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# UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: GAINS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS



**Petro POROSHENKO,**  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2009-2010)*

**A**mong the main tasks and functions of the foreign policy, I wish in the first place to mention the following. *First*, the foreign policy is to provide reliable external guarantees for national security, state sovereignty and territorial integrity. *Second*, the authorities' actions on the international arena should concentrate on creation of a comprehensive effective system to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad. *Third*, the foreign policy is to utmost promote the national economy development, secure a decent place for Ukraine in the international division of labour, promote interests of domestic business on the world markets. And finally – Ukraine's action in the foreign policy should be consistent, predictable, responsible and clear for our partners both in the West and in the East.

Effective attainment of those tasks requires, on one hand, internal stability, consolidation of the lead political forces and institutes of governance, which will ensure public legitimacy of the foreign political course. On the other – optimal, balanced and clearly coordinated mechanisms of foreign political activity need to be created.

Unfortunately, recently, those preconditions have not been fully provided in Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry was working in difficult conditions of domestic instability and under the influence of the global economic crisis. But even in such conditions, the foreign office managed to achieve substantial gains and improve the situation in the main foreign policy domains.

However, along with gains, Ukraine's foreign policy now faces a number of challenges that, in absence of an adequate response, can bring about unfavourable trends and hinder attainment of Ukraine's national interests. Reversal of those trends presents an urgent and priority task for the new government formed in Ukraine after the 2010 presidential elections.

## Foreign policy aspects of national security

The most recent gains in the sector include progress in solution of long-standing problems of the border delimitation with Moldova and Belarus, and demarcation of the border with the Russian Federation.

Development of cooperation with NATO demonstrated an upward trend, a productive format of relations was introduced within the framework of Annual National Programmes (ANP). The Ukrainian side took an active part in discussion of the Alliance's new strategy.

Contacts with the USA in the security sector were on the rise. The new US leadership confirmed invariability of the United States' course in support for Ukrainian democratic reforms and independence. The guarantees provided in the Budapest Memorandum have also been reiterated.

However, despite some achievements, Ukraine so far failed to obtain reliable external security guarantees. Both

Ukrainian and international experts note a growing deficit of Ukraine's security in the conditions of dynamic changes in the European and global security environment.<sup>1</sup>

In this connection, two key problems deserve notice. First: Ukraine still has no consolidated, agreed approach to formulation and implementation of the strategic model of national security, due defence capability of the state. The state political and expert circles, the general public discuss the issue of Ukraine's non-aligned status or accession to one or another collective security system – despite the legislatively provided goal of joining NATO.

Another problem is presented by the absence of clear mechanisms of reliance on external guarantees of national security, independence, territorial integrity, inviolability of Ukraine's borders. As we know, recognition of sovereignty, external guarantees of Ukraine's security are provided in many international legal documents. I mean, e.g., the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in

<sup>1</sup> In particular, according to the expert poll held by Razumkov Centre, 79.8% of respondents does not believe that Ukraine has reliable external guarantees of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity now. For more detail see the material "Foreign policy sector in expert assessments" published in this journal.



Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. However, there are no clear mechanisms to back the guarantees declared in those documents. Having failed to build the due level of defence capability on its own, Ukraine found itself between two strong world centres of power. Such a stand is rather risky and requires immediate response from the new Ukrainian authorities.

I guess, those problems should be a subject of Ukraine's dialogue with the world community.

In the first place, we should finally decide on the strategic model of provision of Ukraine's security and defence capability. One should consider all risks and capabilities of Ukraine's non-aligned status, its accession to one of the existing collective security systems, participation in building new security architecture in Europe. Such strategic decisions may be taken only on the basis of all-round analysis of said advantages, risks and capabilities, with utmost account of the world and European trends in the security domain and on the condition of a national consensus. So, I guess, the final choice of the national security model will stay at least for the middle run.

Before that, in my opinion, we should maintain the format and dynamic of relations with NATO, raise the effectiveness of joint events, solve disputed issues between Ukraine and the Alliance. It is important to deepen continuous political dialogue, promote cooperation on all levels.

We should provide for full-scale implementation of the ANP, improve the practice of its drafting, fill it with clear and concrete measures; employ the ANP as a tool of domestic political, socio-economic, defence reforms; effectively use consultative and material assistance in different cooperation formats, step up Ukraine's participation in non-military programmes of partnership with the Alliance.

We should also make efforts to do away with problems and conflicts in relations with the neighbour countries, build a safe environment resting on equal, pragmatic partnership of countries, normalise interstate relations, enhance the national defence capability. This will guarantee Ukraine's security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Finally, we should initiate discussion on providing true guarantees of Ukraine's security: within the pan-European discourse about the new European security model, at relevant international events, in the format of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, etc.

Effective steps in those domains will give Ukrainian politicians and society the time to pass a considerate and consolidated decision on further actions to ensure reliable security guarantees.

### **Creation of an effective system protecting rights of Ukraine's citizens abroad**

Reliable protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad is among the top priorities of the foreign policy. Our compatriots should always and everywhere feel practical attention and assistance from their State. This concerns millions of Ukrainian citizens who go abroad for different purposes. In particular, we are aware of the large scale of labour emigration.

Recently, a number of steps have been made to protect citizen rights abroad. Agreements were made with many countries in the fields of employment, social protection and pension allowances (talks are underway with Greece, Georgia, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Romania, Hungary).

The dialogue with the EU on negotiation and introduction of visa-free travel of Ukrainian citizens to the EU countries is underway. With some EU countries, agreements of free issue of visas to Ukrainian citizens were signed. I hope for introduction of visa-free procedures with Argentina, Brunei, Israel in the near future.

Agreements of small scale transborder movement were made with neighbour countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary).

The Foreign Ministry stepped up efforts for practical assistance to Ukraine's citizens caught in trouble abroad. In particular, conditions were provided for liberation of Ukrainian sailors seized by pirates onboard vessels *Faina* and *Ariana*. Ukraine decided to join the EU *Atalanta* international operation for fighting piracy in Somalia.

Meanwhile, many problems remain in the sector, and to improve the state of affairs, the following should be done, according to my opinion.

**First.** To continue conclusion of agreements in the fields of labour migration, employment, social protection and pensions between Ukraine and countries – the greatest recipients of Ukrainian manpower, and to make agreements with international organisations active in the fields of labour migration and prevention of human trafficking.

**Second.** To utmost speed up negotiation of a roadmap for introduction of visa-free procedures between Ukraine and the EU, with a view of signing the relevant agreement some time later. For that, the following should be done, among other things: (a) to improve the system of travel document and identity card security in Ukraine in the context of negotiation on documents with biometric data in line with the EU standards (ICAO) with the European Commission; (b) to sign and ratify a number of international agreements, conventions and protocols, to improve the national migration legislation; (c) to step up cooperation with *EUROJUST*, *EUROPOL*.

At the same time, we should step up negotiations on unification and simplification of visa procedures, extension of the list of categories of Ukrainian citizens entitled to free visas. It seems reasonable to expand the practice of agreements on free visas for Ukraine with EU countries. Agreements should also be made with neighbour countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary) expanding the area of small-scale transborder movement, and an agreement on such movement should be concluded with Romania.

**Third.** For better protection of the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens, networks of consular missions in the countries receiving the main tourist and migration flows from Ukraine should be optimised, a system of call-centres should be set up on the basis of consular missions to assist Ukraine's citizens abroad. It also seems reasonable to introduce the practice of setting up provisional mobile consular missions (for the summer season) in the countries accepting Ukrainian tourists. To be sure, effective operation of the consular network will require adequate budget funding for establishment and operation of consular missions, along with raising personal responsibility of their officers for quality services.



**Fourth.** To improve the system of monitoring and analysis of emergency situations threatening safety and interests of Ukrainian citizens, to continuously inform the Ukrainian public about such situations.

### Promotion of Ukraine's economic interests in the world

The authorities' actions on the world scene should promote the development of trade and economic relations both in traditional areas (the EU, Russia, the USA) and in other regions of the world, interesting for Ukraine and Ukrainian manufacturers.

The Foreign Ministry's efforts at foreign policy economisation in 2009 were complicated by the world financial and economic crisis. On the other hand, the crisis revealed drawbacks and prompted the need to look for new ways and effective mechanisms of Ukraine's cooperation with countries remaining on the outskirts of its geo-economic interests.

**From this viewpoint, diplomatic support for Ukraine's presence on its priority markets should be strengthened.** In particular, trade and economic contacts with world and regional leaders should be expanded for import of innovative technologies, investments, modernisation of the national economy (China, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, etc.), with countries of the Middle East, South East Asia, Latin America, Africa – for promotion of domestic products, in particular, engineering and agricultural produce.

**In this context, it is important to resume top-level dialogue with China, India, deepen cooperation with Brazil.**

It seems particularly essential to step up contacts with China on the country leadership level, political consultations between the Foreign Ministries; to conclude a package of agreements on trade and economic, scientific-technological, military-technological cooperation. More efforts should be made to attract Chinese investments in Ukraine's infrastructure in course of its preparation for Euro-2012. Development of cooperation in machine building and agriculture, military-technological cooperation and scientific-technological cooperation (peaceful space exploration) seem promising.

It also seems expedient to develop and introduce the Strategy of development of Ukraine's relations with India, to set the principles and priority sectors of cooperation (rocket and space, aviation, energy, metallurgy, ship and machine building, agriculture, transport, scientific-technological sector, defence industry). At the same time, political dialogue on the top level requires continuous support – for instance, it seems reasonable for Ukraine's President to pay a visit to the Republic of India in 2010, to hold the fourth meeting of the Ukraine-Indian Joint Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission.

Promotion of political dialogue with Brazil through regular exchange of visits on different levels is also on the agenda. It makes sense to sign intergovernmental agreements on military-technological and defence cooperation, as well as on implementation of the Ukraine-Brazilian space project *Tsyklon 4 – Alcântara*.

### Ways to improve relations in traditional foreign policy domains

To be sure, the geography of the national geopolitical interests is not confined to the EU-Russia-USA triangle. As we noted, other regions of the world are important

for promotion of Ukraine's national interests, build-up of effective political, trade and economic partnership. However, traditional foreign policy lines are and will remain among the priorities. **I am sure that the European integration is the main line of Ukraine's foreign political course.** Preconditions for the upward trend in that course include strengthening and development of partnership in other sectors.

**The main lines of deepening cooperation with the EU are as follows.** *First.* Favourable conditions should be created for implementation of the European integration course through expansion of the legal framework for cooperation in the sectors of bilateral interest. Cooperation should rest on the formula of political association and economic integration, active support for joint socially important projects implemented in different regions of the country, intensification of harmonisation of the national legislation to the EU norms and rules, creation of a network of information business centres in Ukraine's regions to promote contacts of the small and medium business with European partners, strengthen the information component of the European integration policy.

