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CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, PATHWAYS

(Informational and Analytical Materials by the Razumkov Centre)

This issue of the journal summarises findings of the second stage of the Razumkov Centre's Project "Formation of a Common Ukrainian Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges".

Studies undertaken as part of the first project stage helped to identify the shifts that took place in various aspects of national identity between 2005 and 2015, including those brought about by the Revolution of Dignity and provoked by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. These studies paint a fairly detailed portrait of identities of Ukrainian citizens, including cross-regional differences and specifics attributable to citizens belonging to various social groups.¹

Certain important issues remain insufficiently explored, particularly the hierarchy of various types of identity, the correlation between civil, national and ethnic components of identity, how citizens in different regions perceive one another, public assessment of the significance of cross-regional differences for the country's future, etc.

Since the previous public opinion survey, notable changes have taken place at the state and society levels as well as in the international political landscape. These changes have affected the public mood.

They mainly have to do with falling living standards, a declining level of trust in government institutions, political parties and individual politicians, active attempts of the aggressor state to destabilise situation in Ukraine, lack of progress in resolving the Donbas conflict and returning Crimea, a somewhat decreased level of attention to Ukraine from the international community coupled with Russia's growing influence on political processes in certain Western countries, the conflicting positions of some EU countries on Ukraine's European future, certain aspects of Ukraine's relations with the EU as well as Russia's role in the ongoing armed conflict.

With these factors in mind, the Razumkov Centre has outlined the following key research objectives for the second stage of the project:

- Obtain a more detailed picture of how citizens understand specific aspects of identity (particularly civil and socio-cultural identity);
- Assess the intensity and nature of the impact these socio-political and international trends have on various identity aspects of citizens, primarily the civil aspect;
- Study how citizens in different regions of Ukraine perceive one another, explore the specifics of this perception and the existing beliefs and stereotypes;
- Identify the specifics of the viewpoints that residents in different regions have on factors contributing to the division or consolidation of society, and assess their potential impact;
- Learn about the attitudes of citizens to possible political approaches and specific efforts in "sensitive" areas, particularly those concerning language, cultural and national policies, and their impact on national unity;
- Analyse the experience of specific post-Soviet and post-socialist countries of Europe in matters of shaping and preserving national identity.

Formulated in this way, objectives are aligned with overriding goal of the second project stage: to devise effective and theoretically sound political tools adapted to the existing social reality (i.e., the substance of public policy and methods for implementing it) intended for shaping a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, which would accelerate the process of consolidation of Ukrainian society, help achieve mutual understanding and support national unity.

The study findings are presented in three chapters.

The first chapter outlines the results of a nationwide public opinion poll.

The second chapter summarises the outcome of focus group discussions.

The third chapter delves into the experience of the Baltic States as well as Poland and Romania in building and maintaining national identity.

¹ For more details see: National Security and Defence, No. 3-4, 2016, http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD161-162_2016_ukr.pdf.

1. IDENTITY FEATURES OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF SOCIETY

(RESULTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY¹)

1.1. IDENTITY HIERARCHY OF THE RESIDENTS OF UKRAINE

In the *identity hierarchy*, Ukrainians find their family and marital status to be the most important. Family position was assigned the highest priority by 22% of respondents. The same item holds first place based on the total amount of the first, second and third choices (59%).

In the total of the first, second and third choices, the 2nd through 4th places are held by the following identity options: current or previous profession of a respondent, age, and gender (34-36%).

Self-identification as a citizen of Ukraine takes only 5th place in this hierarchy (total 29% of the first, second and third choices), and the 6th and 7th positions (21-22%) for choices 1-3 are nationality and belonging to Ukraine as “the country where you live”.

The final places in the identity hierarchy are held by class identification (17%), religious affiliation or attitude to religion (11%), and political proclivity (a total of 7% for choices 1-3).

Self-identification as a citizen of Ukraine is the most important for the residents of Southern (the total of choices 1-3 amounts to 39%) and Western (35%) regions, and the least important for residents of the Eastern region (11%).

Nationality is the most important for residents of Western region (34%) and the least important for the residents of the East (10%), South and Donbas (15%); belonging to Ukraine as to the country where they live is most important for the residents of the Southern (26%), Western (24%) and Central (23%) regions, and the least important for the residents of the East (13%).

Ukrainian citizenship is somewhat more meaningful for ethnic Ukrainians compared to Russians (30% and 25%, respectively), as well as are nationality (23% and 18%, respectively) and belonging to Ukraine (22% and 15%, respectively).

1.2. CIVIC IDENTITY. PERCEPTIONS OF STATE, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES, AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT

The wider the community a person identifies himself with, the larger his field of activity may be, and the more general the interests he advocates for and problems he may participate in solving. In a country (state) the widest community is the society or “citizens of the country”.

Just as in 2014, the majority of respondents identify themselves primarily as *specifically citizens of Ukraine* (58%), while local identification is placed second (as a resident of the village, district or city – 22%), and third place goes to regional identity (11%).

Residents of the Eastern region (52%) and Donbas (45%) are less prone to self-identification as citizens of Ukraine, though in these regions it also remains the most prevalent. The total share of those self-identifying predominantly with region or settlement is higher in these regions (39% in Donbas and 38% in the East) than in others (30-31%).

Local and regional identity prevails among ethnic Russians; among them the total share of those self-identifying predominantly with the region or settlement amounts to 50%, while the share of those who

Participants in collecting information and analytical materials within the second stage of the Project “*Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Changes, Challenges and National Unity Prospects*”: Yu. YAKYMENKO (Project Manager), A. BYCHENKO, V. ZAMYATIN, M. MISHCHENKO, A. STETSKIV (Razumkov Centre), and O. LYTVYENENKO (National Institute for Strategic Studies).

¹ The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 18-23 November 2016 in all regions of Ukraine except for Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 2,015 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

Two-dimensional distribution tables provide the results of only those respondent groups in which the number of respondents in the array exceeds 50.

In the tables with data broken down by regions, the oblasts are divided as follows: **West**: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts; **Centre**: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts and the City of Kyiv; **South**: Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts; **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts; **Donbas**: Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

call themselves citizens of Ukraine totals 34% (31% and 62% among ethnic Ukrainians, respectively). In addition, ethnic Russians, compared to ethnic Ukrainians, more frequently consider themselves citizens of the former Soviet Union (9% and 1%, respectively) and the citizens of the world (5% and 2%, respectively). However, only 0.4% of ethnic Russians identify themselves as citizens of Russia.

Language spoken in the family² has a lesser impact on identity than nationality does (which is obviously related to the fact that identity of Russian-speaking Ukrainians is closer to the identity of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians). The most striking differences can be found in the share of those who consider themselves predominantly citizens of Ukraine – 62% among Ukrainian-speaking respondents and 53% among Russian-speaking respondents. 60% of Russian-speaking Ukrainians claim a general national identity.

It should be mentioned that national identity is more pronounced than the local one among younger age groups. While the share of those who identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine is 48% among the respondents aged over 60; in the 30-39 age group this number is 66%; and in the 18-29 age group this share is 61%. Self-identification as a resident of a settlement or region is characteristic of 41% of older respondents, 25% of respondents aged 30-39 and 31% of respondents aged 18-29. Identification with former USSR grows proportionally to age: from 0.2% in the youngest age group to 7% in the oldest.

Education has the same impact (which is, however, connected to the age factor, as the younger the respondents, the higher their level of education). Among the respondents with post-secondary education, 64% claim a general civic identity and 28% a local or regional one, while among those with incomplete secondary education this share is 52% and 42%, respectively.

Perception of Ukraine

Answering the question “*What is your first association with the word ‘Ukraine’?*”, the majority of respondents call it their Motherland (46%), the country where they live (24%), and the state of their citizenship (17%).

While in Western and Central regions the majority (56%) of respondents state that Ukraine is their Motherland; in the East and Donbas this number is about one-third (35% and 32%, respectively); and in the South it is 28%. In the Southern and Eastern regions and in Donbas the share of those answering that Ukraine is the country where they live (26% to 34%) is larger than in Western and Central regions (18-19%). The option “Ukraine is the country of which I am a citizen” is the most popular in the Southern (22%) and Eastern (25%) regions.

50% of ethnic Ukrainians and only 20% of ethnic Russians consider Ukraine their Motherland. The majority of ethnic Russians (38%) think of Ukraine as a country

where they live while only 22% of ethnic Ukrainians answer this way); and ethnic Russians also more often choose the option “Ukraine is the country of which I am a citizen” (23% and 16%, respectively).

The Feeling of Patriotism

Two-thirds (67%) of *respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine*, 10% responded in the negative, 10% answered that it depends on the situation, and 13% hesitated to give an answer.

76% of respondents claimed to have *patriotic feelings and love for Ukraine*; 14% noted the absence of such feelings. The majority of residents of all regions – from 59% in Donbas to 88% in the West of Ukraine – have patriotic feelings, among them 80% of ethnic Ukrainians and 53% of ethnic Russians.

According to the self-assessments of the respondents, the factors most significantly impacting the *increase of patriotic feelings* were the heroism and self-sacrifice of Ukrainian military personnel, volunteer servicemen, and other volunteers as seen in combating Russian aggression and separatist movements (indicated by 71% of the respondents), Russian aggression against Ukraine: the annexation of the Crimea, military support of separatist forces in Donbas, leading to significant casualties and economic damages (55%), the Maidan (50%), and the conflict in Donbas and its consequences (49%). The actions of the authorities aimed at implementation of reforms in 2014-2016 have, on the contrary, *decreased the patriotic feelings* of a relative majority of respondents (42%).

The heroism and self-sacrifice of Ukrainian military personnel, volunteer servicemen, and other volunteers as seen in combating Russian aggression and separatist movements increased the patriotic feelings of the majority of residents of all regions (from 52% in the East to 90% in the West).

Russian aggression against Ukraine increased the patriotic feelings of the majority of residents in Western and Central regions (76% and 64%, respectively) and a relative majority of residents of Donbas and the South (44% and 39%, respectively), while the residents of the East show roughly equal shares of those who experienced an increase (31%) and decline (29%) of patriotic feelings or were not influenced in this sense (32%) due to Russian aggression.

The Maidan fostered patriotic sentiments among the majority of residents in Western and Central regions (77% and 56%, respectively) and a relative majority of residents of Donbas (42%). Among the residents of the Southern region the shares of those who felt an increase (26%), decrease (22%) and no impact on these feelings (29%) due to Maidan are roughly equal. Among the residents of the East, the relative majority (36%) stated that Maidan decreased their patriotic feelings.

Regarding the actions of the authorities to implement reforms, the majority (59%) of the respondents in the East of Ukraine, and a relative majority in the Southern (45%)

² In tables with two-dimensional distributions, data by groups of languages spoken in the family is provided in the “Language” columns.

and Central (40%) regions stated that this led to a decrease in their patriotic feelings. In the Western region, a relative majority (38%) stated that these actions of the authorities did not have an impact on their patriotic feelings, and in Donbas roughly equal shares of respondents indicated that actions of the state weakened their patriotism (35%) or did not influence it (32%).

According to the majority of Ukrainian citizens, senior government officials *are not patriots of their country*. Thus, 51% of respondents do not consider President P. Poroshenko a patriot; and only 23% believe that he is. The respondents similarly assess the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, A. Parubiy (53% do not consider him a patriot), Prime Minister of Ukraine, V. Hroysman (54% do not consider him a patriot), and the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, O. Turchynov (55% do not consider him a patriot).

Ukrainian military personnel who fought or are fighting in the CTO area are, on the contrary, considered patriots by 74% of the respondents, and working tax-paying citizens are considered patriots by 58%.

The respect for Ukrainian military servicemen, CTO participants and volunteers is connected with the fact that today, as the majority of respondents believe, “Ukrainian military personnel are the only guarantor of security of the citizens of Ukraine and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state” (72% of respondents agree with this statement), and “if not for the self-sacrifice of the CTO participants, mobilised and voluntary military personnel and other volunteers, Ukraine would not exist” today (71%). The majority of residents in six regions support *these statements* (the exception is the East, where the share of those who agree shows a statistically insignificant difference from the share of those who do not).

Both statements are supported by the majority of ethnic Ukrainians. As concerns ethnic Russians, the first of these statements is supported by the majority, and the difference between the shares of those agreeing and disagreeing with the second statement is statistically insignificant.

Changes in the Attitude towards Ukraine in Recent Years

The majority of respondents state that during the last three years their *attitude towards Ukraine* has not changed (43%), 29% claim that it has deteriorated, and 18% note improvement. Among respondents considering themselves patriots of Ukraine, most did not significantly change their attitude towards Ukraine (48%), 23% felt improvement and 22% felt deterioration.

Those who do not consider themselves patriots mainly felt a deterioration in their attitude towards Ukraine (57%), while only 8% of them experienced an improvement and 32% felt no changes. A relative majority (46%) of those who do or do not consider themselves patriots “depending on the situation”, felt a deterioration in their attitude towards Ukraine during the last three years, while only 13% experienced improvement and 27% saw no changes.



The majority (55%) of residents of the Western region and a relative majority of residents of the Central, Southern and Eastern regions (38% to 45%) state that their attitude towards Ukraine has not changed during the last three years. In Donbas, approximately equal shares of respondents state that their attitude towards Ukraine has not changed (34%) or has deteriorated (33%).

The attitude towards Ukraine is dramatically different in various ethnic groups: while a relative majority among ethnic Ukrainians (45%) stated that their attitude towards Ukraine has not changed, the majority of ethnic Russians claimed a deterioration in their attitude towards Ukraine (47%). On the other hand, the shares of those whose attitude improved are approximately equal: 19% among ethnic Ukrainians and 16% among ethnic Russians.

One factor influencing the change of attitude towards Ukraine is the level of prosperity: the higher it is, the larger the share of those whose attitude improved (from 14% among those who barely make ends meet to 32% of those who replied that they are quite well off), just as decreases the share of those whose attitude deteriorated (from 33% to 21%).

It should be noted that although a relative majority of respondents replied that during the last three years their attitude towards Ukraine has not changed, the assessment of processes taking place in Ukraine during the last three years is more likely to be negative.

For example, a majority of respondents (52%) *do not agree with the statement that* after the change of government in 2014, Ukraine underwent an increase in the level of democracy and respect for political and civil rights and freedoms (36% of respondents agree).

68% do not agree that “reforms conducted in Ukraine over the past three years are in the interests of the majority of Ukrainian citizens” (only 20% of citizens agree).

Only the numbers of those who agree (42%) and disagree (45%) with the statement that “since the change of government in 2014 Ukraine has moved closer to the EU membership” do not show a statistically significant difference.

The assessments of social processes differ significantly by region; the most positive attitude towards them is observed in the Western region and the most negative in the East.

Obviously, the higher the assessment of processes occurring in Ukraine, the stronger the positive tendency in the change of attitude towards Ukraine. Thus, 58% of respondents who completely agree with the statement that since the change of government in 2014, the level of democracy and respect for political and civil rights and freedoms has increased in Ukraine, indicate an improvement in their attitude towards Ukraine, while only 7% of those completely disagreeing with this statement indicate improvement in their attitude towards Ukraine (45% state that their attitude towards Ukraine has deteriorated).

However, it should be noted that the survey results also indicate that the attitude towards Ukraine is subject to a certain “resistance”, i.e. it remains somewhat steady regardless of a predominantly negative assessment of the processes occurring in Ukraine in recent years.

Patriotic feelings are closely connected with the *feeling of responsibility for the future of the country*. 68% of those considering themselves patriots feel such responsibility, while the figure is only 21% among those who do not consider themselves patriots.

Overall, 54% of respondents feel such responsibility and 37% do not. While in the Western and Central regions the majority of respondents (68% and 56%, respectively) feel responsibility for the future of Ukraine, in the Southern and Eastern regions and in Donbas the share of those feeling such a responsibility shows no statistically significant difference from the share of those who do not.

Almost two-thirds (73%) of the respondents consider that *“strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens strengthen the country’s positions in the world”* (only 13% disagree). The same number believe that “strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens are necessary for Ukraine to remain united” (12% disagree), the majority (57%) disagree with the statement that “strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens cause a negative attitude towards immigrants” (only 18% agree), 56% do not agree that “strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to negative attitudes towards national minorities” (18% agree) and 51% do not agree that “strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to intolerance” (23% agree).

Feeling a Sense of Control over the State and Pride in the State

Patriotism and responsibility for the fate of the country imply *the need to feel a sense of control over the state*. Among those who consider themselves patriots, 62% feel such a need, while among those who do not, this figure is only 25%. In addition, only 19% of those who identify as patriots feel a sense of control over the state (the population as a whole is even less, at 15%). Additionally, the share of those who consider themselves to have some control over the state has decreased since 2005,³

from 17% to 15%, and the share of those who do not feel a sense of control over the state has increased from 71% to 77%.

In order to *feel pride in the state*, according to 69% of respondents, first of all, the state must be politically stable, economically developed and provide conditions for improving the standard of living of citizens.

Only 18% adhere to the idea that to achieve this the state needs strong defence capabilities and a policy independent of external influences; while 8% answered that the state needs to command authority and respect in the international arena; and only 2% believed that its culture, art and sports should be widely known and popular throughout the world. In this respect the priorities are practically equal in all regions of Ukraine and for different social and demographic groups of respondents.

Attitude towards Citizenship

Answering the question *“What does being a citizen of Ukraine mean to you personally?”*, the respondents most frequently state: “Have Ukrainian citizenship, have a Ukrainian passport” (48%), “Live in my Motherland, where I have my home, relatives, native land and nature” (45%), and “Have the feeling that the government cares about me, have adequate social security” (41%). 31% of the respondents chose the option “Feel like I am part of the united Ukrainian nation, its culture and traditions”, 29% chose “Be able to elect the President, the Verkhovna Rada, local councils, and participate in referenda”, 26% chose “Be able to feel proud of the achievements of my country and its representatives in various fields, such as economics, science, art, and sports”, and 23% chose “Confidence that the Ukrainian government will protect Ukrainian citizens if they have difficulties abroad”. Only 4% chose the option “Feel that I am different from representatives of other countries”. 1% of respondents answered “Although I am a citizen of Ukraine, I wish I was not”.

For most responses, any regional differences are insignificant. However, it should be noted that the socio-cultural understanding of citizenship (“Feel like I am part of the united Ukrainian nation, its culture and traditions”) is the most prominent in the Western region (43%), somewhat less prominent in the Centre (33%) and in the South (31%) and the least prominent in the Eastern region (18%) and Donbas (25%). The frequency of this answer was also significantly different between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians (33% and 16%, respectively).

Answering the question *“If you had the opportunity to take the citizenship of other country in addition to your Ukrainian citizenship, which country would you choose?”*, 49% of respondents who are citizens of Ukraine stated that they would not seek other citizenship.⁴ Among those who state that they would consider taking

³ According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 23-28 February 2005 in all regions of Ukraine. 2,012 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

⁴ Those who answered “yes” to this question most often indicate their wish to take the citizenship of the US (7%), Canada (6%), Germany (5%), Poland (5%), Russia (4%) and Belarus (3%).

other citizenship, 27% answered that they are ready to **abandon Ukrainian citizenship** (the indicator is 14% among all the respondents).

Readiness to abandon Ukrainian citizenship does not differ from region to region at a statistically significant level – from 13% of all the respondents in the Western, Central and Southern regions to 15% in Donbas and 16% in the Eastern region. It is worth noting that 10% of those considering themselves patriots of Ukraine allow for a possibility to abandon Ukrainian citizenship (this is 30% among those who do not identify as patriots).

Vision of Ukraine's Future

The majority (56%) of respondents **believe that Ukraine will overcome the current problems and difficulties** and become a wealthy and prosperous state, while 22% do not believe this and another 22% have no definite opinion.

The answers however show that only a minority expect positive changes in the near future – 39% **believe in their own prospects** for a decent life, while 55% see the prospect of a decent life in Ukraine for their children and grandchildren.

The most optimistic citizens, those who believe that Ukraine will overcome current problems and difficulties and become a wealthy and prosperous state, are found in the West (71%) and the Centre (60%). This share in Donbas is 52% and 47% in the East, and the smallest share is in the Southern region (37%). However, in all regions the share of “optimists” exceeds that of “pessimists” (i.e. those who do not believe that Ukraine will become a wealthy and prosperous state). The share of the latter totals 13% in the Western region and 32% in the Eastern region.

Similarly, the share of those who believe in the prospect of a decent life in Ukraine for their children and grandchildren exceeds the share of those who do not believe this in all the regions. And likewise, the share of those who believe this differs significantly among the regions (from 71% in the West to 42% in the East).

Young people predominantly express their belief both in the future of Ukraine and their own future, as well as the future of their children and grandchildren. 63% of respondents aged 18 to 29 and 51% aged 60 and above believe that Ukraine will overcome the current problems and difficulties and become a wealthy and prosperous state.

Optimism regarding the future of Ukraine, their own future, and the future of their children and grandchildren is expressed more frequently by ethnic Ukrainians than by ethnic Russians; 59% of ethnic Ukrainians and only 39% of ethnic Russians believe that Ukraine will overcome the current problems and difficulties and become a wealthy and prosperous state (the share of those who do not believe this is exactly the same).



1.3. SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY. ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL POLICY

Language Identity and Language Practices

The majority (69%) of citizens consider **Ukrainian their native language**, 27% consider it to be Russian, and 2% chose another language. In 2011,⁵ Ukrainian was indicated as the native language by 61% of respondents; Russian by 36%; and another language by 2% of the respondents.⁶

The language predominantly spoken in the family is Ukrainian for 55% of respondents, Russian for 41% of respondents and another language for 1% of respondents. In 2011, these figures were 52%, 45% and 1%, respectively.

Thus, considering the specific nature of the poll sample, there were practically no changes in the language of communication in 2011 and 2016. Meanwhile, the share of those considering Ukrainian to be their native language increased significantly. It can be assumed that the socio-political processes taking place in Ukraine in recent years have caused certain changes in the language identity of the citizens, but not in the language practices, which turned out to be more stable.

Significant differences between the regions are observed: while in the Western, Central and Southern regions the majority of respondents identified Ukrainian as their native language (97%, 86% and 63%, respectively), in the East and Donbas Russian was most often named as native language (52% and 66%, respectively).

This difference is most striking in the Southern region, where 63% of respondents identify Ukrainian as their native language but only 34% use it as a language spoken at home. Thus, one can conclude that language identity and language practices are at odds.

It should also be noted that while the shares of those speaking Ukrainian and Russian at home differ only

⁵ According to the results of the study conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in all the regions of Ukraine on 2-10 March 2011. 2,011 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

⁶ It should be taken into account that the poll conducted in 2016 did not include Crimea, unlike that in 2011.

slightly by age, native language shows a trend towards an increase of those who consider Ukrainian their native language as the age of respondents decreases (from 67% of those aged 60 and above to 73% of those aged 18-29, respectively, while the share of those who consider Russian their native language decreases from 30% to 23%). Thus, younger respondents are gradually changing their language identity while maintaining language practices in family communication.

At the same time, it should be stated that the dissonance between language identity and language practices is the most prominent among respondents with post-secondary education: in this group 66% of respondents consider Ukrainian their native language, while only 48% speak it at home.

This may be related, to some extent, to the fact that people with higher education predominantly live in the cities, and it was the cities that were most strongly subjected to Russification during the Russian Empire and Soviet period. At the same time, people with higher educational level play the most important role in forming the language practice standards in the society as a whole.

The stability of language practices is being formed at early stages of personal socialisation in early childhood. Answering the question *“What is the strongest determining factor in the choice of the language you speak?”*, the respondents most often chose the answer “I have been speaking this language from childhood” (41%). 12% of the respondents answered “It is the most common language in the city (village) where I live and most residents speak it”, 9% answered “It is the language spoken in my family”, and 5% replied “It was the language that I used for lessons in school”.

Some respondents give an “ideological” justification for language practices: “It is the language of the people to which I belong” (15%), “It is the language of my country and it is my obligation as a citizen to speak it” (6%), and “It is the language of the country I consider my historical homeland” (5%).

“Pragmatic” motives for using a certain language are uncommon: the answer “I can get the most information in this language by reading books, newspapers, magazines, watching TV, etc” was chosen by only 2% of respondents; “It is the language in which I can become better educated” was chosen by 1%; “It is the language spoken at my workplace” by 1%; “It is the language in which I am better understood at work, in public institutions, shops and markets” by 1%, and “It is the language most useful for my profession” by 0.2%.

Self-assessment of Ukrainian Language and Culture Proficiency

In assessing their *own proficiency level* of Ukrainian using a five-point scale, the respondents assess it as 3.9 on average. This self-assessment is higher than the self-assessment of proficiency in Ukrainian literature

(3.6 points), Ukrainian folk customs and traditions (3.6 points), history of Ukraine (3.5 points), Ukrainian culture, art (3.4 points), and cultural features, traditions and customs of different regions (3.3 points).

The highest figures for Ukrainian language proficiency are demonstrated by residents of the Western region. However, self-assessment by residents in the West is higher than those of the East (except for language proficiency) only in knowledge of Ukrainian folk customs and traditions; and for residents of the South, only for language proficiency, knowledge of Ukrainian folk customs and traditions, and Ukrainian literature.

Self-assessments by residents of the Central region are lower than those of the Western region for all indicators, and are statistically approximately equal with the self-assessments by residents of the South, and lower than those of the East with regard to knowledge of the history of Ukraine and cultural features, traditions and customs of different regions.

Self-assessment of the knowledge level by Donbas residents is in all respects lower than those by residents of any other region, indicating a greater detachment of Donbas from the overall Ukrainian socio-cultural and informational space.

It is not unexpected that the knowledge level in most fields increases along with the educational level (except for knowledge of Ukrainian folk customs, traditions and cultural features, traditions and customs of different regions, in which proficiency is not related to the level of education).

The oldest age group is the least knowledgeable in most fields (except for Ukrainian folk customs, traditions and cultural features, traditions and customs of different regions) compared to all the other age groups. The proficiency level of ethnic Ukrainians is higher than that of ethnic Russians in all fields.

22% of respondents feel the *need to improve their level of Ukrainian language proficiency*. Nevertheless, the feeling of the need to improve one’s level of Ukrainian proficiency does not depend on their current level of proficiency. The share of those who feel the need to improve their level of language proficiency (15%) is somewhat less only among those who assessed their language proficiency at the highest level (5 points). Among those who rated their level of language proficiency as 4, 24% feel the need to improve it; among those who answered 3, 26% feel this way, while the figure is 23% among those who rated themselves 1 or 2.

Ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians feel the need to improve their level of Ukrainian proficiency to essentially the same extent (22% and 19%, respectively). The same is true for Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens (22 and 21%, respectively).

Among the residents of various regions, the residents of Donbas show the greatest need to master

Ukrainian (33%) and the lowest need was expressed by residents of the Eastern (8%) and Southern (12%) regions. The younger the respondents, the stronger their feeling that they need to improve their language skills (from 16% of those aged 60 and above to 27% of those aged 18-29). Similarly, the feeling of this need increases with educational level: from 17% of those with incomplete secondary education to 26% of those with post-secondary education.

Answering the question *“If you were offered the following opportunities to improve your Ukrainian language proficiency, which would you use?”*, the respondents who felt the need to improve their Ukrainian proficiency almost equally rated all the following forms of studying: free courses for adults (outside of working hours) (35%), free courses in the workplace and training (33%), free online courses (distance learning) (31%), free online training programmes, and programmes for self-improvement in the Ukrainian language (27%). 9% answered that they would not use any of these if offered.

Answering the question *“Why does a considerable part of Ukrainian citizens have a poor command of the official language?”*, the most frequent answer was “They just do not want to learn the language” (37%). The other reasons mentioned included: “The state has not created proper conditions for citizens to learn the state language if they did not have the opportunity to study it as a part of their education” (30%), “There are many professional fields in which you can work and have a career without a command of the state language” (29%), “As before, Russian remains the language of cross-national communication, so command of the state language is not a compelling need for citizens” (29%), “Much information comes to citizens in other languages” (23%), and “The Ukrainian education system does not ensure that all students know the state language at the same high level” (20%).

Thus, while explaining the motivation for use of their first (native) language, the respondents rarely mentioned practical motives; explaining the refusal to study Ukrainian by those who do not call it their native language, pragmatic motives (or the absence thereof) predominated. For this reason, in order to encourage study of Ukrainian for those who have not mastered it at a sufficient level, one obviously needs not only to improve the teaching process, but also to create a system of pragmatic incentives for studying it.

What Should Be the National Language and Cultural Policy

A relative majority of respondents regard the following *approach to language policy* as correct: “Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions. In everyday life (in and out of the family) every citizen may communicate in any language” (42%).

Another 15% of the respondents adhere to a stricter position: “Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions and in everyday life (outside the family). Every citizen may communicate in any language within his or her family”. In practice, this position limits any communication in other languages to the family setting.

21% of respondents supported the position “Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication. Every citizen may communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life (in and out of the family)”.

12% consider it unnecessary to master Ukrainian or use it either in official institutions or in everyday life. The latter view is the most widespread in Donbas (where it is shared by 28% of respondents) and in the Southern region (19%). It is more popular among ethnic Russians (held by 30% of representatives of this group).

More than two-thirds (69%) of respondents *agree that* “Citizens of all nationalities must know the state language of a country where the titular nation constitutes the vast majority of citizens” (15% did not agree), and almost three-fourths (74%) agreed that “Communication in the Ukrainian state language is an expression of respect for myself as a citizen of Ukraine and for my country, Ukraine” (13% do not agree).

More than half (59%) of respondents agree that “The Ukrainian language, which was suppressed for many years, requires support from the state for its development and spread, regardless of how this affects the position of other languages” (19% do not agree).

However, a relative majority (45%) of respondents disagreed with the statement that “The state has the right within its territory to restrict the areas in which languages other than the state language are used, as in France, for example” (33% of respondents agreed with this statement).

The latter view is less popular in the Eastern, Southern and Donbas regions, while in the Western region the majority (51%) of respondents supported it, and in Central region the number of those who agree and disagree is almost equal.

The opinions of citizens are divided regarding the *principles of the state support for different languages and cultures* within the territory of Ukraine.

42% of respondents believe that “The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian language and culture, and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine”, while 31% have the opinion that “The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine”.

13% of respondents believe that “The state should, above all, promote the Ukrainian and Russian languages



and cultures (as the languages and cultures of the two largest ethnic groups of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine”.

4% of respondents agree that “The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages and cultures (the languages and cultures of the native peoples of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine”.

The first point of view (prioritized support for Ukrainian language and culture) is supported by the majority of residents of the Western and Central regions (56% and 57%, respectively).

In the Eastern region, almost half (49%) of respondents believe that “The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine”, and in the Southern region these two positions have an equal number of adherents (30% each).

In Donbas, the two most widespread viewpoints are: “The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine” (31%) and “The state should, above all, promote the Ukrainian and Russian languages and cultures (as the languages and cultures of the two largest ethnic groups of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine” (30%).

Generally, Ukrainian society has not reached a consensus regarding *the best practice: preservation of the cultural specifics of regional and ethnic groups, or cultural unification*.

41% of respondents agreed that the most effective approach for the social and political unity of Ukraine is preservation of cultural traditions and promotion of the use of their national languages by communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities; while 36% chose a gradual convergence of cultural traditions of communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities with Ukrainian ethnicity, encouraging them on this basis to spread the use of the Ukrainian language and the development of modern Ukrainian culture.

The first point of view is supported by an absolute or relative majority of respondents in the Western (52%), Central (43%) and Southern (44%) regions, while the second is predominant in the Eastern region (52%), and in Donbas the shares of adherents of these viewpoints are almost equal statistically (38% and 29%, respectively).

1.4. NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATION AND PERCEPTION OF APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

National Identity

86% of respondents consider themselves Ukrainians, 11% – Russians, and 2% – representatives of other nationalities and 1% could not define the nationality to which they belong.

Ukrainians represent the majority of the population in all regions, from 60% among the residents of Donbas to 97% of residents of the Western region.

It should be noted that the share of those considering themselves Ukrainians increases and the share of Russians decreases with age of respondents. Thus, while 81% of those aged over 60 called themselves Ukrainians and 15% – Russians, in the 18-29 age group this share is 94% and 5%, respectively. This means that some young people whose parents (grandparents) were Russians self-identify as ethnic Ukrainians (and, as indicated above, they remain predominantly Russian-speaking).

Most frequently (33% of those polled), respondents are prone to consider that *the national identity of a person must be defined* by the ethnic origin of parents (or one parent), 25% adhere to the idea that national identity is self-determined, 14% believe that it is defined by one’s country of permanent residence, 12% believe it is based on native language, and 11% – on the language of everyday communication.

Language criteria for national identity (native language and the language of communication) are most often supported by residents of the Western region, while residents of other regions prefer ethnic origin (and in Donbas the respondents also chose self-identification).

Somewhat more than one-third (37%) of respondents consider it necessary *to indicate one’s ethnic nationality in Ukrainian passport*, 26% of respondents do not consider it necessary, 29% are indifferent and another 8% indicated no opinion.

The share of those considering it unnecessary to indicate ethnic nationality of a passport holder has decreased compared to 2005,⁷ from 34% to 26%, while the share of those considering it necessary has not changed in a statistically significant way (35% and 37%, respectively).

⁷ According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on December 20-27, 2005, in all regions of Ukraine. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

The number of those who support indicating ethnic nationality in the passport is the highest in the Western region (53%), this opinion is supported by a relative majority of respondents in the Central region (39%), while in the rest of regions the shares of those who agree and disagree do not differ in a statistically significant way.

A relative majority of ethnic Ukrainians support indicating ethnic nationality in the passport (40% of such respondents, while 25% do not). Ethnic Russians more often disagree with the idea (34%), while 21% of Russians do consider it necessary.

Citizens of Ukraine more often disagree with the concept of the “melting pot” (where different race and ethnic groups adapt and mix with the majority of citizens); this is supported by only 30% of respondents, while 46% state that it would be better for the country if different race and ethnic groups maintain their special customs and traditions.

The second point of view is supported by an absolute or relative majority of residents in all regions and a relative majority of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians.

1.5. FACTORS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Factors Uniting and Dividing Ukrainian Society

The citizens believe *that the consolidation of Ukrainian society, will predominantly be influenced by the following factors:*

- “Overcoming the existing socio-economic problems, improvement of the welfare of the majority of citizens” (67%);
- “Overcoming corruption and bringing corrupt officials to justice” (66%);
- “Change of government in Ukraine, assumption of power by honest, professional, uncorrupt people” (51%);
- “More equitable distribution of public wealth, reduced gap between rich and poor citizens” (48%);
- “Increased public participation in solving important social problems at the national and regional levels” (29%).

Answering the question: “*What can serve as a basis for uniting the residents of Ukraine?*”, the most frequent answers were:

- “Common vision of the future direction for development of the state” (62%);
- “Common problems which the citizens of Ukraine are currently facing” (59%);
- “Common history and common assessment of the events and personalities of the past” (43%).

These three factors are identified by the residents of all regions as the most important to unite the society. Another 22% believe that this may be brought about by the state language, and the same number identify a common enemy as such a factor.

The most important factors dividing the country, according to the citizens, are:

- Federalisation of Ukraine (mentioned by 33% of the respondents);
- Joining a defence alliance with Russia (32%);
- Moving towards NATO membership (31%);
- Refusal to return Crimea, consent to grant special status to the occupied territories of Donbas (31%).

The residents of the Western (49%) and Central (37%) regions and Donbas (33%) most frequently consider federalisation of Ukraine a potentially dividing factor, as well as joining a defence alliance with Russia (50%, 38% and 31%).

The residents of the Eastern region less frequently consider refusal to return Crimea and consent to grant special status to the occupied territories of Donbas (21%) a dividing factor, compared to the residents of other regions (29% to 36%).

Residents of the Western regions less frequently (11%) than the residents of other regions (31 to 46%) consider moving towards NATO membership a dividing factor. At the same time, in the Eastern and Southern regions and in Donbas, NATO membership is considered a major dividing factor (46%, 33% and 39%, respectively).

In the Eastern region, the second most important factor dividing the citizens is “The history of Ukraine without Soviet and Russian interpretations, formation of historical memory on purely Ukrainian grounds” (22%). Thus, more than one-fifth of residents in this region believe that “rewriting” the history will contribute to a widening of the split in society (11% of the total of respondents consider it a dividing factor).

Meanwhile, 37% in the Western region, and 28% of respondents in Donbas, on the contrary, agree with the idea that the Soviet past, Soviet history and cultural heritage contributes to the division of the country (22% of the respondents support this idea; the lowest number of those who agree is 8% in the Eastern region).

Residents of the Western region also consider improving the status of the Russian language in Ukraine (as a second state language or official language in certain regions) to be a dividing factor more often than the overall total of the respondents (33% and 20%, respectively).

Answering the question “*What is the most significant factor dividing the citizens of Ukraine?*”, most respondents agree with the following options:

- “Attitude towards the government and public policy” (43%);
- “Attitude towards the war in the East of Ukraine” (41%);
- “Attitude towards Russia” (40%);
- “Different ideas of the prospects and directions for development of the country” (30%);
- “Attitude towards Europe and the US” (28%);
- “Financial issues” (28%).



Residents of Donbas, more frequently than the residents of other regions, believe that the citizens of Ukraine are predominantly divided by the attitude towards the war in the East of Ukraine (54%) and attitude towards Russia (50%), and along with the residents of the East they more often believe that the residents of Ukraine are predominantly divided by their attitude towards Europe and the US than the residents of other regions (40% and 42%, respectively).

Residents of the East, more frequently than the residents of other regions, adhere to the idea that the citizens of Ukraine are most of all divided by their attitude towards the authorities and the state policy (56%).

Vision and Assessment of the Past and Future of the Country

59% of citizens agree that *Ukraine has its own history that begins with the emergence of the first settlements of people on its territory* and covers the periods when Ukrainian lands were a part of other state entities and the period of the existence of Ukraine as an independent state.

About one-third (32%) hold an alternative view, in which *“The history of Ukraine is an integral part of that of the greater East Slavic people, along with the history of Russia and Belarus”*.

The first point of view is shared by the majority of the population in the Western and Central regions, the second by the majority of residents of the East, while in the South and Donbas these two points of view have an equal share of adherents.

Ethnic Ukrainians and Russians vary in their views regarding this issue; while ethnic Ukrainians predominantly support the first viewpoint (63%), ethnic Russians support the second one (63%).

The younger the respondents, the more often they agree with the first point of view and less often with the second one. The higher the educational level of the respondents, the more often they agree with the first point of view (the level of consent with the second viewpoint does not depend on the level of education).

Almost two-thirds (65%) of respondents indicated that they *do not want to restore the Soviet Union*, another 13% answered that they do want this, and 22% replied “Yes, but I understand that it is impossible under the current conditions”.

Those who do not want to restore the Soviet Union prevail in all regions (from 51% in the Eastern region to 87% in the West).

While among ethnic Ukrainians 69% answered that they do not want to restore the Soviet Union, this percentage is only 39% among ethnic Russians. 83% of the respondents under the age of 29 do not want to restore the Soviet Union, while the percentage among those aged 60 and above is only 44%.

The higher the educational level of the respondents, the more often they answer that they do not want to restore the Soviet Union: from 55% of those with incomplete secondary education to 71% of those with post-secondary education. Among those who answered that their family “barely makes ends meet”, 50% do not want to restore the Soviet Union; and among those who identify as well off, this share is 79%.

Those who want to restore the Soviet Union most often *justify this desire* by the fact that under the USSR they had certainty about their future (70%), high level of social security (64%), opportunity to receive free higher education (58%), the absence of unemployment (55%), an adequate material standard of living (53%), the fact that they were proud of being a part of a great state on a global scale in Soviet times (50%), and stability and the absence of armed conflicts (46%).

Assessing the *events that took place in Ukraine at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014*, 42% called it the Revolution of Dignity, 20% called it a forced change of government through not entirely legitimate means, and 21% labelled it an anti-government coup.

In the Western region more than two-thirds (70%) and in the Central region almost half (47%) of respondents called these events the Revolution of Dignity. In Donbas more than half (58%), and in the South 45% of respondents represent the overall aggregate of those calling these events either the Revolution of Dignity or a forced change of government through not entirely legitimate means. In the Eastern region the share of those calling these events an anti-government coup (43%) does not differ statistically from the total number of those calling these events either the Revolution of Dignity or a forced change of government through not entirely legitimate means (41%).

Only 18% among ethnic Ukrainians consider these events to be an anti-government coup, while this share among ethnic Russians is 38%.

Answering the question *“Would you like to return to Ukraine as it was before 2014?”*, 37% of respondents agreed and 49% disagreed. 74% of the residents of the Western region would not like to return to “Ukraine as it was before 2014”, 50% of the residents of the Central region share this view (while the share of those



disagreeing in the region totals 36%). In the East the majority (54%) would like to return to “Ukraine as it was before 2014”, 32% would not like this; the share in the South is 43% and 32%, respectively, and in Donbas the shares of those who would and would not like to return to Ukraine as it was before 2014 do not significantly differ statistically – 48% and 46%, respectively.

