The only dramatic change occurred with “Svoboda” as experts located it in the rightmost end of the political spectrum.

**Traditionally they distinguish between the “left” and “right” political parties.
Where would you locate the following political forces in this spectrum?**
Average score*



* A scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means “left”, and “10” denotes “right”.

The expert interviews suggest that the right orientation in the Ukrainian political discourse is primarily associated with patriotism and nationalism, rather than with market-based approaches in the economy and limited government regulation.

The reasons for that lie in typical post-Soviet division between “communists” and “nationalists”, and unpopularity of right-wing approaches to socio-economic issues, which explains the dominance of cultural and geopolitical issues in the “right” political agenda.

The division of Ukrainian parties in terms of humanitarian policy, specifically the status of the state language and the language policy, follows the same pattern as the division based on geopolitical positioning.

Most experts view BPP, “Svoboda”, the People’s Front, “Samopomich” and the Civil Position as parties supporting Ukrainian as the only state language and seeking the state protection and support for this language. Instead, the Opposition Bloc and For Life are perceived as supporters of formal bilingualism and the state’s equal treatment of all languages. Similar division is typical for the question of continuing or discontinuing decommunization.

Speaking of the parties’ attitudes towards educational reforms, the experts clearly separated BPP, the People’s Front and “Samopomich” (support of reforms) from the Opposition Bloc and For Life (preservation of previous system). As for “Batkivshchyna”, the Civil Position and the Radical Party, most experts pointed at these parties’ uncertainty or the absence of clear positions.

The division of parties on the “libertarian-authoritarian” scale (GAL-TAN) has some peculiarities. The absolute or relative majority of experts identified all Ukrainian parties as “defenders” of traditional social values, such as the family and

marriage. This also applies to the government’s tough drug control policy.

As regards parties’ attitudes towards re-introduction of death penalty for the gravest crimes, hard-line approach to combating crime even if this requires violations of civil rights, and perception of the growing number of immigrants as the cause of crime, the experts frequently mention “Svoboda” and the Radical Party as supporters of more authoritarian approach.

While discussing the national minorities and immigrants (maximum rapprochement with the Ukrainian culture vs cultural distinctness), most experts emphasised the polarity of views of “Svoboda” on the one side, and the Opposition Bloc and For Life – on the other. Also, the absolute or relative majority of experts described the position of BPP, “Batkivshchyna”, “Svoboda”, the Civil Position and “Samopomich” as upholding the current level of rights of national minorities, whereas the Opposition Bloc and For Life are likely to seek expansion of these rights.

Within the “rural” (traditional lifestyles and values) and “urban” (urbanisation, new globalisation values) alternative, most experts identified “Svoboda” and the Radical Party as more traditionalist parties, and labelled BPP, For Life, the People’s Front, the Opposition Bloc and “Samopomich” as more liberal ones.

Instead, the priority of the national identity vs cosmopolitanism allowed experts to distinguish between more nationalistic “Svoboda”, BPP, the Radical Party and “Samopomich”, and more “cosmopolitan” Opposition Bloc and For Life parties.

And considering possible restriction of certain civil rights and freedoms against the backdrop of external aggression, the absolute or relative majority of experts viewed “Svoboda”, BPP, the People’s Front and the Radical Party as supporters of more authoritarian approach, while the Opposition Bloc, For Life and “Samopomich” – as more liberal parties.

Therefore, there is no clear division of parties based on the “libertarian-authoritarian” scale. It tends to change depending on specific issues addressed in specific policy proposals.

One and the same party may be associated with more liberal viewpoint on one issue and be more authoritarian or conservative on the other. The experts are slightly more certain about “Svoboda” and the Radical Party – these are mentioned in the authoritarian and conservative context more frequently than other parties.

At the same time, in many “marker” issues on the GAL-TAN scale (e.g. “traditional values” or legalisation of recreational drugs), all Ukrainian parties are viewed by experts as holding “traditionalist” or conservative positions.

As regards the “Servant of the People” party, most experts have picked “uncertain or absent position” option on almost all issues. The experts who were still able to somehow identify the party’s place, generally positioned it as:

- rather pro-Western and anti-Russian in terms of geopolitical orientations and attitudes towards the conflict in the East;
- more disposed to de-centralisation, parliamentarism and accountability of law enforcement agencies in domestic politics;
- rather market-oriented and liberal in economic policy matters;
- more socially oriented in social policy matters, rather reformative in terms of health and educational sector reforms;
- combining support for Ukrainian as a single state language and continued decommunization, along with the state’s equal treatment of all languages;
- more liberal in relation to human rights, equality of churches, the rights of national minorities, urbanization and cosmopolitanism;
- more conservative in relation to the traditional social values and lifestyles.

THE PRESENCE OF POLITICAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC RHETORIC⁵

According to experts, **the topic of Ukraine joining the inter-state alliances/unions** (EU, NATO) is the most popular with BPP and the People’s Front (8-10 points), and somewhat less with the Civil Position, “Batkivshchyna” and “Samopomich” (6-8 points).

The issue of **counteraction or reconciliation with Russia** is rather loud in public rhetoric of all parties, with all scores ranging from 6 to 9 points. BPP and “Svoboda” have the highest scores (8.26 and 8.05 respectively), while For Life, the People’s Front and the Opposition Bloc scored 7-8 points.

According to experts, the topic of **reintegration or isolation of occupied territories** is mostly present in the BPP, the People’s Front and the Opposition Bloc statements (7.73, 7.16 and 7.16 respectively). Other parties have scored 6 to 7 points.

Constitutional changes regarding the structure of the Ukrainian state is hardly a priority for political parties, as most of them scored 5 to 6 points. The only exception is “Batkivshchyna”, where the presence of the Constitution-related issues collected 7.03 points.

Raising social standards and social protection of the population are in the limelight of public rhetoric of all parties, with its intensity ranging from 6 to 8 points in the statements of the Civil Position, the People’s Front, “Svoboda”, “Samopomich” and BPP. Leaders in social rhetoric are “Batkivshchyna” (8.53), the Opposition Bloc (8.12), the Radical Party (8.10), and For Life (8.02).