*Second.* Utmost efforts should be made to complete negotiation and implementation of the Association Agreement. The political will of the authorities, institutional, financial resources should be concentrated on effective implementation of that document, provision of an adequate regulatory framework for its implementation.

*Third.* As I already mentioned, it is important to create all necessary internal and external conditions for full-scale introduction of visa-free procedures in relations with the EU countries.

**We should raise the effectiveness of the politico-diplomatic dialogue in relations with the Russian Federation,** change for the better the information background for cooperation. In this connection, it makes sense to hold the Media Forum "Information background for partnership: from confrontation to cooperation" in the first half of 2010 involving representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian media, expert communities, public organisations.

We should draw up and steadily follow a mid-term schedule of solution of disputed issues stocked in the most sensitive sectors of bilateral relations: security (including border arrangements, Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea), energy, cultural sectors.

An important precondition for intensification of bilateral relations is presented by commencement of a full-scale dialogue within the framework of the Ukraine-Russian Interstate Commission – for constructive development of cooperation in different sectors.

At that, the dialogue on cultural problems should be utmost de-politicised. I guess that the Interstate Commission should concentrate on creation of conditions for effective satisfaction of national cultural needs of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation and Russians in Ukraine. It is worth setting up a permanent bilateral scientific forum for impartial, unbiased discussion of cultural problems. We should also in all ways encourage the work of the Ukraine-Russian joint commission of historians, promote cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian higher educational establishments.

**Partner relations with the USA need deepening.** The parties should concentrate on concrete measures at strengthening contacts in the sectors of security, trade and



economic, energy, scientific-technological cooperation, fighting terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.

It is important to ensure the effectiveness and intensity of the dialogue using interstate mechanisms – topical events here may include arrangement of the second meeting of the US-Ukraine Commission on Strategic Partnership in Kyiv, promotion of the dialogue on the issues of nuclear security in working groups, fighting the economic crisis, implementation of the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. To strengthen the institutional component of the bilateral dialogue, it might be reasonable to institute the post of a Special Governmental Commissioner for the development of the US-Ukraine partnership.

There is a productive idea of setting up a joint expert analysis council (jointly with the US Council on Foreign Relations), involving lead experts in international relations, foreign and security policy from both countries.

In my opinion, promotion of Ukraine's interests in relations with the USA would also benefit from creation of effective mechanisms for cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora in the US (involving the Ukrainian World Congress).

### Improvement of foreign political activity mechanisms

I have more than once stressed that the foreign policy effectiveness greatly depends on the quality of mechanisms of its implementation.

Unfortunately, those mechanisms are not sufficiently established in Ukraine. Additionally, the effectiveness of their work has been affected by permanent conflicts among parliamentary political forces and institutes of governance. This resulted in inadequate coordination of actions between governance institutes in the foreign policy sector, some duplication of functions at planning and implementation of foreign political decisions. Legal support for the foreign policy remained a topical problem.

So, today, comprehensive modernisation of institutional support for foreign political activity is required – for rearrangement of the system of formulation and effective implementation of the foreign policy, creation of functionally coherent, effective structures, an optimal network of diplomatic missions, introduction of effective mechanisms, strict coordination of the state authorities' activity in the foreign policy.

I consider it expedient to set up a **Special Working Group** under the President of Ukraine on improvement of foreign political activity. The Group should perform: (a) comprehensive analysis of the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of foreign political decisions, effectiveness of Ukraine's participation in international organisations; (b) inventory of the regulatory and legal framework for foreign relations, structural and staff inventory of foreign diplomatic missions (embassies, general consulates, missions at international organisations).

Following the results of the Group's activity, a **Presidential Decree** should be issued, providing concrete measures at enhancement of the effectiveness of foreign political activity and, the main thing, assigning to the Foreign Ministry the function of the sole coordinator of executive bodies' activity in foreign relations. The Decree should also introduce the practice of drawing a detailed

list of concrete tasks for each embassy ("Diplomatic charts"), on whose basis the embassy manning schedule is established (or reviewed).

What should the main criteria of the rationale of maintaining diplomatic missions be? In my opinion, they include: *first*, the level and prospects of trade and economic, political, scientific-technological, cultural, military-technological cooperation and community of national interests and priorities; *second*, the need and practical ability to promote domestic products on markets of other countries, the potential of employment of innovative technologies, investments, implementation of joint large-scale projects; *third*, the true need of protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens with account of the level of tourist exchanges and the scale of labour migration; *fourth*, the strength of the Ukrainian diaspora.

Ukraine's participation in international organisations is to rely on correspondence to Ukraine's national interests, effects for its international image, as well as resource capabilities of backing the country's participation in those structures.

I believe that said Decree should also provide for development of a strict system of personnel selection and appointment in the Foreign Ministry's central staff and foreign missions; establishment of rules of cooperation between representatives of state bodies and the Foreign Ministry at official negotiations; creation of workable mechanisms for effective use of the potential of think-tanks of Ukraine's "third sector"; promotion of "popular diplomacy", extension of human contacts; strengthening of the information component in the foreign policy. The foreign office activity should be utmost public, transparent, clear for Ukrainian citizens and foreign partners alike.

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By and large, speaking of the prospects of the foreign policy, it makes sense to remind of the known saying by Theodore Roosevelt: "Do what you can, with what you have, where you are". Meanwhile, one should keep in mind that the foreign policy sector is very sensitive and at the same time inert, so, a few limitations must be considered.

*First*, all foreign political problems stocked for years cannot be solved within a short period.

*Second*, concrete results in the foreign policy sector are seen at different timelines, due to the specificity of the negotiation process and the complex, often overly bureaucratic procedures of international institutions. That is why many decisions taken on bilateral and multilateral levels have a "deferred effect".

*Third*, foreign policy measures are implemented in no less than a bilateral format. So, concrete results of the authorities' activity depend not only on their effectiveness but also on the partner's position, the international situation, influencing dispositions of the countries.

In view of those limitations, the new authorities should realise that their present actions can bring concrete results in the middle and long run. The main thing is that those actions should pursue Ukraine's national interests, rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens, interests and needs of the national economy. **The main vector of supporting national interests should remain unchanged – the European integration.** ■

# UKRAINE ON THE WORLD SCENE: PRESENT AND FUTURE

The effectiveness of Ukraine's foreign policy, its international authority primarily depend on the results of domestic transformations – successful democratic and socially oriented market reforms, curbing corruption, true establishment of the rule of law, creation of an effective and fair judicial system, growth of common wellbeing on the basis of socially oriented competitiveness of the market economy and, finally, on consolidation of the Ukrainian state and political elite for the sake of democratic European development of the state.

But in recent years, Ukraine's foreign policy has become a hostage to the sharp and long political confrontation at home. Its effectiveness was impaired by lack of coordination at implementation of the state foreign policy course, inadequate organisation and support for foreign political activity, use of the international scene by the leading political actors to settle political accounts at home. Such situation misled the world community, undermined the country's international image. Strategic partners of the Ukrainian state, the world in general got increasingly "tired" of Ukraine.

That is why today, foreign political activity needs fundamental improvement, clear priorities and tasks, reformation of its toolset and mechanisms. The main lines of action in the foreign policy sector include: modernisation of institutional support; strengthening international guarantees of Ukraine's security, sovereignty and territorial integrity; active participation in creation of the new global and regional security architecture; better protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad; economisation of the foreign policy; effectiveness of action in the main foreign policy domains – both traditional (the EU, the Russian Federation, the USA) and new, whose importance is conditioned by Ukraine's economic interests, its establishment in the international division of labour (the Asian and Pacific region, the Middle East, South America, etc.)

Concrete measures in those domains will help attain the **strategic goal – establish Ukraine as an equal member of the European and world community, an economically developed, influential, strong state that can defend its national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity, rights and dignity of its citizens.**

## State and problems of Ukraine's foreign policy

Razumkov Centre's monitoring of the authorities' actions on the world scene (2005-2008), data of special expert and national polls<sup>1</sup> give grounds to state the following.

Ukraine's foreign policy had a number of achievements. In particular, it managed: to step up contacts with the EU in different sectors of cooperation, to commence the final stage of negotiation of a large-scale Association Agreement; to improve the politico-diplomatic dialogue with the Russian Federation recently, to resume top-level contacts; to solve some long-standing problems of delimitation of the state border with Belarus and Moldova, to enhance protection of rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad, etc.

At the same time, Ukraine's foreign policy has a number of long-standing problems that hinder its progress and witness unfavourable trends, not reversed for the time being.

## Problems of institutional support for the foreign policy

**The main problem of Ukraine's foreign political activity recently has been presented by confrontation of different institutes of governance, which complicated agreed and consistent foreign policy steps, harmed attainment of national interests on the world scene, destabilised the situation in the country, undermined its international image.**

Ukraine's foreign policy was made "manually", behind the scene; it suffered from dependence on situational

<sup>1</sup> See: The new government's performance in 2005: a view of non-governmental think-tanks. – *National Security & Defence*, 2005, No.12, p.67-83; 240 days of the government activity in the new format. Analytical report. – *National Security & Defence*, 2007, No.3, p.64-77; 100 days of Ukrainian authorities in the new format: assessment of actions in the context of democratic values. Analytical report. – *National Security & Defence*, 2008, No.2, p.62-72. For more detail on the results of expert and national polls see: *National Security & Defence* – 2003, No.3, p.40-60; 2007, No.5, p.41-68; 2008, No.1, p.36-60; 2008, No.6, p.30-56; 2009, No.4, p.61-84.



*Experts and citizens alike believe that the country's foreign policy is most of all affected by internal factors. In particular, experts noted political instability at home (60.6%), inconsistency and contradictions in foreign policy positions of the Ukrainian leadership (56.9%), foreign policy differences among the main political forces (46.8%).*

*People's opinions are very much the same. They suggest that the greatest negative influence on the foreign policy comes from the difficult internal socio-economic situation (40.4%), mistrust of foreign partners in the state leadership (38.2%), differences in foreign policy positions of national political actors (36.5%).<sup>2</sup>*

interests of separate groups of the state and political elite. There was no effective public control of the institutes of governance. As a result, the authorities' actions on the world scene have not brought the desired effect, the declared foreign policy goals were not attained.

**Noteworthy, the authorities made some steps to perfect foreign policy mechanisms,<sup>3</sup> but in the conditions of home political instability many of them had transient, local, sometimes controversial effects.** So, today, one cannot speak about creation of a legislatively regulated, optimal in terms of structure and human resources mechanism of effective implementation of the national foreign policy course.