While ethnic Ukrainians predominantly would not want this (51%), ethnic Russians state that they would (57%). The younger the respondents, the more often they would not like to return to “Ukraine as it was before 2014” – from 43% of those aged 60 and above to 55% of those under 29. While 46% of respondents among those who answered that their family “barely make ends meet” would like to return to Ukraine as it was before 2014, the share is only 28% among those who are well off.

37% of respondents believe that *in the future Ukraine will be* a highly developed, democratic, and influential European country, 21% agree that Ukraine will be a country with an individual way of development (such as China), 9% believe it will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West, 5% state that Ukraine will forever stay an underdeveloped “third world” country with little influence, 3% state that Ukraine will disappear as an independent state, and 1% agree that Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of Russia.

Compared to 2005,⁸ the vision of the future of Ukraine has changed: the number of respondents who consider that in the future Ukraine will be a country with an individual way of development increased from 14% to 21%.

The share of those who believe that in the future Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country is the highest in the Western region (53%) and the lowest in the Eastern (25%) and Southern (22%) regions.

The point of view suggesting that Ukraine will be a country with an individual way of development is approximately equal in most regions (21-24%), except for Donbas, where the number of the respondents choosing this option is somewhat lower (14%).

Pessimistic scenarios (Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West or Russia; Ukraine will forever stay an underdeveloped “third world” country) are more widespread in the Eastern and Southern regions and in Donbas (the total number of those expecting this totals 21% to 26% in these regions, 16% in the Central region and 10% in the Western region).

These pessimistic scenarios are most widespread among ethnic Russians (the total of those seeing the future of Ukraine in this way totals 33%, while only 15% of ethnic Ukrainians agree with this idea).

The assessments of the future of the country depend significantly on the wealth status of the respondents.

Among those who answered that their family is well off, the share of respondents who agree that Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, and influential European country is significantly higher (51%) than within the total aggregate of respondents (37%).

Assessment of the Possibilities for Meeting Cultural and Religious Needs

Having cultural and religious needs met is one of the main rights of citizens. Depriving even some citizens of this right undermines the foundations of the social system and leads to social conflicts.

In general, Ukrainian citizens give a high assessment *of the ability to meet their cultural and religious needs*. 89% of respondents believe that they are able to obtain objective information about events in Ukraine and worldwide in the language they use to communicate in everyday life; to learn their mother tongue (87%); to visit cultural institutions that present activities in their mother tongue (85%); to adhere to national traditions (90%); and to meet religious needs (89%).

While 92% of Ukrainian-speaking respondents state that they are able to obtain objective information about events in Ukraine and worldwide in the language they use to communicate in everyday life, 86% of Russian-speaking respondents gave the same answer. As concerns education in their mother tongue the responses were 92% and 82%, respectively; visiting cultural institutions presenting activities in native language (88% and 82%, respectively); adhering to national traditions (94% and 84%); and meeting religious needs (92% and 87%).

Therefore, according to the survey results, the needs of the Ukrainian-speaking population are somewhat better satisfied than those of Russian-speakers.

Regional Differences and National Unity

The sense of community (historical, cultural) with the inhabitants of other regions expressed by the citizens of Ukraine is limited. Answering the question: “*Do you feel a sense of community (historical, cultural, shared future) with the inhabitants of other regions of Ukraine?*”, only 39% of respondents gave an unequivocally positive answer. 40% answered: “not all, only with some of them”, while only 11% of respondents gave a negative answer.

The strongest sense of community is demonstrated by inhabitants of the Western region (51% have a sense of community with the people of other regions), the weakest sense was reported by inhabitants of the Southern region (24%) and Donbas (26%). Although the percentage of those who do not definitely feel such a sense of community is low (from 4% in the Western region to 20% in Donbas).

The more often respondents *visit other regions of the country*, the more they tend to have a sense of

⁸ According to the results of the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 20-27 December 2005, in all regions of Ukraine. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

community with residents of other regions. While among those who never visited other regions of Ukraine only 30% feel such a sense of community, the percentage among those who visit other regions once a year or more is 46%.⁹ Likewise such a sense of community is felt by 43% of those *who have relatives* or friends in other regions, while the corresponding percentage of those who do not – 31%.¹⁰

At the same time, a relative majority (49%) of respondents believe *that differences between the inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine* is good, because they enrich the country and its culture, while 32% are of the opinion that it is bad because it creates opportunities for “labelling”, the emergence of separatist movements, and envy of others.

Those respondents who feel a sense of community with residents of other regions most often believe that the differences between the inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine are good (59%, while only 28% believe that it is bad), while respondents who clearly do not experience such a sense of community more often believe that the existence of such differences is a bad thing (47%, while 32% believe that it is good).

Therefore, those citizens who feel a sense of community with residents of other regions are aware of differences between them and inhabitants of other regions, but these differences are mainly considered a positive phenomenon. An absolute or relative majority of respondents in all regions except Donbas (where the proportion of those who think that it is good and those who think that it is bad differ little statistically) believe that differences between the inhabitants of different regions of Ukraine are a good thing.

81% of respondents believe that for consolidation of society a country must have a *national idea* common to all citizens (only 6% believe that it is not needed). The majority of respondents in each region (from 67% in the South to 91% in the West of the country) agree that such an idea is needed.

85% of respondents (from 71% in Donbas region to 94% in the West) believe that children (regardless of origin) *should be raised with a feeling of love for Ukraine* and respect for its history.

Most (56%) respondents hope to some extent that the success of such education will help the *younger generation to achieve unity among themselves*, solidarity and mutual assistance. An absolute or relative majority of inhabitants in all regions believe in this (from 42% in the South to 70% in the West of the country).

In general, citizens of Ukraine, despite rather negative assessments of the current situation in the country, are focused on doing all they can for positive changes in the country.

Answering the question “*Which advice would you give to Ukrainians?*”, 55% chose the response: “to focus on improving life in their country”, 33% – “to focus on improving life in their city (village)”, and only 4% chose “to focus on self-fulfillment in other, wealthier countries”.

Issue in Relations between Ukraine and Russia

The ideology that the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are “brother nations” is one of the most important Soviet ideas, which was created to replace the Russian Empire’s idea of the “trinity” of the Russian peoples (based on which the Belorussians and Ukrainians were not recognized as separate peoples).¹¹

The notion of the “*brotherhood*” of the *Ukrainian and Russian peoples* has survived the Soviet era and has many supporters in modern Ukraine, but under the influence of recent events their numbers are decreasing.

Thus, in April 2014¹² (after the Russian occupation of Crimea) 62% of Ukrainian citizens considered Ukrainians and Russians to be “brother nations”, while in November 2016 their share was 51%, and the share of those who do not think so had increased from 28% to 34%. The only region where the idea of “brotherhood” between Ukrainian and Russian peoples is the least supported is the West (where it is supported by 28% of respondents); in the Central region supporters constitute a relative majority (41% compared with 36% of those who do not support it), and in the South and East regions and in Donbas, they make up the majority of respondents (61%, 87% and 55%, respectively).

The Ukrainian and Russian peoples are considered “brother nations” by 82% of ethnic Russians and only 47% of ethnic Ukrainians. The older the respondents are, the more they adhere to this idea (the percentage increases from 42% in the 18-29 age group to 62% among those who are aged 60 years and older).

26% of respondents support the idea that “*Ukrainians and Russians belong to the same people*”, while 63% believe that they are two different peoples. In the Southern and Central regions and in Donbas those who do not support this idea constitute the majority (85%, 67% and 58%, respectively), and in the South and East the share of those who support this idea does not differ statistically from those who do not.

⁹ Overall, 32% of all those polled said they had been to other regions of Ukraine once a year or more, 20% – once every two y.o. or less, 20% – once every five y.o. or less, 15% – once every 10 y.o. or less, and 14% said they have never been to other regions of Ukraine. The majority of those who have never been to other regions of Ukraine live in the East (19%) and Donbas (23%).

¹⁰ Overall, 69% of those polled have relatives or friends in other regions, while 31% do not. Among those who have such relatives or friends, 67% said they communicate with them at least once a year.

¹¹ This is once again becoming increasingly official in modern Russia, as Putin often states in public: “Ukrainians and Russians are the same people. We [Ukrainians and Russians] were first separated and then incited against one another”. See: Putin’s speech at the plenary session of the International Discussion Club “Valdai” – <https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/328567-putin-russkie-i-ukraincy>.

¹² Based on the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 25-29 April 2014 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2,012 respondents aged over 18 y.o. were polled. The sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

The Ukrainians and Russians are considered a single people by 55% of ethnic Russians and by only 22% of ethnic Ukrainians (38% and 67%, respectively, believe that they are two different peoples). The older the respondents are, the more they adhere to the idea that Ukrainians and Russians are a single people (this percentage increases from 19% in the 18-29 age group to 35% among those aged 60 or older, although they constitute a minority in all age groups).

Answering the question *“Do you think that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be normalised, even if Crimea remains part of Russia?”* a relative majority of respondents (41%) said no, and 34% said yes. 54% of respondents among those who consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations” advocate the normalisation of Ukrainian-Russian relations, even in such circumstances, and among those who do not consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations”, 73% oppose such normalisation.

A majority (58%) of the population of the Western region is against normalising Ukrainian-Russian relations under such conditions, while a relative majority (49%) in Central region and majority in the East (62%) advocate normalisation of relations even under such conditions. In the South and Donbas, the shares of those who advocate and those who oppose such normalisation differ little in statistical terms.

Normalisation under these circumstances is advocated by 60% of ethnic Russians and by only 31% of ethnic Ukrainians. The older the respondents, the more likely they are to support normalisation (the percentage increases from 31% in the 18-29 age group to 41% among those aged 60 years or older).

A relative majority (42%) of respondents do not believe that *Russia might start an open full-scale war against Ukraine* (35% do). 56% of those who consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations” do not believe in such a possibility, and 55% of those who do not consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations” do think this is a possibility.

A majority of respondents (54%) in the Western region believe in this possibility, while a majority in the Eastern region (59%) and the Southern region (58%) do not believe this is possible; and in the Central region and Donbas the shares of those who do and do not believe this is possible do not differ statistically.

59% of ethnic Russians do not believe in the possibility of such a war, and the shares of ethnic Ukrainians who do and do not believe in this possibility are not statistically different (38% and 39%, respectively). The older the respondents, the less likely they are to believe this war is possible (the percentage of those who do increases from 37% in the 18-29 age group to 47% among those aged 60 years or older).

57% of respondents think that *if Russia begins open full-scale war against Ukraine*, the latter should provide an armed response (34% believe this in any case, while 23% support this option if there are guarantees of international assistance). 12% of respondents believe that in

this situation Ukraine should surrender. 31% of respondents gave no answer.

The majority of those who gave no answer were also among those who consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations” (41%). Within this group of respondents 40% believe that Ukraine should provide an armed response, and 20% agree that Ukraine should surrender. Among those who do not consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother nations” 87% think that Ukraine must defend itself.

The highest numbers of those who did not indicate what to do in such a situation are among the residents of Southern (47%) and Eastern (40%) regions and Donbas (38%).

Those who believe that Ukraine should provide an armed resistance to Russian aggression under these circumstances constitute the majority in the Western (82%) and Central (63%) regions, and the relative majority in Donbas (48%) and the Southern region (43%); while in the Eastern region the shares of those who believe that Ukraine in this situation should protect itself and those who believe that Ukraine will have to surrender do not statistically differ (33% and 28%, respectively).

61% of ethnic Ukrainians think that under such circumstances Ukraine must provide an armed response to Russian aggression, while only 26% of ethnic Russians share this opinion.

Assessing *the policy of Ukraine towards Russia*, 21% of respondents advocate strengthening of cooperation, 25% advocate reduction of cooperation and Russian influence in Ukraine, and another 26% advocate the curtailing of cooperation with Russia.

Compared with April 2014, the percentage of those who chose the answer “reduce cooperation with Russia” has decreased (from 35% to 25%), mostly due to an increase in the proportion of those who support more radical option, i.e. curtailing cooperation with Russia (their share increased from 22% to 26%). The share of those who indicated no answer increased from 22% to 29%. The share of those who advocate the strengthening of cooperation has changed little in statistical terms (22% in 2014 and 21% in 2016).

38% of ethnic Russians advocate the strengthening of cooperation, while among ethnic Ukrainians this share is half as much (19%). Curtailing cooperation with Russia is supported by 10% of ethnic Russians and 28% of ethnic Ukrainians.

The younger the respondents, the less they support strengthening of cooperation (from 27% among those aged 60 and older to 17% among those aged 18-29) and the more they support curtailing cooperation Ukraine and Russia (22% and 28% respectively).

Only 8% of respondents believe that in the *coming years relations between Ukraine and Russia* will improve; 35% believe that they will deteriorate, and the same number of respondents believe that relations will not change. The vast majority in all regions, as well as the majority in all groups, do not expect an improvement in relations.

The following conclusions may be drawn based on the survey data.

Civic and national identity do not occupy the highest positions in the hierarchy of Ukrainians' identities, indicating the importance of self-identification through belonging to micro-groups (especially family), professional, age, and gender groups. However, civic and national identities have more importance for citizens than class, religious identification and political proclivities.

Choosing between different territorial communities, the majority of respondents identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. For representatives of the younger generation, national identity has greater significance than for older groups, while the importance of local identity for young people is on the wane.

The survey results confirm that the events of recent years have significantly influenced the formation of civil identity. According to the self-assessment of respondents, the feeling of patriotism was strengthened by the heroism and dedication of Ukrainian military forces and volunteers as seen in the struggle against Russian aggression and the separatist movements, the Russian aggression against Ukraine (the annexation of Crimea and Russia's support for separatist forces in the Donbas, significant human casualties and economic losses), and Maidan. The actions taken by the government to implement reforms in 2014-2016, on the contrary, weakened the sense of patriotism among a relative majority of respondents.

At the same time, the level of patriotism among citizens is high: two-thirds of respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, and three-quarters report feelings of patriotism and love for Ukraine. Despite the difficult socio-economic situation, the majority of respondents believe in the ability of Ukraine to overcome the existing problems and difficulties and in prospects for a decent life in Ukraine, less for themselves, and more for their children and grandchildren. The assessment of prospects for Ukraine is significantly affected by the age and nationality of respondents.

The survey results lead to the conclusion that, under the influence of socio-political processes in Ukraine in recent years, certain changes have taken place in the linguistic identity of citizens (in particular, the share of citizens who consider Ukrainian language their mother tongue), but not in language practices, which have proven to be more stable. We can therefore speak of a contradiction between linguistic identity and language practices (which is most pronounced in the South of the country). Representatives of younger groups are changing their language identity while maintaining language practices in family communication.

Citizens provide a somewhat higher assessment of their knowledge of the Ukrainian language than their knowledge of Ukrainian literature, folk customs and traditions, history, culture and art, and cultural features, traditions and customs of different regions, although all ratings are in the range from 3.3 to 3.9 points on a five-point scale. At the same time, this self-assessment among Donbas residents is below that of residents from all other regions, indicating a greater detachment of this region from the national socio-cultural and informational space.

The feeling of a need to improve the level of Ukrainian language proficiency does not depend on the actual level of proficiency. Among residents of various regions, the greatest need to master the Ukrainian language was expressed by the residents of Donbas, and the least was in the Eastern and Southern regions. The younger the respondents, the more often they feel such a need, and the same increase occurs in proportion to the educational level.

Most respondents think that every citizen of Ukraine must be proficient in Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and must use it in official institutions.

The majority of respondents also agree that the state should promote and spread the Ukrainian language, regardless of the impact of these measures on the status of other languages, due to the long-term oppression suffered by Ukrainian language. However, a relative majority of respondents do not support giving the state the authority to limit other languages within its territory.

Ukrainian society has no consensus as to which option is better: preserving the cultural features of regional and ethnic groups or cultural unification. The level of support for these two positions is nearly the same. Similarly, there is no clear discrepancy in the number of those who favour state support only of the Ukrainian language and culture, and those who favour support of languages and cultures of other peoples living in Ukraine. However, the citizens of Ukraine often oppose the concept of a "melting pot" (where different ethnic groups adapt and blend with the majority of citizens).

In general, the citizens of Ukraine gave a high assessment of their opportunity to meet their cultural and religious needs, but, according to the survey, the cultural needs of Ukrainian-speaking population are better served in Ukraine than those of the Russian-speaking population.

Ideas of preserving the cultural identity of regional and ethnic groups are combined with rejection of Ukrainian federalisation, which is the factor most frequently named by respondents as a cause of division

and disintegration of the country. Citizens feeling a sense of community with residents of other regions acknowledge the existence of differences between them and the residents of other regions, but most consider these differences a positive phenomenon (the majority of all citizens of Ukraine have the same belief).

The majority of citizens believe that a common vision of the future, and the common challenges facing Ukraine today, may serve as a basis for the unity of Ukrainian society. More than 80% of respondents believe that a country needs a national idea shared by all citizens.

Most citizens see overcoming socio-economic problems and increasing of prosperity, combating corruption, qualitative change in the government, and more equitable distribution of public wealth as the practical measures that could contribute to consolidation.

The federalisation of Ukraine, accession to a defence alliance (NATO or Russia), refusal to return the occupied territories (including consent to provide a special status to individual areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) are considered by the highest numbers of respondents as divisive factors.

The attitude towards the government and state policy, the attitude towards the war in Eastern Ukraine, and the attitude towards Russia were considered by the respondents to be the main reasons for division in Ukrainian society.

The survey showed that most citizens recognise Ukraine's right to its own history outside of the history of other national communities. The majority of respondents saw either no need or no possibility to restore the Soviet Union, while the relative majority gave a positive assessment of Maidan and would not like to return "Ukraine as it was before 2014" (despite the sceptical attitude to changes that have occurred in the country since then).

More than 80% of respondents believe that Ukrainian children should be raised with love for Ukraine and respect for its history, and according to a majority of respondents the younger generation of Ukraine will find it easier to achieve unity, solidarity and mutual assistance.

Most respondents believe that in the future Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country or will have its own way of development. "Pessimistic" options for Ukraine's future were voiced by an insignificant number of respondents.

The survey results lead to the conclusion that the identity of the citizens of Ukraine continues to develop towards an understanding of themselves as



a separate community, a political nation which has its own territory, history, language, culture, a shared vision of the future (as concerns basic goals), and is conducting an armed struggle against the aggressor for the right to exercise its own choice. A particularly important indicator of this process is a higher level of patriotism, national-level and Ukrainian socio-cultural identity, and a more optimistic assessment of Ukraine's prospects of development among younger categories of respondents.

Formation of civil identity under the present conditions is accompanied by an opposition in public opinion between, on the one hand, the people of Ukraine and, on the other, the government and the ruling political elite, with the latter being seen primarily as an unpatriotic force.







However, the survey revealed the presence of significant differences in identity between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians. The identity of ethnic Russians is characterised by a high degree of contradiction, reinforced by inter-state Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which puts ethnically Russian citizens of Ukraine in a situation where they face a difficult choice, not only a choice of identity, but also to a large extent a moral choice.

Significant differences remain in the identity of residents of different regions. While the identity of residents in the Western and Central regions is characterised by greater certainty in terms of civil position and national identity, the identity of those in the Southern and Eastern regions and Donbas is more conflicted and is largely characterised by manifestations of "transformation anomie", while opposing tendencies are widely represented in public opinion in these regions.

However, in these regions as well, the position of a majority or plurality of respondents concerning most questions related to civic identity, visions of ways to consolidate Ukrainian society, and approaches to understanding socio-cultural issues, corresponds to the same figures for Ukraine as a whole.



We all are members of various groups. Thinking about yourself, which of these groups describe who you are? important to you and which is the second most important?
% of respondents


	UKRAINE	REGIONS					NATIONALITY	
		West 	Centre 	South 	East 	Donbas 	Ukrainians	Russians
First								
Your position in the family, marital status (e.g. son/daughter, father/mother, grandmother/grandfather, husband/wife, not married/married)	22.3	20.2	19.0	18.1	34.0	21.8	22.0	26.6
Your gender (male/female)	15.7	13.1	14.2	17.1	18.6	18.3	15.2	21.2
Your current or previous occupation (or housekeeping)	13.9	8.6	15.3	6.5	18.9	17.0	13.9	13.5
Ukrainian Citizenship	12.5	17.8	11.6	17.6	5.9	11.7	13.2	7.7
Your age group (young, middle-age, elderly)	8.2	6.4	6.4	7.9	15.1	6.3	7.5	11.7
Your nationality	8.1	14.5	9.0	5.6	1.9	6.6	8.3	6.3
Your affiliation to Ukraine, the country where you live	4.4	6.7	4.4	5.6	0.5	5.0	4.2	4.5
Your affiliation to social class (upper, middle, lower, working or similar categories)	1.9	1.4	1.9	3.2	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.4
Your attitude to religion (affiliation to a certain religion, non-recognition of any religion, or atheism)	1.8	2.6	1.6	1.4	1.1	2.5	1.9	1.8
Your commitment to a particular political party, group or movement	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.8	1.9	0.6	1.4
No answer	10.5	8.8	15.7	17.1	1.6	7.3	11.2	4.1
Second								
Your position in the family, marital status (e.g. son/daughter, father/mother, grandmother/grandfather, husband/wife, not married/married)	20.0	18.3	16.7	23.1	29.4	16.8	19.4	24.4
Your gender (male/female)	11.9	9.3	10.7	5.1	11.6	22.8	11.9	11.8
Your current or previous occupation (or housekeeping)	10.7	9.0	8.3	10.2	18.1	9.8	10.4	12.2
Ukrainian Citizenship	8.9	11.2	11.0	11.1	2.7	7.0	9.1	6.3
Your age group (young, middle-age, elderly)	14.1	13.3	12.0	13.0	15.9	18.0	13.4	19.9
Your nationality	6.8	10.9	8.1	5.1	3.8	3.5	7.2	5.9
Your affiliation to Ukraine, the country where you live	6.0	8.1	5.4	8.8	3.0	6.0	6.3	4.1
Your affiliation to social class (upper, middle, lower, working or similar categories)	5.8	4.0	7.0	4.6	7.8	4.4	6.3	3.2
Your attitude to religion (affiliation to a certain religion, non-recognition of any religion, or atheism)	3.9	7.1	4.1	1.4	2.2	3.2	3.9	4.1
Your commitment to a particular political party, group or movement	1.5	0.5	2.3	0.0	2.4	1.3	1.4	3.2
No answer	10.3	8.3	14.4	17.6	3.2	7.3	10.8	5.0
Third								
Your position in the family, marital status (e.g. son/daughter, father/mother, grandmother/grandfather, husband/wife, not married/married)	16.7	18.5	14.6	14.0	18.7	18.0	16.4	16.7
Your gender (male/female)	6.7	5.7	5.9	7.0	8.9	7.3	6.7	6.8
Your current or previous occupation (or housekeeping)	11.8	12.1	8.5	10.7	20.3	9.2	11.3	14.9
Ukrainian Citizenship	7.4	5.5	9.3	10.7	2.4	9.5	7.2	10.8
Your age group (young, middle-age, elderly)	12.1	8.1	11.3	14.0	12.2	17.7	11.2	17.1
Your nationality	6.7	8.5	8.4	4.2	4.3	5.1	7.1	5.4
Your affiliation to Ukraine, the country where you live	10.6	9.2	13.3	11.2	9.8	7.0	11.2	6.8
Your affiliation to social class (upper, middle, lower, working or similar categories)	9.7	9.0	6.8	10.2	17.1	7.9	9.7	10.4
Your attitude to religion (affiliation to a certain religion, non-recognition of any religion, or atheism)	5.0	11.1	3.9	0.9	1.9	5.4	5.4	2.7
Your commitment to a particular political party, group or movement	4.2	5.0	4.9	1.9	2.4	5.7	4.3	4.1
No answer	9.1	7.3	13.0	15.3	1.9	7.3	9.6	4.5



The importance of various issues varies for each of us. In general, which of the following issues is the most important? Which is the third most important?

AGE					LANGUAGE		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
choices														
19.7	21.5	25.3	21.3	23.9	20.7	23.9	19.7	21.7	22.6	22.6	28.2	21.3	19.0	22.5
19.2	15.6	12.7	15.3	15.4	14.2	18.8	13.6	14.7	15.7	16.4	11.8	15.8	18.8	15.5
15.3	18.3	16.6	13.9	8.0	12.4	16.2	9.1	13.4	12.6	16.0	12.2	13.1	15.7	25.4
11.4	13.5	15.4	12.5	10.8	13.4	11.2	10.6	12.9	13.5	11.4	7.6	15.4	11.8	9.9
9.0	4.2	4.2	5.7	14.4	7.3	9.2	18.2	9.0	8.5	6.4	12.9	7.4	6.2	2.8
6.8	7.7	8.1	10.9	7.4	10.5	4.9	6.1	9.0	8.2	7.7	6.3	8.7	9.0	2.8
5.6	4.2	3.0	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	6.1	5.1	4.1	4.2	3.3	4.5	5.4	4.2
1.2	2.7	1.5	2.7	1.3	1.4	2.5	0.0	1.4	1.8	2.5	1.5	1.9	2.1	4.2
1.7	1.3	2.4	1.6	2.1	2.2	1.2	0.0	1.6	1.4	2.6	2.4	1.7	1.5	0.0
1.0	1.3	0.0	1.4	0.4	0.4	1.2	0.0	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.8	1.1	1.4
9.2	9.5	10.8	10.4	12.0	13.0	6.4	16.7	10.6	10.6	9.6	13.8	9.4	9.5	11.3
choices														
18.4	19.7	21.6	22.3	19.2	17.8	23.9	12.1	21.0	19.3	21.1	17.4	19.2	23.5	18.3
12.6	13.6	14.1	10.6	9.7	10.6	13.7	18.2	13.8	11.0	11.0	11.1	12.3	11.9	9.9
10.2	13.3	11.4	12.0	7.8	8.4	12.9	10.6	8.5	10.6	12.1	11.5	9.0	11.0	18.3
10.9	9.3	5.4	8.2	9.7	10.0	7.8	9.1	8.3	8.0	10.2	9.6	9.3	8.2	7.0
15.3	14.4	14.1	11.4	14.7	13.1	15.8	13.6	13.6	15.1	13.3	14.6	14.3	14.0	14.1
5.3	6.4	6.9	7.1	8.0	8.9	4.3	6.1	6.0	7.3	6.9	5.2	7.7	6.9	7.0
6.8	4.3	5.1	7.4	6.3	6.8	4.8	3.0	4.1	6.8	6.7	5.4	6.3	6.0	2.8
7.0	5.3	5.7	6.5	5.0	4.7	6.7	3.0	6.7	5.7	5.8	4.6	6.4	5.6	9.9
2.4	2.9	3.3	3.8	6.1	5.6	1.8	6.1	5.3	4.2	2.5	5.9	4.1	2.2	1.4
1.7	2.1	1.8	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.1	2.0	1.7	0.9	1.4
9.2	8.8	10.5	9.5	12.4	12.5	6.6	16.7	10.8	10.2	9.5	12.6	9.6	9.7	9.9
choices														
16.5	18.5	14.5	18.7	15.3	15.6	17.6	16.7	15.9	17.0	16.9	14.4	19.3	14.8	11.1
6.3	5.5	4.2	6.5	9.6	6.0	7.8	10.6	10.6	6.1	4.8	10.3	7.1	3.6	5.6
9.9	12.9	16.0	11.7	9.8	11.0	13.1	7.6	8.8	12.6	12.9	11.4	11.1	13.1	15.3
8.7	5.0	8.7	8.1	6.8	7.4	7.9	4.5	7.2	7.0	8.0	7.0	5.6	10.3	5.6
12.6	12.9	9.3	12.2	12.7	10.2	14.6	10.6	15.7	12.3	9.9	13.6	11.4	11.8	9.7
7.3	9.8	5.7	4.9	6.0	8.3	4.3	6.1	6.0	7.0	6.9	5.5	7.5	6.2	6.9
11.6	8.7	12.0	10.8	10.2	10.9	9.7	6.1	8.5	11.1	11.7	9.2	10.3	12.5	11.1
9.7	10.3	12.0	9.5	7.9	8.3	12.0	10.6	9.2	9.3	10.4	8.3	9.9	10.9	6.9
5.1	5.0	3.6	5.4	5.5	6.4	3.5	7.6	5.3	5.0	4.8	4.4	5.3	4.1	12.5
3.4	3.2	5.1	4.3	5.1	4.9	3.5	3.0	2.5	3.6	6.0	3.9	4.0	4.5	8.3
9.0	8.2	8.7	7.9	11.0	11.0	5.9	16.7	10.2	8.9	7.8	12.0	8.4	8.2	6.9

Who do you consider yourself first of all? % of respondents




	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Citizen of Ukraine	62.6	63.4	63.7	52.4	45.0	61.2	65.8	61.9	58.7	48.2	62.2	52.5
A resident of the village, district or city where you live	21.1	22.1	17.7	23.7	25.2	19.4	15.6	18.4	25.3	29.2	21.8	23.0
A resident of the region (oblast or several oblasts) where you live	9.5	8.6	12.6	14.5	14.2	11.2	9.3	11.5	11.4	12.0	9.8	13.3
Citizen of the world	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.9	8.8	1.9	6.6	1.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	4.4
A citizen of the former Soviet Union	0.2	2.0	2.3	4.8	3.1	0.2	0.3	2.1	1.1	6.5	1.1	4.2
A representative of your ethnic group or nation	3.8	1.5	1.4	1.9	1.3	3.2	1.3	2.4	1.6	1.7	2.5	1.0
Citizen of Europe	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.3	1.3	1.7	0.8	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.6
Citizen of Russia	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2
Other	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.3	1.2	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6
No answer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1


	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Citizen of Ukraine	61.6	33.9	51.5	49.7	58.7	63.5	49.9	58.2	64.4	64.8
A resident of the village, district or city where you live	21.1	31.7	31.8	29.2	21.3	18.0	30.0	23.4	15.1	12.7
A resident of the region (oblast or several oblasts) where you live	10.2	18.3	10.6	12.6	11.9	9.6	10.7	11.7	11.0	7.0
Citizen of the world	2.1	4.9	1.5	2.1	2.3	3.2	2.6	2.0	2.8	8.5
A citizen of the former Soviet Union	1.4	8.5	4.5	2.8	2.8	1.4	5.3	1.9	1.1	0.0
A representative of your ethnic group or nation	2.1	0.9	0.0	2.1	2.0	2.2	0.4	1.7	3.5	4.2
Citizen of Europe	0.8	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.4
Citizen of Russia	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.4
Other	0.6	0.9	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.0
No answer	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0

Which of the following do you primarily associate with the word “Ukraine”?
% of respondents

2016




REGIONS



	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
My Motherland	49.8	47.1	42.9	48.4	40.4	58.5	28.9	50.0	19.6
The country where I live	20.6	23.7	28.1	24.3	23.7	17.6	31.3	21.5	38.4
The country of which I am a citizen	16.7	16.5	17.2	16.2	18.2	11.7	24.2	16.2	22.8
My everyday environment (my city/settlement/village, familiar landscapes, relatives and countrymen)	10.0	8.5	8.8	6.8	12.0	9.7	9.0	9.1	8.0
Part of Europe	1.5	1.3	0.6	2.2	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3
Part of Russia	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.3	2.7	0.4	2.5	0.8	4.9
Other	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.2	1.8
Hard to say	0.5	1.6	0.6	1.1	1.9	0.6	1.8	1.0	3.1


	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
My Motherland	43.9	42.0	46.0	47.3	44.5	45.0	46.6	56.3
The country where I live	12.1	23.3	25.6	23.3	26.3	23.4	24.0	16.9
The country of which I am a citizen	19.7	18.9	16.4	16.5	14.9	18.3	16.1	19.7
My everyday environment (my city/settlement/village, familiar landscapes, relatives and countrymen)	19.7	11.5	8.7	8.0	9.9	9.0	10.1	1.4
Part of Europe	1.5	0.9	1.0	1.5	0.7	1.4	1.1	2.8
Part of Russia	1.5	0.9	1.0	1.6	2.4	1.0	0.9	0.0
Other	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.2	1.4
Hard to say	1.5	1.4	0.9	1.4	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.4

Are you a citizen of Ukraine? % of respondents




If you had the opportunity to take the citizenship of other country in addition to your Ukrainian citizenship, which country would you choose?
% of those who are citizens of Ukraine

2016




	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
USA	10.2	8.3	4.4	4.5	3.5	10.0	11.5	5.6	5.2	2.9	8.3	5.2
Canada	6.3	5.7	3.9	6.2	5.8	8.3	6.8	6.8	4.7	2.9	5.9	5.7
Germany	8.3	5.3	7.4	2.2	3.5	8.0	5.2	8.6	4.4	1.9	6.5	4.2
Poland	9.7	5.4	2.5	2.0	1.9	6.3	4.9	4.9	4.1	4.1	6.9	2.2
Russia	0.2	1.2	5.4	8.1	8.9	2.3	3.3	3.7	3.0	6.2	0.7	8.4
Belarus	1.7	1.6	2.0	6.2	3.5	2.0	4.1	4.3	1.9	2.3	2.1	3.9
Israel	1.7	1.9	1.0	3.6	1.3	2.3	1.1	3.4	2.2	1.4	1.6	2.3
France	2.4	1.8	1.0	0.6	1.3	2.8	1.4	0.9	1.4	1.2	1.8	1.2
Slovakia	2.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.1
Hungary	1.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.1
Romania	1.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.0
Turkey	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1
Another country	3.6	2.8	1.0	3.4	1.9	3.5	4.9	3.1	1.4	1.6	2.8	2.6
I would not obtain other citizenship	44.4	50.4	46.8	51.0	51.8	33.6	39.9	42.6	58.1	65.3	51.7	45.2
Hard to say	7.0	14.6	24.6	12.3	16.0	19.3	14.8	14.8	12.1	9.7	9.6	18.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
USA	7.4	3.8	3.1	5.2	6.9	8.2	2.9	7.1	7.9	20.9		
Canada	6.1	3.8	1.5	2.8	4.8	8.9	3.6	5.6	6.9	13.4		
Germany	5.7	3.3	0.0	3.8	5.1	6.9	2.0	5.6	7.5	7.5		
Poland	5.3	1.4	3.1	5.2	5.3	4.1	3.8	4.8	5.7	6.0		
Russia	2.0	19.3	6.2	5.2	3.2	3.8	8.1	3.3	2.1	0.0		
Belarus	2.5	4.7	1.5	2.4	3.2	2.7	3.4	2.7	2.5	3.0		
Israel	1.7	2.8	1.5	1.2	1.9	2.5	1.4	2.3	1.9	1.5		
France	1.5	2.4	4.6	1.9	1.3	1.3	0.5	1.4	2.7	1.5		
Slovakia	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.2	1.0	0.0	0.0		
Hungary	0.5	0.0	1.5	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	1.5		
Romania	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.0		
Turkey	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	1.5		
Another country	3.0	0.5	0.0	1.7	1.9	4.5	1.4	2.1	4.4	7.5		
I would not obtain other citizenship	50.6	40.6	72.3	55.7	51.2	40.8	60.2	49.2	43.1	20.9		
Hard to say	12.9	17.5	4.6	12.8	13.8	15.4	11.8	14.2	14.2	14.9		

If you had to renounce your Ukrainian citizenship to obtain another citizenship, would you do this?
 % of those who are citizens of Ukraine and did not decline to obtain citizenship of another state



What does being a citizen of Ukraine mean to you personally?*


% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russia
Have Ukrainian citizenship, have a Ukrainian passport	47.3	51.9	45.8	40.2	50.5	48.4	48.8	49.2	48.0	46.0	48.6	47.4
Live in my Motherland where I have my home, relatives, native land and nature	50.8	44.2	51.2	39.1	40.5	47.0	45.1	41.3	47.7	43.3	45.9	43.7
Have the feeling that the government cares about me, have adequate social security	32.2	43.3	46.8	52.8	26.9	37.1	40.1	39.9	38.8	45.4	40.7	40.8
Feel like I am part of a united Ukrainian nation, its culture and traditions	43.0	32.8	30.6	17.8	25.3	31.6	29.5	33.5	33.1	27.3	37.0	22.0
Be able to elect the President, the Verkhovna Rada, local councils, and participate in referenda	29.1	29.3	20.9	33.2	30.3	26.0	31.9	26.0	31.5	30.2	29.5	28.8
Be able to feel proud of the achievements of my country and its representatives in various fields, such as economics, science, art, sports, etc.	28.4	25.4	27.9	23.7	25.3	27.7	24.9	29.5	25.5	23.6	25.4	26.9
Confidence that the Ukrainian government will protect Ukrainian citizens if they have difficulties abroad	22.2	24.4	26.5	20.5	23.4	22.3	23.3	24.8	26.6	20.7	23.7	23.0
Feel that I am different from representatives of other countries	4.7	3.6	6.0	4.9	3.8	3.4	4.5	6.3	3.3	4.6	4.5	4.3
Other	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.0	1.1	0.9	0.4
I am not a citizen of Ukraine	0.0	0.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Although I am a citizen of Ukraine, I wish I was not	0.5	0.3	0.5	1.3	3.2	1.2	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.1	0.3	2.2
Hard to say	1.4	1.2	0.9	2.2	6.3	2.4	1.9	2.7	1.4	2.1	1.2	3.4
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Have Ukrainian citizenship, have a Ukrainian passport	48.3	42.8	50.0	43.5	52.0	46.1	47.5	47.8	49.2	38.0		
Live in my Motherland where I have my home, relatives, native land and nature	45.1	41.7	27.3	48.6	43.4	45.7	41.3	43.8	49.3	42.9		
Have the feeling that the government cares about me, have adequate social security	41.5	38.3	42.4	32.9	42.8	42.5	49.8	39.7	35.5	35.2		
Feel like I am part of a united Ukrainian nation, its culture and traditions	33.0	15.8	26.2	25.8	29.9	34.6	25.3	31.1	34.0	35.2		
Be able to elect the President, the Verkhovna Rada, local councils, and participate in referenda	28.8	31.5	28.8	23.5	31.3	30.5	27.5	28.1	31.4	43.7		
Be able to feel proud of the achievements of my country and its representatives in various fields, such as economics, science, art, sports, etc.	27.1	21.2	16.9	23.3	24.6	29.8	17.9	27.6	28.4	37.1		
Confidence that the Ukrainian government will protect Ukrainian citizens if they have difficulties abroad	24.4	14.9	16.7	23.7	23.1	23.9	18.3	25.8	23.6	22.9		
Feel that I am different from representatives of other countries	4.4	3.1	6.1	3.2	4.5	4.7	3.9	4.1	5.2	2.8		
Other	0.6	0.9	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.0		
I am not a citizen of Ukraine	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0		
Although I am a citizen of Ukraine, I wish I was not	0.3	6.3	1.5	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.5	0.9	0.9	1.4		
Hard to say	1.9	2.7	3.0	5.1	1.4	1.1	3.7	1.6	1.5	0.0		

* Respondents were asked to select three applicable answers.

