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BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MEANS OF THE FORMATION OF A COMMON IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS

(Informational and Analytical Materials by the Razumkov Centre)

The materials presented in this issue are a result of the third stage of the Razumkov Centre's project "Formation of a Common Ukrainian National Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges".

From the results of the previous stages of the project we were able to form a comprehensive picture of various identity aspects of Ukrainian citizens, their hierarchy and interrelations and to identify features determined by the impact of national, linguistic, cultural, age and other factors.

A particular task of the project's third stage was the research focus on basic components of identity: the system of values inherent to the citizens of Ukraine, their features and regional differences. The struggle to promote European values in Ukraine was the driving force of the Revolution of Dignity; and the continuing confrontation of Ukraine with Russian aggression represents a struggle of different value-based systems.

Establishing common values as the basis for a common national identity is a critical task for consolidation of Ukrainian society. The results of the public opinion survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in March 2017 and published herein make it possible not only to understand value orientations of Ukrainian society, but also to compare them with values of citizens of some European countries as well as values of Russian citizens. This was made possible by having the Razumkov Centre's survey include the same questions used in the international comparative *World Values Survey* research.

The results of the study confirm that formation of the value system of Ukrainians and their identity is affected by complex social and political processes – the military conflict with Russia, protracted economic crisis, and political instability. This leads to a conflicted and internally contradictory nature of these value orientations. Positive trends may be considered to include the predominance of a common civil identity, an increase in Ukrainian national identification. On the other hand, there is a concern about the low level of trust among citizens of Ukraine in other members of society and government institutions and reliance on a "strong leader".

Another task was to determine the key components of state policy on the formation of a common national identity in terms of its content, institutional and organisational elements. For this purpose the Razumkov Centre conducted the expert survey of 106 experts: representatives of national and local government, research and higher educational institutions, political parties and non-governmental organisations. Survey results demonstrated an understanding among the expert community of the procedural nature of a national identity formation and, at the same time, the need for targeted government actions in this area, including the development and implementation of the appropriate national policy.

To gain a more comprehensive approach to formation of a common national identity, the Razumkov Center has conducted interviews with leading national scientists and experts in philosophy, political science, sociology, ethnic policy, linguistics, and cultural studies.

Based on the results of all stages of the project, the Razumkov Centre has prepared an updated draft Conceptual Approach to the formation of a common national identity of Ukrainian citizens. The Razumkov Centre believes that this document could be the basis for further discussion, elaboration, adoption and implementation by the government. "Hybrid" war waged against Ukraine makes these steps especially urgent.

Participants in preparing the information and analytical materials within the third stage of the Project "*Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Changes, Challenges and National Unity Prospects*": Yu. YAKYMENKO (Project Manager), A. BYCHENKO, V. ZAMIATIN, M. MISHCHENKO, L. SHANGHINA, V. YAREMA (Razumkov Centre), and O. LYTVYNENKO (National Institute for Strategic Studies).

1. IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: VALUE ORIENTATIONS

(Results of a Sociological Survey)

The Razumkov Centre has been studying identity of Ukrainian citizens since 2005. This study has revealed a number of identity features of the citizens of our country, in particular, a contradiction in the process of forming a common civic identity.

This research project examines identity in the context of its connection with the value system of Ukrainian society. Within the project framework, a nationwide survey was carried out.[1] The main results are presented below. Some of the indicators used in the survey were taken from those used in the comparative sociological study conducted as part of the *World Values Survey* research project. The sixth and final wave of the research was carried out in 2010-2014 and covered 60 countries. This study examined the trust and tolerance levels and the moral environment in the society, in addition to the value systems of different countries. This allowed us to compare the results from the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre with the results obtained under the *World Values Survey* research project carried out in several European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Russia).[2]

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY AS A FACTOR IN FORMING THE VALUE SYSTEM

The socio-psychological environment in the society is among the factors that form civic consciousness as a whole and its value system in particular. The level of trust in social institutions and other members of the society may be considered an indicator of the socio-psychological environment of the society. Confidence level in the society is an important characteristic of its condition. It provides the possibility for a society to exist as an organised community, creates civic order and interaction within it. Trust in the society – trust between individuals, social groups, and trust in social institutions – provides a certain level of resistance to adverse factors – both from the environment and the effect of internal factors that impede the functioning of a social body. Trust is closely connected with empathy – the ability to empathise and sympathise with concerns and feelings of other members of the society as if they were one's own.[3]

It may be stated that trust is the extrapolation and transfer of empathy to the whole of society and its institutions, since it is associated with an individual's belief that these social institutions are represented by people whose interests, motives and feelings are similar to his/her own. In other words, if a person holds an opinion about social institutions as ones in which representatives have interests, motives, and values that are contrary to his/her own interests, motives, and values, this contradiction will result in a reduction of trust in public institutions, decreasing their legitimacy.

Trust in Other Members of the Society

In general, the trust level in other members of the Ukrainian society is quite low, as it is in East European countries such as Poland and Russia. 75% of respondents in Ukraine, 76% of respondents in Poland and 66% in Russia answered that it is necessary to pay special attention when dealing with people (Diagram "*Can most people generally be trusted…?*", p.14). Slightly more than half (54%) of respondents gave the same answer in

[1] The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 3-9 March 2017 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea and the occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 2,016 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The margin of error does not exceed 2.3%.

In the tables with data broken down by regions, they are divided as follows: **West**: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi regions; **Centre**: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions and the City of Kyiv; **South**: Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson regions; **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv regions; **Donbas**: Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

[2] The survey was carried out in Germany in 2013 (2,046 respondents), in the Netherlands in 2012 (1,902 respondents), in Poland in 2012 (966 respondents), and in Russia in 2011 (2,500 respondents). The results and data set of this study are posted on the website *http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org*.

Although these polls were conducted in these countries a few years before the study by Razumkov Centre, our experts consider it possible and fruitful to compare poll results in these countries with those obtained in Ukraine in 2017, because the value system is relatively stable; it usually does not undergo fundamental changes over a period of a few years. However, the assessment of the situation in the society, which is also used for comparison, is more dynamic. Here one may expect significant dynamics in these evaluations, particularly in Ukraine.

[3] Empathy is emotional "resonance, and affective communication with another person". – Dictionnaire de la psychologie, 1967, p.109.

Germany, and only 32% in the Netherlands. The same trends reveal the answers to the question "*If given the opportunity would most people try to take advantage of you, or would they behave decently and honestly*?" (p.14).[4] The level of positive expectations of Ukrainians concerning the actions taken by other persons is low (5 points on average); these expectations are lower only in Poland (4.7 points) . In Ukrainian regions, this indicator is somewhat higher in the Western and Southern regions (5.4 points) and lowest in Donbas (4.5 points).

Trust in Social Institutions

Among Ukrainian social institutions, the highest trust is in the Armed Forces (70% of respondents trust them fully or to certain extent), the Church (66%), humanitarian and charitable organisations (64%), and universities (52%) (Table "*To what extent do you trust…?*", pp.15-20). 40% or more respondents have trust in women's organisations (48%), environmental organisations (45%), television (43%) and print media (40%). Ukrainians least of all trust political parties (9%), Parliament (10%), courts (12%), the Government (13%) and banks (15%).

With regard to political parties, Parliament and Government, Ukraine does not significantly differ from Poland, where the level of trust in these institutions is very low. In all compared countries, the majority (or relative majority) of respondents do not trust political parties, banks, large corporations, parliaments, television and the print media. Only in Russia an equal number of respondents (47%) express trust and distrust of government; in other countries, the majority do not.

The low confidence level in the police is typical both for Ukraine and Russia (66% and 64% do not trust them, respectively). In other countries, most respondents trust the police. Most respondents in Ukraine, Poland and Russia do not trust courts, and the situation is the opposite in the Netherlands and Germany. On the contrary, most respondents do not trust the Church in the Netherlands and Germany and do trust it in Ukraine, Poland and Russia. The Armed Forces are trusted by the majority or relative majority of respondents in all countries, but the highest confidence level is in Ukraine (70%).

In Ukraine, Ukrainian-speaking respondents have more trust in the Church, the Armed Forces, the print media, television, trade unions, and police as compared with Russian-speaking respondents.

Tolerance Level

Most Ukrainian respondents (62%) answered they do not trust (completely or mainly) the people of other nationalities. This persentage is higher than in all other countries, where the ratio of such respondents is 50% in Russia and the Netherlands, and up to 31% in Poland (Table "*To what extent do you trust the following categories of people?*", pp.21-22). 65 % of Ukrainians do not trust people of other religions and faiths, while this indicator varies from 50% in Russia to 33% in Poland.

Residents of the West express trust in people of other nationalities more frequently (54%), while 46% do not feel such trust.

The same is true for trust in people who practice other religions (52% and 47% respectively).

The indicator of intolerance against a social group is the fact that this group was mentioned among those whom the respondents would not like to have as their neighbours (Table "*Which of the following groups would you prefer not to be neighbours with?*", p.23). As such, Ukrainians mentioned most often drug users (94% would not want to live next door to them), alcoholics (82%), homosexuals (67%), and persons suffering from AIDS (43%). The reluctance to live next door to drug users was expressed as frequently as in the Netherlands (92%) and Russia (93%); alcoholics are also at the same level as in the Netherlands (85%) and Russia (84%). Intolerance against sexual minorities is at the same level as in Russia (66%); this ratio is much lower in other compared countries (from 40% in Poland to 7% in the Netherlands). Ukraine is second to Russia in terms of its intolerance level against persons with AIDS – where 54% respondents would not like to live next door to them. In other countries, this indicator varies from 26% (in Poland) to 10% (in the Netherlands). The level of intolerance against immigrants in Ukraine (20%) is approximately the same as in the Netherlands (20%) and Germany (21%); it is lower than in Russia (32%) and higher than in Poland (7%).

The unwillingness to live near people of another race (12%) is less than in Russia (17%) and Germany (15%) but is higher than in Poland (6%) and the Netherlands (8%).

High tolerance level in Ukraine is observed towards couples living together but not married (only 3% would not want to live next door to them; higher tolerance level is found only in the Netherlands – 0.6%), people who speak a different language (7%; a lower result is found only in Poland – 3%), people of another religion (7%, lower tolerance level only in the Netherlands (3%) and Poland at 5%). This result somewhat contradicts the high level of distrust of people practicing other religions in Ukraine.

Younger respondents less often express intolerance against immigrants, representatives of other religions, and those speaking other languages.

Life Satisfaction Level among Citizens

According to the study results in Ukraine, the level of life satisfaction is proportional to the level of trust in the society. Thus, Cramer's correlation coefficient, which characterizes the relationship between trust in people and life satisfaction, is 0.159, and this is statistically significant (significance level $p<0.001$).[5]

Life satisfaction level in Ukraine, Russia and Poland is lower than in Germany and the Netherlands[6] (Diagram "*How satisfied are you with your life in general*?", p.23).

[4] On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "*people will always try to take advantage of you*", and 10 means "*people will behave decently*".

[5] Cramer's correlation coefficient is a measure of the statistical connection between two characteristics that can vary from 0 (if there is no statistical relationship between variables) to 1 (if there is complete functional link).

[6] Respondents evaluated the level of personal life satisfaction by a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*completely unsatisfied*" and "10" means "*completely satisfied*".

Although 59% of Ukrainian respondents answered that they are "very happy" or "rather happy", this indicator (as well as life satisfaction level) is the lowest among all compared countries (for example, 84% in Germany, 92% in the Netherlands, 93% in Poland, 73% in Russia) (Diagram "*Can you say that you are generally…?*", p.24).

Residents of Western Ukraine (6.1 points) are the happiest with their life, and the least satisfied are residents of the East and Donbas (4.0 and 4.1 points, respectively). 75% of respondents feel happy in the West, and 59% in the Centre, 51% in the South, 53% in the East and only 35% in Donbas. Donbas is the only region where a majority (58%) of residents answered that they were "not very happy" or "completely unhappy".

Life satisfaction decreases with the respondents' age (5.9 points among persons younger than 30 years to 4.3 points among the respondents aged 60 or more). 73% of respondents in the youngest group consider themselves happy compared to 47% in the oldest age group.

Ethnic Ukrainians feel happier than ethnic Russians (5.2 and 4.0 points, respectively). 61% of ethnic Ukrainians consider themselves happy while 55% of ethnic Russians feel unhappy.[7] As compared with Russian-speaking and bilingual respondents, Ukrainian speakers report higher levels of life satisfaction (5.4, 4.9 and 4.5 points, respectively); they also tend to consider themselves happy (64%, 51% and 54%, respectively).

ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE IDENTITY

92% of the respondents consider themselves ethnic Ukrainians, 6% – Russians, and 1.5% identified themselves as other (Diagram "*What is your nationality?*", p.25). There is an increasing trend in the share of respondents who identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainians as the respondents' age decreases (87% among people 60 years or more, to 96% among those 18 to 29 years) and a decrease in the share of ethnic Russians (from 10% to 3%).

The study also drew attention to the problems of bi- and multi-ethnicity as an aspect of forming ethnic identity.[8] 74% of respondents in Ukraine feel they belong to only one ethnicity, 12% feel like they are of two or more ethnicities simultaneously, and 6% do not feel as if they belong to any ethnicity; 8% have no opinion (Diagram "*Do you feel that you belong to a certain ethnicity ?*", p.25).

If among Ukrainians 77% feel they belong to only one ethnicity, only 39% of Russians think the same. 10% of Ukrainians and 30% of Russians feel they belong to two or more ethnicities. 5% and 20%, respectively, do not consider themselves as belonging to any ethnicity. Therefore, one may talk about "distancing", if not the refusal of national self-identification, which, along with bi- or multi-ethnicity, is typical of ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

Residents most often feel that they belong to two or more ethnicities simultaneously in Donbas (27%), the South (24%) and the East (19%) while this indicator is only 6% both in the West and the Centre. Similarly, the largest numbers of inhabitants in these regions do not feel that they belong to any ethnicity (20%, 10%, 12%, 2% and 1%, respectively).

More than two thirds (68%) or respondents call Ukrainian their native language, 14% – Russian, 17% – Ukrainian and Russian equally, and 0.7% – other languages (Diagram "*What is your native language?*", p.26). Ukrainian language is native for 93% of respondents in the West, 84% in the Centre, 42% in the South, 36% in the East, and 27% in Donbas. The share of respondents who consider Russian their native language is 2%, 6%, 31%, 24% and 42%, respectively, and Ukrainian and Russian languages equally – 3%, 10%, 26%, 38% and 29%, respectively.

73% of ethnic Ukrainians called Ukrainian their native language, 9% – Russian, 18% – both languages; these values equalled 4%, 81% and 14%, respectively, among ethnic Russians.

56% of the respondents speak Ukrainian at home exclusively or mainly, 23% speak Russian, 21% speak both languages to the same extent, and 0.4% speak other languages (Diagram "*What language do you speak in your home?*", p.26). 92% of the respondents speak Ukrainian at home in the West, 68% in the Centre, 33% in the South, 18% in the East, and 6% in Donbas. The share of respondents speaking mainly Russian at home is 2%, 13%, 50%, 38% and 68% respectively, and speaking both Ukrainian and Russian is 4%, 19%, 16%, 43% and 25%, respectively.

Among ethnic Ukrainians, 59% speak mostly Ukrainian at home, 19% – Russian, 21% – both languages equally; among ethnic Russians these values are 4%, 82% and 13%, respectively. The number of respondents who call Ukrainian their native language is 80%, 8% and 12%, respectively. The number of respondents who call Russian their native language is 4%, 89% and 7%, respectively, and both languages – 5%, 25% and 63%, respectively.

[7] To some extent, this fact may be explained by the larger share of people aged 60 years or more (43% and 25%, respectively) among ethnic Russians, where (as mentioned above) the number of persons who considered themselves happy is significantly lower, as well as Donbas residents (27% and 4%, respectively) that live near the combat zone and reasonably have less reason to consider themselves happy.

[8] In Ukraine, this problem has been studied by R. Lenchovsky, senior research fellow of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (ref.: R. Lenchovsky Bi-ethnic people are the "reserve army" of each ethnic-national component. – National Security and Defence, 2016, Issue 3-4, p.124-125).

Outside the house, 53% of respondents speak Ukrainian (exclusively or mainly), 23% – Russian (exclusively or mainly). 24% of respondents use both languages to the same extent, and 0.1% – other languages (Diagram "*What language do you speak outside of your home…?*", p.26). 93% of respondents speak Ukrainian outside the home in the West, 64% in the Centre, 28% in the South, 13% in the East, and 7% in Donbas. The share of people speaking mainly Russian outside the house is 1%, 12%, 52%, 41% and 65%, respectively; Ukrainian and Russian to the same extent – 6%, 24%, 19%, 45% and 29%, respectively.

IDENTITY AS IDENTIFICATION WITH A CERTAIN COMMUNITY

Common civil identity prevails in Ukraine. 95% of respondents completely or mostly agreed with the statement "*I consider myself a citizen of Ukraine*" (p.27). In other countries, the vast majority of respondents completely or mostly support the statement "*I consider myself a citizen of my country*" (86% in Germany to 97% in Poland). However, the share of people who completely agree with this statement (72%) is higher in Ukraine than in other countries (18% in the Netherlands to 64% in Russia) (Table "*People think differently of themselves and their attitude towards the country and the world...*", pp.27-31).

The share of respondents who considered themselves citizens of the world is considerably lower in Ukraine as compared with other countries (38% support this view completely or mostly, while this indicator varies from 46% in Russia to 78% in Poland). 52% of Ukrainian respondents consider themselves members of their local community. This is less than in Poland (92%), the Netherlands (78%), and Germany (78%), but is considerably higher than in Russia (24%).

As in Russia, very few people identify themselves as autonomous individuals (21% in Ukraine, 22% in Russia) whereas this value is 80% in Poland, 80% in Germany, and 83% in the Netherlands.

The statement "*I am a citizen of Ukraine*" is completely or mostly supported by 97% of residents in the West, 96% in the Centre, 95% in the South, 91% in the East and 89% in Donbas. Most residents in the West (64%) and in the South (60%) consider themselves members of their local community, while this indicator is 50% in the Centre, 45% in Donbas and 40% in the East.

27% of Ukrainian respondents consider themselves citizens of the former USSR. Residents of the South (48%) and the East (41%) most frequently consider themselves citizens of the former USSR. This value ranges from 17% to 21% in other regions. The smallest share of respondents that consider themselves autonomous individuals are in Donbas (8%), while in other regions this share varies from 19% to 25%. The least number of respondent that think of themselves as citizens of the world is in the East (29% as compared with 40% to 43% in other regions).

Ethnic Ukrainians, more often than ethnic Russians, consider themselves Ukrainian citizens (96% and 81%, respectively), citizens of the world (39% and 26%), autonomous individuals (22% and 12%, respectively). At the same time, ethnic Russians more often consider themselves citizens of the former USSR (26% vs. 38%). As compared with Russian-speaking or bilingual persons, Ukrainian-speaking citizens consider themselves members of their local community (60%, 49% and 34%, respectively), autonomous individuals (25%, 15% and 17%, respectively) and, less frequently, citizens of the former USSR (22%, 33% and 34%, respectively).

The share of respondents considering themselves citizens of the former USSR decreases as respondent age decreases (8% among persons aged less than 30 years and 46% of those aged 60 years and more), with a simultaneous increase in the share of respondents who identified themselves as citizens of the world (40% and 32%, respectively) and autonomous individuals (25% and 19%, respectively).

The share of respondents in Ukraine that are proud of their citizenship is approximately the same as in Germany (68% and 70%, respectively); however, 8% of the persons polled in Germany stated that they were not German citizens vs. 0.4% in Ukraine (Diagram "*To what extent are you proud that you are a citizen of…?*", p.31). 76% of respondents in Russia, 81% in the Netherlands, and 95% in Poland are proud of their citizenship, all more than in Ukraine. In Ukraine, the share of respondents that are not proud of Ukrainian citizenship (30%) is higher than other countries (4% in Poland to 19% in Russia). Among different regions, the highest number of residents who are proud of Ukrainian citizenship is in the West (82%); 76% in the Centre, 64% in the South, 58% in Donbas, and only 45% in the East.

70% of ethnic Ukrainians and only 42% of ethnic Russians are proud to be Ukrainian citizens. 79% of respondents communicate mainly in Ukrainian at home, 55% in Russian, and 56% in both languages to the same extent.

ETHNIC STEREOTYPES

Ethnic auto-stereotypes[9] (both positive and negative) are an integral part of ethnic awareness. Respondents were asked: "*To what extent is each of these traits inherent to Ukrainians?*" (p.32-33) and were prompted to rate 24 different values on a 0-10 point scale, where "0" means "this value is not inherent to any Ukrainian" and "10" means "this value is common to all Ukrainians". When Ukrainian traits were assessed by members of other ethnic groups (ethnic Russians is the largest one), their assessment could combine both elements of auto-stereotypes (to the extent they associate themselves with Ukrainians, for example, in a situation of bi-ethnicity) and hetero-stereotypes (the extent to which they distance themselves from Ukrainians).

As usual, positive auto-stereotypes prevail over negative ones. Ukrainians are no exception. Most often, Ukrainian citizens attribute the following features to Ukrainians: hospitality (8.0 points), industriousness (7.9 points), peacefulness (7.8 points), love of freedom (7.7 points), kindness (7.5 points), patriotism (7.4 points), national pride (7.2 points), and cheerfulness (7.2 points).

The following traits were rated somewhat lower: sincerity (6.8 points), religiousity (6.5), independence of thoughts and views (6.5 points), honesty (6.5 points), individualism (6.3 points), and civic activity (6.1 points). Community spirit received the lowest score (5.8 points) among traits traditionally interpreted as positive.

Jealosy (5.5 points) is the most common negative feature. Indifference to social problems (5.2 points) and greed (5.1 points) were also rated 5 points or more. Grudge-holding (4.7 points), aloofness (4.4 points), cunning (4.3 points), and cruelty (4.1 points) were assessed with lower scores, while hostility to people of other nationalities was the lowest (3.6 points).

"Bellicosity" must be examined separately. Since the rating of this trait correlates most of all with the assessment of such traits as cruelty (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.329[10]), hostility towards people of other nationalities (0.320), grudge-holding (0.307), and cunning (0.305), and is often interpreted as negative. However, a significant (although slightly lower) correlation with such positive qualities as social activity (0.276), independence of thoughts and views (0.247), and religiosity (0.207) shows that some respondents interpret this feature as positive (obviously, taking into account the ongoing military conflict in the East). This feature is rated at 5.1 points (i.e., at a level close to the rating of negative features).

"Bellicosity" is interpreted as decidedly negative by ethnic Russians. In their assessment, its rate is positively correlated with such features as cunning (0.717), cruelty (0.709 inch), greed (0.665), aloofness (0.651), jealosy (0.332), and hostility to people of other nationalities (0.620), and negatively with such positive qualities as kindness (-0.339), honesty (-0.328), and industriousness (-0.263). At the same time, the interpretation of "bellicosity" contradicts the assessments made by ethnic Ukrainians (as well as in the overall pool of respondents).

At the same time, ethnic Russians do not differ from ethnic Ukrainians when assessing prevalence of various features, often ascribing hospitality, generosity, peacefulness, love of freedom, kindness, and cheerfulness to Ukrainians. The biggest difference between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians is in ascribing to Ukrainians such features as sincerity (6.1 and 6.9 points, respectively), patriotism (6.8 and 7.4 points, respectively), peacefulness (7.3 and 7.8 points, respectively), national pride (6.8 and 7.3 points, respectively), and honesty (6.0 and 6.5 points, respectively).

It is necessary to point out that residents of the West assess the level of religiosity much higher (8.0 points) as compared with the average Ukrainian score, while the residents of the East consider it significantly lower (5.0 points). These differences may be explained by the fact that Western residents assess their religiosity the highest (7.1 points) among residents of all regions while residents in the East assess it the lowest (3.5 points). Therefore, the assessment of religiosity among Ukrainians is largely a projection of their own level of religiosity; the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.426.

Residents of the Southern region more often emphasize such typical features as aloofness (5.2 points), cruelty (5,0 points), grudge-holding (5.5 points), cunning (5.2 points), and hostility towards people of other nationalities (4.6 points) as compared with all other Ukrainian residents.

VALUE ORIENTATIONS OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS

Life values

When studying the system of values of Ukrainian residents, the Value Survey developed by M. Rokeach was used.[11] According to the original version of this procedure, a set of 18 cards with designated values is given to a respondent, who has to rate them according to their relevance as guiding principles in his/her life. Since it is impossible to use this procedure in a mass survey, the respondents were asked to select the values that represent their three top priorities.

The following terminal values were mentioned most often: health (physical and mental) (58%), happy family life (41%), financial security (no material difficulties) (39%). Another 24% of respondents mentioned wisdom, 21% – interesting occupation, 19% – active life, 15% – productive life (maximum possible application of their abilities and talents), 14% – love, 11% – close and

[9] An ethnic auto-stereotype is a system of ideas formed by the members of a particular ethnic group about themselves and the features they embody. – Website "Ukrainian Ethnography", *http://etno.us.org.ua/blog/glossary/54.html*.

[10] The Pearson correlation coefficient is the measure of a statistical relationship between two attributes. It may vary from -1 (in case of a negative functional relation between variables) to 1 (if the relation is positive and functional). It takes a zero value in the absence of a statistical relationship between variables.

[11] For more, see: M. Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, New York, 1973.

loyal friends, 11% – self-confidence (internal harmony, freedom from internal inconsistencies and doubt), 10% – freedom, 9% – development (self-perfection, constant physical and spiritual improvement) (Table "*Which of the following values are the most important for you as principles…?*", pp.34-36). Knowledge (5%), happiness of others (well-being, development and improvement of other people, humanity in general) (5%), social recognition (respect by others, fellow workers) (3%), the beauty of nature and art (sensing beauty in nature and art) (3%), entertainment (2%), and creativity (1%) are the least mentioned life values. Thus, Ukrainians assigned the highest priority to the values associated with meeting biological needs, physical and psychological comfort, and well-being. In other words, respondents gave priority to the values which correspond to the lower- and middle-level needs in Maslow's hierarchy – physiological (biological) needs, the need for security and protection, the need for love and belonging.[12] At the same time, the values associated with the top level needs (respect, recognition and self-realisation) were less important.

While "financial security" took the second and third positions in the overall Ukrainian sample along with "happy family life", "financial security" and "health" were placed first and second in the East and second in Donbas, while "happy family life" was in third place. In contrast, "happy family life" was second and "financial security" third in the Western region.

39% of ethnic Ukrainians and 48% of ethnic Russians named "financial security" among the most significant values; "health" was mentioned by 58% and 68% of respondents, respectively (although the hierarchy of values is almost identical for ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians). While Ukrainian-speaking respondents find "happy family life" more important than "financial security", it is the opposite for Russian-speaking respondents and the same for bilinguals.

The younger the respondents, the more frequently they tend to mention "interesting job", "active life", "love" and "development". The older the respondents, the more frequently they mention "health" and "wisdom".

In the *World Values Survey*, the indicators were based on the Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ).[13] It includes short verbal portraits of 40 different people that point implicitely to 10 distinct values. The descriptions are assessed on a scale from 4 (meaning "*very much like me*") to -1 point ("*not like me at all*"). This questionnaire asks to measure each of 10 motivationally distinct types of values.

Thus, S. Schwartz defined each motivationally distinct type of value according to their primary goal:

- *Power* – social status, dominance over people and resources;
- *Achievement* – personal success according to social standards;
- *Hedonism* – pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself;
- *Stimulation* – a desire for novelty and deep emotions;
- *Self-Direction* – independent thought and action;
- *Universalism* – understanding, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature;
- *Benevolence* – preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact;
- *Tradition* – respect for traditions and commitment to cultural and religious customs and ideas;
- *Conformity* – restraint of actions and impulses likely to harm others and violate social expectations;
- *Security* – safety and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.

The method developed by S. Schwartz uses four indicators to reveal each motivational type. An abbreviated version of this method was used in the *World Values Survey*, where only one indicator corresponded to each motivational type. The *World Values Survey* also used an indicator characterising the socio-centric aspect of an individual, i.e. related to preservation and enhancement of the prosperity of the society.

As it may be seen from the Diagram "*To what extent are you similar...?*" (p.37), the most prominent among the Ukrainians was the value profile which Schwartz characterized as "Benevolence" (indicator "*It is important for this person to do something good for the people around him*") (2.5 points on a scale from -1 to 4), "Security" (indicator "*It is very important for this person to feel secure; this person avoids everything that might pose a threat*") (2.3 points) and "Tradition" (indicator "*It is important for this person to follow the traditions and customs of his/her religion or family*") (2.3 points). "Benevolence" also took first place in the structure of value orientations in the Netherlands and Germany (this indicator was not used in Russia and Poland). "Security" and "Tradition" took leading positions in the value system in Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

"Benevolence" and "Security" were the most significant values for all age groups. The importance of values such as "Self-Direction" (indicator "*It is important for this person to offer new ideas, to be creative, to follow his/her own path*"), "Achievement" (indicator "*It is important for this person to be very successful, for people to know his/her achievements*"), "Hedonism" (indicator "*It is important for this individual to have quality leisure time, to indulge him-/herself*"), "Power" (indicator "*It is important for this person to be rich, have a lot of money and expensive things*"), and "Stimulation" (indicator "*Adventures and risk are very important for this person, he/she is committed to a life full of exciting activities*") increased as the respondent age decreased. At the same time, the significance of "Tradition", "Conformity" (indicator "*It is important for this person to always behave properly, not to take actions that other people would not approve of*") increased as respondent age increased. No significant differences were revealed in the hierarchy of values examined by this method among regional and ethnic groups of respondents.

"Benevolence" was more significant for the respondents who identified themselves as Ukrainian citizens as compared with those who rejected such identification (2.1 points among the respondents who answered that they "absolutely" or "mostly" disagreed with their identification as Ukrainian citizens and 2.6 points among those who "absolutely" or "mainly" agreed with this definition). Socio-centric orientations were also more clearly expressed (1.8 and 2.2 points, respectively), as were "Self-Direction" (1.3 and 1.7 points, respectively), "Security" (2.0 and 2.4 points, respectively), "Conformity" (1.6 and 2.1 points, respectively), "Universalism" (indicator "*Caring for the environment and nature is important to this person*") (1.8 and 2.2 points, respectively) and "Tradition" (1.8 and 2.4 points, respectively).

Family (99% of respondents specified it was "very important" or "somewhat important" for them) and friends (92%) were the most important values for Ukrainians (Table "*How important in your life...?*", pp.40-43). 81% of respondents indicated occupation, 75% named free (leisure) time, 55% indicated religion and only 30% identified political activity. The family is a high priority in all compared countries. Friends are important for more than 90% of residents in all compared countries except Russia, where their significance is somewhat lower (80%, although this also takes second place in the significance hierarchy after family). Occupation was of the highest priority for Poles (89%) and of the least for Russians (74%).

Free time and leisure were more important for residents of the Netherlands, Germany and Poland (93%, 87% and 86%, respectively) than for residents of Ukraine and Russia (75% each).

When assessing the level of religiosity, Ukraine was second to Poland (where 80% of respondents considered religion to be important), ahead of Russia (42%), Germany (38%) and the Netherlands (25%).

Political activity was the most important for the Germans (44%) and the Dutch (40%); its importance was noted by 33% of respondents in Poland, 30% in Ukraine, and 27% in Russia.

Ukrainian regions differed significantly in rating the importance of religion. Its importance was noted by 90% of respondents in the West, as compared with 53% in the Centre, 50% in Donbas, 39% in the South and 32% in the East. Religion was also much more important for ethnic Ukrainians than for ethnic Russians (57% and 36%, respectively) as well as for Ukrainian-speaking respondents (66%) compared with Russian-speaking ones (36%) and bilinguals (48%).

The importance of friends, free time and leisure decreased with age, while the significance of religion and political activity increased.

Answers to the question of what qualities are the most important to instill in children (p.44) also reveal the respondents' views on life values. The Ukrainians believed that "industriousness" was the most important trait. The Russians also placed this value first in terms of its importance. At the same time, the Germans and the Dutch considered responsibility the top priority, while the Poles singled out responsibility and tolerance, and respect for other people. The Ukrainians and Russians marked responsibility second, and tolerance and respect for other people third most important value (as did the Germans). The Dutch put this value in second position. The Germans rated independence second, and the Dutch placed it third. The Ukrainians placed independence in the 4-6th position (along with resolution and prudence), the Poles also placed it in the 4-6th positions together with self-expression and religiosity, and the Russians rated it 6th.

Residents of the West, as compared with other regions, placed much more emphasis on inculcating religiosity (40% compared to 6% to 8%) and obedience (34% vs. 12% to 26% in other regions), and less importance on instilling self-expression (25%, and 32% to 50% in other regions).

Younger respondents considered it more important to instill determination, independence and self-expression, while the oldest age group rated tolerance and honor for other people as somewhat higher than members of other age groups.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES

When estimating the importance of living in a democratic country on a scale from 1 ("*not important at all*") to 10 ("*very important*"), the Ukrainians rated it at 8.3 points on average; this was lower than in Germany (8.9 points), the Netherlands (8.9 points) and Poland (8.7 points) but higher than in Russia (7.4 points) (Diagram "*How important is it for you to live in a democratic country?*" p.45). The value of democracy was assessed the highest by residents of the East (8.6 points) and the West (8.5 points) and lowest in Donbas (7.8 points) and the South (8.0 points). The importance of democracy was the highest for ethnic Ukrainians as compared with Russians (8.4 and 7.5 points, respectively); it had the lowest rating among the oldest respondents as compared with those younger and middle-aged.

At the same time, the assessment of the level of democracy in the country was very low (3.8 points) by the scale 1 ("*fully undemocratic*") to 10 ("*fully democratic*"), whereas this indicator was 7.3 points in the Netherlands, 7.2 points in Germany, 5.9 points in Poland, and 4.6 points in Russia

[12] For details, see: A. Maslow Motivation and personality. Translated by A. M. Tatlybaeva. Moscow: Evrazia, 1999.

[13] Schwartz S. H. *Universals in the structure and content of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries*. – In M.P.Zanna (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Orlando, Vol.25, 1992. pp.1-65.

(Diagram "*How democratically is our country governed today?*" p.45). Only 17% of respondents in Ukraine believed their country "fully" and "mostly" respected human rights, as compared with 86% in Germany, 69% in Poland, 64% in the Netherlands, and 42% in Russia (Diagram "*To what extent are human rights respected in our country today?*", p.46).

The opinion that Ukraine is governed in a democratic way with respect for human rights was supported most often in the West, most rarely in the East; more often by ethnic Ukrainians than by ethnic Russians, and by Ukrainian-speaking rather than by Russian-speaking and bilingual respondents.

When assessing the importance of various aspects of democracy on a 10-point scale, most Ukrainians (like citizens of other countries) mentioned the following aspects: "People elect political leaders in free elections", "Women and men have equal rights", and "Civil rights protect people from oppression by the state" (in all countries, the importance of these aspects was assessed as more than 8 points) (Diagram "*How important are the following...?*", pp.47-48). The Ukrainians rather highly rated the importance of such aspects as: "The unemployed receive government assistance" (7.7 points), "The government levies high taxes on the rich and supports the poor" (7.5 points), "The government ensures income equality" (7.2 points). The last aspect of democracy was also appreciated rather highly in Russia (7.4 points), whereas this assessment was significantly lower in other countries – from 5.1 points (the Netherlands) to 5.6 points (Germany).

The Ukrainians assessed the importance of the situation "The Army takes power if the government is incompetent" higher than the Germans, the Dutch and the Poles, but lower than Russian residents. The Ukrainians assessed importance of the statement "People obey their leaders" considerably lower than Russian residents; this provision gained a similarly low rating from residents of the Netherlands and Poland, and was even lower among Germans. The Ukrainians gave the lowest assessment to the statement "Religious leaders interpret laws and their opinion is decisive".