The system of Ukrainian embassies and trade and economic missions abroad lacks effectiveness, retaining some "rudiments" of the Soviet diplomacy; appointments are often time-serving, non-transparent, the professional level of foreign mission officers is inadequate. By and large, today's activity of embassies and trade and economic missions falls short of the state's main tasks on the world scene – protection of the national interests, interests and rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad, economisation of the foreign policy, effective promotion of the interests of Ukrainian manufacturers on the world markets.<sup>4</sup>

**The lack of consensus among the leading political forces froze the problem of legal support for the foreign policy, legislative establishment of national foreign policy priorities.** Said priorities were specified

in the document "Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" (approved by Parliament's Resolution on July 2, 1993) and later specified in the Law "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" (2003), other state acts, in particular, Military Doctrine of Ukraine (2004). Those documents prioritised European and Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership, in Ukraine's foreign policy.

But in 2006-2008, a number of bills were submitted for consideration to Parliament putting forward entirely different foreign policy priorities and aimed not to improve the situation but in fact to change Ukraine's strategic course. In particular, they dealt with a non-aligned, neutral status for Ukraine.<sup>5</sup>

Legislative provision of Ukraine's non-aligned status is also envisaged by the Agreement creating the new coalition of parliamentary factions "Stability and Reforms".<sup>6</sup> On March 16, 2010, President Yanukovich ordered the Foreign Ministry to draft proposals for the new Law "On Fundamentals of Ukraine's Home and Foreign Policy".<sup>7</sup> Judging by some of the President's statements, it may be expected that the new law will be designed to change foreign policy priorities set earlier. It should be noted that currently, promotion of that bill will look like kind of a "political revenge", destabilise the situation in the country, present Ukraine to the world community as an unpredictable, inconsistent country, whose foreign policy course depends on the unstable home political situation. Evidently, drafting and passage of a new law laying down new fundamentals of the foreign policy and fundamentally changing Ukraine's foreign policy course would be a premature and counterproductive decision involving unpredictable effects. Additionally, in the conditions of impetuous changes in the global and regional security system, in particular, breakdown of the previous security architecture in Europe, one should make a comprehensive prognostic analysis of the current geopolitical processes, determine resource capabilities of the country and outline mid- and long-term consequences of its non-aligned status.

Beyond doubt, such analysis should be made with broad participation of domestic and international experts, its results should be known to the public. And only on the

<sup>2</sup> Used hereinafter are the data of the latest expert (February 2010) and national (November 2009) polls by Razumkov Centre whose results summed up in tables and diagrams are published in this magazine. Those surveys show the general stand of the expert community representatives and public opinions on topical foreign policy issues.

<sup>3</sup> In particular, the structure of governmental bodies coordinating the European policy was reformed (Vice Prime Minister's service – a governmental committee), the Coordinating Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic integration was established and staffed.

<sup>4</sup> In this context one should note President Yanukovich's statements on trade and economic missions' transfer to the Foreign Ministry. – Press release of March 11, 2010, official web site of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine; <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/ua/news/detail/35926.htm> (in Ukrainian).

But apparently, the Foreign Ministry should be reformed following a comprehensive structural and functional analysis of the entire system of Ukraine's missions abroad. Meanwhile, transfer of trade and economic missions to the Foreign Ministry requires not only amendment of the legal framework but also serious structural and staff rearrangement of the foreign office.

<sup>5</sup> Namely, submitted for consideration were: in 2006 – the bill "On Fundamentals of Home and Foreign Policy" (Party of Regions, CPU, SPU), intended, *inter alia*, to "preserve a non-aligned status", "stop effect of the Law "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine"; bills on a neutral, non-aligned status of Ukraine (Anticrisis Coalition); in 2007 – bills "On Fundamentals of Home and Foreign Policy of Ukraine" (CPU, Party of Regions); in 2008 – the bill "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" (Party of Regions), intended to remove provisions of Article 8 of the Law on "membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation".

<sup>6</sup> "Stability and Reforms" Coalition plans to legislatively establish Ukraine's non-aligned status. – UNIAN, March 16, 2010 (in Ukrainian).

<sup>7</sup> Ukraine's leadership will seriously approach new tasks in foreign policy. – UNIAN, March 17, 2010 (in Ukrainian).

condition of public consensus and home political stability in general, the issue of development and implementation of a new law on Ukraine's status may be raised. Therefore, it seems reasonable to put off solution of that controversial problem into the future.<sup>8</sup>

**The above contradictions among institutes of power led to incoordination of their foreign political activity.** Two presidential decrees (August 2005 and November 2005) vesting coordination of activity in foreign relations in the Foreign Ministry<sup>9</sup> were never implemented. In fact, there were several foreign policy decision-making centres in the country – Ukraine's President, Parliament, Government, NSDC. No wonder that the decisions of those centres often ran contrary to each other.<sup>10</sup>

The President and the Premier took different positions on: the state of relations with Russia, the military conflict in the Caucasus (2008), the status of the Russian language, the new security architecture in Europe, cooperation with IMF, some aspects of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea. The Presidential Secretariat leadership accused the Prime Minister of attempts to pursue an alternative foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Such confrontation affected Ukraine's relations with its strategic partners.

An especially sharp conflict of the country leaders arose from the "gas dialogue" with the Russian Federation. After the relevant agreements between the country's presidents, made during the second meeting of the Ukraine-Russian interstate commission (February 2008), the President of Ukraine Secretariat made a sharp statement that the Government planned to act under a different scenario than envisaged by the presidents' agreements.<sup>12</sup> Later, a sharp conflict arose over gas agreements with Russia (January 2010), involving Ukraine's NSDC and the Foreign Ministry. On the foreign policy level, mutual accusations were made, the parties presented different positions in foreign media, appealed to heads of foreign diplomatic missions.

**As a result, the conflict in Ukraine's leadership received a wide international echo.** In particular, the EU leaders more than once expressed concern over deepening confrontation between Ukraine's President and Prime Minister. For instance, the European Parliament President Pöhl, speaking in the Verkhovna Rada on April 6, 2009, called upon all Ukrainian political leaders to overstep political differences and jointly work for long-term political stability in the country.<sup>13</sup>

The European Parliament Resolution of February 25, 2010, stressed that "Ukraine has regrettably lost more than five years in properly addressing its major constitutional and institutional deficits, especially in solving the conflicts of competence between the President and Prime Minister... as a consequence, important reform projects in the public, economic and social sectors have been delayed..."<sup>14</sup>

### Situation in the main foreign policy domains

Analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy gives grounds to note a set of problems (some of which are deeply rooted), unclear situations, conflicts, a deficit of strategic vision of future cooperation in the key domains – including European and Euro-Atlantic integration, in relations with Russia and the USA.

### European and Euro-Atlantic integration

**Relations with the EU.** Ukraine's relations with the EU generally were on the rise. Gains in that domain included: (a) development of a full-scale dialogue with the EU in different sectors, strengthening of politico-diplomatic contacts; (b) development of treaty-based relations;<sup>15</sup> (c) implementation of long-term EU projects in Ukraine (energy, small and medium business development, equipment of borders, perfection of the judicial system, the EU *Black Sea* investment programme in the Crimea, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya; *Twinning* assistance programme), etc.

Meanwhile, implementation of the European integration course is hindered by a number of external and internal problems. External ones include, *first of all*, the EU's preoccupation with its internal problems related with the latest waves of expansion and deep transformations envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty – changes in the structure of the EU bodies and decision-making mechanisms. *Second* – influence of the world economic crisis on the Ukraine-EU relations. *Third* – the factor of Russia, strongly seeking to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, in particular, draw it into military-political and economic unions under its auspices (Tashkent Treaty, the Customs Union).

Internal problems include, first of all, political instability at home, ineffectiveness of reforms and fighting corruption, lack of institutional, human and resource support for the European policy.

<sup>8</sup> In particular, that issue should have been considered by the new Parliament of the country.

<sup>9</sup> Decrees "On Amendment of the President of Ukraine Decree of September 18, 1996" No.1888 of August 22, 2005, and "On Amendment of Regulations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine" No.1660 of November 29, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Participants of the round-table "Ukraine's foreign policy at a new stage" noted the existence of "several foreign policies" in the country – of the Foreign Ministry, Presidential Secretariat, Cabinet of Ministers. See: round-table presentations published in this magazine.

<sup>11</sup> Recent statements by the Premier's office witness the desire to pursue an alternative foreign policy – Honcharuk. – UNIAN, October 27, 2008 (*in Ukrainian*).

<sup>12</sup> Presidential Secretariat stresses inadmissibility of the Government's intentions to repudiate Yushchenko-Putin agreements in the gas sector. – UNIAN, February 20, 2008 (*in Ukrainian*).

<sup>13</sup> European Parliament President called on Ukraine's political leaders to work jointly to ensure stability in the state. – UNIAN, April 6, 2009 (*in Ukrainian*).

<sup>14</sup> European Parliament Resolution on the situation in Ukraine of February 25, 2010. – UNIAN, February 26, 2010.

<sup>15</sup> In particular, on January 1, 2008, Ukraine-EU agreements on visa facilitation and readmission entered into effect, negotiations on the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement are coming to an end, a dialogue on legal aspects of cooperation with the EU in other sectors is underway.



Additionally, despite intensification of politico-diplomatic contacts, achievement of positive results in different sectors of cooperation, the Ukrainian side in relations with the EU lacked clear strategic approaches. For instance, against the background of a critical socio-economic state, ineffectiveness of domestic transformations, Ukraine witnessed waged discussions about application for the European Union membership, terms of the country's accession to the European community. The bilateral dialogue focused on the need of the EU setting clear prospects of accession.<sup>16</sup>

The controversy and inconsistency of the Ukrainian side are also witnessed by submission to Parliament at the end of 2009 of two bills, providing for denunciation of the Readmission Agreement with the EU and cancellation of visa-free procedures for the EU citizens. Discussion of joining the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan provide more evidence to that.

An important indicator of the effectiveness of the country's European integration course is presented by implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan (2005-2009).<sup>17</sup> Its monitoring shows that the document was implemented selectively. The monitoring results give grounds to note the absence of systemic positive effects in the socio-economic sector, fighting corruption, independence of the judicial branch, etc. Generally positive democratic transformations do not rest on a reliable socio-economic basis.<sup>18</sup>

Promising lines of relations will be specified in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, now at the final stage of negotiation. But the document will provide a real strategy of cooperation only if the Ukrainian authorities use it as a priority programme of concrete actions.