Do you feel patriotism and love for Ukraine?
% of respondents



	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Yes	42.7	41.5	40.1	37.7	39.7	51.4	26.1	43.7	20.2
Probably yes	35.2	34.3	36.1	40.7	32.4	35.2	36.4	36.0	33.2
No	5.6	8.0	6.6	6.8	7.8	2.6	13.0	5.0	16.6
Probably no	4.6	5.1	7.2	5.4	9.9	3.3	10.6	5.5	16.6
Hard to say	11.9	11.2	9.9	9.5	10.2	7.5	13.9	9.7	13.5

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	46.2	30.9	41.5	44.2	35.8	41.2	41.5	49.3
Probably yes	30.8	35.9	37.5	33.5	33.0	35.5	37.6	32.4
No	4.6	8.8	6.5	6.6	9.0	6.6	6.7	2.8
Probably no	10.8	10.1	5.7	5.2	9.4	6.4	4.5	8.5
Hard to say	7.7	14.3	8.7	10.4	12.9	10.2	9.7	7.0

Assessment of how the following events influence patriotism,
% of respondents



Assessment of how the following events influence patriotism,
% of respondents

(continued)

The heroism and self-sacrifice of Ukrainian military personnel, voluntary military and volunteers
shown in the struggle against Russian aggression and separatist movements

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	90.1	77.9	60.9	52.4	59.2	74.3	70.7	73.1	75.8	64.1	81.6	56.4
Decreased	0.7	3.2	7.4	15.1	5.1	3.6	5.3	5.1	4.9	8.3	2.8	9.8
No impact	5.9	12.8	12.1	23.5	22.5	12.1	15.2	15.1	12.5	17.6	10.6	20.5
Hard to say	3.3	6.1	19.5	8.9	13.3	10.0	8.8	6.6	6.8	9.9	5.1	13.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	75.3	42.5	67.7	64.1	73.9	72.3	62.4	72.6	74.9	80.3		
Decreased	4.2	15.8	3.1	5.1	6.0	5.9	7.9	6.0	3.7	4.2		
No impact	13.0	26.7	23.1	20.7	12.8	12.5	18.3	14.7	12.0	9.9		
Hard to say	7.6	14.9	6.2	10.1	7.3	9.3	11.4	6.7	9.4	5.6		

Russian aggression: Crimea annexation, military support for separatist forces in Donbas,
which have brought significant human and economic losses

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	76.1	64.2	39.2	30.9	44.3	58.1	55.2	55.0	57.5	49.9	67.2	39.1
Decreased	5.0	9.4	21.7	29.0	18.4	12.8	13.5	15.1	16.0	16.1	7.5	24.9
No impact	13.0	15.8	16.6	31.5	22.8	17.2	17.8	18.1	18.4	23.1	16.5	22.5
Hard to say	5.9	10.6	22.6	8.6	14.6	11.9	13.5	11.8	8.1	10.8	8.8	13.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	58.9	27.9	54.5	50.7	55.0	57.1	46.0	57.5	57.5	60.0		
Decreased	12.6	29.3	15.2	13.1	16.0	14.5	17.5	15.2	12.4	11.4		
No impact	18.4	25.2	24.2	25.6	17.9	16.5	23.6	17.8	17.8	17.1		
Hard to say	10.1	17.6	6.1	10.6	11.1	11.9	12.9	9.6	12.4	11.4		

Assessment of how the following events influence patriotism,
% of respondents

(continued)

Maidan												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	76.8	55.8	25.9	27.8	41.5	53.9	50.3	51.1	53.0	42.1	61.9	34.3
Decreased	4.5	13.0	21.8	36.1	25.0	14.3	16.0	16.9	17.4	24.7	8.8	30.6
No impact	12.8	22.8	29.2	28.3	25.3	22.3	23.4	22.4	20.9	24.3	21.0	24.8
Hard to say	5.9	8.4	23.1	7.8	8.2	9.5	10.4	9.7	8.7	8.9	8.3	10.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	53.4	27.0	44.6	44.1	51.0	51.6	40.4	50.6	53.0	67.1		
Decreased	14.8	41.0	20.0	17.5	18.0	19.1	21.8	18.8	14.7	15.7		
No impact	22.3	23.4	26.2	28.5	21.5	20.4	26.9	22.1	22.0	12.9		
Hard to say	9.6	8.6	9.2	9.9	9.5	8.9	10.9	8.5	10.3	4.3		
Conflict in Donbas and its consequences												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	65.0	53.3	37.0	34.5	44.3	48.5	49.1	49.7	52.3	47.1	37.3	58.7
Decreased	7.6	15.4	25.0	32.6	22.2	18.0	19.4	17.8	17.3	21.4	29.9	11.1
No impact	14.9	17.9	16.2	24.3	22.2	19.2	16.4	20.8	17.9	19.9	20.9	17.3
Hard to say	12.5	13.5	21.8	8.6	11.4	14.3	15.1	11.7	12.5	11.6	11.9	12.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	52.6	27.9	50.0	44.2	50.8	50.1	44.5	52.4	49.3	41.4		
Decreased	16.3	37.8	16.7	18.2	19.3	19.5	22.3	18.6	16.8	18.6		
No impact	18.6	21.2	24.2	24.0	16.2	18.4	20.3	17.5	19.2	21.4		
Hard to say	12.6	13.1	9.1	13.6	13.7	12.1	12.9	11.6	14.7	18.6		

Assessment of how the following events influence patriotism,
% of respondents

(continued)

International support to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression


	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	39.2	34.5	23.7	20.7	28.6	33.3	30.5	29.0	34.7	27.7	34.6	25.7
Decreased	11.3	12.5	14.4	23.4	6.3	8.3	14.6	14.8	14.1	15.6	11.8	16.2
No impact	35.5	35.6	33.5	38.2	47.3	41.5	35.5	36.9	34.7	38.7	37.2	38.8
Hard to say	13.9	17.4	28.4	17.7	17.8	17.0	19.4	19.3	16.5	18.0	16.4	19.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	32.6	22.1	21.2	24.7	33.4	32.6	27.1	31.2	31.6	40.8		
Decreased	12.2	21.6	6.1	15.4	13.8	12.8	15.3	14.1	12.3	7.0		
No impact	37.3	38.7	54.5	41.7	34.5	37.2	40.2	38.2	35.9	31.0		
Hard to say	17.9	17.6	18.2	18.2	18.3	17.4	17.5	16.5	20.2	21.1		

Government actions to implement reforms in 2014-2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Increased	18.7	13.8	4.7	7.0	15.8	14.6	13.5	10.6	13.4	12.3	15.3	10.1
Decreased	32.7	40.0	45.1	59.0	34.8	34.7	44.0	48.0	39.8	42.7	35.9	49.4
No impact	37.7	32.8	25.6	21.6	31.6	35.9	26.3	28.1	32.4	30.9	35.3	25.2
Hard to say	10.9	13.4	24.7	12.4	17.7	14.8	16.2	13.3	14.4	14.0	13.4	15.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Increased	13.2	14.0	13.8	9.9	13.4	14.1	10.9	13.0	13.5	13.9		
Decreased	40.2	50.7	43.1	40.0	42.5	41.6	39.4	43.6	41.2	40.3		
No impact	32.3	21.3	35.4	34.7	29.6	29.7	32.6	31.1	29.6	27.8		
Hard to say	14.4	14.0	7.7	15.4	14.4	14.6	17.1	12.3	15.7	18.1		

Has your attitude to Ukraine changed in the last three years?

% of respondents



Do you agree with the following statements?

% of respondents




* Total of answers "agree" and "tend to agree".

** Total of answers "disagree" and "tend to disagree".

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents

(continued)


Since the change of government in 2014, Ukraine has moved closer to the EU membership



	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Agree	47.2	42.7	45.7	44.0	34.8	49.1	34.5	44.7	26.2
Disagree	39.9	45.9	45.8	43.8	48.4	38.5	53.4	42.5	59.0
Hard to say	12.9	11.4	8.5	12.2	16.8	12.4	12.1	12.8	14.8

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree	32.3	35.6	42.9	46.5	32.2	41.3	49.4	65.3
Disagree	52.3	46.2	44.3	44.2	49.9	46.4	42.1	20.8
Hard to say	15.4	18.2	12.8	9.3	17.9	12.3	8.5	13.9

Since the change of government in 2014, the level of democracy and respect for political and civil rights and freedoms has increased in Ukraine




	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Agree	42.1	40.0	35.1	36.0	30.5	43.7	28.1	38.7	23.9
Disagree	44.1	50.9	54.1	52.3	56.7	43.3	62.3	49.1	67.0
Hard to say	13.8	9.1	10.8	11.7	12.9	13.0	9.6	12.2	9.1

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree	28.8	30.0	35.3	42.2	28.6	35.5	43.0	47.9
Disagree	54.5	53.6	53.5	48.6	57.0	53.2	48.4	28.2
Hard to say	16.7	16.4	11.2	9.2	14.4	11.3	8.6	23.9

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents

(continued)


A temporary decrease in living standards is acceptable for the sake of further economic reforms and strengthening of the country's defence



	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Agree	27.8	31.5	27.7	31.5	23.2	32.6	23.2	29.2	20.3
Disagree	55.7	52.7	59.3	54.1	60.1	51.3	62.6	55.0	65.8
Hard to say	16.5	15.9	13.0	14.4	16.7	16.1	14.2	15.8	13.9

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree	19.7	20.2	27.5	33.7	20.8	26.5	35.3	36.1
Disagree	60.6	61.3	58.6	51.1	60.6	60.1	49.2	44.4
Hard to say	19.7	18.5	13.9	15.2	18.6	13.4	15.5	19.5


The reforms conducted in Ukraine over the past three years are in the interests of the majority of Ukrainian citizens




	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Agree	19.9	21.9	15.9	23.1	18.4	25.2	13.0	20.5	14.9
Disagree	63.8	66.5	72.6	64.2	70.3	62.1	74.8	66.8	73.4
Hard to say	16.3	11.6	11.5	12.7	11.4	12.7	12.2	12.7	11.7

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree	23.0	14.5	19.2	23.1	13.9	19.1	23.4	36.1
Disagree	63.1	70.1	70.0	64.2	70.5	70.6	63.4	50.0
Hard to say	13.9	15.4	10.8	12.7	15.6	10.3	13.3	13.9


Do you feel personal responsibility for the fate of Ukraine? % of respondents



Do you feel as if you are the "master of the house" as concerns the Ukrainian state? % of respondents



Do you need to feel as if you are the “master of the house” as concerns the Ukrainian state? % of respondents



Do you consider the following persons patriots? % of respondents



Do you consider the following persons patriots?

% of respondents

(continued)

Ukrainian military personnel who fought or are fighting in the CTO area

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	92.4	80.1	75.5	52.0	58.9	75.0	73.1	73.7	76.4	71.0	83.4	60.7
No	1.4	6.8	4.2	12.7	13.3	7.0	7.4	6.3	6.8	8.9	4.6	11.5
It depends on the situation	5.0	10.1	12.0	25.1	17.4	10.9	13.3	15.4	12.5	13.9	8.9	18.6
Hard to say	1.2	2.9	8.3	10.2	10.4	7.0	6.1	4.5	4.3	6.3	3.1	9.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	77.9	45.5	71.2	71.0	74.9	74.1	65.1	75.7	77.4	81.7		
No	6.3	15.3	7.6	8.3	6.8	8.0	9.6	8.1	5.0	4.2		
It depends on the situation	11.3	23.4	16.7	14.5	12.9	12.2	16.3	11.7	12.7	9.9		
Hard to say	4.5	15.8	4.5	6.2	5.4	5.8	8.9	4.6	4.9	4.2		

Yourself personally

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	81.1	69.6	67.0	62.4	49.4	71.0	69.2	67.5	66.6	63.2	77.1	55.6
No	3.3	7.1	13.0	11.9	19.6	6.3	9.3	9.9	9.8	12.7	5.2	16.0
It depends on the situation	6.1	10.4	6.5	9.7	14.6	9.7	7.2	9.9	10.9	10.2	6.9	12.9
Hard to say	9.5	12.9	13.5	15.9	16.5	12.9	14.3	12.7	12.8	13.9	10.8	15.5
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	70.6	46.6	61.5	60.6	66.8	72.1	60.4	67.0	71.2	88.7		
No	8.2	20.2	13.8	13.1	9.5	8.0	13.1	10.3	6.9	2.8		
It depends on the situation	8.8	16.1	7.7	9.0	10.6	9.2	10.3	9.5	9.2	7.0		
Hard to say	12.5	17.0	16.9	17.3	13.2	10.7	16.2	13.2	12.7	1.4		

Citizens who work and pay taxes in Ukraine

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	69.3	54.6	65.6	64.8	37.7	59.6	60.5	55.6	56.9	57.8	62.9	53.0
No	2.8	12.6	7.9	6.7	15.8	6.3	9.5	11.2	9.2	11.0	7.1	12.1
It depends on the situation	22.5	19.4	17.7	18.3	34.8	23.4	21.0	23.0	25.5	18.8	20.9	23.4
Hard to say	5.4	13.4	8.8	10.2	11.7	10.7	9.0	10.3	8.4	12.4	9.1	11.4
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	60.5	42.5	44.6	52.1	57.8	63.3	57.2	58.8	58.8	54.9		
No	8.8	14.0	18.5	11.8	9.8	6.8	12.0	10.6	6.4	2.8		
It depends on the situation	20.9	29.4	18.5	22.6	23.0	21.2	16.8	22.3	24.9	31.0		
Hard to say	9.8	14.0	18.5	13.6	9.4	8.6	14.0	8.3	9.9	11.3		

Do you consider the following persons patriots?

% of respondents

(continued)

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	28.8	23.6	20.9	16.7	24.7	25.5	22.5	25.3	22.2	21.8	25.8	20.9
No	45.6	52.0	46.5	61.7	48.1	46.1	49.3	51.2	53.9	54.6	48.8	53.8
It depends on the situation	20.8	12.6	13.5	9.2	15.2	16.7	16.4	15.4	13.0	10.8	15.9	12.1
Hard to say	4.7	11.7	19.1	12.4	12.0	11.7	11.7	8.1	10.8	12.7	9.4	13.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	24.1	17.9	31.8	21.8	21.8	25.0	18.4	23.4	26.0	36.6		
No	49.7	60.1	53.0	52.9	54.0	47.2	57.5	52.3	46.5	32.4		
It depends on the situation	15.3	8.1	7.6	12.9	14.7	15.2	8.5	14.9	16.6	23.9		
Hard to say	10.8	13.9	7.6	12.4	9.5	12.6	15.5	9.3	10.8	7.0		
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Andriy Parubiy												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	35.3	20.2	9.8	13.7	25.0	21.1	22.6	24.2	23.3	19.4	25.8	17.3
No	41.0	54.9	56.7	65.2	48.4	48.3	50.8	53.8	54.5	56.7	49.6	57.0
It depends on the situation	17.5	11.3	14.4	9.2	13.6	15.3	14.4	13.3	12.7	9.7	14.3	11.4
Hard to say	6.2	13.6	19.1	11.9	13.0	15.3	12.2	8.8	9.5	14.2	10.3	14.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	22.7	14.9	27.3	20.0	19.8	24.5	15.8	21.9	26.2	23.9		
No	51.7	61.3	50.0	52.1	57.4	49.3	60.2	54.5	47.1	36.6		
It depends on the situation	13.5	9.0	10.6	11.5	12.9	13.9	7.9	13.3	15.1	23.9		
Hard to say	12.1	14.9	12.1	16.4	9.8	12.4	16.2	10.3	11.6	15.5		
Prime Minister of Ukraine, Volodymyr Hroysman												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	24.1	21.5	10.2	14.8	19.6	19.9	17.8	21.8	20.3	17.6	22.1	16.1
No	48.0	53.1	54.6	62.8	50.0	49.8	49.9	53.5	56.9	56.4	51.0	56.2
It depends on the situation	21.3	12.3	18.1	10.2	17.4	17.0	19.9	16.0	14.1	11.0	16.4	14.2
Hard to say	6.6	13.1	17.1	12.1	13.0	13.3	12.5	8.8	8.7	15.0	10.5	13.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	20.3	12.6	24.2	19.6	17.5	20.7	13.8	20.8	21.1	21.1		
No	52.0	62.3	53.0	53.5	55.9	51.0	60.2	53.4	50.2	36.6		
It depends on the situation	16.1	10.3	7.6	12.9	16.1	16.4	9.0	15.9	18.3	23.9		
Hard to say	11.6	14.8	15.2	14.1	10.5	11.9	17.1	9.8	10.4	18.3		




Do you consider the following persons patriots?

% of respondents

(continued)


Citizens who travel abroad to earn a living												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	26.3	16.5	28.7	13.0	8.5	19.9	18.4	15.7	16.8	18.4	19.8	16.1
No	19.7	24.4	18.1	20.8	27.2	18.2	23.9	21.7	24.2	24.3	21.8	23.7
It depends on the situation	45.7	46.2	28.2	51.4	50.0	49.0	44.4	48.2	47.0	41.4	46.9	44.1
Hard to say	8.3	12.9	25.0	14.9	14.2	12.9	13.3	14.5	12.0	15.9	11.5	16.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	18.7	14.0	18.5	16.4	18.1	18.9	15.1	20.0	17.8	12.7		
No	23.0	18.0	26.2	23.5	22.7	21.6	23.0	23.1	22.4	12.7		
It depends on the situation	45.4	47.7	41.5	43.5	46.1	46.7	45.5	44.6	46.9	53.5		
Hard to say	12.9	20.3	13.8	16.6	13.0	12.7	16.4	12.3	12.9	21.1		
Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	22.9	18.4	7.4	12.7	18.4	17.2	15.9	17.5	19.8	16.0	20.1	13.8
No	46.8	53.3	62.5	65.7	54.4	51.2	55.8	54.1	56.6	58.0	51.2	60.4
It depends on the situation	20.1	11.2	11.1	8.9	10.4	15.3	14.0	15.4	11.1	8.6	14.7	9.8
Hard to say	10.2	17.1	19.0	12.7	16.8	16.3	14.3	13.0	12.5	17.5	14.1	16.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	17.9	12.2	20.9	18.6	15.9	17.3	14.5	17.3	18.7	22.5		
No	54.1	62.9	53.7	54.9	57.7	53.2	60.3	56.2	52.3	36.6		
It depends on the situation	13.1	9.0	4.5	10.6	12.9	14.0	6.6	12.9	15.5	21.1		
Hard to say	14.8	15.8	20.9	15.9	13.6	15.6	18.6	13.6	13.5	19.7		
Citizens who travel to Russia to earn a living												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	17.7	11.9	23.7	8.9	4.7	13.6	11.9	11.2	11.9	14.1	12.6	13.6
No	39.2	37.4	23.7	25.3	39.6	31.8	35.0	33.5	38.8	33.7	37.4	30.5
It depends on the situation	35.9	39.1	28.4	50.4	40.8	41.3	40.6	43.2	37.9	36.7	40.2	39.1
Hard to say	7.1	11.6	24.2	15.4	14.9	13.3	12.5	12.1	11.4	15.6	9.8	16.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	12.6	15.3	9.2	12.2	12.5	13.7	11.6	14.7	11.6	7.0		
No	36.2	22.1	35.4	38.2	33.9	32.6	33.4	34.1	36.1	29.6		
It depends on the situation	39.0	42.3	38.5	34.6	41.2	41.2	39.1	39.9	39.6	43.7		
Hard to say	12.2	20.3	16.9	15.0	12.4	12.5	15.9	11.3	12.7	19.7		

What do you need, above all, to feel proud of your country?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
It should be politically stable, economically developed and provide conditions for improving the standard of living of the citizens	68.6	66.4	70.2	84.4	57.9	69.7	68.2	66.8	69.6	70.9	68.5	70.3
It should have good defence capabilities, and its policy should be independent of external influences	19.4	23.6	18.1	9.1	16.8	19.9	19.4	18.4	18.4	16.7	21.0	15.3
It should command authority and respect internationally	7.8	7.0	5.6	4.0	15.5	8.0	7.4	10.6	6.8	6.7	6.5	9.6
Its culture, art and sports should be widely known and popular throughout the world	1.2	0.9	1.9	1.3	3.2	0.7	2.1	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.9
Hard to say	3.1	2.2	4.2	1.1	6.6	1.7	2.9	3.0	3.5	4.2	3.0	2.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
It should be politically stable, economically developed and provide conditions for improving the standard of living of the citizens	68.9	73.9	69.7	62.7	70.2	72.3	73.4	68.8	65.8	76.1		
It should have good defence capabilities, and its policy should be independent of external influences	19.9	10.4	15.2	21.9	18.7	16.5	14.4	17.8	24.5	12.7		
It should command authority and respect internationally	7.2	9.0	7.6	9.0	6.8	8.0	7.4	9.0	5.8	5.6		
Its culture, art and sports should be widely known and popular throughout the world	1.2	2.3	0.0	1.8	1.5	1.2	0.7	1.5	1.7	2.8		
Hard to say	2.8	4.5	7.6	4.6	2.8	2.1	4.1	2.9	2.2	2.8		

Do you believe...?
% of respondents



Do you believe...?
% of respondents

(continued)

That Ukraine will overcome the current problems and difficulties and become a wealthy and prosperous state

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	71.4	60.1	36.6	47.4	52.4	63.1	56.4	56.8	56.9	50.6	64.7	45.9
No	13.2	19.4	25.5	32.3	23.8	18.0	20.5	23.9	18.2	27.4	15.8	30.1
Hard to say	15.4	20.5	38.0	20.2	23.8	18.9	23.1	19.3	24.9	22.1	19.5	24.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	59.4	39.2	53.0	48.8	57.7	59.8	46.5	59.5	58.1	69.0		
No	18.9	38.7	21.2	25.6	22.7	19.1	29.3	22.1	17.4	11.3		
Hard to say	21.7	22.1	25.8	25.6	19.5	21.1	24.2	18.3	24.5	19.7		

In a future with a decent life in Ukraine for your children and grandchildren

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	71.2	56.9	42.6	41.9	52.1	59.1	57.0	56.6	57.1	47.3	63.4	44.1
No	11.3	20.9	27.3	31.4	22.4	16.8	19.6	22.9	19.6	27.9	16.9	28.5
Hard to say	17.5	22.2	30.1	26.8	25.6	24.1	23.3	20.5	23.4	24.7	19.7	27.4
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	57.4	38.7	52.3	50.0	54.0	59.0	44.2	55.2	60.8	77.5		
No	20.2	32.4	21.5	23.3	22.6	19.9	29.8	22.9	14.2	12.7		
Hard to say	22.4	28.8	26.2	26.7	23.4	21.1	26.0	21.8	25.0	9.9		

In your own prospects for a decent life in Ukraine

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	50.9	42.8	29.2	27.4	35.0	50.5	47.2	37.5	38.3	25.6	46.8	29.4
No	33.2	35.0	38.0	51.3	40.1	26.0	30.5	39.3	38.9	54.3	34.9	43.4
Hard to say	15.9	22.2	32.9	21.2	24.9	23.5	22.3	23.3	22.8	20.1	18.3	27.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	41.9	23.0	27.7	30.9	39.7	44.2	26.5	38.7	47.2	67.1		
No	36.2	55.4	47.7	47.7	39.5	32.0	53.6	40.0	27.4	15.7		
Hard to say	21.9	21.6	24.6	21.4	20.8	23.9	19.9	21.3	25.4	17.1		

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents

At present, Ukrainian military personnel are the only guarantor of security for the citizens of Ukraine, and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state

71.6 19.7 8.7

If not for the self-sacrifice of CTO participants, mobilised and voluntary military personnel and volunteers, Ukraine would not exist today

70.6 18.3 11.1

□ Agree* ■ Disagree** ■ Hard to say

2016

At present, Ukrainian military personnel are the only guarantor of security for the citizens of Ukraine, and of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree*	86.1	77.5	75.0	48.1	64.8	75.7	69.3	69.1	75.4	69.1	80.8	59.0
Disagree**	10.4	14.6	12.5	41.9	22.2	16.7	21.1	22.7	18.4	19.9	13.7	28.4
Hard to say	3.5	7.9	12.5	10.0	13.0	7.6	9.6	8.2	6.2	11.0	5.6	12.6

	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree*	74.8	49.1	77.0	73.2	72.4	69.7	66.8	73.7	74.0	68.1
Disagree**	17.0	38.3	13.9	16.6	19.3	22.4	19.9	20.8	17.6	19.5
Hard to say	8.2	12.6	9.1	10.2	8.3	7.9	13.3	5.5	8.4	12.4


If not for the self-sacrifice of CTO participants, mobilised and voluntary military personnel and volunteers, Ukraine would not exist today

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree*	89.3	75.4	72.0	44.9	64.4	75.7	67.9	68.2	72.9	68.4	79.6	58.4
Disagree**	5.9	14.1	13.5	40.1	22.1	14.9	19.4	20.9	17.6	19.2	12.6	27.0
Hard to say	4.8	10.5	14.5	15.0	13.5	9.4	12.7	10.9	9.5	12.4	7.8	14.6

	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Agree*	74.2	47.1	72.7	73.4	71.2	68.2	63.7	73.6	70.7	74.3
Disagree**	15.4	39.0	15.2	11.6	19.0	21.9	21.1	18.7	17.2	7.1
Hard to say	10.4	13.9	12.1	15.0	9.8	9.9	15.2	7.7	12.1	18.6


* Total of answers "agree" and "tend to agree".

** Total of answers "disagree" and "tend to disagree".

What do you consider your native language?
 % of respondents


	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Ukrainian	73.3	67.4	69.3	67.8	66.6	98.6	30.3	78.7	9.9
Russian	22.6	26.8	27.1	27.6	30.0	0.9	63.6	18.4	89.6
Other	1.2	1.3	0.9	3.3	1.7	0.3	2.3	0.7	0.5
Hard to say	2.9	4.5	2.7	1.4	1.7	0.3	3.8	2.3	0.0


	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Ukrainian	71.2	68.3	71.4	66.3	62.6	71.8	69.4	78.9
Russian	24.2	26.0	26.0	28.9	34.8	24.0	25.9	16.9
Other	0.0	3.2	0.6	1.8	1.3	1.9	2.1	0.0
Hard to say	4.5	2.5	2.0	3.0	1.3	2.4	2.6	4.2

Which language do you mainly speak at home?
 % of respondents


	REGIONS					AGE				
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more
Ukrainian	95.0	74.4	33.5	28.8	7.6	57.5	50.7	54.4	56.8	56.9
Russian	3.8	21.8	60.5	67.2	90.5	40.8	44.0	43.8	40.5	38.7
Other	0.7	0.7	1.4	3.5	1.3	0.2	2.4	0.6	1.6	1.9
Hard to say	0.5	3.1	4.7	0.5	0.6	1.5	2.9	1.2	1.1	2.5

	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Ukrainian	63.2	9.0	66.7	61.2	58.8	47.5	52.8	59.4	52.1	56.3
Russian	34.0	90.1	27.3	35.6	37.7	49.9	42.8	37.8	45.8	39.4
Other	1.3	0.5	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.2	2.4	1.3	0.9	0.0
Hard to say	1.5	0.5	4.5	1.6	2.2	1.4	2.0	1.4	1.1	4.2


What is the strongest determining factor in the choice of the language you speak?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
I have been speaking this language from childhood	49.5	37.1	38.1	41.1	41.5	41.7	41.0	39.6	42.7	41.3	43.4	38.8
It is the language of the nation to which I belong	19.2	19.0	11.9	5.9	11.1	14.1	13.8	12.7	16.0	15.9	18.1	9.6
It is the most common language in the city (village) where I live and most residents speak it	3.6	10.9	21.6	20.7	9.8	10.7	13.6	12.7	10.3	13.3	7.6	17.3
It is the language spoken in my family	3.6	10.0	9.2	13.7	7.3	7.8	7.7	7.6	9.8	10.2	7.8	10.5
It is the language of my country and it is my obligation	10.4	4.6	2.8	5.9	6.3	5.3	8.8	11.2	3.8	3.6	7.3	4.8
It is the language of the country I consider my historical homeland	5.5	5.5	1.8	2.7	10.4	6.3	4.3	5.4	5.7	5.1	5.5	5.6
It was the language that I used for lessons in school	1.9	7.1	4.1	3.8	5.1	7.0	4.3	4.5	4.6	3.6	4.3	5.5
I can get the most information in this language by reading books, newspapers, magazines, watching TV, etc.	1.4	1.2	2.3	1.1	2.5	1.5	0.8	1.2	2.2	1.7	1.1	1.9
It is the language in which I can become better	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.8	1.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.8
It is the language in which I am better understood at work, in public institutions, shops and markets	0.7	0.4	1.8	1.6	0.0	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.0
It is the language spoken at my workplace	0.0	0.7	1.8	0.5	0.6	1.5	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	1.1
It is the language most useful for my profession	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1
Other	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Hard to say	3.8	1.7	4.6	1.3	3.5	1.7	2.7	2.1	3.5	3.2	2.6	2.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
I have been speaking this language from childhood	41.2	43.9	40.9	43.2	41.4	40.1	46.3	40.6	40.9	34.7		
It is the language of the nation to which I belong	15.2	11.7	13.6	15.0	14.8	14.4	12.2	15.4	14.6	16.7		
It is the most common language in the city (village) where I live and most residents speak it	11.9	13.0	10.6	10.9	13.8	11.4	14.0	13.0	10.3	6.9		
It is the language spoken in my family	8.6	9.0	7.6	11.3	8.8	7.4	8.5	9.1	8.4	6.9		
It is the language of my country and it is my obligation	6.8	1.3	7.6	3.0	5.9	8.2	3.9	5.2	9.3	6.9		
It is the language of the country I consider my historical homeland	4.7	9.0	4.5	4.2	4.6	6.8	4.4	5.3	4.7	9.7		
It was the language that I used for lessons in school	5.2	2.2	7.6	6.0	4.1	4.5	4.4	5.3	4.5	2.8		
I can get the most information in this language by reading books, newspapers, magazines, watching TV, etc.	1.3	2.7	0.0	0.9	1.2	2.3	0.9	1.2	2.4	4.2		
It is the language in which I can become better	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.6	0.8	0.4	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.0		
It is the language in which I am better understood at work, in public institutions, shops and markets	0.7	0.9	1.5	0.2	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.4		
It is the language spoken at my workplace	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.0		
It is the language most useful for my profession	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0		
Other	0.2	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.0		
Hard to say	2.5	4.0	4.5	2.5	3.1	2.1	2.8	2.2	2.1	9.7		

Do you feel the need to improve your Ukrainian language proficiency?
% of respondents




	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Yes	26.9	26.1	21.8	18.7	16.0	22.0	21.1	22.1	18.9
No	63.6	64.4	71.9	69.4	74.7	69.2	69.5	68.8	70.7
Hard to say	9.5	9.6	6.3	11.9	9.3	8.8	9.4	9.1	10.4

	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	16.7	19.1	19.8	25.5	19.0	22.7	20.7	26.8
No	74.2	69.2	71.0	66.3	70.2	69.6	69.3	53.5
Hard to say	9.1	11.7	9.2	8.2	10.7	7.7	9.9	19.7

If you were offered the following opportunities to improve your Ukrainian language proficiency, which would you use?*


% of those who feel the need to improve their Ukrainian language proficiency



2016

* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.


Which approach to language policy do you think is correct?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions. In everyday life (in and out of the family) every citizen may communicate in any language	48.8	42.2	26.0	48.9	32.9	43.0	40.4	44.4	40.1	41.3	49.1	32.5
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication. Every citizen may communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life (in and out of the family)	16.8	28.7	20.9	20.7	10.8	24.0	21.0	22.4	20.9	18.1	22.1	19.8
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions and in everyday life (outside the family). Every citizen may communicate in any language within his or her family	24.9	12.8	19.5	9.1	11.1	14.1	15.7	15.4	17.3	13.5	16.6	13.2
Knowledge of the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication is not obligatory for citizens. Every citizen may communicate in any language	2.1	7.3	18.6	12.1	27.5	10.9	12.0	9.7	11.1	12.9	3.8	21.0
None of these approaches is correct	2.1	2.9	5.6	6.7	10.4	3.9	5.9	3.0	4.1	6.8	3.0	7.6
Other	0.2	0.9	0.5	0.3	1.3	0.2	1.6	0.0	0.3	1.1	0.4	0.7
Hard to say	5.0	5.2	8.8	2.2	6.0	3.9	3.5	5.1	6.2	6.3	5.0	5.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions. In everyday life (in and out of the family) every citizen may communicate in any language	44.4	23.9	50.7	40.0	38.0	46.0	45.4	41.4	37.9	45.7		
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication. Every citizen may communicate in any language in official institutions and in everyday life (in and out of the family)	22.3	14.0	14.9	17.3	24.8	20.1	16.4	21.9	24.6	20.0		
Every citizen of Ukraine must be able to speak the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and use it in official institutions and in everyday life (outside the family). Every citizen may communicate in any language within his or her family	15.1	15.3	11.9	15.0	15.9	14.7	12.2	14.9	17.0	18.6		
Knowledge of the Ukrainian language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication is not obligatory for citizens. Every citizen may communicate in any language	8.4	29.7	4.5	16.4	10.4	10.0	14.4	11.1	10.3	8.6		
None of these approaches is correct	4.2	10.8	7.5	3.9	5.1	4.9	5.0	5.2	4.1	4.3		
Other	0.6	0.5	1.5	1.2	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.5	1.3	0.0		
Hard to say	5.0	5.9	9.0	6.2	5.4	3.8	6.3	4.8	4.9	2.9		

Why does a considerable part of Ukrainian citizens have a poor command of the official language?*
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
They just do not want to learn the language	49.9	32.1	21.4	45.6	30.1	37.6	37.5	33.7	38.3	36.7	40.9	31.3
The state has not created proper conditions for citizens to learn the state language, if they did not have the opportunity to study it as part of their education	30.5	31.3	24.7	25.3	33.2	29.1	27.9	31.1	31.0	29.4	32.0	26.3
There are many professional fields in which you can work and have a career without a command of the state language	31.2	35.5	26.4	24.8	18.0	32.5	27.9	29.6	27.6	27.2	30.4	25.6
As before, Russian remains the language of cross-national communication, so command of the state language is not a compelling need for citizens	23.2	23.6	40.9	34.2	33.9	28.9	29.2	28.7	29.5	28.5	21.3	37.9
Much information comes to citizens in other languages	32.7	21.0	24.5	15.6	21.8	22.8	21.8	28.4	21.5	21.5	25.1	19.5
The Ukrainian education system does not ensure that all students know the state language at the same high level	16.5	19.0	18.1	18.3	31.6	19.7	21.0	22.0	19.0	20.0	19.1	22.1
Other	2.1	1.3	0.0	2.7	0.6	1.5	1.3	2.1	0.8	1.7	1.9	1.1
Hard to say	3.8	6.2	12.5	3.2	7.9	4.6	6.9	4.8	7.1	6.7	4.6	8.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
They just do not want to learn the language	37.4	31.4	40.9	38.0	35.2	37.4	36.5	37.2	36.4	40.8		
The state has not created proper conditions for citizens to learn the state language, if they did not have the opportunity to study it as part of their education	29.7	26.1	27.7	30.4	32.3	26.6	33.0	29.0	28.2	29.6		
There are many professional fields in which you can work and have a career without a command of the state language	30.1	19.8	16.7	29.5	28.5	29.9	23.2	29.7	32.0	34.3		
As before, Russian remains the language of cross-national communication, so command of the state language is not a compelling need for citizens	28.3	32.0	16.9	27.2	28.9	31.2	26.4	30.5	30.1	21.1		
Much information comes to citizens in other languages	23.7	16.7	13.6	21.9	21.5	26.1	18.8	24.2	23.9	30.0		
The Ukrainian education system does not ensure that all students know the state language at the same high level	20.4	16.7	22.7	19.4	19.7	21.3	20.8	18.9	23.0	19.7		
Other	1.6	0.4	1.5	1.4	2.0	0.8	2.0	1.3	1.5	0.0		
Hard to say	5.9	8.1	10.6	6.5	5.6	5.9	6.1	5.5	5.8	9.9		


* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents


Communication in the Ukrainian state language is an expression of respect for myself as a citizen of Ukraine and for my country, Ukraine



Citizens of all nationalities must know the state language of a country where the titular nation constitutes the vast majority of citizens



The Ukrainian language, which was suppressed for many years, requires support from the state, regardless of how this affects the position of other languages



The state has the right within its territory to restrict the areas in which languages other than the state language are used, like in France, for example



☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Hard to say

2016

Communication in the Ukrainian state language is an expression of respect for myself as a citizen of Ukraine and for my country, Ukraine

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	94.6	78.4	56.9	64.7	58.0	75.2	76.6	73.2	73.7	71.3	87.5	56.2
No	1.9	10.6	16.2	20.2	19.6	11.7	11.2	12.7	12.7	14.0	6.5	21.0
Hard to say	3.5	11.0	26.9	15.1	22.4	13.1	12.2	14.2	13.6	14.6	5.9	22.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	78.6	42.8	78.5	69.7	75.1	74.8	71.3	74.2	74.2	83.1		
No	10.0	30.2	12.3	13.6	13.6	11.0	14.9	12.4	11.6	8.5		
Hard to say	11.4	27.0	9.2	16.8	11.4	14.3	13.8	13.4	14.2	8.5		

Citizens of all nationalities must know the state language of a country where the titular nation constitutes the vast majority of citizens

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	87.0	70.7	59.3	63.6	53.2	67.9	68.4	71.6	68.6	68.3	79.0	56.4
No	5.4	13.6	14.4	18.9	25.0	14.8	14.3	14.5	14.4	15.4	9.8	21.3
Hard to say	7.6	15.7	26.4	17.5	21.8	17.3	17.2	13.9	17.1	16.3	11.2	22.4
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	72.3	46.6	72.3	65.0	67.9	72.2	64.8	68.7	72.7	71.4		
No	12.3	31.4	10.8	14.1	17.1	12.8	16.8	15.0	12.7	15.7		
Hard to say	15.4	22.0	16.9	21.0	15.0	15.1	18.3	16.2	14.6	12.9		

Do you agree with the following statements?

% of respondents

(continued)

The Ukrainian language, which was suppressed for many years, requires support from the state, regardless of how this affects the position of other languages

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	86.8	63.8	42.3	36.1	46.8	58.7	61.8	57.7	61.4	54.8	72.3	40.6
No	4.7	13.2	20.5	39.1	24.4	15.5	18.3	23.3	16.8	19.9	10.1	29.8
Hard to say	8.5	23.0	37.2	24.8	28.8	25.7	19.9	19.0	21.7	25.2	17.6	29.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We barely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	63.3	26.6	53.0	53.2	60.1	60.6	47.2	60.9	63.9	66.2		
No	15.7	39.2	22.7	17.3	18.8	18.9	25.1	17.2	17.2	9.9		
Hard to say	21.0	34.2	24.2	29.5	21.1	20.4	27.7	21.8	18.9	23.9		

The state has the right within its territory to restrict the areas in which languages other than the state language are used, like in France, for example

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	50.6	37.4	18.1	17.8	24.7	33.3	35.0	34.1	33.2	28.7	43.4	19.2
No	31.7	37.6	50.2	63.6	52.8	43.9	44.0	45.6	44.0	46.2	34.1	58.3
Hard to say	17.7	25.0	31.6	18.6	22.5	22.8	21.0	20.2	22.8	25.1	22.5	22.5
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	35.3	15.8	24.2	31.8	32.3	34.0	27.8	34.0	34.0	32.4		
No	41.7	63.1	37.9	44.0	45.7	44.9	46.8	43.8	47.6	29.6		
Hard to say	23.0	21.2	37.9	24.2	22.0	21.1	25.4	22.1	18.5	38.0		

Which of the following approaches is the most appropriate?

% of respondents



2016

Which of the following approaches is the most appropriate?
% of respondents

(continued)

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian language and culture, and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	55.5	57.0	29.8	22.6	21.2	42.1	39.8	42.3	44.4	41.0	54.9	24.6
The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine	31.0	21.2	30.2	48.5	31.0	27.3	32.9	34.4	31.4	29.3	27.3	35.3
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Russian languages and cultures (as the languages and cultures of the two largest ethnic groups of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	3.6	6.8	18.1	19.4	29.7	12.9	15.6	12.4	10.6	14.3	5.1	23.8
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages and cultures (the languages and cultures of indigenous peoples of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	5.2	3.6	3.7	1.3	3.8	5.1	3.4	3.3	1.9	3.6	4.7	2.2
None of these approaches is correct	0.9	4.1	3.7	5.4	8.9	5.6	2.4	3.0	5.1	5.1	2.7	6.7
Hard to say	3.8	7.3	14.4	2.7	5.4	7.1	5.8	4.5	6.5	6.7	5.3	7.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian language and culture, and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	46.2	14.0	36.9	37.9	45.0	41.2	34.9	43.9	44.3	47.9		
The state should contribute equally to the development of the languages and cultures of all nationalities living in Ukraine	29.7	34.7	36.9	32.1	28.0	32.7	34.3	31.2	29.3	14.1		
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Russian languages and cultures (as the languages and cultures of the two largest ethnic groups of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	10.9	31.1	6.2	13.6	12.4	14.4	15.1	11.3	15.0	16.9		
The state should, above all, promote Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages and cultures (the languages and cultures of indigenous peoples of Ukraine), and only after that the languages and cultures of other nationalities living in Ukraine	3.5	5.0	6.2	4.6	3.7	2.5	4.4	3.2	2.4	5.6		
None of these approaches is correct	3.7	7.7	3.1	4.4	4.2	4.8	4.6	4.9	3.0	5.6		
Hard to say	6.0	7.7	10.8	7.4	6.6	4.4	6.8	5.5	6.0	9.9		


Which approach is the most effective for the social and political unity of Ukraine?
% of respondents




2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Preservation of cultural traditions, encouraging use of their national languages by communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities	51.5	42.9	43.7	27.2	37.5	42.1	39.4	45.3	39.8	39.7	43.2	38.6
Gradual convergence of cultural traditions of communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities with Ukrainian ethnic culture, encouraging them to spread the use of the Ukrainian language and the development of modern Ukrainian culture on this basis	35.2	36.4	20.9	51.8	29.3	37.7	33.3	35.3	39.8	34.9	39.4	32.5
None of these approaches is correct	3.8	6.5	8.8	11.9	18.9	8.3	12.4	6.0	7.0	10.8	5.0	13.8
Other	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.2
Hard to say	9.0	13.6	26.5	9.2	13.6	11.4	14.0	12.7	13.3	14.4	11.8	14.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Preservation of cultural traditions, encouraging use of their national languages by communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities	42.4	32.4	40.3	43.0	41.0	40.3	37.3	43.7	41.4	37.1		
Gradual convergence of cultural traditions of communities of Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities with Ukrainian ethnic culture, encouraging them to spread the use of the Ukrainian language and the development of modern Ukrainian culture on this basis	37.0	32.0	32.8	33.6	36.1	38.3	38.9	35.9	34.1	35.7		
None of these approaches is correct	7.4	18.9	10.4	8.5	9.2	9.2	9.8	9.6	7.5	7.1		
Other	0.4	0.0	1.5	0.2	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.0		
Hard to say	12.8	16.7	14.9	14.7	13.7	11.4	14.0	10.2	16.4	20.0		

What do you consider your ethnic nationality? % of respondents




On what grounds should a person's nationality be determined? % of respondents



Should the nationality be indicated in a Ukrainian passport?


% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	52.7	39.4	25.6	29.6	29.7	34.2	35.8	38.9	38.3	39.5	47.2	24.6
No	25.5	23.9	20.5	29.3	33.8	26.9	26.8	28.9	31.0	21.1	23.5	30.3
Indifferent	15.4	29.3	42.8	34.9	28.1	30.6	31.6	25.3	24.7	30.0	23.1	36.0
Hard to say	6.4	7.4	11.2	6.2	8.5	8.3	5.8	6.9	6.0	9.5	6.2	9.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	40.1	20.7	47.0	36.4	39.1	35.3	38.9	35.3	39.4	35.7		
No	25.2	33.8	18.2	25.6	25.5	28.8	24.5	27.9	25.6	27.1		
Indifferent	27.7	34.7	27.3	29.5	27.5	29.5	28.4	29.8	27.3	28.6		
Hard to sav	7.0	10.8	7.6	8.5	7.9	6.4	8.1	7.0	7.7	8.6		

Some people say that it is better for a country, if different racial and ethnic groups retain their special customs and traditions. Others say it is better, if these groups adapt and blend with the majority of citizens. Which of these views is the closest to yours?

% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
When different racial and ethnic groups retain their own special customs and traditions	56.0	39.8	42.8	48.7	45.3	46.4	47.3	46.2	45.3	45.2	45.2	47.3
When these groups adapt and blend with the majority of citizens	27.2	30.0	27.9	35.5	26.3	32.5	28.7	32.3	32.0	24.5	31.5	27.0
Hard to say	16.8	30.2	29.3	15.9	28.5	21.1	23.9	21.5	22.8	30.2	23.3	25.7
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
When different racial and ethnic groups retain their own special customs and traditions	45.8	45.0	36.4	45.4	45.3	48.1	45.9	46.9	46.4	41.4		
When these groups adapt and blend with the majority of citizens	30.4	25.7	31.8	27.9	29.0	31.1	30.6	30.8	26.0	30.0		
Hard to say	23.8	29.3	31.8	26.7	25.7	20.7	23.6	22.3	27.7	28.6		


Do you agree with the following statements? % of respondents

2016


The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens strengthen the country's position in the world



The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens are necessary for Ukraine to remain united



The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to intolerance



The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to negative attitudes towards national minorities



The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to negative attitudes towards immigrants


☐ Agree ☒ Disagree ☐ Hard to say

The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens strengthen the country's position in the world

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree	90.5	77.5	61.1	66.3	57.7	74.5	74.8	72.8	75.6	70.2	85.8	56.7
Disagree	4.5	11.6	13.9	20.8	19.2	13.1	10.6	14.5	11.7	15.4	7.0	22.0
Hard to say	5.0	10.9	25.0	12.9	23.0	12.4	14.6	12.7	12.7	14.4	7.3	21.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Agree	77.3	48.2	78.5	66.1	77.3	73.2	70.5	74.9	72.5	81.7		
Disagree	10.7	29.3	9.2	14.7	12.0	14.0	14.0	12.8	14.0	4.2		
Hard to say	12.0	22.5	12.3	19.1	10.7	12.8	15.5	12.3	13.5	14.1		

The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens are necessary for Ukraine to remain united

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree	90.3	75.8	66.2	68.7	54.7	74.5	74.5	73.7	72.4	71.5	83.7	59.5
Disagree	3.8	13.6	13.4	15.4	15.5	13.8	10.6	13.9	12.2	11.0	8.7	17.2
Hard to say	5.9	10.6	20.4	15.9	29.7	11.7	14.9	12.4	15.4	17.5	7.6	23.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Agree	77.6	45.5	78.8	66.8	75.6	74.1	72.5	73.5	74.4	74.6		
Disagree	10.1	26.6	7.6	14.3	11.5	12.2	10.9	13.3	12.1	7.0		
Hard to say	12.2	27.9	13.6	18.9	12.9	13.7	16.6	13.2	13.5	18.3		

Do you agree with the following statements?
% of respondents

(continued)

The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to intolerance

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree	21.3	25.5	25.0	23.7	16.8	22.6	22.8	23.9	20.4	24.3	20.8	25.6
Disagree	62.4	52.2	38.4	43.9	48.7	52.9	49.1	50.5	56.8	46.4	58.7	41.6
Hard to say	16.3	22.3	36.6	32.3	34.5	24.5	28.1	25.7	22.8	29.3	20.5	32.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Agree	21.7	29.7	21.5	21.9	22.7	23.7	21.2	23.6	22.6	26.8		
Disagree	53.1	34.7	46.2	47.5	52.7	51.4	50.1	50.8	53.6	42.3		
Hard to say	25.2	35.6	32.3	30.6	24.6	24.9	28.7	25.7	23.7	31.0		







The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to negative attitudes towards national minorities

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree	11.1	17.6	26.9	22.1	17.1	13.6	17.2	18.1	16.5	22.8	13.9	24.1
Disagree	65.7	61.7	42.6	48.0	50.6	60.3	56.5	59.6	60.2	48.0	64.9	44.3
Hard to say	23.2	20.8	30.6	29.9	32.3	26.0	26.3	22.3	23.3	29.2	21.2	31.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Agree	16.3	29.3	12.1	16.6	19.9	17.1	19.2	19.1	16.7	9.9		
Disagree	58.4	41.4	60.6	51.8	56.3	58.7	52.2	58.4	56.2	59.2		
Hard to say	25.4	29.3	27.3	31.6	23.8	24.1	28.6	22.5	27.2	31.0		

The strong patriotic feelings of Ukrainian citizens lead to negative attitudes towards immigrants

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Agree	15.8	18.1	17.6	20.8	16.7	15.8	17.8	15.4	17.6	21.4	16.6	20.1
Disagree	64.3	61.9	49.1	52.8	44.8	59.0	57.3	61.9	59.6	49.0	64.0	46.6
Hard to say	19.9	20.0	33.3	26.4	38.5	25.2	24.9	22.7	22.8	29.6	19.4	33.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Agree	16.6	27.0	16.9	19.1	17.4	17.7	18.3	19.4	15.9	16.7		
Disagree	59.1	38.7	55.4	50.2	59.0	58.3	52.6	57.9	59.4	56.9		
Hard to say	24.3	34.2	27.7	30.6	23.7	24.0	29.0	22.7	24.7	26.4		

Which of the following will divide
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					NATIONALITY	
		West 	Centre 	South 	East 	Donbas 	Ukrainians	Russians
Federalisation of Ukraine	33.3	48.7	37.2	24.2	14.0	32.8	34.2	22.1
Joining a defence alliance with Russia	31.8	50.4	37.7	14.4	10.8	30.7	34.0	14.4
Moving towards NATO membership	31.1	10.6	30.8	33.3	46.1	39.4	28.9	45.5
Refusal to return Crimea, consent to grant special status to the occupied territories of Donbas	30.6	32.4	32.9	28.7	20.5	36.3	32.0	20.7
The Soviet past, Soviet history and cultural heritage	21.8	36.5	19.9	13.4	8.4	27.8	22.8	13.1
Improving the status of the Russian language in Ukraine (as a second state language or official language in certain regions)	19.7	33.4	19.9	11.6	6.5	22.1	21.4	9.0
Restoration of good relations with Russia	16.3	20.8	18.4	13.5	3.0	23.1	17.8	7.2
Cessation of war with Russia under any conditions	15.8	11.8	20.3	11.6	7.5	23.7	15.9	11.7
Implementation of policies aimed at European integration and the EU membership	14.9	5.5	12.8	20.8	19.4	22.8	12.9	28.4
The history of Ukraine without Soviet and Russian interpretations, formation of historical memory on purely Ukrainian grounds	11.4	9.0	6.8	16.7	22.1	8.5	10.7	17.1
Non-bloc status of Ukraine	7.6	7.1	10.9	4.6	3.2	8.2	7.6	4.5
Liberation of the occupied Ukrainian territories by force and achievement of peace through negotiations with Russia on terms set by Ukraine	7.4	3.1	5.7	10.2	8.4	14.2	6.3	14.3
Extension of the use of Ukrainian language	5.4	0.9	3.6	7.9	6.5	11.7	4.2	11.3
Return of Crimea and Donbas	4.9	2.8	8.6	3.2	3.0	3.2	4.7	6.8
Promotion of the development of national minorities culture	4.7	4.3	5.4	2.3	6.2	3.8	4.8	2.7
A charismatic leader coming to power	3.5	2.6	5.4	0.9	1.9	4.4	3.7	2.3
A change of government in Ukraine, coming to power of honest, professional, uncorrupt people	2.8	1.9	4.2	1.9	2.2	2.5	3.2	0.9
A more equitable distribution of public wealth, reduced gap between rich and poor citizens	2.2	2.1	3.8	1.4	0.5	1.3	2.4	0.9
Overcoming the existing socio-economic problems, improvement of the welfare of the majority of citizens	1.7	1.9	3.2	1.4	0.3	0.0	1.9	0.5
Popularisation of Ukrainian culture	1.6	1.7	0.7	0.9	3.0	2.5	1.3	5.0
Overcoming corruption and bringing corrupt officials to justice	1.2	1.4	2.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.3	0.5
Increased public participation in solving important social problems at the national and regional levels	1.0	0.5	1.7	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.9	2.3
Other	1.0	1.2	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.5
Nothing	3.6	1.4	1.5	6.9	6.2	5.7	3.1	6.8
Hard to say	12.7	8.3	11.6	21.3	21.6	5.1	13.0	10.4







* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.



the citizens of Ukraine?*

AGE					LANGUAGE		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
31.6	31.9	36.3	41.5	27.9	36.0	29.9	28.8	27.0	32.6	38.1	23.6	34.9	39.3	35.2
33.5	35.8	32.6	31.8	27.1	38.2	23.7	25.8	25.3	31.3	36.8	23.2	33.4	35.4	36.6
26.9	31.3	31.1	31.3	33.8	23.6	40.6	34.8	30.2	30.1	32.4	35.4	30.6	29.3	23.9
31.1	30.2	34.9	28.5	29.2	31.8	28.5	37.9	23.5	31.3	33.1	26.9	30.4	32.1	42.9
22.9	21.8	23.3	22.2	19.8	24.6	18.4	16.9	18.9	20.3	25.6	15.5	23.4	23.9	21.1
20.6	18.0	25.9	18.2	17.6	24.8	13.8	15.2	14.1	20.2	22.9	15.5	21.3	21.1	22.5
17.5	18.4	19.0	15.4	12.7	17.8	14.3	13.6	13.1	15.5	19.3	12.0	14.5	22.4	17.1
16.0	14.3	17.8	17.9	14.1	15.0	16.2	18.2	12.4	14.4	18.9	14.4	13.5	20.7	18.6
12.9	14.1	21.1	12.7	14.6	9.6	21.0	16.7	16.6	15.5	13.0	15.5	14.9	14.6	9.9
10.7	11.1	12.4	11.4	11.6	9.5	14.5	16.7	9.4	10.6	13.2	12.0	12.0	10.7	8.6
8.3	8.5	8.5	9.2	4.6	8.4	6.7	1.5	6.5	6.3	10.1	7.2	6.4	9.0	7.0
8.0	6.6	8.7	6.8	7.2	4.7	11.5	1.5	5.5	6.8	9.9	7.9	6.5	8.4	9.9
4.1	6.1	5.1	4.6	6.6	1.8	10.0	1.5	4.8	3.8	7.8	4.4	6.7	4.9	1.4
4.1	5.8	5.1	4.6	4.9	5.3	4.1	12.1	2.5	6.0	4.3	5.3	5.6	3.7	2.8
3.6	5.3	4.5	4.6	5.1	4.1	4.9	12.1	5.8	4.2	4.0	4.2	3.9	5.8	5.6
3.4	6.1	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.0	4.2	1.5	3.2	2.9	4.4	2.8	3.4	4.3	1.4
3.6	2.9	3.3	1.1	2.9	3.5	2.2	7.7	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.0	0.0
3.2	2.1	2.4	0.8	2.3	3.1	1.1	6.1	1.8	2.6	1.6	2.6	2.1	2.4	0.0
2.2	3.2	0.6	1.1	1.1	2.7	0.4	0.0	0.7	2.2	1.8	0.9	2.1	1.9	1.4
1.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	2.1	1.0	2.6	3.0	2.1	1.9	1.1	2.2	2.1	0.7	0.0
1.9	1.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	2.0	0.1	4.5	0.7	1.4	0.8	1.1	1.4	0.9	1.4
0.7	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.3	0.7	3.0	1.4	1.1	0.5	0.9	1.3	0.7	1.4
1.0	0.8	2.1	0.8	0.8	1.3	0.7	1.5	0.2	0.9	1.4	0.7	1.2	1.1	0.0
5.1	2.7	1.8	3.5	4.2	2.3	5.3	4.5	5.8	3.3	2.5	4.2	3.5	3.2	4.2
12.4	12.2	9.1	14.4	14.6	12.5	12.7	16.7	18.2	12.8	9.2	19.4	12.1	8.0	12.7

Which of the following will unite
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	REGIONS					NATIONALITY	
		West 	Centre 	South 	East 	Donbas 	Ukrainians	Russians
Overcoming the existing socio-economic problems, improvement of the welfare of the majority of citizens	66.5	64.8	66.2	57.4	81.2	58.4	66.7	62.6
Overcoming corruption and bringing corrupt officials to justice	65.9	67.4	67.5	50.9	73.3	61.8	66.1	59.2
A change of government in Ukraine, coming to power of honest, professional, uncorrupt people	50.6	52.5	45.3	51.4	62.5	45.3	50.5	49.5
A more equitable distribution of public wealth, reduced gap between rich and poor citizens	47.5	42.8	44.1	47.9	64.7	41.1	48.4	41.0
Increased public participation in solving important social problems at the national and regional levels	29.4	28.8	26.1	27.3	32.6	34.8	28.9	27.4
Return of Crimea and Donbas	26.3	26.7	33.7	22.8	14.0	26.8	28.6	9.5
Liberation of the occupied Ukrainian territories by force and achievement of peace through negotiations with Russia on terms set by Ukraine	22.5	26.5	26.4	19.4	13.7	21.2	24.0	12.6
Implementation of policies aimed at European integration and the EU membership	21.8	32.4	19.9	15.7	13.5	25.6	22.9	13.0
A charismatic leader coming to power	19.7	19.6	14.5	15.7	32.1	19.9	19.5	22.1
Popularisation of Ukrainian culture	19.6	25.8	24.4	12.1	7.8	19.3	21.3	7.2
Extension of the use of Ukrainian language	17.3	29.4	18.1	12.0	5.7	16.5	18.9	5.8
Cessation of war with Russia under any conditions	16.2	15.6	14.4	21.4	17.0	16.1	15.6	20.3
The history of Ukraine without Soviet and Russian interpretations, formation of historical memory on purely Ukrainian grounds	12.8	20.1	13.6	6.0	5.4	14.6	14.2	1.8
Moving towards NATO membership	11.8	15.1	11.9	9.3	5.1	16.8	12.6	4.5
Restoration of good relations with Russia	11.6	2.8	10.2	10.7	25.3	10.4	10.5	19.8
Non-bloc status of Ukraine	10.7	4.3	6.7	17.6	26.7	4.4	9.8	17.6
Promotion of the development of national minorities cultures	7.3	8.3	4.6	13.0	3.0	13.3	7.1	5.9
Improving the status of the Russian language in Ukraine (as a second state language or official language in certain regions)	4.7	0.7	2.8	9.7	7.5	7.3	3.4	12.1
The Soviet past, Soviet history and cultural heritage	4.3	0.7	3.3	8.8	10.5	0.6	3.4	9.9
Federalisation of Ukraine	2.7	1.2	0.9	4.6	3.5	6.3	1.6	10.4
Refusal to return Crimea, consent to grant special status to the occupied territories of Donbas	2.0	0.5	1.9	2.8	1.9	3.8	1.5	5.4
Joining a defence alliance with Russia	1.7	0.5	1.4	2.3	3.2	1.3	1.2	4.5
Other	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.5
Nothing	3.2	0.9	1.5	3.7	4.3	7.9	2.5	6.3
Hard to say	4.1	3.3	5.5	5.1	2.4	3.5	3.9	5.9


* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.



the citizens of Ukraine?*

AGE					LANGUAGE		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING			
18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases
67.0	63.4	66.6	66.7	68.1	66.4	66.1	60.6	58.5	67.3	70.6	64.3	67.6	66.2	70.4
63.6	66.3	68.6	67.1	64.7	66.3	64.8	63.6	62.2	64.6	69.5	67.6	64.3	65.4	76.1
49.5	49.9	51.7	53.1	49.8	49.9	51.5	40.9	47.5	51.9	51.9	46.0	53.9	51.4	43.7
46.0	47.7	49.2	46.6	48.1	44.4	51.1	43.9	41.9	47.3	51.2	47.5	49.7	44.3	47.9
30.6	27.6	35.0	30.9	25.0	25.9	33.2	33.8	24.2	27.5	34.0	24.5	28.4	32.7	45.1
27.2	23.9	29.3	25.5	26.2	28.5	23.3	21.2	21.7	27.1	28.5	23.8	24.2	29.7	37.1
21.6	22.3	23.9	23.9	21.7	25.7	19.1	21.2	16.8	23.1	25.5	19.0	24.8	23.0	18.3
26.2	25.2	19.0	24.4	15.9	23.2	20.6	9.2	13.9	21.0	28.4	14.7	21.9	26.0	28.2
18.9	16.7	23.3	21.4	19.4	19.7	20.1	20.0	19.9	18.0	21.4	21.0	22.1	15.5	21.1
19.5	17.8	21.1	20.3	19.4	22.9	15.1	15.2	13.1	19.3	23.9	13.5	22.6	17.8	23.9
15.8	16.2	18.4	21.1	16.0	22.7	10.3	12.1	13.1	18.3	19.3	12.9	18.3	18.7	16.9
14.1	13.8	16.9	17.1	18.4	15.3	17.9	21.2	17.7	15.3	15.8	18.6	16.1	15.0	12.7
13.4	12.7	13.6	13.0	11.8	15.4	9.5	12.1	8.5	15.3	12.9	6.6	14.0	15.7	14.1
12.2	11.4	14.5	12.7	9.5	12.6	11.2	10.8	7.6	10.6	15.5	10.7	10.5	13.6	14.1
8.3	10.6	12.4	13.0	13.3	8.8	15.6	10.6	9.4	12.0	12.5	16.2	11.6	8.2	7.0
9.2	9.3	13.6	10.8	11.0	7.8	14.8	12.1	10.8	9.7	11.4	12.7	11.2	8.6	9.9
7.1	7.4	7.6	7.9	6.8	6.8	7.8	4.5	3.9	6.4	10.6	4.6	8.4	7.7	9.9
3.9	3.7	5.7	4.6	5.3	2.4	7.9	7.7	3.5	5.0	4.8	5.9	4.6	4.7	1.4
2.7	3.5	3.3	4.3	6.5	2.7	6.3	7.7	3.2	4.3	4.5	7.4	4.4	2.4	0.0
1.0	2.9	3.9	1.6	3.6	1.2	4.9	3.0	2.1	2.3	3.3	3.7	2.2	2.8	0.0
2.7	1.9	2.7	0.8	2.1	1.3	2.8	0.0	1.6	1.8	2.6	1.1	2.4	2.1	0.0
0.5	1.6	1.5	2.2	2.3	1.3	2.2	3.0	1.8	1.4	1.6	2.2	1.9	1.1	0.0
0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.4	1.4
4.4	3.2	2.1	2.7	3.0	1.9	5.0	1.5	5.1	2.7	2.5	4.8	3.3	1.5	1.4
2.4	5.8	3.6	4.9	4.2	4.1	4.1	6.1	5.5	4.5	2.9	6.8	3.1	3.7	4.2


What is the most significant factor dividing the citizens of Ukraine?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Attitude towards the government and public policy	28.4	45.6	46.8	55.8	38.6	41.4	43.0	42.9	42.3	44.6	38.8	48.9
Attitude towards the war in the East of Ukraine	24.1	42.6	41.2	44.5	53.9	40.3	39.6	40.7	42.8	40.4	34.2	48.4
Attitude towards Russia	31.7	43.0	36.7	36.7	49.8	34.0	38.5	42.3	43.6	41.4	35.7	44.4
Different ideas of the prospects and directions for development	39.7	23.8	26.5	35.8	26.6	26.0	29.0	33.5	33.6	29.2	28.6	31.6
Attitude towards Europe and the US	10.2	23.9	30.6	41.8	40.2	23.5	28.4	29.8	30.6	26.8	19.5	38.3
Financial issues	30.6	33.8	25.6	22.6	16.8	26.0	28.9	31.1	31.4	22.8	30.0	24.6
Attitude towards the history of Ukraine	20.3	12.5	29.8	22.4	23.1	16.7	17.5	24.7	20.9	18.6	16.7	23.8
Russian language and culture	19.6	17.1	2.8	7.0	8.2	10.9	14.1	15.4	14.1	11.0	16.3	8.5
Religion	13.3	17.8	2.8	4.6	12.3	10.2	14.1	13.9	11.9	10.8	13.2	10.3
Ukrainian language and culture	6.4	6.2	1.9	6.2	7.0	4.1	6.4	7.2	8.2	4.7	5.8	6.4
Other	0.9	1.2	0.0	0.3	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.6	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.4
Hard to say	5.7	5.8	15.8	7.0	3.5	9.2	7.2	5.7	4.9	6.5	6.6	6.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Attitude towards the government and public policy	43.4	41.9	30.3	39.9	45.0	43.8	43.7	45.3	38.7	42.3		
Attitude towards the war in the East of Ukraine	39.9	46.2	27.3	36.4	40.7	44.4	40.0	40.6	41.7	38.0		
Attitude towards Russia	39.7	41.4	32.3	35.5	40.1	42.8	38.9	39.8	40.0	42.3		
Different ideas of the prospects and directions for development	30.1	26.0	22.7	28.8	29.4	32.2	25.6	30.2	34.2	28.2		
Attitude towards Europe and the US	26.1	36.0	29.2	22.4	28.8	29.4	29.7	26.8	27.7	21.1		
Financial issues	29.1	15.8	27.3	21.9	29.9	28.4	27.4	26.6	29.2	25.7		
Attitude towards the history of Ukraine	19.2	20.3	18.5	16.8	18.3	22.5	16.6	18.3	23.4	22.9		
Russian language and culture	13.4	8.1	18.5	9.9	12.0	15.1	13.6	12.1	12.9	16.9		
Religion	12.2	8.6	22.7	10.1	10.3	13.9	13.1	11.1	12.3	11.3		
Ukrainian language and culture	6.1	4.1	4.5	5.3	6.3	6.2	4.6	7.0	5.0	9.9		
Other	0.8	0.9	6.1	1.2	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.0		
Hard to say	6.3	9.0	12.1	10.6	5.2	5.5	8.1	5.5	7.1	10.0		

* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.

What can serve as a basis for uniting the residents of Ukraine?*
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Common vision of the future direction for development of the state	62.9	59.4	54.6	64.2	66.5	60.8	58.9	65.6	62.2	61.1	59.8	63.3
Common problems which the citizens of Ukraine are currently facing	54.8	57.8	64.4	68.5	50.9	57.2	58.4	53.5	61.2	61.8	57.9	59.5
Common history and common assessment of the events and personalities of the past	37.6	48.9	38.6	51.5	31.5	43.4	44.0	39.6	41.7	45.7	44.5	41.5
Common state language	29.8	24.9	11.6	21.3	14.6	20.9	23.4	23.5	21.5	22.2	27.7	14.4
Common enemy	29.6	21.0	13.9	19.4	22.7	21.1	21.8	22.7	19.8	24.0	25.6	16.9
Other	0.7	1.3	1.4	0.3	0.6	0.5	1.3	1.5	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.7
Hard to say	4.0	1.7	10.2	7.0	13.9	6.8	6.4	5.4	5.4	5.7	3.1	10.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Common vision of the future direction for development of the state	62.2	58.6	51.5	55.3	63.6	63.9	57.9	61.7	65.0	63.4		
Common problems which the citizens of Ukraine are currently facing	59.5	54.1	64.6	52.8	59.3	60.9	63.0	57.1	59.4	52.1		
Common history and common assessment of the events and personalities of the past	44.1	37.4	45.5	36.6	43.2	46.9	48.6	41.5	41.1	44.3		
Common state language	24.2	9.5	23.1	18.0	22.0	25.2	23.6	22.5	20.4	25.4		
Common enemy	23.5	11.7	33.3	18.0	21.4	24.0	24.3	20.5	23.4	15.5		
Other	0.8	1.4	3.0	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.7	4.2		
Hard to say	5.1	10.8	9.2	8.5	4.5	5.6	5.5	6.9	4.1	7.0		


* Respondents were asked to select three applicable answers.

With which statement regarding the history of Ukraine do you agree the most?
% of respondents




	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Ukraine has its own history that begins with the emergence of the first settlements of people on its territory and covers the periods when Ukrainian lands were a part of other state entities and the period of the existence of Ukraine as an independent state	86.8	68.7	40.7	30.2	47.6	64.8	57.8	58.9	64.8	51.8	73.6	40.5
The history of Ukraine is an integral part of the greater East Slavic people, just as the history of Russia and Belarus	6.6	21.2	42.1	63.6	45.7	27.2	32.4	32.0	28.2	38.1	18.5	50.1
Hard to say	6.6	10.1	17.1	6.2	6.6	8.0	9.8	9.1	7.0	10.1	7.9	9.5
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Ukraine has its own history that begins with the emergence of the first settlements of people on its territory and covers the periods when Ukrainian lands were a part of other state entities and the period of the existence of Ukraine as an independent state	63.4	30.9	51.5	55.1	60.2	61.3	50.0	61.2	62.8	66.2		
The history of Ukraine is an integral part of the greater East Slavic people, just as the history of Russia and Belarus	27.6	62.8	36.4	32.3	31.2	32.6	40.6	30.6	29.0	18.3		
Hard to say	9.0	6.3	12.1	12.7	8.6	6.0	9.4	8.2	8.2	15.5		

Do you want to restore the Soviet Union?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	2.4	13.2	14.0	17.8	19.6	3.4	5.6	10.3	14.7	25.8	8.3	19.3
Yes, but I understand that it is impossible under the current conditions	10.6	21.3	30.7	31.0	20.3	13.8	15.1	23.9	23.9	29.8	19.0	24.5
No	87.0	65.3	54.9	51.2	60.1	82.5	79.0	65.9	61.1	44.4	72.6	56.1
No answer	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	10.4	31.1	23.1	16.4	12.6	10.2	23.4	12.3	6.7	1.4		
Yes, but I understand that it is impossible under the current conditions	20.8	29.7	20.0	21.4	24.5	18.9	26.5	22.8	16.1	20.0		
No	68.8	38.7	55.4	62.2	62.8	70.8	49.9	64.8	77.0	78.6		
No answer	0.1	0.5	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0		

What circumstances lead to your sympathy to the Soviet Union?*
% of those who want to restore the Soviet Union




2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Certainty about the future	56.4	58.0	82.3	86.2	66.7	59.2	70.1	65.5	71.1	74.1	60.7	77.5
The high level of social security in Soviet times	43.6	63.0	72.9	72.4	54.8	51.4	46.2	61.1	69.0	69.9	59.5	66.2
The opportunity for free post-secondary education	36.4	42.0	50.0	74.6	77.0	53.5	52.6	59.3	57.0	59.2	44.3	69.2
The absence of unemployment	67.3	44.5	52.1	64.1	57.1	50.0	38.5	54.0	56.3	59.7	51.1	56.6
Adequate material standard of living	40.0	42.4	66.7	62.4	53.2	42.3	37.2	45.1	57.7	59.7	46.2	56.6
I was proud of being a part of a great state on a global scale in Soviet times	14.5	46.6	45.8	62.4	54.0	24.3	37.2	52.2	50.3	57.5	39.8	58.2
Stability and the absence of armed conflicts	25.5	29.8	52.1	69.1	46.0	33.8	37.2	42.5	52.8	48.8	33.8	55.2
Low crime rate	12.7	16.4	19.8	26.0	25.4	16.9	16.7	15.9	22.5	24.0	15.5	26.1
I was young then	1.8	11.8	12.5	19.9	10.3	7.1	6.4	10.6	12.7	16.8	12.1	13.2
Soviet communist ideology	1.8	5.0	7.4	12.1	9.5	2.9	2.6	7.1	5.6	11.6	2.0	13.2
Other	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0

	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION			FINANCIAL STANDING		
	Ukrainians	Russians	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult
Certainty about the future	69.5	71.3	67.7	68.4	75.5	71.5	68.2	73.0
The high level of social security in Soviet times	62.4	66.7	64.6	62.4	65.9	64.9	63.0	63.9
The opportunity for free post-secondary education	53.0	74.1	48.2	57.0	67.9	65.9	51.2	57.4
The absence of unemployment	54.0	54.4	53.0	54.6	57.1	60.1	49.7	56.6
Adequate material standard of living	51.2	58.5	43.3	55.3	55.2	57.0	51.6	45.1
I was proud of being a part of a great state on a global scale in Soviet times	45.6	61.5	47.0	49.8	50.5	52.6	45.8	56.6
Stability and the absence of armed conflicts	41.2	56.6	47.0	43.3	49.5	50.0	42.9	48.4
Low crime rate	18.8	25.7	18.3	19.6	24.2	25.0	17.4	23.8
I was young then	12.3	17.0	19.5	11.3	10.4	17.9	11.8	4.1
Soviet communist ideology	4.8	17.8	10.4	6.5	7.1	13.1	5.3	5.0
Other	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8

* Respondents were asked to select all applicable answers.


How would you describe the events in Ukraine in late 2013 - early 2014? % of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
The Revolution of Dignity	69.7	46.7	20.0	22.0	32.5	45.4	44.8	41.1	43.6	36.7	51.6	29.5
An anti-government coup	6.4	13.8	27.9	43.0	24.6	16.7	21.2	21.1	17.1	26.2	13.8	30.6
Forced change of government through not entirely legitimate	13.0	19.7	25.1	19.1	25.6	17.7	18.8	22.7	22.0	18.1	17.5	22.6
Hard to say	10.9	19.9	27.0	15.9	17.4	20.1	15.1	15.1	17.3	19.0	17.1	17.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
The Revolution of Dignity	45.3	21.2	35.4	36.1	43.1	44.7	33.4	42.2	46.6	57.7		
An anti-government coup	18.3	38.3	33.8	22.3	19.8	19.9	28.8	20.5	15.2	14.1		
Forced change of government through not entirely legitimate	19.0	24.3	7.7	20.0	19.4	20.6	18.3	19.3	22.3	18.3		
Hard to say	17.4	16.2	23.1	21.6	17.6	14.8	19.4	18.0	15.9	9.9		

Would you like to return to Ukraine as it was before 2014? % of respondents




2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	14.7	36.1	42.6	53.6	47.5	31.5	35.4	38.8	35.6	43.6	29.6	48.0
No**	74.2	49.8	29.2	31.8	45.5	54.9	49.0	48.8	49.4	43.2	57.2	38.0
Hard to say	11.1	14.1	28.2	14.6	7.0	13.6	15.6	12.4	15.0	13.2	13.2	14.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	34.4	56.7	47.0	43.0	35.7	34.8	45.5	36.6	33.5	28.2		
No**	51.2	34.2	37.9	43.2	49.5	52.6	38.3	50.2	53.9	53.6		
Hard to say	14.4	9.1	15.1	13.8	14.8	12.6	16.2	13.2	12.6	18.2		

* Total of responses "yes" and "probably yes".

** Total of responses "no" and "probably no".

How do you see the future of Ukraine?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country	52.5	37.0	22.2	24.8	37.3	41.3	34.2	38.1	40.1	30.7	43.3	28.2
Ukraine will be a country with an individual way of development (such as China)	24.1	22.8	22.7	21.3	13.9	23.1	25.7	19.3	21.7	18.2	24.1	17.2
Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West	4.5	6.7	12.5	9.2	14.9	8.7	8.8	8.8	4.9	10.6	5.1	13.5
Ukraine will forever stay an underdeveloped “third world” country with little influence	2.6	4.8	6.9	8.6	4.4	4.6	4.0	5.7	6.0	5.5	2.9	8.5
Ukraine will disappear as an independent state	1.9	1.7	2.3	6.2	0.6	1.7	2.9	2.4	2.4	3.0	1.3	3.7
Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of Russia	0.5	2.5	0.5	1.6	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.8	2.5	1.4	1.3
I am not interested in the future of this country	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.3	1.9	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8
Other	1.4	3.8	0.5	1.3	0.6	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.8	1.0
Hard to say	12.3	20.6	31.5	26.7	25.6	17.5	21.0	21.8	21.1	26.8	18.8	25.7
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic, influential European country	38.8	22.4	33.8	29.6	38.0	39.2	34.6	34.1	39.4	50.7		
Ukraine will be a country with an individual way of development (such as China)	22.4	13.0	16.9	22.9	19.9	22.7	12.5	22.6	26.9	26.8		
Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West	7.4	17.5	9.2	7.9	9.1	8.5	8.8	9.7	7.3	2.8		
Ukraine will forever stay an underdeveloped “third world” country with little influence	4.9	6.7	1.5	8.3	3.4	5.5	3.5	5.6	5.6	5.6		
Ukraine will disappear as an independent state	1.7	5.8	1.5	2.5	3.2	1.8	3.9	2.4	1.3	1.4		
Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of Russia	1.1	2.7	4.6	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.5	2.0	0.7	0.0		
I am not interested in the future of this country	0.5	1.3	1.5	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.4	1.0	0.2	0.0		
Other	2.2	0.9	1.5	2.8	2.3	1.1	2.2	2.8	0.7	0.0		
Hard to say	21.1	29.6	29.2	24.2	21.9	19.6	32.6	19.8	17.8	12.7		

Do you have the following opportunities? % of respondents

2016



* Total of responses "yes" and "probably yes".

** Total of responses "no" and "probably no".

☐ Yes*

☒ No**

☐ Hard to say

To engage in the national traditions of your people

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	97.6	90.2	82.9	93.5	77.9	90.6	90.2	90.4	88.9	88.4	94.3	83.9
No**	0.2	5.8	6.0	3.8	14.9	4.4	6.6	6.6	6.2	5.5	2.8	9.0
Hard to say	2.2	3.9	11.1	2.7	7.2	5.1	3.2	3.0	4.9	6.1	2.9	7.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	91.3	80.7	83.4	88.5	89.6	91.2	87.1	89.3	91.3	95.7		
No**	4.6	10.3	6.0	6.7	5.8	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.0	1.4		
Hard to say	4.1	9.0	10.6	4.8	4.6	3.7	7.4	4.6	2.6	2.8		

To satisfy your religious needs

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	94.8	88.1	87.0	90.6	84.2	87.2	89.9	89.4	88.1	90.6	91.9	86.6
No**	1.6	5.7	1.9	2.9	3.8	4.9	4.0	2.7	4.6	2.5	2.9	3.7
Hard to say	3.5	6.2	11.2	6.5	12.0	7.9	6.1	7.9	7.3	6.9	5.2	9.7
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	89.9	86.0	87.8	87.3	89.3	90.3	89.5	89.8	88.4	87.3		
No**	3.4	3.2	4.5	3.5	4.4	3.1	3.3	3.6	4.3	1.4		
Hard to say	6.7	10.8	7.7	9.2	6.3	6.6	7.2	6.6	7.3	11.3		

* Total of responses "yes" and "probably yes".

** Total of responses "no" and "probably no".

Do you have the following opportunities?
% of respondents

(continued)

**To obtain objective information about events in Ukraine and worldwide
in the language that you use in everyday life**

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	94.8	88.1	87.1	92.5	81.0	92.3	88.9	89.1	89.7	86.6	91.9	85.5
No**	4.3	8.5	8.4	6.1	14.2	6.3	8.7	8.8	8.1	8.5	5.9	11.0
Hard to say	0.9	3.4	4.5	1.4	4.7	1.4	2.4	2.1	2.2	4.9	2.2	3.5
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	90.6	81.0	84.8	87.8	89.5	89.7	86.5	89.4	90.2	93.0		
No**	6.8	14.0	12.1	9.7	7.1	7.9	9.0	8.6	7.1	4.2		
Hard to say	2.6	5.0	3.1	2.5	3.4	2.4	4.5	2.0	2.7	2.8		

To obtain education in your native language

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	96.2	86.0	80.0	88.1	82.3	91.8	89.1	90.4	85.7	81.8	92.1	81.6
No**	1.4	10.0	7.5	7.0	11.7	5.1	9.0	5.4	8.9	9.0	4.8	10.8
Hard to say	2.4	4.0	12.5	4.9	6.0	3.1	1.9	4.2	5.4	9.2	3.1	7.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	89.8	76.1	76.1	84.8	87.2	90.3	82.3	87.1	91.7	90.1		
No**	6.1	13.1	15.0	9.0	6.5	7.4	10.7	7.6	5.4	5.6		
Hard to say	4.1	10.8	8.9	6.2	6.3	2.3	7.0	5.3	2.9	4.3		


To attend cultural institutions whose activities are carried out in your native language

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes*	91.5	81.4	82.4	90.6	79.7	89.8	86.2	88.5	83.6	79.1	87.7	82.2
No**	3.1	11.6	5.1	5.7	14.8	5.4	10.6	6.0	8.7	11.2	6.2	11.0
Hard to say	5.4	7.0	12.5	3.7	5.5	4.8	3.2	5.5	7.7	9.7	6.1	6.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes*	68.7	80.3	77.2	82.0	84.3	88.3	80.5	83.9	89.7	92.1		
No**	7.2	12.1	13.7	9.9	8.4	7.7	9.6	9.9	6.4	1.4		
Hard to say	6.1	7.6	9.1	8.1	7.3	4.0	9.9	6.2	3.9	5.6		

* Total of responses "yes" and "probably yes".