As compared with other regions, residents of the West gave a lower assessment to the importance of the opinion that the government imposes taxes on the rich and supports the poor and that the army would seize power if the government was incompetent. Residents of the Western and Central regions gave a lower rating to the idea that the unemployed should be provided with government assistance; and that people should obey their leaders.

87% of Ukrainians believed that a democratic political system is "rather good" or "very good" for their country (this indicator is higher only among German respondents (94%) and is the lowest in Russia (67%)) (Table "*How good are the following types of political systems for our country?*", p.49). However, the highest share (80%) of respondents in Ukraine (among the compared countries) believed that the presence of "a strong leader independent of the parliament and elections" was "rather good" or "very good". Russia was the country where this statement had the highest rating (67%), whereas in other countries it varied from 20% to 27%. 69% of Ukrainian respondents supported a system where "experts, not the government, make decisions, which they consider to be the best for the country" (the second highest rating after Poland at 75%).

12% of Ukrainian respondents considered a system governed by a military administration or military regime as "rather good" or "very good". This result was lower than in Poland (19%) and Russia (14%) but higher than in Germany (4%) and the Netherlands (2%).

In sum, when assessing their political views on a scale from 1 ("*left-wing*") to 10 ("*right-wing*"), the Ukrainians averaged 5.3 points. This value did not significantly differ from the situation in other countries (from 5.0 points in Germany to 5.6 points in the Netherlands) (Diagram "*People speak of the "left-wing" and "right-wing" in politics...*", p.50).

The Western region of Ukraine differs by having more "right-wing" political views (average score is 6.3), and the Eastern region is mostly "left-wing" (4.5 points). Ethnic Ukrainians are more "right-wing" (5.4 points) than ethnic Russians (4.7 points). The same is true for Ukrainian-speaking respondents (5.7 points) as compared with Russian speakers (4.9 points) and bilinguals (4.8 points). Young and middle aged respondents are more "right-wing" in their political views than older ones (60 years or more).

The relationship between the respondents' self-identification on a "left-wing – right-wing" scale was studied along with their value orientations (using the Schwartz PVQ). As the correlation analysis showed, the greatest political "rightism" correlated with such values as "Tradition" (0.127) and "Stimulation" (0.122). There was also a statistically significant correlation with the values "Achievement" (0.079), "Universalism" (0.066), "Power" (0.060), "Independence" (0.060), and "Benevolence" (0.046).

The research results make it possible to claim that political "rightism" in Ukraine positively correlated with positive ethnic stereotypes of Ukrainians, while political "leftism" correlated with negative ethnic stereotypes of Ukrainians. Thus, a positive correlation was observed on a "left-wing – right-wing" scale with traits attributed to the Ukrainians such as: religiosity (Pearson correlation coefficient equals 0.273), patriotism (0.111), freedom (0.105), national pride (0.077), sincerity (0.075), peacefulness (0.072), industriousness (0.070), honesty (0.68), hospitality (0.061), social activity (0.056) and bellicosity (0.048) (see above for the ambivalent interpretation of this last trait by respondents).

A negative correlation was observed between the responses on the "left-wing – right-wing" scale and traits inherent to the Ukrainians such as: indifference to public problems (-0.094), cruelty (-0.084), grudge-holding (-0.74), cunning (-0.063), and greed (-0.055). Since lower scores on the scale are consistent with left-wing views, and higher scores with the right-wing views; negative correlation of this scale with evaluation of the intensity of certain features means a higher assessment of the intensity of this feature by those holding left-wing views.

Pairs of statements were proposed to indicate the respondents' political views. They were asked to evaluate on the 10-point scale the extent to which they agreed with these statements (Diagram "*To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*", pp.50-55).

When choosing between the two statements "It is necessary to reduce the income gap" and "It is necessary to increase the income gap so that people exert more effort", the Ukrainians are more inclined to support the first option (almost the same as the Russians). Germans also tend to support the first statement (although to a lesser degree), while the Poles and the Dutch more often supported the second statement. The Ukrainians (as well as the Poles and the Russians) often advocated an increase of the state's share in business and industry. The Ukrainians (about the same as the Russians) supported the view that "The government should bear more responsibility for ensuring the financial well-being of all citizens" most often among the compared countries. At the same time, most Ukrainians tend to believe that "Competition is good. It encourages people to work hard and develop new ideas" (this idea is supported more only by the Germans). Choosing between the statements "People can get rich only at the expense of others" and "The well-being of all people can be improved", the Ukrainians more often tended to choose the second option (more often than Russians, less often than the Dutch and the Poles and about the same as the Germans). Choosing between the statement "In the end, hard work is usually rewarded" and "Hard work usually does not lead to success: success requires luck and connections", most Ukrainians were inclined to agree with the first opinion (about the same as the residents in most other countries except for Poland, where the residents tend to agree with the second statement).

Among the inhabitants of different Ukrainian regions, residents of the East most often supported the idea of increasing the government's share in business and industry, while the residents of the West showed little support. The statement "Competition is good. It encourages people to work hard and develop new ideas" was supported most strongly by residents of the West and Donbas. Western Ukrainians most often agreed with the statement "In the end, hard work is usually rewarded", whereas inhabitants of the Southern and Eastern regions more often agreed with the opinion "Hard work usually does not lead to success: success requires luck and connections". Residents of the West more often supported the statement "The well-being of all people can be improved" (as opposed to judgment "People can get rich only at the expense of others").

As compared with ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians more often supported reducing the difference between incomes, increasing the share of the government ownership, and the idea that the government is more responsible for the welfare of citizens. They supported statements about the danger of competition and that "People can get rich only at the expense of others" more often than ethnic Ukrainians.

The younger the respondents, the more they supported increasing the income gap, increasing the share of private ownership in business and industry, and the importance of competition.

Respondents were also asked to select goals, which they considered most important for the country during the next 10 years, from several lists (Diagram "*Today, many people discuss the goals of our country for the next 10 years…*", p.55). Ukrainians, as well as residents of other countries, when choosing between the following goals: "High economic growth rate", "High combat readiness", "Paying more attention to people's opinions at work and in society," and "Making cities and villages more beautiful" placed the highest importance on "High economic growth rate". "High combat readiness" was placed second (in other compared countries – third). Only 10% of Ukrainians selected "Paying more attention to people's opinions at work and in society", which had the lowest rate among the compared countries (in other countries this ranged from 16% in Russia to 40% in Germany).

Residents in the East selected "High economic growth rate" most often and "High combat readiness" most rarely.

Choosing between the goals "Maintaining order in the country", "Providing people with more opportunities to influence the decision-making processes of authorities", "Keeping prices down", "Protecting freedom of speech", Ukrainian residents mentioned "Maintaining order in the country" most often (as did respondents in Russia and the Netherlands) (Diagram "*If you had to choose...?*", p.56). German residents most often mentioned the goal "Giving people more opportunities to affect decision-making by the government" while the Poles chose "Fighting against rising prices". "Keeping prices down" was placed second by Ukrainians (as well as the Russians); "Providing people with more opportunities to influence the decision-making processes of authorities" – third; and "Protecting freedom of speech" last (as in Russia and Poland).

Choosing between the goals "Stable economy", "Transition to a more humane and less impersonal society", "Transition to a society where ideals are worth more than money", and "Crime prevention", the vast majority of Ukrainians preferred stable economy (Diagram "*What is the most important in this list?*", p.56). "Stable economy" was placed highest by residents in all other countries, but the share of respondents who chose this answer was higher in Ukraine. The goals "Transition to a more humane and less impersonal society" and "Transition to a society where ideals are worth more than money" received the least support in Ukraine (as in Poland and

Russia). Among inhabitants of different regions, residents of the East most often emphasised the provision of economic stability (85%).

Willingness to Defend the Country

The willingness to fight for one's country during a war is among the indicators of patriotism most frequently used in sociological surveys. Among the countries compared, Ukraine is the only country where a military conflict was taking place during the survey period. In other words, if respondents from other countries had only hypothetically considered the willingness to protect the country with arms, it has been the reality for Ukrainians. In Ukraine, the share of respondents who answered affirmatively concerning this willingness (31%) did not differ statistically from those who answered negatively (34%) (Diagram "*Of course, we all hope that there won't be another war...*", p.57). The ratio was the same in the Netherlands (42% and 43%, respectively). Germany is the only country where the share of respondents ready to fight for their country was less than those not willing to do so (41% and 53%, respectively); at the same time, the majority of respondents in Poland and Russia (71% and 53%, respectively) replied affirmatively.

A relative majority of residents in the West is ready to fight for the country (41%, while 32% answered negatively); in the East, a relative majority (42%) answered negatively, and 23% affirmatively. In the Central region, in the South and in Donbas, the difference between the respondents who answered positively and negatively was not statistically significant. There was no statistically significant difference between ethnic Ukrainians who answered positively and negatively (32% and 33%, respectively) whereas negative answers prevailed among ethnic Russians (26% and 42%, respectively). Among Ukrainian respondents, those answering affirmatively exceeded those answering negatively (36% and 31%, respectively) and negative responses prevailed among Russian-speaking (25% and 35%, respectively) and bilingual respondents (28% and 40%, respectively). The respondents who answered "yes" exceeded those who answered "no" among respondents younger than 50 years. Among respondents aged 50 to 59 years, the difference in these shares was not statistically significant, while respondents aged 60 or more answered negatively twice as often. 44% of male respondents answered this question in the affirmative and 25% in the negative; these values were 21% and 41%, respectively, among females. 48% of men aged 18 to 59 years claimed their willingness to fight for their country, while 22% answered negatively.

Civic and Political Activity

The socio-political sphere is among the areas where value orientations of individuals are being realised. Interest in politics in Ukraine (as in Poland and Russia) is considerably less than in Germany and the Netherlands, where 62% and 65% of respondents, respectively, are interested in politics (as compared with only 37% in Ukraine) (Diagram "*To what extent are you interested in politics?*", p.57). Ukrainian youth demonstrated particularly low interest in politics – only 25% of respondents younger than 30 years. This increased in proportion to the respondent age – to 46% among persons aged 60 years or more.

Ukraine is second to Germany in terms of the level of participation in peaceful demonstrations (16% of respondents in Ukraine and 21% in Germany mentioned that they participated in this form of protest) and ahead of Russia (12%), the Netherlands (12%) and Poland (8%) (Table "*Have you ever participated...?*", p.58). At the same time, more people among the Ukrainians (along with the Russians) responded that they never considered participation in this type of protest (64%) as compared with Germany – 31%, Poland – 40%, and the Netherlands – 42%.

The share of respondents that never considered participation in such forms of protest as strikes, boycotts and signing petitions was also high in Ukraine (along with Russia). The share of people who signed petitions (16%) was lower in Ukraine than in Germany (43%), the Netherlands (35%), and Poland (30%) and higher than in Russia (11%).

The share of respondents who participated in boycotts (5%) was lower in Ukraine than in Germany (13%), the Netherlands (8%), approximately the same as in Poland (4%) and higher than in Russia (2%). The share of people who participated in strikes (6%) was lower than in Germany (12%), the Netherlands (9%), the same as in Poland (6%) and higher than in Russia (2%).

As compared with the overall population, the most politically active Ukrainians live in the West; they more often participate in strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, and signing petitions. (Donbas residents were also active in this last kind of protest). Residents of the East demonstrate the lowest level of protest activity.

The higher the interest in politics, the more often the respondents take part in protests (p.59). Thus, only 8% of respondents who were not interested in politics at all participated in peaceful demonstrations, while this value was 31% among people interested in politics.

The level of participation by Ukrainians in non-governmental organisations was low (one of the lowest among the compared countries) (Table "*Are you a member of the following non-governmental organisations...?*", pp.60-61).

CONCLUSIONS

The value system and identity of Ukrainians are being formed in a difficult social and political environment including the military conflict in the East, a protracted economic crisis and political instability. The socio-psychological situation in Ukrainian society features a low level of trust (in particular for other members of society and institutions of power). Among social institutions, the Armed Forces, the Church, charity and humanitarian organisations, and universities have enjoyed the highest level of trust.

As the research data showed, the level of people's satisfaction with life is interconnected with the level of trust in the society. Ukrainians are most satisfied with life in the West and least satisfied in the East and in Donbas. Donbas is the only region where a majority of residents answered that they were "not very happy" or "very unhappy".

The study devoted attention to problems of bi- and multi-ethnicity as an aspect of the formation of ethnic identity. 74% of respondents in Ukraine felt an affiliation with only one ethnicity, 12% with two or more ethnicities, 6% did not feel an affiliation with any ethnicity, and 8% remained undecided. Bi- and multi-ethnicity, just like "distancing" from ethnic self-identity, is more typical in Ukraine for ethnic Russians and residents of Donbas, the South and the East.

Common civil identity prevails in Ukraine. The number of respondents who considered themselves citizens of the world is significantly less in Ukraine than in other European countries used for comparison. Identification of themselves as members of a local community is lower in Ukraine than in Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany but significantly higher than in Russia. As in Russia, a negligible percentage of Ukrainian citizens identify themselves as autonomous individuals; this number is considerably less than in the other countries compared.

More than a quarter of respondents (27%) consider themselves citizens of the former USSR. This share is most prevalent among the residents of the South and the East, among ethnic Russians and older people.

Positive auto-stereotypes prevail in the consciousness of Ukrainians. Ethnic Russians do not significantly differ from ethnic Ukrainians in assessing the intensity of various features of Ukrainians by attributing positive values to them.

Ukrainians mention health (physical and mental), happy family life and financial security as the top terminal values. Thus, the Ukrainians assign the highest priority to the values associated with meeting biological needs, physical and psychological comfort, and well-being. In other words, respondents give priority to the values which correspond to the lower- and middle-level needs in Maslow's hierarchy – physiological (biological) needs, the need for security and protection, the need for love and belonging. At the same time, the values associated with top level needs (respect, recognition and self-realisation) are less important. The younger the respondents, the more frequently they mention "interesting occupation", "active life", "love" and "development".

Individual value profiles featured by Schwartz, such as "Benevolence", "Safety" and "Traditions", prevail among the Ukrainians. "Benevolence" and "Safety" are the most significant values for all age groups. The importance of such values as "Self-Direction", "Achievement", "Hedonism", "Power", and "Stimulation" increases as the respondents' age decreases, while, on the contrary, the importance of such values as "Tradition" and "Conformity" increases with age.

"Benevolence" and socio-centric orientation, as well as "Independence", "Security", "Conformity", "Universalism" and "Tradition" are more relevant for the respondents who identify themselves as Ukrainian citizens as compared with those who do not.

Ukrainian respondents assess the importance of democracy for them somewhat lower than residents of Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, but higher than the Russians. At the same time, the Ukrainians gave low assessment of the level of democracy of the current government (the lowest among the countries compared).

Assessing the importance of various aspects of democracy, most Ukrainians (like citizens of other countries) mention the following: "People elect political leaders in free elections", "Women and men have equal rights," "Civil rights protect people from oppression by the state". The Ukrainians consider ensuring equality of incomes by the government an important aspect of democracy similarly to residents of Russia (and higher than people in other countries). The Ukrainians assess the importance of "obeying the leaders" at the lowest level.

The inconsistency of the Ukrainian political mentality is particularly seen in the combination of their support for democracy with the hope for a "strong leader, independent of the parliament and elections", while the idea of a "military regime" has little support. Also, a highly-rated idea of reducing the income disparity comes along with support for competition as an impetus for individual effort and development.

Ukraine is not uniform in adherence to "left-wing" and "right-wing" political ideas. The Western region demonstrates more "right-wing" political views while the East shows more "left-wing" trends. Ethnic Ukrainians adhere to "right-wing" political views more often than ethnic Russians, and less often to "left-wing" views. The younger the respondents, the more "right-wing" their views are.

The correlation analysis showed that the highest political "rightism" correlates with such values as "Tradition" and "Stimulation". A statistically significant correlation is observed for the values "Achievement", "Universalism", "Power", "Self-Direction" and "Benevolence" (based on the Schwartz PVQ).

Political "rightism" in Ukraine positively correlates with positive ethnic stereotypes of Ukrainians, while political "leftism" correlates with negative ethnic stereotypes.

The research results make it possible to conclude that the socio-political orientations of Ukrainians are connected to the formation of their identity. The differences in value orientations and identity between older and younger generations confirm the fact that consciousness of younger people matches more closely the contemporary environment while the consciousness of older generation was formed to a large extent under the impact of social realities and paradigms of the Soviet period.

Can most people generally be trusted or must one be very careful in dealing with them?
% of respondents



If given the opportunity, would most people try to take advantage of you, or would they behave decently and honestly?*
average score



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "*people will always try to take advantage of you*", and 10 means "*people will behave decently*".

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE CHURCH					
Ukraine	22.1	43.6	24.1	9.9	0.2
Germany	9.4	27.9	40.6	19.9	2.1
The Netherlands	5.2	16.9	40.5	29.7	7.7
Poland	19.9	38.4	30.9	9.0	1.9
Russia	21.0	42.0	19.5	11.1	6.5
THE ARMED FORCES					
Ukraine	20.6	49.7	22.1	7.4	0.3
Germany	11.5	52.1	27.5	5.5	3.5
The Netherlands	4.3	45.2	32.7	6.7	11.2
Poland	11.9	50.5	26.6	3.2	7.8
Russia	16.2	47.1	23.2	8.5	5.0
HUMANITARIAN AND CHARITY ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	8.6	55.8	25.0	10.2	0.3
Germany	14.2	59.9	19.7	3.4	2.8
The Netherlands	3.0	38.3	41.7	9.0	7.9
Poland	12.3	52.7	23.1	3.8	8.2
Russia	6.3	34.7	25.3	12.5	21.1
WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	4.4	43.9	38.1	13.4	0.1
Germany	9.2	51.9	23.8	5.2	9.9
The Netherlands	1.9	36.6	36.2	6.6	18.8
Poland	5.2	41.3	25.8	4.4	23.3
Russia	6.2	33.2	22.1	11.6	26.9
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	4.1	40.4	39.7	15.4	0.4
Germany	7.7	58.4	26.2	5.3	2.4
The Netherlands	3.2	41.5	36.9	9.4	9.0
Poland	5.8	45.5	31.3	5.0	12.4
Russia	6.9	40.6	23.8	11.2	17.5
UNIVERSITIES					
Ukraine	3.9	48.4	32.5	14.7	0.4
Germany	18.1	59.8	12.9	1.8	7.4
The Netherlands	7.6	63.8	18.1	1.6	8.9
Poland	9.7	54.0	17.5	2.6	16.1
Russia	8.0	48.7	21.8	9.8	11.7
THE POLICE					
Ukraine	2.6	30.8	44.3	22.1	0.2
Germany	22.3	59.4	13.6	3.6	1.1
The Netherlands	5.1	60.4	28.0	3.2	3.3
Poland	5.2	45.3	35.3	8.4	5.9
Russia	4.6	27.1	39.8	24.4	4.1
TELEVISION					
Ukraine	2.3	40.8	42.1	14.5	0.3
Germany	5.2	42.2	42.5	9.3	0.8
The Netherlands	1.1	38.5	51.2	5.0	4.2
Poland	3.0	26.9	55.9	11.4	2.7
Russia	4.8	36.3	38.9	18.3	1.8
TRADE UNIONS					
Ukraine	1.9	31.7	44.0	21.9	0.3
Germany	5.5	40.0	38.4	9.1	7.1
The Netherlands	1.2	36.4	43.5	8.2	10.7
Poland	1.5	16.2	39.0	15.9	27.3
Russia	3.8	22.2	31.5	21.8	20.8

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE PRESS					
Ukraine	1.6	38.4	44.3	15.6	0.1
Germany	6.3	38.1	45.0	9.7	0.9
The Netherlands	0.7	33.4	53.3	8.8	3.8
Poland	2.4	25.3	55.1	13.0	4.2
Russia	2.9	30.6	43.1	21.1	2.3
COURTS					
Ukraine	1.3	10.5	43.0	44.9	0.3
Germany	17.0	54.3	21.6	4.8	2.3
The Netherlands	9.5	52.4	29.0	5.0	4.1
Poland	3.4	35.3	39.6	12.9	8.8
Russia	4.9	27.6	38.0	22.3	7.2
LARGE COMPANIES					
Ukraine	1.3	25.0	49.3	24.0	0.4
Germany	1.8	23.3	51.1	19.0	4.7
The Netherlands	1.4	35.9	47.4	6.2	9.1
Poland	3.1	33.7	38.1	6.0	19.1
Russia	3.2	29.6	35.9	16.9	14.4
THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE					
Ukraine	1.0	11.8	41.0	45.9	0.3
Germany	5.5	38.9	43.6	10.4	1.6
The Netherlands	1.3	31.7	48.9	13.4	4.7
Poland	0.4	15.6	54.2	25.5	4.3
Russia	7.0	40.4	30.6	16.6	5.3
STATE INSTITUTIONS					
Ukraine	0.9	27.6	43.7	27.1	0.6
Germany	5.3	48.9	37.9	5.9	1.9
The Netherlands	1.1	32.3	50.5	9.3	6.9
Poland	0.7	18.8	55.0	17.5	8.0
Russia	5.4	41.2	31.3	14.0	8.1
BANKS					
Ukraine	0.8	14.4	42.6	41.8	0.4
Germany	2.9	22.0	47.1	26.6	1.4
The Netherlands	1.1	24.8	50.1	18.6	5.6
Poland	4.4	36.9	40.3	10.3	8.1
Russia	5.6	32.7	34.2	20.9	6.5
PARLIAMENT					
Ukraine	0.6	9.1	39.3	50.7	0.2
Germany	5.0	38.5	44.7	9.1	2.7
The Netherlands	1.3	31.3	48.3	12.1	7.0
Poland	0.2	10.8	56.0	26.8	6.2
Russia	3.3	27.2	34.9	23.6	11.0
POLITICAL PARTIES					
Ukraine	0.4	8.8	40.0	50.5	0.2
Germany	2.6	21.3	57.8	15.8	2.5
The Netherlands	0.1	18.1	60.1	16.3	5.4
Poland	0.2	7.0	51.0	35.2	6.6
Russia	2.7	23.3	37.7	29.0	7.3

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE CHURCH					
Ukraine	**22.1**	**43.6**	**24.1**	**9.9**	**0.2**
West	44.8	41.9	10.8	2.5	0.0
Centre	18.3	47.5	24.2	9.6	0.4
South	10.0	45.2	32.8	11.6	0.4
East	8.9	39.1	35.0	16.9	0.0
Donbas	26.3	38.1	22.0	13.6	0.0
THE ARMED FORCES					
Ukraine	**20.6**	**49.7**	**22.1**	**7.4**	**0.3**
West	27.3	54.2	15.9	2.5	0.0
Centre	21.9	53.5	18.1	6.1	0.4
South	25.7	36.9	28.6	8.3	0.4
East	4.8	45.5	34.5	14.9	0.2
Donbas	29.7	46.6	16.9	5.9	0.8
HUMANITARIAN AND CHARITY ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	**8.6**	**55.8**	**25.0**	**10.2**	**0.3**
West	10.6	59.6	24.3	5.3	0.2
Centre	5.9	52.8	30.4	10.7	0.3
South	13.8	58.3	18.3	8.8	0.8
East	6.3	56.3	20.8	16.4	0.2
Donbas	16.2	53.8	22.2	7.7	0.0
WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	**4.4**	**43.9**	**38.1**	**13.4**	**0.1**
West	5.7	44.4	40.6	9.3	0.0
Centre	3.2	36.6	45.5	14.4	0.3
South	7.9	54.4	25.7	11.6	0.4
East	3.1	54.5	25.5	16.9	0.0
Donbas	3.4	30.8	49.6	16.2	0.0
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS					
Ukraine	**4.1**	**40.4**	**39.7**	**15.4**	**0.4**
West	4.9	48.7	37.7	8.7	0.0
Centre	3.5	32.2	47.6	16.0	0.8
South	6.2	47.3	32.8	12.9	0.8
East	3.4	45.3	30.1	21.2	0.0
Donbas	2.6	29.1	45.3	23.1	0.0
UNIVERSITIES					
Ukraine	**3.9**	**48.4**	**32.5**	**14.7**	**0.4**
West	4.0	61.5	28.1	5.9	0.4
Centre	3.0	42.7	37.2	16.7	0.4
South	10.4	56.0	23.7	9.5	0.4
East	2.6	38.9	33.4	24.8	0.2
Donbas	1.7	51.3	33.3	12.8	0.9
THE POLICE					
Ukraine	**2.6**	**30.8**	**44.3**	**22.1**	**0.2**
West	3.0	39.0	49.2	8.7	0.1
Centre	2.5	33.9	40.6	22.7	0.3
South	6.2	20.3	39.8	33.2	0.5
East	0.5	19.0	48.2	32.0	0.3
Donbas	1.7	41.5	44.1	12.7	0.0
TELEVISION					
Ukraine	**2.3**	**40.8**	**42.1**	**14.5**	**0.3**
West	1.9	52.2	38.3	7.6	0.0
Centre	2.3	38.5	42.8	16.0	0.4
South	5.4	27.3	47.9	18.2	1.2
East	1.0	41.3	40.9	16.6	0.2
Donbas	3.4	35.9	43.6	17.1	0.0
TRADE UNIONS					
Ukraine	**1.9**	**31.7**	**44.0**	**21.9**	**0.3**
West	2.1	38.1	45.1	14.6	0.0
Centre	1.6	29.6	45.5	23.0	0.4
South	6.2	28.9	40.1	24.4	0.4
East	0.2	33.0	42.2	24.1	0.5
Donbas	1.7	21.8	45.4	31.1	0.0

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE PRESS					
Ukraine	**1.6**	**38.4**	**44.3**	**15.6**	**0.1**
West	2.1	48.8	39.7	9.3	0.0
Centre	1.9	35.3	47.1	15.5	0.1
South	2.1	32.2	48.8	16.5	0.4
East	0.7	38.6	41.8	18.6	0.2
Donbas	0.8	27.7	42.0	29.4	0.0
COURTS					
Ukraine	**1.3**	**10.5**	**43.0**	**44.9**	**0.3**
West	1.9	13.9	53.4	30.6	0.2
Centre	1.0	8.1	42.5	48.2	0.2
South	2.5	14.9	35.5	46.7	0.4
East	0.5	7.7	39.0	52.8	0.0
Donbas	1.7	15.3	33.9	49.2	0.0
LARGE COMPANIES					
Ukraine	**1.3**	**25.0**	**49.3**	**24.0**	**0.4**
West	0.8	33.1	51.7	14.2	0.2
Centre	0.4	19.9	51.1	28.1	0.5
South	5.4	24.9	50.2	18.7	0.8
East	1.0	22.4	46.0	30.4	0.2
Donbas	1.7	35.6	38.1	24.6	0.0
THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE					
Ukraine	**1.0**	**11.8**	**41.0**	**45.9**	**0.3**
West	1.3	15.4	51.4	31.9	0.0
Centre	0.5	12.3	43.2	43.7	0.3
South	2.5	12.9	27.8	55.6	1.2
East	0.2	4.3	33.6	61.8	0.0
Donbas	1.7	18.8	39.3	40.2	0.0
STATE INSTITUTIONS					
Ukraine	**0.9**	**27.6**	**43.7**	**27.1**	**0.6**
West	1.3	34.5	46.5	17.5	0.2
Centre	0.4	23.5	46.0	29.4	0.8
South	2.5	36.0	40.5	19.8	1.2
East	1.2	22.2	39.0	37.1	0.5
Donbas	0.0	29.9	40.2	29.9	0.0
BANKS					
Ukraine	**0.8**	**14.4**	**42.6**	**41.8**	**0.4**
West	1.5	19.9	51.0	27.5	0.2
Centre	0.6	10.6	41.6	46.8	0.4
South	1.2	14.1	37.3	46.9	0.4
East	0.2	11.1	42.2	45.8	0.7
Donbas	0.9	28.2	27.4	43.6	0.0
PARLIAMENT					
Ukraine	**0.6**	**9.1**	**39.3**	**50.7**	**0.2**
West	0.4	11.4	48.9	39.2	0.0
Centre	0.6	8.3	42.1	48.7	0.3
South	1.7	9.5	30.7	57.3	0.8
East	0.0	4.8	29.2	65.8	0.2
Donbas	0.8	19.3	36.1	43.7	0.0
POLITICAL PARTIES					
Ukraine	**0.4**	**8.8**	**40.0**	**50.5**	**0.2**
West	0.2	12.1	46.2	41.3	0.2
Centre	0.4	6.4	41.9	51.0	0.3
South	1.2	12.0	35.3	51.0	0.4
East	0.2	4.8	32.5	62.3	0.2
Donbas	1.7	17.9	38.5	41.9	0.0

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents based on the language of communication in the family (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE CHURCH					
Ukrainian	27.5	45.2	19.9	7.2	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	13.6	42.0	31.8	12.6	0.0
Russian	16.0	41.9	27.8	13.9	0.4
THE ARMED FORCES					
Ukrainian	24.2	52.4	18.6	4.6	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	13.6	47.5	26.6	12.1	0.2
Russian	17.5	45.6	26.4	9.8	0.6
HUMANITARIAN AND CHARITY ORGANISATIONS					
Ukrainian	8.1	56.3	26.8	8.5	0.3
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	10.7	53.9	24.3	10.9	0.2
Russian	7.9	56.5	21.7	13.4	0.4
WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS					
Ukrainian	4.4	41.3	42.3	12.1	0.0
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	4.4	50.0	30.6	15.0	0.0
Russian	4.1	45.0	35.0	15.4	0.6
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS					
Ukrainian	4.5	38.8	42.4	14.0	0.4
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	3.4	43.9	36.4	16.0	0.2
Russian	3.0	41.7	36.4	18.1	0.9
UNIVERSITIES					
Ukrainian	3.9	49.9	32.5	13.3	0.4
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	3.4	44.7	34.2	17.5	0.2
Russian	4.1	49.0	31.1	15.1	0.6
THE POLICE					
Ukrainian	3.4	33.3	45.7	17.4	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.5	26.2	47.7	24.7	0.0
Russian	1.7	28.8	38.4	30.5	0.6
TELEVISION					
Ukrainian	2.5	43.9	41.7	11.8	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.2	41.3	43.0	14.6	0.0
Russian	2.6	33.8	42.1	20.3	1.3
TRADE UNIONS					
Ukrainian	2.4	35.3	44.5	17.6	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.0	31.1	43.0	24.8	0.2
Russian	1.7	24.9	43.5	29.0	0.9

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?
% of respondents based on the language of communication in the family (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust	No answer
THE PRESS					
Ukrainian	2.1	41.5	44.0	12.4	0.0
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.2	38.3	44.4	16.0	0.0
Russian	0.9	31.5	44.9	22.1	0.6
COURTS					
Ukrainian	1.6	10.6	47.9	39.7	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.0	10.4	41.2	47.5	0.0
Russian	0.9	9.8	33.9	55.0	0.4
LARGE COMPANIES					
Ukrainian	1.0	25.4	51.1	22.3	0.3
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	1.7	23.1	46.4	28.4	0.5
Russian	1.7	25.6	48.0	24.1	0.6
THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE					
Ukrainian	1.2	13.1	46.4	39.2	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	0.5	10.1	39.6	49.3	0.5
Russian	1.1	9.8	30.4	58.1	0.6
STATE INSTITUTIONS					
Ukrainian	1.0	29.2	45.3	24.4	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	0.7	25.7	45.0	27.4	1.2
Russian	0.9	26.0	39.0	32.8	1.3
BANKS					
Ukrainian	0.9	14.2	44.8	39.9	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian. sometimes Russian	0.2	16.5	39.8	43.0	0.5
Russian	0.9	13.0	40.7	44.6	0.9
PARLIAMENT					
Ukrainian	0.5	10.7	43.8	44.9	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	0.5	7.5	37.3	54.7	0.0
Russian	0.6	6.8	31.1	60.6	0.9
POLITICAL PARTIES					
Ukrainian	0.4	9.2	43.3	47.0	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	0.2	8.5	37.6	53.2	0.5
Russian	0.4	7.7	35.0	56.5	0.4

To what extent do you trust the following categories of people?
% of respondents

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust at all	No answer
YOUR FAMILY					
Ukraine	90.4	8.7	0.6	0.1	0.1
Germany	75.9	19.0	3.4	1.1	0.5
The Netherlands	58.6	34.1	4.8	0.7	1.7
Poland	69.2	27.9	1.6	0.4	1.0
Russia	87.1	9.4	1.7	0.5	1.4
YOUR NEIGHBOURS					
Ukraine	16.0	57.0	21.9	4.7	0.4
Germany	14.3	59.2	21.1	5.1	0.4
The Netherlands	15.7	52.8	22.8	4.0	4.6
Poland	8.3	65.5	18.4	4.3	3.4
Russia	18.4	54.1	20.5	5.7	1.3
PEOPLE YOU KNOW PERSONALLY					
Ukraine	14.4	65.6	17.2	2.7	0.2
Germany	18.1	70.3	10.2	0.8	0.7
The Netherlands	19.0	67.6	10.3	0.6	2.5
Poland	7.5	78.9	10.5	0.6	2.5
Russia	20.0	62.2	14.8	2.0	1.0
PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION / CONFESSION					
Ukraine	2.1	33.0	49.1	15.5	0.3
Germany	3.5	46.5	34.7	6.3	8.9
The Netherlands	0.9	38.6	39.0	7.3	14.2
Poland	1.6	46.5	25.9	6.6	19.5
Russia	4.5	32.0	31.2	18.9	13.4
PEOPLE OF ANOTHER NATIONALITY					
Ukraine	1.9	35.6	46.0	16.3	0.2
Germany	4.0	47.8	32.8	8.4	7.0
The Netherlands	0.7	35.5	42.6	7.1	14.1
Poland	1.1	46.6	25.9	5.5	21.0
Russia	4.6	32.1	31.3	18.8	13.3
PEOPLE YOU MEET FOR THE FIRST TIME					
Ukraine	0.5	21.7	55.0	22.6	0.2
Germany	2.0	28.9	48.6	18.1	2.3
The Netherlands	0.1	22.2	57.3	12.1	8.3
Poland	0.1	23.7	53.6	16.9	5.7
Russia	1.7	18.7	43.2	32.4	4.0

To what extent do you trust the following categories of people?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Trust completely	Trust to a certain extent	Do not really trust	Do not trust at all	No answer
YOUR FAMILY					
Ukraine	**90.4**	**8.7**	**0.6**	**0.1**	**0.1**
West	91.1	8.3	0.4	0.0	0.2
Centre	90.9	8.3	0.5	0.1	0.1
South	90.5	7.9	0.8	0.4	0.4
East	90.4	8.7	1.0	0.0	0.0
Donbas	84.7	15.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
YOUR NEIGHBOURS					
Ukraine	**16.0**	**57.0**	**21.9**	**4.7**	**0.4**
West	20.9	61.7	14.8	1.7	0.8
Centre	13.9	54.7	27.1	4.2	0.1
South	27.1	52.5	18.8	1.3	0.4
East	11.6	61.0	17.3	9.6	0.5
Donbas	3.4	47.5	39.0	10.2	0.0
PEOPLE YOU KNOW PERSONALLY					
Ukraine	**14.4**	**65.6**	**17.2**	**2.7**	**0.2**
West	15.2	72.3	10.6	1.7	0.2
Centre	14.4	63.5	20.0	1.9	0.1
South	14.5	65.6	18.7	0.8	0.4
East	16.1	59.8	17.1	6.7	0.2
Donbas	5.1	71.8	21.4	1.7	0.0
PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RELIGION / CONFESSION					
Ukraine	**2.1**	**33.0**	**49.1**	**15.5**	**0.3**
West	5.9	46.5	37.0	10.4	0.2
Centre	0.9	27.4	59.3	12.0	0.4
South	1.2	32.2	48.8	16.9	0.8
East	1.0	27.7	44.1	27.0	0.2
Donbas	0.0	35.0	49.6	15.4	0.0
PEOPLE OF ANOTHER NATIONALITY					
Ukraine	**1.9**	**35.6**	**46.0**	**16.3**	**0.2**
West	5.5	48.4	34.9	11.0	0.2
Centre	0.8	32.4	53.8	12.7	0.3
South	0.8	32.0	48.1	18.7	0.4
East	1.2	27.5	42.5	28.7	0.0
Donbas	0.0	40.2	47.0	12.8	0.0
PEOPLE YOU MEET FOR THE FIRST TIME					
Ukraine	**0.5**	**21.7**	**55.0**	**22.6**	**0.2**
West	0.0	26.5	53.2	20.1	0.2
Centre	0.8	19.4	59.2	20.4	0.3
South	0.8	26.0	51.2	21.5	0.4
East	0.5	19.3	53.0	27.2	0.0
Donbas	0.0	17.1	49.6	33.3	0.0

Which of the following groups would you prefer not to be neighbours with?*
% of respondents

	Ukraine	Germany	The Netherlands	Poland	Russia
Drug addicts	94.0	66.3	92.3	73.9	93.2
Alcoholics	81.5	70.2	84.6	65.4	84.3
Homosexuals	66.5	22.4	6.9	39.6	66.2
People with AIDS	42.9	24.0	9.7	25.6	54.3
Immigrants/foreign workers	20.3	21.4	19.6	7.2	32.2
People of other races	12.1	14.8	8.2	5.5	17.2
People of other religions	6.7	14.1	2.7	4.6	14.3
People who speak a language different from yours	6.6	13.4	14.5	3.2	18.9
Unmarried couples living together	2.9	9.3	0.6	3.5	7.8
REGIONS OF UKRAINE					
	West	**Centre**	**South**	**East**	**Donbas**
Drug addicts	93.7	92.9	97.1	96.6	86.3
Alcoholics	76.7	82.2	91.7	81.6	76.3
Homosexuals	60.0	59.8	83.0	80.0	55.1
People with AIDS	44.3	29.5	58.1	58.1	39.3
Immigrants/foreign workers	16.7	13.5	23.2	36.6	15.3
People of other races	12.9	6.7	14.5	20.8	9.4
People of other religions	7.6	6.9	7.9	6.0	1.7
People who speak a language different from yours	4.2	7.9	10.4	6.0	1.7
Unmarried couples living together	1.1	4.3	4.1	2.4	1.7
AGE OF UKRAINIAN RESPONDENTS					
	18-29 years	**30-39 years**	**40-49 years**	**50-59 years**	**60 years or more**
Drug addicts	94.8	93.3	95.8	94.9	92.3
Alcoholics	81.6	80.6	83.2	78.5	83.3
Homosexuals	66.5	66.7	61.3	67.7	68.7
People with AIDS	41.5	42.5	41.0	41.8	46.1
Immigrants/foreign workers	15.6	20.7	19.9	21.2	23.2
People of other races	9.9	11.0	11.4	13.3	14.2
People of other religions	3.8	6.7	5.4	8.2	9.0
People who speak a language different from yours	3.8	7.8	6.0	5.1	9.4
Unmarried couples living together	2.1	1.9	2.4	2.5	4.9

* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.