**Relations with NATO.** Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration with the set end goal of full-fledged NATO membership is a legislatively provided line of the foreign and national security policy.<sup>19</sup> Ukraine-NATO relations may be described as partner-like, cooperation with the Alliance is developing dynamically and productively. The NATO leadership consistently stresses the invariability of its "open door" policy and the sovereign right of the Ukrainian leadership and people to decide the issue of joining the Alliance.

However, in Ukraine, accession to the Alliance remains a subject of a heated discussions, sometimes –

even conflict situations. For instance, on January 15, 2008, the state leadership applied to the NATO Secretary General with a letter testifying Ukraine's intention to join MAP. That step met a mixed reaction in Parliament: it was supported by the Coalition of Democratic Forces, but other parliamentary forces unleashed a harsh anti-NATO campaign, demanding repudiation of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman signature under the application to the Alliance. As a result, Parliament's work was stopped, the opposition leader Yanukovich sent a letter to the NATO leadership requesting not to consider the issue of MAP for Ukraine, the Party of Regions faction proposed an all-Ukrainian referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO.

In April, 2008, heads of the NATO countries at the Bucharest summit passed a declaration proving readiness to admit Ukraine to Alliance in the future. In November, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers took a decision regarding the Annual National Programme (ANP) that replaced Annual Target Plans<sup>20</sup> and, starting from mid-2009, provided the main format of Ukraine-NATO interaction. In addition to the general goals of reforms, ANP names concrete actions and priorities in the context of the country preparation for NATO membership in five domains: political and economic issues, military-defence aspects, resource support, information security and legal issues.

However, with the new state leadership coming to power, strategic approaches to cooperation with NATO may fundamentally change. In particular, as we noted above, the ruling coalition announced its intention to legislatively establish Ukraine's non-aligned status, involving amendment of the Law "On Fundamentals of Ukraine's National Security" and the Military Doctrine. Such a step will undermine the prospects of relations with the Alliance, affect the national security and require fundamental revision of approaches to provision of the national defence capability.

### Relations with the Russian Federation<sup>21</sup>

Over the recent years, bilateral relations have actually been in a critical state. Tensions were growing in key sectors of cooperation – political, socio-economic, humane. "Gas", "meat and milk", "territorial", "historic" wars went on. Disputes on the key geopolitical issues increased, differences between state and political elites of the two countries grew up. Political dialogue turned mutual

<sup>16</sup> It should be added in this connection that Ukraine still has a valid Strategy of integration in the EU passed under Leonid Kuchma. It is high time to develop a new document with account of the present state of cooperation with the EU, results of implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan, domestic institutional and structural changes, conclusion of a new Agreement with the EU, creation of a free trade area.

<sup>17</sup> For more detail see: Assessments of the Ukraine-EU action plan implementation in 2005-2007. – *National Security & Defence*, 2008, No.6, p.6-21.

<sup>18</sup> On March 11, 2008, the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council took a decision to extend Ukraine-EU Action Plan for another year (till 2009). Also, approved the list of 23 additional measures. This witnesses, *inter alia*, the existence of many difficult problems on Ukraine's road to the EU.

<sup>19</sup> Law of Ukraine "On Fundamentals of Ukraine's National Security" (2003), Article 8.

<sup>20</sup> Under those plans, long-term objectives of the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan were attained in 2002-2009.

<sup>21</sup> For more detail see: Ukraine-Russia: from crisis to strategic partnership. Razumkov Centre analytical report. – *National Security & Defence*, 2009, No.4, p.2-42.



Ukraine's relations with NATO officially started in 1991, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (since 1997 – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). In 1994, Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP).

Currently, Ukraine's official relations with NATO rest on the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed on July 9, 1997, and supplemented in 2009.<sup>22</sup> In 2005, the Intensified Dialogue with NATO on NATO membership and associated reforms was started. Consultations and cooperation cover a wide range of issues dealing with peacekeeping operations, the security and defence sector reform, military and military-technological cooperation, civil emergency planning, science and environment, as well as public information.

The security and defence sector reform is the most far-going aspect of cooperation. NATO countries provide material and consultative assistance for building a professional, mobile Armed Forces of Ukraine capable to insure defence of the state and take an active part in international peacekeeping operations. Another key line of cooperation is presented by enhancement of democratic civilian control over the security sector. In 2005, the Programme for Professional Development of Civilian Personnel Employed in Ukrainian Security Sector was inaugurated; the Ukraine-NATO Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control over the

Intelligence Sector, the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development were set up (2006).

Another important aspect of relations is presented by Ukraine's bilateral cooperation with Alliance member states for provision of all-round assistance in implementation of reforms, in particular, in the security and defence sector. Ukraine is the only partner country taking part in four operations under the NATO auspices (KFOR, Iraq Training Mission, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Active Endeavour operation in the Mediterranean). Possible participation of a radiological, chemical and biological protection unit in NATO Reaction Force and provision of airlift services are being considered.

As part of the PfP Trust Fund projects, Ukraine is assisted in retraining and adaptation of retired military servicemen, as well as in disposal of antipersonnel mines, redundant stocks of ammunitions and arms.<sup>23</sup> The latter project is the biggest in the field of demilitarisation ever implemented by NATO.

Ukraine has been taking part in NATO scientific programmes since 1991, yielding only to Russia by the amount of grants for scientific research in the fields of fighting terrorism and new threats, information technologies, cell biology and biotechnologies, new materials, use of natural resources, environmental problems.

accusations and demarches. Top-level contacts and full-scale employment of the main cooperation mechanism – the Ukraine-Russian interstate commission – were frozen.<sup>24</sup>

The Ukrainian policy in relations with Russia was pursued largely “manually”, was inconsistent and controversial. Ukraine's stand in the dialogue with the Russian Federation was undermined by deregulation of the system of state governance, permanent home policy crises.

Strategic approaches to cooperation with Russia were missing. A number of decisions in the key sectors (political, energy, trade, humanitarian) were transient, often controversial and confrontational. The elites, MPs, lead political forces showed fundamentally different approaches to prospects of bilateral relations. Ukraine-Russian relations were a subject of large-scale speculations during election campaigns.

The situation has not changed for the better with creation in January, 2009, under Ukraine's President of the Interdepartmental Strategic Group for Ukraine-Russian Relations, whose main task lied in “preparation of proposals for further constructive development of Ukraine-Russian relations”.<sup>25</sup> Ukraine-Russian joint action

plans for 2005-2009 were in fact of a tactical, applied nature, their implementation remained beyond the parties' attention.

Meanwhile, Russia pursued a coordinated and tough policy towards Ukraine, actively using tools of politico-diplomatic, “energy” pressure, pro-Russian spirits among many representatives of the political elite and the country citizens. The goal of that policy is to influence Ukraine's foreign policy course, strengthen the “pro-Russian component” in its home policy developments and generally keep Ukraine in the sphere of “privileged interests” of the Russian Federation.

Differences in approaches to bilateral relations led to permanent confrontation, climaxed in the Russian President Medvedev address to Ukraine's President Yushchenko (August 10, 2009). The address stressed the alleged “anti-Russian course” of the Ukrainian leadership, the Ukrainian side was accused of “departure from the principles of friendship and partnership with Russia, established in the Treaty of 1997”.<sup>26</sup>

Such escalation of conflicts devalued “geopolitical assets” of the countries, fell short of their national interests, aggravated the regional situation, complicated their contacts with the European community, NATO, and the USA.

<sup>22</sup> In 2009, a declaration supplementing the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was signed, giving the NATO-Ukraine Commission a central role in deepening political dialogue, cooperation and promoting Ukraine's efforts “to take forward its political, economic, and defence-related reforms pertaining to its Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO, with a focus on key democratic and institutional goals”. – Declaration to complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine, signed on July 9, 1997.

<sup>23</sup> In course of implementation of the first project, 400 thousand antipersonnel mines were disposed. The second project, started in 2005, provides for disposal of 133 thousand tons of ammunitions, 1.5 million pieces of small arms and 1,000 man-portable air defence systems. The tentative project value is €25 million, implementation term – 12 years.

<sup>24</sup> The commission was set up by the two presidents' decision on May 8, 2005. Since that, it has met in the presidents' presence only twice (November 2006, February 2008). During the office of Russia's President Medvedev, the Commission never met in a body.

<sup>25</sup> Presidential Decree “On Regulations of the Interdepartmental Strategic Group for Ukraine-Russian Relations” No.7 of January 12, 2009.

<sup>26</sup> Information bulletin of August 11, 2009. – Official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; <http://www.mid.ru>



**The most alarming, over the recent years the relations between the countries citizens have substantially deteriorated.** Sociological surveys recorded growth of alienation, bias, enmity.<sup>27</sup> Contacts between representatives of academic circles, expert communities, public organisations declined.

Some positive changes in bilateral relations came to light in late 2009 – early 2010. In particular, foreign offices of the two countries managed to improve the atmosphere of the politico-diplomatic dialogue, intensify negotiation of the key problems of Ukraine-Russian cooperation. President Yanukovich's visit to the Russian Federation on March 5, 2010, witnessed resumption of top level contacts.

### Relations with the USA

One of the key lines of Ukraine's foreign policy envisages promotion of partnership with the world leader – the USA. On its part, the United States of America under the President Bush Administration steadily promoted democratic transformations in Ukraine, consistently supported its Euro-Atlantic integration. In particular, in April, 2008, the Senate passed a resolution encouraging Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO.

Approaches to the development of Ukraine-US partnership were outlined in the joint presidential statement "A New Century Agenda for the Ukraine-American Strategic Partnership" (April 2005).<sup>28</sup> Common views of future bilateral relations are also demonstrated by the Roadmap of Ukraine-US cooperation priorities (2008), Ukraine-US Charter on strategic security (2008). In particular, it mentions development of relations in the political, security, trade and economic, energy and humanitarian sectors, as well as in the field of scientific-technological and military cooperation.

However, those documents did not envisage concrete measures and have not led to qualitative strengthening of strategic partnership between the countries. The Ukrainian side lacked clear approaches and strategic vision of bilateral cooperation priorities, in particular, in the sectors of strategic interest for the USA – nuclear security, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting international terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking, settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, etc.

Top-level contacts were largely situational and sporadic. The visits by US Vice President Biden to Ukraine (July 2009) and by President Yushchenko to New York (September 2009) failed to bring a breakthrough in bilateral relations.

Bilateral cooperation mechanisms (trade and investment councils, working groups on defence, energy

security, democracy and rule of law) were not used with due effectiveness. Meanwhile, a constituent meeting of the Ukraine-US commission for strategic partnership held in Washington on November 9, 2009, was a success.<sup>29</sup>

Some issues of bilateral relations were not solved because of political situation in Ukraine. In particular, the Crimean authorities barred establishment of a US mission in the autonomy. Ukraine's Parliament gave no permit to conduct of the traditional Ukraine-US *Sea Breeze* naval exercise in 2009.