**Total of responses "no" and "probably no".


Do you feel a sense of community (historical, cultural, common future) with residents of other regions of Ukraine? % of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	51.1	43.0	24.1	36.7	25.7	37.6	40.4	37.8	42.4	36.8	46.9	28.6
No	4.3	12.0	12.0	8.9	19.7	9.5	13.0	9.1	11.4	11.4	7.1	16.0
Not with all, only with some of them	37.1	33.9	51.4	45.3	45.4	42.5	35.1	43.8	37.5	42.5	36.6	45.4
Hard to say	7.6	11.0	12.5	9.2	9.2	10.4	11.4	9.4	8.7	9.3	9.4	10.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	41.1	25.7	39.4	34.0	40.1	40.1	37.4	37.5	40.4	56.3		
No	9.9	15.8	10.6	11.3	10.6	11.4	12.0	11.1	10.7	5.6		
Not with all, only with some of them	39.3	47.7	34.8	40.7	40.0	41.0	37.4	42.5	39.9	28.2		
Hard to say	9.7	10.8	15.2	14.0	9.3	7.5	13.1	8.8	9.0	9.9		


Differences between the residents of different regions of Ukraine are... % of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Good because this enriches the country and its culture	53.2	47.5	42.3	55.4	41.1	47.3	56.5	44.6	49.1	45.6	50.3	47.2
Bad because it creates opportunities for “pinning labels”, the emergence of separatist movements, envy between people, etc.	34.5	29.9	33.5	27.3	38.3	31.1	26.0	36.1	32.0	35.0	31.6	32.7
Hard to say	12.3	22.6	24.2	17.3	20.6	21.6	17.5	19.3	19.0	19.4	18.1	20.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Good because this enriches the country and its culture	49.8	40.8	55.4	42.4	49.2	50.8	48.1	49.3	49.8	42.3		
Bad because it creates opportunities for “pinning labels”, the emergence of separatist movements, envy between people, etc.	31.8	35.0	26.2	31.8	32.0	33.1	29.3	34.2	30.6	26.8		
Hard to say	18.4	24.2	18.5	25.8	18.8	16.2	22.5	16.5	19.6	31.0		


Should every country have its own national idea common to all citizens?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	90.8	84.2	67.1	78.4	71.5	81.5	82.5	83.6	83.2	75.0	87.2	71.9
No	2.4	6.4	8.3	7.0	4.4	5.4	4.2	6.7	4.6	6.6	4.3	7.1
Hard to say	6.9	9.4	24.5	14.6	24.1	13.1	13.2	9.7	12.2	18.4	8.5	21.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	83.9	59.9	71.2	72.4	83.3	83.5	74.6	81.1	84.9	83.1		
No	4.9	8.6	9.1	8.0	4.6	4.8	4.8	6.3	4.7	5.6		
Hard to say	11.2	31.5	19.7	19.5	12.1	11.7	20.6	12.6	10.5	11.3		


Do you think it is good to bring up children, regardless of their origin, to love Ukraine and respect its history?
% of respondent



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	94.1	88.5	87.5	78.4	70.7	85.9	84.9	86.4	85.9	82.7	91.5	76.3
No	1.2	6.0	3.2	8.6	6.6	3.2	4.8	8.5	5.7	4.9	3.6	7.5
Hard to say	4.7	5.5	9.3	12.9	22.7	10.9	10.3	5.1	8.4	12.4	4.9	16.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	88.1	67.6	81.5	81.6	85.4	86.8	83.2	84.4	87.1	88.7		
No	4.5	10.8	6.2	4.8	5.9	4.7	4.6	6.3	4.7	2.8		
Hard to say	7.5	21.6	12.3	13.6	8.7	8.5	12.2	9.3	8.2	8.5		


Do you think that it will be easier for the younger generation to achieve unity, solidarity and mutual assistance?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	70.1	56.5	41.7	48.1	56.0	57.8	56.8	56.5	59.2	52.0	61.6	49.9
No	13.0	24.3	22.7	24.5	18.0	20.9	18.3	21.5	20.9	22.2	18.8	23.2
Hard to say	16.8	19.2	35.6	27.4	25.9	21.4	24.9	22.1	19.8	25.8	19.6	26.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	57.9	48.6	51.5	56.2	53.1	59.8	54.6	56.9	55.3	59.2		
No	20.3	23.9	25.8	18.9	24.1	18.1	19.2	22.6	20.0	18.3		
Hard to say	21.8	27.5	22.7	24.9	22.7	22.1	26.2	20.5	24.7	22.5		

Which advice would you give to Ukrainians?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
To focus on improving life in their country	56.0	61.0	56.7	48.5	44.9	56.6	57.3	51.7	54.5	53.3	58.9	48.7
To focus on improving life in their city (village)	36.2	31.1	25.6	38.8	32.6	31.1	31.3	38.4	34.1	32.4	33.8	32.6
To focus on self-fulfillment in other, wealthier countries	2.6	4.4	3.3	5.7	2.5	3.6	4.2	3.9	4.3	3.0	2.7	5.0
None of the above	1.9	0.6	6.0	2.4	12.0	5.1	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.6	1.3	6.8
Hard to say	3.3	3.0	8.4	4.6	7.9	3.6	4.2	3.0	3.8	7.6	3.2	6.8
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
To focus on improving life in their country	56.3	43.7	43.9	52.1	54.7	57.0	53.9	56.1	54.0	52.1		
To focus on improving life in their city (village)	33.5	31.5	34.8	34.1	34.5	31.4	31.4	32.1	35.7	36.6		
To focus on self-fulfillment in other, wealthier countries	3.5	5.4	4.5	3.7	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.7	4.2		
None of the above	2.9	8.6	7.6	4.6	1.7	4.9	3.1	4.1	3.0	2.8		
Hard to say	3.8	10.8	9.1	5.5	5.6	2.7	7.9	3.7	3.6	4.2		


How often have you been to other regions of Ukraine?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Once a year or more	33.1	37.0	27.3	22.7	33.3	39.3	40.8	34.4	32.0	18.1	33.9	29.4
Once every 2 years or less	18.9	21.9	20.8	22.4	14.3	20.9	25.5	23.9	19.2	14.1	19.7	20.8
Once every 5 years or less	23.6	19.6	19.9	17.6	17.8	17.5	14.9	19.9	20.9	24.3	20.6	18.4
Once every 10 years or less	13.0	14.2	17.1	18.6	11.4	5.6	8.2	11.2	16.3	27.4	14.8	14.3
I've never been to other regions of Ukraine	11.3	7.3	14.8	18.6	23.2	16.7	10.6	10.6	11.7	16.2	11.0	17.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION			FINANCIAL STANDING						
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Once a year or more	33.0	26.1	9.2	24.0	31.2	39.5	19.9	30.2	42.5	47.9		
Once every 2 years or less	21.0	14.4	13.8	18.2	21.1	20.9	17.1	20.2	21.9	28.2		
Once every 5 years or less	19.6	19.4	15.4	20.5	20.7	18.7	19.5	21.4	18.0	16.9		
Once every 10 years or less	14.2	16.2	27.7	19.1	15.3	10.0	23.9	14.8	8.1	4.2		
I've never been to other regions of Ukraine	12.1	23.9	33.8	18.2	11.7	11.0	19.7	13.4	9.6	2.8		


How often have you been abroad?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Once a year or more	17.7	5.1	8.3	5.9	7.6	10.2	10.6	9.7	9.0	5.1	9.5	7.8
Once every 2 years or less	10.4	10.3	6.9	5.6	7.3	11.4	12.2	8.5	6.5	5.1	8.4	9.0
Once every 5 years or less	15.6	11.8	13.0	9.9	6.6	10.2	17.8	11.5	12.0	8.0	10.6	13.1
Once every 10 years or less	15.8	16.1	13.9	14.0	21.5	7.8	12.5	19.9	23.6	18.2	14.9	18.8
I've never been abroad	40.4	56.7	57.9	64.5	57.1	60.4	46.8	50.5	48.9	63.6	56.7	51.3
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION			FINANCIAL STANDING						
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Once a year or more	8.6	10.8	0.0	6.7	8.0	11.2	7.4	5.8	11.6	32.4		
Once every 2 years or less	8.7	6.7	3.0	4.8	7.9	12.1	3.9	8.1	11.2	22.5		
Once every 5 years or less	11.8	10.3	3.0	6.7	11.1	15.6	6.1	12.0	15.9	12.7		
Once every 10 years or less	15.5	21.5	9.1	11.0	19.0	17.0	12.4	18.8	15.9	14.1		
I've never been abroad	55.5	50.7	84.8	70.8	53.9	44.0	70.1	55.4	45.4	18.3		

Do you have any relatives and/or friends in other regions of Ukraine? % of respondents




2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	77.1	73.7	67.9	62.8	57.1	66.3	73.5	71.9	71.0	65.7	75.7	61.2
No	22.9	26.3	31.2	37.2	42.9	33.5	26.5	28.1	28.7	34.2	24.1	38.7
No answer	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	70.8	62.2	50.0	60.4	73.1	72.2	64.6	69.0	73.3	76.1		
No	29.1	37.8	50.0	39.6	26.8	27.6	35.4	30.8	26.5	23.9		
No answer	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0		

How often do you communicate with them?


% of those who have relatives and/or friends in other regions of Ukraine



2016


	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Once a year or more	74.5	64.6	61.0	66.4	67.8	74.4	71.8	73.9	63.6	56.5	68.8	64.9
Once every 2 y.o. or less	13.8	23.2	21.2	16.2	16.7	17.6	18.8	16.4	20.7	19.7	19.1	18.6
Once every 5 y.o. or less	7.7	7.3	11.6	14.0	13.3	7.0	6.5	5.0	12.3	15.9	8.3	11.6
Once every 10 y.o. or less	4.0	4.9	6.2	3.4	2.2	1.1	2.9	4.6	3.4	7.8	3.8	4.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION			FINANCIAL STANDING						
	Ukrainians	Russians	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases			
Once a year or more	68.1	62.3	61.5	68.1	71.3	56.9	66.3	74.0	88.9			
Once every 2 y.o. or less	18.7	17.4	21.0	20.1	15.4	20.3	19.5	17.3	7.4			
Once every 5 y.o. or less	9.3	14.5	13.0	8.2	9.3	16.6	10.1	5.1	3.7			
Once every 10 y.o. or less	3.9	5.8	4.6	3.5	4.0	6.1	4.1	3.6	0.0			

Do you consider Ukrainians and Russians “brother peoples”?
% of respondents




	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	28.0	41.2	60.5	87.1	54.9	42.3	46.2	51.8	49.1	62.4	41.4	64.7
No	61.8	36.1	14.9	6.5	36.0	38.9	35.5	34.9	38.5	24.3	43.2	21.4
Hard to say	10.2	22.6	24.7	6.5	9.1	18.7	18.3	13.3	12.5	13.3	15.5	13.9
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION					FINANCIAL STANDING				
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	47.4	82.4	53.0	50.2	55.3	46.8	65.7	50.8	42.5	30.0		
No	36.5	12.2	27.3	33.6	32.1	36.5	21.6	34.7	41.4	40.0		
Hard to say	16.1	5.4	19.7	16.1	12.6	16.7	12.7	14.5	16.1	30.0		

Are Ukrainians and Russians one people or two different peoples?
% of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
One people	9.5	16.8	39.1	45.3	34.2	19.2	22.6	25.3	23.3	34.6	14.2	41.8
Two different peoples	85.3	67.2	45.1	46.6	57.9	67.0	66.0	66.0	66.1	54.9	76.9	44.8
Hard to say	5.2	16.0	15.8	8.1	7.9	13.8	11.4	8.7	10.6	10.5	8.9	13.4
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
One people	21.5	54.5	28.8	29.7	24.6	24.1	32.4	27.1	19.2	8.5		
Two different peoples	67.3	38.3	60.6	56.2	66.3	64.5	53.8	64.1	70.0	70.4		
Hard to say	11.2	7.2	10.6	14.1	9.1	11.4	13.8	8.8	10.8	21.1		


Do you think that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be normalised, even if Crimea remains a part of Russia?
% of respondents



2016

	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	18.7	25.1	35.2	62.3	42.1	31.3	28.6	34.4	33.4	41.4	25.6	47.0
No	58.1	49.2	28.7	15.1	41.5	43.4	43.2	45.0	42.9	34.7	50.9	28.5
Hard to say	23.2	25.7	36.1	22.6	16.5	25.2	28.1	20.5	23.6	23.9	23.5	24.5
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	31.1	60.4	43.9	31.1	36.9	32.6	44.5	34.3	27.9	25.0		
No	44.1	22.1	34.8	39.4	40.7	43.8	29.9	42.9	47.2	47.2		
Hard to say	24.9	17.6	21.2	29.5	22.3	23.6	25.5	22.8	24.9	27.8		



Do you think that relations between Ukraine and Russia should be normalised, even if Crimea remains a part of Russia?
% of respondents



2016


	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	54.4	38.3	15.8	18.5	37.0	37.7	34.5	38.1	35.0	32.8	45.5	22.8
No	29.3	36.8	57.7	59.4	37.0	37.0	40.1	39.9	42.0	47.2	34.3	53.1
Hard to say	16.3	24.9	26.5	22.0	25.9	25.3	25.5	22.1	23.0	19.9	20.2	24.0
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	37.7	23.4	36.4	32.3	37.5	35.3	32.3	34.2	39.2	42.3		
No	39.3	58.6	39.4	41.0	42.1	41.8	45.2	44.4	36.9	26.8		
Hard to say	23.0	18.0	24.2	26.7	20.5	22.9	22.5	21.4	23.9	31.0		

If Russia starts open full-scale war against Ukraine, how should Ukraine react?
% of respondents




	AGE					LANGUAGE		NATIONALITY	
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainians	Russians
Conduct an armed resistance even without guarantees of international assistance	32.8	34.7	39.6	36.7	26.9	41.6	22.7	36.0	14.0
Conduct an armed resistance if there are guarantees of international assistance	28.2	21.5	19.0	22.8	23.7	26.1	19.8	25.1	12.2
Surrender as soon as possible to avoid loss of lives and destruction of the country's infrastructure and economy	10.2	10.9	12.7	10.9	14.2	8.1	16.8	10.0	23.1
Hard to say	28.9	32.9	28.7	29.6	35.1	24.3	40.6	28.9	50.7
	EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING				
	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases	
Conduct an armed resistance even without guarantees of international assistance	19.7	30.7	34.4	35.4	24.3	33.3	40.4	45.1	
Conduct an armed resistance if there are guarantees of international assistance	24.2	23.3	24.4	21.9	20.8	26.0	22.2	18.3	
Surrender as soon as possible to avoid loss of lives and destruction of the country's infrastructure and economy	16.7	12.0	11.2	12.2	17.7	11.3	7.9	12.7	
Hard to say	39.4	33.9	30.0	30.5	37.2	29.4	29.5	23.9	

What should be the policy of Ukraine towards Russia? % of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Deepening of cooperation	4.0	19.3	23.7	44.7	18.0	16.5	17.2	21.5	20.3	27.4	16.8	27.5
Reduction of cooperation and Russia's influence on Ukraine	31.2	29.1	16.3	13.2	26.9	25.0	26.5	26.9	26.8	21.1	26.1	22.5
Curtailing of cooperation with Russia	48.5	22.3	13.5	13.2	25.0	27.9	26.5	27.8	24.9	22.2	32.4	16.8
Hard to say	16.3	29.3	46.5	28.8	30.1	30.6	29.7	23.9	27.9	29.3	24.6	33.2
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Deepening of cooperation	18.6	38.3	21.5	20.3	22.5	19.9	32.4	20.5	14.2	14.1		
Reduction of cooperation and Russia's influence on Ukraine	25.1	21.6	26.2	25.3	27.3	21.9	18.4	26.7	27.1	28.2		
Curtailing of cooperation with Russia	27.9	9.5	16.9	23.5	25.8	27.6	19.0	25.3	31.3	28.2		
Hard to say	28.4	30.6	35.4	30.9	24.4	30.6	30.2	27.5	27.4	29.6		

How would you assess the prospects for development of relations between Ukraine and Russia in the coming years? % of respondents



	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Relations will improve	3.8	8.4	7.9	12.9	8.9	4.1	7.2	6.9	10.0	12.2	7.4	9.6
Relations will remain unchanged	39.7	35.6	31.5	34.2	28.2	33.7	36.6	33.5	36.5	33.1	36.0	32.7
Relations will worsen	41.4	35.8	29.2	27.2	40.2	35.7	34.5	37.2	37.3	33.3	36.1	35.0
Hard to say	15.1	20.2	31.5	25.6	22.8	26.5	21.8	22.4	16.2	21.5	20.4	22.7
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Relations will improve	7.4	16.1	12.1	8.5	8.4	7.8	13.8	7.8	5.8	1.4		
Relations will remain unchanged	35.1	32.3	30.3	35.5	36.2	32.8	30.9	36.2	33.6	46.5		
Relations will worsen	36.3	26.5	30.3	33.4	34.7	37.7	31.3	35.3	39.8	29.6		
Hard to say	21.2	25.1	27.3	22.6	20.7	21.7	24.1	20.7	20.7	22.5		

2. CITIZENS OF UKRAINE ABOUT THEMSELVES, THEIR COUNTRY, COMMON AND DISTINCT, AND WAYS TO ATTAIN NATIONAL UNITY

In the framework of the project “Formation of a Common Ukrainian Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges” from 29 September to 12 October 2016, discussions in 17 focus groups were held: in Kyiv city, Chernihiv (Chernihiv city and Kyinka village), Cherkasy (Cherkasy city and Mliiv village), Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro city and Novooleksandrivka village), Kharkiv (Kharkiv city and Sharivka village), Donetsk (Kramatorsk city and Vasylivska Pustosh village), Odesa (Odesa city and Shabo village), Lviv (Lviv city and Soloshyn village), and Zakarpattia (Uzhhorod city and Rativtsi village) oblasts of Ukraine.

Working-age women and men (22-55 years old) of various professions who live in the above cities and villages (a total of 173 persons) were invited to participate in focus group discussions.¹

The focus group discussions touched on pressing issues that affect formation of the national identity of Ukrainian citizens at the regional level, the nature of and reasons for the existing differences, and factors that favour and hinder the strengthening of unity of the Ukrainian society.

2.1. IDENTITY HIERARCHY

Respondents found the question of identity, self-identity, self-determination quite complex. The vast majority of focus group participants give priority to social and family identity, and only after that to ethnic and geographical identity.

A significant portion of respondents are most inclined to identify themselves primarily as residents of their locality, then of their district, region, and only after that as a citizen of Ukraine. However, some participants, independently and spontaneously (without prompting), stated that they above all consider themselves Ukrainians, citizens of Ukraine.

The majority of focus group participants do not deny that it is important to them to consider themselves citizens of Ukraine, but this feeling is ambiguous since they often lack reasons to be proud of Ukraine and have no sense of security, stability, care and respect on the part of the state.

Nevertheless, summarising all the responses on citizenship, one may conclude that:

- the awareness of citizenship as a value adds a sense of unity, solidarity and power among the people, and boosts confidence that we can overcome anything and settle things together;
- this is one of the elements of self-esteem, an essential element in the self-identification of a civil-minded person who is not indifferent to what is happening in the country;

- it is an integral part of the identity of a person who considers himself/herself a patriot, who loves Ukraine, its culture, traditions, nature, etc.;
- for some of the participants, citizenship is an emotional but important sense of home, comfort, family, Motherland and stable ties with it, and of historical and ethnic roots.

Practically all the groups included some respondents who indicated that, before 2014, they did not think deeply about their civil position and civil self-identification.

After the Maidan, they felt pride for the freedom-loving and brave Ukrainian people, the need and the value of identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine, as Ukrainians and their belonging to the Ukrainian people. Unfortunately, according to some of the participants, this feeling was then lost due to the worsening political and socio-economic situation in the country, the sharp decline in the financial conditions and the decrease of confidence in the new Government.

Factors such as dissatisfaction with their lives and treatment by the state, the situation in the country, and the global attitude towards Ukrainians, lower the value of the civil self-identification. Because of these factors some focus group participants (irrespective of region, gender, and age) do not show a pronounced and substantiated need to feel themselves citizens of Ukraine.

¹ All quotes from statements by the focus group participants are transcribed with minimal edits.

The importance of local identity is growing in view of the following factors:

- origin, permanent residence in a particular locality, stable family ties; memories, key periods, adult life experiences associated with this locality;
- lack of sufficient experience of traveling to or staying in other locations and regions of Ukraine;
- individual inner feelings and connections: love for a native city/village, a sense of comfort and home;
- deeply rooted social relationships, standards of behavior, customs and atmosphere of life, traditions.

All of this together creates a feeling of comfort, home, a place where everything is familiar, predictable and understandable to you, and therefore safe, providing a sense of security and stability.

On the other hand, the following factors help one feel as a resident of a larger area, the whole country, and as a citizen:

- living in different cities, especially different oblasts and regions of the country;
- frequent work or tourist trips within the country or abroad;
- stable personal ties with different regions;
- love for the various traditions and customs of various regions, love for all things Ukrainian, patriotism on a national scale as a result of conscious civic position and education;
- a sense of self-esteem, the ability to influence certain processes and public events in the country, for example, performing public service (participation in reforms), participating in volunteer movements, etc.;
- a feeling of unity with the residents of other oblasts and regions, even if it is based on common problems.



– I live in Lviv, I consider myself a resident of Lviv and I am more concerned about my city. All public officials in Kyiv are concerned about Ukraine. (Lviv)

– I am, first of all, a resident of Odesa... This is our home. First get your own house in order, and then go somewhere else. This is the state of mind. (Odesa)

– I am a resident of Dnipropetrovsk. I was born here, my children were born here, I got married here. I've lived here all my life. (Dnipro)

– I've lived in Kramatorsk all my life, and I've never been elsewhere, which is to say that I am a local. I feel nothing special about being Ukrainian. (Kramatorsk)

– My father comes from western Ukraine and my mother from central Ukraine. I've been to almost all oblasts of Ukraine. So I always, wherever I go, consider myself Ukrainian, and that this is my country all the way to the border. (Cherkasy)

– It is very important to be a citizen with rights and obligations. Because Ukraine has at least some laws. And there are no laws in the occupied territories. (Kramatorsk)

– It would be important for me to know that the country acts for my benefit. But since it does not, then what should I be part of? What is it that needs me? (Dnipro)

– I was born in the Soviet Union. When we became independent, I frankly did not much welcome it. I was a Soviet person. But after they bit off Crimea in 2014, and attacked Donbas and Luhansk, I became a patriotic Ukrainian. (Odesa)

– I have a sense of belonging to the history that is being shaped right now. I had the opportunity to be a citizen of Israel, but my feelings here are much more compelling. (Kharkiv)

– It is important to feel like you are a citizen. Our country is young. 25 years is hardly anything for a country. Considering how our ancestors strove and struggled for independence, I am a patriot of my country, and I would rather our country developed, and maintained its independence. (Odesa)

– I am proud to live in Ukraine. I believe that, whatever may happen, Ukraine has some future prospects. Poor people can also live a normal life here; the important thing is not to sit around and whine. (Lviv)

2.2. UKRAINE: HOMELAND, COUNTRY, STATE

To the question about what Ukraine means to people, most respondents gave neutral to somewhat positive responses, stressing that Ukraine is the country where a focus group participant and his/her family members were born and now live.

It represents the Motherland, home, family and relatives for about a third of the focus group participants. Smaller numbers of participants stated that they associate Ukraine with beautiful scenery and hard-working and hospitable people. Still fewer said they considered Ukraine to be no more than the place in which they live. Participants in various focus groups said they were proud of the will of Ukrainians and proud of their hard-working, sincere and hospitable nature.

Among the reasons to be proud of Ukraine, focus group participants mentioned the following:

- beautiful nature, landscape, fertile lands, and rich mineral resources;
- good-natured, hard-working, sincere, hospitable and strong-willed people;
- national traditions, culture, and cuisine;
- talented cultural figures, artists, scientists, and scientific and technical potential;



- talented athletes, especially Paralympians;
- Ukrainians who are famous abroad;
- CTO heroes, volunteers, representatives of defence and law enforcement agencies who perform their duties conscientiously.



– I can say that I am proud of the will of Ukrainians. Because... our athletes, literally training in sheds, become Olympic champions. (Cherkasy)

– I am proud of my family, my ancestors, my grandmother and my parents. They are hard-working people. (Kyiv)

– The land and nature. The village in Poltava Oblast where I was born. I love it. I feel sick, at death's door, if I go more than two months without being there. I feel so good when I go there and sit under the pear tree. (Kyiv)

– Our people are hard-working, cheerful and optimistic. No matter how bad things are in the country, people still hope for better and look to the future with optimism. (Dnipro)

– Ukraine is a very rich country. People here are good, peaceful, unless they are turned against each other. (Odesa)

– Our soldiers are performing a great feat now. (Kramatorsk)

– I did not know that our people could do this. When it was necessary, they rose to defend their land. I honestly did not expect this. (Lviv)

– It all was palpable in Kharkiv, when the country, volunteers, all these movements, all these people in military commissariats going, and I myself was in one and I got a feeling that the country would not only survive, but also grow. (Kharkiv)

Factors that negatively affect the attitude towards Ukraine:

- the authorities (the Verkhovna Rada, the Government, the President, politicians) and their disregard and lack of responsibility towards the people, their impunity (all groups mentioned this item first);
- corruption, “constant plundering of the country by public officials”;
- Crimea, which was “lost in a few days”, and the war in Donbas, which allegedly the “authorities can, but do not want to stop”;
- the poverty of most Ukrainian people in contrast to the wealth of government officials and oligarchs; absence of a middle class;
- the overall decline in all fields: economy, education, health care, judicial system, social programs, etc.;
- no positive changes or achievements in 25 years of independence, no prospects;
- the country receiving large amount of loans and using them irresponsibly;
- the low level of culture in society (littered streets, dilapidated playgrounds, impudent behaviour of young people, etc.).

What country would the citizens like to have as their Motherland?

Some focus group participants responded that they would like to have been born in France, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Canada, Spain, Germany, the US, Australia and Italy, and less often Russia, Belarus, Brazil and the UAE.

Reasons for choosing a country as a potential homeland:

1. high quality of life indicators, opportunity for self-fulfillment and employment, the opportunity to ensure that your children will live a comfortable and stable life, social security;
2. the rule of law in all areas, adherence to laws and human rights, a country that respects and values all citizens, all types of freedom and choice;
3. high level of economic development, innovations and technologies, higher cultural level of citizens.

Less often:

4. having relatives or friends who can ease the period of adaptation;
5. a more favourable climate;
6. beautiful nature and architecture;
7. interesting culture and history.

The motivation of people who would choose Ukraine was more emotional in nature, for example:

- “This is something close to me, I can’t explain it”;
- “There’s nothing else that we know”;
- “The grass is always greener on the other side”;
- Love for Ukraine, its national culture, traditions, patriotic feelings.

Common responses with a more rational basis included:

- clear and familiar conditions and way of life. Relatives, friends, a particular status, property, business, useful contacts and connections;
- the climate is good, low probability of natural disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, terrible floods, etc.);
- lack of in-depth knowledge about other countries, lack of travel and tourism experience;
- a belief that the Ukrainian mindset differs from that of other peoples;
- Ukraine has enough natural and human resources to live in abundance and prosperity; fertile land was mentioned with particular frequency;
- instead of seeking a better place, it is better to develop everything here in Ukraine, work for the prosperity of your family and country.

A considerable part of the focus group participants that consider themselves patriots do not deny that, under certain conditions or given a better opportunity, they would have moved out of the country or sent their children abroad.

Those who still would like to have been born in Ukraine often specified that it must be Ukraine before 2014 or with a new (not the current) government.

The people of Odesa contrasted with the overall picture, as they traditionally chose their particular city over the country as their potential homeland.

Has the attitude towards Ukraine changed over the last three years?

The attitude towards Ukraine among a considerable number of the focus group participants has declined over the last three years. The main reasons are socio-economic in nature: "it is much more difficult to live in the country now". Discussion of certain issues often came down to an emphasis on difficult financial situations, the lack of opportunities to earn money, uncertainty about the future of one's family, and especially concerns for the future of one's children.

On the one hand, some of the focus group participants indicated that there were no noticeable changes after the Revolution of Dignity, with the state policy being ineffective. Some participants consider the decisions of the authorities, including de-communisation, to be incomprehensible.

On the other hand, a significant part of the participants in all focus groups indicated that the events of the past three years made them see Ukrainian people in a different light, and that the people surprised them with their personal involvement, courage, sensitivity and unity in defending their rights at Maidan, with a huge showing of patriotism, especially during the first period of the CTO and deployment of the volunteer movement.



– It's shameful that we piss away the potential we have, and no one develops it. In terms of industry, agriculture or even the IT sector itself... (Kharkiv)

– Ukraine deserves pity. The country could have been rich by now, but it can't. People are hard-working here, and we have the soil... (Dnipro)

– Fear appeared. We actually lost heart. Before these events, it seemed that we were protected somehow, that we were somehow a country. And when it all happened, it was so sad that they could just come and take Crimea. Come and take Donetsk... (Dnipro)

– We've lost faith over these three years. I think that everyone supported Maidan, especially the West and all of Ukraine. Everyone supported it, but what have we achieved? (Lviv)

– I was 47 three years ago, and I never thought that there were so many good people in the world. I never suspected that before Maidan. It was a pleasant surprise. And now I go to the CTO zone (as a volunteer). (Kyiv)

– The disaster pulled us together. People became patriots. A lot of people started speaking Ukrainian. (Kyiv)

– This is a difficult period in the history of our state. I like that there were so many patriots in the country. A lot of people started reading a bit, like the history of Ukraine. (Odesa)

More than half of the focus group participants have confidence that life in Ukraine will change for the better.

Respondents gave the following rational foundations and possible causes of positive changes:

1. change of government via elections for a new, more honest, responsible and truly patriotic government, including the new President;
2. hope for the young generation of Ukrainians which might be more honest, responsible and professional.

Some participants emphasised the responsibility of the people themselves, as they are the ones who elected this government and allowed themselves to be treated so poorly. It was suggested that any new government would similarly embezzle from the country just as the previous one until there is a change in the Ukrainian mind-set and outlook.

In this regard, some of the participants in various focus groups emphasised the importance of an active and responsible position on the part of each person as a citizen, a member of the society, a resident of certain city/village and a voter: everyone should make a more careful and considered choice, and vote in every election.



– The issue here concerns a change of the government. The faster it happens... the faster our life improves. (Kramatorsk)

– The younger ones have understood that they must somehow manage their lives on their own. This concept changed in people's minds. There are start-ups appearing more and more in Kharkiv, new shops opening... (Kharkiv)

– It seems to me that young people are growing up different to how we did, they have a different way of thinking, a love for freedom, determination, and they are ready to build something here, and live, and change. (Lviv)

– I don't understand: why go anywhere else if this is the place to try and build ourselves a comfortable life in our country. Who will help this country grow, if not me? (Kyiv)

– To begin with, a thoughtful attitude towards elections is the key. This is the first step. We should think about what we're choosing, and whom. Second, we sometimes need to take a stand against the injustice around us. No more silence, no more hiding our heads in the sand like ostriches. We must respect ourselves. (Shabo village, Odesa oblast)

– In general, Ukrainians need to think. There are upcoming elections. First, we must fulfill our duty as Ukrainian citizens and come out to vote in the elections to begin with. We have a huge number of people not going to vote, and then complaining about how bad life is. (Cherkasy)

– Everyone should begin with themselves. For example, tell me, what have you done that's good not just for yourself, but for the building where you live or work? Be specific. What have you done to make things better? (Cherkasy)

In considering possible time frame for positive changes, a significant number concluded that at least one generation (25-30 years) would be necessary for change, while some believed it to be a matter of 5-10 years. There were also those who believed that it would require much more time (50 years).

“The State and the Country”: Interpretations


A significant number of the focus group participants indicated that the attitudes to Ukraine as a country and as a state are different things. The attitude towards the country is good and positive, since the country is understood as nature, people, history and traditions.

The attitude towards the state shown by the most of those surveyed is rather negative, since this notion is primarily associated with the government, the president and the authorities in general. Sometimes the attitude is indifferent.

There were participants in various groups who questioned the existence of the state due to its failure to perform its basic functions (protecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, ensuring the rule of law, honouring the rights and freedoms of citizens, etc.).

All focus groups strongly criticised high-level government institutions.

Some of the focus group participants noted that the attitude towards the state improved when considering that the Ukrainian people are part of the state.



– I am proud of the Ukrainian people for not allowing themselves to be enslaved. (Chernihiv)

– Will power, especially in terms of war, we did not surrender, we went forward. And now we are defending ourselves quite well. Very well. I think this is crucial. (Cherkasy)

Perception of Patriotism

The self-identification priorities of many of the focus group participants start from the small family circle, then involve their towns/villages, and only after that rise to the country level and self-perception as citizens. Naturally, then, the closest and the most clear sense of patriotism for many participants concerns their family, then their native community/region, and only after that the country as a whole.

The most common responses may be summarised as follows: patriotism is:

1. love for the Motherland;
2. love and respect for everything connected with the country and the state – history, traditions, symbols, culture, etc.;
3. willingness to give your life for the country and take up arms to protect its interests;
4. ability to unite for the sake of prosperity and peace in the country.

Patriotism in everyday life may appear at the level of the family or town/village in the following forms:

1. responsible and decent behavior in everyday life: not wishing anyone harm, showing diligence, honesty, paying taxes, and conscientious performance of professional duties. Responsibility to colleagues and family;
2. civic activity;
3. taking holidays and travelling in Ukraine, not abroad;
4. teaching children to love and respect Ukraine, its traditions, history and language.

Such points as supporting domestic producers and volunteering were mentioned less often.

The feeling of patriotism strengthens when a citizen clearly understands what and whom he actually defends and has a direct connection with a sense of ownership.

The unity of the Soviet people during the Second World War was given as an example of “true” patriotism towards one’s country, while the current level of patriotism is much lower than during that period.

Some of the participants noted that a significant surge in sincere civic patriotism occurred during the Maidan and the beginning of the CTO, but its level has now decreased slightly because citizens do not see the same patriotism on the part of the new government.

Meanwhile, many inhabitants of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zakarpattia oblasts have found it difficult to associate the notion of patriotism with the development of events since the Maidan and with the situation in the East of the country.

According to many participants in various focus groups, patriots are not only those who protect their country’s interests with weapons, but also those who in their peaceful everyday lives remain honest, responsible, hard-working and concerned about injustice and the grief of others, kind and able to empathise and help others, willing to do something not only for their loved ones, but also for their home, street, native village/city, and engage in civic activity.

In the words of some focus group participants, the value of the concept of patriotism has recently been neutralised by frequent manipulation on the part of politicians and by the ostentatious and insincere patriotism of government officials. Some focus group participants said that education and inculcation of patriotism, and even insisting that it be present, is appropriate not for the Ukrainian people, but for the state authorities, especially the highest agencies.

A considerable part of the focus group participants emphasised that being a patriot is easier when you are on your feet, when you are respected, supported and protected by the state, and do not suffer from the imposition of a particular language, compulsory and sometimes irrelevant use of the national and state symbols, etc. Some Ukrainians, regardless of the region, emphasised that making the elements of national symbols a part of one’s appearance does not make one a patriot.



– (Patriotism is) ...An active stand against the oppression of the people of your own country and their dignity as Ukrainians. (Odesa)

– I think that lying under a tank is patriotism. (Dnipro)

– You don’t necessarily have to have a machine gun. Patriotism is about being involved in the life of the country and helping others. (Chernihiv)

– (A patriot is) ...A person who knows the history of his/her country and respects its traditions, who knows the national symbols and culture of the country. (Kramatorsk)

- Patriotism is not to believe Ukraine's attackers and not to run off to vote in these pseudo-referendums. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)
- (Patriotism is)... Paying taxes. Raising decent children. (Dnipro)
- You have to start small. Go and pick up litter or paint the fence. (Dnipro)
- It's what every person does every day: goes to work and fulfills the duties for the benefit of their city and their people. (Kramatorsk)
- Patriotism is selfless actions, when people give selflessly, and the state pulls the wool over their eyes, puts them into debt and then exploits them. It is very difficult to be a patriot in our country. (Odesa)
- The volunteers who help the wounded for no more than a "thank you" are the exemplary patriots. (Kharkiv)
- Patriotism is the goodness and actions of people who have something to say and can express their opinions. (Cherkasy)
- A patriot is someone who can honourably represent Ukraine abroad. Someone who speaks of Ukrainians with pride. Just as gusli players who once lovingly sang songs about their land. Such people are patriots. (Kramatorsk)
- Being a patriot is not about putting on the national flag. A person puts on the national flag, ties it around, dries himself off with it. He's wearing the flag. This is just an exercise. Being a patriot means doing something for the country. (Kramatorsk)
- Patriotism is, for example, when you get up and pray for the country and go to church with this mind. (Lviv)
- Patriotism is when you have some money in your pocket... What has this country given me? Has it cared for me? Has it created the conditions for me to be a patriot? No! (Lviv)
- People think they are patriots if they have a blue-and-yellow ribbon stuck on their cars, but I think that it is enough just to throw garbage into the waste-basket and not to litter. (Lviv)

National symbols

For most focus group participants national symbols are a somewhat positive thing, and are neutral for only a small number.

A vivid example of the Ukrainian flag evoking a feeling of pride is the raising of the flag at international sports competitions, the Olympic Games, and whenever there is a reason to be proud of Ukraine.

Some focus group participants, simply not knowing the words of the national anthem, may believe that it has a pessimistic mood. For others, however, it is a reason to be proud.



- Many people know their anthem and the coat of arms, and this is an achievement. The war is making people proud of Ukraine. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

- Being proud of the flag. Because of the competitions, in particular the Paralympic Games, everybody knows that this is the flag of Ukraine. This is our symbol. This is a time when we can be proud of our country. (Kyiv)
- I like our coat of arms. It has the word "freedom". It's a historical symbol, more than 2000 years old. (Kyiv)
- I don't like some words in the anthem: "Ukraine has not yet died". What is this, a funeral? (Chernihiv)
- I am a fan, and hearing the Ukrainian anthem makes me feel proud and gives me goosebumps. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

2.3. ATTITUDE TO THE ISSUE OF LANGUAGE AND NATIONALITY

State Language of Ukraine

Most participants in all focus groups (regardless of regional, gender and age characteristics) are unanimous about the following language questions:

1. the Ukrainian language is very beautiful, melodic and musical. It is most often perceived positively, and less often neutrally;
2. Ukrainians (of whatever origin) should know Ukrainian, BUT not necessarily use it in everyday communication;
3. the Ukrainian language will be known by younger generations who study in Ukrainian schools and have the opportunity to use Ukrainian in their everyday speech;
4. representatives of older generation have no time or opportunity to learn Ukrainian, especially if they live in communities with a Russian-speaking population, and do not have sufficient practice speaking Ukrainian;
5. there is a problem with a "standard" and pure Ukrainian language, since different regions have different dialects.

A considerable part of the focus group participants noted that to know (understand) the Ukrainian language and to speak and use it in everyday life are entirely different things.

Some focus group participants tend to think that Ukrainians have the right to choose what language to speak in their everyday life. The most active advocates of this right are those from the Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Donetsk oblasts. "Ukrainisation" has stirred opposition among some focus group participants from Russian-speaking cities.

Ukrainian-speaking respondents, showing a certain loyalty to Russian-speaking people, nevertheless noted that speaking Ukrainian provides a certain degree of self-esteem and self-respect as a Ukrainian, a citizen of Ukraine, as well as respect for Ukraine.

It seems that Russian-speaking respondents are not ready to recognise this and, whatever the circumstances, want to be addressed in Russian.



Some participants also noted that the language issue is one of the factors that divides Ukrainians, and that it is widely used by politicians to distract people from more pressing issues and separate Ukrainians of various regions.

Some participants in various groups said that popularisation and consistent introduction of the Ukrainian language into all areas of life should involve not only official regulations and requirements for citizens of Ukraine of various ages to speak Ukrainian, but also creating the right conditions and holding various events to encourage and promote the learning of Ukrainian.



– It would be better for our children to know Ukrainian, so that the Ukrainian language will not die out. (Cherkasy)

– You can even speak Chinese in everyday life, but you must know the state language, since documents must be written and forms must be completed in Ukrainian. You have to know the state language. (Lviv)

– It is obligatory to know the native language. This is how we show respect for our homeland. (Odesa)

– Citizens of Ukraine must know the state language, but what language you converse in is up to you. (Kharkiv)

– It is desirable that all citizens of Ukraine know and speak Ukrainian, but it should not be an obligation, as for example in the Baltic states, where Russian-speaking people were forced to learn Latvian... But all documents should be written in Ukrainian, since it is the official language. (Kramatorsk)

– A person living in Ukraine must respect its culture and language. (Kyiv)

– You have to know the Ukrainian language, if only for the sake of self-respect. You tread this ground, breathe this air, and live in this country.

You have this blue passport. If you respect yourself, you must know the language. (Cherkasy)

– The Ukrainian language is an obligation: if you cannot speak Ukrainian, then you are not Ukrainian. Not a patriot. (Shabo village, Odesa oblast)

– Even if you're handing out advertising brochures, people don't care if they're in Ukrainian. (Dnipro)

– I've graduated from a Russian university, I am a philologist, and I would like to be fluent in Ukrainian too. But all this has been extorted from us with red-hot iron for 70 years. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

Who can be considered/called Ukrainian?

The most common answers to the question “Who can be considered Ukrainian?” are: those who have a Ukrainian passport, were born and reside in Ukraine. Fewer focus group participants referred to people who recognise and consider themselves to be Ukrainians, accept and respect the culture and traditions of Ukraine, know/study the history, the Ukrainian language, observe Ukrainian laws, common moral principles and standards of behaviour.


A considerable share of focus group participants tends to ask more of people born in other countries and having different origins than they do of people born in Ukraine or of themselves personally. As concerns former citizens of Ukraine who have emigrated and changed their citizenship, respondents expressed no such doubts and special requirements; these people are considered to be Ukrainians as long as they recognise themselves as such.

Thus all citizens, regardless of their nationality, and even persons, who are not citizens of Ukraine but consider themselves Ukrainians, observe Ukrainian traditions, customs, advocate the interests and reputation of Ukraine, and care about its future – in other words, those loving Ukraine – may be considered/called Ukrainians.

Most focus group participants are certain that all Ukrainians, irrespective of their origin, must know the language of their country, its history and culture, and respect the national symbols. They must take this as an axiom that requires no further reasoning or argument.

Some participants adhere to the opinion that to be a true Ukrainian one must be born in Ukraine, live there and love the country.

In everyday life, most focus group participants do not care about people's nationality, especially residents of oblasts with mixed nationalities.



– I believe that both a person born in Ukraine and a person that immigrated to Ukraine can be Ukrainians. A person that came to Ukraine and took Ukrainian citizenship and takes complete responsibility for becoming Ukrainian. And to do so the person learns Ukrainian history and traditions, cares about our national spirit, loves our homeland, Ukraine, the way that he/she at one time loved another homeland, if it could be called a homeland. (Cherkasy)

– For example, people live in Canada, but consider themselves Ukrainians, because they love their country. They like to be here and consider themselves Ukrainians. Although they have a Canadian passport, their hearts are in this country. This is an internal state of mind and sense of oneself. (Kramatorsk)

– *I was born in Russia, but I've lived in Ukraine all my life. I am Ukrainian. (Chernihiv)*

– *My parents are Russian. They came here from Russia. But I was born here, I consider myself Ukrainian, and my children feel the same way. (Dnipro)*

– *It's not essential for a person to be born Ukrainian. It's important, but even if you were born in another country, and came here, live here and love this country, then you can be called Ukrainian. (Lviv)*

– *To be Ukrainian is a moral criterion, an interest in the country, its way of life, culture, history and roots, and its future. (Kramatorsk)*

Understanding the Ukrainian nation

The discussion shows that many, if not most, participants in the focus groups do not fully understand the term “nation”.