How satisfied are you with your life in general?*
average score



UKRAINE

Regions



Age



Nationality



Language spoken in the family



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "*completely unsatisfied*", and 10 means "*completely satisfied*".

Can you say that you are generally ... ?
% of respondents



UKRAINE

Regions



Age



Nationality



Language spoken in the family



What is your nationality?
% of respondents



Do you feel that you belong to a particular ethnicity?
% of respondents



What is your native language?
% of respondents



What language do you speak at home?
% of respondents

What language do you speak outside your home and family (at work, at school, etc.)?
% of respondents

People think differently of themselves and their attitude towards the country and the world. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you?
% of respondents

	Completely Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know	No answer
I consider myself a citizen of the world						
Ukraine	15.1	23.1	24.9	27.2	9.5	0.1
Germany	20.4	39.6	28.0	8.4	0.0	3.6
The Netherlands	9.8	57.5	26.4	5.6	0.0	0.7
Poland	25.4	52.3	15.4	2.5	0.0	4.4
Russia	17.5	28.8	27.4	17.6	0.0	8.7
I consider myself a member of the local community						
Ukraine	20.4	31.7	17.5	21.9	8.2	0.2
Germany	35.4	42.5	16.9	4.3	0.0	0.9
The Netherlands	9.9	68.5	17.0	3.9	0.0	0.7
Poland	35.8	56.5	5.2	0.3	0.0	2.1
Russia	6.2	17.4	24.4	38.8	0.0	13.2
I consider myself a citizen of my country						
Ukraine	72.0	22.5	2.4	1.1	1.9	0.2
Germany	39.1	46.8	10.1	2.4	0.0	1.6
The Netherlands	17.7	75.2	4.8	1.5	0.0	0.7
Poland	51.9	45.1	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.9
Russia	64.4	27.6	3.8	2.2	0.0	2.0
I consider myself a citizen of the former Soviet Union						
Ukraine	9.8	17.1	21.2	44.0	7.5	0.3
I consider myself an EU citizen						
Germany	12.2	43.1	31.4	10.4	0.0	3.0
The Netherlands	6.3	52.7	32.0	8.4	0.0	0.7
Poland	26.3	54.9	12.9	1.5	0.0	4.5
I consider myself an autonomous individual						
Ukraine	7.1	14.0	17.4	37.4	23.6	0.4
Germany	38.8	41.3	12.2	4.6	0.0	3.1
The Netherlands	23.6	59.3	13.2	3.2	0.0	0.7
Poland	31.8	47.8	14.0	1.0	0.0	5.4
Russia	8.0	14.4	24.1	34.5	0.0	19.0

People think differently of themselves and their attitude towards the country and the world. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Completely Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know	No answer
I consider myself a citizen of the world						
Ukraine	**15.1**	**23.1**	**24.9**	**27.2**	**9.5**	**0.1**
West	14.8	26.1	26.1	26.1	7.0	0.0
Centre	16.0	23.6	25.5	22.9	11.9	0.1
South	22.0	20.7	23.2	24.9	8.7	0.4
East	10.4	18.6	23.7	40.8	6.3	0.2
Donbas	13.6	28.8	25.4	16.1	16.1	0.0
I consider myself a member of the local community						
Ukraine	**20.4**	**31.7**	**17.5**	**21.9**	**8.2**	**0.2**
West	24.8	38.8	15.5	18.0	2.8	0.2
Centre	19.6	30.4	18.2	19.4	12.3	0.1
South	34.0	25.7	13.3	21.2	5.4	0.4
East	9.7	30.7	19.3	32.6	7.5	0.2
Donbas	17.1	28.2	23.9	18.8	12.0	0.0
I consider myself a citizen of Ukraine						
Ukraine	**72.0**	**22.5**	**2.4**	**1.1**	**1.9**	**0.2**
West	80.5	16.3	1.9	0.6	0.6	0.0
Centre	79.4	16.4	2.3	1.0	0.5	0.3
South	70.4	25.0	1.7	0.0	2.9	0.0
East	55.7	35.2	2.7	1.9	4.3	0.2
Donbas	52.1	36.8	4.3	1.7	5.1	0.0
I consider myself a citizen of the former Soviet Union						
Ukraine	**9.8**	**17.1**	**21.2**	**44.0**	**7.5**	**0.3**
West	4.7	11.9	21.6	57.4	4.2	0.2
Centre	4.5	16.1	22.3	48.4	8.6	0.1
South	30.7	17.4	10.4	27.8	12.4	1.2
East	14.2	26.3	24.3	29.2	5.8	0.2
Donbas	6.8	12.0	23.9	47.9	9.4	0.0
I consider myself an autonomous individual						
Ukraine	**7.1**	**14.0**	**17.4**	**37.4**	**23.6**	**0.4**
West	8.3	16.8	21.4	33.3	19.7	0.4
Centre	5.1	16.7	14.1	32.9	30.5	0.6
South	10.7	10.3	12.0	41.3	25.2	0.4
East	8.7	10.6	20.7	43.9	15.9	0.2
Donbas	2.6	5.1	23.1	52.1	17.1	0.0

People think differently of themselves and their attitude towards the country and the world. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Completely Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know	No answer
depending on the age of Ukrainian respondents						
I consider myself a citizen of the world						
18-29 years	17.9	22.4	28.5	23.6	7.3	0.2
30-39 years	17.7	23.9	20.4	26.8	11.0	0.3
40-49 years	15.6	25.2	25.2	25.2	8.7	0.0
50-59 years	13.3	25.4	27.1	27.1	7.1	0.0
60 years or more	12.0	20.2	23.6	31.6	12.4	0.2
I consider myself a member of the local community						
18-29 years	20.5	29.9	19.8	23.1	6.4	0.5
30-39 years	19.8	30.3	18.2	22.5	8.6	0.5
40-49 years	19.9	33.1	19.3	20.2	7.5	0.0
50-59 years	23.5	30.3	16.7	20.1	9.3	0.0
60 years or more	18.9	34.1	14.6	23.1	9.2	0.0
I consider myself a citizen of Ukraine						
18-29 years	74.6	20.0	2.6	0.9	1.6	0.2
30-39 years	76.3	19.1	1.9	0.8	1.6	0.3
40-49 years	70.6	25.5	0.3	0.9	2.7	0.0
50-59 years	71.1	24.1	2.8	0.6	1.4	0.0
60 years or more	68.7	23.6	3.6	1.7	2.2	0.2
I consider myself a citizen of the former Soviet Union						
18-29 years	2.8	5.4	14.6	68.2	8.3	0.7
30-39 years	4.3	6.7	26.3	53.2	9.1	0.3
40-49 years	8.7	15.0	25.5	43.2	7.2	0.3
50-59 years	11.6	29.4	22.6	31.1	5.1	0.3
60 years or more	18.7	27.0	19.3	27.3	7.5	0.2
I consider myself an autonomous individual						
18-29 years	9.7	14.9	14.4	41.1	19.1	0.7
30-39 years	9.2	12.7	19.4	36.7	21.8	0.3
40-49 years	7.5	15.3	18.0	37.2	21.9	0.0
50-59 years	4.8	13.1	20.7	34.7	25.9	0.9
60 years or more	4.7	14.2	16.1	37.2	27.7	0.2

People think differently of themselves and their attitude towards the country and the world. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Completely Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Completely disagree	Do not know	No answer
depending on the nationality of Ukrainian respondents						
I consider myself a citizen of the world						
Ukrainians	15.5	23.3	24.9	26.8	9.4	0.2
Russians	9.9	15.7	25.6	35.5	13.2	0.0
I consider myself a member of the local community						
Ukrainians	20.6	31.1	18.0	22.0	8.2	0.2
Russians	15.8	39.2	14.2	20.8	10.0	0.0
I consider myself a citizen of Ukraine						
Ukrainians	73.9	21.6	2.2	1.0	1.3	0.1
Russians	44.2	36.7	6.7	1.7	10.8	0.0
I consider myself a citizen of the former Soviet Union						
Ukrainians	8.9	17.0	21.1	45.1	7.5	0.3
Russians	23.3	15.0	23.3	29.2	8.3	0.8
I consider myself an autonomous individual						
Ukrainians	7.3	14.3	17.4	37.1	23.5	0.4
Russians	2.5	9.2	20.2	42.9	24.4	0.8
depending on the language of communication in the family						
I consider myself a citizen of the world						
Ukrainian	16.1	23.7	25.0	24.7	10.5	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	14.3	23.5	23.0	31.2	8.0	0.0
Russian	13.4	21.5	26.2	29.6	8.7	0.4
I consider myself a member of the local community						
Ukrainian	24.5	35.0	16.0	17.2	7.1	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	12.1	22.1	24.0	32.3	9.5	0.0
Russian	16.8	32.1	16.0	24.3	10.4	0.4
I consider myself a citizen of Ukraine						
Ukrainian	78.2	17.2	2.4	0.7	1.3	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	65.6	29.3	1.9	1.2	1.9	0.0
Russian	62.8	28.8	2.8	1.7	3.6	0.2
I consider myself a citizen of the former Soviet Union						
Ukrainian	6.4	15.1	21.1	49.1	8.1	0.3
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	10.2	24.0	24.8	35.2	5.8	0.0
Russian	18.1	15.3	18.1	40.0	7.7	0.9
I consider myself an autonomous individual						
Ukrainian	8.7	16.7	16.2	32.6	25.4	0.4
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	4.6	11.9	17.2	46.1	19.7	0.5
Russian	5.8	8.8	20.7	41.7	22.4	0.6

How proud are you to be a citizen of Ukraine (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia)?
% of respondents



UKRAINE

Regions



Nationality



Language spoken in the family



Very proud | Rather proud | Not very proud | Not proud at all | I am not a citizen of Ukraine | No answer

To what extent is each of these traits inherent to Ukrainians?*
average score



* On an 10-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means "*the trait is not inherent to Ukrainians*", and "10" means "*the trait is inherent to Ukrainians*".

To what extent is each of these traits inherent to Ukrainians?*
average score (*continued*)

NATIONALITY



* On an 10-point scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "*the trait is not inherent to Ukrainians*", and 10 means "*the trait is inherent to Ukrainians*".

How religious are you?*
average score



* On an 10-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means "*absence of religiousity*", and "10" means "*maximum expression of religiousity*".

Which of the following values are the most important to you as principles that you follow in your life?*
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Health (physical and mental)	58.4	62.3	60.9	48.5	53.7	62.7
Happy family life	40.9	44.9	42.2	30.8	41.4	34.2
Financial security (no financial difficulties)	39.3	32.6	37.8	34.4	50.6	47.0
Life wisdom (maturity of judgments and common sense achieved through life experience)	23.9	21.6	25.8	20.7	23.9	26.5
An interesting job	21.1	17.8	22.5	22.0	23.1	17.8
Active life (fullness and emotional richness of life)	18.9	18.0	14.0	22.8	28.0	14.5
Productive life (making full use of one's own capabilities, strengths and talents)	15.4	12.3	17.3	18.3	13.7	15.4
Love (spiritual and physical intimacy with a loved one)	13.7	13.3	13.0	17.8	13.0	13.6
Having good and loyal friends	11.1	10.2	8.9	16.6	12.3	14.5
Self-confidence (internal harmony, freedom from internal conflicts and doubts)	10.6	9.1	10.1	14.5	10.4	11.1
Freedom (autonomy, independence in judgments and actions)	9.5	9.7	10.5	8.7	6.3	14.5
Development (self-improvement, constant physical and spiritual improvement)	9.1	10.4	10.5	10.4	4.1	9.4
Knowledge (the ability to expand one's own horizons, education, general cultural level, intellectual development)	5.2	6.8	3.6	8.7	4.8	3.4
Happiness of others (welfare, development and improvement of other people, of the entire nation and humanity as a whole)	4.6	6.6	3.6	5.4	4.6	0.8
Social recognition (respect for others, fellow workers)	3.4	4.0	2.9	5.4	2.7	1.7
The beauty of nature and art (experiencing beauty in nature and art)	2.7	2.1	2.2	5.8	2.2	2.6
Entertainment (pleasant, free time without responsibility)	1.9	2.1	1.2	3.7	2.2	0.0
Creativity (opportunity for creative activity)	0.6	1.5	0.1	1.2	0.0	0.8
Hard to say	2.2	1.1	5.2	0.4	0.0	0.0

* Respondents were asked to select no more than three acceptable answers.

Which of the following values are the most important to you as principles that you follow in your life?*
% of respondents depending on the age of respondents (*continued*)

	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years or more
Health (physical and mental)	41.5	50.4	58.4	66.6	72.1
Happy family life	37.1	45.0	45.6	39.7	38.7
Financial security (no financial difficulties)	32.5	40.9	40.8	41.4	41.4
Life wisdom (maturity of judgments and common sense achieved through life experience)	11.6	15.1	18.9	31.4	38.0
An interesting job	31.6	28.0	24.3	14.7	10.5
Active life (fullness and emotional richness of life)	28.3	20.7	20.5	16.1	11.0
Productive life (making full use of one's own capabilities, strengths and talents)	16.7	16.4	13.3	15.9	14.6
Love (spiritual and physical intimacy with a loved one)	20.8	19.4	11.4	8.8	9.0
Having good and loyal friends	14.4	12.1	12.3	8.5	9.0
Self-confidence (internal harmony, freedom from internal conflicts and doubts)	10.8	11.3	7.8	11.9	10.7
Freedom (autonomy, independence in judgments and actions)	10.8	9.4	11.7	9.6	6.9
Development (self-improvement, constant physical and spiritual improvement)	14.4	9.4	10.2	7.6	4.9
Knowledge (the ability to expand one's own horizons, education, general cultural level, intellectual development)	7.8	6.5	4.2	3.4	3.9
Happiness of others (welfare, development and improvement of other people, of the entire nation and humanity as a whole)	3.5	2.7	4.2	4.0	7.5
Social recognition (respect for others, fellow workers)	3.5	2.7	3.9	4.0	3.0
The beauty of nature and art (experiencing beauty in nature and art)	2.4	1.3	4.5	2.5	2.6
Entertainment (pleasant, free time without responsibility)	3.8	3.0	0.6	1.7	0.4
Creativity (opportunity for creative activity)	1.7	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.0
Hard to say	1.4	1.1	1.5	2.3	3.9

* Respondents were asked to select no more than three acceptable answers.

Which of the following values are the most important to you as principles that you follow in your life?*
% of respondents depending on ethnicity and language of communication in the family (*continued*)

	NATIONALITY		LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	Ukrainians	**Russians**	**Ukrainian**	**Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian**	**Russian**
Health (physical and mental)	58.0	68.3	61.2	55.9	54.2
Happy family life	40.6	42.5	42.7	39.3	38.0
Financial security (no financial difficulties)	38.8	48.3	37.3	39.0	44.8
Life wisdom (maturity of judgments and common sense achieved through life experience)	23.9	22.5	23.8	27.8	21.3
An interesting job	21.2	23.3	20.0	21.1	23.2
Active life (fullness and emotional richness of life)	19.2	12.5	17.3	26.2	16.4
Productive life (making full use of one's own capabilities, strengths and talents)	16.1	5.8	14.8	17.2	14.9
Love (spiritual and physical intimacy with a loved one)	13.9	10.0	13.9	10.2	16.0
Having good and loyal friends	11.0	10.8	10.4	13.8	10.7
Self-confidence (internal harmony, freedom from internal conflicts and doubts)	10.3	15.8	9.0	10.2	14.7
Freedom (autonomy, independence in judgments and actions)	9.5	9.2	9.5	8.2	10.9
Development (self-improvement, constant physical and spiritual improvement)	9.4	5.0	9.8	7.3	8.7
Knowledge (the ability to expand one's own horizons, education. general cultural level, intellectual development)	5.4	3.3	4.6	4.6	7.2
Happiness of others (welfare, development and improvement of other people, of the entire nation and humanity as a whole)	4.6	5.0	5.4	3.9	3.2
Social recognition (respect for others, fellow workers)	3.5	2.5	3.9	2.2	3.2
The beauty of nature and art (experiencing beauty in nature and art)	2.6	3.3	2.3	3.1	3.2
Entertainment (pleasant, free time without responsibility)	2.0	0.0	1.5	2.2	2.1
Creativity (opportunity for creative activity)	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.9
Hard to say	2.3	1.7	2.9	1.9	1.1

* Respondents were asked to select no more than three acceptable answers.

To what extent are you similar or not similar to the people described?*
average score



* On a six-point verbal scale with the following values: 4 – "*very much like me*", 3 – "*like me*", 2 – "*somewhat like me*", 1 – "*slightly like me*", 0 – "*not like me*", -1 – "*not like me at all*".
** This option was not offered in the questionnaires in Poland and Russia.

To what extent are you similar or not similar to the people described?*
average score (*continued*)

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
It is important for this person to do something good for the people around him/her	**2.5**	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.3
It is very important for this person to feel secure; this person avoids everything that might pose a threat	**2.3**	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3
It is important for this person to follow the traditions and customs of his/her religion or family	**2.3**	2.7	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.0
It is important for this person to do something good for the society	**2.1**	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.3	1.8
It is important for this person to always behave properly, not to take actions that other people would not approve of	**2.1**	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.9
Caring for the environment and nature is important to this person	**2.1**	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.8
It is important for this person to offer new ideas, to be creative, to follow his/her own path	**1.7**	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.7
It is important for this person to be very successful, for people to know his/her achievements	**1.7**	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5
It is important for this person to have quality leisure time and indulge him-/herself	**1.4**	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.2
It is important for this person to be rich, have a lot of money and expensive things	**1.3**	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.4
Adventures and risk are very important to this person; this person seeks a life full of exciting activities	**1.0**	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.7

* On a six-point verbal scale with the following values: 4 – "*very much like me*", 3 – "*like me*", 2 –"*somewhat like me*", 1 – "*slightly like me*", 0 – "*not like me*", -1 – "*not like me at all*".

To what extent are you similar or not similar to the people described?*
average score (*continued*)

	AGE (UKRAINE)					NATIONALITY (UKRAINE)	
	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years or more	Ukrainians	Russians
It is important for this person to do something good for the people around him/her	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4
It is very important for this person to feel secure; this person avoids everything that might pose a threat	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2
It is important for this person to follow the traditions and customs of his/her religion or family	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.0
It is important for this person to do something good for the society	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.8
It is important for this person to always behave properly, not to take actions that other people would not approve of	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.0
Caring for the environment and nature is important to this person	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.0
It is important for this person to offer new ideas, to be creative, to follow his/her own path	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.1	1.7	1.3
It is important for this person to be very successful, for people to know his/her achievements	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.7	1.4
It is important for this person to have quality leisure time and indulge him-/herself	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.8	1.4	1.1
It is important for this person to be rich, have a lot of money and expensive things	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.2	0.8	1.3	1.0
Adventures and risk are very important to this person; this person seeks a life full of exciting activities	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.4	1.0	0.5

* On a six-point verbal scale with the following values: 4 – "*very much like me*", 3 – "*like me*", 2 –"*somewhat like me*", 1 – "*slightly like me*", 0 – "*not like me*", -1 – "*not like me at all*".

How important is the following in your life?
% of respondents

	Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not important at all	No answer
Family					
Ukraine	92.7	6.6	0.2	0.1	0.4
Germany	77.6	17.9	3.6	0.6	0.3
The Netherlands	85.5	8.8	2.3	1.3	2.2
Poland	92.1	6.4	0.3	0.3	0.8
Russia	85.0	12.7	1.3	0.5	0.5
Friends					
Ukraine	46.7	44.9	7.4	0.5	0.5
Germany	50.9	42.6	6.1	0.3	0.0
The Netherlands	49.6	45.1	4.3	0.3	0.7
Poland	38.3	55.2	5.0	1.2	0.2
Russia	34.6	45.8	15.2	3.5	0.9
Work					
Ukraine	44.3	36.5	12.1	6.4	0.7
Germany	39.4	40.5	9.9	7.0	3.2
The Netherlands	29.5	49.1	12.4	5.2	3.8
Poland	64.2	25.0	4.0	3.8	2.9
Russia	45.0	29.3	9.4	9.7	6.6
Free time, leisure					
Ukraine	28.8	46.5	21.8	1.9	1.0
Germany	31.6	55.8	11.4	1.0	0.3
The Netherlands	40.4	52.6	5.7	0.2	1.0
Poland	35.0	50.5	11.6	1.2	1.6
Russia	29.4	45.2	18.5	5.1	1.8
Religion					
Ukraine	18.7	36.7	32.2	11.5	0.8
Germany	13.1	24.9	36.1	25.6	0.3
The Netherlands	10.7	14.5	28.9	43.8	2.1
Poland	45.7	33.9	15.1	4.8	0.5
Russia	14.3	27.5	30.5	22.4	5.3
Politics					
Ukraine	4.9	24.6	49.1	20.6	0.8
Germany	10.1	34.2	42.5	13.1	0.0
The Netherlands	3.3	36.5	46.3	12.4	1.5
Poland	5.3	27.5	44.9	21.8	0.5
Russia	6.9	20.2	40.1	30.3	2.5

How important is the following in your life?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not important at all	No answer
Family					
UKRAINE	**92.7**	**6.6**	**0.2**	**0.1**	**0.4**
West	91.9	7.8	0.2	0.0	0.0
Centre	93.9	5.8	0.1	0.0	0.1
South	95.4	3.3	0.0	0.8	0.4
East	92.5	5.5	0.2	0.0	1.7
Donbas	83.1	16.1	0.0	0.8	0.0
Friends					
UKRAINE	**46.7**	**44.9**	**7.4**	**0.5**	**0.5**
West	47.2	42.4	10.0	0.4	0.0
Centre	50.8	43.3	5.4	0.3	0.1
South	61.8	34.4	2.5	0.8	0.4
East	36.0	52.9	8.7	0.5	1.9
Donbas	24.1	58.6	16.4	0.9	0.0
Work					
UKRAINE	**44.3**	**36.5**	**12.1**	**6.4**	**0.7**
West	39.2	44.1	9.7	6.8	0.2
Centre	41.4	37.1	14.0	6.9	0.5
South	56.8	24.9	10.0	7.5	0.8
East	46.3	34.7	12.5	4.8	1.7
Donbas	51.7	32.8	11.2	4.3	0.0
Free time, leisure					
UKRAINE	**28.8**	**46.5**	**21.8**	**1.9**	**1.0**
West	30.0	44.4	23.7	1.9	0.0
Centre	27.8	47.9	21.7	1.6	1.2
South	34.7	43.4	17.8	3.3	0.8
East	28.0	46.6	22.0	1.0	2.4
Donbas	22.2	51.3	23.1	3.4	0.0
Religion					
UKRAINE	**18.7**	**36.7**	**32.2**	**11.5**	**0.8**
West	42.8	46.8	7.6	2.5	0.2
Centre	16.1	37.0	36.6	9.9	0.5
South	7.0	31.8	43.4	16.9	0.8
East	5.3	26.7	45.8	19.8	2.4
Donbas	11.1	38.5	31.6	18.8	0.0
Politics					
UKRAINE	**4.9**	**24.6**	**49.1**	**20.6**	**0.8**
West	4.7	27.1	47.7	20.6	0.0
Centre	4.7	22.4	53.3	19.2	0.4
South	3.3	23.8	42.9	29.2	0.8
East	6.3	25.4	46.6	19.1	2.7
Donbas	6.0	27.4	48.7	17.9	0.0

How important is the following in your life?
% of respondents depending on age (*continued*)

	Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not important at all	No answer
Family					
18-29 years	91.5	8.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
30-39 years	94.1	5.1	0.5	0.3	0.0
40-49 years	94.3	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.6
50-59 years	90.7	7.9	0.3	0.3	0.8
60 years or more	93.1	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.4
Friends					
18-29 years	56.2	40.7	2.4	0.5	0.2
30-39 years	51.3	45.2	3.0	0.3	0.3
40-49 years	47.3	47.0	5.1	0.0	0.6
50-59 years	43.1	44.2	11.3	0.6	0.8
60 years or more	37.9	47.1	13.5	1.1	0.4
Work					
18-29 years	52.6	39.4	6.1	1.7	0.2
30-39 years	56.1	35.8	6.1	1.3	0.5
40-49 years	54.1	38.1	6.9	0.3	0.6
50-59 years	47.6	39.4	9.3	2.8	0.8
60years or more	21.2	32.0	25.8	20.0	0.9
Free time, leisure					
18-29 years	41.3	46.7	10.8	0.7	0.5
30-39 years	36.0	47.0	14.5	0.8	1.6
40-49 years	31.5	47.7	18.3	1.2	1.2
50-59 years	22.4	52.1	23.2	1.1	1.1
60 years or more	16.3	41.3	37.0	4.5	0.9
Religion					
18-29 years	11.3	36.8	36.6	15.1	0.2
30-39 years	14.5	37.1	33.3	14.0	1.1
40-49 years	20.7	33.3	34.8	10.2	0.9
50-59 years	22.7	37.8	28.1	10.5	0.9
60 years or more	23.6	37.6	29.0	8.8	0.9
Politics					
18-29 years	3.8	17.7	52.5	25.5	0.5
30-39 years	2.9	23.6	46.4	26.0	1.1
40-49 years	3.6	28.2	49.8	17.1	1.2
50-59 years	6.2	24.6	48.2	19.8	1.1
60 years or more	7.1	28.3	48.5	15.7	0.4

How important is the following in your life?
% of respondents depending onnationality language of communication in the family (*continued*)

NATIONALITY					
	Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not important at all	No answer
Family					
Ukrainians	93.2	6.2	0.2	0.1	0.4
Russians	85.8	12.5	0.0	0.0	1.7
Friends					
Ukrainians	47.5	44.5	7.2	0.4	0.4
Russians	34.2	50.8	10.8	2.5	1.7
Work					
Ukrainians	44.6	36.7	11.8	6.3	0.6
Russians	43.8	29.8	16.5	7.4	2.5
Free time, leisure					
Ukrainians	29.4	46.3	21.5	1.8	1.0
Russians	22.3	46.3	25.6	4.1	1.7
Religion					
Ukrainians	19.2	37.5	32.0	10.7	0.7
Russians	6.6	29.8	37.2	23.1	3.3
Politics					
Ukrainians	5.0	24.9	48.9	20.4	0.8
Russians	2.5	17.5	53.3	25.0	1.7
LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY					
	Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not important at all	No answer
Family					
Ukrainian	93.2	6.4	0.2	0.1	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	95.6	3.2	0.0	0.0	1.2
Russian	89.1	9.8	0.2	0.2	0.6
Friends					
Ukrainian	47.0	45.5	7.0	0.4	0.1
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	44.4	43.7	10.2	0.2	1.5
Russian	47.8	44.6	6.2	0.9	0.6
Work					
Ukrainian	39.5	40.9	12.8	6.5	0.3
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	48.7	29.8	12.6	7.0	1.9
Russian	52.0	31.6	10.2	5.5	0.6
Free time, leisure					
Ukrainian	26.7	48.1	22.9	1.8	0.4
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	29.5	41.2	25.2	1.5	2.7
Russian	33.5	46.9	16.2	2.6	0.9
Religion					
Ukrainian	24.7	41.3	26.7	7.1	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	12.3	35.8	35.6	13.6	2.7
Russian	9.4	26.9	42.4	20.5	0.9
Politics					
Ukrainian	5.0	24.6	51.6	18.6	0.2
Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	6.1	28.1	45.3	18.9	1.7
Russian	3.6	20.9	47.3	26.7	1.5

Which of the following qualities that can be instilled in children in the family do you consider especially important?*
% of respondents

	Ukraine	Germany	The Netherlands	Poland	Russia
Industriousness	77.8	17.9	31.3	17.9	84.5
Responsibility	67.2	80.9	90.8	81.0	77.5
Tolerance and respect for others	51.5	66.7	86.0	82.6	63.5
Determination	42.9	59.6	37.1	19.3	45.4
Thrift (careful attitude towards money and belongings)	42.4	38.1	47.5	49.5	50.3
Independence	41.6	73.5	60.7	43.4	37.8
Self-expression	36.8	39.2	23.0	41.0	32.1
Obedience	23.5	12.6	25.6	34.1	34.8
Religiousness	14.8	12.1	13.9	39.5	13.9
Imagination	14.3	29.5	20.0	16.8	16.5
Unselfishness	13.9	5.9	22.9	15.1	22.6
REGIONS OF UKRAINE					
	West	**Centre**	**South**	**East**	**Donbas**
Industriousness	80.7	72.9	78.0	82.1	83.1
Responsibility	71.2	60.8	64.3	73.7	75.2
Tolerance and respect for others	50.7	54.2	54.4	48.7	41.0
Determination	36.2	44.0	51.9	42.9	44.9
Thrift (careful attitude towards money and belongings)	34.5	40.6	51.5	45.2	57.3
Independence	32.6	45.8	44.8	43.1	37.3
Self-expression	25.0	37.7	32.4	49.9	41.5
Obedience	33.8	25.6	21.2	12.5	12.0
Religiousness	40.0	7.5	7.5	6.7	5.9
Imagination	11.0	16.2	12.4	16.4	12.0
Unselfishness	15.4	13.6	16.6	13.7	4.3
AGE OF UKRAINIAN RESPONDENTS					
	18-29 years	**30-39 years**	**40-49 years**	**50-59 years**	**60 years or more**
Industriousness	70.7	72.7	75.3	83.6	84.6
Responsibility	63.7	66.8	67.9	68.6	68.9
Tolerance and respect for others	48.9	48.9	48.9	50.8	57.5
Determination	49.1	51.5	45.0	38.0	34.1
Thrift (careful attitude towards money and belongings)	35.4	42.2	41.4	46.3	46.1
Independence	46.0	48.9	45.9	39.5	31.6
Self-expression	42.9	43.3	41.3	33.1	27.0
Obedience	24.3	17.7	19.6	24.6	28.5
Religiousness	12.3	11.0	14.8	15.9	19.1
Imagination	17.0	18.0	17.2	12.7	9.0
Unselfishness	15.8	10.2	10.5	13.8	17.0

* Respondents were asked to select no more than five acceptable answers.

How important is it for you to live in a democratic country?*
average score



UKRAINE

Regions



Age



Nationality



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*not important at all*", and "10" means "*very important*".

How democratically is our country governed today?*
average score



UKRAINE

Regions



Language spoken in the family



Nationality



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*fully undemocratic*", and "10" means "*fully democratic*".

To what extent are human rights respected in our country today?
% of respondents



UKRAINE

Regions



Nationality



Language spoken in the family





How important are the following characteristics to democracy?*
average score



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*not important at all*", and "10" means "*very important*".

How important are the following characteristics to democracy?*
average score (*continued*)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*not important at all*", and "10" means "*very important*".

How good are the following types of political systems for our country?
% of respondents

	Very good	Rather good	Rather bad	Very bad	No answer
Democratic political system					
Ukraine	35.8	50.7	10.3	3.0	0.2
Germany	64.8	29.3	3.0	1.6	1.3
The Netherlands	34.3	46.3	4.5	1.0	14.0
Poland	18.0	55.9	12.5	2.4	11.2
Russia	20.8	46.5	12.6	4.6	15.5
A strong leader independent of the parliament and elections					
Ukraine	35.0	44.9	14.3	5.7	0.2
Germany	3.7	17.0	25.1	50.3	3.9
The Netherlands	3.6	23.3	28.0	26.1	18.9
Poland	2.7	17.3	40.7	31.7	7.6
Russia	26.0	41.0	16.1	5.4	11.5
Experts, not the government, make decisions which they consider to be the best for the country					
Ukraine	20.6	48.1	23.2	8.0	0.2
Germany	12.2	44.5	27.0	12.3	4.0
The Netherlands	6.0	43.8	25.6	7.0	17.5
Poland	16.5	58.1	12.3	2.5	10.6
Russia	16.3	38.8	21.9	6.7	16.3
Military administration or military regime					
Ukraine	1.7	10.7	46.7	40.7	0.3
Germany	1.1	3.0	18.7	75.3	1.9
The Netherlands	0.2	2.2	23.2	63.6	10.8
Poland	1.0	18.0	38.5	30.1	12.5
Russia	3.6	10.7	34.8	39.9	11.0
REGIONS OF UKRAINE					
Democratic political system					
West	38.1	48.9	11.0	1.9	0.0
Centre	37.5	48.2	11.4	2.6	0.3
South	35.7	47.7	10.4	5.4	0.8
East	29.2	59.8	6.7	4.1	0.2
Donbas	38.1	48.3	11.9	1.7	0.0
A strong leader independent of the parliament and elections					
West	40.7	37.8	16.0	5.5	0.0
Centre	34.0	49.1	10.4	6.4	0.1
South	41.5	35.3	16.2	6.6	0.4
East	28.0	53.9	15.2	2.7	0.2
Donbas	29.1	34.2	25.6	11.1	0.0
Experts, not the government, make decisions which they consider to be the best for the country					
West	16.1	47.2	28.6	8.1	0.0
Centre	25.7	49.2	18.1	6.9	0.1
South	27.1	37.9	25.0	9.2	0.8
East	15.7	54.2	21.2	8.7	0.2
Donbas	8.5	43.6	38.5	9.4	0.0
Military administration or military regime					
West	2.1	8.9	49.4	39.6	0.0
Centre	1.7	13.1	45.2	39.9	0.1
South	2.5	9.5	42.7	44.4	0.8
East	1.0	9.9	46.7	42.2	0.2
Donbas	0.9	6.8	53.0	38.5	0.9

People speak of the "left-wing" and "right-wing" in politics. Where are your views on this scale?*
average score









* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means "*left-wing*", and "10" means "*right-wing*".