Development of trade and economic cooperation is obstructed. Contacts in that sector have long been hindered by pressing for Ukraine problems – absence of effective economic reforms, poor guarantee of foreign investor rights and business security in general, the ineffective tax system, unsatisfactory fight with corruption.

Demonstratively, operation of the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (*OPIC*) has been blocked for several years in a row, which contained the activity of the US business in Ukraine and made US companies refrain from large-scale strategic investments in the Ukrainian economy.

The new US leadership declared continuity of the George W. Bush Administration course to promote partnership with Ukraine. Meanwhile, the US interest in our state goes down – due to the change in its geopolitical priorities and the shift in geo-strategic interests from the European continent to other regions of the world. In such conditions, the new Ukrainian authorities will have to do their best at least to keep partnership with the USA at least at the achieved level.

### Other promising lines of Ukraine's foreign policy

The European and Euro-Atlantic vectors are of core importance for Ukraine's foreign policy. Not questioning their importance and priority, it should be stressed that the foreign political activity in other important domains often stayed in the background and was supported after all others. This weakened Ukraine's international position, barred active promotion of political and economic interests of the state in those sectors.

In particular, the potential of cooperation with the Asian and Pacific region countries, first of all, China, Japan, South Korea, is not used effectively enough. Specific of that line of the foreign policy was spontaneity, instability, lack of full-scale politico-diplomatic dialogue, effective use of available interstate cooperation mechanisms. The unfavourable business climate in Ukraine prompted the Asian business to take a wait-and-see position on participation in the development of the Ukrainian economy.

<sup>27</sup> Ukraine-Russia: from crisis to strategic partnership..., p.13-14.

<sup>28</sup> For more detail see: The new government's performance in 2005: a view of non-governmental think-tanks. – *National Security & Defence*, 2005, No.12, p.73.

<sup>29</sup> Before that, the Ukraine-US Interdepartmental Coordinating Group led by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Assistant to the US Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs was active.



The political dialogue with China was also notably slowed down by the fact that there were no top level visits over the past five years, bilateral contacts were confined to the level of separate agencies and business structures. Despite some revival in the military-technological sector, the two countries' capabilities in trade, economic and scientific-technological sectors were used ineffectively.

Contacts were limited also with Ukraine's "special partner" – India. The volume of mutual trade did not meet the countries' potential, in particular, in the most dynamic sectors of the Indian economy (IT, communications, pharmaceuticals, etc). The top level dialogue was actually confined to the only visit by the Indian President Kalam to Ukraine (2005) that brought no breakthrough in bilateral relations, most of the initiatives announced during that visit have not been implemented.

The state policy was insufficiently effective in the Middle East, Central and South Eastern Asia, as well as on the African continent. Ukraine did not fully use the opportunities for participation in the development of fuel and energy sectors in those regions, promotion of the produce of Ukrainian manufacturers (agriculture, construction) on their markets. The dialogue with Turkey needs a new impetus, in particular, on the Black Sea region security problems.

Therefore, Ukraine's new leadership should pay more attention to intensification of the foreign policy in the world regions interesting for national manufacturers and meeting the needs of modernisation and restructuring of the Ukrainian economy.

## PROPOSALS

**Analysis of the state and problems of Ukraine's foreign policy, results of long-term monitoring of the foreign policy situation, data of expert and national polls let us formulate some proposals and recommendations intended to enhance the effectiveness of Ukraine's activity on the world scene.**

**But in the first place it should be noted that in view of some unfavourable internal and external circumstances, Ukraine should give up attempts of forced acquisition of formal membership in interstate unions (except trade associations) and tackle solution of internal problems, achievement of internal priorities and public accord with respect to such membership.**

**In this connection, it seems reasonable to introduce a mid-term (three-year) moratorium on:**

- referendums on issues of the country accession/non-accession to interstate unions, foreign policy initiatives on sensitive subjects that can destabilise society and/or have a negative effect Ukraine's international image;
- use of those subjects and initiatives by political actors in political struggle, including election campaigns;

- amendment of Ukraine's Constitution and basic laws laying down fundamentals of the state home and foreign policy ("On Fundamentals of Ukraine's National Security", "On Main Guidelines of Ukraine's Foreign Policy").

## ALL-ROUND MODERNISATION OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLITICAL ACTIVITY

### Legal support

To perform all-round examination of effective treaties and agreements in foreign relations: to denounce obsolete, ineffective agreements (upon partner countries' consent); to initiate negotiations of appropriate amendments to effective documents; to accomplish state internal procedures of effectiveness of documents important for development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

To work out a clear, transparent strategy of action in the key foreign policy domains: (a) to adopt a new wording of the "Strategy of Ukraine's integration in the European Union" with account of the present state of cooperation with the EU; (b) to draw up a plan of action at implementation of the Ukraine-US Charter on strategic partnership; (c) to work out the strategy of cooperation with the Russian Federation at the new stage; (d) to adopt a concept of Ukraine's activity in the CIS that will clearly specify the scope of participation in the Commonwealth structures, character, forms and lines of cooperation with the CIS.

To initiate: (a) drafting and conclusion of agreements with international organisations and countries – strategic and special partners on topical unsettled issues of bilateral and multilateral relations in political, economic, humanitarian, military sectors; (b) development of agreements elaborating provisions of some bilateral documents, in particular: the Treaty of Peace, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the Ukraine-US Charter on Strategic Partnership.

In the middle run, on the condition of achievement of socio-political consensus, to provide for drafting of the basic Law "On Main Guidelines of Ukraine's Foreign Policy and Foreign Political Activity"; to submit the bill for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada in 2013. In the bill:

- to lay down fundamentals, main lines and priorities of the state foreign policy at the new stage;
- to establish the system of functions and mechanisms of pursuance of the foreign policy (including to do away with duplication of functions at passage and implementation of foreign policy decisions; to provide that coordination of executive bodies' activity in the field of foreign relations rests solely with the Foreign Ministry; to specify concrete mechanisms of such coordination).

### Organisational support

To take inventory of foreign diplomatic institutions, trade and economic missions for optimisation of their number; to establish strict criteria of the expediency of maintaining Ukraine's missions, to have a list of concrete tasks for each embassy.



**To implement a set of measures for enhancement of foreign policy effectiveness. For that purpose, to issue a Presidential Decree, in which:**

- to establish that functions of coordination of executive bodies' activity in the foreign policy sector rest solely with the Foreign Ministry;
- to work out a clear system of criteria of selection and placement of personnel in the central staff of the Foreign Ministry and foreign institutions; to regiment the procedures of appointment and rotation of ambassadors, heads of trade and economic missions, diplomatic mission staff; to introduce a transparent system of mid-term (six to twelve months) planning of foreign assignments of the Foreign Ministry officers, a practice of trade and economic mission officers' probation in big Ukrainian companies active on foreign markets;
- to provide legal mechanisms and forms of cooperation of state body representatives with the Foreign Ministry (diplomatic missions) at official negotiations and implementation of concluded agreements;
- to reform the network of Ukraine's foreign diplomatic missions, in particular, to strengthen diplomatic contacts with the countries – strategic and special partners and to liquidate embassies in the countries the level of politico-economic contacts with which does not meet the needs of internal development of Ukraine at the current stage and in the short run; to set up, where necessary, regional diplomatic missions; to introduce a practice of drawing a concrete list of tasks for each embassy, whereby the manning schedule is established;
- to optimise the network of trade and economic missions; to introduce effective coordination of their activity with foreign representative offices of Ukrainian companies; to provide for effective information of Ukraine's international partners about investment needs, export capabilities, commercial proposals of Ukrainian business entities;
- to introduce a practice of agreements between the Foreign Ministry and associations of Ukrainian business circles on diplomatic, consular, information support for their activity; to promote wider participation of small and medium business representatives in annual international fairs and exhibitions in the countries – main trade partners of Ukraine; to provide that embassies, trade and economic missions inform business circles of the host countries about interregional and regional exhibitions in Ukraine;
- to set up under the Foreign Ministry a Council of Representatives of regional state bodies to promote the development of socio-economic, cultural contacts of Ukraine's regions with foreign partners; to provide within the Council framework effective diplomatic-legal support for cooperation of Ukraine's regions with foreign partners as an element of interstate relations;
- to enhance the information component of the foreign political activity, namely, to introduce a practice of: regular parliamentary hearings; monthly briefings on foreign policy issues involving the Foreign Minister; release (in particular, on the official web site of the Foreign Ministry) of information materials on implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements, work of mixed commissions, memorandums of cooperation with the leading countries of the world, etc.;
- to encourage public (“popular”) diplomacy: (a) to employ (on a competitive basis) public organisations, think-tanks for implementation of state programmes in the foreign policy domain, monitoring of international events, Ukraine's foreign political activity, etc.; (b) to promote international ties of public organisations, direct human contacts.

**PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF UKRAINE'S SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**

To intensify the politico-diplomatic dialogue with the neighbour countries on final legal establishment of the state border: (a) with the Russian Federation – on delimitation of the Azov and Kerch water area; conclusion of an Agreement of the Ukraine-Russian state border in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea; signing of an Agreement on demarcation of the Ukraine-Russian state border; (b) with the Republic of Moldova – on completion of demarcation of the Dniester segment of the Ukraine-Moldovan border.

To support the idea of arrangement of an international top-level conference of the states – parties to the Memorandum on security guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty (Budapest, 1994), to specify concrete, legally binding mechanisms guaranteeing Ukraine's security.

To initiate a summit of the Black Sea countries on security problems in the Black Sea basin and to put forward proposals of converting the military base in Sevastopol into an international peacekeeping (antiterrorist) centre under the UN auspices involving Ukraine, the Russian Federation, other Black Sea countries. The Centre's tasks might be to fight terrorism, piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal circulation of arms and drugs.

To intensify negotiations with the Russian Federation, NATO, the USA on creation of legal and organisational-technical mechanisms of effective implementation of the provisions on recognition of (support for) Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, inviolability of its borders found in the relevant bilateral documents: (a) 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (Articles 2-3); (b) 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO (Items 14-15); (c) 2008 Ukraine-US Charter on Strategic Partnership (Item 1).

To provide for Ukraine's participation in dialogue on the new model of European security (at international forums, conferences, in the format of bilateral negotiations on different levels). To promote consensus in society on security issues, to continuously make Ukraine's position known to the European community.