According to experts, **the country’s economic development** is a rather popular topic for political parties. Its average presence in public rhetoric ranges within 7-8 points. Somewhat less active in this area is “Svoboda” (6.29) and the Civil Position (6.97), while “Batkivshchyna” with its 8.21 points is a clear leader.

Leaders by the presence of **socio-cultural issues** (language, history, religion, and the like) are “Svoboda” (8.67) and BPP (8.54). This topic is the least appealing for the parties For Life (5.71) and the Civil Position (5.97), while its presence in the rhetoric of other parties ranges from 6 to 7 points.

Combating corruption draws equally serious attention of all parties, which have scored 7-8 points. The only exception is the Opposition Bloc with its 6.51 points.

The need to conduct reforms is the most popular topic with BPP (9.49) and “Batkivshchyna” (8.65%). Other parties have scored from 7.03 (“Svoboda”) to 7.79 (“Samopomich”).

⁵ Based on a 10-point scale with “1” meaning minimum presence and “10” denoting maximum presence. The Servant of the People has finished last in all categories and therefore is analysed separately.

Experts believe that the Servant of the People is likely to put greater focus on combating corruption, implementing reforms, supporting economic development and ensuring social protection.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REFORM COURSE

The experts feel that the parliamentary coalition parties – BPP and the People's Front – have the most positive attitudes towards reforms implemented in 2014-2018 (the sum of responses “fully positive” and “mostly positive” is 96% and 79%, respectively).

The relative majority of experts believe that “Samopomich” Union is quite neutral about the reforms, while the shares of those who noted both positive and negative attitudes are roughly the same.

According to experts, the Opposition Bloc (92%), For Life (79%), and “Batkivshchyna” (71%) are the most critical about the course of reforms.

The experts believe that all other parties also share this negative attitude towards reforms. This concerns the Radical Party (59% of experts), the Civil Position (53%) and “Svoboda” (49%).

Speaking of the Servant of the People, equal shares of experts noted negative or neutral attitudes, while relative majority of those polled could not answer this question.

LEADERS' IMPACT ON THE POSITION OF THE PARTY

The experts agree that the party leaders, most of whom are potential presidential candidates, have a significant influence on the political positions of their respective parties. This impact has scored a minimum of 6.67 points and further increases.

According to experts, Yulia Tymoshenko (9.37) and Petro Poroshenko (9.03) have the biggest impact on their parties. The impact of Oleh Lyashko (8.61) and Anatoliy Hrytsenko (8.25) exceeds 8 points. As for

other party leaders, their impact ranges from 6.67 points (Volodymyr Zelenskyi) to 7.69 points (Oleh Tyahnybok).

The Razumkov Centre would like to express its gratitude to experts who took part in the survey:


S.M. Bayrak, V.I. Besarab, I.E. Bekeshkina, S.V. Bondarenko, V.V. Bureha, P. Burkovskiy, M.A. Buchyn, I.M. Vehesh, M.M. Vehesh, N.A. Vynnykova, O.O. Volynets, V.I. Hyrya, H.V. Hlukhova, O.N. Horbach, M.M. Huitor, R.B. Demchyshak, I.I. Dotsiak, T.M. Dublikash, T.H. Zhovtenko, Z.M. Zazuliak, M.P. Zan, O.B. Kandiuk, S.Y. Kardash, O.M. Kindratets, V.Y. Klymonchuk, R.V. Kozubovskiy, M.M. Kolodiy, S.M. Korol, H.O. Korzhov, A.M. Kostenko, V.M. Lebediuk, O.I. Lypchuk, A.D. Lytovchenko, V.Y. Litkovets, I.I. Lomaka, H.I. Lutsyshyn, O.M. Mayboroda, Y.I. Makar, N.V. Malynovska, V.Y. Malynovskiy, V.V. Maryna, R.S. Martyniuk, Y.V. Matsiyevskiy, M.L. Mool, P.O. Molochko, I.S. Monolatiy, I.S. Nedokus, T.I. Neprytska, T.E. Nikolayeva, I.Y. Osadchuk, Y.O. Ostapets, R.Y. Pasichnyi, V.M. Pakholok, M.V. Polishchuk, M.A. Poliovyy, N.I. Popadiuk, M.V. Prymush, N.O. Ryzanova, A.S. Romaniuk, N.Y. Rotar, N.D. Svitaylo, N.E. Stepanova, I.O. Stryapko, Y.Y. Tyshkun, Y. Tyshchenko, M.Y. Tokar, O.Y. Khoroshykov, O. Khrustynskiy, O.O. Tsebenko, E.H. Tsokur, O.M. Chaltseva, I.I. Chmil, M.O. Shabanov, Y.Z. Shaihorodskiy, H.V. Shypunov, M.F. Shmyhol, O.B. Yarosh, Y.B. Yarosh, as well as other experts filling the questionnaire on condition of anonymity.

Abbreviations:

The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom)	SVU	Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	RPL
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	BPP	Servant of the People	SOP
The People's Front	PF	The All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland)	BAT
The “Samopomich” Union (Self-Reliance)	SU	The Opposition Bloc	OB
The Civil Position	CP	For Life	FL

Traditionally they distinguish between the “left” and “right” political parties. Where would you locate the following political forces in this spectrum?

Average score*



* A scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means “left”, and “10” denotes “right”.

Which ideological and political course do these political forces represent?
% of experts

	BPP	BAT	SVO	CP	FL	PF	OB	RPL	SU	SOP
Environmental ("the greens")	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.0
Communist	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0
Liberal	23.9	20.7	1.1	20.7	10.9	32.6	8.7	3.3	22.8	9.8
National-democratic	39.1	9.8	12.0	34.8	0.0	35.9	2.2	6.5	35.9	3.3
National-radical	5.4	2.2	75.0	1.1	1.1	4.3	0.0	39.1	7.6	0.0
National-communist	0.0	1.1	2.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	2.2	0.0	0.0
Political course aimed at reunification of Ukraine with Russia	0.0	1.1	1.1	0.0	39.1	0.0	56.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Social-democratic	6.5	29.3	0.0	8.7	5.4	4.3	5.4	5.4	5.4	3.3
Socialist	0.0	2.2	0.0	1.1	5.4	0.0	1.1	8.7	0.0	2.2
Christian-democratic	3.3	1.1	3.3	2.2	0.0	4.3	0.0	2.2	13.0	0.0
Other	2.2	7.6	1.1	7.6	9.8	3.3	12.0	10.9	0.0	7.6
None	13.0	8.7	0.0	5.4	6.5	6.5	5.4	8.7	2.2	21.7
Hard to say	6.6	14.1	4.4	17.4	17.4	8.6	7.6	11.9	9.8	52.2