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?**
average score



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and "10" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*
average score (*continued*)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and "10" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*
average score (*continued*)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and "10" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*
average score (*continued*)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where "1" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and "10" means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*
average score (*continued*)

AGE (UKRAINE)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and “10” means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

To what extent do you agree with the following ideas?*
average score (*continued*)

NATIONALTY (UKRAINE)



* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means unconditional agreement with the idea to the left, and “10” means unconditional agreement with the idea to the right. The respondents could also choose any intermediate number on the scale, depending on the extent to which each of the two judgments is closer.

Today many people discuss the goals of our country for the next 10 years. Which of the goals do you consider to be the most important?
% of respondents



If you had to choose, which of the following would you consider to be the most important?
% of respondents



REGIONS (Ukraine)



What idea is the most important from the following list?
% of respondents



REGIONS (Ukraine)



Of course, we all hope that there won't be another war, but if this happens would you fight for your country?
% of respondents



REGIONS (Ukraine)



	Age					Nationality		Language spoken in the family			Gender	
	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years or more	Ukrainians	Russians	Ukrainian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Russian	Male	Female
Yes	34.0	36.2	40.1	31.9	20.2	31.7	25.8	35.5	27.8	24.5	44.1	20.9
No	27.2	28.4	27.7	36.4	44.5	33.2	41.7	30.9	40.2	35.2	24.9	41.0
No answer	18.9	16.9	19.3	15.8	20.7	18.2	21.7	15.8	19.6	23.7	16.7	20.0
Undecided	19.9	18.5	13.0	15.8	14.6	16.8	10.8	17.8	12.3	16.6	14.3	18.1

To what extent are you interested in politics?
% of respondents



	REGIONS (Ukraine)					Age (Ukraine)				
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years or more
Very interested	6.6	6.7	4.6	6.0	9.3	3.3	5.6	4.2	7.1	10.3
Somewhat interested	35.8	28.7	27.8	29.2	31.4	21.5	29.3	33.6	31.2	36.0
Not very interested	48.3	45.5	48.5	49.2	41.5	55.6	47.6	48.0	47.6	38.8
Not interested at all	8.9	18.4	17.0	15.4	16.9	19.1	16.9	13.8	12.7	14.1
No answer	0.4	0.6	2.1	0.2	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.3	1.4	0.8

Have you ever participated in any of the following forms of protest; could have participated, but chose not to; or under no circumstances considered the possibility of participation in such forms of protest?
% of respondents

	Yes, I have participated	I could have participated, but I chose not to	No, under no circumstances	No answer
Participation in peaceful demonstrations				
Ukraine	15.7	19.9	64.1	0.2
Germany	21.1	46.9	30.5	1.5
The Netherlands	11.9	46.1	41.5	0.4
Poland	7.8	49.6	39.6	3.0
Russia	12.1	22.1	63.5	2.2
Signing a petition				
Ukraine	15.5	24.8	59.6	0.1
Germany	42.7	32.2	23.9	1.2
The Netherlands	35.4	52.4	11.8	0.4
Poland	29.9	32.9	34.1	3.1
Russia	11.1	24.6	62.8	1.5
Participation in a strike				
Ukraine	6.0	17.2	76.1	0.6
Germany	11.9	40.5	45.0	2.6
The Netherlands	8.8	48.0	42.7	0.4
Poland	5.6	21.3	68.7	4.5
Russia	2.3	17.2	76.3	4.2
Participation in a boycott				
Ukraine	5.4	16.9	77.5	0.2
Germany	12.9	32.8	51.9	2.4
The Netherlands	7.8	46.4	45.4	0.4
Poland	4.0	29.1	62.9	3.9
Russia	2.1	17.2	78.5	2.3
REGIONS (UKRAINE)				
Participation in peaceful demonstrations				
West	31.7	22.4	45.9	0.0
Centre	12.6	22.1	64.9	0.4
South	12.0	21.5	66.1	0.4
East	4.3	11.3	84.1	0.2
Donbas	19.7	23.1	57.3	0.0
Signing a petition				
West	24.9	26.4	48.6	0.0
Centre	12.7	28.6	58.7	0.0
South	17.4	24.1	57.7	0.8
East	6.7	15.2	78.1	0.0
Donbas	23.1	29.1	47.9	0.0
Participation in a strike				
West	11.9	23.3	64.8	0.0
Centre	4.8	18.2	76.6	0.4
South	7.4	22.7	66.9	2.9
East	1.4	7.0	90.8	0.7
Donbas	3.4	11.1	85.5	0.0
Participation in a boycott				
West	9.7	22.4	67.9	0.0
Centre	5.3	16.7	77.8	0.1
South	6.6	24.1	68.5	0.8
East	1.2	8.7	89.9	0.2
Donbas	1.7	10.3	88.0	0.0

Have you ever participated in any of the following forms of protest; could have participated, but chose not to; or under no circumstances considered the possibility of participation in such forms of protest?
% of respondents depending on the level of interest in politics

Participation in peaceful demonstrations



Signing a petition



Participation in a strike



Participation in a boycott



Are you a member of the following non-governmental organisations and, if so, how actively do you participate in their work?
% of respondents

	Actively participate	I am a member, but I do not take an active part	I am not a member of this organi-sation	No answer
Church or religious organisations				
Ukraine	4.6	9.6	85.5	0.3
Germany	14.1	34.2	51.7	0.0
The Netherlands	10.9	18.8	70.1	0.2
Poland	15.2	12.0	72.5	0.2
Russia	2.0	4.1	93.2	0.6
Recreation and sport organisations				
Ukraine	3.3	3.5	92.9	0.2
Germany	26.4	11.0	62.6	0.0
The Netherlands	36.4	9.3	54.2	0.2
Poland	6.0	6.4	87.3	0.3
Russia	2.4	3.9	93.0	0.6
Organisations involved in art, music, education				
Ukraine	2.5	3.3	93.9	0.3
Germany	8.2	6.4	85.3	0.0
The Netherlands	12.8	8.5	78.5	0.2
Poland	6.0	4.9	88.9	0.3
Russia	1.5	2.1	95.8	0.6
Self-help/mutual help groups				
Ukraine	1.8	2.8	95.1	0.3
Germany	2.3	2.6	94.9	0.2
The Netherlands	1.3	1.8	96.7	0.2
Poland	1.8	2.4	95.5	0.3
Russia	1.0	1.8	96.5	0.7
Humanitarian or charity organisations				
Ukraine	1.6	2.8	95.2	0.3
Germany	5.6	7.7	86.7	0.1
The Netherlands	3.0	12.9	84.0	0.2
Poland	3.9	3.8	92.1	0.1
Russia	0.6	1.2	97.3	0.9

	Actively participate	I am a member, but I do not take an active part	I am not a member of this organisation	No answer
Other organisations				
Ukraine	1,8	2,2	95,3	0,7
Germany	–	–	–	–
The Netherlands	3,5	1,4	56,6	38,4
Poland	3,7	1,7	94,1	0,5
Russia	1,4	1,8	95,9	1,0

Are you a member of the following non-governmental organisations and, if so, how actively do you participate in their work?
% of respondents (*continued*)

	Actively participate	I am a member, but I do not take an active part	I am not a member of this organi-sation	No answer
Church or religious organisations				
UKRAINE	**4.6**	**9.6**	**85.5**	**0.3**
West	10.2	15.9	73.5	0.4
Centre	3.5	5.8	90.3	0.4
South	2.5	17.4	79.7	0.4
East	1.9	2.7	95.4	0.0
Donbas	2.6	17.1	80.3	0.0
Recreation and sport organisations				
UKRAINE	**3.3**	**3.5**	**92.9**	**0.2**
West	4.2	2.5	93.0	0.2
Centre	3.2	3.8	92.7	0.3
South	6.2	5.4	87.6	0.8
East	1.0	2.4	96.6	0.0
Donbas	2.6	6.0	91.5	0.0
Organisations involved in art, music, education				
UKRAINE	**2.5**	**3.3**	**93.9**	**0.3**
West	4.0	3.6	92.2	0.2
Centre	1.3	3.9	94.6	0.3
South	7.1	5.8	86.3	0.8
East	1.0	0.5	98.3	0.2
Donbas	0.8	2.5	96.6	0.0
Self-help/mutual help groups				
UKRAINE	**1.8**	**2.8**	**95.1**	**0.3**
West	3.0	5.5	91.3	0.2
Centre	1.4	1.8	96.5	0.3
South	1.7	4.1	93.4	0.8
East	0.7	0.5	98.6	0.2
Donbas	1.7	3.4	94.9	0.0
Humanitarian or charity organisations				
UKRAINE	**1.6**	**2.8**	**95.2**	**0.3**
West	2.8	4.5	92.1	0.6
Centre	0.6	2.2	96.9	0.3
South	3.3	4.1	91.7	0.8
East	0.2	0.5	99.3	0.0
Donbas	3.4	5.1	91.5	0.0

	Actively participate	I am a member, but I do not take an active part	I am not a member of this organisation	No answer
Other organisations				
UKRAINE	**1,8**	**2,2**	**95,3**	**0,7**
West	1,5	3,6	93,4	1,5
Centre	1,3	1,6	96,6	0,5
South	5,0	3,7	90,1	1,2
East	1,4	0,7	97,3	0,5
Donbas	0,8	3,4	95,8	0,0

	Actively participate	I am a member, but I do not take an active part	I am not a member of this organi-sation	No answer
Trade unions				
UKRAINE	**1.5**	**9.0**	**89.0**	**0.5**
West	1.9	6.4	91.5	0.2
Centre	0.8	8.6	90.3	0.4
South	3.3	10.0	85.4	1.3
East	1.7	8.7	89.2	0.5
Donbas	0.0	21.4	77.8	0.9
Professional associations				
UKRAINE	**1.5**	**3.0**	**95.3**	**0.2**
West	1.7	3.8	94.1	0.4
Centre	1.8	3.1	94.9	0.1
South	2.1	1.7	95.4	0.8
East	0.7	1.0	98.3	0.0
Donbas	0.8	7.6	91.5	0.0
Political parties				
UKRAINE	**0.7**	**1.5**	**97.5**	**0.3**
West	0.4	2.3	96.8	0.4
Centre	0.0	0.6	99.0	0.4
South	3.3	3.7	92.5	0.4
East	0.5	0.7	98.8	0.0
Donbas	1.7	0.9	96.6	0.9
Environmental organisations				
UKRAINE	**0.7**	**1.2**	**97.9**	**0.2**
West	0.6	2.1	97.0	0.2
Centre	0.4	0.5	98.8	0.3
South	2.5	2.5	94.2	0.8
East	0.0	1.0	99.0	0.0
Donbas	0.8	0.8	98.3	0.0
Organisations for protection of consumer rights				
UKRAINE	**0.4**	**1.3**	**98.0**	**0.3**
West	0.4	1.5	97.5	0.6
Centre	0.1	1.3	98.4	0.1
South	2.1	2.1	95.0	0.8
East	0.0	0.2	99.8	0.0
Donbas	0.0	3.4	96.6	0.0

2. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY POLICY: EXPERT INTERVIEWS

Interviews dedicated to the topic "The Principles, Constituent Parts and Institutional Mechanisms of the Formation of a Common National Identity of Ukrainian Citizens" were conducted from 8 February to 1 March 2017.

The thoughts and proposals of experts are presented in alphabetical order.

IT SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF STATE POLICY TO DEVELOP MEASURES AIMED AT ESTABLISHING CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY

Vitalii DUKHNEVYCH,
Head of the Psychology of Political and Legal Relations Laboratory, Institute of Social and Political Psychology, National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine (NAPS)

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

In Ukraine regional differences determine the formation of varying visions of historical and current events from the point of view of the formation of a national identity. Ukrainian citizens currently do not form a single community with common values and a common vision of history. Maybe they do not need to. In any case, this is hardly possible. The formation of a common vision of the future would be more productive. Everybody can join this process.

State policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens should be focused on establishing of common values. The events of recent years show that the common values needed are those of mutual assistance, tolerance for differing points of view and, in part, patriotism. Why *in part?* Because the military conflict in the East and the way it is covered lead to people on opposite sides having very different understandings of patriotism.

Among these values, we may certainly include freedom, justice, self-fulfilment, and so forth. It is crucial, however, that such values be established on very concrete grounds.

Therefore, another important principle for the state policy in question is the development of measures to promote civic responsibility. Perhaps this should include not only educational activities focused on raising awareness among the citizenry that there is another side of the coin of freedom – "being responsible for" [coping with that freedom], shared responsibility.

Accordingly, the main areas for the implementation of state policy should be the scientific, practical and applied development of a responsible attitude among citizens towards the state and its institutions, the law, respect for values that differ from our own, and developments aimed at ensuring open discussion, the exchange of ideas, and dialogues to resolve various problematic issues.

On the other hand, the state must provide solutions to the most urgent issues it faces: reducing corruption among government officials (at all levels), ensuring a just legal system and the rule of law, restoring confidence in the authorities, and so on. In the view of ordinary citizens, these things are not always in evidence.

I realise how difficult it is to form an understanding of other people's values, their thoughts and beliefs, especially if they are opposed to your own and are based on different principles. However, the organisation of a dialogue between constituents of Ukrainian society with differing values, differing ideological visions of historical and current events, and different understandings of how to solve specific issues is both vital and urgent. Moreover, that dialogue should be held based on the position "we are together against the problem".

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

As established in global practice, the institutions of civil society – non-governmental organisations, volunteer movements, and so on – ensure that a dialogue is maintained. In our circumstances, where citizens play a relatively minor role in the country's social and political life, we obviously need to look for other ways to involve the public in the national debate. Online petitions are one way to do that. Perhaps there may be others – discussions at the local community, neighbourhood, district, town, city and regional levels. Perhaps such discussions should be held at the level of individual communities, and then after the issues are formulated and specific proposals prepared, they should be formalised through the mechanism of online petitions. It is difficult to say how effective this would be, but at present, with citizens somewhat sceptical of politicians, to put it mildly, this could bring certain benefits.

As to which public and state institutions can and should take responsibility for this process, it is difficult to say whether it would be expedient to create new state institutions. There are governmental research institutions with the human resources to make dialogues of this kind possible – from the standpoint of materials, public opinion research, technological development, etc. How such research is to be funded is another matter.

Non-governmental organisations are created "from below," based on the needs of the actual members of society. In our situation, however, they do sometimes simply carry out the orders of certain political forces. But these are growing pains; everybody goes through them. An urgent need is to ensure the functioning of the mechanism by which dialogue takes place, the exchange of ideas among all stakeholders, and also to involve community representatives in this process. ■

MODERNISATION IN THE REALM OF VALUES AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING MORALITY AND SOCIAL NORMS, IS A CONDITION FOR CONSOLIDATION OF A MODERN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Anatoliy YERMOLENKO,
Deputy Director for Science, Head of the Social Philosophy Department, Skovoroda Philosophy Institute, NAS of Ukraine

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

Ukraine is dealing with new challenges and threats brought about not only by the changing socio-economic, socio-political, moral and psychological state of society, but also by the necessity of radically transforming and reforming society which is what we mean conceptually by the term "modernisation". **One of the most critical problems for the modernisation of society is the issue of national identity and the associated issues of social integration and consolidation.** As society's identity is based upon its traditions and customs, everything grows in a natural way, which is reflected in such terms as the "living world", "habitus" and "ethos" of the nation.

Today, however, the problem of creating an essentially open modern identity, related to the rationalisation of the living world as part of the process of modernising society, is key. Moreover, with the advance of globalisation and the so-called "post-national" constellations (cf. Jurgen Habermas), national and ethnic identities are, to a certain extent, being diluted, which has the effect of enhancing far-right nationalist tendencies.

An important task today is the creation of a modern identity with a corresponding modernisation of the institutions of society as a whole, including our economy, politics, science, and the moral sphere, which would "remove" the traditional factors of social integration and, on basis of all that, would create new mechanisms for the consolidation of Ukrainian society.

This form of modernisation requires not only the creation of new European institutions ("post-modernisation"), but taking into consideration the potential for modernising the Ukrainian ethos in the fields of culture, economy, politics, science, etc. In turn, while developing modernisation models, it is necessary to consider globalisation processes in terms of the global and European experience, when the European values (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular with respect to persons belonging to social minorities, tolerance, justice, non-discrimination, solidarity and equality between women and men) stated in the European constitution will be a regulatory principle or orientational idea in the development of Ukrainian society, as well as a guide for cooperation with other countries and regions around the planet. However, one should consider the processes which have been seen recently in Europe itself, including the strengthening of far-right nationalist tendencies, enhanced by digital information technologies, which also generates disintegrational tendencies.

A modern identity for Ukrainian society can be achieved via the following factors:

- the choice of goals, models and paths to reform, modernisation of the country via open public discourse, since the chief method of creating social development strategies, unfortunately, still takes the form of a monologue initiated "from above";
- the development of networks, organisations and institutions of civil society, volunteer movements, integrating active citizens into discourse and social activities;
- the development of the process by which Ukrainian society is to be integrated into European values and its social, economic, educational and scientific spaces;
- reform of the axiological and regulatory system based on the aforementioned European values affirmed in the EU constitution, and the development of mechanisms ensuring the common responsibility of the government, civil society and the citizens. Modernisation of the Constitution and the legal system of Ukraine should be implemented as key aspects of a constitutional state as a modern state;
- the development of an economy focused on advanced technologies and on social and environmental values;
- the development of processes to integrate regions and promote interregional cooperation among cities and communities in different regions of Ukraine.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

To create a modern identity for Ukrainian society, it is important to reform its main institutions in accordance with the requirements of European integration and basic European values, the development of an integrative model of national unity based on respect for human rights, the granting of fundamental political and economic freedoms, the rule of law and respect for the law, economic growth, especially the growth of national high-tech production and the development of a socially and environmentally-oriented responsible market economy. European values as universal values open the way to cooperation with other cultures and nations. The modernisation of all aspects of society, and especially modernisation in the realm of values and regulations, including morality and social norms, is a condition for the consolidation of a modern Ukrainian society, making possible the establishment of its modern identity. ■

SOCIETAL DEMAND EXISTS FOR FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORMATION OF [NATIONAL] IDENTITY



Hanna KISLA
Professor, Department of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Psychology and Social Communications, Dragomanov National Pedagogic University

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

State policy on the formation of a common national identity for Ukrainian citizens should be based on principles of inter-ethnic solidarity and respect, which will encourage people of any ethnic identity to reply: "I am a citizen of Ukraine" – not only in visa applications for foreign travel, but in other various communication situations.

The main things that must happen if this is to become a reality are as follows.

1. Taking into account patterns in identity formation, from the micro to macro level (in terms of the size of the social group, be it the family, a school group, a student group, a corporate group, a local group, a civil group, etc.).

2. The level of intensity with which a common national identity forms. This depends on "mutual relations" between the citizen and the state. "I like my country. I take pleasure in considering myself a citizen of my country because:

- I have a sense of that there is social justice;
- I am not the object of any kind of discrimination;
- I have the opportunity to achieve success in my plans for my life;
- I am satisfied with the quality of life and the standard of living in my country;
- I am satisfied with the quality of the governing authorities in my country".

3. The rationalisation of human and state relations:

- a consideration of the utility of this identity for the achievement of one's personal goals;
- a consideration of the utility of the identity in the context of group productivity (the state is a group capable of solving issues that are important to me).

4. The integration of citizens into social processes, i.e., the formation of a sense of responsibility for state matters.

For illustration purposes. The Ministry of Education and Science proposed considering commitment to the community and involvement in social projects a marker in creating individual student evaluations. The changes were immediately noticeable. Students' "socialisation" (level of community spirit) can be visualised.

5. The intensive replication of state achievements, at the micro and macro levels, as a basis for the formation of pride in one's country.

6. A visual representation of the "Ukrainian-ness" of our country.

For illustration purposes. Compared to previous years, any bookstore in Kiev creates a strong positive impression: they contain lovely books; world classics, modern literature from Ukraine and beyond, and all of them are published in Ukrainian.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

1. Education as a social institution.

2. The mass media.

3. NGOs.

Among others, the institutions of the family and culture must be considered.

Education "works" in the intellectual and learning space of both society and the individual. Education trains a human being to ask the main question when it comes to forming an identity – "Who am I?" – and it helps him to answer it, as well.

The mass media has the ability to provide for the replication of an enormous volume of information, influencing the formation of identity, including:

- [the content of] collective memory;
- information on national achievements;
- information on the unique aspects of our historical and cultural heritage, those things that belong only to our country;
- information on the achievements and the international recognition of famous Ukrainians.

NGOs, as a factor in the formation of a common national identity, are viewed in the context of a person's commitment to the community and his integration into national affairs.

The family as a social institution influencing the formation of a common national identity has the following characteristic: identity formation in the family setting is not subject to wider social control.

For illustration purposes. In public opinion polls related to identity among young people, researchers observe that, in a certain cases, the question "What do you consider yourself (in terms of nationality)?" evokes the response: "A citizen of the former Soviet Union". The respondents are young people, born after 1991, who have never even seen the Soviet Union, but a positive association with the Soviet Union influences the identity of these young people.

The need for the development of new or modification of existing institutions definitely exists. Innovations is usually a step to perfection. Social service commissioning for new institutions of identity formation exists, and what they will look like is a question of time. ■

A POLICY OF REINTEGRATION SHOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT OF STATE ETHNIC AND NATIONAL POLICY IN UKRAINE, GIVEN THE ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND THE OCCUPATION OF PART OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY



Iryna KRESINA,
Head of the Department of Political and Legal Problems of Political Science, Koretsky Institute, NAS of Ukraine

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

State policy on the formation of a common national identity for citizens of Ukraine should be based on the concept of a polyethnic Ukrainian political nation, and, consequently, on the principles of a state ethnic and national policy aimed at the harmonious development of the Ukrainian nation as a whole and of national minorities in Ukraine. The state is the "subject" of ethnic and national policy, while ethnic and national relations in Ukraine are the object.

This policy is implemented through the adoption of laws and other regulations aimed at ensuring the rights, legal interests and ethnic and cultural needs of citizens – members of the Ukrainian nation, as well as through activities of the public authorities aimed at establishing an atmosphere of inter-ethnic tolerance, and strengthening the overall national unity of the country.

Ukraine needs a clear-cut conception of its state policy with respect to ethnicity and nationality, complete with detailed principles, objectives and targets, including the providing ethnic and political security, the prevention of ethnic and political conflicts and their resolution, and the implementation of a state reintegration policy. This conception should determine the content of state activity in the area of ethnicity politics, as well as aspects of legislation to be developed, aspects of nation building and state building, and the vector of scientific research to be conducted in this area.

The Ukrainian nation is understood by us as comprising all Ukrainian citizens, regardless of ethnic origin, united by common citizenship, common territories, political interests, legal obligations, historical destiny, cultural traditions, a recognition of a unified national identity and the future of their Homeland as a democratic, social, and jurisdictional Ukrainian state.

National identity is a feature of a modern nation, meaning the objective association of a person or social group with the national community and their conscious identification with its values, history, territory, culture, symbols, and its government and legal institutions. **The development of a sense of national identity in citizens of Ukraine is the crucial factor in nation building and general national consolidation.**

The basic identifying indicators (identifiers) of national identity are as follows: [national] consciousness, citizenship, territory, language, history and culture. National identity is based on the conscious choice of the subject and depends on rational factors – the recognition of historical, civic and political values by the subject, which are secondary to ethnic identity values (which, as a rule, remain constant and unchanged). National identity, therefore, is historically and socially a dynamic category.

An important part of Ukraine's ethnic and national policy in a situation of ethnic and political conflict in the east of the country and the occupation of a part of its territory is the policy of reintegration. It is aimed at the peaceful settlement of the ethnic and political conflict, the restoration of control over the state border, territorial integrity, and the reunification of all occupied territories of Ukraine which have seceded (e.g., parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) or were annexed by the Russian Federation (e.g., the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), the establishment of a dialogue with the populace of the temporarily occupied territories, and the consolidation of a multi-ethnic Ukrainian society within the borders of the Ukrainian political nation.

Reintegration should become a consolidating idea which will unite a polyethnic Ukrainian nation regardless of its citizens' ethnic background or place of residence. Reintegration should be adapted to the specific conditions and needs of the country and society; there is, therefore, no global, universal reintegration formula for Ukraine to follow. We will need to develop our own model of national reintegration.

So Ukraine's ethnicity and nationality policy needs to be substantially revised and amended in view of the ongoing ethnic and political conflict, [the goal of] its peaceful resolution, the protection of human rights in the occupied territories, the political and legal conditions needed to support the reintegration of the populace of these territories into Ukraine. The role of the state in the reintegration process, the advancement of this ethnic and political idea as the national idea, remains a crucial issue.

The promotion of the political consolidation of the elites around a common goal – the settlement of the ethnic and political conflict, the reunification of Ukraine, the overcoming of the ethnic and cultural divide, the rejection of the notion that Ukraine can do without the territories that have seceded or been annexed, the [resolution of]

deconsolidation trends through dialogue, the formation of a single ethnic and political space in view of the ethnic, cultural and historical specifics of each region, the collection and dissemination of common values, a [vision of a] common future – will make it possible to end the use of deconsolidation factors as a political technology and the rejection of a radical, intolerant rhetoric on the future of Donbas and Crimea.

Ukrainians in general have not yet decided on the format of coexistence of Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas, and an isolationist policy dominates over the idea of reintegration. Despite the different ethnic and political status of Crimea and Donbas, the problems of restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity are indivisible and require a unified solution.

An analysis of the role of international support and exchanges of experience in the reintegration of Ukraine shows that the use of radical means in relations with occupied territories, where society has not been presented with an overall plan for state action [within its territory or beyond its borders], may be a source of domestic tension. The temporarily occupied territories may be returned by means of strong international pressure and the implementation of a policy including a Ukrainian presence in the occupied territory.

International experience tells us that the key goals of the peace process are the elimination of hostilities, demobilisation, disarmament and aid in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Two central problems to be solved in the early stages of the mission are the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment and the coordination of various groups from the regional and international communities groups involved in the peace mission. Lack of coordination not only puts the mission at risk, but also, more importantly, slows down or disrupts the post-conflict reconstruction stage, where the emphasis is put on maintaining law and order, building infrastructure, societal demilitarisation and sustainable development.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration have become integral parts of the UN practice of post-conflict peace settlement and have been a typical feature of the mandate for UN peacekeeping operations over the past twenty years. The goals of this integrated programme are the promotion of stability and security in the post-conflict environment, leading to the beginnings of recovery and development.

A reintegration policy should be thoroughly worked out and implemented immediately. The experience of other countries proves that the greater the period of time that is allowed to pass after territories are divided or secede from an independent state under pressure from and with the direct participation of another state, the more illusory the prospects for reunification become and the greater the efforts and resources that must be expended to restore this region.

The continuing ethnic and political conflict, the "hybrid war" with Russia, and the loss of control over the occupied territories absolutely do not mean that the development and implementation of reintegration policy should be postponed until a more propitious time or that we should reject reintegration entirely, confining ourselves to the territories we now control.

A real model for an ethnic and national policy aimed at reintegration would create an informational, political and legal space favourable for reintegration. It is necessary to create social, ethnic and cultural, political, legal, and economic conditions that will make the uncontested reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories into Ukraine inevitable.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

A model of ethnic and national policy for the reintegration of Donbas and Crimea should contain, first and foremost, a powerful informational component, which should contain measures not only to counter Russian separatist propaganda, but also, most importantly, to promote the idea of reintegration as a consolidating national idea for Ukraine. This task should be entrusted to the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, which is the main body in the system of central executive authorities responsible for ensuring the information sovereignty of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Information Policy (MIP) should develop a set of measures for monitoring, tracking and blocking information containing messages discrediting the idea of the reintegration or reunification of Ukraine, or which foment hatred between the populations of Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories. Were the populace not to support the idea of reintegration, the effects would be disastrous and could completely block the ethnic and political process of reunification in Ukraine. The MFA and MIP should also monitor and block any attempts to downplay the importance of the ethnic and political conflict or to discredit Ukraine in the international arena.

Ukraine should not create the illusion of rapid reintegration, but should rather implement a policy based on presence and providing aid to the populace in the temporarily occupied territories. A policy of presence is an integral part of reintegration and should be implemented through civil society projects and through state support for the actions of individuals (citizens, their organisations) who continue to operate in the temporarily occupied territories in support of Ukraine. State support for initiatives which would prevent the populace of the temporarily occupied territories from forgetting that they live in Ukraine, notwithstanding the opposition of an aggressor, could be of decisive importance.

A key part of a model of ethnic and nationality policy for the reintegration of Donbas and Crimea can be its international, foreign policy dimension; it is advisable that this be implemented by MFA and MIP. It would consist of the following components: (*a*) the provision of the widest possible international support for Ukraine in these ethnic and political conflicts, with the strategic goal of restoring state sovereignty throughout Ukraine; (*b*) increasing international pressure on Russia to cease its military aggression and occupation of Ukrainian territory (for this purpose, Ukraine and the international community should use all available international platforms (the UN, OSCE, etc.), while continuing to exert economic pressure – i.e., sanctions); (*c*) establishing international cooperation to facilitate the settlement of the ethnic and political conflict and the return of the territories – most especially this means cooperation with countries that have experienced ethnic and political disintegration, with Russia's involvement, and that are now implementing reintegration policies of their own (e.g., Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) to share experience; (*d*) blocking the imposition of any foreign reintegration scenario on Ukraine.

Russia is trying to disintegrate Ukraine not only from the outside, via armed conflict, but also to split it internally by unofficially supporting political forces which promote reintegration models incompatible with the preservation of Ukraine as an independent state. After the idea of federalism had been discredited, it became very popular among pro-Russian forces to argue for granting the widest possible administrative, linguistic and cultural autonomy to Donbas – which amounts to nothing more than a reduced form of federalism as a reintegration model for Ukraine. Scenarios and models of reintegration inconsistent with the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and not supported by Ukrainian citizens should not be implemented in terms of politics or legislation.

One important element of the internal dimension of ethnic and nationality policy is the development of legislative basis for reintegration. The reintegration of Ukraine should not rely solely on political will; a legislative basis should be provided for it as part of the state-building process, making- the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine an integral component of the ethnic and national policy of Ukraine.

The key to successful reintegration is not only a detailed and balanced legal framework, but also an effective institutional structure for its implementation. Currently, attempts in Ukraine to provide institutional support for reintegration are chaotic at best.

An analysis of the activities of the Ministry for the Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons shows that the authorities are more focused on post-conflict reconstruction than on the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories. The Ministry performs some, but not all the functions connected with reintegration – establishing a dialogue, cooperation with the temporarily occupied territories, assisting internally displaced persons, etc.

While concrete measures towards reintegration are a welcome development, the non-systematic approach to the issue must be abandoned. This is because it indicates this incorrect strategy of a targeted response to problems which ought to be solved in a comprehensive and systematic manner as part of the Ukraine's overall state ethnic and nationality policy, the responsibility for the formation and implementation of which should, in general, be entrusted to a single central executive authority – a Ministry of Ethno-national Policy of Ukraine.

The Ministry for the Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons performs only an insignificant part of the functions associated with reintegration, casts doubt on the effectiveness of such a policy for achieving its central aim, suggesting its inability to provide a comprehensive response to the challenges it faces in the ethnic and political sphere. Challenges which constitute a contradictory and conflicted ethnic and political process that will unavoidably accompany the reintegration process. Its successful execution and the achievement of the expected outcome can be obtained only through a systematic approach as part of the state ethnic and nationality policy of Ukraine.

Today, functions related to ethnic and nationality policy are scattered among various ministries – the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry for the Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, which hampers their effective, coordinated and timely implementation. Considering the importance of state ethnic and nationality policy in the context of Ukrainian domestic policy in countering external and internal ethnic and political challenges, the importance of its integrated formation, coordination and implementation, we propose here that an institutional structure be established to ensure its implementation through the creation of a specialised Ministry of Ethno-national Policy of Ukraine. ■

UNLESS AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF BASIC VALUES AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IS ESTABLISHED, UKRAINE WILL BE DOOMED TO CONSTANT CONFRONTATION IN ITS POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION



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– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

Sadly, in recent years the government has time and again ignored the issue of the consolidation of our society, and its practical actions have aggravated the deepening social polarisation. Contrary to expectations, 2014-2016 turned out to be a critical period, witnessing a disturbance of the balance of power and the transformation of destabilisation into a permanent component of political life.

This neglected conflict in values, brought about by a situation where Ukrainian regions and communities evolved in the context of different civilisational systems, has turned into "a war of everybody against everybody". The processes through which a sense of identity emerges are developing in this situation, characterised as it is by an incompatibility of fundamental values. Asymmetry in orientations, ambivalence in value systems, the conglomerate nature of the party system – all these are symptoms of a social "drama of misunderstandings".

Although we do find the concept of "civil society" in political rhetoric, it is lacking in detail. The government seems to consciously avoid discussions of this problem,

preferring a vague concept of the "nation", replete with various national, civil, and ethnic connotations. The lack of a civil identity is weakly compensated for by a variety of local social and cultural identities.

A consolidation strategy exists – in the form of vague declarations. But society needs a debate on the means by which consolidation may be achieved, and it needs it now. Clearly, **the weakness of the horizontal identification and fragmentation of political culture issue not only from the vagueness of the national cultural and symbolical space, but also from the lack of feedback between the government and society**.

The growing gap between the elite strata and common citizens has led to misunderstanding and social exclusion. The ill-conceived regional policy, entrenching the interests of regional clans, has led to a split in social consciousness, and opposed axiological matrices of regional identities. The presence of several relatively closed political subcultures, multiplied by an acute confrontation at the governmental level, has led to the dramatic binarism of mental models in Ukrainian society.

Clearly, unless an integrated system of basic values and fundamental principles is established, Ukraine will be doomed to constant confrontation in its political thought and action.

We are not talking about imposing an ideology upon the whole of society or a contrived show of unanimity. We are talking, *firstly*, about a search for a completely new paradigm of development based on assimilation of the best international practices, on the achievements of all political and ideological trends, in respect of domestic social ideas; and *secondly*, about a responsible government attitude towards their own promises and a readiness to implement these much needed reforms in actual practice. It is also important to develop mechanisms for informing the general public about priority strategic objectives by creating a branched system of civic education.

Achieving social unity and consolidation by overcoming both objective and artificial social and cultural contradictions, in a manner fully compliant with the constitutional guarantees of the rights and freedoms of people and citizens, is a matter of national security.

The idea of national consolidation should be our main national idea. This means that a state policy aimed at the formation of a common identity for Ukrainian citizens should be based on the idea of the unity of the Ukrainian people.

The main areas for the implementation of government policy on the consolidation of society are:

- the creation of the conditions necessary for the social and cultural development of all segments of society;
- ensuring the rights and the protection of the interests of citizens in all areas of life;
- enhancing of the social role of non-governmental organisations and making their expert role a practical reality;
- implementation of "participatory democracy": the strengthening of the role of citizens in decision-making on policy matters.

The crisis in the East and the militarisation of the markers of social and spiritual life have given rise to an urgent need for the implementation of a national programme (project) aimed at achieving the consolidation and reintegration into Ukrainian society of the populace of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, internally displaced persons, and residents of the temporarily occupied territory.