## BETTER PROTECTION OF UKRAINIAN CITIZEN RIGHTS ABROAD

To provide for conclusion of agreements on labour migration, employment, social protection and pensions between Ukraine and the countries where Ukrainian citizens work and study (registered in consulates).

To optimise (expand) the network of consular offices in the countries that accept the main tourist and migration flows from Ukraine.

To step up efforts for development of the “roadmap” for visa-free travel between Ukraine and the EU, with a view of signing an agreement to that end in the future.

To initiate: (a) agreements with neighbour countries on institution of common border and customs control; (b) creation of a single readmission space with the EU, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova, conclusion of readmission agreements with Central Asian and Caucasian states.

To provide for monitoring of emergency situations (international piracy, hostage taking, technical accidents, acts of God, etc.) threatening the interests and security of Ukrainian individuals and legal entities, suggesting concrete methods of defending their rights, providing support and assistance.

To provide for Ukraine’s participation in the *Atalanta* international operation of fighting piracy near the Somalia shores.

To continuously inform Ukrainian citizens via the Foreign Ministry’s official web site about the situation in countries of the world – usual destinations of Ukrainian tourists.

## PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE COOPERATION IN THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY DOMAINS

### European Union

To complete in 2010 negotiations on conclusion of an Association Agreement with the EU. Until the Agreement comes into effect – to provide for implementation of provisions of the Association Agenda in different sectors: political dialogue, foreign and security policy, cooperation in the issues of justice, in the sectors of energy, trade and economic cooperation, etc.

To make an agreement on creation of a free trade area with the European Free Trade Association member states (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein).

To work out, jointly with the European Commission, in pursuance of the Association Agreement provisions, a package of bilateral agreements in the trade and economic, energy, social, scientific-technological, humanitarian and other sectors; to introduce transparent mechanism for monitoring implementation of concluded agreements and plans of actions at their implementation.

To concentrate on implementation of branch agreements, programmes and projects with the EU, promising substantial socio-economic effects: (a) project of development of territories that suffered from the Chernobyl accident; (b) the EU project “Transparency and

Efficiency of the Judicial System of Ukraine”; (c) the EU *Black Sea* investment programme in the Crimea, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya; (d) the *Twinning* assistance programme; (e) the pan-European satellite navigation *Galileo/EGNOS* system project; (f) Eastern Partnership: a set of branch projects in the socio-economic, energy, humanitarian sectors, equipment of Ukrainian borders in line with European standards, development of international transport corridors (e.g., “Black Sea – Baltic Sea”); (g) monitoring of implementation of transborder cooperation projects, in particular, in small and medium business (within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Programme) on the level of Euroregions: *Carpathian, Upper Prut, Lower Danube, Buh*, funded by the EU. Identification of promising lines of their further development with account of priorities of Ukraine’s socio-economic policy.

To intensify dialogue with the EU in the energy sector (to create conditions for implementation of a package of priority investment projects in the fuel and energy sector in cooperation with EBRD and the European Investment Bank; to provide for implementation of the joint Declaration with the EU on modernisation and reconstruction of the Ukrainian Gas Transportation System (Brussels, 2009).

### NATO

To provide for full implementation of the Annual National Programme (ANP). To improve the practice and mechanisms of development and monitoring of ANP implementation, to include in them measures pursuing concrete results.

To use ANP as the integral national tool of political, economic and defence reforms in the context of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

To deepen permanent political dialogue, hold consultations and promote cooperation on all levels (including in the context of practical application of the provision of Paragraph 8 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document dealing with convocation, on Ukraine’s request, of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, should Ukraine see a direct threat to its territorial integrity).

To strengthen among the NATO members respect for Ukraine as a reliable partner and an important contributor to regional and global security systems, to develop relations of partnership and solidarity.

To minimise the threat of disruption of joint military exercises with NATO on the territory of Ukraine. For that purpose, to provide for timely approval by the Verkhovna Rada of the relevant decision on admission of military units of foreign states to Ukraine’s territory in line with the plan of military cooperation. To introduce a practice of joint Ukraine-Russia-NATO, Ukraine-Belarus-NATO exercises.

To wage a wide PR campaign among Ukraine’s citizens on the advantages of the Euro-Atlantic collective security system and to promote non-military lines of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO.

To take an active part in peacekeeping operations, joint actions against terrorism, piracy, provision of strategic airlift services to the Alliance members, to hold joint military exercises.



To provide for effective use of consultative and material assistance in the formats of the Joint Working Group for Defence Reform and projects of the PfP Trust Fund.

### Russian Federation

To draw up and steadily follow a mid-term schedule of solution of disputable issues dealing, in particular, with energy, economic, humanitarian, border problems and problems of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea.

To promote utmost de-politicisation of the dialogue on humanitarian problems; to reach in the subcommittee for humanitarian cooperation of the Ukraine-Russian Interstate Commission constructive, mutually acceptable approaches to language problems and satisfaction of cultural and educational needs of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia.

To arrange for an in-body meeting of the Ukraine-Russian interstate commission headed by the Presidents of the two countries, scheduled for May, 2010. For that purpose: (a) to arrange meetings of subcommittees on international cooperation, security, humanitarian issues; in the committee for economic cooperation – to hold meetings of concerned sub-commissions to elaborate bilateral cooperation programmes in different sectors; to establish a sub-commission for environmental cooperation in the committee; (b) to incorporate members of the Interparliamentary Commission for cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in the concerned sub-commissions; (c) to hold an in-body meeting of the Ukraine-Russian interstate commission headed by the Presidents of the two countries.

To resume activity of the Strategic Group under the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, to expand it at the expense of regional leaders.

To promote deeper economic contacts, namely: (a) to provide for all-round modernisation of the regulatory-legal framework and mechanisms of economic and foreign trade regulation, first of all, in the fields of taxation of foreign trade operations, pricing, customs, financial, tariff policies; (b) to create conditions for full-scale implementation of the Agreement of free trade between Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (c) to create mechanisms of implementation of economic agreements, first of all, on investment; (d) to develop scientific-technological cooperation in priority hi-tech branches (missile and space; aircraft building; nuclear energy; energy conservation technologies).

To build up confidence in security issues (to take an active part in the dialogue on problems of creation of the European security system with account of interests of all countries; to develop military cooperation in sectors of mutual interest).

To develop interregional cooperation, namely: (a) to deepen trade and economic, scientific-technological, humanitarian contacts on the basis of created Euroregions. To complete creation of the Donbas Euroregion (Luhansk and Rostov regions); (b) to resume activity at implementation of the “Council of Regions” project;

(c) to solve, within the Interstate Commission framework, problems of opening new checkpoints on the common border, granting border regions powers of organisation of joint border and customs control, “one stop” customs clearance of cargoes.

### USA

To enhance the institutional level of the politico-diplomatic dialogue: to initiate talks on full-scale resumption of the work of the Ukraine-US Commission led by the Ukrainian President and the US Vice President.

To work out a concrete plan of action at implementation of provisions of the Ukraine-US Charter on strategic partnership in the security and defence sector, trade and economic cooperation, energy, educational, cultural and scientific exchanges.

To arrange a Ukraine-US business forum on the basis of the Ukraine-US Council on Trade and Investment to discuss capabilities for attraction of US investments, innovative technologies in Ukraine’s economy.

To introduce a practice of regular consultations (on foreign ministry level) to work out a common stand on bilateral cooperation problems, global and regional security issues, settlement of “frozen” conflicts.

To intensify cooperation in fighting terrorism and organised crime, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, export control, peacekeeping, energy security, etc.

### Promising lines of Ukraine’s foreign policy

To step up dialogue with China, India and Brazil, envisaging: regular exchange of visits on different levels, mechanism of political consultations; expansion of the legal framework for the relations; arrangement of bilateral business forums for development of economic cooperation, including cooperation in the airspace, military-technological sectors, communication technologies, etc.

To actively promote Ukraine’s position on markets of its priority interest: to expand trade and economic contacts with countries – world and regional leaders to ensure imports of innovative technologies, investments, modernisation of the national economy (India, China, South Korea, Japan, etc.).

To develop economic cooperation with the Middle East, Asian, African countries; to provide active politico-diplomatic support for promotion of Ukrainian agricultural produce to the markets of those countries (including participation in implementation of UN programmes of assistance to countries suffering from natural calamities).

To deepen relations with Asian and Pacific, Central and South-East Asian, Middle East, African countries in the sectors of: reconstruction and modernisation of operational fuel and energy sector facilities; performance of prospecting, drilling and assembly operations at oil and gas field development; restoration and development of the transport and communications infrastructure; supply of agricultural produce, foodstuffs, agricultural equipment; military-technological cooperation; high technologies and scientific research. ■

# UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY ON THE NEW STAGE\*

## FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES – PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND ORIENTATION TO ATTAINABLE GOALS VITAL FOR AN ORDINARY UKRAINIAN



**Valeriy CHALYI,**  
Deputy Minister  
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

The subject of our discussion is “Ukraine’s foreign policy at a new stage”. I guess, this stage is associated not only with internal transformations but also with the general trends in the European and world policy. The expert community has recently performed a number of studies, and they all prove the need of new approaches to the assessment of Ukraine’s environment, reconsideration of its role in the global world and on the regional level.

All those changes are known – we are moving to a multipolar world, and “resets” are a sign of global, long-term developments. Today, countries of the world are shaping their new foreign policy dispositions. I guess that the new stage is associated with search of an absolutely pragmatic model of the foreign policy.

What does this mean for Ukraine? At least three things. *First* – primary reliance on own capabilities and use of opportunities for partner cooperation in different sectors. *Second* – setting attainable goals, taking into account the new political reality at least in the middle run. *Third* – a national foreign policy that should move from declarations to the firm soil of interests and needs of Ukraine’s citizens.

The idea of such new pragmatism requires consideration and proper documentation. In my opinion, the following key steps should be made in that direction: **all-round modernisation of the institutional framework for foreign political activity, perfection of the**

**toolset, enhancement of the effectiveness of actions.** We work on that, there are concrete plans and mechanisms already waiting for implementation.

**Economisation of the foreign policy.** Of course, today, not only the Foreign Ministry but other state structures, too, should pursue this line. I assure you – every visit, every decision of the Ministry in the first place aims at search of new markets, expansion of contacts with countries that offer investment capabilities, practical interest for Ukrainian manufacturers. In particular, this is witnessed by the latest visits of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to [different] regions of the world.

**Provision of international guarantees of Ukraine’s security,** its sovereignty, territorial integrity, active role in creation of a new architecture of global and regional security. There are international initiatives in which Ukraine actively takes part. And as a state that gave up its nuclear potential, it has the moral right to remind the world community about the security vacuum felt in Ukraine. Today, that problem, despite the absence of military threats, remains on the agenda. I mean the prospects of integration in security structures, development and effectiveness of mechanisms declared in the Budapest Memorandum.