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Ukraine joining the union with Russia and Belarus; accession to the Eurasian Economic Union	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	1.1	1.1	96.7	1.1	Ukraine's accession to the EU in the foreseeable future
	"Batkivshchyna"	2.2	32.6	59.8	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	1.1	39.1	55.4	4.3	
	The Civil Position	3.3	30.4	60.9	5.4	
	For Life	62.0	26.1	4.3	7.6	
	The People's Front	1.1	14.1	82.6	2.2	
	The Opposition Bloc	77.2	17.4	1.1	4.3	
	The Radical Party	1.1	55.4	39.1	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	1.1	10.9	84.8	3.3	
	Servant of the People	2.2	59.8	20.7	17.4	
Non-bloc status of Ukraine, non-participation in military alliances	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	0.0	1.1	95.7	3.3	Ukraine's NATO membership in the foreseeable future
	"Batkivshchyna"	6.5	32.6	54.3	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	15.2	27.2	51.1	6.5	
	The Civil Position	14.1	21.7	57.6	6.5	
	For Life	59.8	26.1	3.3	10.9	
	The People's Front	0.0	13.0	81.5	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	82.6	14.1	0.0	3.3	
	The Radical Party	6.5	57.6	31.5	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	0.0	17.4	78.3	4.3	
	Servant of the People	7.6	55.4	17.4	19.6	
Reconciliation with Russia; strengthening of political and economic ties	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	2.2	12.0	84.8	1.1	Tough stance on Russia; weakening of political and economic ties
	"Batkivshchyna"	23.9	44.6	25.0	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	1.1	5.4	90.2	3.3	
	The Civil Position	6.5	28.3	58.7	6.5	
	For Life	73.9	15.2	1.1	9.8	
	The People's Front	1.1	15.2	82.6	1.1	
	The Opposition Bloc	92.4	4.3	1.1	2.2	
	The Radical Party	2.2	40.2	51.1	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	1.1	23.9	71.7	3.3	
	Servant of the People	3.3	60.9	17.4	18.5	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?

% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Return of the temporarily occupied territories through peace talks and compromises with Russia	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	17.4	30.4	50.0	2.2	Return of the temporarily occupied territories by military means
	"Batkivshchyna"	29.3	50.0	17.4	3.3	
	"Svoboda"	2.2	12.0	81.5	4.3	
	The Civil Position	8.7	39.1	44.6	7.6	
	For Life	70.7	18.5	1.1	9.8	
	The People's Front	8.7	28.3	59.8	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	90.2	4.3	1.1	4.3	
	The Radical Party	5.4	45.7	44.6	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	8.7	37.0	50.0	4.3	
	Servant of the People	8.7	58.7	12.0	20.7	
Peace in the East of Ukraine should be established at all costs	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	4.3	7.6	87.0	1.1	Peace in the East of Ukraine is only possible on terms acceptable for Ukrainian society
	"Batkivshchyna"	15.2	41.3	39.1	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	10.9	10.9	76.1	2.2	
	The Civil Position	3.3	35.9	55.4	5.4	
	For Life	64.1	20.7	8.7	6.5	
	The People's Front	3.3	25.0	69.6	2.2	
	The Opposition Bloc	78.3	14.1	5.4	2.2	
	The Radical Party	6.5	42.4	44.6	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	2.2	27.2	66.3	4.3	
	Servant of the People	3.3	58.7	19.6	18.5	
Increased influence of the Verkhovna Rada on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the President	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	6.5	18.5	71.7	3.3	Increased influence of the President on the Cabinet and the executive branch; restricted powers of the Verkhovna Rada
	"Batkivshchyna"	45.7	27.2	22.8	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	29.3	33.7	33.7	3.3	
	The Civil Position	17.4	48.9	25.0	8.7	
	For Life	37.0	42.4	9.8	10.9	
	The People's Front	22.8	50.0	22.8	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	55.4	27.2	12.0	5.4	
	The Radical Party	19.6	53.3	21.7	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	40.2	45.7	9.8	4.3	
	Servant of the People	10.9	68.5	3.3	17.4	
Prevention of restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	27.2	25.0	45.7	2.2	Political stability even through restrictions on citizens' political rights and liberties
	"Batkivshchyna"	30.4	41.3	22.8	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	19.6	23.9	53.3	3.3	
	The Civil Position	37.0	43.5	10.9	8.7	
	For Life	27.2	34.8	26.1	12.0	
	The People's Front	16.3	47.8	32.6	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	25.0	34.8	33.7	6.5	
	The Radical Party	16.3	45.7	28.3	9.8	
	"Samopomich"	48.9	38.0	8.7	4.3	
	Servant of the People	23.9	52.2	4.3	19.6	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Limitation of the central government's functions with delegation of greater powers to local self-governments; de-centralisation	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	47.8	31.5	17.4	3.3	Expansion of the central government's functions with reduction of powers of local self-governments; increased guidance of all state institutions by the centre
	"Batkivshchyna"	39.1	37.0	17.4	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	37.0	37.0	20.7	5.4	
	The Civil Position	33.7	50.0	9.8	6.5	
	For Life	31.5	29.3	29.3	9.8	
	The People's Front	30.4	47.8	17.4	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	34.8	30.4	31.5	3.3	
	The Radical Party	33.7	47.8	12.0	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	73.9	21.7	3.3	1.1	
	Servant of the People	18.5	59.8	2.2	19.6	
Possibility of granting a special status (autonomy) to certain regions	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	4.3	7.6	84.8	3.3	Preservation of the unitary state system; rejection of any special statuses to regions
	"Batkivshchyna"	9.8	27.2	57.6	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	1.1	7.6	89.1	2.2	
	The Civil Position	1.1	28.3	65.2	5.4	
	For Life	63.0	20.7	6.5	9.8	
	The People's Front	1.1	15.2	78.3	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	80.4	13.0	3.3	3.3	
	The Radical Party	2.2	32.6	59.8	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	3.3	25.0	66.3	5.4	
	Servant of the People	3.3	55.4	19.6	21.7	
Greater public control over law enforcement agencies	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	25.0	28.3	43.5	3.3	Greater accountability of law enforcement agencies to the state
	"Batkivshchyna"	35.9	39.1	18.5	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	42.4	27.2	23.9	6.5	
	The Civil Position	47.8	31.5	10.9	9.8	
	For Life	28.3	33.7	25.0	13.0	
	The People's Front	14.1	45.7	37.0	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	26.1	32.6	33.7	7.6	
	The Radical Party	27.2	45.7	20.7	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	55.4	31.5	7.6	5.4	
	Servant of the People	21.7	51.1	3.3	23.9	
Reduced expenditure on the Armed Forces of Ukraine	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	0.0	4.3	94.6	1.1	Increased expenditure, strengthening and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
	"Batkivshchyna"	9.8	43.5	42.4	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	2.2	18.5	77.2	2.2	
	The Civil Position	3.3	33.7	57.6	5.4	
	For Life	46.7	39.1	4.3	9.8	
	The People's Front	1.1	18.5	79.3	1.1	
	The Opposition Bloc	55.4	31.5	4.3	8.7	
	The Radical Party	13.0	41.3	43.5	2.2	
	"Samopomich"	3.3	47.8	45.7	3.3	
	Servant of the People	8.7	55.4	13.0	22.8	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?

% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Scaling up the public sector of economy; re-nationalisation of previously privatised companies	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	5.4	20.7	70.7	3.3	Privatisation of state-owned companies; priority development of the private sector
	"Batkivshchyna"	29.3	33.7	31.5	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	37.0	34.8	22.8	5.4	
	The Civil Position	5.4	55.4	31.5	7.6	
	For Life	26.1	43.5	16.3	14.1	
	The People's Front	2.2	32.6	62.0	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	35.9	34.8	22.8	6.5	
	The Radical Party	34.8	44.6	15.2	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	3.3	54.3	34.8	7.6	
	Servant of the People	4.3	63.0	10.9	21.7	
Active role of the state in managing economic processes and price control	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	21.7	33.7	40.2	4.3	Government non-interference in the economy (de-regulation) and price control; total market regulations
	"Batkivshchyna"	57.6	23.9	14.1	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	41.3	38.0	16.3	4.3	
	The Civil Position	10.9	55.4	23.9	9.8	
	For Life	44.6	34.8	12.0	8.7	
	The People's Front	10.9	41.3	42.4	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	48.9	31.5	15.2	4.3	
	The Radical Party	38.0	39.1	16.3	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	6.5	51.1	37.0	5.4	
	Servant of the People	8.7	60.9	7.6	22.8	
Extension of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	16.3	22.8	55.4	5.4	Introduction of the sale of agricultural land
	"Batkivshchyna"	67.4	17.4	8.7	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	45.7	28.3	17.4	8.7	
	The Civil Position	18.5	54.3	14.1	13.0	
	For Life	51.1	28.3	6.5	14.1	
	The People's Front	13.0	35.9	43.5	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	62.0	23.9	7.6	6.5	
	The Radical Party	59.8	26.1	8.7	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	10.9	51.1	28.3	9.8	
	Servant of the People	7.6	55.4	13.0	23.9	
Support for national manufacturers; heavy duties on imported goods	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	21.7	38.0	35.9	4.3	Free competition of domestically produced and imported goods in the domestic market
	"Batkivshchyna"	42.4	41.3	13.0	3.3	
	"Svoboda"	59.8	27.2	9.8	3.3	
	The Civil Position	19.6	55.4	14.1	10.9	
	For Life	30.4	42.4	14.1	13.0	
	The People's Front	9.8	35.9	48.9	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	44.6	32.6	17.4	5.4	
	The Radical Party	67.4	26.1	3.3	3.3	
	"Samopomich"	22.8	38.0	32.6	6.5	
	Servant of the People	7.6	58.7	15.2	18.5	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Predominant state support for large national companies	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	48.9	26.1	21.7	3.3	Priority support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises
	"Batkivshchyna"	32.6	27.2	38.0	2.2	
	"Svoboda"	13.0	32.6	48.9	5.4	
	The Civil Position	6.5	43.5	40.2	9.8	
	For Life	39.1	29.3	20.7	10.9	
	The People's Front	28.3	34.8	32.6	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	60.9	22.8	14.1	2.2	
	The Radical Party	13.0	38.0	38.0	10.9	
	"Samopomich"	2.2	27.2	67.4	3.3	
	Servant of the People	1.1	58.7	17.4	22.8	
Priority focus on public needs and moods inside Ukraine; implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations that are in line with the above	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	6.5	12.0	80.4	1.1	Unconditional and consistent implementation of the EU, US and IMF recommendations even if these are unpopular in Ukraine
	"Batkivshchyna"	45.7	31.5	14.1	8.7	
	"Svoboda"	53.3	33.7	6.5	6.5	
	The Civil Position	33.7	43.5	12.0	10.9	
	For Life	45.7	34.8	2.2	17.4	
	The People's Front	9.8	29.3	56.5	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	63.0	27.2	1.1	8.7	
	The Radical Party	55.4	34.8	3.3	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	33.7	45.7	13.0	7.6	
	Servant of the People	15.2	59.8	1.1	23.9	
Ukraine's economy to rely on traditional industries – metallurgy, machinery manufacturing, mining industry, agriculture	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	25.0	28.3	41.3	5.4	Ukraine to accelerate its economic growth only through active development of new industries and technologies – IT sector, robotics, AI, nano- and biotechnologies, etc.
	"Batkivshchyna"	33.7	31.5	30.4	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	23.9	53.3	16.3	6.5	
	The Civil Position	10.9	51.1	28.3	9.8	
	For Life	54.3	30.4	6.5	8.7	
	The People's Front	17.4	37.0	38.0	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	69.6	18.5	7.6	4.3	
	The Radical Party	46.7	37.0	8.7	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	4.3	38.0	52.2	5.4	
	Servant of the People	4.3	57.6	18.5	19.6	
Increase in wages and pensions even at the cost of inflation and weakening hryvnia	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	21.7	29.3	46.7	2.2	Inflation prevention and hryvnia stabilisation even at the cost of "freezing" of wages and pensions
	"Batkivshchyna"	57.6	26.1	14.1	2.2	
	"Svoboda"	25.0	54.3	14.1	6.5	
	The Civil Position	14.1	54.3	19.6	12.0	
	For Life	62.0	18.5	9.8	9.8	
	The People's Front	8.7	42.4	44.6	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	73.9	17.4	6.5	2.2	
	The Radical Party	60.9	26.1	7.6	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	8.7	56.5	26.1	8.7	
	Servant of the People	9.8	60.9	6.5	22.8	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?

% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Introduction of progressive taxation – persons with higher income to pay higher taxes	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	22.8	41.3	28.3	7.6	Introduction of equal taxation for all citizens regardless of their income
	“Batkivshchyna”	37.0	37.0	16.3	9.8	
	“Svoboda”	43.5	35.9	10.9	9.8	
	The Civil Position	25.0	57.6	6.5	10.9	
	For Life	33.7	35.9	18.5	12.0	
	The People’s Front	18.5	52.2	20.7	8.7	
	The Opposition Bloc	27.2	43.5	20.7	8.7	
	The Radical Party	48.9	33.7	8.7	8.7	
	“Samopomich”	29.3	53.3	7.6	9.8	
	Servant of the People	8.7	63.0	3.3	25.0	
Tax system, in which a person pays high taxes but receives some social services from the state for free	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	10.9	53.3	26.1	9.8	Tax system, in which a person pays low taxes but receives social services at his/her own expense
	“Batkivshchyna”	33.7	46.7	12.0	7.6	
	“Svoboda”	23.9	42.4	21.7	12.0	
	The Civil Position	6.5	63.0	17.4	13.0	
	For Life	33.7	39.1	12.0	15.2	
	The People’s Front	9.8	56.5	23.9	9.8	
	The Opposition Bloc	37.0	40.2	13.0	9.8	
	The Radical Party	31.5	47.8	9.8	10.9	
	“Samopomich”	5.4	55.4	29.3	9.8	
	Servant of the People	5.4	64.1	9.8	20.7	
Protection of interests of low-income citizens	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	16.3	32.6	47.8	3.3	Protection of interests of the “middle class” – skilled labourers with middle income
	“Batkivshchyna”	51.1	32.6	14.1	2.2	
	“Svoboda”	39.1	44.6	10.9	5.4	
	The Civil Position	16.3	50.0	21.7	12.0	
	For Life	54.3	28.3	9.8	7.6	
	The People’s Front	16.3	46.7	32.6	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	59.8	25.0	10.9	4.3	
	The Radical Party	64.1	26.1	7.6	2.2	
	“Samopomich”	13.0	52.2	30.4	4.3	
	Servant of the People	18.5	53.3	7.6	20.7	
Fighting poverty by increasing social assistance to people with low wages (subsidies, allowances, etc.)	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	31.5	21.7	43.5	3.3	Fighting poverty by increasing the price of labour and hence raising salaries
	“Batkivshchyna”	57.6	25.0	15.2	2.2	
	“Svoboda”	38.0	40.2	17.4	4.3	
	The Civil Position	15.2	44.6	32.6	7.6	
	For Life	47.8	33.7	8.7	9.8	
	The People’s Front	19.6	35.9	40.2	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	59.8	25.0	13.0	2.2	
	The Radical Party	58.7	23.9	15.2	2.2	
	“Samopomich”	10.9	39.1	44.6	5.4	
	Servant of the People	12.0	54.3	12.0	21.7	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where “1” means support of the left-side position; “3” denotes support of the right-side position; and “2” means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Reduction of tariffs for housing and utility services at the expense of the state budget subventions to service providers	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	5.4	15.2	77.2	2.2	Targeted subsidies on housing and utility services for persons who cannot afford paying their real cost (current approach)
	"Batkivshchyna"	59.8	14.1	21.7	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	30.4	44.6	18.5	6.5	
	The Civil Position	22.8	46.7	20.7	9.8	
	For Life	50.0	25.0	15.2	9.8	
	The People's Front	6.5	38.0	51.1	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	57.6	20.7	19.6	2.2	
	The Radical Party	48.9	22.8	22.8	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	13.0	46.7	35.9	4.3	
	Servant of the People	12.0	59.8	6.5	21.7	
Each and all medical services in the state-run and municipal health facilities to be available for free. The state must guarantee this right to all citizens	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	2.2	17.4	80.4	0.0	The state must provide the guaranteed package of free medical services (first aid, chronic diseases, childbirth, etc.) to all citizens. Other health services to be paid by patients themselves and/or through compulsory or voluntary health insurance
	"Batkivshchyna"	50.0	30.4	15.2	4.3	
	"Svoboda"	26.1	39.1	31.5	3.3	
	The Civil Position	14.1	50.0	29.3	6.5	
	For Life	57.6	27.2	5.4	9.8	
	The People's Front	5.4	33.7	57.6	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	66.3	19.6	10.9	3.3	
	The Radical Party	57.6	26.1	12.0	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	6.5	37.0	50.0	6.5	
	Servant of the People	10.9	53.3	16.3	19.6	
The state must guarantee a decent living standard for citizens who work (or worked) during their entire working age	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	34.8	27.2	33.7	4.3	Citizens should themselves secure their living in senior age, make savings and the like
	"Batkivshchyna"	66.3	22.8	7.6	3.3	
	"Svoboda"	43.5	35.9	15.2	5.4	
	The Civil Position	33.7	46.7	10.9	8.7	
	For Life	67.4	22.8	2.2	7.6	
	The People's Front	29.3	32.6	32.6	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	73.9	19.6	3.3	3.3	
	The Radical Party	73.9	20.7	2.2	3.3	
	"Samopomich"	22.8	39.1	32.6	5.4	
	Servant of the People	20.7	52.2	6.5	20.7	
Active role of the state in re-distribution of public goods; support in narrowing the income gap between the rich and the poor	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	22.8	34.8	39.1	3.3	Non-interference of the state in re-distribution of public goods; rejection of "income levelling"
	"Batkivshchyna"	62.0	27.2	5.4	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	50.0	33.7	10.9	5.4	
	The Civil Position	28.3	43.5	16.3	12.0	
	For Life	60.9	26.1	4.3	8.7	
	The People's Front	22.8	39.1	32.6	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	63.0	20.7	9.8	6.5	
	The Radical Party	64.1	27.2	4.3	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	21.7	42.4	29.3	6.5	