Clearly, recognition of multiculturalism, in the sense of a principle of respect for otherness, together with prevention of ethnocracy and political selection on an ethnic basis, should form the basis of a policy aimed at forming a common civic identity. State policy should aim to fulfil the following tasks:

- to lay the legal groundwork for equality and equal opportunities for all segments of society;
- to create the means for achieving national integration in order to form a persistent general civic identity. ■

WE SHOULD PROMOTE A NATIONAL IDEA FOR UKRAINE, AN IDEA OF REVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT

Vitalii LOZOVYI,
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– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

As the citizens of our country have proven to be in a deeply divided state today with respect to national identity, a **clearly defined and consistent hierarchy of identities is needed in which Ukrainian citizenship has the highest status**. The idea of a political nation based on self-identification in civic terms and the development of civil society should be the chief factor in social and cultural integration.

A powerful social advertising campaign is needed to promote positive thinking and a general overarching Ukrainian identity, a campaign featuring the slogan "Ukraine is united!" As part of the campaign, we should initiate a discussion throughout Ukraine, asking: "Who are we? What does it mean to be Ukrainian? What does it mean to be European?"

The discussion should focus on the issues of nation, identity, collective consciousness, historical and cultural heritage, and so forth, as well as matters related to commonalities and distinctions among regional identities, as well as issues related to the unifying framework. The mass media should emphasise the economic, social and cultural importance of each region for Ukraine as a whole.

We should promote a national idea for Ukraine, an idea of revival and development. Ethnologists claim that Ukrainians were characterised by concepts such as: "freedom, work and honesty" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These categories can be important positive characteristics of an identification image for Ukraine and a slogan for the revival of the nation.

The basic principles and values upon which Ukrainian civil identity should be formed include:

- mental characteristics and social and political behavioural models associated with the Ukrainian nation (including such central values as democracy, freedom, self-government and tolerance);
- an economic model and social and economic values (e.g., a socially oriented economy, social justice, opportunities for personal fulfilment, an appreciation of the value of labour and of the value of earned private property), emphasising in particular the transformation of social values that lead to the recognition of the priority of creative work that legitimises wealth;
- collective memory, common historical destiny (common heroes, a common cultural heritage);
- Ukrainian as the language of the state-forming ethnic group (the language of education and science, the language of internal communication), the unfettered development of the languages of national minorities;
- the interaction and interpenetration, and thus mutual enrichment of the cultures of the populace of different regions.

The priority areas of focus should be:

- the creation and introduction of a concept of the history of Ukraine, the creation of "a grand narrative" and an acceptable modern model containing a general view of history for Ukrainians and representatives of ethnic minorities (the Crimean Tatars, Jews, Poles and others), the incorporation of regional narratives into the history of Ukraine, mobilisation for distribution via historiography, the press and schools;
- the establishment of Ukrainian as the sole state language, ensuring its functioning in all areas of public life;
- the implementation of a unified state policy in education; ensuring patriotic education in all regions;
- the introduction of a state cultural policy aimed at supporting the development of Ukrainian culture and the cultures of Ukraine's ethnic minorities;
- the implementation of a state information policy as an important factor in the formation of a general, overarching Ukrainian identity.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

It would make sense to create an informational and analytical centre within the President's administration to ensure the formation, coordination and implementation of an identity policy by the relevant ministries (of education and science, culture, information policy, etc.). ■

NATIONAL IDENTITY POLICY SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLIDARITY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL ETHNIC GROUPS AND DIFFERENT RELIGIONS, HUMANISTIC VALUES, THE RULE OF LAW, AND DEMOCRACY

Larysa LOIKO,
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– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

In terms of content, it should focus on the purposeful activity of the state and its organs from the standpoint of conceptual, regulatory and institutional support for the process of nation-building – the national self-identification of de-facto citizens of the country, who among them are de-jure citizens, which occurs at the personal and social levels. It is the process by which you come to understand your inextricable connection with the state as your Homeland, with its historical past, national traditions and customs, state symbols (its coat of arms, anthem, flag and so forth), as well as the birth of the sense of responsibility for the present and the future of your Homeland and a selfless readiness to protect it.

Therefore, national identity policy should be based on the principles of the solidarity of representatives of all ethnic groups and different religions, humanistic values, the rule of law, and democracy.

The Revolution of Dignity – given the rapid development of self-organisation of society for the defence of its rights, the mass volunteer movement that has illustrated the established psychological and ethical bond between the citizens and the nation, their self-identification as full-fledged members of a unified Ukrainian community, as people who speak for the national interests of their country – has created a new matrix for nation-building in Ukraine.

This determines what society demands of state policy in this area: a huge demand for social justice and a categorical rejection of an oligarchic system that controls the media, political parties, parliamentary fractions and groups, law enforcement and judicial authorities, as well as the executive authorities.

Now **society is asking for an essentially different relationship with the institutions of state power**, which are obliged to provide the legal conditions for the growth of the middle class, and finally become a partner, not a monopolist.

The humanitarian component of national-building should be focused, first of all, on systematic (with the help of education at all levels, literature and the arts, the mass media, etc.) patriotic education, the learning of such values as state sovereignty, commitment to democratic traditions, the real participation of citizens and territorially-identified communities in solving their most urgent problems.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

The subjects of a national identity policy are, primarily, the head of the state, the parliament, the government, the central executive bodies, and inter-territorial and local executive bodies.

The dominant subject of this policy is the executive branch (the Cabinet of Ministers, local state administrations, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Migration Service, the Ministry of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs, the Ministry of Information Policy, the Ministry of Defence, the National State Service Agency, the National Agency of Corruption Prevention, The Institute of National Memory, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine, and the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine).

State policy on the formation of a common national identity for Ukrainian citizens is a complicated, multi-faceted, contradictory and lengthy process which cannot be implemented by simply creating a universal body. ■

IDENTITY IS NOT IMPOSED BY FIAT, IT IS FORMED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY COMMUNICATIONS OF CITIZENS

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– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

First of all, one should not overestimate the power of the state in the formation of a national identity: identity is not imposed by fiat as a result of state policy, it is formed in the day-to-day communications of citizens. Sometimes these communications are essentially anti-establishmentarian. **State authorities must create conditions which would enhance social communication** and obtain the consent of the majority of the population on crucial issues.

Such issues include:

- the competitiveness of domestic production as a condition of full employment and decent salaries. One can demand this only of a totalitarian state. In a country with a market economy, this condition must be fulfilled by business, primarily by large corporations. The state, for its part, should do everything possible to create a legal environment that will make business fulfil this national duty. Otherwise, the social divide will become so deep that a national identity will be formed based on a common hatred of big business. As the latter is associated with the state authorities, the national identity will once again become stateless. This situation might be suitable for big business: after all, the role of "quisling" may be a guarantee of profits. The country demands intellectual and spiritual leaders capable of uniting the nation on the basis of dignity and patriotism;
- a national collective memory that can survive beyond national ideologemes. In any event, separate historical epochs cannot be painted in opposite colours, especially while representatives of the prior epoch, embodying the collective memory of each family, are still alive. Mentally, Ukrainians remain an agricultural nation with powerful kinship bonds and resisting everything; anything that might discredit to any degree the descendants of their line is perceived as discrediting the family as a whole;
- state prosecution of manifestations of intolerance in inter-social relations while simultaneously encouraging hatred towards the aggressor and its collaborators – traitors to the Homeland, so that everyone can clearly differentiate between "us" and "them". It is this distinction that is the foundation of a national identity. An attitude of ruthlessness towards those who discriminate against defenders of the Homeland;
- the preservation of each citizen's right to select a language of communication and cultural patterns with parallel adherence to a policy of providing additional support to the language and culture of the core ethnic group – ethnic Ukrainians.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

The process of the formation of a national identity should be facilitated by everyone. It is a so-called "common cause". The current situation demands that non-governmental organisations be especially active in controlling the authorities and big business and creating an atmosphere of mobilisation for the populace – establishing a volunteer movement and compelling the authorities to establish popular militias to be in readiness for any kind of large-scale aggression. Ridding the educational system of persons demonstrating a pro-Russian way of thinking and who aid the formation of an inferiority complex among Ukrainians. ■

THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE, THE CULTURE BASED UPON IT, FOLK TRADITIONS, AND A COMMON VISION OF ONE'S HISTORY ALL SERVE TO FACILITATE THE FORMATION OF A COMMON NATIONAL IDENTITY IN UKRAINIAN CITIZENS

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– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

As historical experience shows, the lead role in the process of the formation of a national state is played by the common national standard language which grounds common communications and creates the nation's social and cultural space. The national language, the culture based upon it, folk traditions, and a common vision of one's history all serve to facilitate the formation of a common national identity in citizens and an awareness of their relationship to a particular national community.

In Ukraine, the aforementioned process of nation building is complicated in significant ways by the post-Soviet heritage. As a result of the implementation of Soviet project of assimilation, aimed at creating a "new historical community – the Soviet nation" using for the purposes of integration of Communist ideology and the Russian language, a significant proportion of Ukrainians and national minorities living in the territory of Ukraine began using Russian as their main form of communication. In the Ukrainian community, this led to a weakening of ethnic and political identity, which split into Ukrainian and Russian aspects of self-awareness and sometimes even large-scale shifts in identity from Ukrainian to Russian.

In a democratic system, de-nationalised social groups bring to power leaders bearing a Russified and Sovietised consciousness. Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych are typical representatives of this sort of "elite". Where issues of language in Ukraine arise, post-Soviet authorities adhere to an erroneous strategy of maintaining large-scale Ukrainian and Russian bilingualism, leading to a state where Ukrainian is the national language only in name.

The absence of the kind of language policy necessary to permit the Ukrainian language to perform its nation-unifying function had not only led to the preservation of Russification in the urban environment, but has also accelerated the self-assimilation process in the regions most prone to Russification – East, South and, in part, central Ukraine. It deepened not only the linguistic and cultural split, but also the civilisational divide in Ukraine. While, since the 1980s, political development in the Western regions of Ukraine resembled that found in central Ukraine and the Baltic states, in the eastern and southern regions the majority of the populace tends to favour the Eurasian or Russian developmental model. The groundwork for the occupation of Crimea and the armed invasion in Donbas was successfully laid by the occupation of the Ukrainian information and cultural space by Russia, which faced no resistance from the Ukrainian central authorities.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

Today, the active formation of a civil society which began after the Revolution of Dignity, provides hope that a further Russification and de-nationalisation of the Ukrainian community may be averted. Many non-governmental organisations, movements and Internet communities have appeared, whose aim is the protection of the nation-building rights of the Ukrainian language. These include Don't Be Indifferent, Push-Back, Space of Freedom, Begin Speaking Ukrainian, Free Ukrainian Courses, and many others.

Under the pressure of a patriotic civil society, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine began consideration of a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada on the cancellation of the anti-constitutional Law "On the Foundations of State Language Policy" by Kivalov and Kolesnichenko.

Additionally, three further draft laws aimed at the legislative regulation of language issues have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada: "On Languages in Ukraine", "On the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language and Procedure for Using other Languages in Ukraine" and "On the State Language". A preliminary analysis of these draft laws supports the view of certain experts in language planning that it would be proper for the Verkhovna Rada to adopt two separate laws: one on the state language and the other on the languages of national minorities. This requirement corresponds to the professionally executed draft law "On the State Language". Two other draft laws combining the establishment of the functions of the state language with an attempt to regulate the use of national minority languages, despite the range of practical provisions on the state language, are characterised by a relative lack of competence with respect to issues related to the languages of national minorities.

If the draft law "On the State Language," stipulating the establishment of special institutions authorised to supervise the implementation of language legislation in areas established by the law, is adopted as a framework by the Verkhovna Rada, it would create new prospects for establishment and strengthening of a unified Ukrainian political nation. ■

IN UKRAINE THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY OCCURS IN THE WARTIME. THEREFORE, THE KEY IS ONLY THE FOLLOWING POSITION: "ARE YOU FOR THE ENEMY OR AGAINST THE ENEMY?"

Lidia SMOLA,
Professor of Publishing and Editing Department, National Technical University of Ukraine "Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute"

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

Implementing national identity policy is impossible without understanding the phenomenon of identity and its foundations. Identity is a complex concept connected with collective subconsciousness. **Collective identity can be based on common values, goals and interests, ideology or a common cultural space.**

As for Ukraine, it should be noted that there remain profound narratives which have an archetype basis. This is evident in culture, in social interaction, and in everyday life. On the other hand – there is a close interrelation of political goals and identity, where self-identification is acquiring a practical importance. However, the question "Who am I?" is still of importance.

To understand the strategy for the formation of a common national identity and its areas of focus, it is necessary, first of all, to answer a number of key questions. What defines the concept of being "Ukrainian"? What factor should be decisive for national identity? Ukrainian parents, the Ukrainian language, certain values or a certain vision of the future? What should be the attitude towards the Russian-speaking Ukrainian identity?

In the ancient time, Jews formed their identity based on compliance with the laws of Moses in the absence of their own state and the destroyed Temple. Christians have decided to form their identity on their faith in Christ. The American identity has been formed around the American dream – important ideals of the US residents in both the material and spiritual sense, the opportunity for any person to realise their dreams. The European identity has been formed on self-identification with European institutions, their recognition as the source of their rights and duties, as well as the daily experience of citizens. European nationality and common values have become a source of identity.

What could be the source of our identity? The consolidating factor of national identity and the major area of focus is the definition of a common past and points of reference for a common future. The collective memory of great achievements in the past both at the social level and at the level of individual consciousness, may also be an element of psychological protection.

However, all these positions relate to the formation of a national identity in times of peace. In Ukraine, the formation of an identity is occurring in wartime. Therefore, the key is only the following position: "Are you for the enemy or against the enemy?", "What is important for you: the availability of work and food or territorial integrity and overcoming the enemy?" Reference points for the self-identification of citizens are determined in this light.

It should be remembered that identity is more connected with emotional and subjective perceptions than with objective factors. According to D. Kelner, the emphasis on leisure and consumption is a feature of our postmodern identity. One of the important areas of government policy should be the demonstration of Ukrainian identity through the promotion on television of the Ukrainian culture as a certain set of values, behaviour model, historical events and personalities, ideas and principles of public life. At the same time, one should focus on its uniqueness and richness, avoiding the odious "cossacks".

Actually, the American formation of national identity has occurred this way. It should be noted that state policy should not have its centre in Kyiv, because then it will not be implemented. Therefore, establishing communication between the state and its citizens should be an important area of focus. This issue has remained unaddressed for almost the entire period of independence of Ukraine.

The issue of the attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukraine will be the key, on which the success of the government policy will depend. It is necessary to search for compromise and a transitional model to a Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine. Without rigid Ukrainisation, which only slows down this process. It would be better to apply the experience of Finland during the Swedish reign there.

In the implementation of state policy, it is necessary not only to classify Ukrainian citizens as a certain civilisational community, but also to define their place in the system of state-to-state relations in a way that is clearly outlined and understandable for society. The practice of citizenship should be another important area of focus. The issue is not only about the presence (provision) of a passport or identification code, but about creating a civil identity of an individual: knowledge of Ukrainian language, history and so on.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

Institutions that play a key role in the formation of national identity are education, the army and the media (previously, newspapers, now – television, films, Internet media). Attention to education is attention to the formation of a future nation. In the process of socialisation, a child adopts a certain set of cultural and social characteristics, and identifies him- or herself with other people. Funding for education, the quality of teaching staff and textbooks is not only the main area of government policy; it is also an investment in the future of the country. The army has already proved to be a state institution around which there is a process of national identification.

As for the state media as an instrument for implementing state policy, it is only a remark on the quality of the proposed media product. As for private media, it might be necessary to conclude a certain "pact" with their owners. They may have a different policy orientation and priorities, however, any actions contrary to national interests should be rigidly stopped by the state, and probably lead to denying licence. And the Ministry of Information Policy should play its role here, which should be to monitor the information space for early detection, prevention, localisation and neutralisation of information threats.

The church will play a particular role in this process. However, in the absence of a single local church and the presence of religious polyphony, this cannot be a key role. We should fight to ensure that none of the churches act from opposing positions concerning Ukrainian statehood.

The lack of adequate resources does not allow the network forms of self-organisation of Ukrainian society – non-governmental organisations – to become one of the key institutions in this process. We can speak about local communities, which influence or realise this area of state policy.

As for the creation of new institutions, such actions will bring no benefit, and will be just another step towards strengthening of a bureaucratised state system. ■

THE FORMATION OF A COMMON NATIONAL IDENTITY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT AN IDEOLOGY THAT THE STATE PROFESSES, DEFENDS AND DISSEMINATES

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Chief Researcher, Department of Humanitarian Security, National Institute for Strategic Studies

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

The defining basis of state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens is the linguistic, cultural and value-based Ukrainisation of society based on a national idea. However, certain optimal proportions in volume and time are extremely important, as are limits, which the linguistic, cultural and value-based Ukrainisation of society should not cross to avoid becoming indiscriminate and compulsory concerning, in particular, the linguistic issue. The formation of a common national identity is impossible without an ideology which the state professes, defends and disseminates.

The main problem related to the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens is the competition of the pan-Russian and Ukrainian identities; moreover, the project to create a pan-Russian supranational identity in Ukraine is being implemented extremely aggressively. The risk of this process is that the pan-Russian identity, unlike the European identity, can replace the Ukrainian national identity, since the mechanisms of its construction form an illusion of "non-distinction", and so the reason for the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity disappears.

A significant obstacle to the formation of an All-Ukrainian identity is the information war waged by Russia against Ukraine. A significant component of this war is the restriction and derogation of all the Ukrainian in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

The key areas of government policy on the formation of a national identity in Ukraine are:

1) coordination of the actions of the public authorities, civil society and local government in humanitarian policy;

2) formation of a coherent national cultural and linguistic space, ensuring sustainable humanitarian development, and the integration of ethnic cultures into the common cultural space of Ukraine;

3) updating history as a factor of national identity, the formation of a national historical narrative;

4) formation of a national emblematic and symbolic space;

5) strengthening the political background of the Ukrainian national identity, formation of civil loyalty and activity, establishment of the principles of justice and solidarity;

6) achievement of social and cultural unity of the Ukrainian nation, establishment of a common national culture, development of national communication networks and discourses;

7) homogenisation of the Ukrainian information space, ensuring informational and psychological security of Ukrainian citizens, the formation of favourable image of Ukraine at the international level, the spreading of constructive myths concerning its national existence;

8) strengthening of the axiological unity of Ukrainian society, promotion of democracy as a valuable reference point for a modern Ukraine, harmonisation of social, religious and inter-faith relations, the religious space of Ukraine.

A significant challenge for state policy on the formation of a national identity is also the very low level of institutional trust (which is both a life philosophy, and the defining criterion for the consolidation of all communities), that is trust in the authorities, officials, institutions, political parties and movements, public associations, social programmes, events and so forth.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

It is clear that the most favourable conditions for the formation of a common national identity are ensured by a legal, democratic, social state which by creating decent working and living conditions and protecting the fundamental rights of people and citizens instills a common life purpose, values and interests in its citizens. Unfortunately, the establishment of a welfare state (Art. 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine) remains on paper only.

State policy on the formation of a common national identity should be based on the idea of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian State and the Strategy of Ukrainian Humanitarian Policy, which was supposed to be developed according to Clause 9 of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers programme for 2015, but which was not developed.

Identity policy should also encompass social de-oligarchisation by introducing a progressive super-profit taxation scale for most well-off citizens of Ukraine. One of the positive results of this policy would be to limit the main source of financing of separatism, levelling citizens incomes, and de-escalating tensions and protest spirits in society.

In order to decrease the regional identity potential and stop it from transforming into separatism, one should provide for proportional representation of the regional elites at the central level and rotation of elites, guarantee the rights and interests of the regions, unite vertical relations (between the capital and the regions) with horizontal ones (between the regions) in a harmonious way, develop interpenetration of cultures and traditions typical for certain regions, and spread information using horizontal channels.

An urgent task is to hold promotional events related to Ukrainian civil identity.

In developing the draft law of Ukraine "On Indigenous Peoples of Crimea" (Crimean Tatars, Krymchaks, Crimean Karaites, ministry in charge – Ministry of Culture of Ukraine) it is necessary to agree the main positions on the preliminary work of the working group headed by R. Chubarov, people's deputy and the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. The conceptual framework of this law should be based on the UN Declaration on the Rights for Indigenous Peoples and the Convention of the International Labour Organisation No.169, dated 1989, "On Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries".

It is difficult to overestimate the crucial role of the national elite in the formation of an Ukrainian identity as it forms the strategy and policy of the nation and generates a common purpose in life. M. Rozumnyi, based on certain types of responses to the historical challenges, distinguishes three categories of national elite – "reactionary", "emigrants" and "imitators".[1] And he considers all three types of elites to be negative in their essence. Unfortunately, potential and actual representatives of the new elite are lost in the public domain dominated by the reactionary and emigrant discourse and political simulacra. They cannot develop their own language and symbolic system, create a separate communicative environment and agree on joint activities, as almost all of them is infected with the essence of dominant discourses.

Civil society should play a significant role in the formation of a common identity. However, the identification of civil society structures as NGOs that is popular in the public discourse causes the domination of the individual over the collective, the corporate over the common national, and leads to the destruction of the nation's general life purpose, including the common national identity.

The formation of a common national identity is a lengthy process which took more than a century even for the "old" nations. In Ukraine, this problem, except for the general sense, has its own peculiarities caused primarily by a long period of lack of statehood, Ukrainian territories being controlled by different empires and state institutions, and the lengthy period of linguistic and cultural assimilation of the Ukrainian populace by Russia. ■

THE STATE SHOULD ACTIVELY FACILITATE THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISES THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

Maksym ROZUMNYI,
Head of the Research Centre for Problems of the Russian Federation, National Institute for Strategic Studies

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

The first methodological issue which should be resolved on the way to an effective policy on identity, is to understand the type of identity which we aspire to form.

The cultural and historical conditions in which the Ukrainian national identity was formed led to the dominance of the ethno-cultural identification factor. This happened because the ideological determinants of this process were, on the one hand, formed by European romanticism with its emphasis on ethnicity and "rootedness" of a national project.

On the other hand, the dominance of ethnic identity is also determined by the Soviet social and institutional heritage: the inclusion in passports and other documents of Soviet citizens of the column "nationality" did for it not less than a half-century of educational work on the part of the Ukrainian intellectual class.

[1] For more details see: M. Rozumnyi, The challenges of national self-determination (monograph). – NISS, 2016, pp.70-71.

The model of identity formed on this basis, has fulfilled its important role in legitimising the rise of the Ukrainian state as a result of the self-determination of the Ukrainian people (ethnic Ukrainian community), but no longer fully meets the needs of the nation-building process.

The interests of forming a consolidated modern political nation in Ukraine require an adjustment of the basic model in favour of greater dynamism and universality. These are the two fundamental transitions – from an exclusive model to an inclusive one and from a retrospective model to a prospective one.

In the first case, we are referring to the fact that Ukrainian identity is still largely interpreted as a factor that separates ethnic Ukrainians from all other members of Ukrainian society. This division has no institutional framework, but mostly affects the humanitarian policy of the state. In particular, it provokes a fight for the various "benefits" in the humanitarian sphere, and the people engaged in the fight may be both representatives of a dominant ethnic group and representatives of a minority group who insist on different forms of "positive discrimination". Conflicts that arise on this basis divide Ukrainian society, create an atmosphere of distrust and are used by external actors for hostile purposes.

An inclusive model of identity recognises the key role of the national self-determination of the Ukrainian people in the formation of a Ukrainian state, but in politics it is guided by the principle of citizenship as the basis for identification of persons belonging to Ukrainian nation. A Ukrainian is considered to be the person who took on certain obligations related to membership in the national community. A command of the Ukrainian language and loyalty to the Ukrainian cultural and historical traditions under these conditions are no longer related to ethnic and cultural heritage, but are a part of a new social contract.

The inclusive model of identity is related to another adjustment of identity politics, and the acutely politicised discussions on language, history and cultural heritage in the Ukrainian media attests to its importance.

The model of a common Ukrainian house will be integral in the event that the consciousness of its inhabitants is directed not to the past, but the future.

When major public debates shift from discussions on historical issues and its controversial issues, to discussions on the idea of a desired national project, a new basis for constructive dialogue and mutual understanding will emerge. If we accept the definition of a nation as a project, collective mission, defined and implemented the direct participation of people, then it enables the deadlock of mutual claims and mistrust to be broken. After all, in terms of the future, differences in culture, experience, and preferences do not prevent participants in the nation-building process to come to terms with each other, and vice versa allow them to help each other, complement each other and achieve a common desired result.

The principle which will be the basis for a new identity politics on terms outlined above, may be formulated as follows: "It is never too late to become a Ukrainian".

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

Effective policies should be regulated by respective rules and be provided with necessary resources. Institutions should be built according to the functions that are outlined in the framework of this policy.

The rules are the most important decision. Therefore laws which are adopted on issues related to identity politics (language, history, heroes, place names), must be adopted by consensus and have a force of conviction of 90% in respect of their usefulness and acceptability to the popular majority. Otherwise it is better not to adopt such rules.

This instrument has started to be used in our internal political struggle. Initially, it was used in general battles for power, then in geopolitical "solitaire", but now it has come to the point that respective laws are used for manipulation purposes to improve party ratings and for personal political promotion.

Therefore, **it is necessary to impose a moratorium on the use of identity issues in political technologies**. In this regard there should be an agreement between the responsible political parties, influential media and expert community to avoid provocative identity issues in the public space and counteract such attempts by both internal and external forces.

Among other things, **limits on radical changes in national legislation should be set up**. Overcoming the conflict in matters of identity is possible only after the removal of potential threats to self-awareness and social well-being of citizens, which have been created by the politicisation of identity issues in recent years.

The main form of such threats are the uncontrolled and overly drastic changes in legislation and public policy. Social tensions may be significantly reduced if the main political forces reach an agreement, such as the preservation of the moratorium on changes to the respective articles of the Constitution and legal acts, which define the principles of state policy on identity in respect of ethnic relations, language, educational policies and so on.

Instead, the state should actively promote the search for compromise solutions that would form the basis for a new social contract.

Overall, the state in recent years has abused the rule-making function in respect of identity politics. For its substantive content and resolution of conflict issues, there are other instruments. In particular, this can be done through the formation of an appropriate educational discourse and communication culture.

Acute and controversial issues should be covered in books, popular TV shows, and also be covered in a reasoned and moderate fashion in school textbooks and so on. For such forms of communication the state should create high-quality orders and provide the necessary resources for its implementation. ■

THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS ARE: LANGUAGE, MORAL STANDARDS AND VALUES, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND RELIGION, THE MYTH OF A COMMON ANCESTOR AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR HOMELAND

Vasyl TKACHENKO,
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Institute of World History,
NAS of Ukraine

– What principles should form the basis for state policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, and how do you see it being implemented?

The current global processes demonstrate that the issue of identity is a problem of public safety. Existential threats do not always mean a threat to physical survival: it is enough that a particular historical community will no longer be able to live as a collective "WE".

Science states that national identity is not unique, it exists together with civil, cultural, religious, political and regional identity. However, national identity aspires to universality: it tends to homogenise the population of the country and to make it uniform and consolidated, inspire it with common interests and perceptions of a "common historical destiny". And the defining characteristics here are: language, moral standards and values, collective memory and religion, the myth of common ancestors and understanding of their homeland.

The most authoritative scientists around the world state that there are not and cannot be any universal ways to achieve national identity. E. Smith warns: "An ideal of a nation, brought from its western environment and transplanted across the globe, brought disorder, instability, clashes and terror, especially in states with ethnically and religiously mixed populations".[2] So, obsessive uncritical references to the model of national relations in Switzerland or Canada are basically irrelevant. The policy of "multi-culturalism" in Europe has also gone bankrupt, leading to the creation of a sort of "ethnic and confessional ghetto" and further rise of political extremism.

So we have to proceed from the specific historical formation of nations. For instance, in Europe, the nation-building process took place mostly in the XIX-XX centuries, where the components of the western model were: historical territory, political and legal equality of members of the community, a common civic culture and the related liberal and democratic ideology. The leading role in this process was played by the state, which "created" the nation by introducing: a unified universal governance, consolidated jurisdiction, common civil rights, a unified tax system, military duty, and the general development of the infrastructure of communication networks. And on this basis a system fostering a unified identity and civic loyalty was formed.

Eastern Europe had its own specific features. The absence of a national government and civil society led to the fact that, unlike the western "civil" model, the oriental "ethnic" model of the nation was based on a common origin and native folk culture, i.e., language and customs. So **it was impossible for Ukraine in 25 years of independence to force "the introduction" of a civil (political) nation by the enactment of a law.**.

On the one hand, the development of a civic nation is a long process that requires careful attention to the identity of all ethnic groups existing in Ukraine, whose consolidated and synergetic interaction constitutes the entire Ukrainian people. On the other hand, having badly damaged roads and no uniform system of taxation (almost half of the production is working "under the table"!) – in the process of fostering a "community of historical destiny" words will never correspond to actions, and the result will degenerate into a caricature.

And here it would be necessary to adopt the European experience. The European Social Charter, ratified by Ukraine in 2006, interprets a sense of unity and identity as the ability of society to ensure equal access of citizens to political rights and material resources. The charter recognises the lack of a mechanism to ensure social cohesion exclusively by the legal declaration of individual rights.

Instead, the mechanism to enforce human rights should take the form of specific commitments of the state to implement a series of programmes for economic growth, improve prosperity, and ensure sustainable development. Without this, any cultural and educational programmes will inevitably hang in the air. The charter considers social cohesion as the distinctive ethic of cooperation and confidence in today's hard and competitive market world.

– Which government and public institutions should play a major role in the implementation of this policy and is there a need for the development new institutions or to modify existing ones?

The need for state institutions should be determined by the necessity to produce a social product. The above-mentioned E. Smith notes that national identity is the "maintenance and regular reproduction of a certain composition, a set of values, symbols, myths and traditions which are part of the cultural heritage of the nation".[3] Likewise Z. Brzezinski notes that the acquisition of identity "includes not only the formal acceptance of citizenship and loyalty to a particular common future – as it is happening in America – but also a sincere acceptance of a common past, often mythological".[4] The main outcome of this process is that a person should be filled with a sense of common historic destiny, when life is worthless, if he does not have anything to die for.

All these functions are provided in Ukraine by the humanities institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, respective departmental academies, leading universities and creative unions. So the problem is not the scientific staff who form a national identity through their creativity, but the attitude of people to scientists. Because of inadequate financing their products do not reach the consumer. For exactly these reasons the work of scientists in the Znannya association has decreased, and the system of political education in Ukraine is not functioning at all.

And the parallel creation of some public institutions will perhaps lead to the process of bureaucratisation. So the main well-known principle remains: "the younger generation is brought up by teachers, and teachers themselves are brought up by life". ■

[2] See: E. Smith, National identity. – *http://mreadz.com/read-162303/p10*.
[3] A. D. Smith Nationalisn and modernisn. A critical survey of recent theorions of nations and nationalish – N.Y., 1998, p.30.
[4] Z. Bzhezins'kyy Selection: world domination or world leadership (trans. A. Ishchenko). – Publishing house 'Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", 2006, p.144-156.

3. NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION: INFLUENTIAL FACTORS, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND AREAS OF FOCUS

Expert opinions have been an important part of the research on the formation of a national identity of Ukrainian citizens. In order to identify the main trends in expert opinions on matters related to the development and implementation of policy on forming a common identity among the citizens of Ukraine, its content and implementation mechanisms, the Razumkov Centre held an expert survey.[1]

An important element of this study was to ascertain which factors positively and negatively affect social cohesion; on which grounds should humanitarian policy be formed, in particular with regard to its linguistic and cultural aspects; which policy towards the occupied territories and Russia will promote consolidation of society and formation of a common identity among Ukrainian citizens.

Survey results are summarised in tables and diagrams below.

National Identity Formation: Influential Factors, Basic Principles and Areas of Focus

A majority (77%) believe that the process of building national identity among Ukrainian citizens is underway. According to 13% of the experts, this process is not practically taking place, and 7% of experts believe that a common national identity has already been formed.

Can it be said that a national identity common for all citizens has been formed in Ukrainian society?
% of the experts



The vast majority of the experts consider the following to have the most positive impact on the formation of a common national identity: prominent figures in the field of culture, art, sports (in total 81%[2]), secondary schools (80%), armed forces (78%), kindergartens (76%), non-governmental organisations, the CTO (counter-terror operations) veteran organisations, the Ministry of Education and Science (75%).

74% of the experts marked positive impact of higher education institutions and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). Furthermore, experts mentioned the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (72%) and the Ministry of Culture (70%). 63% of the experts noted positive impact of the *Znannia* (Knowledge) Society, the President of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (62%).

The experts also were positive about the impact of activities performed by local authorities and local governments (this view was supported by 56% and 60% of experts, respectively). 56% of experts also mentioned the positive impact of national and cultural unions of national minorities.

According to the experts, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (70%[3]) and the Verkhovna Rada (57%) have a negative impact on the formation of a common national identity.

According to the survey, the influence of mass media and the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine is ambivalent: approximately the same shares of respondents find it positive and negative (41% and 43%).

[1] The polling of experts on the topic "*Formation of a Common National Identity Among Citizens of Ukraine*" was conducted from 3 to 27 March 2017 in all regions of Ukraine, except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 106 questionnaires were received.

Scientists, experts from state and non-governmental research institutions, politicians, experts from regional state administrations (or departments or divisions of internal policy, education or culture), local administrations (regional centres), professors from higher education institutions, and journalists were polled.

[2] Hereinafter, unless otherwise stipulated, the sum of answers "*positive*" and "*rather positive*".

[3] Hereinafter, unless otherwise stipulated, the sum of answers "*negative*" and "*rather negative*".

How would you describe the influence of each of the following state and civic institutions, organisations and social groups on the process of formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts



Among various factors that affect the identity of citizens, the overwhelming majority (75%) of the experts stress that the education system and educational policy contribute the most to the formation of a national identity.

State policy on the formation of a collective memory and national cultural policy also exert positive influence (62% of the experts indicated their positive impact). 57% of experts emphasised positive impact of legislation in the field of international relations, 53% – language legislation and policy, 49% – information policy.

However, the appreciable proportion of experts noted the negative impact of language legislation and policy (43%) and information policy (39%).

Among factors that hinder formation of a common national identity, experts emphasised, first of all, the lack of a realistic national development project acceptable to people from all regions (“national idea”) – 4.4 points.[4]

Furthermore, experts say that such factors as fragility of the national information space, lack of qualitative national information products, vulnerability from external influences (4.3 points), no deliberate policy for forming a common national identity, as well as a protracted geopolitical uncertainty (4.2 points) have a particularly negative impact.

The impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine, a transitional state of society that has lasted for too long, citizens who are frustrated with social and national prospects (4.1 points), the targeted use of existing social divisions and regional differences by political forces and the authorities (4 points) were assessed somewhat lower.

To a lesser extent, according to the experts, uneven socio-economic development and politicisation of church and religious issues, and forced labour migration (3.4 points) hinder the formation of a common identity (3.7 points).

However, for all the variability of estimates, negative impact of all these factors was rated above average.

National Identity Policy: Approaches to Its Development and Content

Survey shows that most experts (57%) do not feel that Ukraine has a targeted national policy for formation of a national identity among citizens. 26% of experts believe that such a policy exists.

To what extent do each of the following contribute to the formation of a national identity among Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts



[4] On a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, where “1” means that “*the factor is quite unsubstantial*” and “5” means “*very substantial*”.