The most common definitions of this term are as follows:

1. Nation is a synonym for the word “nationality” (i.e. ethnic origin).
2. Nation means the people, the native population of any country.
3. Nation is associated with nationalism and has a negative connotation.
4. Nation is associated with qualities, characteristics, and national features specific to certain people or nationality. Germans, for example, are known for their punctuality and carefulness, while the Japanese are hard-working. In this context, the concept of the “Ukrainian nation” evoked associations with hard-working, talented people who can sing well, who have their own particular way of life and traditions, who have suffered greatly during various historical periods, and who are economically poor but ready to defend and to fight for Ukraine.

Some focus group participants think that the Ukrainian nation encompasses all Ukrainians throughout the world.



– *Nation means a people with its own history and its own traditions. (Dnipro)*

– *Nation means those brought up with Ukrainian traditions. It's the people who remember their roots and know their language. (Kramatorsk)*

– *It seems to me that the nation (natsiya) has a narrower meaning than the people (narod). (Lviv)*

– *The nation is you and me. (Cherkasy)*

2.4. PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENT REGIONS OF UKRAINE

Many focus groups demonstrated the same effect: their participants confidently and unanimously said that there were significant differences between different regions of Ukraine, but when specifying these differences the exchange of opinions slowed down significantly immediately after naming the first difference: the language.

The participants also talked with some certainty about regional differences in traditions, history, and mentality, but generally could not provide specific examples.

When reflecting on regional differences, the participants most often noted the “east-west” vector of Ukraine as the regions with the greatest number of differences.

According to some focus group participants, the residents of Southern Ukraine (excluding Crimea) do not have features that differ significantly from the residents of Central Ukraine.

Many participants, especially rural residents, do not have sufficient experience in traveling around Ukraine to form a personal opinion on this issue. Many people are guided by rumours, impressions gathered from their friends and information in the media.

For example, the participants of various focus groups believed there were typical cases when Russian-speaking tourists were refused service or were charged higher prices in Western regions just because they spoke Russian. It appears that individual cases that might have actually happened are popularised and spread as rumours and legends that support negative stereotypes, since the respondents who confidently and categorically related these instances had never personally dealt with such cases.

It is worth noting that residents of Zakarpattia emphasised their separateness and distinct features as compared to other regions of the country (including Western regions).

Residents of all regions except Donbas mentioned a somewhat negative perception of Eastern residents because of the low level of culture, high rate of crime, poverty and the depressing mood of their nature and architecture.

At the same time, a considerable share of the focus group participants in Kramatorsk think of Donbas as a historically separate region distinct from the rest of Ukraine. The East is considered to include Donbas, or the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

These are contrasted with Western region, where, in their view, “there is no industry”, “people talk more than work there”, “people there just relax all the time”, and most people work abroad and do not pay any taxes in Ukraine. Residents of Donetsk oblast often tend to claim that they “feed Ukraine”.

Almost all groups included participants who named the Poltava oblast as the most typical, “most Ukrainian” oblast, which is also an outdated stereotype.

In general, the focus group participants remarked on the fact that not only Ukrainian regions, but also oblasts and settlements within the oblasts differ among themselves, and this is a normal thing. This primarily concerns differences in language (pronunciation and local dialects).

A considerable number of the participants emphasised their “normal” attitude towards residents of all regions. Others tend to believe that residents of neighbouring regions are easier to understand and more likely to have a similar mentality.

In general, the differences among residents of various regions are considered to be natural and may highlight the richness of Ukrainian culture, traditions, and national colour.



– I don't think there are any stark differences. Every region has its good and bad people. (Chernihiv)

– Every region has its own way of thinking, way of talking, dialect, and even different pronunciation. (Lviv)

– The Dnieper River historically divided Ukraine into the left and the right banks. That meant different cultures and views of the world, and two different languages. The left bank belonged to Russia. (Kramatorsk)

– I think that only western Ukraine is different from the other parts of Ukraine. By and large, all other regions are the same. (Dnipro)

– In western Ukraine people cherish and value family relationships above all else. They keep their traditions. They are more religious. They are more conservative. (Kharkiv)

– The West has no industry. There you can drive all day and hardly see a single pipeline. But here they are everywhere. (Kramatorsk)

– The Eastern part is closer to Russia, right on the border. Western Ukraine borders Poland and Hungary. This affects our living standards and our mentality. The West is closer to Europe, there is more freedom there. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

– For me, people in Kherson and Mykolaiv are simpler and better than in Odesa, where they will take your last kopeck. (Lviv)

– Kharkiv is the intellectual, industrial, financial East, the city is developing itself. (Kharkiv)

– We [the West and East of Ukraine] are historically, religiously and ethnically different peoples. We were united in an artificial way, the Soviet government just heaped us all together. (Odesa)

– We are Ukrainians. We are. Except for Zakarpattia, which is not quite Ukraine... Not even close. Hungarians, Ukrainians, gypsies, we all live together here and we never have a quarrel with each other. (Rativtsi village, Zakarpattia)

– The Ukrainian language in Kyiv or Poltava differs greatly from the Ukrainian language in Zakarpattia, which is hard to understand, what with its Hungarian and Polish tangs and what is not... (Kharkiv)

– In the past, all the criminals were taken to Donetsk. (Dnipro)

– Donbas. I've a remark on that. When I was doing my service in Baikonur, USSR, we had some soldiers from Ukraine, but we were from Donbas. We were treated differently... Donbas was like a separate state. (Kramatorsk)

– In the USSR, Donbas had a more prestigious status than Ukraine itself! (Kramatorsk)

– For some reason, I associate the East with the working class. Here people work at plants and factories, and there [in the West] they have no such industry. They have tourism there. (Kramatorsk)

– They are more Europeans, and we are more Asians. Why? Tourism changes them; their cities are visited by a lot of foreigners. People there are always happy to greet these guests. They are hospitable and so they are well-bred, open and joyful. We are a little bit different. We are reserved. (Kramatorsk)

– Sumy and Poltava are the true Ukraine; ...they can serve as an example of Ukraine... (Lviv)

– Odesa, we might say, is a multinational little country. There are a lot of ethnic groups there. (Cherkasy)

– Regions differ by their attitudes to each other, language and culture. They have different traditions, but this is all interesting, this is Ukraine. (Rativtsi village, Zakarpattia)

Unlike residents of Donbas, the focus group participants considered residents of Crimea to be Crimeans rather than Ukrainians, and the native people of Crimea are thought to be Crimean Tatars. Participants in several groups noted that the Crimean Tatars proved to be more Ukrainian than the residents of Donbas.



– They [residents of Crimea] do not want to return to Ukraine. (Odesa)

– [Residents of Crimea] ... are not Ukrainians, but they can become Ukrainians. (Cherkasy)

– The Tatars turned out to be the only Ukrainians in Crimea. (Odesa)

2.5. UNITY OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE AND PATHS TO CONSOLIDATION

The issue of the unity of the Ukrainian people turns out to be rather complex and ambiguous for many focus group participants and leads to different opinions.

Some participants (about one-third) do not find the issue of the unity of Ukrainians problematic. Others admit that this problem exists, but have no idea how to resolve it.

Reflecting on how the situation in the country has changed over the last three years, the focus group participants could not reach common conclusions. Many of them believe that Ukrainians have become estranged from each other over the last three years. Some think that Ukrainians from different regions have been brought together by common problems, the conflict in Donbas, and the CTO. Some of the participants assumed that nothing has changed: people live their lives and deal with their financial problems in the same way as before, but have more problems as they do so. Others, however, were unable to decide whether or not there had been changes in this context in the last three years.



– There is no unity. We've been lied to so many times. We were united in 2004, and then again. But when they keep lying to us for so many years... (Chernihiv)

– The people are generally united, but most of them have been thrown into poverty. Some people are selfish and spiteful, especially pensioners. (Cherkasy)

– In my opinion, recent events have brought us all together. Soldiers from western and central Ukraine go to defend Donbas. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

Factors that are thought to divide people are as follows:

1. the absence of a middle class, a deep gulf between the rich and the poor;
2. the language issue;
3. different views of the direction of development of Ukraine, and the expectation of help from other countries, as some people are orientated towards Europe and others towards Russia;
4. nationalism, especially in its radical manifestations;
5. indifference, jealousy and spite among Ukrainians, the obsession with their own welfare and security, the tendency to resolve issues and problems through bribery;
6. different attitudes towards the war, displaced persons, events and residents in Donbas;
7. less often: different attitudes towards history, the events of the past and historic personages, for example, Bandera, Shukhevych, Mazepa and Hrushevskyi.



– The war divides people: will mothers from western Ukraine forgive residents of Donbas for killing their children? And again there will be Donbas over here and the west over there. (Kramatorsk)

– The mentality is different in different regions... I mean how they see their future: some people want to stay with Russia, others want to choose Western countries. For historical reasons, people look in different directions. (Chernihiv)

– Some consider Russia an aggressor, others don't. Some need the European Union, others don't. (Kramatorsk)


– History divides people. Some want to call it the "Patriotic War", and others want it to be the "Second World War"; some are for recognising the Holodomor famine, and others are against it. (Kharkiv)

Factors that are thought to unite Ukrainians from different regions include:

1. the sharp decrease in the quality of life, social and financial problems, and poverty;
2. joint territory and national borders;
3. common hopes and desire for peace and a better life;
4. shared grief and distress: the conflict in Donbas, the death of relatives and friends in the CTO;
5. a negative attitude towards the government and the President;

6. the ability of Ukrainians to support each other, provide mutual assistance, endure a lot and work hard.

The volunteer movement was rarely mentioned in the context of discussing uniting factors, while non-governmental organisations were not mentioned at all.



– Poverty unites us. There is no light at the end of the tunnel. We all know and feel that we all live badly. (Chernihiv)

– Our people have always been united. Generally speaking, no one ever abandons others in time of need... If the people were not so united, they would all have been taken long ago (not only Donbas and Crimea). (Cherkasy)


– Everyone dreams of bright future. So for this reason, they can find compromises. When the war ends, everything will be all right. (Kramatorsk)

– People became more united, in groups and ideas. They've become more patriotic. They've fed the army for two years. (Dnipro)

– We are united, for example, by victories, the Olympics, when Ukraine won Eurovision. (Kramatorsk)

– Being backed into tight corner, people become more tolerant to each other. We are getting used to each other. (Shabo village, Odesa oblast)

To the question of WHAT alienates Ukrainians of different regions, the responses of most focus group participants were similar: first, the government and politicians, followed by the media, which are owned by the same politicians and oligarchs and actively manipulate public opinion and awareness.



– We, Ukrainians from different regions, were not divided by the war at all, but by the government. (Ratiotsi village, Zakarpattia)

– Ukraine used to be united, but now the focus is on the West, East, South and North. This is highlighted by television broadcasts, which is not how it was in the past. Ukraine used to be united, and whether you lived in the east or the west was not important. (Lviv)

– The election campaign of Yanukovich in 2004 used some colors: red, yellow and green, saying that Yushchenko allegedly treated some people better. Nothing of the sort! They shouldn't have done this. (Vasylivska Pustosh village, Donetsk oblast)

Albeit rarely, some participants mentioned Russian propaganda as a significant factor that divides people.



– It is the Russian propaganda and Ukrainian politicians funded by Russia that create a division. That's how they work off the money. (Kyiv)

Some focus group participants noted that media propaganda creates entrenched stereotypes about residents of different regions, such as "the East feeds all of Ukraine" or "people in the West only talk about patriotism but they make a living working abroad".



2.6. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF PARTICULAR FACTORS ON THE UNITY OF SOCIETY

Common past

A considerable share of focus group participants tend to believe that this factor is likely to unite people. However, there is no single definition of this common past. Some people may think of the common past from the time of the Cossacks, while others may think primarily of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet period is believed to unite primarily pensioners or those nearing retirement age. Many groups included participants who felt nostalgia for Soviet times (in particular Chernihiv, Odesa, Kyiv and Dnipro oblasts).

Common present

About half of the focus group participants tend to perceive the national independence of Ukraine as a unifying factor: Ukraine became an independent state, more attention was paid to studying the history of the Ukrainian nation and popularising the Ukrainian language, national culture and traditions.

Some of the participants believe that independence was perceived differently in different regions, and that this period gave rise to the division of people and plundering of the state budget.

Attempts to reassess past events from the perspective of the Ukrainian people

This factor was more understandable in the context of reassessment and review of specific historic facts and periods. Younger participants took a more neutral stance.

Middle-age and elderly participants expressed the opinion that this is all perceived in an ambiguous way, provokes resistance and sometimes even irritation. They argue that “history should be studied by historians and not be used for purposes of manipulation in political games, which alienate people and intentionally distract them from more pressing issues”.

Some participants are unhappy with the processes of re-interpreting certain historic events and find these processes “intrusive”.

Fighting for the integrity of your country against a common enemy, Russia

For many focus group participants, thinking of Russia as the enemy of Ukraine is not obvious. This concerns not only the residents of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.

The focus group participants tended to blame the Russian and Ukrainian governments, and oligarch clans from both countries, for the armed conflict in the East, and do not place responsibility on Russia as a whole and its people. A considerable number of them believe it is impossible to fight against Russia, which is where their relatives and friends live.

In general, the focus group participants have ambiguous attitudes towards the war, its causes and the means of ending it.

Vision of the common future

The participants of all focus groups without exception expressed a desire to live in a peaceful and prosperous country independent of influence from other states, and one that has a good international reputation.

The participants have different views of how to achieve this, and only a handful of participants support association with Russia.

Some participants state that the need to make a geopolitical choice is a divisive factor.

Common heroes

When considering common heroes and outstanding personalities who are respected and thought of positively by Ukrainians in different regions, the focus group participants chose people mainly from among scientists, researchers, writers, poets, cultural figures, doctors, athletes, and, more rarely, politicians and historical figures.

Some participants immediately stated that politicians are out of the question.

The choices of the participants (those mentioned most often) were as follows:

1. Mykola Amosov, Oleksandr Shalimov, Borys Paton, and more rarely Igor Sikorsky, Serhiy Koroliov, and Oleg Antonov.
2. Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, Hryhorii Skovoroda, and more rarely Ivan Franko.
3. Bohdan Stupka, and more rarely Ada Rogovtseva.
4. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk and his band Okean Elzy, and more rarely a singer Kuzma Scriabin.
5. Oleksandr Usyk, Andriy Shevchenko (footballer), Vitali Klitschko (before he became the mayor of Kyiv and, according to many respondents, lost his good image), Serhiy Bubka.
6. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Mykhailo Hrushevsky.
7. More rarely, Mykola Gogol, Mykhailo Bulgakov, Ilf and Petrov, Leonid Bykov, Serhiy Zhadan, Kazimir Malevich.

The most important steps that should be taken by the government to unite Ukrainians

Based on the responses of the focus group participants, the following expectations can be identified:

1. ending the war in Donbas;
2. improving the living standards and social security of citizens. This would make people feel more calm, kind and satisfied and improve their attitude towards the state, as well as increase patriotism and unity;
3. increasing the value of an individual in society and respect for each citizen by the state;
4. refraining from dividing Ukrainians, emphasising their differences in a negative context and manipulating the language issue and historical events;
5. finding and actively promoting a national idea that will be understandable and attractive to residents of different regions, an ideology which, for example, would place the emphasis on the independence of



Ukraine from other countries, on active economic, scientific and technological development, etc.;

6. actively improving the cultural level of the population.

The respondents place primary responsibility for achieving unity on the President and authorities at various levels, emphasising that ordinary citizens have no tools to influence the government and the situation in the country in general.

The participants in all focus groups noted that Ukrainians can only be united by a new charismatic and honest leader, who must be a professional and, most importantly, a patriot.

What common citizens can do (according to the focus group participants) to strengthen the unity of the society:

1. take a more active civic position in various ways: not be indifferent to other people's problems, be able to empathise and help others, participate in solving problems at the level of one's house or block of flats;
2. not ignore elections at various levels with the thought that "I make no difference, and those required will be chosen, not those voted for";
3. respond to instances of injustice and disrespect from the state, not be afraid to defend their position, even through participation in protests;
4. be more tolerant, patient and sober-minded; treat residents of other regions with respect and not to fall victim to stereotypes; to be decent and responsible, for example, not to give bribes;
5. travel around Ukraine more, get to know the traditions, customs, and specific features of different regions; to be more open to communication and host more guests;
6. raise one's own cultural and educational level to prevent falling victim to propaganda and stereotyping, giving in to provocations and falling for empty promises;
7. teach children to respect each other, promote love for Ukraine, its various traditions, culture, history, language, national symbols, and customs, and the local colour and uniqueness of each of its oblasts; to bring up decent, sincere, kind and hardworking patriots.

2.7. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE FOCUS GROUP RESULTS

The responses of these citizens showed that the society continues to hold an ambiguous attitude to Ukraine and various groups of Ukrainians. The aspect that most significantly influenced the answers of respondents was their dissatisfaction with their personal socio-economic situation, and primarily a decreasing living standard. In many cases this was the basis for attitudes towards the state (which were generally negative). In addition, a significant part of participants in all focus groups demonstrated a predisposition to focus primarily on their own problems and problems of their own social circle.

The perception of Ukraine as a state among the focus group participants is often mixed with distrust towards state institutions, government leaders and politicians, and often depends on opinions prevailing in certain social circles, regardless of the availability of other sources of information.

Assessments of other regions of Ukraine and of the European direction of the state's development show a lack of personal experience and insufficient information, which leads to the persistence of stereotypes and vulnerability on the part of citizens to common myths.

There is a significant level of mutual distrust among residents of different regions, which often results from deeply entrenched stereotypes, conservatism, inadequate information, and lack of knowledge and communication. In particular, this is seen in the small number of specific references when talking about problems in communication with residents of other regions.

It may be stated that the politicisation and exploitation of differences between the residents of different regions of the country, including historical memory, the language issue, and geopolitical choice, continue to have a negative impact on the process of shaping the overall national identity.

The situation is further complicated by a deteriorating socio-economic position of the majority of citizens, disappointment in the actions of government institutions, loss of trust in the government and politicians, and their ability to bring about positive changes in the country.

At the same time, the research clearly shows a tendency towards a generally tolerant mutual perception among residents of different regions of the country. It also shows that the society has the capacity for consolidation and that there is a societal demand for formation of a new national idea, common for all citizens, which would offer the citizens clear and comprehensible common prospects for the future. For example, a significant share of the focus group participants showed a tendency to recognise themselves as citizens. It is also important to note that residents of various regions of Ukraine would like to have more reasons to be proud of their country.

When analysing the focus group results, we must also take into account the specific nature of this type of research and its differences from large-scale sociological surveys, including the possible impact of leaders on other focus group participants, regional and local considerations, and so on. ■

3. THE FORMATION/ PRESERVATION OF IDENTITY: EXPERIENCE OF THE BALTICS, AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES

Many countries of the former USSR and the socialist bloc faced the problem of a formation or “reboot” of their identity under new conditions that were fundamentally different from both their socialist past and the inter-war period, which was the time of the establishment (the Baltic States), revival (Poland) or dynamic development (Romania) of their statehood.

3.1. IDENTITY FORMATION EXPERIENCE OF THE BALTIC STATES

Identity policy in the Baltic states has both commonalities and differences due to disparate history and national composition of the population at the time when independence was regained. Common traits include the desire to radically dissociate themselves from the Soviet heritage.


Unlike Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have never regarded the Soviet period as a time that included “good things too”. They considered it a period of occupation, and the Soviet authorities, although partially represented by local staff, were regarded as absolutely alien institution, with all of its “achievements” evaluated negatively and not considered to be in the interests of these countries.

Likewise, the “liberation from German fascist invaders” was also considered only a replacement of one invader by another, while the term “Great Patriotic War” was excluded from the historical discourse from the very beginning. As a result, the relations of the Baltic States with Russia, which officially proclaimed itself the successor of the USSR and at some point created a kind of cult of victory in this war, have always been chilly or strained.

Since the Baltic republics considered their independence as a restoration of the state status they had before 1940, and themselves as direct political and legal successors of the states of the inter-war period, their societies (except the non-native population) had no doubt about the foundations of their identity.

Thus, it was not a question of identity formation or “reboot”, but, above all, about protecting it by overcoming the effects of the Soviet occupation and “returning” to the European community. The consistent desire of the

Baltic political elites to achieve membership in the EU and NATO for their countries was based on a clear understanding that this – not any regional alliances or bilateral arrangements – was the only thing that could provide a reliable guarantee of their state sovereignty and national development.



3.1.1. Latvia

The specific features of the political identity of Latvia in the first years after regaining national independence were largely due to the fact that when the country was part of the USSR the percentage of ethnic Latvians in the overall structure of the population of the Republic was significantly reduced. In 1989, they made up 52%, compared to 77% in 1935, 62% in 1959, 57% in 1970, and 54% in 1979.¹

Russian was spoken by 81.6% of the Latvian population, including 68.3% of Latvians, whereas Latvian was spoken by only 20% of Russian-speaking residents of the republic, including 21.1% of ethnic Russians.² From 1959 to 1989 the percentage of people who considered Russian their native language increased from 31.4% to 42.1%.³ The Russian language was predominant in the capital of Latvia and in all cities under the jurisdiction of the republic.

There were justifiable concerns that such trends as the small total number of ethnic Latvians (1,387,757 Latvians out of 2,665,770 residents of Latvia in 1989)⁴ may lead to their assimilation. Therefore, the first step towards preserving Latvian identity was the language policy. The local authorities took high-priority actions to defend the Latvian language before they officially gained independence.

¹ Website of the Central Statistics Bureau (Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes (CSP). – http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/Sociala/Sociala_ikgad_iedz_iedzskaitis/ISO080.px/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8.

² Results of the 1989 Latvian SSR census – http://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/1989_tautas_skaitisana.pdf.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Website of the Central Statistics Bureau (Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes (CSP). – http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/Sociala/Sociala_ikgad_iedz_iedzskaitis/ISO080.px/table/tableViewLayout2/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8.

In 1989, the Constitution of the Latvian SSR was amended to include an article declaring Latvian language the state language in the republic, and the Law on Language was adopted, with considerable amendments made in 1992. In 1999, the Law on the State Language was adopted. This Law recognised Latvian as the only state language. The status of indigenous language was given to the Livonian language, which the state was obliged to preserve, defend and develop (it is now spoken by only a few dozen people⁵). All other languages used in the country for private communication were declared to be foreign.

Pursuant to law, government officials made a list of public and private sector professions that require knowledge of the state language and introduced penalties for violation of these requirements. The list was later expanded and the penalties were increased. The Law on the State Language and other laws and bylaws provided for the predominance of the Latvian language in education, the judiciary and the media.

However, other languages (mainly Russian) maintain their positions in secondary and secondary vocational education, as well as in private post-secondary educational institutions. Of 811 schools funded from the state budget, 104 schools have their curricula in the languages of national minorities (Russian in 94 schools, Polish in 4 schools, Ukrainian in 1 school, Belorussian in 1 school, Hebrew in 2 schools, Lithuanian in 1 school and Estonian in 1 school).⁶ However, some lessons are taught in the state language.

By consent of all the parties, it is permitted to use a non-state language in court proceedings. In other cases, persons who do not know the state language are provided with an interpreter.

The responsibility for enforcing compliance with the Law and other regulations on the use of the state language, rests with the State Language Centre (*Valsts valodas centrs*) under the Ministry of Justice (established in 1992). On principle, Latvia did not ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

On 16 January 2002, upon the initiative of the President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, the State Language Commission was established to “consider the state language situation and to develop proposals for strengthening Latvian as the state language and for developing the state language”. The activities of the Commission are funded by the Chancery of the President of the Republic of Latvia.⁷ The Commission’s main task is to support development of the conceptual approaches of the state language policy on the basis of comprehensive analysis of the language situation, to

develop the state programme for studying and developing the Latvian language and to determine strategies for implementation of this programme.⁸

An integral part of identity preservation is the citizenship policy aimed at avoiding assimilation of the native population of Latvia. The first step was to adopt the regulation of the Republic of Latvia Parliament “On the Renewal of Republic of Latvia Citizens’ Rights and the Fundamental Principles of Naturalisation” dated 15 October 1991. On 22 July 1994, this regulation and other related documents became null and void based on the adoption of the Law “On Citizenship”.⁹

According to this Law, residents of Latvia as of 17 June 1940 (the day when Latvia was occupied by the Red Army) and their descendants, as well as Latvians and Livonians who prove that their ancestors lived in Latvia in the period from 1881 to 17 June 1940, knew Latvian and belonged to the national people (for Latvians) or indigenous people (for Livonians), were recognised as citizens of Latvia. The right to citizenship was reserved for persons who left Latvia in the period from 17 June 1940 to 4 May 1990, fleeing from the Soviet or German occupation, as well as their descendants.

Other categories of the population were recognised as non-citizens and, if desired, could undergo naturalisation. The conditions for naturalisation were as follows: residence in the territory of Latvia for the last five years; knowledge of Latvian (at a basic level), basic provisions of the Constitution, the text of the anthem, the essentials of the history and culture of Latvia; having a legal source of income; renunciation of previous citizenship; and commitment to remain loyal to the Republic of Latvia. Some categories of residents of Latvia were given restrictions on naturalisation.¹⁰ Currently, Latvia has 232,000 non-citizens who are not permitted to take part in political activities or the basic social guarantees and the right to freely choose a profession and place of work.¹¹

The Law provides for the deprivation of Latvian citizenship for: service in the armed forces or other military organisations of other countries, with limited exceptions; actions in furtherance of a violent overthrow of the government of the Republic of Latvia and attempts to undermine its independence; public calls for such actions or violent changes in the constitutional system, although provided that “according to a court decision and in the event of deprivation of Latvian citizenship, the person will not be a stateless person”.

In 2013 the Law was revised and amended to liberalise the acquisition of Latvian citizenship.

⁵ European minority languages. – <http://minlan.narod.ru/Livonian.html>.

⁶ Minority education: statistics and trends. – Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, 21 March 2016, <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/minority-education-in-latvia/minority-education-statistics-and-trends>.

⁷ Valsts valodas komisija (State Language Commission). – Website of the President of Latvia, http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?cat_id=8.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Law “On Citizenship”. – Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/ru/informacionnye-materialy-i-dokumenty/voprosy-istorii-latvii/zakon-latviyskoy-respubliki-o-grazhdanstve>.

¹⁰ According to the Law “On Citizenship”, naturalisation shall not apply to: persons who stayed in Latvia after being demobilised from the Soviet armed forces after 17 June 1940, provided that before their call-up and service Latvia was not their permanent residence; former Soviet intelligence agency officers (except for persons working in financial, administrative/economic, and planning departments); persons who as members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Latvian Communist Party, the Interfront of the LSSR, the United Work Collective Council, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-Latvian Committee of Public Safety and the Latvian Union of Communists took action against the Republic of Latvia after 13 January 1991.

¹¹ How many non-citizens remain in Latvia? – TV*NET, http://rus.tvnet.lv/novosti/obschjestvo/329317-skolko_njegrzhdan_ostalos_v_latvii.



The third direction of the policy for preservation of national identity has been the memory policy with a focus on the period of the Soviet occupation and the Second World War. The main documents that set forth the official position on the events of that time were the declarations of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia "On the Occupation of Latvia" dated 22 August 1996; "On the Latvian Legionaries in the Second World War" dated 29 October 1998; and "On the Condemnation of the Totalitarian Communist Occupation Regime in Latvia" dated 12 May 2005.

These regulations set forth the basic approaches to assessment of the historical past: affirm that the Soviet occupation meant purposeful genocide against the people of Latvia and actions to destroy their identity; provide a positive explanation of the motives of the citizens of Latvia to participate in the formation of the Latvian volunteer legion and in the anti-Soviet national underground actions, which were to protect Latvia from the renewal of Stalin's regime and to struggle for the national independence of the country; condemn the totalitarian communist occupation regime of the USSR and the actions of all persons involved in the crimes committed by this regime; and recognise and commemorate the participants in the national resistance as fighters for the freedom of Latvia.¹²

In 1998, the Commission of Historians was established under the President of the Republic of Latvia. There also exists the position of Advisor to the President on History, which emphasises the importance of historical issues for the current state policy of Latvia. The main task of the Commission during the first stage of its existence was to study and consider the problem of "Crimes against

humanity during the two occupations of 1940-1956" and to arrange for preparation of a final report.¹³

The Commission was further assigned to "contribute to the teaching of history at schools by preparing a basis for writing new books, as well as promote awareness within society of the events of this period and explain the history of Latvia abroad".¹⁴

The Museum of the Occupation, the Latvian War Museum and the Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism under the Constitution Protection Bureau are worth noting as government agencies that are actively engaged in studying the history of the occupation and publicising the lessons learnt. Non-governmental agencies include the Occupation of Latvia Research Association and the Small Library of Latvian History Foundation, one of whose tasks is to develop "immunity" among the Latvian population to Russian and Soviet myths.

In general, identity policy in Latvia is primarily aimed at overcoming the Soviet legacy in political, demographic and cultural areas, as well as limiting the propaganda influence of Russia, which is justifiably seen as a threat to Latvian sovereignty.

3.1.2. Estonia



The special attention paid by Estonians to protection of their identity after restoration of statehood is caused by negative demographic factors that prevailed in the Republic during

the Soviet period. The share of Estonians in the population of Estonia steadily decreased in the postwar years. Thus, while Estonians constituted 88% of the population in 1934, the share was 61.5% in 1989.¹⁵ Such a trend was bound to cause concerns regarding the future of the nation. According to a survey in 1995, 67% of Estonians believed that the threat to existence of the Estonian nation still existed.¹⁶

As in Latvia, the main areas in the preservation of national identity were language policy and policies in the areas of citizenship and national memory.

The language policy was aimed at the preservation, spread and development of the Estonian language, transforming it into the language of inter-ethnic communication in the country. In accordance with the 1995 Law of the Republic of Estonia "On Language", the official language of Estonia is Estonian, and all other languages, including those used by national minorities, are considered foreign. According to the Law, measures to support foreign languages must not cause harm to the Estonian language.

¹² For texts of the regulations see: Diukov A. R., Symynde V. V. State history policy of Latvia: materials for study. – Historical Memory Foundation, 2011, p. 20-31, www.historyfoundation.ru/dl.php?file=739.

¹³ To this end, five working groups were formed in such areas as "Crimes against humanity in Latvia in 1940-1941", "The Holocaust in Latvia in 1941-1944", "Crimes against humanity in Latvia during the Nazi occupation in 1941-1944", "Crimes against humanity in Latvia during the Soviet occupation in 1944-1956" and "Latvia as part of the Soviet Union in 1956-1990". See: Commission of Historians in Latvia. http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?cat_id=7&lng=ru.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Population by Nationality. – <http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/country/population-by-nationality.html>.

¹⁶ Alar Jaanus. Estonian Citizenship Law: Principles and Evolution. – <http://www.hrights.ru/text/b9/Chapter10.htm>.

Proficiency in Estonian is compulsory for public servants, employees of governmental institutions and local government authorities, as well as for employees of public legal entities and their institutions, notaries, court officers, sworn interpreters and employees of their offices.

Employees of commercial companies, non-commercial associations and foundations with the status of private legal entities, as well as individual entrepreneurs are required to have proficiency in Estonian if this is justified in terms of the public interest, including: public safety, public order, public administration, education, health, protection of consumer rights and labour safety. Language proficiency is assessed by an examination, and the person receives a certificate regarding the level of language proficiency based on the examination results. These certificates are entered into a state registry.

State supervision over compliance with the Law is carried out by the Language Inspectorate, whose officials are authorised to send representatives of the aforementioned categories to the examination if they have reasonable doubts concerning the appropriate level of their proficiency in Estonian. If the person fails the examination at the appropriate level, he or she loses the certificate of language proficiency and faces the appropriate employment consequences.

In addition, the Language Inspectorate monitors compliance of the official use of the language with literary standards, adherence to requirements established for the language of records management, holding meetings, communication with citizens, etc. The Inspectorate officials are authorised to freely obtain any necessary information, make suggestions to employers concerning termination of employment agreements with employees who have an improper level of proficiency in Estonian, and make similar suggestions concerning dismissal of public servants from their positions.

Languages of national minorities may be used in internal records management by local government authorities, if representatives of this national minority comprise at least half of the population of the local government agency. The right to use the minority language as a language of internal records management is provided by the Government of the Republic based on a recommendation from the local government assembly.

However, the minority language may be used in such institutions only alongside Estonian, while correspondence with other local governments and national governmental agencies is carried out only in Estonian. All writings on seals, stamps and official forms, as well as texts of notices, announcements and messages must be in Estonian, with optional translations into the language of the respective minority.

Estonian is the main language of information. It must be used to translate foreign-language texts of audio and video productions, radio and TV programmes and advertising. No translation is required for foreign-language lessons, news announcer texts from original foreign-language news broadcasts, and live broadcasts, but these

may comprise not more than 10% of the weekly volume of domestically produced broadcasts.¹⁷

Language issues are the responsibility of the Estonian Language Council under to the Ministry of Education and Research, established on 6 April 2000.¹⁸ In 2004, the Government approved the Estonian Language Development Strategy 2004-2010. Currently, the Estonian Language Development Plan 2011-2017 is being implemented.¹⁹

One of the important aspects of language policy has been strengthening of the position of the Estonian language in the educational system. According to Article 21 of the Law “On Primary and Secondary Schools”, adopted in 2010, the Estonian language is the language of instruction in primary schools (nine years of education) and in upper secondary schools (12 years of education). Municipal schools may choose other languages of instruction in accordance with established procedures.²⁰

However, schools and classes with a non-Estonian language of instruction must, firstly, have mandatory learning of Estonian in grades 1-3 and, secondly, “...arrange for learning of the Estonian language at a level that will allow graduates of the primary school to continue their education in educational institutions with Estonian as the language of instruction”.

The objectives of converting most schools to the Estonian language are as follows: “encouraging students to use the official language in various language situations, providing them with equal opportunities to receive higher education, participate in public life, and help in achieving success in the labour market”. Education in the official language is also regarded as “important tool of integration that may increase the unity of the society”.²¹

One of the means of preserving identity, providing prospects for national development and state-building has been limitation of opportunities for the non-Estonian population to affect the political and economic life of the country and, consequently, a reduction of opportunities for Russia to influence the politics of the restored state through the Russian-speaking population (in Estonia, as in Latvia, they spoke not of gaining independence, but rather of restoration of the statehood lost in 1940 as a result of the Soviet occupation).

According to the 1938 Law “On Citizenship”, which took effect at the beginning of 1992, only those who possessed citizenship before 16 June 1940, and their direct descendants, were recognised as citizens. Those persons who came to the country after its annexation by the USSR and their descendants were permitted to obtain Estonian citizenship through a quite complicated process of naturalisation. Due to non-citizens (about a third of the population, mainly Russians) being deprived of their political rights and unable to participate in the elections, the Parliament became completely Estonian after the 1992 elections. This enabled the restored state to carry out liberal economic reforms quickly and hold a consistent course towards European integration.

¹⁷ Law of the Republic of Estonia “On Language”. – <http://rup.ee/rus/pdf/zakoninarusskom/27.pdf>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017. – https://www.hm.ee/sites/default/files/eestikeelearengukavainglise.indd_.pdf.

²⁰ Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act. Passed 09.06.2010. – Riigi Teataja, <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013042/consolide>.

²¹ Russian-language schools' transition to partial Estonian-language instruction – What is happening and why? – Estonia.eu, 19 September 2016, <http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/russian-language-schools-transition-to-partial-estonian-language-instruction-what-is-happening-and-why.html>.



The current Law of the Republic of Estonia "On Citizenship", adopted in 1995, contains the following requirements for obtaining Estonian citizenship: a long-term or permanent residence permit; residing in Estonia on the basis of such a residence permit for at least eight years, five of them permanently; a registered place of residence in Estonia; proficiency in the Estonian language in accordance with requirements of the Law; knowledge of the Constitution and the Law "On Citizenship"; legal and stable income; loyalty to the Estonian state; and an oath of loyalty to the constitutional order of Estonia.

Language proficiency must be at a B-1 level, which allows for: communicating in most everyday situations; being able to describe one's own experiences, events, dreams and goals, and briefly justify and explain one's positions and plans; understanding everything essential on topics such as work, school and leisure activities; and being able to compose a simple text on a familiar topic.

There are also restrictions on obtaining Estonian citizenship. Specifically, citizenship is denied to: persons who have committed acts against the Estonian state and its security; persons who are or were employed in an intelligence service or security agency of any foreign state; persons served as regular servicemen in the armed forces of any foreign country; were transferred to reserve; their wives who came to Estonia in connection with the serviceman's assignment to the place of service, transfer to reserves or retirement from service.²²

Obviously, the latter provisions are aimed at former employees of the USSR intelligence apparatus and military officers of the Soviet army, who by and large showed no support for independence of the Baltic states, and sometimes even actively resisted it.

A significant role in formation of the post-Soviet Estonian identity was played by the memory policy, which, just as in Latvia, is aimed primarily at "settling accounts" with the Soviet period of Estonian history.

In 1998 President Lennart Meri established the Estonian International Commission for investigation of crimes against humanity. This Commission investigated crimes against humanity which were committed in Estonia from the time it was occupied by the Red Army in June 1940. The Commission's work was based on the definitions of "crime against humanity", "war crime" and "genocide" contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Commission issued three reports: "The German occupation of Estonia in 1941-1944", "The Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940-1941" and "Soviet occupation of Estonia from 1944".

The Commission concluded its work in December 2008.²³ Its work with regard to investigation of the Soviet period in Estonian history is continued by the Estonian Memory Institute. This organisation was established in

2008 upon the initiative of the President Toomas Hendrik Ilves in order to give citizens of Estonia detailed and impartial overview of the human rights situation in Estonia during the Soviet occupation".

The Estonian Memory Institute operates under the President of the Republic. Rather than protecting human rights and performing judicial functions, it investigates violations of human rights during a certain period and creates databases that "will help study processes that took place in Soviet times in Estonia, as well as their consequences in modern Estonian society and throughout Central and Eastern Europe, beginning from the collapse of the Soviet Union".²⁴ The Institute chooses topics for investigation and prepares conclusions based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.

Among the institutions that shape the historical memory of Estonians and their post-Soviet identity is the Estonian Museum of Occupations in Tallinn, which was opened in 2003 and whose exhibits represent the period from 1940 to 1991.²⁵



3.1.3. Lithuania

The situation in Lithuania after the restoration of state independence was quite different than in Latvia and Estonia, since Lithuanians constituted the overwhelming majority of the Republic's population: 79.58% according to the census of 1989.²⁶ The largest national minorities were Russians (9.37%) and Poles (7.02%).²⁷ Consequently, the problem of assimilation of Lithuanians was not so acute, and the government adopted a more liberal citizenship law, according to which all citizens of the Republic as of the restoration of state independence were declared Lithuanian citizens.²⁸ Lithuania never faced the problem of stateless persons that complicated the domestic political situation in other Baltic countries, as well as their international relations.

According to the census of 2011, Lithuanians are in the majority in all regions of the Republic (more than 80% in most regions) except for the Šalčininkai and Vilnius districts, where ethnic Poles are predominant.²⁹ This homogeneity of ethnic composition leads to a relatively low level of significance with regard to international problems in the country, although they do exist: Poles, for example, demand cultural autonomy, in particular claiming their right to write their names on documents in Polish and have bilingual names of streets and settlements and signs in places where they are concentrated.

Lithuania pays considerable attention to the preservation of its language as an important element of the national identity. The Law of the Republic of Lithuania

²² The Law of the Republic of Estonia "On Citizenship". – Protection of rights on-line, August 23, 2014, <http://pravfond.eu/?p=1430>.

²³ International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity. – <http://www.historycommission.ee>.

²⁴ Estonian Memory Institute. – Website of the President of Estonia, <https://president.ee/ru/president/institutions/152-2010-10-04-12-59-06/5079-2010-10-04-13-53-56/layout-institution.html>. See also: Estonian Institute of Historical Memory. – <http://www.mnemosyne.ee>.

²⁵ Website of the Museum of Occupations. – <http://www.okupatsioon.ee/index.php/et>.

²⁶ National composition of the population of the republics of the USSR. – All-Union census of 1989, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=8.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Lithuania: analysis of electoral legislation in the context of compliance with common democratic standards and human rights. – SIS-EMO website, <http://www.cis-emo.net/ru/materials/demokraticheskie-processy/litva-analiz-izbiratel'nogo-zakonodatel'stva-v-kontekste-soblyudeniya-obshchedemokraticheskikh>.

²⁹ Results of the 2011 Population and Housing Census of the Republic of Lithuania. – <http://statistics.bookdesign.lt/?lang=en>.



“On the State Language”, as well as the Constitution, recognise Lithuanian as the state language. Other languages do not have official status.

According to the Law, the Lithuanian language is used for keeping records, accounting, and documentation in all institutions, for correspondence between national and local government institutions, agencies, companies and organisations, and for all legal agreements between legal entities and individuals; it is used for court proceedings (persons who do not know it are provided with an interpreter free of charge); official events (sessions, conferences, meetings, assemblies and so on) organised by national and local government institutions, state agencies and companies.³⁰

The state ensures the right to primary, vocational and higher education in the state language throughout the country. There are national minority schools where Lithuanian is taught only as a subject. However, history and geography are also taught in Lithuanian at these schools.