	Servant of the People	17.4	56.5	5.4	20.7	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	15.2	50.0	29.3	5.4	Protection of rights of the employees before employers. Empowering employees and their associations – labour unions
	"Batkivshchyna"	46.7	39.1	6.5	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	42.4	45.7	7.6	4.3	
	The Civil Position	30.4	53.3	8.7	7.6	
	For Life	35.9	44.6	9.8	9.8	
	The People's Front	13.0	53.3	26.1	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	40.2	34.8	19.6	5.4	
	The Radical Party	57.6	33.7	3.3	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	28.3	55.4	10.9	5.4	
	Servant of the People	15.2	60.9	3.3	20.7	
The government to increase expenditure on health care, social security and education even at the expense of tax hikes	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	29.3	28.3	37.0	5.4	The government to prevent any tax hikes even if this requires social expenditure reductions to balance the budget
	"Batkivshchyna"	47.8	32.6	12.0	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	40.2	38.0	14.1	7.6	
	The Civil Position	16.3	57.6	15.2	10.9	
	For Life	45.7	32.6	8.7	13.0	
	The People's Front	20.7	39.1	32.6	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	53.3	25.0	14.1	7.6	
	The Radical Party	51.1	27.2	14.1	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	15.2	50.0	29.3	5.4	
	Servant of the People	9.8	59.8	7.6	22.8	
Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on comparable salaries in the EU countries	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	45.7	27.2	22.8	4.3	Salaries of top government officials, civil servants, judges, prosecutors and the like based on average pay in Ukraine
	"Batkivshchyna"	15.2	37.0	41.3	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	10.9	32.6	50.0	6.5	
	The Civil Position	13.0	45.7	32.6	8.7	
	For Life	7.6	26.1	54.3	12.0	
	The People's Front	34.8	41.3	18.5	5.4	
	The Opposition Bloc	8.7	25.0	59.8	6.5	
	The Radical Party	4.3	27.2	62.0	6.5	
	"Samopomich"	25.0	42.4	23.9	8.7	
	Servant of the People	9.8	46.7	22.8	20.7	
Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) must be state-run	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	22.8	31.5	43.5	2.2	Social security system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) can be served by private companies
	"Batkivshchyna"	54.3	31.5	6.5	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	39.1	40.2	13.0	7.6	
	The Civil Position	20.7	43.5	21.7	14.1	
	For Life	59.8	21.7	3.3	15.2	
	The People's Front	20.7	37.0	35.9	6.5	
	The Opposition Bloc	62.0	18.5	10.9	8.7	
	The Radical Party	62.0	26.1	3.3	8.7	
	"Samopomich"	15.2	43.5	34.8	6.5	
	Servant of the People	15.2	53.3	8.7	22.8	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Preserving the status of the Ukrainian language as the only state language	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	94.6	2.2	1.1	2.2	Granting the status of second state language to the Russian language
	"Batkivshchyna"	60.9	32.6	3.3	3.3	
	"Svoboda"	95.7	1.1	1.1	2.2	
	The Civil Position	73.9	19.6	1.1	5.4	
	For Life	12.0	20.7	57.6	9.8	
	The People's Front	83.7	12.0	2.2	2.2	
	The Opposition Bloc	5.4	7.6	83.7	3.3	
	The Radical Party	75.0	20.7	2.2	2.2	
	"Samopomich"	89.1	6.5	3.3	1.1	
	Servant of the People	25.0	48.9	8.7	17.4	
The state protection and support for the Ukrainian language (compulsory education in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on the radio and TV, etc.)	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	91.3	7.6	1.1	0.0	All languages should be treated equally by the state
	"Batkivshchyna"	53.3	32.6	8.7	5.4	
	"Svoboda"	93.5	3.3	1.1	2.2	
	The Civil Position	56.5	33.7	2.2	7.6	
	For Life	4.3	18.5	68.5	8.7	
	The People's Front	80.4	17.4	1.1	1.1	
	The Opposition Bloc	3.3	8.7	87.0	1.1	
	The Radical Party	69.6	23.9	3.3	3.3	
	"Samopomich"	80.4	15.2	3.3	1.1	
	Servant of the People	16.3	50.0	16.3	17.4	
The pre-reform system of secondary education was well-balanced both in content and the term of schooling (10 years), provided sufficient level of knowledge and skills – this system should be preserved following its adaptation to current level of knowledge and labour market requirements	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	1.1	13.0	82.6	3.3	Current reformation of the system of secondary education is a positive phenomenon, as the extension of the term of schooling to 12 years, changes in the content of education and relations between a teacher and students brings the Ukrainian school closer to the European norms and standards of secondary education
	"Batkivshchyna"	18.5	58.7	16.3	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	9.8	59.8	20.7	9.8	
	The Civil Position	3.3	66.3	20.7	9.8	
	For Life	58.7	27.2	2.2	12.0	
	The People's Front	2.2	30.4	60.9	6.5	
	The Opposition Bloc	67.4	25.0	1.1	6.5	
	The Radical Party	20.7	56.5	15.2	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	1.1	39.1	54.3	5.4	
	Servant of the People	2.2	64.1	12.0	21.7	
The state offers privileges to certain religious denominations and churches	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	43.5	18.5	35.9	2.2	Equality of all religious denominations and churches in relations with the state
	"Batkivshchyna"	10.9	47.8	33.7	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	52.2	16.3	26.1	5.4	
	The Civil Position	6.5	46.7	38.0	8.7	
	For Life	17.4	21.7	48.9	12.0	
	The People's Front	28.3	35.9	32.6	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	22.8	17.4	53.3	6.5	
	The Radical Party	20.7	45.7	28.3	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	17.4	37.0	37.0	8.7	