To what extent do each of the following factors prevent the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens?*
average score

Absence of a national development project (objective, goals, strategy, national idea) which is realistic and acceptable for residents from all regions	4.4
Weakness of a national information space, lack of quality national information product, vulnerability to external influence	4.3
Long period of geopolitical uncertainty of the state, fluctuations between different integration vectors and centres of power (West-Russia)	4.2
Absence of a targeted policy for development of a common national identity and the system of state institutions necessary to implement such a policy	4.2
Prolonged period of "transition" of the society accompanied by the loss of a basis for social identification (economic, professional, status, etc.) by large groups of the population, which results in the dominance of identification on a territorial and ethnic basis	4.1
Disappointment and frustration of the citizens in their social prospects in Ukraine and/or positive prospects for Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state	4.1
Absence of a "critical mass" of opinion leaders (public thought leaders, "national conscience") who could defend the ideas for development of a common national identity of Ukrainian citizens	4.1
Russian aggression against Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, occupation of some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts	4.1
Targeted use of existing social divisions and regional differences by political forces and authorities	4.0
Aggravation of the uneven socio-economic development of the country's regions	3.7
Politicisation of church and religious issues by political forces, the state, churches and religious organisations themselves	3.7
Forced external labour migration of Ukrainian citizens	3.4

* On a scale from 1 to 5 where "1" means that the factor is not significant at all and "5" means that the factor is the most significant.

Does Ukraine have a targeted state policy aimed at the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts



However, the vast majority (92%) is confident that such a policy needs to be developed and implemented. Only 4% believe the opposite.

Is there a need to develop and implement such policy?
% of the experts



Three-quarters of the experts believe that common national identity should be a task of government policy. 20% of experts do not agree with that, and 7% did not respond.

Do you believe that it is necessary to recognise the formation of a national identity among Ukrainian citizens as an area of government policy (following the example of the European integration policy, etc.)?
% of the experts



Attention is drawn to the fact that, in the opinion of 56% of experts, the initiators of a policy on the national identity should be academic research institutions and civil society organisations. 54% of the experts think that the President should be an initiator of this policy; 45% think that it should be the Verkhovna Rada, 26% – the Government, 19% – National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, 2% – political parties.

Experts consider the potential of intellectual elites and civil society representatives in developing policy for building a common national identity to be higher than that of state institutions and political forces.

Among measures needed for implementation of this policy, the majority of experts named the involvement of non-governmental organisations, civic initiatives (65%), the adoption of relevant public documents (concepts, strategy, programme) – 61%. 41% of the experts consider necessary to involve non-governmental organisations funded by the state, i.e. *Znannia* (Knowledge) Society, *Prosvita* (Enlightment) Society, Ukraine Defence Assistance

Who should initiate the development of a national identity policy?*
% of the experts

* The experts were asked to check all applicable answers.

Society, etc.). One third of the experts also point to the need to establish a consultative body under the President of Ukraine or the Government, and only 8.5% of the experts deem it necessary to create a separate executive body.

Which of the following do you consider necessary for this policy?*
% of the experts

Involvement of non-governmental organisations, associations, civic initiatives in the appropriate areas (education, culture and art, history and historical memory, patriotic education, etc.) on a voluntary basis	65.1
Adoption of the appropriate state documents (conceptual approaches, strategies, programmes, etc)	61.3
Inclusion of non-governmental organisations receiving budgetary support (for example, "Znannia" Society, "Prosvita" Society, etc.) in the policy implementation process.	41.5
Establishment of an advisory body (consisting of representatives of state authorities and civil society) under the President and the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers	33.0
Assignment of the corresponding functions to the Secretariat of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine	16.0
Assignment of the functions of coordinating the activities of the authorities with regard to implementing identity policy to one of the Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine	14.2
Establishment of an interdepartmental agency in the executive branch of the government system	14.2
Establishment of a separate executive authority	8.5
Hard to say	4.7

* The experts were asked to check all applicable answers.

Experts raised the issue of possible approaches to the content of policy for the formation of a national identity in areas that promote formation of a common national identity – linguistic and cultural politics, policies of collective memory.

Language Policy

According to the opinion of two-thirds (66%) of the experts, the approach in which the Ukrainian language as the only official language that is practiced in every sphere of society, would be the most appropriate way to form a national identity among citizens of Ukraine. Minority languages can be used for interpersonal communication, and for satisfaction of cultural and religious needs of these minorities.

However, almost a third of experts believe that in order to preserve the status of Ukrainian language as a unified state language, a widespread use of regional or minority languages should be ensured for all in all sectors of social life.

What status for the Ukrainian language would contribute the most to the development of a national identity of Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts

The Ukrainian language should be the only official language in Ukraine and should be used in all spheres of activity in the society. The languages of ethnic minorities can be used for interpersonal communication and meeting the cultural and religious needs of members of those ethnic minorities	66.0
The Ukrainian language should be the only state language in Ukraine. However, wide use of regional and ethnic minorities' languages in all spheres of activity in society should be supported	31.1
Other approaches	1.9
Hard to say	0.9

Among the proposed approaches to language policy, a majority (63%) of the experts chose: "Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions. Every citizen may communicate in any language in everyday life (in and outside of the family)".

24% support a different approach: "Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions and in everyday life (outside of the family). Every citizen may communicate in any language within his or her family".

9% think that every citizen can communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life (in and outside of the family). Only 4% of the experts consider the command of Ukrainian language optional.

According to 91% of the experts, communication in Ukrainian is an expression of self-respect and respect for your country.

84% believe that in a country where a dominant ethnic group makes up the vast majority of the population, citizens of all nationalities must know its language.

Which approach to language policy do you think is correct?
% of the experts

Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions. Every citizen may communicate in any language in everyday life (in and outside of the family)	63.2
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions and in everyday life (outside of the family). Every citizen may communicate in any language within his or her family	23.6
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication. Every citizen may communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life (in and outside of the family)	9.4
Knowledge of the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication is not obligatory for citizens. Every citizen may communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life	3.8
Other	0.0
Difficult to answer	0.0

According to 74% of the experts, Ukrainian language needs to be promoted, developed and spread by the state in view of its oppression in the past and regardless of the impact of these measures on the situation with other languages. 11% of the experts do not share this opinion.

With regard to the state's right to limit the use of other languages on its territory, expert opinions were divided. A plurality (45%) support this idea, but a slightly smaller number (36%) stand against it.

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of the experts

The vast majority (84%) of the experts consider it is necessary to strengthen the state status of the Ukrainian language and expand its scope of use. 12% think the opposite.

Do you consider it necessary to strengthen the state status of the Ukrainian language and expand the scope of its use?
% of the experts



Widely supported measures aimed at strengthening the national status of Ukrainian language and broadening its usage are as follows: relevant amendments to the Law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" (supported by 38% of the experts), the Law "On the State Language" and "On the Languages of National Minorities" (31%), revision of the Law "On the Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages" (23%), the abolition of the Law "On the Principles of State Language Policy" and adoption of a new law that would regulate the use of state language and languages of national minorities (20%).

What measures to strengthen the state status of the Ukrainian language and expand the scope of its use would you support?*
% of the experts

Introduction of corresponding amendments to the current Law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy"	37.7
Revision of the Law of Ukraine "On Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages" to reduce Ukraine's obligations to support such languages	22.6
Adoption of two separate Laws "On the State Ukrainian Language" and "On Minority Languages"	31.1
Repeal of the current law and adoption of a new Law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" which would regulate the use of the state language and minority languages	19.8
None of the above	3.8
Hard to say	7.5

* The experts were asked to check all applicable answers.

Among the proposed measures to improve the command of Ukrainian language among the adult population, the experts gave an approximately equal assessment of the effectiveness of free courses at work or in education facilities, free online courses (3.7 points), free online training programmes for independent study and improvement of the command of Ukrainian language (3.8-3.6 points). The experts rated the effectiveness of free courses for adults (beyond working hours) at 3.2 points.[5]

[5] On a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means minimum effectiveness and "5" means maximum effectiveness.

Which of the proposed options for improving the level of Ukrainian proficiency of willing citizens are the most effective?*
average score



* On a scale from 1 to 5 where "1" means minimum effectiveness and "5" means maximum effectiveness.

Cultural Policy

The vast majority (80%) of the experts support cultural models in which the Ukrainian culture (culture of the Ukrainian ethnos) should be the basis for forming a modern Ukrainian political nation, which embraces all citizens of Ukraine, and requires them to know its foundations, and where public education system and cultural policy are used to ensure respect for it.

47% of the experts (a plurality) believe that government should create conditions for promoting minority cultures, and one-third of the experts believe that the state should directly support such cultures (including with public funds).

Only 9% of the experts believe that Ukrainian culture should remain primarily the culture of Ukrainian ethnos and be equal in status with minority cultures, while the state policy should promote cultural pluralism.

The majority (58%) of the experts believe that promoting Ukrainian language and culture is a primary goal of a state, before languages and cultures of other nationalities in Ukraine.

According to 16% of the experts, the state should primarily promote cultures of its indigenous citizens – Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.

According to 23% of the respondents, the state should contribute equally to the preservation of languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine. (Table "*Which approach to language policy do you think is correct?*")

Which of the following cultural models are the best for Ukraine?
% of the experts

Ukrainian culture (culture of the Ukrainian ethnos) should become the basis for development of the culture of a modern Ukrainian political nation, which includes all Ukrainian citizens. Basic knowledge of Ukrainian culture by each citizen and promotion of respect for it should be promoted by the education system and state cultural policy. The State should create conditions for preservation and development of the cultures of ethnic minorities	47.2
Ukrainian culture (culture of the Ukrainian ethnos) should become the basis for development of the culture of a modern Ukrainian political nation, which includes all Ukrainian citizens. Basic knowledge of Ukrainian culture by each citizen and promotion of respect for it should be promoted by the education system and state cultural policy. The state should provide direct support (including budgetary funds) for preservation and development of the cultures of ethnic minorities	33.0
Ukrainian culture (culture of the Ukrainian ethnos) should become the basis for development of the culture of the a modern Ukrainian political nation, which includes all Ukrainian citizens. Basic knowledge of Ukrainian culture by each citizen and promotion of respect for it should be promoted by the education system and state cultural policy. Preservation and development of the ethnic minorities' cultures is a private matter of the members of these cultures	8.5
Ukrainian culture should remain the primary culture of the Ukrainian ethnos and be equal in its status to the cultures of ethnic minorities. The state should equally support the development of all cultures on the basis of cultural pluralism	8.5
Other	0.0
Hard to say	2.8

Which of the following approaches is the most appropriate?
% of the experts

The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian language and culture, and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	57.5
The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine	22.6
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages and cultures (the languages and cultures of indigenous peoples of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	16.0
Other	0.9
Hard to say	2.8

The majority (60%) of the experts believe that the best way to ensure social and political unity will be for different national communities in Ukraine to blend in with cultural traditions of the Ukrainian ethnos.

Almost one-third (31%) of the experts believe that preserving cultural and linguistic diversity is a more effective tool.

Which approach is the most effective for the social and political unity of Ukraine?
% of the experts

Gradual convergence of the cultural traditions of communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities with Ukrainian ethnic culture, encouraging them to spread the use of the Ukrainian language and the development of modern Ukrainian culture on this basis	60.4
Preservation of cultural traditions, promotion of the use of their national languages by communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities	31.1
Other	1.9
Hard to say	6.6

Policy of Collective Memory, De-communisation

69% of the experts believe that de-communisation policy generally has had a positive impact on the formation of a national identity. However, according to 21% of the respondents, this impact is negative.

How does the implementation of de-communisation policy influence the national identity of Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts



Among the specific provisions of Ukrainian legislation regarding assessments of historical events, almost 90% of the experts noted a positive effect of the recognition of Holodomor (1932-1933) as a genocide against the Ukrainian people; 82% – condemnation of the Nazi totalitarian regime; and 74% – condemnation of the communist totalitarian regime with a ban on the use and propagation of such symbols.[6]

Fewer experts marked a positive impact of introducing criminal liability for violating these laws – 70% for the Nazi regime; and 60% for the communist regime.

In the opinion of 64% of the experts, decision on the recognition of fighters for Ukraine's independence in the 20th century, namely, the Ukrainian National Republic, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, squads of the Kholodnoyarska Republic, Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction will have a positive impact.

70% of the experts pointed to the positive impact of establishing on 8 May in Ukraine a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation to commemorate all victims of World War II, 1939-1945.

The positive impact of changing the name of the Victory Day (May 9) to the Victory Day over Nazism in World War II was noted by 65% of those polled, while 17% negatively perceived this change.[7]

62% of the experts noted positive impact of replacing the name of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) to World War II (1939-1945). 25% of the experts mark it as negative.[8]

Factors that Unite or Divide the Society

Among factors that may contribute to the unification of Ukrainian citizens, the vast majority of the experts noted the following: overcoming existing socio-economic problems, increasing prosperity (94%), ensuring the rule of law, promoting democracy, protection of human rights (93%), promotion of internal mobility among citizens, development of domestic tourism (91%).

According to the experts, the popularisation of Ukrainian culture (90%), fighting corruption (89%), increasing the involvement of citizens in solving important social problems at the national and regional levels (87%), the widespread use of the Ukrainian language (80%) may serve as powerful factors for unifying society.

[6] Hereinafter, unless otherwise stipulated, the sum of answers "*positive*" and "*rather positive*".

[7] The sum of answers "*negative*" and "*rather negative*".

[8] Ibid.

How have the following provisions of Ukrainian legislation in terms of assessment of the historical past of Ukraine affected the process of formation of a common identity among Ukrainian citizens?
% of the experts

	Positive	Rather positive	Rather negative	Negative	No effect	Hard to say
Recognition of the Holodomor (famine) in Ukraine in 1932-1933 as genocide against the Ukrainian people	58.5	31.1	4.7	1.9	0.0	3.8
Condemnation of the National Socialist (Nazi) (1933-1945) totalitarian regime and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols	50.0	32.1	2.8	0.9	8.5	5.7
Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols	44.3	30.2	9.4	5.7	4.7	5.7
Establishment of criminal liability for violating the law prohibiting the propaganda of the National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols	38.7	31.1	4.7	0.9	11.3	13.2
Recognition of such government agencies as The Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), detachments of The Kholodnoyarsk Republic, Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction as fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century	36.8	27.4	12.3	5.7	3.8	14.2
Establishment of a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation to commemorate all victims of World War II (1939-1945) on 8 May in Ukraine	34.0	35.8	8.5	8.5	9.4	3.8
Change of the holiday name from Victory Day (9 May) to Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II (Day of Victory), on 9 May	34.0	31.1	7.5	9.4	11.3	6.6
Change in official documents, names of public holidays, historical monuments, etc. of the name "Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945" to "World War II, 1939-1945".	25.5	36.8	7.5	14.2	10.4	5.7
Establishment of criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols	24.5	35.8	14.2	4.7	8.5	12.3

Fewer experts mentioned the unifying role of fair distribution of social benefits, reducing the gap between the rich and poor (79%), restoration of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine (70%).

According to 67% of the experts, decentralisation and the granting of powers and financial opportunities to municipalities will contribute to social cohesion. 62% believe that promoting national culture will positively influence the process of social cohesion. 59% support, as a unifying factor, the removal of Soviet interpretations of history and the formation of a collective Ukrainian memory. 55% of the experts support creating a single local church as a unifying factor.

Significantly fewer experts noted the positive impact of factors such as the possible rise to power of a charismatic leader (36%), ending the war with Russia on any terms (20%), change of power in Ukraine (16%).

Instead, the experts negatively assessed the refusal to return Crimea and consent to grant "special status" to the occupied Donbas areas (77%), improving the status of the Russian language (74%), the Soviet past, history and cultural heritage (67%).

48% of the experts believe that possible ending of the war with Russia on any terms, and normalisation of relations with Russia (44%) would contribute to social division (p.86).

How will the following affect the consolidation or division of Ukrainian society?
% of the experts

	Will promote consolidation	Will promote separation	Will not affect	Hard to say
Overcoming the existing socio-economic problems, improvement of the welfare of the majority of citizens	94.3	0.9	1.9	2.8
Ensuring of the rule of law, development of democracy and protection of human rights in Ukraine	93.4	0.9	3.8	1.9
Promoting internal mobility of citizens, domestic tourism, etc.	90.6	0.9	3.8	4.7
Popularisation of Ukrainian culture	89.6	1.9	1.9	6.6
Overcoming corruption and bringing corrupt officials to justice	88.7	1.9	4.7	4.7
Increasing possibilities for public participation in solving important social problems at the national and regional levels	86.8	2.8	4.7	5.7
Extension of the use of Ukrainian language	80.2	4.7	10.4	4.7
A more equitable distribution of public wealth, reduced gap between rich and poor citizens	79.2	3.8	5.7	11.3
Restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, its full sovereignty over the occupied territories on the terms set by Ukraine	69.8	5.7	6.6	17.9
Implementing decentralisation, providing more wide-ranging powers and financial capacities to the territorial communities	67.0	2.8	11.3	18.9
Promoting the development of the cultures of ethnic minorities	62.3	2.8	20.8	14.2
The history of Ukraine without Soviet and Russian interpretations, formation of historical memory on purely Ukrainian grounds	59.4	13.2	3.8	23.6
Implementation of policies aimed at European integration and EU membership	54.7	11.3	11.3	22.6
Establishment of a unified Local Orthodox Church	54.7	15.1	6.6	23.6
A charismatic leader coming to power	35.8	7.5	23.6	33.0
Ending war with Russia on any terms	19.8	48.1	3.8	28.3
Change of power in Ukraine	16.0	23.6	30.2	30.2
Normalisation of relations, renewal of trade and economic cooperation with Russia	10.4	44.3	17.0	28.3
Improving the status of the Russian language in Ukraine (as a second state language or official language in certain regions)	5.7	73.6	10.4	10.4
The Soviet past, Soviet history and cultural heritage	3.8	67.0	18.9	10.4
Refusal to return Crimea, consent to grant special status to the occupied territories of Donbas	0.9	77.4	4.7	17.0
Federalisation of Ukraine	0.9	76.4	6.6	16.0

The majority (74%) believe that a common vision of a desired future for the country could be the basis for unity among the Ukrainians.

59% of the experts think that the bases for social unity are shared values and a shared outlook on life, and 55% point to the need for joint efforts to overcome the existing problems.

49% of the experts believe that common language, culture and traditions of the Ukrainian people is the basis for social unity, 48% point to the need to defend against a common enemy, 39% – the common past.

What may serve as the basis for uniting the residents of Ukraine?*
% of the experts



* The experts were asked to check all acceptable answers.

An absolute majority (95%) stressed the need to develop cross-regional interaction between residents of different regions in different sectors, thus giving grounds to consider this initiative as one of the most important means of consolidating the society.

Is there a need for targeted state support of communications development (domestic labour mobility, domestic tourism, academic exchanges, cultural art and sports events, business activity, etc) **between residents of various regions of Ukraine at different levels?**
% of the experts



The experts expressed no clearly defined opinion as to whether the idea of European integration is to become a unifying force for society as a whole. 43% of experts support this opinion, and 37% oppose it.

Could European integration of Ukraine be a national idea to consolidate all the regions of Ukraine?
% of the experts



The experts were also ambiguous as to the future policy to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine that would contribute to the consolidation of society.

A plurality (45%) of the experts believe that the restoration of a pre-war status quo would be the best option for society, including reenactment of the Constitution and legislation, and punishing of traitors and war criminals, and restoring economy in the region.

15% of the experts support the complete isolation of the occupied areas of Donbas and their separation from Ukraine for the benefit of society. 13% support the continuation of the current policy (including warfare).

6% of the experts support giving a "special status" to the occupied territories, and 16% of them were undecided.

What government policy for resolving the Donbas conflict would promote consolidation of Ukrainian society?
% of the experts

Restoration of the status quo ante (carrying out self-government and local affairs according to the Constitution and Ukrainian legislation, punishing traitors and war criminals, economic recovery)	45.3
Recognition of the territories as occupied by Russia (complete isolation and separation)	15.1
Continuing the current policy (conduct of military activity, partial isolation, including absence of social benefits, limitation of rights and freedoms in the CTO zone)	13.2
Reintegration of the temporarily occupied and uncontrolled territories of Ukraine and granting them "special status" (transformation of fighters into "people's militia", independent formation of public prosecution bodies, courts, separate budgetary financing)	5.7
Other	4.7
Hard to say	16.0

As regards relations with Russia, almost half (49%) of the experts support the option of limited cooperation in crucial sectors, maintaining contacts and dialogue but defining the "red lines" where compromises are impossible.

However, 38% of the experts believe that limiting contacts and curtailing cooperation, as well as the introduction of a visa regime would be beneficial for society. Less than 3% of the experts are ready to search for compromises with Russia at the expense of territorial losses.

Which Ukrainian policy towards Russia would promote consolidation of Ukrainian society?
% of the experts

Limited cooperation on critically important areas and issues, preservation of contacts and bilateral dialogue but, along with this, the establishment of "red lines" on which compromise is impossible (occupation of Crimea and Donbas)	49.1
Limiting contacts as much as possible, curtailing cooperation, maintenance of the sanctions regime and introduction of a visa regime	37.7
Seeking compromise with Russia, agreeing to Russia's conditions regarding Crimea and Donbas in order to resolve the conflict and return to friendly relations and partnership within the shortest possible time	2.8
Other	3.8
Hard to say	6.6

Conclusions

Survey results demonstrate that Ukrainian expert community is aware of the procedural nature of a national identity formation and the need for targeted efforts by authorities in this area, including the development and implementation of relevant state policy. According to most experts, the initiators of this policy should be the President, the intellectual elite and civil society.

Most experts support the adoption of relevant state conceptual documents and broader involvement of non-governmental organisations and civic initiatives.

Most experts are positive with regards to the ongoing situation, current legal framework, and policies in the areas, which directly influence the identity formation (education, language, culture, collective memory, inter-national relations). Most experts are positive about influence that education institutions, non-governmental associations, most state institutions, and churches (with the exception of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches – Moscow Patriarchate) have on the formation of a national identity.

Most experts assert that state policy in the areas of collective memory, de-communisation, and the removal of Soviet interpretations of history has had a positive impact.

The majority support approaches in which Ukrainian language and culture are central to building national identity of Ukrainian citizens. Accordingly, the state should pay more attention to encouraging citizens to improve their command of Ukrainian language and expand the scope of its use, promoting the Ukrainian culture, and building communications between regions.

According to most experts, during the policy development and implementation phase, the main focus should be on creating a common vision of a desired future for the country, common values and searching for ways to overcome common problems of our time. In the future, this unifying vision could be the idea of Ukraine's European integration, which positive impact on the consolidation of society acknowledge more than half of the experts.

Experts believe that significant obstacles to the formation of a national identity among citizens of Ukraine include: the absence of a joint "project" of the country's future, lack of a targeted policy for identity formation and no eligible state institutions, the vulnerability of the national information space, citizens' dissatisfaction with their personal prospects in Ukraine or with general prospects of the country.

According to the experts, overcoming the existing socio-economic problems, increasing the prosperity of the majority of citizens, ensuring democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and freedoms, combating corruption, the promotion of Ukrainian culture and internal mobility will have a positive impact on the consolidation of society. Attempts to federalise Ukraine, accepting the annexation of Crimea and providing a special status to the occupied territories of Donbas, and raising the status of the Russian language will have a negative impact.

The majority of the experts understand the fact that consolidation of society will be facilitated by policies related to the conflict in Donbas and relations with Russia that arise out of national interests and involve curtailing or restricting cooperation to the minimum.

DRAFT

4. THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE FORMATION OF A COMMON NATIONAL IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS*

The formation of a common national identity is a required prerequisite for sustainable democratic development of a country, strengthening of national unity and assurance of territorial integrity, the ability of the state and society to adequately respond to internal and external challenges, and an important factor in ensuring the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens of all nationalities, creating a civil society in Ukraine and ensuring its dynamic development.

The Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression against Ukraine have created favourable conditions for the formation of a common national identity. Recent years have been characterized by an increase in public support for Ukraine's independence, an appreciative attitude towards the country, state symbols and attributes, a high level of patriotism and strengthening of the positions of the Ukrainian language and the spread of Ukrainian cultural tradition, the combination of the civil principle of constructing an understanding of the nation with the necessity of the Ukrainian cultural component, a common vision among the population of the country of unifying factors, common values and a conscious demand for a clear definition of generally accepted goals for development of the country.

In the conditions of Russian aggression against Ukraine, annexation and occupation of parts of its territory, societal unity has a crucial meaning for national security, defence capacity and the ability of a state to create a foundation for further successful development. Under these conditions, targeted systematic actions regarding the formation of a common national identity must be a priority for Ukrainian state. Implementation of this is provided by development of a comprehensive and consistent state policy in relevant areas based upon this Conceptual Approach.[1]

The legal bases of this Conceptual Approach are the Constitution and current legislation of Ukraine and international regulations, which the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has agreed to abide by.[2]

* In this draft, terms are used in the following meanings:

- Ukrainian people means citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities;
- Ukrainian political nation means citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, a synonym of "Ukrainian people";
- Ukrainian nation means all citizens of Ukraine who consider themselves part of the Ukrainian ethnic group, which historically lives in the territory of Ukraine and gave the official name to the state;
- national minorities are groups of citizens of Ukraine who are not Ukrainians by ethnic nationality and express national self-awareness and community with each other (Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities");
- indigenous people means the community whose ethnic origin took place in the territory and within the current borders of the Ukrainian state, united by signs of ethnic identity and has no state entity outside the Ukrainian state; creation of the necessary conditions for maintaining the ethnic and cultural uniqueness of this group is supported based on the same principles used for national minorities;
- "a common national identity among citizens of Ukraine" – means the nature of identity whose political and legal aspect is characterized by the recognition of Ukraine as the Homeland, its inviolability and territorial integrity, respect for Ukrainian citizenship, adherence to the principles of the rule of law, priority of rights and freedoms of people and citizens, whose socio-cultural aspect is characterized by recognition of Ukrainian as the state language and command of this language, understanding of the spiritual values and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian nation, and whose ethnic and national aspect is characterized by the recognition of the right of each citizen to determine his own nationality by choice, and the equality of all citizens irrespective of their ethnic affiliation.

[1] The basis for the project was the Draft Conceptual approach to the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens prepared by the Razumkov Centre on the basis of research conducted in 2006-2007. See National Security and Defence, No. 9, 2007, pp. 28-31.

[2] In particular, the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities adopted in Strasbourg on 1 February 1995, ratified by the Law of Ukraine "On ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities" dated 9 December 1997; the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages adopted in Strasbourg on 5 November 1992, ratified by the Law of Ukraine "On Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages" dated 15 May 2003.

ROLE AND PLACE OF THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

The goal of the Conceptual Approach is to define the areas of government policy for development of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens.

The main task of the Conceptual Approach is to promote the following:

• organising a targeted comprehensive, step-by-step and mutually agreed-upon timeframe, resources and results of activities of public and local authorities and non-governmental organisations aimed at formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens;

• classifying and approaching the real needs of a regulatory framework for the rule of law, rights and freedoms of people and citizen, development of Ukrainian culture and spirituality, usage of Ukrainian language and languages of other nationalities of Ukraine, provision of rights of ethnic communities for free development of their languages and cultures, reform of relations between the centre and regions related to expansion of the rights and powers of local self-government;

• development and implementation of valid mechanisms of levelling the social and economic disproportions between regions, extension and deepening of interregional communications, creation of a unified informational and cultural space in Ukraine;

• development of a modern Ukrainian political nation based on synthesis of Ukrainian cultural tradition, the traditions of other ethnic communities in Ukraine and the achievements of European civilisation;

• cultivation of mutual respect and tolerance among representatives of different nationalities, cultural and religious traditions which inhabit Ukraine;

• cultivation of civic patriotism in social consciousness, as the basis for national unity of Ukrainian citizens, and a motivating factor for social behaviour and political activity;

• the formation of a value system accepted by an absolute majority of society, based on both Ukrainian historic and cultural tradition, and modern value system specific for the European people;[3]

• overcoming negative complexes of Ukrainian national consciousness caused by centuries of lack of nationhood, historical defeats, social and spiritual humiliation, artificial inhibition of development of Ukrainian language and culture as being a part of other countries and due to the impact of certain political interests in Ukraine;

• harmonisation of international relations, overcoming negative external impact, gradual dissipation of the socio-cultural basis of irredentism, first of all, in border regions;

• overcoming existing negative stereotypes in understanding to the citizens from different regions and communities of one another, strengthening of trust between them; increasing tolerance for existing differences; creation of conditions for development of a common national agenda;

• acceleration of social adaptation and integration of temporarily displaced persons into social communities in a new place of residence, improvement of conditions for implementation and protection of their social rights and meeting their educational, cultural, and informational needs;

• creating prerequisites for restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty over the annexed territory of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and over temporarily occupied separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; restoration of constitutional order and normal life activity in these territories, creation of conditions for implementation of rights and freedoms of citizens who live in these territories, and return of internally displaced persons to their permanent places of residence.

General prerequisites and principles of the formation of a common national identity of Ukrainian citizens:

• the Ukrainian political nation, defined in the Constitution of Ukraine as "Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities" is in the process of being formed;

• the Ukrainian cultural tradition, through priority state support and social mechanisms of self-organisation, must be the basis for formation of a cultural tradition of the modern Ukrainian political nation, which covers all citizens of Ukraine irrespective of their ethnic origin; this will correspond to the historical logic of the development of Ukrainian statehood and will promote consolidation of Ukrainian society;

• cultural traditions of ethnic communities of Ukraine must be an integral part of cultural tradition of a modern Ukrainian political nation;

• development of a modern Ukrainian political nation must provide for harmonisation of development tendencies, bringing together and simultaneously preserving the uniqueness of ethnic communities, and preserving the cultural diversity of Ukrainian society;

• all forces of society, based on their solidarity and structural cooperation, must be involved in the process of the formation of Ukrainian national identity within relevant state programmes developed for this purpose;

• under conditions of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and occupation of separate areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the formation of a common national identity is a priority task in order to ensure national security.

Main areas of government policy on the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens

1. Creation of legal and institutional principles for the formation of a common national identity

• Development, legislative recognition and reporting to all levels of the population regarding a clear and realistic system of national priorities understandable for society (targets and paths of development of Ukraine in a medium-term and strategic perspective), which cannot be changed by any political force;

• the official interpretation by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of the terms used in the Constitution: "Ukrainian people", "Ukrainian nation", "the whole of Ukrainian people", "people", "indigenous peoples", "national minorities of Ukraine", "Ukrainians living outside the state";

• adoption, based on the official interpretation by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, of the Concept to the state ethnic policy; updating and systematising the legislation which governs ethno-national relations in Ukraine;

• official interpretation by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine due to adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Ratification of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages" from the point of view of the scope and procedure for implementation of the Charter's provisions by national and local authorities of Ukraine;

• bringing the decisions on designation of certain languages as official regional languages of relevant territories, adopted by local authorities, into compliance with the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine;

• adoption of the Law "On the State Language", which must clearly define the content and procedure for supporting and protecting the official status of Ukrainian language, the conditions in which the state language operates, activities for its development, and the system of institutions required for implementation of this Law;

• adoption of a law which would determine the procedure for the use of other languages in Ukraine, including languages of indigenous peoples and national minorities, provision of mutual coordination of legislative acts which control language implementation procedure in different spheres of public life in Ukraine;

• adoption of the Conceptual Approach for church-state relations in Ukraine, developed with the participation of representatives of the largest Christian churches and religious organisations of Ukraine and approved by the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations;

• increasing the liability of persons and legal entities, political parties, and the mass media for expression of xenophobia, incitement of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional hatred, infringement upon the state symbols and state language, as well as symbols, cultural monuments, and languages of all national (ethnic), religious, and cultural communities and minorities in Ukraine;

• introduction of annual reports of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights on the status of observing citizens' rights in national, cultural, language, religious spheres, prepared with the participation of non-governmental human rights organisations (e.g. the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, etc.);

• creation of active legal mechanisms to prevent manifestations of regional separatism, irredentism, and propaganda thereof by local authorities, political parties, non-governmental organisations and individual citizens;

• introduction of the practice of expert review (including civil expert review) of regulatory documents of all levels regarding their impact on the status of inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, and inter-regional relations, proportionality of socio-economic development of regions, the possibility of social and humanitarian inter-regional exchange, and internal mobility of the population;

• introduction of changes to the current law on citizenship to ensure proper adherence to Article 4 of the Constitution of Ukraine, making it impossible for Ukrainian citizens to illegally obtain citizenship of other countries, modification of the mechanism for revoking Ukrainian citizenship if it is found that a Ukrainian citizen has obtained citizenship of another country, and in other cases as provided by the current law;

• commencement of activities of the National Unity Council in support of a comprehensive discussion and development of proposals related to main areas and specific activities to implement the policy for the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens with the participation of national and local authorities, non-governmental organisations, and research and expert institutions and organisations;

• creation, under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, as a central executive authority, of an Interdepartmental Coordination Committee on the formation of a common national identity. This authority should include representatives of central executive authorities responsible for issues which have an impact on the formation of Ukrainian identity. Management functions should be delegated to a specialised Vice Prime Minister responsible for these issues.

2. Enrichment and integration of the information and cultural space

• The formation and implementation of state information policy on the principles determined by the approved Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine;

• the development of a Conceptual Approach to the development of a national information space of Ukraine, which would determine its role and place in globalisation and integration processes, processes of socio-political and economic transformation of Ukraine under external conditions and a protracted aggression against Ukraine, would provide mechanisms and tools for its protection from destructive external impacts, and attempts to impose foreign discourse on language, history, culture, the current policy of Ukraine, and Ukrainian identity. Based on the approved Conceptual Approach: development and implementation of the Strategy for Development of the National Information Space of Ukraine;

• prevention of the use of media of any form of ownership as tools for manipulation of citizens' consciousness (including issues that may incite civil conflict); anti-Ukrainian propaganda, incitement of interregional, inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and other hatred in society;

• provision, to the extent possible, of full, unprejudiced and timely notification of Ukrainian citizens regarding main directions and pressing issues of foreign and domestic policy, and actions of senior authorities, which are of significant public interest, and prevention of the suppression of important information;

• the formation of an integrated humanitarian space of the country based on extension of the usage areas of the Ukrainian language and its transformation into the

[3] See The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (date 07 December 2000) – *http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_524*.

language of inter-ethnic communication, including the development of modern Ukrainian culture, involving the cultures of national minorities, provision of all citizens with access to information sources, high-quality education and cultural benefits;

• creation of conditions conducive for the development of production and distribution of high-quality, competitive Ukrainian-language cultural and information products; provision of consistent and adequate governmental support (including through economic and tax policy, etc.) for publishing and selling Ukrainian-language books, periodical publications and print media, production of Ukrainian-language feature films, TV shows and documentary films, and film distribution of original and translated Ukrainian-language films;

• gradual increasing in television and radio broadcasts of the Ukrainian-language share of audiovisual products; bringing the lexicon of the Ukrainian-language media, primarily electronic media, into compliance with the Ukrainian literary language;

• encouraging the creation and distribution in the information space of cultural and information products that promote awareness of Ukrainian society of its history, culture, spiritual and domestic traditions, the way of life of national, cultural, and religious communities of Ukraine, and special features of history, ethnography, and culture of Ukrainian regions;

• promoting the development of literatures in the languages of national minorities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine; propaganda of the best aspect of their heritage, including in Ukrainian translation;

• encouraging the development of translation activities; restoration of literary translation in higher educational institutions in Ukraine; translation into Ukrainian of new specialised literature in different areas of knowledge, as well as translation from Ukrainian into foreign languages;

• enabling timely translation into Ukrainian of newly created best-selling foreign cultural products (primarily literature and movies);

• implementing governmental information programmes aimed at expansion among the citizens of objective information related to the European Union, NATO, foreign countries and international organisations that are partners of Ukraine; debunking of myths and stereotypes spread by Russian propaganda, with a particular emphasis on the Eastern and Southern regions and Donbas;

• continuous notification of the public regarding the status of implementation of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU, national programmes for Ukraine-NATO cooperation, implemented practical activities and their importance for Ukraine.