Publicly shown audiovisual programmes and films must be translated into the state language or have Lithuanian subtitles (there are radio- and TV programmes broadcast in national minority languages: Belorussian, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian).

Heads, civil servants and officials in national and local authorities, agencies and services; heads, civil servants and officials in police offices, law enforcement agencies, communication and transport institutions, health care facilities and social welfare institutions and so on, must know the state language according to the language categories established by the government.

The Law provides that the state must concern itself with the prestige of proper usage of the Lithuanian language; ensure that its rules, personal names, toponyms, dialects and written artifacts are preserved; provide material resources for the state language to function; and provide extensive support for the research of the Lithuanian language as a priority task.

Enforcement is delegated to the Language Inspectorate under the State Lithuanian Language Commission.³¹

The State Lithuanian Language Commission determines the areas and tasks of concern for the state language and establishes and approves language standards. The Commission consists of 17 members appointed by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Fifteen members represent universities, the Lithuanian Language Institute and other institutions.

The Commission considers draft laws pertaining to language policy and concerning the state language and submits recommendations to the Seimas or the government. In accordance with a decision of the Constitutional Court, the Seimas cannot ignore proposals submitted by the Commission if they relate to the language use.

Commissions for terminology, grammar, pronunciation, surnames and names, and information technologies operate on a continuous basis in the intersession periods. An important task of the Commission is to promote the use of the Lithuanian language for information exchange. For this purpose, the Lithuanian Ministry of Communication is implementing a programme entitled “Lithuanian language in the information society”.

The State Bank of Terms was established in Lithuania, which includes only the terms approved by the Commission, which are required for use in official speech.

According to the Law “On Public Information” dated 2 July 1996, public information must be prepared and distributed in the state language or other languages in compliance with the Law “On the State Language” and regulations issued by the State Lithuanian Language Commission. Programmes not broadcast in Lithuanian must be translated or have subtitles (except educational, holiday or special programmes and broadcasts, as well as programmes from foreign countries and programmes for national minorities). The minimum percentage of the latter in each individual case (when granting a broadcast license) is determined by the Commission for Radio and Television Broadcasting of Lithuania with due regard for the needs of national minorities.³²

According to the 2011 census data, 98% of Latvian residents named one language as native, and for 85.4 of these this was Lithuanian. Most representatives of the largest ethnic groups consider the language of their ethnicity to be native: 99.2% of Lithuanians, 77.1% of Poles and 87.2% of Russians.³³

An important part of the national identity in Lithuania is historical memory. Lithuanians, who first achieved statehood as early as the thirteenth century, have a rather deep but controversial memory (as with Ukrainians), because a significant part of the Lithuanian heritage may be claimed by Belorussians (who made up most of the population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) and Poles (who politically and culturally dominated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the 1569 Union of Lublin.)

At this time, the main topics of the memory policy are the Soviet and German occupations and the Lithuanian resistance movement. Criminal liability in the form of imprisonment for up to three years may be imposed for denying the occupation of Lithuania. Glorification of the resistance is one of important areas of the memory policy.

³⁰ The Law of the Republic of Lithuania “On the State Language” (1995). – http://lib.rada.gov.ua/static/LIBRARY/catalog/law/lit_mova.html.

³¹ Ibid.

³² The Law of the Republic of Lithuania “On Public Information”. – http://lib.rada.gov.ua/LibRada/static/LIBRARY/catalog/law/lit_inf.html.

³³ Results of the 2011 Population and Housing Census of the Republic of Lithuania. – <http://statistics.bookdesign.lt/?lang=en>.

There is a widespread opinion in Lithuania that it was the large-scale and effective organisation of the resistance that prevented the Soviet government from changing the ethnic composition of the country by relocating inhabitants of other regions of the USSR into its territory, as happened in Latvia and Estonia.

The country has the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania.³⁴ This was called the State Genocide Research Centre of Lithuania until 16 July 1993 (created by a Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 29 October 1992 for the preservation, processing and study of the “archives of all secret services, repressive structures and the Communist Party of Lithuania”). The Museum of Genocide Victims operates under the jurisdiction of the Centre.

The Foundation was established under the Centre in 1998 in order to research genocide of and resistance by the people of Lithuania, and to provide support and commemorate the victims. The Foundation provides financial aid to the victims of repressions and participants in the resistance movement, as well as funding of victim commemoration programmes. Apart from its charter, the Centre’s activities are governed by a separate Law of Lithuania “On the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre” dated 5 June 1997.³⁵ 11 March 2006, a declaration of cooperation was signed between the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania and the Centre for Research of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.

3.2. POLAND



Unlike in the former Soviet republics, now independent states, for Poland, as other post-socialist countries, the problems of oppression, dwindling or genocide of the indigenous nation, as well as protection of

the national language and culture, were not quite so pressing. However, the issue of protecting the Polish language is considered to be an important tool for preserving the national identity and development of the national culture. Such a conclusion can be drawn based on the preamble to the Law “On the Polish Language” dated 7 October 1999. (*Ustawa o języku polskim*). This preamble contains the following provisions justifying the need to adopt this Law:

- the Polish language is the main element of the national identity and heritage of the national culture;
- there is historical experience of invaders and occupants utilising efforts against the Polish language as a tool of the denationalisation;
- there is a need to protect the national identity during the process of globalisation;
- Polish culture is a contribution to development of a shared culturally diverse Europe, and preservation and development of this culture is possible only through protection of the Polish language;



- protection of the Polish language is the duty of all authorities and public institutions of the Republic of Poland and its residents.³⁶

Among the important factors in formation of contemporary Polish identity is historical memory. In a relatively short period, Polish society had to repeatedly adjust its sense of itself, seeking confirmation of the new views of the past.

During different periods of the formation and development of the modern Polish nation, different periods of national history were put forth where one could find the solution for the current problems. In particular, post-socialist Poland faced the following tasks that required turning to modern history:

- to prove its commitment to the European idea, i.e. the willingness of the state and society to join NATO and the EU;
- to connect the past and the present, i.e. prewar and post-socialist Poland, which required defining the attitude towards the postwar past;
- to define the attitude towards problems of the historical past in relations with neighbouring nations, some of which had just gained or restored their statehood;
- last but not least, to define the outline of modern Polish identity.

Although the “historical policy” (“polityka historyczna”) was officially recognised as one of the areas of the government policy only in 2005 after the Law and Justice party came to power, it has a long tradition in Poland and is well protected institutionally.

In addition to academic institutions, several establishments have operated in the country since the post-war period, such as the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites³⁷ and the Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation – the Institute of National Remembrance.³⁸ The primary state institution of Poland in this area now is the Institute of National Remembrance.

³⁴ Website of the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania – <http://genocid.lt/centras/ru>.

³⁵ The Law the Republic of Lithuania “On the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania”. – http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc?p_id=43653.

³⁶ Ustawa z dnia 7 października 1999 r. o języku polskim. – Сайт Интернетовый Систем Актów Prawnych, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19990900999>.

³⁷ The Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites (*Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa*), was established in 1947, was given its current name in 1988, and is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister of Poland.

³⁸ The Lead Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against the Polish Nation — the Institute of National Remembrance (*Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu – Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*) was established in 1945 as the Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. It received the aforementioned name in 1991 and joined the Institute of National Remembrance as an investigation agency in 1998.

The Institute was established as a state institution on 18 December 1998. Its various activities are focused on crimes against the Polish nation committed during the period from 1 September 1939 to 31 July 1990.

The Institute is engaged in management, collection, storage, processing and publication of documents of the Polish security services of the Communist era, as well as security services of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union regarding crimes of the Nazi and Communist regimes against Polish citizens and other crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes committed in the said period, investigation of these crimes, lustration of security services and governmental officials (during 1944-1990), and outreach activities.

The Institute consists of several integral parts, including the Bureau of Provision and Archiving of Documents, Bureau of Public Education, Lustration Bureau and the Lead Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against the Polish Nation.

Branches of the Institute have been established in the cities that have courts of appeal. Although the Institute of National Remembrance is funded by the state budget, it is independent in its activities from the authorities in accordance with the Law that established it. Its President is elected and dismissed by the Sejm upon a recommendation from the Institute Board. Prosecutors of the Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation and the Lustration Bureau, which are part of the Institute, as well as prosecutors of commissions and bureaus that are part of the branches, are appointed and dismissed by the Prosecutor General. The Director of the Commission is appointed and dismissed by the President of Poland upon a recommendation by the Prosecutor General after consultation with the President of the Institute of National Remembrance.³⁹

The Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression was established in 1991, with its main tasks being: to ensure due respect, assistance and care for war veterans and victims of oppression; to preserve and promote the traditions of struggle for the sovereignty and independence of Poland.⁴⁰

According to the Law "On War Veterans and Victims of War and Post-war Oppressions", the war veterans include, but are not limited to, those who served in: the Polish army or Polish military units in the armies of the allies during the Second World War; underground resistance formations and guerrilla troops from 1939-1945; the allied armies and allied resistance movements from 1939-1945 (except the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR and other special services that acted against the Polish nation); underground military formations from the end of the war to the end of 1956, as well as those who participated in battles along with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.⁴¹

Thus, former soldiers of the Home Army were also recognised war veterans, while official attitude of socialist Poland to them was similar to attitude of the USSR to UIA.

One of non-governmental organisations worth mentioning is the Karta Center. This NGO was established in 1982, originally as editorial office of an underground newspaper (later an almanac). Since 2004, it has a status of non-profit charitable organisation engaged in documentation and publication of materials concerning contemporary history of Poland and Central and Eastern Europe.

The Centre collects and organises documents in the following areas: the East Archive focuses mainly on the fate of the Polish population and people in the eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic after the Second World War; the Opposition Archive is dedicated to the public resistance and opposition against the authorities from 1944-1989; the "Close History" Archive contains contest entries from senior high school students (*ponadgimnazjalnych*) that describe events that took place in different regions of Poland during the 20th century; the Photographic Archive contains more than 190,000 photos covering the period from 1890-1990; and the Oral History Archive contains more than 2,500 audio and video recordings from 1987-2007.

The means used to promote the information collected and studied are extremely diverse. In 2005, The Centre created a Learning from History Internet portal dedicated to the history of Poland and its neighbours in the 20th century. It also has an active "20th century" portal and issues a quarterly newspaper entitled "Karta".

An example of international cooperation was the "Common Place, Common Europe" programme, which was created in 1992 and, in addition to the Centre, counts Ukrainian and Russian Memorial, and organisations from Belarus, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia among its participants.⁴²

In 2006, the Centre opened the History Meeting House, a cultural institution that organises exhibitions, documentary and feature film exhibitions, discussions, conferences, educational programmes, artistic installations, theatrical exhibitions, and so on, for the purpose of promoting modern history.⁴³

In December 2007, on behalf of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, the Karta Centre examined the activities of the government as to the domestic and international problems related to the modern history. This document is thought of as an attempt to formulate the policy in question.

In general, the Polish memory policy has always been characterised by the cultivation of heroes and martyrs to represent the country's tragic history in the 19th century (the suppressed rebellions of 1831 and 1836), and particularly in the 20th century, when these images coalesced most clearly into the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Recently, this trend has taken centre stage as a result of the ideology of the Law and Justice party.⁴⁴

A positive thing is that the Polish memory policy is not monopolised by any authority or any party and continues to be a matter of considerable debate in the society and

³⁹ Website of the Institute of National Remembrance – <http://ipn.gov.pl>.

⁴⁰ Urząd do Spraw Kombatantów i Osób Represjonowanych. – <https://www.udskior.gov.pl/Informacje,o,Urzedzie,8.html#content>.

⁴¹ Ustawa z dnia 24 stycznia 1991 r. o kombatantach oraz niektórych osobach będących ofiarami represji wojennych i okresu powojennego. – Website Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19910170075>.

⁴² Website of the Karta Centre – <http://www.karta.org.pl>.

⁴³ Website of Dom Spotkań z Historią. – <http://www.dsh.waw.pl>.

⁴⁴ For more detail see: Babakova O. Unrecognisable Poland. What has changed in the neighbouring country over the year, European Pravda. 21 November 2016, <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2016/11/21/7057742>; Isaev I. Why reconsider the past in Poland. – Carnegie Moscow Center. <http://inosmi.ru/social/20160820/237596978.html>.

among experts.⁴⁵ This reduces (but does not eliminate) the threat of “indoctrination” of the social consciousness by certain ideological interpretations of recent history.

Cinema has always been one of the important means to support historical memory and to strengthen the national identity in Poland (one may recall the film versions of historical works by Henryk Sienkiewicz and Stefan Żeromski in Communist times). Even now, the making of historical films received priority support from the Polish Film Institute and the Ministry of Culture.⁴⁶

Speaking of the Polish “history policy” in the context of Ukrainian interests, we should remember that some of its trends occasionally become a stumbling block in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

3.3. ROMANIA



One of the important factors of the formation of the modern Romanian identity is historical memory. Experts note its complexity and multi-layered nature caused by the contradictory and dramatic Romanian

history before and during the war, “In 1990 Romanian society resembled a cross-section of various geological epochs, when legionaries, supporters of Karol II, followers of King Michael and apologists for Antonescu all remained alive. There were adepts of Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceaușescu and supporters of Iliescu remembering the “communism with a human face” between 1964 and 1971”.⁴⁷

Unlike some other post-socialist and post-Soviet countries, it is difficult for Romania to relate the present with the pre-communist past. While the memory policy in the Baltic countries and Poland mainly consisted of settling scores with the totalitarian regimes which covered these countries during and after the Second World War, the situation in Romania was much more problematic. Before 1944, this country was an ally of Germany, and the pre-war years in its history were marked by acute political conflicts and expressions of violence, which made it difficult for the public consciousness to identify contemporary Romania with the state of that period.

However, there were times when crimes committed by radical national organisations and the Antonescu regime, including in the territories occupied by the Romanian army during the Second World War, were assessed in different ways within Romanian society. The traumatic experience of the later period under Ceaușescu (1980-1989) caused the public to perceive the communist period as the most dramatic and “gloomy” in modern Romanian history.

Against this background, pre-war times looked more attractive than they really were. On the other hand, both the legionary movement as “an expression and defender of Romanian national ideals”, and Antonescu as “a patriot and fighter against Bolshevism” were somehow idealised in the public consciousness in the early pre-war years.⁴⁸ Monuments were built and streets were named after the latter.

The situation changed in October 2004, when the “left” President I. Iliescu initiated the establishment of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, headed by a famous social activist and writer, Nobel Prize winner E. Wiesel.

The reports of the Commission revealed the scale of violence against Jews and the Roma in Romania and in the territory occupied by the Romanian army during the Second World War, and showed the criminal nature of the regime during that period. A logical conclusion of this tendency in Romanian memory policy was the Law “On the introduction of revisions and amendments to the Extraordinary Regulation of the Government ‘On the prohibition of organisations and symbols of fascist, racist and xenophobic character and the promotion of the cult of persons guilty of committing crimes against peace and humanity’”, adopted on 30 July 2015.⁴⁹

Particularly resonant were the provisions of the Law related to:

- the definition of the Holocaust in Romania (“The Holocaust in Romania is understood as the systematic prosecution and extermination of Jews and Roma with support from the Romanian government and state institutions and in its dependent territories in the period from 1940-1944”);
- the assessments of the legionary movement (“The Legionary movement is understood to refer to the fascist organisations named ‘The Legion of the Archangel Michael’, ‘The Iron Guard’ and ‘The Everything for the Country Party’”), according to which legionary organisations were identified as “fascist, racist and xenophobic”.

Some media sources called the Law “anti-Romanian”, “the last Ceaușescu law”, and “an assault on the national memory”. In clerical and conservative circles, it was called “anti-legionary” and characterised as “a frontal attack on the national memory of heroes and anticommunist martyrs”. It was noted that the legionnaires endured brutal repression during the rule of both King Karol II and Antonescu, as well as the Communists, i.e. they seemed to be perfect victims in the fight for a national idea. It was also noted that the law damaged Romanian culture, as the legionary movement involved such prominent members as M. Eliade and E. Cioran.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ See, for example: *Pamięć jako przedmiot władzy*. Pod redakcją Piotra Kosiewskiego. – Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Warszawa 2008, 85 c.

⁴⁶ For example, the films “Battle of Warsaw” by J. Hoffman (2011) and “Walesa” by A. Wajda (2013) received considerable funding. Every year, several historic films are submitted to the Festival of Polish Feature Films in Gdansk. The most popular topics are the Second World War, the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, the socialist period in Poland and the military situation of 1981-1983 and relations with Russia. See: *Cinema and the state in Poland: how does the Polish Cinema institute work?* – <http://kinobuzz.ru/2012/12/26/state-support-poland>.

⁴⁷ Mikhail M. In the labyrinth of memory. Consideration of the past in post-Communist Romania. – Historical Expertise Website, http://istorex.ru/page/mach_m_v_labirinte_pamyati_prorabotka_proshlogo_v_postkommunisticheskoy_rumini.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Legea nr. 217/2015 pentru modificarea și completarea Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 31/2002 privind interzicerea organizațiilor și simbolurilor cu caracter fascist, rasist sau xenofob și a promovării cultului persoanelor vinovate de săvârșirea unor infracțiuni contra păcii și omenirii.

⁵⁰ Legea 217/2015 – Cronica unui atentat la Memoria Națională. – Ortodoxia Tinerilor, 27.08.2015, <http://www.ortodoxiatinerilor.ro/sfintii-inchisorilor/21300-legea-217-2015-cronica-unui-atentat-la-memoria-nationala>

The Presidential Commission for the study of the Communist dictatorship in Romania was established in 2006 upon the initiative of the “right” President T. Basescu. It also prepared a report submitted to the Parliament on 18 December 2006, which characterised the Communist regime as “illegitimate and criminal”. The report also contained recommendations, in particular regarding the necessity of further study of this period in Romanian history and a legal response to specific crimes related to the operation of this regime.

The main state institution for carrying out such studies is the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Emigration.⁵¹ The activities of the Institute are committed to “analysis of the nature, objectives and consequences of totalitarianism in Romania in 1945-1989, as well as the memory of this regime in the Romanian emigre community during the post-communist period”.

The Institute also established the goal of exploring the “intellectual sources of Communist doctrine, the genealogy of totalitarian thought and practices, the structures of the Communist Party before and after 1945, institutional definition of the former Securitate, as well as the repressive mechanisms in Socialist Romania”, “to explore organisation and functioning of the institutions responsible for establishing and perpetuating the Communist regime”, “to identify the rhetoric and propaganda of the Communist ideology in the areas of public impact, such as cinema, television, plastic arts, music, etc.”, “to study the impact of the communist ideology and practice, as well as urban policy in areas of education, architecture, heritage, fine art in 1945-1989”, “to analyse short- and long-term impact of the economic, environmental and social policies initiated by the Communist regime”.

The tasks of the Institute also include preparing materials for investigation and lustration: it is to “collect data, documents and testimony regarding all the actions that led to violations of human rights and freedoms during the Communist regime, alert investigators authorities on this basis regardless of the time and circumstances in which the actions were committed; expose members of the party, the military, civilians and officials who actively operated within the repressive party and state system; and identify abuses and crimes committed or caused by such persons”. In addition, the Institute is engaged in research and outreach activities in its field.⁵²

Thus, the memory of the Communist regime and its predecessors can hardly be regarded as a unifying factor in Romanian society, although it is necessary to engage in order to put the country on a path to democracy and assimilation of European values. However, this role can be claimed by the memory of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with implementation of its secret protocols resulting in Romania’s losing much of its territory, as well as memories

of suffering of Romanian citizens caused by actions of the Red Army and Soviet intelligence in 1940-1941 and after 1944.

Thus, 1 April 2011 was declared the National Day of Remembrance of the Romanians Victimised by the Massacre in the Village of Bila Krynytsia (Romanian Fântâna Albă), Deportations, Famine and Other Repressions of the Totalitarian Regime in Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia.

The Soviet border patrol killed a group of local residents who tried to escape from the USSR to Romania near the village of Bila Krynytsia (now Chernivtsi oblast, Ukraine) in April 1941. Official Romanian history assumes the death toll to be 3,000, although figures from 7,000 to 15,000 are also put forth.

In April 2016, an exhibition entitled “The Massacre of Fantana Alba. 75 Years — a Hidden Page of History” was opened in the European Parliament. At the opening ceremony, the Romanian Member of the European Parliament Z. Mureşan compared this crime to “massacre of the Polish elite at Katyn”. The event evoked a negative response from Russia.⁵³ The Russian Federation Foreign Ministry has a similar response to the exhibition opened in January 2016 in Bucharest and dedicated to deportation of the Transylvanian Germans to the USSR in January 1945.⁵⁴

Significant potential for consolidation in Romania both at the level of the political community and society is represented by ideas of unity of the Romanian nation despite the state borders and differences in self-identities of various groups that are regarded as its potential constituents, as well as the restoration of “Greater Romania” in the borders before 28 June 1940.

The largest of these groups is the Moldavians. The unionist trends, which importantly include rejection of the identity of the Moldavian people and the Moldavian language, are promoted by the Romanian authorities both in Moldova itself and in Ukraine, where there is a large Moldavian minority. Suffice it to recall the protests of the Romanian Foreign Ministry concerning inclusion of the “Moldavians” in the list of national groups during the Ukrainian census. On 24 February 2014, the Foreign Ministry of Romania issued a statement regarding possible repeal of the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of the State Language Policy”, which, inter alia, expressed concern about recognition of a separate Moldavian language by the Ukrainian law.

According to amendments to the Romanian law on citizenship dated 29 October 2009, the latter may be gained in accordance with the simplified procedure by persons who were born on the territory that was part of Romania from 1918 to 1940, as well as by their relatives up to the third generation.⁵⁵ Thus, Romania actually expands its citizenship to the territories of Ukraine

⁵¹ The Institute was established on 18 November 2009 by combining the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania (established in 2005) and the National Institute of the Memory of the Romanian Emigration (established in 2003).

⁵² Website of the Institute. — <http://www.iiccr.ro>.

⁵³ Romania Reveals Its Own Katyn in the European Parliament. — REGNUM Information Agency, 7 April 2016, <http://regnum.ru/news/polit/2113817.html>.

⁵⁴ The Foreign Ministry of Romania are Surprised as their Russian Colleagues to Distort the Holocaust Remembrance Day. — Ukrinform, 5 February 2016, <http://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-world/1960932-v-mid-rumynii-udivlautsa-kak-ih-rossijskie-kollegi-iskazili-den-pamati-zertv-holokosta.html>.

⁵⁵ Palchuk V. The Policy of Dual Citizenship in the Countries of Eastern Europe: Consequences for Ukraine. — The Constitutional Assembly, VNU Electronic Library, http://nbuviap.gov.ua/asambleya/pol_pod_gr.php.



(Northern Bukovyna and Southern Bessarabia), Moldova, and some other countries. Support for the idea of the “Greater Romania” may be considered a stable trend in Romanian policy that is supported by the society. According to 2012 sociological surveys, 86% of inhabitants of Romania would support unification of their country with Moldova.⁵⁶

On 8 May 2013, the Romanian Parliament, upon an initiative of the Liberal Democratic Party, adopted the Law stipulating that all the Romanian-speaking Balkan nations (Aromanians, Istro-Romanians, Megleno-Romanians, Moldovans, Vlachs, etc.) were to be recognised as representatives of the unified Romanian ethnicity. They were given the name of “Romanians Everywhere” (*Românii de Pretutindeni*).

According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, B. Aurescu, Romanians “have existed for a long time under various names. All of them are reflections of the same roots, the same culture, the same language, and the same spirituality: Romanianism. Thus, we oppose any attempts to re-write our history in such a way as to influence the sacred principle of self-government and identification and impose different identities for those who feel themselves to be Romanians and declare their adherence to Romanian culture and spirituality”.⁵⁷

The “Romanians Everywhere” were objects of the state policy even before acquiring this legislative definition within the legal framework of Romania. Specifically, these matters are overseen by the Department for Policies on Relations with the Romanians Everywhere under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Departamentul pentru Politici Relația cu Românii de Pretutindeni)⁵⁸ and the NGO National Foundation for Romanians Everywhere, established on 20 April 1999.⁵⁹ Work on cultural integration of these people is among the activities of the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research of Romania.

Currently, the national unification and the restoration of “Greater Romania” may be regarded as a unifying idea for Romanian society associated with deeper memories of almost 2000 years of history in the formation of the Romanian ethnicity.⁶⁰

3.4. CONCLUSIONS

The main areas in addressing the issue of formation/preservation of identity implemented in these countries can, to a certain extent, be considered to include the following.

1. Development of memory policy or “historical policy” with typical main tasks being: overcoming the “communist heritage” in culture, science, education, and national worldview; formation of a positive image of a nation that was forced to accept this heritage; creating an

image of relations with other nations in the pre-war past that is acceptable for a country’s national dignity.

The process of achieving this involved adoption of appropriate regulations, creation of institutions to implement them (national memory institutes and other research centres and foundations, museum institutions, professional commissions reporting to government institutions, etc.), and activities in the areas of education and culture and reconstruction of the symbolic space of the country.

2. In some cases, especially when developing a memory policy acceptable to the whole society proved problematic, identity formation took place through “outward” measures: creating myths of a formerly great country and divided nation with its separated parts that must be integrated into a joint state structure, or at least taken under cultural and political care. This method of forming or strengthening the national identity created certain problems in relations with neighbouring countries and complicated state-to-state relations.

3. Countries whose national composition significantly changed to the detriment of the titular ethnic group after the Second World War called for special measures: (1) refusal to provide automatic citizenship to those who arrived in the country after the loss of its independence, as well as to their descendants, thus limiting their ability to influence the political direction of the country; (2) adoption of citizenship laws that provided for citizenship to be earned by migrants and their descendants only under very strict conditions of naturalisation.

4. All Baltic states, as opposed to the CEE countries and other former republics of the USSR, underwent some degree of Russification, which was expressed not so much in forcing out the languages of the native population, as in their artificial stagnation: an unavoidable consequence of limiting the areas of use of the language given the lack of statehood. These problems (development of the languages of titular ethnic groups, expanding their areas of use and number of speakers) were addressed through special measures: adoption of the appropriate laws, creation of special institutions for monitoring their implementation (language inspectorates) and for developing and preserving the purity of state languages.

5. The abovementioned areas and means of forming a common national identity in the countries examined are not comprehensive and do not cover all spheres of public life. In each of these countries, the use of a certain combination was determined by national conditions, and some areas (like, information space, development of internal mobility, etc.) require separate analysis. At the same time, based on this experience, a conclusion can be made about the crucial value of such areas as development and implementation of “memory policy” (“history policy”), as well as protection and promotion of the state language. ■

⁵⁶ Bondarenko A. Union of Moldova and Romania: a Myth that May Become a Reality. — European Pravda, 3 July 2015, <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/articles/2015/07/3/7035520>.

⁵⁷ Aurescu: Romanians must enjoy basic rights aimed at preservation of their identity worldwide. — Website of the Embassy of Romania in the Republic of Belarus, <http://minsk.mae.ro/ru/romania-news/5827>.

⁵⁸ Website of the Department. — <http://www.dprp.gov.ro>.

⁵⁹ Fundatia Nationala pentru Românii de Pretutindeni. — FNRP, http://www.romanii.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=75.

⁶⁰ It resembles the idea of the “Russian World” to a certain degree (and its Orthodox counterpart, “Holy Rus”), which is both a tool for justifying the expansionist policy of the Russian Federation and consolidating its population with slogans encouraging them to support “compatriots” abroad and restore the national greatness of Russia.

CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: PATHWAYS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Expert discussion on “Consolidation of Ukrainian Society: Pathways, Challenges and Prospects” was held on 16 December 2016.

The discussion was conducted as part of the project “Formation of a Common Ukrainian Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges” implemented by the Razumkov Centre in cooperation with the Representative Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ukraine and the Matra European Partnership Programme under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

The participants discussed the most pressing issues with regard to national unity, the foundations and principles of the consolidation of Ukrainian society, priority areas, approaches and crucial measures of state policy aimed at social consolidation.

Presented below are individual speeches of the participants in the order they were presented at the discussion. Texts have been prepared using discussion transcripts and are presented in somewhat shortened form. Some presentations include references made by editors.

THE KEY ELEMENT IS COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY



Rostyslav PAVLENKO,
*Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration of Ukraine*

The current topic is extremely important since this is a critical time for such issues as unity and consolidation. The problems are self-evident, associated with both post-Soviet and post-revolutionary development, especially under conditions of war. This may be compared to a situation in which one must rebuild a car engine while in motion, and shoot back at the same time. However, this should not be an explanation of failures, but rather a discussion of the next steps.

Indeed, the solutions mentioned today, in particular the Decree of the President on the promotion of national unity and consolidation of Ukrainian society,¹ and a number of other solutions, such as the Strategy for promoting the development of civil society,² are aimed at seeking out such mechanisms. This is just the promotion of development, and not the intrusion of scientific communism or nationalism.

Such mechanisms should concern a number of things. The first is the inventory of assets already held by the state. It looks as if most things from textbooks – mechanisms, priorities – already exist, but the question is how, in the current environment and with the current resources, to achieve an effective model of prioritizing the use of these opportunities and resources.

The key element here is cooperation between the government and civil society. In a broad sense, civil society begins with think tanks and non-governmental organisations working in the areas of particular policies, the volunteer movement, different means of self-organisation of the population into organisations capable of rendering social services more effectively in some areas than state agencies or local authorities.

We may speak of various forms of state support, i.e. grants, more transparent funding of certain programmes, and partnerships with various donor organisations. The mechanism is being developed for providing grants by the state for civil society development, and many initiatives are being established. **If the society itself has found something, the task of the state is to take the positive experience, scale it up by its own means and encourage it to be naturally extended and supported** so as to ensure success with regard to particular issues across the country. This is an issue of information policy, coordination of efforts, ranging from participation in various TV programmes to work on the Internet.

One important matter is that of exchanges in which children from various regions go to other regions during holidays, thus becoming familiar with new ways of life and traditions. There are also special projects such as the “Train of unity”, in which artists from Central and

¹ Decree No. 534/2016 of the President of Ukraine “On Priority Measures for the Promotion of National Unity and Consolidation of Ukrainian Society, and Support of Public Initiatives in This Area”, Official website of the President of Ukraine, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5342016-20814>.

² Decree No. 68/2016 of the President of Ukraine “On Promotion of the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine”, Official website of the President of Ukraine, <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/682016-19805>.

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Western Ukraine travel in the East up to the demarcation line, actually the frontline, and vice versa, when the representatives of artist groups from the East and South go to Western Ukraine, showing the cultural and social life of their regions.

With regard to cultural projects, we may mention as specific examples the draft law on the cultural foundation, which could concentrate and more transparently and efficiently allocate public funds to support certain cultural, information and other undertakings. Work on amendments to the law on support for cinema is being completed in order to work out all the aspects in detail and pass a law that will yield positive results.

The issue of national memory and identity is associated with the creation of new traditions and new heroes. It is important not to impose, but to promote and support them, as well as to modernize what we have in Ukrainian history.

Another important point is civil education in the broad sense, i.e. the understanding of the rights and obligations of a citizen, the ability to make good use of the existing mechanisms for citizens to have a definite effect on the authorities, self-government capabilities, especially in the context of decentralisation, where many questions depend on the will of the local community.

National patriotic and military patriotic education is important. The corresponding Strategy, Decree of the President, and programme adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers are all in place. But the point here is that the things should move beyond documents to specific agencies. It is necessary to arrange for the creation of coordinating councils, whose effectiveness can differ, and this is a point of debate. So civil society organisations should use these mechanisms, apply pressure, in the good sense of this word, to the national and local governments.

The Decree on promotion of national unity stipulates that the Cabinet of Ministers should present a plan of activities and an action plan for its implementation within three months. Think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and volunteer groups should be involved in this work. The resulting document should be active and effective so the whole system can bring positive results through direct propaganda, explanation and extension of good examples. ■

ALL THESE IDEOLOGIES SHOULD BE PRO-UKRAINIAN AND INDEPENDENT OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES



Mykola KNYAZHYTSKY,
*People's Deputy of Ukraine,
Chairman of the Committee on
Culture and Spirituality of
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine*

It seems that in recent times no one has been interested in consolidation per se. Our Presidents, starting from Kuchma, were elected by the votes of the East, and then held the office with the votes of the West. This means that they were elected with support from Russia, its cultural centres, money and business. (Recall that Yushchenko was not elected in the first round, but after the second, after international pressure and, essentially, the abandonment of the election of Yanukovich.) There have been extreme situations, as during the Maidan. But often the Presidents counted on the votes of the East for their support.

As for political parties, they were divided into those that targeted the Eastern electorate and those that targeted the electorate of the West and the Centre. This is still happening to a certain extent. The parties that targeted the Eastern electorate enjoyed and, unfortunately, still enjoy support from Russia.

This situation changed for the first time only after Maidan, when Russian aggression distracted many supporters, people who were under the influence of Russian culture, but had doubts. The presidential election in 2014 showed the consolidation of Ukrainian society in the electoral process for the first time; we had not had such consolidation before.

The problem is that, having come to power after Maidan, the political elite is not interested in this consolidation, because they continue to approach political processes using the same matrix and methods that were used when the media and politicians divided Ukraine based on loyalty to Russian or Ukrainian culture, and political parties also followed this model.

With regard to national values, the Maidan wanted to bring people together and to create an ideological competition between right and left ideologies at the same time. But all these ideologies should be pro-Ukrainian and independent of external influences. We have not achieved this. Why? Because the "hybrid" war, which did not start with the Maidan, is still underway. It has lasted throughout the entire history of Ukraine. Now we have merely added a military aspect and counter-terrorism operation (CTO).

Now any law which is supposed to support Ukrainian culture faces problems in the information space. There must be pressure in response to this anti-Ukrainian pressure.

As for the media space, we see that laws on transparency of media ownership are not enforced. The owners of the main channels are in Russia, either our former compatriots or simply those who finance it. Unfortunately, the government authorities make use of it. It seems to them that it can be useful if they are not criticized. We have seen similar processes.

No public television has been developed as a counterbalance to such Russian influences, as both the oligarchic and political systems are not interested in this. State television has no influence at all.

So the Russian influence remains, and we are approaching a turnabout in which a President who relies on the pro-Russian electorate replaces the President who relies on the pro-Western electorate. This is felt with regard to the presidential election. Such a risk also exists in the parliamentary elections.

The polls echo a very dangerous trend: only 42% of the population of Ukraine called the developments on the Maidan a “Revolution of Dignity”, while 20% called them a forced change of regime by not entirely legitimate means, and other 21% called it a *coup d’etat*.³ In other words, essentially half the population considers the revolution a coup. There has not yet been an adequate response from government authorities to this dangerous trend.

Unless we draw lessons from the Maidan, and understand that the responsibility of each politician and political force is precisely in changing the rules of the game and the political conventions, we will go from circle to circle, from revolution to revolution. But Ukraine does not have the resources to go round in circles. ■

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TALK ABOUT FORMATION OF IDENTITY WITHOUT STATE PARTICIPATION



Volodymyr VIATROVYCH,
*Head of the Ukrainian Institute
of National Memory*

I am glad that finally (in the 25th year of independence) we are talking about formation of national identity as a specific policy, not in the context of a struggle for power, but as a specific effort aimed at achieving a result. It is good that we are talking about this at the level of experts, citizens, and the state.

I am convinced that this is one of the duties of a modern state, taking into account the fact that dilution of identity during the previous decades and even centuries was also a deliberate policy pursued first by the Russian Empire and then by the Soviet Union. It is impossible to talk about formation of identity without state participation.

It is extremely important to study the experience of other countries pursuing such policies. In today’s survey we see an interesting part devoted to the experience of other post-socialist countries in forming an identity and overcoming the consequences of the totalitarian past.⁴

If we carefully read these texts, which describe the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, we see that what has been going on in Ukraine, at least since 2014, in the context of identity policy is essentially a repetition, with national specifics, of what was going on in post-communist Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that is after their revival as democratic states. The experience of these countries shows that the policy of identity formation has been an important element in their reforms and their transformation into normal democratic states.

Based on the survey findings we see that there are overall positive trends in humanitarian policy. These are trends from Euromaidan taken up by civil society, taken up by certain state institutions, formalized in some very important laws.

This process of the accelerated formation of Ukrainian national identity, the process of formation of the Ukrainian political nation, is very dynamic and has been progressing without any snags, for the time being. This also refers to issues of language and understanding of history, to an upward trend in these areas. The survey of the “Rating” group on de-communisation is indicative as well.⁵ And the base of support with regard to the issue of identity formation is the younger generation, which shows further potential of these transformations.

What are the problems? One of the main problems, of course, is the understanding of what the Maidan was. This seems to be local. But the attacks on the Maidan may become the basis for a rapid destruction of all the positive results in formation of a new Ukrainian identity, which we have accumulated in the three years since Maidan. It is necessary to get out the message about what Maidan was. The idea of Maidan as a coup is not only the delegitimation of government, but of all actions taken by it.

Another threat to the success that we have made in humanitarian policy is failure in other policy areas. If we succeed in the issues of language and history, but disastrous problems in the economy, and corruption scandals at the same time, then the problems will compromise the success and we will be blamed for not dealing with important matters, for fooling the people while stealing everything we can. This is a problem that may affect the process of identity formation. ■

³ M. Knyazhytsky cites the sociological survey of the Razumkov Centre, which results are published in this magazine.

⁴ V. Viatrovych refers to the chapter “The Formation/Preservation of Identity: Experience of the Baltics, and Central and Eastern European States”, published in this edition.

⁵ For more detail see: study conducted by the sociological group “Rating” in November 2016 “Attitude to certain historical figures and decommunisation process in Ukraine” http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/otnoshenie_k_otdelnym_istoricheskim_lichnostyam_i_processu_dekommunizacii_v_ukraine.html.

WE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE AROUND THE CONCEPT OF HONESTY, THE IDEALS OF JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW



Yevhen BYSTRYTSKY,
*Executive Director
of the International
"Renaissance" Foundation*

Identity is a feeling that the English concept of *integrity* can well convey. Integrity is wholeness and honesty. It is the sense of belonging to a whole that can never be captured by defining individual characteristics. Attempts are made in the literature to talk about identity as a set of specific characteristics of a certain nation...

The fact is that identity is a sense of belonging to a whole that sometimes is not even recognized, so it is difficult to survey it sociologically... Identity is a projection, always dynamic, and interpretive. It cannot be given, it is always an open opportunity to feel belonging in different forms.

The correlation between identity and the progress of a country is an interesting one. Optimism, a sense of progress and reforms in the country, is reflected in the strengthening or weakening of national, cultural and civic identities.

We need not only concerted effort now, but development of policies in the areas of culture, science and education. **It is particularly important to develop civic identity in order to consolidate us.**

I would select several areas that I believe to be fundamental. We can complain now that the Parliament is not consolidated, and we need to overcome party selfishness. In this regard, we have certain things outlined at the level of the Parliament, the executive agencies of the government, and even at the level of presidential power.

Public policy has started to develop. This means openness in policy decision-making to ensure that policies do not become those of one person or party or the majority in Parliament, but are instead general in nature. This is how to make policy decisions when they are prepared based on work with stakeholders, meaning representatives of social groups that are interested in a certain reform.

Departments of public policy under the Cabinet of Ministers are being established, work in Parliament is in progress. The interests of different community groups are taken into account during formulation of policies. Thus more consolidated policy decisions are taken, reflecting more general interests. This is an area of great importance. The Academy of Public Administration should be modified and special courses should be introduced to this end.

A system must be intentionally built which leads to creation of the essential conditions for consolidation of citizens and the nation.

Strategic communication is also a part of public policy. Strategic communication of reforms between the government authorities and citizens is very important at this time. Communication exists when there is a dialogue, and the latter appears when both sides are equally open to the content of communication. This is the creation of conditions for our consolidation. This also applies to the area of culture.

And public education is vitally important as well. We need to consolidate around the concept of integrity, the ideals of justice and the supremacy of law. ■

UNITY OF A HISTORICAL DESTINY SHOULD BE A SUBJECT OF A HISTORICAL POLICY



Vasyl TKACHENKO,
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of the Institute of World History,
National Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine*

3 July 2016 marked the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Sadova, when Prussia defeated Austria and when professor Peschel⁶ first wrote the famous words: it was a victory not of the army over the army, it was the victory of the Prussian teacher over the perfect education system that had existed in Austria and throughout Europe.


This phrase was so well received that it was ascribed to Bismarck during the war between France and Germany in 1871. At this time, in the second half of the 19th century, almost all of Europe had fully adopted the Prussian system of education, which was not just about receiving professional education, but the education of a citizen – from childhood through school, through the army, an education of patriotism.

After the unification of East and West Germany, on the same day all history teachers throughout East Germany were dismissed and sent for retraining. **When the unification of two parts of a nation happens, there cannot be two different versions.**

Unity of a historical destiny should be a subject of a historical policy. When they say that they should not impose or maintain certain heroes, how do we respond?

In this regard, I would like to pose a question. Can say that there will be a victory of Ukrainian teachers over that system? I doubt it. The general condition of all our education is neglected, as is the financial status of our teachers... ■

⁶ This refers to the German geographer and anthropologist of the nineteenth century, Oscar Peschel, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oscar_Peschel. The Battle of Sadova (now Hradec Králové, Czech Republic – the greatest battle of Austro-Prussian War of 1866).