	Servant of the People	1.1	47.8	28.3	22.8	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Decommunization should stop	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	1.1	5.4	91.3	2.2	Decommunization should continue
	"Batkivshchyna"	4.3	43.5	45.7	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	2.2	3.3	90.2	4.3	
	The Civil Position	5.4	31.5	55.4	7.6	
	For Life	69.6	18.5	3.3	8.7	
	The People's Front	2.2	19.6	76.1	2.2	
	The Opposition Bloc	85.9	7.6	1.1	5.4	
	The Radical Party	5.4	30.4	58.7	5.4	
	"Samopomich"	3.3	14.1	79.3	3.3	
	Servant of the People	5.4	53.3	18.5	22.8	
The state's hard-line approach to combating crime, even if it leads to a violation of the civil rights of those involved	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	17.4	43.5	31.5	7.6	The state must earnestly ensure the civil rights of all citizens, including perpetrators of crime
	"Batkivshchyna"	15.2	46.7	27.2	10.9	
	"Svoboda"	48.9	25.0	17.4	8.7	
	The Civil Position	21.7	47.8	20.7	9.8	
	For Life	12.0	45.7	28.3	14.1	
	The People's Front	22.8	47.8	21.7	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	19.6	42.4	28.3	9.8	
	The Radical Party	38.0	38.0	16.3	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	10.9	44.6	35.9	8.7	
	Servant of the People	8.7	48.9	18.5	23.9	
Protection of traditional social values, such as the family and marriage based on a free will of a man and a woman	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	38.0	44.6	13.0	4.3	The state's recognition of people's right to same-sex marriage (partnership)
	"Batkivshchyna"	38.0	48.9	4.3	8.7	
	"Svoboda"	77.2	17.4	1.1	4.3	
	The Civil Position	33.7	52.2	3.3	10.9	
	For Life	52.2	35.9	2.2	9.8	
	The People's Front	38.0	44.6	10.9	6.5	
	The Opposition Bloc	69.6	25.0	0.0	5.4	
	The Radical Party	55.4	34.8	2.2	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	38.0	47.8	7.6	6.5	
	Servant of the People	15.2	55.4	6.5	22.8	
Support for maximum rapprochement of cultures of national minorities and immigrant communities with the Ukrainian culture, their acceptance of Ukrainian traditions and eradication of cultural differences between these communities and the Ukrainians	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	33.7	38.0	22.8	5.4	Support for the cultural, language and religious distinctness of all national minorities and immigrant communities; and co-existence of different cultures in Ukrainian society
	"Batkivshchyna"	21.7	51.1	18.5	8.7	
	"Svoboda"	62.0	20.7	16.3	1.1	
	The Civil Position	19.6	54.3	14.1	12.0	
	For Life	10.9	29.3	48.9	10.9	
	The People's Front	22.8	56.5	14.1	6.5	
	The Opposition Bloc	8.7	29.3	55.4	6.5	
	The Radical Party	27.2	48.9	16.3	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	31.5	39.1	22.8	6.5	
	Servant of the People	4.3	58.7	14.1	22.8	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?*
% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Upholding the current level of the rights of national minorities	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	54.3	31.5	12.0	2.2	Scaling up the rights of national minorities
	"Batkivshchyna"	33.7	46.7	12.0	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	69.6	19.6	6.5	4.3	
	The Civil Position	35.9	47.8	5.4	10.9	
	For Life	9.8	28.3	52.2	9.8	
	The People's Front	48.9	39.1	7.6	4.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	7.6	29.3	59.8	3.3	
	The Radical Party	45.7	41.3	5.4	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	46.7	35.9	9.8	7.6	
	Servant of the People	14.1	56.5	7.6	21.7	
Priority development of Ukrainian rural communities as the centres for preservation of traditional lifestyles and values	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	7.6	47.8	38.0	6.5	Priority development of cities (urbanisation) as hubs for progress and a modern, dynamic lifestyle geared towards new global values
	"Batkivshchyna"	28.3	39.1	22.8	9.8	
	"Svoboda"	48.9	39.1	4.3	7.6	
	The Civil Position	5.4	69.6	14.1	10.9	
	For Life	14.1	45.7	26.1	14.1	
	The People's Front	7.6	54.3	30.4	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	15.2	42.4	33.7	8.7	
	The Radical Party	63.0	25.0	4.3	7.6	
	"Samopomich"	10.9	51.1	29.3	8.7	
	Servant of the People	1.1	58.7	20.7	19.6	
Ensuring Ukraine's accelerated economic growth even if it harms the environment	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	21.7	58.7	14.1	5.4	Maximum attention to environment protection, even if it impedes economic growth
	"Batkivshchyna"	22.8	55.4	15.2	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	15.2	56.5	20.7	7.6	
	The Civil Position	6.5	69.6	12.0	12.0	
	For Life	29.3	53.3	5.4	12.0	
	The People's Front	23.9	62.0	6.5	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	37.0	51.1	4.3	7.6	
	The Radical Party	16.3	54.3	19.6	9.8	
	"Samopomich"	8.7	56.5	26.1	8.7	
	Servant of the People	2.2	68.5	7.6	21.7	
A person's belonging to a certain nation with its particular interests, language, culture, traditions and values is of primary importance	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	48.9	35.9	14.1	1.1	All people belong to universal community sharing common values, while nationality is secondary
	"Batkivshchyna"	28.3	48.9	15.2	7.6	
	"Svoboda"	87.0	10.9	1.1	1.1	
	The Civil Position	18.5	62.0	10.9	8.7	
	For Life	9.8	45.7	35.9	8.7	
	The People's Front	38.0	48.9	10.9	2.2	
	The Opposition Bloc	14.1	38.0	43.5	4.3	
	The Radical Party	42.4	46.7	7.6	3.3	
	"Samopomich"	35.9	50.0	9.8	4.3	
	Servant of the People	6.5	59.8	14.1	19.6	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.