3. The formation of a unified academic and educational space

• supporting the use of Ukrainian language as the language of teaching and instruction in all governmental and public pre-school, secondary, vocational, extracurricular and higher educational institutions;

• guaranteeing the right of citizens to obtain pre-school and secondary education using languages of the indigenous peoples and national minorities, with obligatory learning of the state language as a separate discipline to an extent sufficient for obtaining higher education in official language and implementing professional activities in one's chosen field using this language;

• in regions where, in addition to Ukrainian, languages of other nationalities are widespread, including the study of these languages in the curricula and encouraging all students who wish to learn them to do so on an optional basis;

• strengthening of the humanitarian component in programmes of secondary and vocational schools; its basic components (Ukrainian language, history and literature) at all stages should be taught as separate subjects;

• creation of unified textbooks and manuals for secondary schools on the history of Ukraine and other humanitarian disciplines of an ideological orientation that include common interpretations and evaluations of the history and modern development of Ukraine, made on the basis of discussions with leading Ukrainian scientists from research institutions and higher educational establishments from different regions of Ukraine and foreign experts; textbooks must meet the requirements of tolerance and objectivity;

• introduction of teaching the history of Ukraine and other humanitarian disciplines by the same textbooks and programmes in all educational institutions of Ukraine regardless of their instructional profile;

• promotion and inclusion of works by famous foreign writers who advocated in their writings ethnic tolerance, and works of Ukrainian writers of similar ideological orientation in literature study programmes in secondary schools;

• ensuring the usage of state Ukrainian language as the language of research in Ukraine;

• implementation, at the level of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, of the programme for development and unification of Ukrainian terminology in the STEM disciplines, natural and technical sciences; based on the implementation results, editing school and university textbooks in relevant disciplines; expansion of the publication of reference literature and dictionaries on all branches of knowledge;

• creation in all regions of general and specialised training courses (proficiency improvement) in the Ukrainian language for adults using Internet technologies. Involvement of public organisations, including those funded from the state budget ("Prosvita", "Znannia", etc.).

• inclusion of compulsory excursions in school programmes for ethnology, history of Ukraine, Ukrainian literature, including excursions to other regions to familiarise pupils with historical, cultural and ethnographic monuments, museums and reservations, the diversity of cultural traditions of Ukraine, and encouraging the development of infrastructure along tour routes;

• promoting scientific exchange and strengthening of cooperation between research institutions and higher educational institutions across the country, and scholars and research institutions of other countries;

• implementation of exchange of students and academic staff between higher educational institutions in different regions of Ukraine; promotion of the establishment of common national and regional student, youth, professional and other associations and movements;

• ensuring the proper level of teaching of English and other foreign languages in secondary and high schools; introducing the practice of mandatory systematic training of teachers (lecturers) of foreign languages in corresponding foreign countries.

4. The fostering of respect for the history and culture of Ukraine, state symbols and attributes

• adopting the Law of Ukraine "On State Symbols";

• implementation of a comprehensive national information campaign to promote the history and culture of Ukraine, Ukrainian language, state symbols, and the country's success in various fields;

• expansion and consistent use of state symbols in the activities of national and local authorities, educational and cultural institutions in all regions;

• the formation of our own symbolic space, completion of its de-communisation, ensuring harmonisation with the modern interpretation of the history of Ukraine, the creation of the National pantheon, glorification of fighters for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including participants in the Revolution of Dignity and CTO within various units and as volunteers;

• expansion of the national historical policy based on cooperation by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory with relevant academic and educational institutions and public associations. Active countermeasures against external challenges in this area;

• systematic reforms of museum activities, taking into consideration their importance as a factor in the formation of a common national memory and the consolidation of society;

• introduction of certification of Ukrainian language proficiency for applicants for the positions in local government;

• introduction of examination for Ukrainian language proficiency as an integral part of annual qualification of civil servants that impacts their career;

• establishing liability for violation of citizens' rights to use the state language in relations with the state and local authorities across the territory of Ukraine;

• introducing standards for customer service using the official language in the areas of trade and provision of services to citizens regardless of the form of ownership of the facilities;

• increasing the efficiency of promotion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard, and other security forces of Ukraine and their role in protecting the independence of Ukraine from Russian aggression as a means of the patriotic education of young people, and a factor consolidating the country's citizens; enhancing the prestige of contract service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other security agencies; promotion of their symbols;

• increased activity in efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad, especially in crisis or conflict situations; systematic sharing of information about actions carried out by the Ukrainian government to protect its citizens abroad.

5. The development of intercultural dialogue and internal mobility, formation of a culture of tolerance in Ukrainian society

• Spreading the practice of general national, interregional and regional forums of national cultures (festivals, reviews, national holidays, contests, charity events, etc.); introduction of the practice of particular decades devoted to national cultures at the national and local levels (in the latter case using interregional exchanges); exchange of exhibitions from the collections of historical museums, art galleries, and private collections;

• stimulating the creation and promotion of the information space of cultural and information products which help familiarise Ukrainian society (especially young audiences) with history, culture, spiritual and everyday traditions and ways of life of national and cultural communities and minorities of Ukraine, especially the history, ethnography, culture of its regions;

• development of professional training and qualifications advancement of teachers (instructors) who teach national minority languages and/or subjects related to minority cultures and fostering of international tolerance; inclusion of tolerance lessons in the programmes of pre-school, secondary schools and extracurricular educational institutions and educational programmes;

• stimulation of social advertising and conduct of advertising campaigns aimed at the formation and development of a culture of tolerance in Ukrainian society;

• state encouragement of implementation by non-governmental organisations, including youth and children's organisations, of programmes and activities aimed at establishing contacts between young people in different regions and familiarity with each other's culture and traditions.

• development of domestic tourism as a means of cultural enrichment of citizens of different regions; state incentives for the tourism businesses that deal with domestic tourism; tariff reductions for domestic railway and motor transportation for tourist groups and individual tour packages; the introduction of "family travel tickets" and holidays rates for suburban and intercity passenger transportation;

• development and implementation of a programme for "The Development of Tourism in Ukraine", which provides for the development and codification of tourist routes in a single atlas based on geography and themes, which would make it possible to become familiar with cultural and historical monuments of Ukraine in a short-time; construction of the network of roads and necessary infrastructure along these routes;

• introducing a grant system for full or partial coverage of expenditures on excursions in Ukraine for schoolchildren and college students;

• creation of a general constantly updated national database of labour resources; the identification of areas of excess and shortage of labour forces, assistance to local authorities with balancing the labour market; the development of a programme for internal labour migration; the development of targeted state programmes of professional (vocational training), professional retraining, internal labour migration, promotion of small and family businesses, youth businesses and other start-ups in different regions of the country. Particular attention should be given to the help and assistance to IDPs from the temporarily occupied territories;

• stimulation of interregional migration of young people to obtain higher education; prevention of an enclave mentality in higher education based on "the closest location to home"; creation of major research and educational centres with adequate social infrastructure in cities (dormitories, cafeterias, libraries, health care institutions, etc.) for students from other areas; the introduction of special subsidies for students for rental of accommodations;

• implementation of the principle of extraterritoriality in staffing of the Armed Forces, provision of the possibility of carrying out service outside of one's place of residence for contract military personnel;

• development of a recreational and tourism potential of Ukraine's regions (mainly in the West and South); development of a state programme for modernisation of the recreational sector, bringing it in line with international standards.

6. Decentralisation, elimination of socio-economic disproportions of the regions, strengthening of interregional economic relations

• Consistent implementation of decentralisation policy and reformation of local governments; creation of economically competitive local government agencies, transfer to the local authorities of some executive powers in financial, educational, social, and law enforcement areas and the resources needed for their implementation;

• the development and implementation of an integrated conceptual approach to regional policy;

• gradual levelling of socio-economic development of regions, in particular through implementation of relevant state programmes;

• enforcing compliance with national standards (regulations) and social guarantees of a decent life for every citizen, regardless of place of residence; levelling average wages in regions;

• promoting internal economic relations and industrial cooperation;

• promoting the priority development of small and medium business in all regions of the country, especially by reforming the tax system, simplification of registration and licensing processes; implementation of targeted national and regional programmes for this purpose;

• assistance by local authorities to territorial communities in the creation of interregional information centres for business development;

• implementation of policy for creating a sufficient number of jobs (with competitive wages) in cities.

Expected results from the development and implementation of the Conceptual Approach:

• ensuring consistent, systematic actions by national and local authorities aimed at achievement of the strategic goal: the formation of a common national identity among the citizens of different regions of the country, the formation of the Ukrainian political nation;

• creating favourable conditions for expanding the use of Ukrainian language as the language native to most of the population of Ukraine, and as the main language of interethnic communication and understanding in the country;

• ensuring ideological, political, social and cultural consolidation of Ukrainian society based on common values, education and support of a high level of patriotism in society;

• creating conditions that will prevent the use of existing regional social and cultural differences to divide the society on a regional basis and increase separatism or irredentism;

• ensuring civil peace and welfare, a favourable social and psychological climate in society, strengthening social solidarity and tolerance and respect for minority rights;

• creating prerequisites for social mobilisation of society, achievement of general public consensus in resolving matters at the national level, implementation of large-scale "national projects", improving the level of competitiveness of Ukraine in the world, increasing the ability to withstand external threats and challenges of a military and non-military nature;

• overcoming the alienation of citizens from the state, increasing their respect for national symbols and institutions; development of a political culture of the population and civil society institutions; guaranteeing the democratic nature of the authorities;

• creating more favourable conditions for the development of Ukrainian culture, science, education and art, and integration of Ukraine into the European and global cultural space.

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MEANS OF A COMMON UKRAINIAN IDENTITY FORMATION

A Roundtable Discussion on "Basic Principles and Means of a Common Ukrainian Identity Formation" was held on 12 April 2017. The event was conducted as part of the project "Formation of a Common Ukrainian National Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges", implemented with support from the MATRA Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine.

Issues under discussion were the results of the national public opinion and expert surveys carried out by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre and the main provisions of the future Conceptual Approach to the formation of a common Ukrainian identity.[1]

THERE IS A NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH FOR THE COUNTRY THAT FORMS ITS IDENTITY AND OFFERS ITS CITIZENS A CHOICE OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Yuriy RUBAN,
Head of the Main Department for Humanitarian Policy, Administration of the President of Ukraine

I want to welcome everyone who worked on the survey and the Conceptual Approach. It is an extremely interesting document, one that provokes a lot of reflection.

In my opinion, the sociological survey provides grounds for optimism. In fact, it indicates that **there is a certain unity among citizens of Ukraine in their views on the country**, there is a shared vision of the future, and this is a huge plus.

It seems to me that the question at issue is how to turn this shared and rather vague vision into mobilisation for a particular development path in the country. This is certainly a challenge. The proposed conceptual approach[2] is indeed a proposal to transform the polyphony of our society into a single political will for achieving particular social, economic, cultural and other results. This is an important matter. This is an extremely useful document, which is worth developing and discussing further.

Of course, there is an eternal problem of identity in a liberal, philosophical and political tradition. Conservatives have it easier when it comes to identity. But for those who adopt a liberal agenda, it is always a problem, because identity is not entrenched in the liberal philosophical tradition. Each of us at any specific time has the right to choose an identity in a given situation. It was argued that the process of choosing an identity is ongoing. If we favour liberal philosophy, this process will be eternal. Every day a person opts for certain aspects of identity. Identity is a variable thing, and therefore this process will always exist, and we need to consider it a kind of norm.

Another extremely interesting question is why a person chooses a particular identity. For example, with regard to the language question we ask – What do you consider your native language – I think a different question would be more interesting (and important for the development of public policy): Why people choose a certain language and believe that this language predetermines the success of their life strategy?

Related to this, incidentally, is a feature of the proposed draft of the conceptual approach and what is said there about the lack of identity policy. This can be felt in the questions and answers. It is the choice of identity that dictates that the state must offer people its capacities.

[1] The speeches of the participants are presented below in the order in which they were delivered during the discussion. The texts have been prepared on the basis of the discussion records and are presented in a shortened form. Some speeches are supplemented by references and essential comments added by the editors.

[2] The text of the Conceptual Approach, revised after the Roundtable, is published in this journal.

Then people will choose Ukrainian identity. It should be noted that the conceptual approach describes different areas where the state must demonstrate its capacity to stimulate this choice of identity, which is certainly right. But in terms of analytics (and in terms of public documents), there is always a danger that, while considering the question in such a manner, we will write in the conceptual approach "do everything good and nothing bad". This is the issue of analytical value and value in terms of public policy of any conceptual approach.

On the formation of identity. Again, it was easier for the statesmen of the nineteenth century: they had a clear standardisation of identity, and before the First World War, no more than 10% of citizens actually voted. When the right to vote belongs to all citizens, the situation is somewhat different. The normative manner in which some politicians are dictated by order from above and "step left, step right" is not allowed; I think it will not work in our situation. There is a need for a new approach for the country that forms its identity and offers its citizens a choice of Ukrainian identity in the 21st century in a completely new information space, in a completely new political situation, etc.

The issue of values. The *World Value Survey* studies are remarkable, important and very informative, but how does this technique work in our reality? In Ukrainian reality, interpretation of the results of the *World Value Survey* requires a deeper analysis.

> For example, Ukrainians say that religion is their value. In a week, we will be able to get data on church attendance on Easter night and I think we will see a striking difference between the figure of 80% and the number of those who attended churches on Easter night in Kyiv, with its 5 million inhabitants, for instance.[3] This is the problem of any sociological surveys. In the survey citizens will say that they are strongly against corruption, and then they will later vote for people who cannot explain the origin of their fortunes.

We want to see ourselves in terms of European coordinates, particularly in regard to democracy. At the same time, the concept of democracy has a very long history. It is, therefore, possible that at the beginning of the *World Value Survey* there was one understanding of democracy, including in Europe, and now this understanding is changing slightly.[4] I think that what we have in Ukraine now is a third understanding of democracy. In general, the issue of comparability is extremely interesting.

In conclusion, let me go back to where I started. I propose to go beyond the approach we have and, rather than answering the question "What language do you speak?", answer the question "Why do you speak this particular language?".[5] ■

WE SEE THE ENORMOUS CAPACITY OF A SOCIETY WHICH HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM BUILDING A STRONG STATE

Mykola KNYAZHYTSKY,
Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Spirituality, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

It is pleasant to note that the views on the identity of Ukrainian society do not differ much from those closer in time to the Revolution of Dignity. We were very worried that these phenomena and attitudes confirmed by the previous survey would change, because there was significant disappointment in Ukrainian society due to the lack of improvement in the economic situation and lack of progress towards a visa-free regime. But this did not happen. And it gives us hope for the possibility of building Ukrainian democracy, which is what most of us are trying to do here.

Incidentally, just the other day an article by one of the figures, as he calls himself, of the Jewish movement, Mr. Dolinsky[6] was published in *The New York Times*. However, he is not a figure of the Jewish movement (because we honour such figures as Y. Zissels, V. Nahmanovych and many other people, true patriots of Ukraine and Israel). He is an anti-Ukrainian figure and this article is full of slander against members of the Ukrainian liberation struggle and directly against the Institute of National Memory. This is caused by the fact that the activities of the Institute and the public mood have changed drastically since the Revolution of Dignity, and the willingness of Ukrainians to build an effective Ukrainian state frightens those who do not want this state to be built. Because an article could not appear in the *New York Times* for no reason in particular. And this is not an isolated case.

I received a link from the Ukrainian media, where I. Novikov, a Russian lawyer, in an interview on ZIK TV-channel claims that Arseniy Yatsenyuk has obligations to M. Karpyuk and S. Klykh, and almost makes a statement that Yatsenyuk was really fighting in Chechnya, like many Ukrainian leaders.[7] What seems ridiculous to us was also confirmed by M. Azarov in a number of Russian publications... In other words, **this fight against an incipient Ukrainian identity continues**.

[3] In the survey by the Razumkov Centre, whose results were presented at the Roundtable, the total share of respondents identifying religion as "important" or "very important" in their lives was 55%. Yuriy Ruban may be referring to other data here.

[4] Reference: *World Value Survey* has been conducted since 1981. For more detail see the website *World Value Survey – www.worldvaluessurvey.org*.

[5] In the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre from 18 to 23 November 2016, respondents were asked a question with similar content: "What is the strongest determining factor in the choice of the language you speak?". For the answers of respondents, see: Information and analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre "The Consolidation of Ukrainian Society: Pathways, Challenges and Prospects". – National Security and Defence, No.7-8, 2016, p.42.

[6] M. Knyazhytsky refers to publication *What Ukraine's Jews Fear* by Eduard Dolinsky, published in the Opinion Section of *The New York Times*: *https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/opinion/what-ukraines-jews-fear.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FUkraine&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection*.

[7] This refers to materials prepared by the ZIK TV-channel: Ilya Novikov claimed that Yatsenyuk was responsible for two prisoners of Kremlin. – ZIK website, *http://zik.ua/news/2017/04/11/illya_novikov_zayavyv_pro_vidpovidalnist_yatsenyuka_za_dvoh_vyazniv_kremlya_1078241*.

I want to focus on other aspects of the proposed study which were absent in the previous study, since it has become possible to join the international network of public opinion surveys. Here, I see a lot of dangerous things for us that we have not discussed yet.

For example, there is a question "Can most people generally be trusted or must one be very careful in dealing with them?" – an extremely important question. As you can see, in Ukraine only 17% of people believe that they can trust others, that we can do something in our society together with other people.[8] Even in Russia, this figure is 28%. In Poland it is 22% – not much, and we are very similar to Poland as it is also going through an unstable political situation, change of political elites and internal confrontation in society. In other words, we are similar in some basic aspects. Such a large number of people who believe that we should be very careful in dealing with others – 75% – is certainly frightening. This prevents Ukrainian society from evolving and moving forward as quickly as is required, among other things, by our economic situation.

Another interesting question is "To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?" We can see that the level of trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is quite high, which makes sense since, unfortunately, we are currently at war. We have high trust in the media, which, oddly enough, is also lower in Poland. Somehow, trade unions enjoy a high level of trust – perhaps we underestimate this, or there might be some other reason, and this should be specified by the researchers.

And now on the bad. Universities enjoy the lowest level of trust. The trust in courts is also the lowest: only 10.5% trust them somewhat and 1.3% trust them completely, whereas in Germany 17% trust completely and 54% partially, and even in Poland 3.4% trust completely and 35% partially, and in Russia 5 % trust completely and 28% partially. That is, there is no trust in courts. The trust in government is the lowest among all the countries where the surveys were conducted. There is no trust in the banking system. There is no trust in the parliament and political parties either. This means that **Ukrainian society does not trust the Ukrainian state whatsoever – it trusts neither the Ukrainian government nor the courts, the parties and instruments of society**. And this is a huge disappointment in the state.

Roundtable, 12 April 2017

To some extent there are objective reasons for this; these reasons should be analysed and we should work on them. But at the same time, in my opinion, this is a modelled situation, primarily by Russia, through the media that it controls. Oddly enough, as this study shows, despite these media being fake and many other factors, the trust in them does not differ from other countries. As if that were not enough, there is complete distrust in state institutions and in some civic institutions, since a party is, in fact, a civic institution.

This is just an attempt to show that Ukraine is a state that has failed. This is what the Russians have been trying to prove all this time – invalidate or set limits, keep that large capacity of society from the development demonstrated in other parts of the study which indicate the growth of patriotism and self-identification of Ukrainian-ness. And we should definitely think about the reasons for these results, and do our best to overcome them. We see the enormous capacity of a society which has been prevented from development towards building a potentially strong state. This "wall" must be broken down. I am grateful for this study because it also shows the reasons for these factors. ■

WE NEED A TARGETED STATE POLICY ON IDENTIFY FORMATION

Volodymyr VIATROVYCH,
Head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory

On trust. I am also afraid of these numbers. Because this is the essence of changes: when trust becomes the main social capital that can be invested in changes. I agree that trust is being undermined systematically, specifically by information campaigns conducted from outside. However, we should understand that the trust is lacking, in particular, due to our internal weaknesses. I mean that we cannot just discard this, as it is clearly shown that there is a **lack of trust in the institutions which Ukrainian citizens often encounter** – the law enforcement agencies, courts – these are the institutions where no major changes have taken place.

On the other hand, I believe that this lack of trust has something to do with the social-psychological pendulum effect. The fact is that the events we had during and after the Maidan resulted in the maximum growth of the level of trust in society. Trust is volatile and now the pendulum has, unfortunately, gone the other way. Obviously, various political forces inside and outside the country take advantage of this.

[8] Hereinafter, M. Knyazhytsky quotes data from the sociological study contained in this journal.

Now on to the positive things we can observe in this study. I absolutely agree with the frequently repeated statement that now we have the most favourable conditions for the formation of identity. I absolutely agree with the statement expressed in this and the previous material that we need a targeted state policy of identity formation. There is a term *nation-building* in American culture (this word has two meanings in Ukrainian), which means both identity formation and the formation of a state.

It is very positive that we have finally come to the conclusion that **participation by the state in these processes is very much needed**. Of course, I am pleased that most of the public, as well as experts understand the need for state involvement in these processes of identity formation. I am referring to the aspect of the work related to the formation of national identity in which the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory has a direct responsibility, i.e. the state memory policy.

Public opinion polls conducted over the past two years give us an encouraging statistic, indicating that the group that supports the principles of this policy is always the largest (and the current expert survey demonstrates an even higher level of support and understanding of the need to implement the state policy of memory). It is obvious that we are absolutely ready to support the recommendations we have been discussing here. The role of the state policy of memory in the processes of forming the national identity at this point is significant.

On the one hand, our task is to deconstruct the foundations of the Soviet identity, which were fundamentally laid in Ukrainian society and which, unfortunately, continued to live long after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is really what the policy of de-communisation is aimed at. But **we understand full well that we should offer some alternative – a new model of historical memory**, and this is currently being discussed among historians and the public. This is a positive programme that we are currently trying to work out.

I also completely agree with the findings of these studies and expert surveys on the necessity of a state language policy. *Firstly*, these surveys have shown the crucial importance of the language issue in the context of national identity. *Secondly*, an interesting point concerns the language of respondents: a fairly large number (68%) named Ukrainian language as their native tongue, the share of those predominantly using Ukrainian at home is somewhat lower (52%), while the share of people speaking Ukrainian outside their home is even less. This means, first of all, that Russification as such, or non-use of Ukrainian language is driven by external circumstances, those built into the society.

I think that what is happening in society, as well as the parliamentary initiatives on introducing quotas for the state Ukrainian language on radio and television – this is the right approach. It actually changes those external conditions that will let the language develop freely and will allow Ukrainians to speak Ukrainian in society without considering it as a some secondary language. Therefore, the policy in this area should certainly be continued, and I hope that the current Parliament will get round to the relevant draft law on state language, which is also very much needed.

Another *note concerns the statement about the right and left political forces in Ukraine*. I have always been very skeptical of such a classification in the Ukrainian reality. I think that, given the post-colonial views in the country, it is still difficult to talk about this classic political division in Ukraine. Despite the fact that we have been living in an independent Ukraine for 25 years, a post-colonial approach does much more to explain the Ukrainian political situation: we are still rather talking about the pro-Ukrainian forces, incredible as it may seem, in Ukraine, and the anti-Ukrainian forces in Ukraine as well.

Obviously, it happens that the forces positioning themselves as the left are mainly anti-Ukrainian, but if you look deeper into the programme of the so-called "right" parties, for example "Svoboda", you will see that its socio-economic platform is far to the left. Therefore, in my opinion, the use of the classical division "the right *vs.* the left" in the Ukrainian situation may not be entirely reasonable.

In conclusion, I want to express my thanks once again for this extremely useful study, based on which we can verify all the activities we conduct. ■

STATE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE AIMED AT CONSOLIDATION OF OUR SOCIETY



Iryna KRESINA,
Head of the Department of Political and Legal Problems of Political Science, Koretsky Institute, NAS of Ukraine

I would also like to thank everyone who was involved in this large-scale sociological study, which really provides us with very interesting material for our research and for political and practical activities in the area of social management and everything that has come to be known as "our state policy". I will not comment on these results; they speak for themselves. Of course, each scholar will take them as interesting material for his scientific studies and proposals for policy implementation.

I would like to talk about what was proposed for discussion today. What I mean is the conceptual approach to state policy in the area of national identity formation. First of all, it must be noted that **the formulated goal of this conceptual approach is certainly correct and aimed at ensuring the consolidation of Ukrainian society on the basis of studying the cross-section of the society** that we see today. But the task today is not to create an identity policy. As was rightly said earlier, identity is the self-identification of a person with a certain ethnic, social, cultural community, etc. Therefore, this is a psychological act: to identify yourself with certain communities that have actual valuable content. But the goal and the objectives of our politics today do not involve identity formation. Managing this process is useless.[9] Instead, we should manage the processes that occur in society and indicate that we have a great many problems to deal with today.

The issue here is that **we now need to become consolidated on the basis of Ukrainian national values, on the basis of European values**. In other words, promoting European and national values is what constitutes the basis of our Revolution of Dignity. Therefore, state management activities should be aimed at consolidation of our society.

I have quite a negative impression from the document presented herein because it seems that the authors started their work from scratch, as if no one has ever done this in 26 years.[10] It must be stated that Ukrainian ethnic policy specialists take the lead in the European political science when it comes to the elaboration of issues regarding ethno-national development, ethno-national relations etc. We have made excellent achievements, and published excellent academic monographs. We have achievements particularly in the field of ensuring regulatory and legal support for this policy. And the name of this policy is unambiguous – the ethno-national policy of Ukraine – it has been stated and articulated everywhere.[11] It seems to me that when we talk about challenges that Ukraine faces now in the context of consolidation of society, reunification of the country, "stitching" our regions together, the point at issue is not managing identity but controlling the ethno-national processes that must develop in a way desirable for today, as the state establishes itself as self-sustained and independent.

As shown in the materials of the sociological study, a common identity on the basis of a single political nation and citizenship has been formed in Ukraine. Have a look: 95% of respondents consider themselves citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origin, cultural and educational identity, etc. Therefore, we should draw upon this great gain, the achievement of our independent state development over the past 25 years. We have formed this identity, regardless of who sets the tasks regarding the formation of a common identity today. Moreover, I find posing a question of the formation of this identity in

[9] According to the expert survey by the Razumkov Centre published in this issue, 74% of experts consider it necessary to recognise the formation of the national identity of citizens of Ukraine as a separate area of government policy.

[10] ***Comments by editors***. For discussion at the Roundtable meeting, the Razumkov Centre proposed material under the title "Main Objectives, Principles, and Areas of Government Policy with Regard to Identity under the Current Conditions. Topics for Discussion". During the presentation of the results of the project at the Roundtable, special emphasis was placed on the fact that the submitted topics are not a holistic, complete document but rather the generalisation of positions based on the results of sociological and expert surveys, focus groups, and thoughts expressed by participants of the extramural roundtables and previous panel discussions. It was assumed that following the results of the discussion, the work on the Conceptual Approach will be continued, taking into consideration the proposed comments and suggestions.

[11] Currently, there is no official document of a conceptual nature that outlines principles of state policy in the area of ethnic relations in Ukraine, and the legal framework in this area requires amendments and supplements.

[12] Perhaps this refers to the conflict between People's Deputies N. Shufrych and Yu. Bereza which resulted from the use of the Russian language by N. Shufrych in the Parliament. For more details, see: Shufrych and Bereza squabble over declarations and Russian language. – *http://espreso.tv/news/2017/04/12/shufrych_i_bereza_polayalysya_cherez_deklaraciyi_ta_rosiysku_movu*.

the 26th year of Ukrainian independence to be a manifestation of inferiority. The main objective, I repeat, is consolidation on the basis of the national idea and our common values. Accordingly, ethnic policy should be aimed at strengthening the unity of the nation and the state. And the issue of identity is one among many standing in the way of this, which must be resolved.

Equally important components of this policy, by which I mean ethno-national policy, are language, migration, cultural, and educational policies – which, by the way, are reflected in the conceptual approach. These are the sectoral types of policy, but they are not the components of the identity policy. There is a clear shift in emphasis here, in my opinion. Today, another clash of political positions[12] in the Parliament took place. And these are exactly the matters that need to be resolved today: we need to talk not about identity but about the sharp confrontation of political positions – pro-Ukrainian and anti-Ukrainian, i.e., pro-Russian positions. Therefore, all our practical activities should be focused primarily on the development of consolidation in society.

On the terminology of the conceptual approach. It does not hold up to scrutiny. We say that we have one nation and many ethnic groups. And then we see some old, frequently criticised positions here again. For example, "language of cross-national communication", "titular nation" – these terms are absolutely unacceptable. I do not know which Soviet textbooks this terminology was copied from and then pasted into this text. I think that we should work seriously on such documents. Or, for example, "inter-ethnic relations"! Well, this just becomes some kind of caveman Stalinism, if we talk about inter-ethnic relations,

the ethnic composition of the population, ethnic and national identity, common identity – I do not understand why this document did not make it into the hands of researchers who could help find the correct wording. I will not elaborate any further on that because this would take too much time.[13]

I wish to emphasise a few statements. The policy of forming a common identity cannot cover all types of policies: educational, cultural, migration – these are only the branches of activity of the state policy in educational, cultural, and other areas. But this is not identity policy. Nor is there any main actor in this conceptual approach – the subject of this policy (who will implement the state policy?). Next, some essential points that should accompany this kind of document – if the conceptual approach to policy is being formulated, then the deadlines, goals, objectives, principles, and responsibilities of these entities, the relationship between them should be established, the required regulatory framework should be defined (the theoretical basis stated in the conceptual approach further becomes the foundation for formation of an adequate regulatory framework); there is no authority, no institutional structure that will support this, i.e. there is no state body that will implement this policy.[14] In fact, today, this does not fit in the traditional understanding of what this policy is. ■

WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM IF WE TALK ONLY ABOUT IDENTITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHILE IGNORING NATIONAL IDENTITY AND IDENTITY OF THE STATE

Volodymyr VASYLENKO,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

Much has been said about the absence of a policy either regarding the identity of the citizens of Ukraine or national identity. There is no terminological approach to this issue among the expert community either. Naturally, if we do not work out the common language we speak, no conversation will be possible.

Regarding the study. This study is very interesting and valuable. It can be used for building a conceptual approach, I would say, for supporting and strengthening national identity. It has been said here that Ukrainian identity is just being developed or starting to emerge, and so on. **Ukrainian identity has existed for a millennium.** It is always in the process of development. Therefore, we have to face this very fact, that Ukrainian identity is always in the process of development, that it is forever evolving. This is not some constant static phenomenon.

It was stated in the topics for discussion that the goal is "the formation of the Ukrainian political nation as a community of citizens". Explain what the "political nation" is, what is meant by this term. *Firstly*, there was a more suitable term. Not a "political nation" but a "*civic nation*", i.e. a kind of nation whose unity is based on a community of people with the same citizenship, sole citizenship. This is an absolutely different aspect. The idea of a "political nation" takes on quite a different meaning when we call it a "civic nation". Indeed, in Ukraine, a civic nation exists in the same way it does in any country in Europe. What is a civic nation? What does a civic nation consist of? The components of a civic nation are not the individuals but the communities.

The specific community, the core of the civic nation is always the nation officially called the "titular nation". In Germany it is the German nation, in France – the French nation, in Ukraine – the Ukrainian nation. And **we should certainly talk about national identity**. We will not be able to solve the problem if we talk only about identity of an individual while ignoring national identity and identity of the state. In this regard, we must agree conceptually that there may be a citizen's identity, an individual's identity, but there is also a national identity – that of the community in which this citizen exists. And this is the only way to properly solve the issue of identity and implementation of this identity.

Next. If you take any state, all its foreign and domestic policy are always nation-centred. In Ukraine, unfortunately, there is no Ukraine-centred policy. It is precisely **due to the lack of Ukraine-centred humanitarian policy that we have Russian aggression** committed against Ukraine, which resulted in the loss of Crimea and the Donbas and Luhansk regions.

What territories were lost? Those where a total purge of everything Ukrainian took place. This fact shows that **without normal Ukraine-centred humanitarian policy we will not be able to save the state and, moreover, we will doom this state to future crises and suffering**. Therefore, instead of speaking about state policy on identity among citizens, we should speak about the humanitarian state policy, which makes the state strong and provides it with the capacity to counter external and internal threats.

The conceptual approach states that it is necessary to implement language policy, cultural policy, policy of national memory, migration policy, etc. These are the

[13] ***Comments by editors***. The terms mentioned here in a critical context are being explicitly used in contemporary research publications on the problems of ethnic policy, including English-language ones, and some of them appear in current legislation, including the Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities".

[14] ***Comments by editors***. Most of the information here is contained in the material proposed for the discussion at the Roundtable meeting. See: Main Objectives, Principles, and Areas of Government Policy with Regard to Identity under the Current Conditions. Topics for Discussion. – Basic Principles and Means of Formation of a Common Identity among Citizens of Ukraine. Information and Analytical Materials for the Roundtable Meeting on 12 April 2017, pp.89-93, *http://www.razumkov.org.ua/images/Material_Conference/2017_04_12_ident/2017-Identi-3.pdf*.

components of a natonal humanitarian policy. From my perspective, and I have written about this – due to the lack of Ukrainian-centred humanitarian policy we have become not only the target of armed aggression but we are also the target of humanitarian aggression on the part of Russia. The components of this humanitarian aggression include: *firstly*, a linguistic and cultural war which has been waged against Ukraine for several centuries now; *secondly*, an information and propaganda war; *thirdly*, war in the area of historical memory – we were denied the right to have our own history and historical memory; and *fourthly*, war in the realm of religion. These are four components of humanitarian aggression directed against Ukraine which the state fails to counter properly due to the lack of the Ukraine-centred humanitarian policy.

And the edge of the humanitarian war against Ukraine is the war on the language front. Why? Because **language is the key factor whereby we identify a citizen's affiliation with ethnic communities and the state**. Therefore, today almost all of us – the Razumkov Centre, the National Institute for Strategic Studies and other institutions – must address this issue, join forces and work together on a conceptual approach to Ukraine-centred humanitarian policy. And while this conceptual approach is under consideration, the Verkhovna Rada must adopt the Law "On the State Language",[15] which has already been registered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Secretariat and needs to be discussed immediately in order to be adopted as soon as possible. ■

FOR UKRAINE, THE TOPIC OF IDENTITY IS TENSE AND PROBLEMATIC

Evhen BYSTRYTSKY,
Executive Director, International Renaissance Foundation

A few words about the concept of "identity" spoken of in the philosophical sense. We can talk about a very simple thing. Identity (if we translate this word) means sameness; it is oneness among oneself and people, the communities in which people live; identity is what keeps our oneness, preserves the dignity, the unity of the community, therefore, it is the basis of economic and cultural development, political relations, and the basis of what is called the subjective feeling of the country.

What this study touches upon or analyses is, above all, civic or civic-political identity. Regarding the topic

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of national identity, there are only numbers indicating the attitude of the citizens towards their self-identification. This is clear and right. But herein lies the problem. For Ukraine, the topic of identity is tense and problematic, as **the two identities that exist in any society – *the political identity and civic-political identity*, and ethnic-national identity, have complex relations with one another**. I can say that it is specifically these complex relations between the two dimensions of identity that engender most conflict situations, from the parliament to public opinion. And the preservation of sameness or identity of Ukraine in general.

On this occasion, I wish to say something in my capacity as the Director of the Renaissance Foundation. I am extremely happy with the figures indicating that when choosing among government and civic institutions, non-governmental organisations and social movements existing in Ukraine exert the greatest influence.[16] Hence, the de-centralisation reform is on the right track.