**OUR TASK IS TO BUILD INSTITUTIONS
OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY**

Anatoliy YERMOLENKO,
*Deputy Director of Scientific
Research, H.S. Skovoroda
Institute of Philosophy,
National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine*

Problems of identification, identity and consolidation are closely interrelated.⁷ This is what is indicated by the pronoun “we.” Who is “we”? How can we come together? The Presidential Decree calls for consolidation. Even in everyday conversations we hear the phrase “this country”, from politicians, from the media and from academics. Why “this country”? Why not “my”, “our”? When politicians say this, it seems that they do not feel as if they are in our country, but as if they were getting ready to go somewhere else.

The question of consolidation is the question of whether Ukrainian society is possible. To paraphrase the question raised by German sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel, the problem of consolidation is also marked by other concepts – solidarity, cohesion, unity, union, etc. The concept of integration is broadly sociological. These concepts also indicate a community of people, citizens.

What kind of integration could it be? Firstly, social integration, in which the unity is based on common values, and, secondly, systemic integration – common interests or interests based on compromise. In both of these areas we have problems. As for shared values, the modernisation process in part leads to the destruction of traditional values. Now we must revive traditional Ukrainian values. We are experiencing the value-regulatory anomie.⁸

Exploring these issues, the Institute of Sociology has documented that, in a state of anomie for 20 years, we are in a situation where the level of anomie⁹ is 13% to 18%. This is manifested in a situation in which the destruction of value preferences leads to the disintegration of society, to a certain fragmentation of society.

Similarly, we have a problem in the field of systemic integration, institutional forms. The trust in the central government, according to research by the Institute of Sociology, is about 27%, in the parties – from 3% to 7%. The level of trust in non-governmental organisations is

increasing. The highest level of trust is in interpersonal relationships. Unfortunately, institutional forms do not enjoy a high level of trust.

According to a study by Francis Fukuyama, CIS countries (to which Ukraine almost no longer belongs) have a very low level of trust. In the developed countries of Europe, America, Japan, this level is higher. Trust is the invisible hand of society. If trust does not exist, we cannot talk about integration mechanisms and solidarity.

The Institute of Sociology published a book about a “Society of No Trust”.¹⁰ I cannot entirely agree with this research. Such a society cannot exist, because if there is no trust at all, the society collapses. Although we are deceived everywhere, a certain level of trust remains. Thus there are still some opportunities for consolidation in society.

We are drifting towards Europe, towards European values. So we can say that **the function of consolidation may be performed by these European values.** But here also things are not so simple here. Let us recall that Europe was the source of two World Wars. We refer to the values of freedom, solidarity and justice, but there are also conservative values. Since the 1970s, Europe has seen a wave of neo-conservatism. Let me quote Dietrich Böhler: “we are concerned, on the one hand, about Russian nationalism and imperialism, and on the other hand, about the danger of reactionary nationalism, particularly in Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall”.¹¹ Thus we must take into account such processes.

As concerns the consolidation of our society, **we must build a new systemic integration, and new social integration, at the level of institutions and values.** There is a need for what is called shared responsibility... But shared responsibility is not the opposite of personal responsibility; it is an addition to it, it is one of the categories of social consolidation. Our task is to build institutions of shared responsibility. ■

Expert Discussion, 16 December 2016



⁷ In more detail these problems are discussed in the article by A. Yermolenko entitled “Socio-cultural and Systemic Functional Factors in the Consolidation of Ukrainian Society”, published in this issue.

⁸ Disorder, lawlessness, lack of social order.

⁹ See, in particular: Ukrainian society: monitoring of social changes. – Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, 2 (16), 2015, <http://i-soc.com.ua/files/us2015.pdf>.

¹⁰ A society without trust. Kiev. 2014, http://i-soc.com.ua/files/v9_Reznik_V_Trust_and_Social_Order_K_2014.pdf.

¹¹ Dietrich Böhler (b. 1942) – a contemporary German philosopher.

FACTORS OF CONSOLIDATION ARE, FIRST OF ALL, OVERCOMING THE EXISTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVING PROSPERITY

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The first aspect. Reflection on the study. This study emphasizes the discrepancy between public needs and the actual policy that is being implemented. According to the research, factors of consolidation are, first of all, overcoming the existing socio-economic problems and building prosperity. Rather than offering society a real programme of stimulus and economic growth, we mostly have subsidies, raising of social standards from unknown sources. As a result, poor people are being encouraged to waste energy. This is the basic resource of economic policy.

Instead of fighting corruption we have show trials. Holding on to a mixed electoral system, bringing to perfection of something that is euphemistically called “economic voting”, the system of bribing voters; there is a huge gap between public demand and the real activity of the government.

The second aspect is methodological. Positivism as a scientific idea counts almost all the social and humanitarian sciences as art. They become a science only when they begin to talk in terms of statistics – economic, demographic and social. Sociology also makes us talk in terms of science. But many scientists make great universalized conclusions on the basis of one or two surveys. When we speak about a trend, we need a continuity in time, and repeatability.

Methodological wishes. Today some indicators have already been worked out, including ones in the sphere of identity, that are universal. It is desirable to develop a set of such indicators and to repeat them every time so there will be no contradictions. We must create a set of “properly” formulated questions. Then we will obtain regularity, trends and continuity. Then any science that uses the achievements of sociology will be a real science.

We will see the trend of the development of our society. **If we have a government that listens to science, it will also help ensure that our policy meets social needs and trends.** ■

¹² V. Kotyhorenko talks about the study of the Razumkov Centre, which results are published in this journal.

THE PROTECTOR AGAINST FRAGMENTATION DUE TO THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF UKRAINE MAY BE INTERNAL CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Tatyana CHERNENKO,
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The “hybrid” war started long before the military activity in our country. And in the humanitarian area a foundation was established that made it possible to use a wide range of tools with aggressive intentions. In particular, I want to stress the educational field. Unfortunately, there are specialists with a low level of professional training in our schools and universities.

Last year’s external independent testing (EIT) campaign shows that the lowest entrance mark was established precisely for teacher training institutions. Applicants selected them based on what was left. Everybody was accepted by teacher training institutions. In four years we have people who do not want to go to work at a school, but have to, because this is how their lives went.

My colleagues and I believe that this system must be changed. An ambitious target for the Ministry of Education, which could be achieved, is the creation of a professional audit for teachers in grade schools. This should be done with the involvement of civil society, because parents are often also unhappy with the level of teaching in today’s schools. It is necessary to increase the prestige of the teacher. The doubling of salaries is being declared, and we will see what happens. I would also return creative competition to the EIT in (teacher training) institutions. Work with children should be done by people who want to do it and have creative talents.

The protector against fragmentation due to the socio-cultural diversity of Ukraine may be internal cultural diplomacy, as proposed by our department. The term “diplomacy” refers to international relations, but here it is also appropriate. **Internal diplomacy and domestic tourism build relationships between people of different regions of Ukraine, helping to understand not only existing differences, but also performing a unifying function.**


I personally want to thank Mr. Viatrovych for the disclosure of many documents and that have become public. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Information Policy was not fully included in this process. With a sufficient documentation basis, we must conduct educational work. There should be a broad information campaign with wide publicity, to open people’s eyes.

At present there are very few professionals in Ukraine who really understand what strategic communication is. It is a state programme that combines information and the existence of a great narrative, or perhaps even several, which may be called a national idea. Strategic communication is performed between all branches of the government, especially executive agencies.

The media should be informed about this narrative and engaged in building the general policy of Ukraine, both on an external level and in terms of circulating truthful information within the state. Then strategic communications will be effective. Then we will have a gradual change in humanitarian policy, and in identity, and in the consolidation of our society.

Unfortunately, we have a somewhat cursory attitude to new communication technologies and to how they should be used in the state. And this attitude is an obstacle to disseminating accurate information, to pursuing a policy of national consolidation through the state history policy by dissemination of a narrative. ■

**I WANT THE STATE TO LOVE ME,
TO DEFEND MY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.
THEN THERE WILL BE CONSOLIDATION**



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Economics Faculty
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The subject of consolidation is important even in countries with a history of 100-200 years. It acquires a particular relevance in countries which either recreate or create a state. I do not agree with the fact that there has been no consolidation in Ukraine over the last 20 years. It has been and is there, but another matter is what it is, what its purpose is and what methods are used to achieve it.

We talk about unification and cohesion for a great common goal. The challenges should be divided into two groups: objective and subjective. Among the first are the “hybrid” war, the military and economic crises and macro-financial instability. **But the bigger problem for Ukraine is the subjective challenges.** Among them are the lack of clarity in integrating ideas, institutional strains, corruption and the shadow economy. Raiding, the unproductive effect of capital. **If Ukraine wants to develop, it must be transparent and fair.** The main thing is not to steal from our own people.

Among the subjective factors is also the problem of the high level of distrust, lack of responsibility on the part of every citizen, businesses and state agencies. When we talk about consolidation, we must take into account collective interests, a balance of the interests of an individual, a group, a region and the state. If we ignore this, there will be no consolidation.


The consolidation of Ukraine should take place around a main idea. And the main idea at present should be the idea of state-building. Consolidation contains strategic and situational, current ideas. I have read the study, and Ukrainians like Ukraine and show their patriotism. But when there is mutual affection, then there is true love. I am for true love; I want it to be required. I want the state to love me, to defend my rights and interests. Only then will there be consolidation.

We are talking about conflicts in business, linguistic and regional conflicts. Once it was taught that conflict is a driving force. I am sure that it's only an incentive. The driving force is a solution to this conflict through active state policy. I feel that the policy of education reforms is undergoing a transition from the language of educational knowledge to the language of skills. The whole world is now for the knowledge economy. Education is knowledge, abilities, patriotic education and other functions. If we just want skills, let's start monthly courses for accountants.

Ukraine is an independent, sovereign, democratic, social and legal state. This is Article 1 of the Constitution. This is a process for which consolidation must be developed.

Which areas should be a priority in public policy? The first is to overcome the imbalance of social interests. Next is overcoming the institutional strains, anti-consolidation factors such as corruption and the shadow economy, which erode the state. We are forgetting about this. De-centralisation, de-offshorisation, other “de” things – let's stop there. This is about institutional support for the consolidation of society, about legal and personnel support. The basis of every policy should be the development of true patriotism. **We must eliminate legal nihilism and indifference.** ■

**IDENTITY IS ALWAYS A DEMARCATION.
WHEN WE IDENTIFY OURSELVES WITH
SOMEONE OR SOMETHING, AT THE
SAME WE DRAW A DIVIDING LINE AND
DISTINGUISH OURSELVES FROM SOMEONE**



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2016 marked 110 years since the outstanding article by M. Hrushevskiy, “Galicia and Ukraine”, in which he speaks about Ukrainian identity and about something that we may tentatively call social engineering. He writes that Galicia and greater Ukraine had separated so much that, in order to connect them (and there was a will to do so), special efforts were required, particularly those of the elite. He recounts the things that should be done for this purpose, including what we now call a student exchange.

¹³ Refers to the study by the Razumkov Centre.

We put forward the initiative of the Andrey Sheptytsky Scholarship, Master's Degree students from Drohobych would go to Mariupol to study the productiveness of Azov forces, and likewise from Mariupol to Chernivtsy, and so on. And one lady from the Ministry of Education said that this cannot be done because then Central Ukraine will be "deprived". That is how she understood the process.

I would like to mention another very important part of identity, without which the picture is incomplete. Identity is always a demarcation. When we identify ourselves with someone or something, at the same we draw a dividing line and distinguish ourselves from someone. When the Moscow Patriarchate invites us to talk about the unity of the Orthodox Church (under the Moscow Patriarchate), it offers us a demarcation line with our Ukrainian brothers in other churches and Patriarchates. When we make our choice, we draw our demarcation line. The Moscow Patriarch Kirill is a prominent expert in the field of identity. His request to the Ukrainians was most concentrated in 2009, when he was the first to propose that they review their historic choice, because they have made an outstanding contribution to the construction of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. He called them to create a centre of power that would stand against the West. This is a clear and concise message.

Obviously, it would be wrong to talk about creating a Ministry of Consolidation. I believe the number of such institutions is already quite sufficient. There are factors which under certain conditions could "sew" the country together – the media, social networks, etc. **There are traditional factors which have always "sewn" the country together in a traditional way – school, the army, the church.**


When we speak of the consolidation of society, one must not think only horizontally, as in East-West and North-South. There is also vertical consolidation, which refers to different strata and classes in society. We know that the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor strata is dramatically high. Without bringing these closer together, it is premature to talk about consolidation, even as the country faces the challenge of Russian military aggression.

In the end, the consolidation of society happens through fierce resistance. Those who work with the state apparatus understand how powerful this resistance is. It includes military actions by Russia, which are conducted on land and at sea, as well as in cyberspace and the

media. We see the emanations of this war every day. We see how the agenda of the news feeds of some leading channels is formed. We see how the society discusses unimportant issues instead of the issues of education, culture, subsidies, gas distribution systems, etc. We see how a major channel developed its news feeds with the agreement of a Ministry in the so-called DPR.

But consolidation is always happening – in the fight against carelessness, lack of professionalism and incompetence. And this shows that all of us may participate in consolidation. ■

THE DEFINING PRINCIPLES OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDEA SHOULD BE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IN NATURE – THE PROSPERITY OF ALL CITIZENS OF UKRAINE



Mykhailo STEPYKO,
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I would like to highlight certain challenges faced by Ukrainian society today. The first is an ambivalence of the Ukrainian national identity that has persisted for many years. The research study told us that 67% of respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine. The figures provided by the Institute of Sociology are as follows: in 2015, 57.3% considered themselves patriots, in 2014 it was 64.4%, and in 2016 it was 58%.

According to various studies, we also have citizens of the Soviet Union and citizens of the world, and of Europe. So almost 40% of citizens search for their identity beyond Ukrainian citizenship. If we analyze the events that took place in Crimea and Donbas, this figure is problematic. Behind this figure are entire regional enclaves of citizens, far from Ukrainian identity, whose language, heroes, values, customs and traditions are Russian. Many institutions are included in this. First of all, a state that could not develop a deliberate policy of integration in Crimea and Donbas into the Ukrainian socio-cultural space. Researchers spoke of the identity of "Donetsk people". We could talk about the criminal oligarchic clan of Yanukovich, who worked on programmes for the formation of such an identity.

The ambivalence of the national identity is a challenge. But the main challenge for the consolidation of Ukrainian society is the very low level of well-being. In response to the question "How would you assess the financial situation of your family?" in 2015, 41.8% of the population answered "poor", and 33.7% answered "miserable". The answers are terrible – "we do not have enough for food, sometimes we go hungry", "we often do not have money and food. We sometimes have to beg for it" – this was 50% of respondents.

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


A major challenge for the consolidation of society is also the level of institutional trust – in government agencies, official institutions, political parties, movements, public associations, social programmes and measures, etc. In 2015, for the first time after the Revolution of Dignity, the balance of trust became sharply negative, and this related to all institutional structures: the President, the Prime Minister, courts and prosecutor's offices. A cause of this may be considered the response to the question "How would you rate the people who are now in power?" According to the Institute of Sociology, in 2015, 44% of respondents said that they are people who care only for their own material well-being and career.

What could consolidation be possibly based on? The thought that it may be based on a Ukrainian national idea is interesting. We must be aware that we are investing in this concept. If it is Ukrainian independence, then this step was taken in 1991. The defining principles of the Ukrainian national idea should be socio-economic in nature – the prosperity of all citizens of Ukraine, and the means to achieve this. Experience, unfortunately, shows otherwise.

What areas should be prioritized for implementing national consolidation policy? **This would be economic reforms in the interests of all citizens, not just the oligarchs and corrupt officials, and the transformation of the humanitarian sphere based on Ukrainisation of language, culture, and values.** We can also talk about state ideology. This must be thought about. We should be answering not the question "Who are we?", but the question of how we solve socio-economic problems. And then the consolidation of society will be everyone's business. ■

THE FANTASTIC DISTRUST OF ALMOST ALL AUTHORITIES IS A BRAKE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY



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I. F. Kuras Institute of
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National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine

If you open any textbook of modern political science, then consolidation is considered an adaptation, an identification, a transformation. But, as Goethe said, theory is dry, and only the tree of life is forever green. I would say that **consolidation is a general action for the realisation of common goals.** The materials accurately reflect the possible foundations for consolidation. 62% of respondents speak of a joint vision of a common future. But is there a common vision of Ukrainian society, a Ukrainian state, of all of us? It may be argued that a common goal is European integration. Maybe so. But I think the European vector is just more of a mechanism.



When we talk about working together, a common goal, let us honestly admit that we have a divided society and a divided political class. **When society makes demands on the government, and the government on society, this should be symbiotic; there should be a mutual understanding between them.** When there is no dialogue between the government and the society, then we can talk about consolidation, but what is the result?

The society itself, as a whole, cannot develop the mechanisms, resources and tools to bring about consolidation. But the state itself also cannot do this alone. A key factor for consolidation as such must be the development of consistent rules of the game. If these exist, then we can talk about the mechanisms, factors, means and aspects. If there are no consistent rules of the game, then everything else comes right from the devil.

The documents presented today emphasize once again that the society is changing rapidly. Not only with regard to the government, the state, the political class, but in and of itself. Even six months ago we talked about the existence of two poles: East and West. Today, I would not talk about the Ukrainian-speaking West and the Russian-speaking East. I would talk about the differences that are on the line between the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The mental and socio-cultural situation in the Centre is changing rapidly.

The processes of age differentiation, which barely registered before, are now important. We see the uneven waves of patriotism. On the other hand, it is interesting that some teenagers (about 12%) consider themselves a "Soviet person". New identities are being formed – Slobozhan and Azov.

We must consolidate the nation, the society, and relations between the state and society. But the recovery of trust in the government is a prerequisite. The astonishing distrust of almost all authorities is a brake for the consolidation of Ukrainian society, an insuperable obstacle. Shevchenko said: "How long will wait until Washington comes with a new and righteous law? We wait yet again".¹⁴ ■

¹⁴ Taras Shevchenko, preamble to the unfinished poem "The Holy Fool", 1857.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: THREATS, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND PROSPECTS



Anastasiya DEHTERENKO,
*Head of the Ethnic Policy Section,
National Institute for Strategic Studies*

One important aspect of the consolidation process is to minimise the risks and threats from ethnic politics. For that to happen, these threats and risks must be foreseeable and comprehensible. After all, as the experience of the occupation of Crimea and war in Donbas has shown, the territorial integrity of a state depends precisely on the level of national consolidation.

Today, the main ethnic political threats to national consolidation are as follows:

1. Regional differences in the processes of national consolidation;
2. The political significance of the ethnolinguistic factor;
3. The risks of politicisation of activities among ethnic diasporas in Ukraine under the influence of policy of Hungary, Russia, Romania and Poland.

These threats are most significant in the regions where the share of one ethnic community (an ethnic minority) is greater than the share of ethnic Ukrainians, or exceeds other ethnic groups (except for Ukrainians) in a particular region, or in the border areas, which may be subject to claims by neighbouring states. At present, these regions include the Donetsk, Zakarpattia, Luhansk, Odesa and Chernivtsi oblasts.

Regional Features of National Consolidation

As of 2016, the idea that there are significant cultural differences between certain regions of Ukraine prevails in public opinion.

According to the answers of respondents throughout Ukraine, the greatest distance is between the “residents of Ukraine and residents of the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts” (3 points).¹

However, there remains a large imagined distance between “the residents of Western and Eastern Ukraine” (2.7) and between “the residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas” (2.4). For comparison, the greatest distance is between the citizens of Ukraine and the citizens of EU member states (2.5).²

However, despite the internal and external differences, Ukrainians consider themselves to be related enough to live in one state (60%),³ as confirmed by a gradual decrease in the integral index of the national distance position of the Ukrainian population from various ethnic groups. Thus, in 2014, this figure was 5.0, in 2008-2012 it was 5.2, and in 2006 amounted to 5.3.⁴

It is worth noting that in recent years ethnic features have become increasingly important as components of civic patriotism. This is shown by the fact that 2015 saw a fivefold increase (to 41.7%) in the level of importance of “qualities of a patriot of Ukraine” compared to the level in 2013 (8.3%).⁵

The Political Significance of the Ethnolinguistic Factor

The politicisation of the linguistic and ethnic situation remains one of the factors contributing to internal tension, especially during the election campaigns. This is due to regional differences, the influence of stereotypes of Soviet/Russian propaganda concerning the usage of Ukrainian and Russian languages, and ineffective public policy supporting the Ukrainian language.

It is important that the language of communication at home acts as a kind of test for evaluating the linguistic situation in society. The results of sociological studies conducted in 2015 and 2016 demonstrate the regional diversity of linguistic and ethnic affiliation of citizens based on the criterion of the language used for communication at home.⁶ Thus, although the majority of respondents in large cities of all regions consider themselves ethnic Ukrainians, the South, East and some of the Centre of the country remain a Russian-speaking

¹ Identity of the citizens of Ukraine under the new conditions, the status, trends and regional differences. – Razumkov Centre, <http://razumkov.org.ua/upload/Identi-2016.pdf>.

² Ibid.

³ Ukraine in one year after the Revolution of Dignity: state of public consciousness. – Newsletter (ed. M. Slyusarevskoho), May 2015, p.30.

⁴ Ukrainian society: monitoring social change. Collected Works, vol.2. – Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, no. 1 (15), 2014.

⁵ By Independence Day: what the Ukrainian think about Ukraine? – Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, <http://dif.org.ua/article/do-dnya-nezalezhnosti-shcho-ukraintsi-dumayut-pro-ukrainu>.

⁶ Ukrainian Municipal Survey, March 2-20 2015. – International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015-05-19_ukraine_national_municipal_survey_march_2-20_2015.pdf; Ukrainian Municipal Survey, 20 January - 8 February 2016. – International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/municipal_poll_2016_-_public_release.pdf.

environment. Donbas is substantially different from other regions of the country in terms of the linguistic indicator.

The language situation in the Central regions of the country is a cause for some concern. In particular, during 2015-2016, there was an increase in the share of citizens who speak only Russian at home. In this regard, attention must be paid to the results of recent sociological studies, which indicate a correlation between linguistic and ethnic identity and vulnerability to Russian propaganda. As evidenced by the studies conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,⁷ Russian-speaking citizens and representatives of the Russian ethnicity are more receptive to Russian propaganda.

Among ethnic Ukrainians, the RPE index⁸ was 20, while among ethnic Russians it was three times as high (RPE=66). Similarly, Ukrainian-speaking respondents scored only 15 on the RPE index, while speakers of Russian were two and a half times more susceptible to Russian propaganda.

The lowest level of Russian propaganda was observed in the West of the country (RPE=12), in the Central region (RPE=19) and in Kyiv (RPE=19), while the highest level was in Kharkiv oblast at 50, in Donbas at 46, in Odesa oblast at 43 and in the South in general at 32.

However, the dynamics of linguistic and ethnic processes in the country has a positive trend due to the increase in the share of bilingual citizens in the Southeast resulting from a decrease in the share of the Russian-speaking population.

The Risks of Politicisation of Activities of Ethnic Diasporas in Ukraine: Assessment of the Policy of Hungary, Russia, Romania and Poland

Differences in ethnic political self-identification of the population in the regions could become the basis for neighbouring countries to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine. An example of such policy is the politicisation of ethnicity and religious issues, and encouraging Ukrainian citizens to obtain passports of a foreign state.

Public opinion polls⁹ illustrate the regional risks of the spread of hidden dual citizenship. According to a recent poll by KIIS in 2014, in response to the question "Do you think that Ukraine has to provide its citizens with the right to dual citizenship?", 56.8% of respondents were in favour of the right to have two passports, and 31.3% held this view categorically.

There are many who would like to legalise citizens holding two (or more) passports in Ukraine – 30.2% throughout the whole country, including 47.3% in the East, 45.3% in Donbas and 41% in the South. In general, 44.9% of Ukrainians are against "dual citizenship", and 64% of these are in the West of the country. It is revealing that in Zakarpattia only 5.5% of respondents believe that there is a direct correlation between the division of the country and dual citizenship.

As the experience of the occupation of Crimea and events in Odesa in the spring of 2014 has shown, dual citizenship might be a tool for covering hybrid aggression. The practice of "passport pressure" by Russia on its "compatriots" who are either ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking citizens extends throughout Ukraine. At the present time, manifestations of such policy by Hungary, Poland and Romania are also worthy of attention.

In general, it should be noted that the hybrid war has accelerated the development of national self-consciousness, which is itself a significant victory on the way towards the consolidation of Ukrainian society.

However, there remains a significant risk from the distance between the residents of different regions of Ukraine, as reflected in the public opinion, in particular, that between the residents of Halychyna and Donbas, which is considered greater than between Ukrainians and Russians in general. Under crisis conditions, this situation could be used to impose opinions on citizens concerning contradictory and conflicting goals of different parts of the country that might overshadow the value of staying in one state.

The disintegration of Ukrainian ethnolinguistic and religious space taking place in the border areas creates additional opportunities for diplomatic, economic and even military pressure not only on the part of Russia, but also other neighbouring countries which openly express their dissatisfaction with the existing borders in Europe.

The attempts by Russia and its situational allies in Europe to implement their national and state interests in Ukraine through the politicisation of ethnicity, by providing dual citizenship, a set of privileges, and stimulation of a gradual change of identification, may produce new lines of social differentiation and risks on the way to the national consolidation of the Ukrainian people.

Despite the seriousness of the existing threats to national unity, the current public policy to combat ethnic political risks remains weak. In particular, there is no legislative framework to regulate the activities of the vertical hierarchy of executive power in the area of ethnic policy. Furthermore, there is no state strategy in this area, which would not only establish the long-term goals (creation of a consolidated, tolerant society) but also the means of achieving them in the near future.

The inconsistent nature of Ukrainianisation of the public life, limited as it is to superficial, formal and symbolic measures, remains a key issue with regard to issues of ethnic nationality in Ukraine. For this reason, the state should focus on integration mechanisms aimed at supporting and developing those features of kinship that are already considered by most citizens to be the important components of patriotism and civic loyalty: awareness of the history and culture of Ukraine, Ukrainian language, Ukrainian traditions, and promotion of respect for the representatives of different ethnic groups.

These shortcomings of state policy are, to some extent, compensated by the activities of civil society. However, without active state involvement, the efforts of citizens will have no long-lasting effect on the situation.

There is a further need for targeted state support of the most successful public initiatives to build an integrated national and cultural space, as well as for stimulation of national consolidation processes in the regions most vulnerable to subversive activities by Russia.

Sustaining the achievements of national consolidation in the longer term will depend on the success of reforms in the education and judicial systems, which are the main factors in developing the loyalty of citizens to the state and respect for the rule of law. ■

⁷ Index of Russian Propaganda Efficiency. – Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=510>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The study "The opinions and views of the population of Ukraine, December 2014". – International Centre for Policy Studies, <http://opros2014.zn.ua/west>. Reference cited study was commissioned ZN.UA Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 4-19 December 2014. During the study, conducted 3,035 interviews with adult residents of Ukraine who live in 179 settlements of Ukraine.

SOCIO-CULTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY



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It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the problem of the consolidation of our society is becoming perhaps the main issue, especially in the context of the dramatic and tragic events that have been taking place recently. However, to a large extent this is also the result of contradictions that Ukraine is experiencing in the process of modernisation, making Simmel's question of "How is society possible?" more acute and specific: "How is Ukrainian society possible?" The answer to this question is directly related to the problem of consolidation.

Let us start with definitions. The term **consolidation** (Latin: *con* – together, *solido* – to strengthen) means cohesion, union, harmony, conjunction, mutual understanding of separate individuals, groups and organisations aimed at achieving common goals, interests and values. A tangent to this concept is that of **solidarity** – from Latin *solidus* – related, derived from Latin *salvus* – whole, or wholeness.

Among the others, an important term is the **integration** of society, derived from Latin *integrum* – wholeness, which means combining individual elements (parts), unifying, incorporating political, economic, government and public structures into a cohesive whole. Social integration is an important concept in social theory, which, in turn, can be subdivided into the concepts of **social** and **systemic** integration: the first is determined by common values, and the second by a compromise of interests and systemic functional mechanisms (Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann).

Another important aspect is determining the "diagnosis of our time", i.e. identifying what **divides** Ukrainian society, what are the challenges for its consolidation, cohesion, solidarity and integration. The problematic nature of these definitions is seen in the value-normative and systemic and institutional dimensions, leading to a state of anomie. This **disintegrative factor** is evidenced by the studies conducted by the Institute of Sociology,

which demonstrate in the table "Rating of Social Structures Able To Integrate Ukrainian Society" that the rating of the central government authorities in the integration process is quite low (27%), that of the local authorities is equal to zero, and the ratings of professional associations (3%), political parties (7%) etc., are low as well. Meanwhile, the main factors in the integration of society include non-governmental organisations and associations (67%), the media (53%) and, especially, family and relatives as carriers of the established values and norms (43%).¹

As we see, government institutions have rather low credibility, which hardly unites the society. This conclusion is also confirmed in the Razumkov Centre's study. Answering the question "What is the most significant factor divides the citizens of Ukraine?", respondents indicated "attitude towards the government and public policy" (43%). So the government surpasses the influence of "attitude towards the war in the East of Ukraine" (41%), "attitude towards Russia" (40%) and even "financial issues" (28%), thus being the factor contributing most to disintegration. In other words, the government does not unite the citizens of Ukraine as it should, but rather separates them. An encouraging factor is the "attitude towards Europe and the US", which separates citizens least of all (28%).²

The increase in social inequality in Ukraine should also be added to disuniting factors, as evidenced by the studies conducted by the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and

¹ Expert assessments of trends in the integration of Ukrainian society. – Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Centre of Social Expertise. – Kyiv, Institute of Sociology, 2012. – p. 19.

² The Consolidation of Ukrainian Society: Pathways, Challenges and Prospects. Informational and Analytical Materials for the Expert Discussion on 16 December 2016. – p. 12.



Social Studies under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. In particular, as was stated in the monograph entitled “Inequality in Ukraine: Scope and Possibilities for Influence”, social inequality is an obstacle to social cohesion.³ We should add that this is more a result of the distorted capitalism associated with anti-modernisation and re-feudalisation processes than a consequence of the aggravation of social problems in the process of modernising Ukrainian society.

This situation leads to a lack of responsibility at all levels of society: at the level of citizens, communities, politicians and social institutions, including even an institution such as the state. This fact is also reflected in the language, in which politicians often speak about Ukraine in the third person: “this country”, “this state”, “these people”, instead of “our country”, “our people”, as if they were not “the insiders” responsible for their country, but rather outside observers.

Because our state has not become the expression of the common interest as a *volonte generale*,⁴ but is instead primarily the embodiment of corporate interests saturated with those particular values, the state often does not perform even its main functions. This situation was particularly evident during the Russian aggression in the Eastern regions of our country when a crucial function of the state, i.e. protecting the country against an external aggressor, was first undertaken by non-governmental organisations and volunteer movements.

But this had a positive side as well. After all, by taking on such functions and responsibility, non-governmental organisations catalyse the process of forming civil society in Ukraine. This is also a significant factor in the consolidation of the Ukrainian people on their way towards democratic transformations, reconstruction of the society and state based on humane conditions, i.e. based on a regulatory system with universalistic values.

The lack of responsibility as a fundamental moral and ethical value, in turn, leads to a deficit of trust as the “invisible hand of consolidation” in the society. According

to domestic and foreign sociologists, compared to developed societies Ukraine is a country with a low level of trust, a factor which unites it with other post-Soviet countries. While at the level of interpersonal relations (especially family relations) most people still trust each other (although this index has also decreased), the level of trust in social institutions, including state and political ones, is rather low (from 1.99 to 2.65 on a 10-point scale).⁵ This is a concrete indicator of the level of responsibility of these institutions.

An important recent factor in the consolidation of Ukrainian society was the Maidan, with its universalistic ethos and democratic potential. After beginning as a process in defence of the choice to move towards Europe and, therefore, European values, it turned into a “Revolution of Dignity”, which accelerated modernisation processes in Ukraine. It is important that “the majority (56%) of respondents support the civic definition of the Ukrainian nation as a community of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ethnic origin, language of communication, and traditions”.⁶ This means that *universalistic* European values are becoming part of the self-identification of the Ukrainian people.

This is also evidenced by sociological studies. In particular, Iryna Bekeshkina notes that: “After the revolution of 2004, there was a 10% increase in the number of those who considered themselves to be predominantly citizens of Ukraine. This number increased by as much as 15% following the Maidan in 2013-2014. Currently, about 73% identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine. Moreover, this increase was primarily among residents in the East and South of Ukraine. It is worth pointing out that 50% of the population in Donetsk oblast identify themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine, although even quite recently this share was only 34%. Thus, the idea that Donbas residents have of themselves as a special people has been thoroughly undermined”.⁷ Similar conclusions may be drawn from the Razumkov Centre study, in particular: “The Maidan increased the patriotic feelings of the majority of residents in the Western and Central regions (77% and 56%, respectively) and the relative majority of Donbas residents (42%)”.⁸

This indicator of the self-identification of Ukrainian citizens also adds to the significant progress in the consolidation of Ukrainian society. But the main work is yet to come. It will require the development of functional mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the interaction between systemic integration and social integration based on the principles of public discourse, mutual understanding and trust, and defining the shared responsibility of the Ukrainian people on the basis of universal human values. This may also serve as guidance for putting into practice the motto of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation with regard to global responsibility as the common responsibility of mankind. ■

³ Inequality in Ukraine: Scope and Possibilities for Influence. Ed. by E.M. Libanova, Kyiv: Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2012. – p. 35.

⁴ “Common (general) will”, French.

⁵ E. Golovakha, A. Gorbachyk, Trends in Social Changes in Ukraine and Europe: Outcomes of the European Social Survey 2005-2007-2009-2011, Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2012. – p. 119.

⁶ National Security and Defence. – No. 3-4. – 2016. – p. 12.

⁷ Ukraine-Russia: Dialogue in a Time of the Conflict / Compiled by O. Bilyi, Kyiv: Agency Ukraine, International Renaissance Foundation, 2015. – p. 11-12.

⁸ The Consolidation of Ukrainian Society: Pathways, Challenges and Prospects. Informational and Analytical Materials for the Expert Discussion on 16 December 2016. – p. 5.

CONSOLIDATION OF CITIZENS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CONFLICT IN VALUES AND CONSCIOUSNESS



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Centuries without an independent state and long periods when regions of Ukraine belonged to various other states, often at odds with each other, have had an impact on the collective consciousness and affected the formation of a common identity. The search for common socio-cultural meanings is still problematic in view of the impacts of different histories, geopolitical factors and the problem of the weakness of civil society institutions.

The boundaries of social division also depend upon the characteristics of the regional and mental landscape. The areas subordinated to different states coexisted on Ukrainian lands for centuries, resulting in the phenomenon of Ukrainian “separation”, conflict of loyalty, and a divided mentality. To be sure, these factors led to threats to national sovereignty, challenges for national unity and centrifugal development trends.

Under conditions of societal transformation *the regional societies* represent ranges of unstable systems, each in search of its own “organisational model”. In this context there are new factors, territorial and symbolic, to reinforce the demarcation lines. This has led to an updating of the “image of an enemy” and negative perception of positive social experience. This can destroy the balance of the relationship between “insiders” and create rigid boundaries in communication with “outsiders”.

The population of the West and the East of Ukraine represent different regional communities. Such concepts as “the south-eastern identity”, “extra-national Donbas identity”, and “Donetsk identity” have appeared in the contemporary scientific discourse.

Undoubtedly, Donbas is a special region, where the increasing urgency of regional patriotism and the politicisation of regional identity, along with extraordinary media activity, have been used in election processes to bring about the victory of a particular political force. We cannot help agreeing that Donbas has been turned to a kind of symbol of regional identity with active participation by the media. The question of whether the creation of the Donbas

image corresponds or does not correspond to the existing reality deserves special attention. So-called “*regional patriotism*” has become one of the factors whereby collective consciousness has been manipulated, and new quasi-identities with artificially developed regional memory models have been created.

Stereotypes inherited from the time of cohabitation by Ukrainians and Russians in the Soviet Union have a serious impact on the course of socio-cultural development in the eastern regions. A certain part of society still today identifies itself with a non-existent state called the Soviet Union, which leads to preservation of negative identities in the cultural identification of citizens, creating a “*paradox of social ambivalence*”.

The uncertainty of the Donbas region’s political status will contribute to this. The draft Law of Ukraine “On special procedures for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts”, and the attitude of the central authorities to the future prospects of these territories, suggest the existence of two political centres (Kyiv – Moscow/LPR-DPR) “in certain areas” of the region.

In our opinion, the status of these “certain areas” in Donbas will lead to the emergence of a “condominium”, a “protectorate”, so to speak, an “associated state”(!) within the unitary state of Ukraine. This will lead to bashing of the East as “alien” and creation of a strategy of “internal colonisation”. This, in turn, will result in an atmosphere of rejection on both sides of the demarcation line, construction of new characteristics of “the enemy”, and displacement of the boundaries of traditional social and cultural identities: the former “insiders” (citizens of Ukraine) beyond the line of the new artificial boundaries are labelled as “outsiders”. This will slow down the process of building of a common civic identity.

Determinations of the level of “Ukrainian-ness” of the East and West of Ukraine are not reliable. The post-Soviet way of thinking inherent in Ukrainian society is present in Western regions no less than in Eastern ones. The level of European-ness in the West is a myth, as is the “backwardness” of the East. The biggest problem in Eastern Ukraine is a lack of symbolic resources for building an alternative version of the national identity. A particular attitude to “other-ness” is being formed; something “alien” is always present, from the “other”, someone “different”, “not one of us” to the enemy. That is why the formula of “East and West together” can be interpreted not only as a call for unity, but also as a statement of mental uncertainty.

The war in Donbas reminded us how dangerous it is to underestimate the state of regional consciousness, the feeling of being a “man on the edge”, a “frontier man”. We believe *that there is a clear socio-cultural conflict in the East: amid the destruction of a common spiritual awareness, the various segments of society build up opposing visions of their model of the state. The crisis in the East of the country is also an ideological one.*

Developments in 2014, the change of the power structure, the Crimea annexation, have had their effect: demoralised citizens believed it is possible that the Crimean scenario will be repeated in other regions.

Studies of the last two years showed that, despite the persistent contradictions in Ukrainian society, there is a gradual shift in priorities to search for new ways to integrate the society on the basis of values such as *mutual aid, patriotism and tolerance*. An important factor in the consolidation of Ukrainian society is *historical memory*. (It was in precisely the areas where citizens who hold “Soviet values” live that the Russian aggression unfolded in 2014).

The confrontation, at the interregional level, of several memory models based on different perceptions of communist ideology and the Soviet historical experience and Ukrainian liberation movement, as well as the destructive influence of outside information and propaganda with the use of warped interpretations of historical facts, present challenges to the unity of Ukrainian society.

The foregrounding of local identity leads to risks for consolidation. Regional societies that feel they are “at odds” with the national identity lean towards the “lower

layers” of identities, namely the ethnic, local and religious ones. They are more easily influenced by mythologised ideological structures, respond to past traumas and develop a victim consciousness.

We recognize that what is going on in the East is a cultural marker of differences in identity and value, civilisational differences in the socio-cultural system of Ukraine. It is now obvious that the demarcation and delimitation lines have divided our society *along lines of confrontations, which make it impossible to consolidate Ukrainian society. It is evident in the Ukrainian lands in the following ways:*

- in the opposing values of society;
- in the archetypes of regional consciousness;
- in non-civic behaviour models.

For the sake of fairness we must note that for many years Ukrainian society was formed in the context of the “clash” of cultural traditions and the dichotomy of “insiders”/“outsiders” was present in its value system. This gave rise to the *ideological crisis* in the East of Ukraine.

Conclusions and recommendations. *Transculturation, commitment to cultural transcendence, and a focus on the dynamics of mutual influence and distinctions are now of critical importance. A strategy of consistent decentralisation, which will take place at both the regional level and the level of local communities, seems to be the best approach. The government authorities must get rid of political bias on matters of regional specificity, and to anticipate the challenges of regionalism threatening the loss of the national sovereignty at the proper time.*

A lack of factors in favour of the formation of a *common identity* has significantly escalated the *threat of separatism*, strengthening of importance of the *regional identities*.

In view of the sufficient potential for sustaining the separatist sentiments in some regions, it is necessary to implement an effective *communication strategy of dialogue* with the population, which must take into account:

- specific features of regional identity;
- the area’s historical development conditions;
- mental and psychological characteristics of the local population.

A programme for *comprehensive restructuring* of Donbas must be adopted and launched based on best practices in order to return the East to Ukraine in terms of culture, values and, most importantly, the economy.

Internal Ukrainian integration, extensive civic dialogue, and development of a programme of national reconciliation are the highest priorities given the ambivalence of the social consciousness and the social and cultural conflict. Otherwise, Ukrainian society will have to pay a high price for creation of a united nation. ■