Which position does each political force hold with regards to suggested policy alternatives?

% of experts

(continued)

		1	2	3	Did not answer	
Revival of death penalty for the most grave and cruel crimes against humanity	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	5.4	34.8	53.3	6.5	Preventing the revival of death penalty for any crimes
	"Batkivshchyna"	10.9	41.3	37.0	10.9	
	"Svoboda"	57.6	28.3	8.7	5.4	
	The Civil Position	9.8	44.6	32.6	13.0	
	For Life	9.8	45.7	31.5	13.0	
	The People's Front	6.5	42.4	43.5	7.6	
	The Opposition Bloc	13.0	52.2	23.9	10.9	
	The Radical Party	45.7	31.5	13.0	9.8	
	"Samopomich"	3.3	44.6	45.7	6.5	
	Servant of the People	2.2	47.8	29.3	20.7	
Tough drug control policy and criminal punishment for drug use and possession	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	40.2	48.9	2.2	8.7	De-criminalisation of the use and possession without intent of certain recreational drugs
	"Batkivshchyna"	41.3	45.7	2.2	10.9	
	"Svoboda"	59.8	33.7	0.0	6.5	
	The Civil Position	43.5	43.5	3.3	9.8	
	For Life	41.3	41.3	3.3	14.1	
	The People's Front	33.7	53.3	4.3	8.7	
	The Opposition Bloc	42.4	44.6	3.3	9.8	
	The Radical Party	47.8	37.0	3.3	12.0	
	"Samopomich"	40.2	42.4	6.5	10.9	
	Servant of the People	18.5	54.3	5.4	21.7	
Growing number of immigrants leads to increase in crime in the country	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	9.8	57.6	27.2	5.4	Growing number of immigrants is not the reason for increase in crime in the country
	"Batkivshchyna"	12.0	64.1	17.4	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	59.8	28.3	9.8	2.2	
	The Civil Position	12.0	62.0	17.4	8.7	
	For Life	15.2	60.9	12.0	12.0	
	The People's Front	12.0	59.8	25.0	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	23.9	58.7	9.8	7.6	
	The Radical Party	46.7	39.1	9.8	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	7.6	59.8	26.1	6.5	
	Servant of the People	3.3	65.2	10.9	20.7	
Against the backdrop of external aggression some civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) may be restricted	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	50.0	32.6	15.2	2.2	Restriction of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression
	"Batkivshchyna"	22.8	51.1	19.6	6.5	
	"Svoboda"	65.2	19.6	12.0	3.3	
	The Civil Position	23.9	50.0	15.2	10.9	
	For Life	13.0	37.0	39.1	10.9	
	The People's Front	48.9	37.0	10.9	3.3	
	The Opposition Bloc	12.0	37.0	45.7	5.4	
	The Radical Party	34.8	48.9	12.0	4.3	
	"Samopomich"	19.6	46.7	30.4	3.3	
	Servant of the People	5.4	59.8	14.1	20.7	

* On the scale from 1 to 3, where "1" means support of the left-side position; "3" denotes support of the right-side position; and "2" means uncertain or absent position.


How important is the following topic to the party's official discourse?
Average score*

Ukraine's integration into inter-state alliances or unions (EU, NATO)	Counteraction or reconciliation with Russia	Reintegration or isolation of the occupied territories
<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 9.36</p> <p>The People's Front 8.00</p> <p>"Samopomich" 7.65</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 6.88</p> <p>The Civil Position 6.48</p> <p>"Svoboda" 5.82</p> <p>The Radical Party 5.53</p> <p>Servant of the People 4.55</p> <p>For Life 3.57</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 3.32</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 8.26</p> <p>"Svoboda" 8.05</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 7.90</p> <p>The People's Front 7.40</p> <p>For Life 7.09</p> <p>The Radical Party 6.88</p> <p>The Civil Position 6.75</p> <p>"Samopomich" 6.75</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 6.54</p> <p>Servant of the People 4.49</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 7.73</p> <p>The People's Front 7.16</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 7.16</p> <p>"Svoboda" 6.97</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 6.41</p> <p>The Radical Party 6.38</p> <p>The Civil Position 6.30</p> <p>"Samopomich" 6.22</p> <p>For Life 6.10</p> <p>Servant of the People 4.52</p>
Constitutional changes regarding the structure of the Ukrainian state	Raising social standards and social protection of the population	The country's economic development
<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 7.03</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 5.79</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 5.70</p> <p>For Life 5.66</p> <p>The People's Front 5.56</p> <p>"Svoboda" 5.55</p> <p>"Samopomich" 5.28</p> <p>The Radical Party 5.21</p> <p>The Civil Position 5.12</p> <p>Servant of the People 4.10</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 8.53</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 8.12</p> <p>The Radical Party 8.10</p> <p>For Life 8.02</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 7.84</p> <p>"Samopomich" 6.84</p> <p>"Svoboda" 6.61</p> <p>The People's Front 6.56</p> <p>The Civil Position 6.54</p> <p>Servant of the People 5.67</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 8.21</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 7.92</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 7.87</p> <p>For Life 7.51</p> <p>The Radical Party 7.37</p> <p>The People's Front 7.14</p> <p>"Samopomich" 7.11</p> <p>The Civil Position 6.97</p> <p>"Svoboda" 6.29</p> <p>Servant of the People 5.63</p>
Socio-cultural issues (language, history, religion, etc)	Combating corruption	The need to conduct reforms
<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>"Svoboda" 8.67</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 8.54</p> <p>The People's Front 6.94</p> <p>"Samopomich" 6.72</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 6.34</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 6.22</p> <p>The Radical Party 6.20</p> <p>The Civil Position 5.97</p> <p>For Life 5.71</p> <p>Servant of the People 4.61</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 7.78</p> <p>The Radical Party 7.75</p> <p>The Civil Position 7.52</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 7.49</p> <p>"Samopomich" 7.48</p> <p>"Svoboda" 7.43</p> <p>For Life 7.02</p> <p>The People's Front 7.02</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 6.51</p> <p>Servant of the People 6.46</p>	<p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Petro Poroshenko Bloc 9.49</p> <p>"Batkivshchyna" 8.65</p> <p>"Samopomich" 7.79</p> <p>The People's Front 7.66</p> <p>The Civil Position 7.65</p> <p>The Radical Party 7.41</p> <p>For Life 7.14</p> <p>The Opposition Bloc 7.07</p> <p>"Svoboda" 7.03</p> <p>Servant of the People 6.47</p>

*Based on 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means the topic's absolute irrelevance, and "10" means the topic's key role.


What is the party's public attitude towards reforms implemented in 2014-2018 (in general)?

% of experts



How the position of the party leaders – potential presidential candidates – affects these parties' attitudes towards policies in various spheres?

Average score*



* Based on 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means no impact, and "10" means maximum impact.