The main strategic lines of the foreign policy remain unchanged, and this was confirmed by Ukraine’s President Yanukovich. The Foreign Ministry’s priorities are absolutely invariable: European integration, Euro-Atlantic integration, true strategic partnership with Russia, access to the regions of economic interest for Ukraine. This refers to the Middle East, and South-East Asia, and BRIC countries alike. I guess that time has come for practical actions.

**We should expand the geography of contacts beyond legislatively provided segments.** Now, we entirely differently look at Ukraine’s environs, its neighbours. And you see that today, more attention is paid to relations with Belarus, Moldova, neighbouring EU member states. We will continue this endeavour, forming a belt of friendly countries on the borders, implementing concrete pragmatic cooperation projects.

**Recently, substantial progress has been observed in Ukraine’s border setting** (this refers to the Dniester segment of the border with Moldova). I hope that

\* The round-table was held on March 4, 2010. The texts are presented after the discussion records, in an abbreviated form, in the order of presentations by the panellists.

The round-table was held after the first visit of Ukraine’s President Yanukovich to Brussels (1 March) and on the eve of his visit to the Russian Federation (5 March).

in the near future, a decision will be taken on ratification of the border agreement with Belarus, demarcation of the land border with the Russian Federation will be started.

**Protection of the interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad is among the priority tasks.** Today, no incident involving a Ukrainian citizen who appeared in a difficult situation abroad is attended by the Foreign Ministry, and such situations are being resolved.

The Foreign Ministry also monitors issues of labour emigration: through bilateral agreements, through concrete decisions, we secure progress in the defence of our citizen interests abroad. I will not mention all relevant agreements signed recently – that information is available at the Foreign Ministry web-site.

**Introduction of a new algorithm of relations with Russia is another priority.** I mean qualitatively new pragmatic partnership, first of all, in the economic and energy sectors. However, in my opinion, Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan proposed by experts in mass media is not the decision meeting Ukraine's national interests. There are different tools of deepening interaction with Russia – such as a free trade area without restrictions and exceptions, concrete cooperation projects in different sectors, etc.

We continue to boost the dynamic of bilateral relations with Western countries – strategic partners, maintain a positive dynamic of relations with special partners – provided that Ukraine's interest always lies with the interests of citizens, interests of the Ukrainian business.

Beyond doubt, development of relations with NATO will go on through proper implementation of the Annual National Programme for 2010, timely planning of such a programme for 2011. Indeed, today, Ukraine's accession to military-political alliances in the West and in the East is not on the agenda. Although discussions of the idea of joining CSTO go on, that stand is not realistic. In my opinion, the Euro-Atlantic integration course should remain and, I am sure, will remain unchanged. That is the course meeting the national interests and needs of Ukraine's national security. Some "pauses", associated with unreadiness of both parties, may occur. But the dynamic and intensity of contacts should not and need not go down.

**Today, national interests, pragmatism are the main benchmark in the field of the European integration.** The following points deserve attention here. *First.* The Association Agreement with the EU should meet the interests of Ukrainian manufacturers. *Second.* Implementation of the road map of movement to visa-free procedures should have strict time limits. Liberalisation of visa procedures with the countries – candidates for accession to the EU and other countries of the world should go in parallel. *Third.* Utmost concrete projects and practical results in cooperation with the EU

are needed. Today, tools of the EU and world financial institutions, the Eastern Partnership programme give an opportunity to achieve concrete goals.

Expert proposals for enhancement of the Foreign Ministry effectiveness will be thoroughly examined. They reiterate the need to optimise Ukraine's foreign policy service, foreign diplomatic institutions and the central staff. There should also be strict assessment criteria of the activity of trade and economic, diplomatic institutions, search of a model less costly for the state but also more effective.

Today, Ukraine needs European diplomacy. We should get rid of rudiments of the Soviet times but find a reasonable balance in combination of, on one hand, the skills of our highly experienced diplomats, on the other – the new thinking and enthusiasm of the youth. That is why better education of diplomats and formulation of new criteria of personnel selection are on the agenda.

I would formulate the main priority of the foreign policy as follows: **pragmatism, realism and orientation to attainable goals vital for every Ukrainian citizen.** I am sure that the foreign policy results depend not only on diplomats but also on the effectiveness of internal transformations in the country. Today, concrete steps are needed. I guess that windows of opportunities open up, and it would be erroneous not to use them.

**I am sure that the strength of the Ukrainian diplomacy will not go down, and the thrust of the country's foreign policy course will remain the same – Ukraine's European integration.** However, if there is no political consensus regarding the European choice, if we do not do away with "political turbulence", we will hardly succeed. ■

**WE SHOULD PURSUE A PREDICTABLE AND FORESEEABLE FOREIGN POLICY**



**Anatolii ZLENKO,**  
*ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*

Over the years of independence, Ukraine passed rather a difficult path of building and formulation of the foreign policy. That path may conventionally be divided into three stages associated with the country's Presidents – since, according to the Constitution, it is the President who directs foreign political activity. So, we had three stages: the first one – 1991-1994, the second – 1994-2004 (or even 2005), the third – from 2005 till 2010.



One may get an impression that every stage began with new approaches and formulations. This is not the case. Classically, any changes in the state, even touching in-depth internal processes, exert no huge influence on the foreign policy.

*First*, the state keeps on abiding by international commitments. *Second*, Ukraine, as any other state, should present itself to the world as a predictable and foreseeable partner. That is why the change of the stages is no revolution, involving fundamental changes in approaches, ways, principles, norms, etc.

To be sure, foreign political activity may be adjusted in line with the international and world policy developments. When the world was unipolar, we pursued an appropriate policy, keeping in mind one centre of power. Today, a multipolar world is being formed – and we should respond accordingly, find our place in this new world.

Now, a new stage of foreign political activity begins, associated with the fourth President of Ukraine. I will not describe each of the previous stages, dwelling instead upon this new one that raises many questions before all of us.

**The impression from the first several days of the new President's work, in particular his foreign policy activity is positive.** Analysis of public statements made by the President, including in the foreign media, give grounds to hope that Ukraine's foreign policy will be foreseeable and predictable. I mean first of all the positive perception in the West of Yanukovich's article published on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February, 2010, in the *Wall Street Journal*. I personally talked to US representatives and made sure that the publication met a warm welcome.

You may say that articles are one matter and concrete steps are another one. In my opinion, such publications and such signal for the West are a positive step that cannot remain unnoticed, such publications shape a certain public opinion. Today, we cannot and should not expect too much from the foreign policy of our state – since we are passing through a very difficult transitional period. This bars Ukraine from taking an international position fully meeting its geopolitical status and potential. Evidently, the home policy greatly shapes the foreign one. And, of course, our internal problems will affect the foreign policy.

So, we cannot separate foreign and home policy – although at earlier stages, foreign policy was at the cutting-edge of all nation-building processes. And I would like foreign policy to regain the role it played in due time. Today, the new President has a credit of trust of the international community. How he will use that credit is another matter.

We have rather a sad experience of the not so distant past, when the credit of trust was great but we could not make use of it for solution of not only home policy issues but even strategic foreign policy tasks. This is very regretful, and we should learn serious lessons from that past.

In this connection, it is highly important to adapt our foreign policy to the global developments. Foreign policy of many countries, as well as the international policy in general, is being reformatted.

Ukraine cannot remain on the outskirts of the world developments. *First, we should pursue a predictable and foreseeable foreign policy* that can defend the state from drawing into the orbit of any foreign subordination. *Second, we should best use our geopolitical status to expand the horizons of foreign political activity.* *Third* – the European integration course should remain unchanged. In the *Wall Street Journal* publication, Yanukovich clearly said: “We should be pragmatic and concentrate on accession to the EU.” This is a positive signal. And I believe that in this context, all forces and efforts should be mobilised to promote that process.

We should also secure a strong international position for Ukraine in the East and West, position ourselves as a European regional power willing to be a regional leader (but positioned dependent on the emerging international situation). And the main thing – **we should pursue a pro-Ukrainian foreign policy.** ■

**WE HAVE EVERY CHANCE TO TAKE A DECENT PLACE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD**



**Borys TARASIUK,**  
*Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada  
of Ukraine Committee  
for European Integration*

Analytical materials on the “Present state, problems and prospects of Ukraine's foreign policy: expert and public opinion” prepared by Razumkov Centre are highly topical, especially in the first days of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich. The results of those surveys prompted some ideas, which I wish to share.

*First*, what strikes the eye in the poll results is the notable decline in support for Ukraine's accession both to the EU and to NATO, and growth of the negative

attitude to Ukraine's membership in those organisations. Such trends are observed, to a different degree though, in both public opinion and expert polls, being rather an alarming signal and witnessing problems with implementation of Ukraine's course towards the EU and NATO membership.<sup>1</sup>

*Second*, I wish to stress the striking contrast persisting in the attitudes of experts and [rank-and-file] citizens to Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This trend, on one hand, shows that the expert community continues to support Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO, on the other – proves that citizens still have insufficient information about the reasons, benefits and shortcomings of Ukraine's integration in those organisations. I guess that the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy experts should pay attention, first of all, to the results of the expert community poll, since the latter has the knowledge and information on whose basis a pragmatic choice meeting Ukraine's national interests can be made.

If we try to describe Ukraine's foreign policy under President Yushchenko in general, we should admit that Ukraine, unfortunately, did not use the credit of trust given to it after the Orange Revolution victory. However, one can hardly put the blame on Ukrainian diplomats who through their everyday efforts defended its national interests on the international scene. After all, their efforts were rather successful but too often offset by the unconsoling situation in Ukraine's home political developments.

Permanent home policy shocks that started as early as 2006, incomprehensible for society and the outside world struggle between former political allies, political pressure on the Foreign Ministry leadership (that for eight months had no head) and the global economic crisis not only failed to add positive traits to the image of the Ukrainian state but undermined Ukraine's ability to promote its foreign policy interests. Furthermore, specific of the past five-year term was the presence of several foreign policies, when, in addition to the Foreign Ministry policy, we had a foreign policy of the Presidential Secretariat and a foreign policy of the Cabinet of Ministers. To be sure, in such situation one can hardly expect serious achievements in foreign policy.

But despite home policy problems, Ukrainian diplomats continued active work for the development of Ukraine's relations with NATO, with the EU, and with other foreign partners, to secure a decent place for the state in regional, European and global developments.

Those years saw substantial progress in relations with the EU, we came close to the formula we sought for years – economic integration and political association. And I have no doubt that on the condition of home political stability,

Round-table, March 4, 2010



we can expect membership prospects provided in the would-be Association Agreement.