In general, this concerns common national identity, in which I mark out two parameters, two modes. It is worth noting that the next step in this research is the most difficult one. Namely, analysis, developing qualitative sociological analytics of interaction between ethnic and civic-political identity.[17] Whoever does this will shed light on the problems that we have. Take the Parliament: I will not give an example of pro-nationalist, pro-civic groups of deputies – this can be spelled out, and the point is how to develop an analysis of relations between them, between their identities. This is a fantastic prospect and I congratulate you for having basically reached it. And it would be a good answer to the questions on the conceptual approach, which has been discussed here. ■

[15] This evidently refers to the draft law No.5670, dated 19 January 2017, "On the State Language".

[16] This evidently refers to answers to the question "*To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions?*", where social institutions occupy the leading positions according to the cumulative indicator ("trust" and "likely to trust") of the level of trust.

[17] For more details on the ratio of different aspects of the identity of Ukrainian citizens, see the section "Identity Features of Different Language and National Groups" in "*Identity of Ukrainian Citizens Under New Conditions: Status, Trends and Regional Differences*". – National Security and Defence, No.3-4, 2016, pp.84-103.

AN ALARMING TREND: DISASSOCIATION OF RESIDENTS OF THE UNCONTROLLED TERRITORY OF THE DONETSK OBLAST FROM UKRAINE

Volodymyr KIPEN,
Head of the Institute for Social Research and Political Analysis (Donetsk)

I wish to draw attention to several points. Of course, I am quite impressed by the approach proposed in the work itself, which in the final analysis offers points for a discussion on creation of a conceptual approach to development of a state identity policy. This is actually more normative. It is a desire to establish the fundamentals, principles, directions that will make it possible to ensure more progress, proceeding from the conclusion that Ukrainian civic identity is currently being formed. This is of crucial importance for me.

But I would like to say that **it is worth moving from the conceptual/theoretical and somewhat universalist approaches to certain approaches of a more topical nature**. I think that, along with the assumption that the current situation opens a window of opportunities for adequately effective work in terms of continued formation of Ukrainian civic identity, it seems to me necessary to add that a portal of danger is also opening up along with this window of opportunities. And this portal of danger is no less threatening in terms of the conditions existing today for Ukrainian identity, Ukrainian social unity, and ultimately the unity of the Ukrainian state. If we fail to understand this or if we downplay these threats, this is no longer a theoretical mistake, but a political and practical one.

In view of this I will draw attention to three dimensions that seem to me to be the main problems in the formation of Ukrainian identity today. *The first one* is connected with the community of practically two million internally displaced persons from the temporarily occupied territories, who are looking for their identity today in most other regions of Ukraine. And, incidentally, **the state is doing a great deal of work to make this identity more complicated in terms of self-determination**. From my point of view, this problem is still of the first level of complexity. And the need to devote attention to it directly, not only analytically but also in terms of political and practical response, is extremely important.

The second dimension is an order of magnitude more complicated with regard to the formation of Ukrainian identity and the level of threat – this is the community and the segment of population located in the East of Ukraine on the line of demarcation. And again this involves millions of people. Recent studies suggest that problems there are often much more complex than the average medial indicators for Ukraine.

And *the third* problem is the most complex, it is the population behind the line of demarcation, the population of separate districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the population of the temporarily occupied territories. I would like to say that the absence of items addressing these three aspects in the primary goals of the state policy which have been proposed for discussion is not a very good sign.

From this perspective, I would like to emphasise that certain results regarding the real problems of these three dimensions (I will probably address the latter two in more detail) have been achieved by certain civic analytical institutions relevant to that territory. In particular, by the Think Tank.[18] They conducted a study that can to a certain extent supplement the positive developments proposed today by our colleagues from the Razumkov Centre. This research concerns special features of consciousness and identity among residents of the controlled and uncontrolled territory of the Donetsk oblast.

I will note the following. The fact that some common identification items remain among both these parts and at the same time the trends currently pointed out by the sociologists are indicative of the extremely threatening aspects for common Ukrainian identity as well. What is this about? I am not going to talk about objective reasons, as this is obvious and requires no additional comments. Let us note the following: Ukrainian civic identity among residents of the uncontrolled territory (8%) is quite weak as compared to that of residents of the controlled territory (32%).[19] *The first* fundamental difference: 8% express Ukrainian civic identity in the uncontrolled territories. As a sociologist who has addressed this issue previously in that area, I can say that this drop is extremely alarming.

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[18] This evidently refers to the "Donbas Think Tank", an independent, non-profit think tank "in action". For more details, see: *http://donbasthinktank.org/ua*.

[19] Hereinafter V. Kipen presents data from the study conducted by the Ukrainian office of the international research agency *Institut für Automation und Kommunikation* from 30 May to 13 June 2016 using the *face-to-face* interview method (the sample population is 605 respondents in the uncontrolled territory of the oblast and 805 respondents in the controlled territory; the margin of error is 3.98% in the uncontrolled territory and 3.45% in the controlled territory). See: The results of the sociological study "The special features of consciousness and identity among residents of the controlled and uncontrolled territory of the Donetsk oblast" – *http://www.ifak.com.ua/upload/image/Особенности%20сознания%20и%20идентичности%20жителей%20подконтрольных%20и%20неподконтрольных%20Украине%20территорий%20Донецкой%20области,%20июнь%202016%20года.pdf*.

The second point is that the formation of a new identity, "citizen of the DNR", has begun. And today this is already at the level of 18% among residents of the uncontrolled territories of the oblast – almost one-fifth. Another alarming trend is the disassociation of residents of the uncontrolled territory of the Donetsk oblast from Ukraine, an expressed sense of distance with regard to residents of other regions of Ukraine as compared to the residents of the controlled part of the territory. A quite strong sense of their own social and cultural distinctiveness, dissimilarity with the residents of all other territories of Ukraine in comparison with the residents of the controlled part of the territory. Such a sense of self among a large part of the population is a huge issue. The fact that the attitude towards the Ukrainian state as one of the key indicators of civic identity itself in these territories is very problematic can also be added to this. There are much assessments that are far more critical than the general Ukrainian indicators proposed by the Razumkov Centre.

We get a holistic view, which I described as a portal of danger for formation of the Ukrainian national civic identity. **Failure to respond to these threats will be a political mistake by the Ukrainian state.** And from my point of view, development of a policy that can minimise these threats is the key aspect in the context of this issue.

I also would like to say that further research associated with monitoring the progress in implementation of the Ukrainian state policy in the controlled territories in terms of its impact on promotion of Ukrainian civic identity formation seems to me to be sufficiently heuristic and practically and politically useful. If we obtain the relevant data, we will have better understanding of the need for specific pragmatic actions. ■

THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH IS A STEP TOWARDS THE FORMULATION OF A REGULATORY DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE AN IMPERATIVE AND WILL INTEGRATE ALL TYPES OF POLICY

Viktor KOTYGORENKO,
Chief Research Associate, Department of National Minorities, Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic studies, NAS of Ukraine

Like all my colleagues, I want to thank both the Razumkov Centre and our foreign partners for this research. Because for me personally, as a researcher, it is extremely useful. We are all beginning to better understand the society we live in. Such studies are usually better understood by researchers and experts, and unfortunately, are decreasingly understood by the authorities, because they live in their own identity parameters. It does not really come down to our level.

I looked through the documents from 2007 and 2017.[20] I would have thought that a new draft would be somewhat stronger, more powerful and more modern, but it is conceptually weaker, and there is much more conflict in it. There can be many approaches and they have been heard here. But the same approach cannot contain contradictions. The document turned out to be internally inconsistent. Let us read the statement of purpose: "The purpose of the conceptual approach is to develop state policy..." and then the expected result would be consolidation in society. The result will be just a document on paper, and the consolidation in society will result from the implementation of this document.

I support the thesis that the Ukrainian society was, is and will be a multifaceted one. Integrate it? Yes. Consolidate it? This must be thought about, because in any case we have to integrate a lot of differences, but around what? This is the question. So the output is a conceptual approach, a stage to formulate a regulation that will not be an umbrella, but will be an imperative, and will integrate all types of policy. Such a document may be called either a "Strategy" or a "Framework of the state policy on forming the national identity of the citizens of Ukraine," or something else. But the concept must be something like this.

Its components must certainly include the strategic aim (principles of exclusiveness and inclusiveness: this is not the point; this is philosophising and contemplation); goals and objectives – these are prescribed quite strongly here. It was said that there must be a unified tool, that only humanitarian policy or only ethnic-national policy can shape identity – this is incorrect. **If we do not pay pensions to people who live in the territory that we do not control, they will never feel themselves to be Ukrainians.**

Before the blockade we were told tales that we have no connections there. It turns out that they paid salary on cards, but they could not pay pensions for some reason. How will these people then think about the Ukrainian state? Although it was correctly stated that in Donbas there have always been up to 30% non-Ukraine oriented people; in Crimea, surprisingly, this up to 25% – this is even less. This was shown by the last sociological study before the occupation.

But let us return to the document. The main thing is that the mechanisms of this policy should be outlined and they should apply both to the President and to the Government, and to regional authorities, local government, civil society and even business (because any policy, especially at the regional level or when it is implemented by non-governmental organisations, must be funded somehow, and without business it cannot be funded through the budget); tax laws are required, etc. These mechanisms are in fact already prescribed, and they simply need to be connected.

The inconsistencies are terminological. There was much debate about these. Terms should be not debated about, but agreed on. Let's analyse the terms. The aim

[20] V. Kotyhorenko compares the draft Conceptual approach to the formation of a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens prepared by the Razumkov Centre and published in the journal "National Security and Defence" (No.9, 2007, p.28), and the draft Conceptual approach proposed for discussion at this event.

of the conceptual approach is to form a political nation. Paragraph 7 speaks of the language and culture of the titular nation. This is nonsense. We know well the minister who answered the question, when he was appointed, what is his nationality, and he said, "I am a Ukrainian of Buryat origin".[21] So should we persuade these Ukrainians of Buryat origin not to be Buryat because we have our own Ukrainian ethnic nation?

When we establish the scale of priorities for our ethnic community ("Who do you consider yourself first?"), we do it based on 1992. The Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine conducts surveys, then others started to do this: the Razumkov Centre and many other services. According to these studies, from 1.8% to 3% identified themselves with their ethnic group. Even in Galicia such self-identification has never exceeded 4%, while civic identity in Galicia was greater than 90%. So we must also think about this community of citizens. Incidentally, the PACE in 2006 passed a resolution called "The definition of the nation". The resolution also states that the nation should no longer be qualified as purely civic or ethnic etc., but within the civic nation all diversities should be integrated, including ethnic ones (in the preamble to the PACE resolution).[22] And we must carry out this integration.

But when we say that the nation consists of people with common rights and obligations, let's go say this to these people, and we will be greeted with Homeric laughter, because we know perfectly well the difference between declarations and reality. But there are basic values around which civic identities are formed. Moreover, if we want to monitor how identity is formed, we must use qualitative indicators which may be measured quantitatively. And this is very simple: it has been done by researchers from the Razumkov Centre and many others.

The importance of state independence is the first indicator, and is measured quantitatively by various questions. *The priority of civic features in the structure of self-identification* is the second. *Pride in belonging to a community of citizens* is the third. *The significance of patriotism* is the fourth. We have about as many Russian-speaking patriots in Donbas as there are Russian-speaking people in Ukraine in general. And in this case we cannot say that those who do not embrace ethnic values are not patriots. It cannot be so. So these criteria exist. And when we evaluate the effectiveness of policy, we must measure this by certain indicators. We know that these indicators behave differently in different regions: in Volyn they do one thing, in Galicia another, in Kharkiv another, and in Donbas still another.

Furthermore, the adjective "political" with nation is also nonsense. A nation is a nation. Yes, a nation of compatriots. The nation has a common identity, a civic one. And when we say "political"... Well, let's say it, we have the same political goal that has been formulated for us – NATO – it still breaks Ukraine. (Incidentally, NATO is where no one is waiting for us today.) Our people, not believing in parties, are attached to different parties and go and vote. But, **what is politically unites us all**, then (it was already stated today), is **a total distrust in all the representatives of political power without exception**.

We must integrate all persons who relate or identify themselves with any ethnic, cultural, linguistic community, etc., and develop their civic identity. Many of these issues which I have spoken about (about mechanisms etc.), in 2008 I prepared and published in "Strategic Priorities" a draft law "On the Strategy of the State Ethnic Policy".[23] It is clear that no one had any need of it. But, in any case, it is very appropriate to this text of the Razumkov Centre. You could just take it and add 60% to this document. ■

STATE POLICY SHOULD NOT BE "KYIV-CENTERED" AND SHOULD NOT BE DEVELOPED ONLY IN KYIV



Lidia SMOLA,
Professor of Publishing and Editing Department, National Technical University of Ukraine "Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute"

I would like to echo the previous thanks and congratulations to the Razumkov Centre. This is indeed a very important study. There is a wide range of material here that can be used in further studies.

First of all, there is a problem in definitions. Once Descartes said that people would get rid of half of their troubles if they agreed on the meaning of words. And we see that even in this room there is a different interpretation of certain approaches, certain words.

However, certain scholars have spoken about the collective unconscious or other aspects. I would have stopped at the felicitous expression "to speak about the sameness of oneself and communities". I noticed three points which seem to me to be important ones. *First*. What could play the role of this consolidating and unifying factor? Because it exists somewhere in the context of this civic and political identity. To give a brief overview, the Jews were united by the identity of a common temple, Christians were united by faith in God, Americans were united by the "*American dream*". In other words, by some vital priorities in material or spiritual terms. Europeans are united by European institutions that actually protect and reflect the values, rights and principles based on which Europeans live. For this reason, something that could be a factor of consolidation for Ukrainians, for Ukraine, for Ukrainian citizens, I believe, is the key thing. Either this is the shape of a common future, or examples of a heroic past.

Second – the moment of successful implementation of public policy will depend on the attitude towards Russian-speaking Ukraine. And here questions of the nation may arise. I think that for further study or preparation of a future document, the experience of Finland would be a very reasonable example – not fierce Ukrainisation for assertion of the rights of the Ukrainian language and information space. What I mean is the experience of Finland in the period when the Swedish language dominated there and the Finnish language was considered to be the language of the backward strata of the population.[24] Language is an important aspect in the context of the attitude to Russian-speaking Ukraine, too.

The third aspect is that state policy should not be "Kyiv-centered" and should not be developed only in Kyiv. Because, if we take all these years – and the previous speakers have talked about this – the worst in Ukraine, in my opinion, is the question of communication between the authorities and the public. This communication is not established. It is impossible to talk about a common national identity without the establishment of that communication. Indeed, we have something that unites us and it is something that is joked about in social networks, the "treason *hash tag*", that is people very quickly united around "treason, what the government does wrong". But, unfortunately, we do not have any examples of actions, consolidation actions, originating from the state.

And the last thing I want to say in this context is the things which are discussed in social networks, i.e. the practice of citizenship. In other words, it is not only a question of providing someone with a passport or an identification code, but of implementing civic identity, language skills and knowledge of history. And I believe that in this aspect this document should prescribe institutions, namely: education, the army (as one of the factors around which a national identity is formed is the army: a sphere where we already feel that identity). There must in any case be agreement or some sort of pact with the private owners of the media, convention as an option. ■

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WE LOST BOTH CRIMEA AND DONBAS, AS THEY WERE COMPLETELY PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN MEDIA

Larysa MASENKO,
Professor at the Department of Ukrainian Language, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Lead Research Associate at the Institute of the Ukrainian Language, NAS of Ukraine

I share the expressed opinions that the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre is extremely important and topical and provides useful conclusions.

I wish to say a few words about the discussion. *Firstly*, it was expressed here that the term "titular nation" is a Soviet one, that it comes from the Soviet tradition. This is absurd, because the term "titular" was never used in Soviet terminology. There was no concept of "state language" at all and the concept of the "state-constituting nation" was rejected. There was a "harmonious Russian-national bilingualism", there was "friendship of peoples", but in fact all this rhetoric covered the strict Russification and unification of the whole country on linguistic and cultural grounds.

Secondly, the opinion was expressed that language policy should be pursued using liberal methods. I would like to say that **the state cannot withdraw from the state language policy**. We lost both Crimea and Donbas, as they were completely placed under the control of the Russian media, which constantly spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda there. It must be emphasised that the language factor is very important, because Russia constantly uses it. And here lies our great mistake: the Ukrainian language was proclaimed a state language, that is, it acquired official status, but there was no control over the implementation of this law and this status and it amounted solely to a declaration. Indeed, the state can not help but be didactic in certain ways.

> I would like to provide an example of a great mistake made in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Back in the early 1990s a resolution was adopted that it is necessary to learn the Ukrainian language in the Armed Forces, but on a voluntary basis.[25] It is clear that the officers educated in Moscow ignored this. And in practice our army remains "russified".

Thirdly, it was mentioned here that "we have a very negative phenomenon in our schools, when after lessons, during breaks (outside the lessons) teachers talk with children in Russian". This phenomenon is absolutely unacceptable. And, incidentally, when Vakarchuk was Minister of Education, the Resolution on the Ukrainian

[21] An excerpt from Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov's response is quoted (September 2005 – August 2006) from an interview following the 2005 results. "To the young people of Ukraine" (January 2006).

[22] This refers to the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe №1735 (2006) "The concept of the nation", *http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17407&lang=en*.

[23] See: Kotyhorenko V. On the strategy of the state ethnic policy. – Strategic Priorities, №1, 2008 p. 40-52. *http://old.niss.gov.ua/book/StrPryor/6/7.pdf*.

[24] The Finnish language had no official status until the 19th century. As part of Sweden from 13th to 19th centuries, Finland used the Swedish language in education, government and literature. Formally, the Finnish language gained equal rights with Swedish in 1863. At that time it began to be taught in schools and universities, it began to be used in publishing of newspapers and fiction. However, only in 1919 Finnish was declared an official language in Finland along with Swedish.

[25] Apparently this refers to Directive of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine No. D-10 "On learning the Ukrainian language in the Armed Forces of Ukraine", dated 15 May 1992.

language regime in Ukrainian schools (teachers and children must speak Ukrainian during breaks) was adopted under the pressure of non-governmental organisations (it was even signed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko).[26] Because the state language policy itself is mainly aimed at young people. **Education has been the key institution in all countries with an assimilated population in post-colonial environment.**

Now we have three draft laws on the state language prepared. Incidentally, the shameful Kivalov-Kolesnichenko[27] law has not been revoked yet and it seems that the Constitutional Court does not intend to revoke it. The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Culture and Spirituality has three draft laws. The best of them is the draft Law "On the State Language", which proposes to create a centre responsible for enforcement of the law.[28] Unfortunately, there are two other draft laws. I would like to see an agreement reached. In my opinion, this lack of trust that we have in society, which was mentioned before, holds true among our elite as well. It would be highly desirable for this committee to choose the draft Law "On the State Language" as a basis and insist on its adoption, although I understand what the opposition will be like. ■

WE HAVE TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE LANGUAGE INSTEAD OF ISSUING DECREES

Volodymyr OLIYNYK,
Project Coordinator, Representative Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Ukraine

I want to speak not as a representative of the Foundation but as a person who has studied the history of language. In fact, I have a word of advice for further research. When it comes to the number of people who understand what you have as your native language and the number of people who use it in their families and outside their home. I think that the work we have is more serious than issuing decrees or orders, as this tradition is quite extensive here, in the Dnieper region.

In particular, if we have a look at our history, then a thousand years ago we spoke (I mean the population) the popular language and officially used another one, the literary language, namely Old Slavonic, Church Slavonic. This is evidenced by the books of that time and the difference in graffiti that can be seen on the walls of the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv – their language was closer to the colloquial one. This tradition in the Dnieper region has been preserved until recently.

This was not surprising for Europe, because in the Middle Ages Latin was also the literary language, even in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But the gap between Latin and the popular language was extremely wide. Therefore, the transition to the popular languages as spoken was very easy in Germany and in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But here, this closeness of Old Slavonic, Church Slavonic to the popular Ukrainian language was an obstacle.

In addition, we must also recall policy. In Finland, Estonia, Latvia and even in civilised Galicia, the Baltic German-speaking elite or the Habsburg Empire, respectively, whose representatives wrote historical and linguistic investigations and regulatory books (in particular, in grammar and spelling), for example, for the Estonian language, which at that time was called the peasant language by the Estonians themselves, so that the language gained its prestige. The same happened in the Austrian Empire and then in the Austro-Hungarian Empire with respect to the Rusyn (Ukrainian) language. Here, in the Dnieper region, this tradition (in the Russian Empire), the tradition of a lack of prestige, the vernacular nature of the popular language was retained and maintained for a long period of time. And this situation has not changed even 25 years since the country gained independence.

> A minor experience I've had. I come to the supermarket. The cashiers are young girls who probably were born in independent Ukraine and speak beautiful Ukrainian to each other. I speak to them in Ukrainian and receive an answer in Russian. I ask "Why?" – "Well, you are a customer", you are, they say, an official person, this is in their consciousness. The same happens at the reception desks in sport centres and in restaurants.

This means that we have to enhance the prestige of the language instead of issuing decrees. And we need to investigate why the situation is this way. So my word of advice is to do research. **A thousand-year tradition is very difficult to overcome, and still more so by issuing decrees.** ■

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[26] This refers to Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1033 "On amendments to the Regulations on a general education institution" dated 30 September 2009, which has been repealed.

[27] The notorious Law of Ukraine "On the principles of the state language policy", dated 5 June 2012.

[28] This refers to the draft law "On the state Language", registration No. 5670, dated 19 January 2017, mentioned during the discussion.

UKRAINIAN CIVIL NATION, THE UKRAINIAN CIVIL STATE SHOULD BE BASED ON THE CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION



Ivan ZAYETS,
Member of Parliament of Ukraine, Convocations I-IV, and VI

First of all, I would like to note the extreme relevance of this research, as well as the importance of the problem – it is very urgent and we need to broaden and deepen all these studies and do this such that they will take the form of making political decisions. If we focus only on the level of scientific research, we there will be little benefit from it.

This is what I fear. I am afraid that, because of these encouraging trends, many of which were discussed today, the authorities will come to the wrong conclusion. They will say that everything is fine, everything is going in the right direction and we will calm down. This is the greatest danger, knowing the nature of our government.

And we see it in three areas, three processes that shape national identity: these are NATO, language, and farming. So I think we should proceed from the premise that this mood of society must be secured and documented.

Indeed, if we talk about the identity of a certain citizen, the identity of an individual, it cannot exist outside the identity of a community. This was already noted here. There are two approaches: liberal and conservative. Liberals say that what is important is the process, and the conservatives say that each process must conclude with an act, some formalisation, some fixation of these things. And if today we were to proceed with a conservative approach, we would not have such a problem when schoolteachers speak Russian to students during breaks, because these relationships needed to be formalised for teachers – it is a sign of their professionalism, their loyalty to the state and law.

The first thing I want to say is that **our government may come to the wrong conclusions**. **The second thing is that we should take into account global trends.** The liberal model of the world order is now receding before a tide of nationalism. I would like it to be the same nationalism which created Europe. A civilised nationalism, not a wild one. What does this mean? Humanity is focused on this era of nationalism, which is why governments and nations will be more concentrated on restoring the capacity of the national state. Liberalism, which was based on human rights without regard for the rights of ethnic nations, moved this institution to the side – the institution of the nation-state. Whether we want it or not, both Brexit and Trump`s ascendancy, and the war of Russia against Ukraine, and many other features show that the world will go in this direction. And it will be a very big problem if liberals make further gains in Ukraine. We need to find an intersection of these two processes, in which the liberal world moves back and the national world moves forward.

Now, as to what is civic identity and the civic nation. Name just one nation in the world that is a civic one and which does not have a national face. All have their national face. That is why we say that the Ukrainian civil nation, the Ukrainian civil state should be based on the customs and traditions of the Ukrainian nation. Today we worry about the rights of national minorities and avoid exactly what is now the biggest problem here, namely how to restore the capacity of the Ukrainian nation, which is the foundation of a civil nation. If we continue to speak this way, then we will go only so far and then begin to cause great tension.

Now, about the three areas, which should be implemented in public policy in order strengthen the Ukrainian identity. **The first is a Ukrainian-centered humanitarian policy** (which has already been mentioned). First of all, it should begin with the adoption of technical solutions. It is not possible to delay the passage of the law on the Ukrainian language as the state language any more. Today, we read newspapers and see that a delay in resolving these problems leads to the aggravation of the situation in Ukrainian society: somewhere an earring with the Trident coat of arms is ripped out of an ear; somewhere in Poltava service at the library is refused to a professor. What causes this? The fact that when a trend proceeds but there is no documentation of it in the law, this is the point at which all these contradictions arise.

Therefore, the following things are necessary: *first*, it is essential to hasten the passage of the law on language; *second*, to eliminate the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law (the Constitutional Court is working on this and I witnessed one of the hearings) and remove all these contradictions generated precisely by the lack of regulation of these processes.

The second area. It should be noted that the formation of the national identity is affected not only by humanitarian policy, although it is crucial, but also by the economic structure. It should be based on farming – family farming, which is similar to other European countries.

Today, two trends have merged because of bad regulation: agricultural holdings, some big farms, estates, which have entirely discredited themselves around the world, and a complete blockade of farming development. Without farming we will be unable to revive the sources of the Ukrainian tradition and the Ukrainian customs, and unable to operate agriculture as an effective business sector. We must understand that we are already late with these processes. We need to transition to a farm system, to write down, like the Poles did in their Constitution, that the basis of the economic structure of the Republic of Poland is the family farm. And instead we have a discussion about a moratorium on land. A moratorium is not the aim today. This was a means of

control of irrational processes that did not solve the range of problems in the country and, in particular, the structural problem.

The third and the last is the issue of NATO. It was said here that NATO is an issue that splits the society. I do not agree with this statement. If during a referendum had been held in 2015-2016 in Ukraine on its membership in NATO, then in Ukraine about 85% of people participating would vote affirmatively[29] (you would not see such overwhelming results even in the current countries of NATO). But again, our elite plays a waiting game. I think that these issues should be carried over to a technical level, the level of decisions, and then we will truly have the recovery of the national identity. There is an urgent need to deepen these processes and enter the political level. ■

I WANT THE UKRAINIAN TO BE PERCEIVED AS DEFAULT LANGUAGE



Galyna YAVORSKA,
Lead Research Associate, Department of Global Studies and Security Strategies, National Institute for Strategic Studies

It was stated here that European integration may become a unifying idea. I want to say that this situation should be looked at in this way (this should not be taken as a sign of a negative attitude towards European integration): European integration started to be perceived simply as a given, as a presumption, it left the area of discussion, it ceased to be a problem, and I see this as a positive thing.

And the second issue is language. Today we can see: if this becomes a topic that is perceived by default, then a step forward has been taken. I wish we had such a situation with the Ukrainian language, so that it would be perceived as a default language, not one which we must fight for. But this requires time. ■

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WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PATH FROM ADEQUATE NATIONAL IDENTITY TO SUCCESSFUL SUBJECTIVITY

Victor TKACHUK,
Member of Parliament of Ukraine, Convocation III

It seems to me that the crisis in the EU management and the war between Ukraine and Russia have led to demand for identity both in terms of definition and in terms of tools to influence its formation. And for developing the topic we have worthy European examples of successful leaders – I would mention Holland, Germany, and Great Britain. They are successful because they preserved their identity and strengthened state subjectivity. It would have been somewhat intolerant and a little bit seditious to talk about this just a few years ago, but three years ago Ms. Merkel officially announced the crisis of the policy of multiculturalism.[30] And since that time, identity as a type has become a legal European tool for strengthening statehood.

We are only at the beginning of this path from adequate national identity to successful subjectivity. And it is important that we have one small stop called "democracy" on this path. It is evident to anyone here that **democracy in Ukraine is always associated with chaos**, particularly in the public consciousness. But when you propose things one by one, i.e.: "Do you want the government to report?" – "Yes"; "Do you want to have transparent elections?" – "Yes"; "Does a citizen want to have a right to defence" – "Yes"; "Do you want to have freedom of speech" – "Yes", "Well, this is what democracy is" – "Then it's all right".

It is very important that we keep this in mind on the path from identity to state subjectivity, and that we remember that democracy does not lead to success at once. And this is exactly what the Centre is doing today: research and implementation of how identity will penetrate into the system of democracy that we can build. ■

[29] In particular, according to a sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Centre jointly with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in May 2016, 78% of Ukrainians would vote affirmatively for joining NATO in a hypothetical referendum. Apparently, I. Zayets is basing this on other sources.

[30] V. Tkachuk likely refers to a speech at a meeting of the youth organisation of the Christian Democratic Union on 16 October 2010, where the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany A. Merkel acknowledged the failure of attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany: "It is obvious that the multicultural approach involving a happy life together side by side has failed completely... Those who want to become a part of our society must not only comply with our laws but also speak our language". See, in particular: *http://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/kriza-multikulturalizmu*.

THE MAIN PROBLEM AND STRATEGY OF UKRAINE IS THE ADVANCE OF THE UKRAINIAN RECONQUERING OF THE EAST AND SOUTH OF UKRAINE

Taras STETSKIV,
Member of the Parliament of Ukraine, Convocations I-IV and VI

What, in my opinion, should be the strategy for completing the formation of Ukrainian national identity? This completion, because as rightly stated in the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre it is indeed not completed yet, but the equator has certainly been crossed.

It was said here that the main problem and threat to identity formation in Ukraine is the problem of Donbas, namely the public sentiments there in the controlled and uncontrolled territories in the conflict zone.

My point of view on this issue is just the opposite. The main problem and the main strategy of Ukraine with regard to completing the formation of Ukrainian national identity is the advance of the Ukrainian reconquering of the East and South of Ukraine. And as for the problem of Donbas, we will resolve it later, after we rescue them. We cannot resolve it now and this is not the main problem for Ukraine today. ■

IT IS NECESSARY TO CONVERT THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS INTO A MORE COHERENT, CONSCIOUS POLICY

Rostyslav PAVLENKO,
Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine

I would like to thank the Razumkov Centre, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the MATRA programme for making this survey possible. This is not the first survey, but the third series already in a set that covers this year and the previous one. I remember a similar survey conducted in 2006. And it is good to observe certain things over time and see the changes that have occurred since then. And that is under the influence of war, but also under the influence of the fact that society evolves and institutions operate, for better or worse.

To a large extent, of course, we can talk about the problems of state policy or the lack of state policy. I would like to say that, of course, these materials will be thoroughly studied and applied. And I have an offer of cooperation for all the Roundtable attendees. On 1 December 2016, the President issued a Decree "On priority measures for the promotion of national unity and consolidation of Ukrainian society, and support of public initiatives in this area", which sets forth the directions for almost all issues raised by participants in the discussion.

This Decree, as is traditional for such documents, envisages that the Cabinet of Ministers will develop a plan of actions. The Cabinet of Ministers shifted attention to the Ministry of Culture, which is working on this. But there is a certain danger that we may end up with a plan of actions that will say "Work to be done" in the left column, and "work done" in the right column to indicate progress. We have already seen such conceptual approaches and such action plans.

My proposal is that, counting on the assistance of the organisers, we introduce both the text of the Decree and the text of this plan of actions for consideration in order to form a working group composed of persons invited to this Roundtable for discussing practical mechanisms, in about a month, so that you also have time to study out how to integrate all of this.

Several colleagues have said that there is a lack of unity in this identity policy and that the interaction of various mechanisms is insufficient. Sometimes mechanisms exist, unfortunately, only in theoretical developments, and the state responds reflexively to the challenges associated with either Russian aggression or with the pressure of society.

We need to convert this into a more coherent, more conscious policy and create a basis for working with specific government bodies, with specific mechanisms for financing and co-financing. I suggest that we jointly prepare such a document based on existing criteria for progress assessment and rely on this in implementing the identity policy. ■

Roundtable, 12 April 2017

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN MADE IN ALL AREAS OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN THE QUARTER OF A CENTURY SINCE FORMAL INDEPENDENCE



Stanislav KULCHYTSKY,
Acting Chief Research Associate, Department of Ukrainian History (1920s-1930s), Institute of Ukrainian History, NAS of Ukraine[31]

The national and social unity of Ukrainian society can be strengthened by a certain set of specific measures, including, most notably, those that can be implemented at the governmental level. However, it is possible to determine the set, volume, sequence and interdependence of specific measures only when we have a clear vision of certain more or less abstract categories, namely the national and social unity of Ukrainian society in transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

There is no need to prove that this transition is not easy. Therefore, it is necessary to understand what happened to all citizens of Ukraine, not only in the last quarter of a century, but in the whole century, starting from the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Unfortunately, there is no such understanding. There is even no understanding that it is necessary to determine the principal directions of economic and humanitarian policies at the level of government structures and civil society. Even the terminology has not been developed, and experts attach different meanings to such concepts as, for example, "titular nation", "political nation", "civil society", "civil nation". There is no understanding of how communism/socialism of the Soviet type deformed the state and society, although politicians and political scientists constantly repeat that even now there is a considerable difference between "Ossies" and "Wessies"[32] in the FRG. In Korea, where half of one nation was distorted by communism/socialism, the difference in the conditions of society and state between South and North Korea has become quite deep.

At the governmental level there are still no attempts to reflect on the legacy that still hangs over modern Ukraine and threatens its future. The Decree of the President of Ukraine on the 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution[33] concerns the Ukrainian revolution, although this was a part of the Russian revolution, and it was precisely the latter, after its seizure by the Bolsheviks, that absorbed or distorted the achievements of the Ukrainian revolution. There is no understanding of coexistence of the communist legacy of modern Ukraine with the centuries-old serfdom of the Russian society at the governmental level, even under the conditions of open war with Russia which exist today.

In my opinion, **ignoring academic research in the humanitarian sphere by the government** (which extends to the problem of financing the NAS of Ukraine as well) **slows down the transformation processes significantly**. They become uncontrolled and constitute the main cause of the increasingly deepening manifestations of crisis. In essence, biology then becomes the main driving force of transformation processes: the oldest of the Soviet generations personified by the Veterans of World War II is disappearing and at the same time the youngest of the three generations is being formed: the Maidan generation. However, the uncontrolled nature of transformation processes creates a reality that has a disastrous impact even on the youngest generation.

The Institute of National Memory has focused on the problem of de-communisation, and this is wonderful. It is worth recalling that a Communist managed this agency in the days of V. Yanukovych. It is also worth recalling that relatively recently (before the turn of the millennium) the Verkhovna Rada was headed by Communists. But only **in recent years have favourable conditions been created, by virtue of the Russian aggression, for a transition from a superficial de-communisation to an attempt to influence the world view of generations raised in the Soviet spirit**. The key factor for such a transition is an understanding of what has happened to us over the past 100 years.

The Institute of National Memory as a state institution should join the efforts of social scientists in tackling these problems. It may also be necessary to leverage the works of German and South Korean specialists, as well as the Sovietologist community gradually disappearing in the English-speaking world, in order to reveal the true face of Soviet communism/socialism.

Communicating with specialists who study the same problems, I have come to the conclusion that **Ukrainian researchers were already approaching an understanding of what happened to us during the last century**. We have already matured to create an approximate picture of the last hundred years. This is not about Ukrainian history but about the history of communism in Ukraine, created by the joint efforts of historians, political scientists, economists, legal scholars and ethnologists. We need an organisation for creation of this multi-author monograph, and the Razumkov Centre may well be just what we require. All the more so, as the Razumkov Centre can prepare a sociological snapshot, including by age, of the condition of Ukrainian society from the perspective of ideology, attitude to the state, to the system of management and all other characteristics, which are different in democratic and totalitarian states, as an appendix to such a monograph. Of course, the funds for such research must be found, but the problem is worth the cost. ■

[31] The speech of S. Kulchytsky is printed according to the text submitted to the editorial office, in a slightly abridged form.

[32] Terms that are used in Germany after unification of the FRG and GDR to identify residents of the east and west.

[33] Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 17 "On the ceremony to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921" dated 22 January 2016.