Regarding our cooperation with NATO, after the Bucharest Summit decision where all members of the Alliance agreed that Ukraine would be a NATO member, our relations were developing rather pragmatically and constructively. In December, 2008, Ukraine *de facto* obtained the NATO Membership Action Plan (since Annual National Programmes are the main element of the MAP implementation mechanism) and now pursues the course to attainment of criteria necessary for NATO membership. That is why I am surprised with some statements of the newly-elected President and the Foreign Ministry leadership, since nobody cancelled the Law "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" setting the goal of Ukraine's accession to NATO, and neglect of law proves the low level of legal culture and, unfortunately, the actual absence of a law-ruled state here.

Regarding Ukraine's foreign policy development under the new President, I wish to say that the latter begins his office with very positive messages from abroad that, unfortunately, Ukraine did not get in 2005, after the victory of democracy. I mean the European Parliament Resolution of February 25 that for the first time in the history of Ukraine-EU relations said that Ukraine could apply for membership in line with Article 49 of the Amsterdam Treaty. It is a positive signal, and I would like Ukraine under the presidency of Yanukovich not divert the hand stretched by the EU. The President's first visit to Brussels, his meetings and words instil hope that Ukraine's foreign policy course, at least with respect to the EU membership, will remain unchanged.

At the same time, serious concern is caused by the statements made by then presidential candidate Yanukovich about Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic course, the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing, SES and many other issues. Alarming signals come from Yanukovich's milieu. For instance, between the first and second rounds of the presidential elections MPs from the Party of Regions

<sup>1</sup> For more detail see the results of the expert and national polls summed up in tables and diagrams in this magazine.



registered in the Verkhovna Rada two bills actually designed to undermine Ukraine-EU relations. I mean the bill on denunciation of the Readmission Agreement with the EU, and the second one – on cancellation of visa-free procedures for EU citizens. It is not difficult to predict the negative consequences of such initiatives for relations with the EU. Passage of those bills may entail the EU denunciation of the agreement on visa facilitation for Ukrainian citizens and suspension of negotiation on visa-free procedures started in the fall of 2008.

I will not dwell on Ukraine's future relations with the Russian Federation. I guess that tomorrow Yanukovich's visit to Moscow will tell a lot, and wish to hope that the visit will promote Ukraine's national interests and improvement of Ukraine-Russian relations.

To sum up, I wish to note that despite the difficult situation, **our state has every opportunity to take a decent place in Europe and the world but that process should be preceded by a set of serious reforms within the state.** ■

#### TO RECONSIDER STRATEGIC FUNDAMENTALS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY



**Oleksandr CHALYI,**  
*Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine*

I support the proposal put forward here of shifting Ukraine's foreign policy to a new, pragmatic paradigm. **The main principle of that policy should be that of democracy.** *First of all*, it should rest not on decisions of some state officials or the Foreign Ministry leadership but on consensus in society and Parliament.

*Second*, it should unite, not split society – we should take it as the key achievement of the Orange Revolution. I used to say that before 2004, one could pursue a foreign policy without asking the people, take steps not meeting wishes of Parliament or Ukrainian citizens. But after 2004, nobody in this country has the right to do so.

*Third*, we should rest the foreign policy not on values but on the balance of interests. **Ukraine should have neither eternal friends nor eternal enemies. It should have its own Ukrainian national interests.**

Regarding goal attainability. We should part with European romanticism and say that candidacy for the EU membership is possible only in 2020, membership – in 2025. After all, this is conditioned by the EU budget planning – if not a single euro is planned in the EU budget

for our membership or candidacy (for instance, in the 2020-2027 budget), this is all jangle.

We should also part with Russophobia that cannot be a principle of Ukraine's foreign policy. If they in Russia say "yes", we *a priori* say "no". And we see to what it led over the past five years.

I agree with the periodisation of Ukraine's foreign policy proposed here.

1991-1994 – the period of Kravchuk, the time of establishment of the Ukrainian sovereign state as neutral and non-aligned.

In 1993-1995, I negotiated the Big Treaty with Russia. We made it only because we made it clear to the Russian side that Ukraine was neutral – pursuant to the Declaration of State Sovereignty and Parliamentary Resolution "On Main Guidelines of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" where Ukraine announced its intention to become a neutral state.

1994-2004 – the foreign policy of Kuchma. Its essence: Ukraine is not Russia.

2005-2010 – the foreign policy of Yushchenko. Its main result: Ukraine is not EU and not NATO. Although it was democratically elected President Yushchenko who proved with his foreign policy that Ukraine deserved prospects of EU and NATO membership. However, we did not see such prospects.

Yet in May, 2004, I stressed Ukraine had no chances to be an EU or NATO member – not because we did not deserve that but because the EU and NATO would not agree to that. That is why I said that Yushchenko, if elected President, "will get even less than Kuchma". So it happened.

The reason is not only in us but first of all – in them. Neither NATO nor the EU can incorporate Ukraine as a member, first of all – because of their internal processes and the Russian factor.

So, we should admit that we cannot freely choose our geopolitics. We found ourselves among four geopolitical centres (not forget about China). That is why I disagree with the Foreign Ministry's opinion presented here, that Ukraine should not change the foreign policy strategy but only modernise its tactical principles.

In my opinion, **exactly today arises the need of fundamental change of the foreign policy strategy** we have been implementing since 1995. It was simple: accession to the EU and NATO. But, as I have said, this is impossible, at least till 2025. Then – what do we do in the forthcoming years?

In this context, it disturbs me that during Yanukovich's visit to Brussels it was said that Ukraine would have the Association Agreement before the end of 2010. My opinion is that if we defend our interests, we will not have that Agreement even in three years. One cannot have a roadmap to cancel visa procedures within a year either. So, our leaders should set realistic goals that can be attained without neglect of Ukraine's interests.

The USA is leaving Europe, its influence of Europe goes down due to the shift in its priorities for the next 20-50 years. **So, we, European countries, should assume greater responsibility for the development of and the general situation in Greater Europe.**

With this in mind, we should determine the essence of the fourth stage (2010-2020) of our foreign policy. **Its essence is that Ukraine should acquire the appropriate internationally recognised status and become a European regional non-aligned state** (I use the terms “non-aligned” and “neutral” as kind of synonyms). This will give us new opportunities in the global and European policy. And this will let us cease to be an irritant in relations among Russia, the EU, the USA, and China.

So, today, it is time to fundamentally reconsider the strategic principles of our foreign policy. This does not mean refusal from the European integration. I not accidentally defined Ukraine as a *European* regional non-aligned state. European integration as the policy of movement to the EU involves implementation of its standards but the pace of that movement should meet our national interests and be set by us. We are not a candidate country entirely relying on the EU directives. We are freer. And we should not be afraid of that freedom that gives us new opportunities. I see here the great historic mission of Ukraine as a European state in the new global revolutionary reconsideration of the world’s geopolitical structure and Greater Europe. ■

**FOR THE NEW PERIOD TO BRING POSITIVE CHANGES AND MEET OUR EXPECTATIONS**



**Yuriy SHCHERBAK,**  
*Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary of Ukraine*

So, a new period begins now in Ukraine’s foreign policy, which I would call “a period of great concern, uncertainty and expectations”. Too many steps and statements already made by the new President and his milieu arouse concern. However, there also remain grounds for better expectations.

Ukraine should first of all assess the new, changed geopolitical world situation. Security mechanisms built after the Cold War break apart, the geopolitical situation is changing – and this will shape world developments in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We saw how the situation in Kosovo and the Russian-Georgian conflict undermined the Helsinki

security principles. The new order will not rest on the principles to which we got used after 1991.

We should realise in what direction formation of that order will go on. There is a room for very dangerous conflicts, fraught with Ukraine’s involvement. So, we should think about a security system, in particular, find measures to strengthen the Budapest Memorandum and get some additional guarantees under that document. This is a very serious challenge for our foreign policy.

They call upon us to forget about NATO. But as soon as we forget about NATO, they will impose CSTO on us. Will it be better than NATO?

There are countries that have the ambitions to draw Ukraine into their spheres of influence. So we should very seriously think about Ukraine’s non-aligned status not backed with any guarantees. I am sure that there will be no such guarantees.

I would like to show our miscalculations by the example of some countries. First of all – Belarus. This is our natural ally, a nice people, not aggressive, not infected by the imperial complex. And this is a promising direction for our diplomacy, no matter who rules Belarus, since it is the internal affair of Byelorussians themselves.

I also have to stress the need of rapprochement with Germany. Germany is our strategic partner. And the myths invented, that Germany is a pro-Russian and in a way anti-Ukrainian state, are far from being true. Development of relations may be hampered by our inertia or laziness. Meanwhile, Germany offers huge opportunities for economic and, especially, energy cooperation.

Canada is also worth mention. We often speak about the USA and Canada together. But they are entirely different countries! I was the Ambassador to Canada and dare say that we should learn democracy and approaches to different international problems there, not contact that country after all others.

On the USA. The country is in a deep crisis now. Society division into polar groups may be even deeper than in Ukraine – this was demonstrated by the elections of Bush Jr. and Obama. And Ukraine’s 50<sup>th</sup> rank in the US foreign policy priorities is not so bad, if we recall that Western Europe is not on top either. The USA now entirely concentrates on Afghanistan and Iran, and unfortunately, we cannot hope for any support from it. But, of course, we should maintain good relations with the strategic partner.

We often forget about China. It is shameful that the previous President of Ukraine over the years of his office did not visit that mighty country with huge prospects and an active, open foreign policy – since Ukraine has immense possibilities for cooperation with China. The same refers to Brazil, with which we have rather interesting agreements and which today comes to the forefront globally.



Serious problems exist in the Russian segment. It was said here that our policy had been moved by Russophobia. But for the sake of justice, one should recall Ukrainophobia. It remains unknown if the change of our leadership and new accents in foreign policy will lead to an end of the merciless anti-Ukrainian campaign waged by a number of political think-tanks in the Russian Federation. For instance, the Centre of Gleb Pavlovsky compares Ukraine to Afghanistan and Somalia, in that way pursuing a provocative policy. So, we will hail return of the Russian policy to the path of pragmatism, a normal attitude to Ukraine and its independent status.

Summing up, I wish to note that in reality, we don't know today what the forthcoming period will be like. The future always poses a danger. I would like Razumkov Centre to issue new materials in a year, for us to come together and assess the new period of Ukraine's foreign policy, commencing today. For it to bring not only concerns but positive changes and meet our expectations. ■

**MODEL OF THE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE CHANGED**



**Oleksandr LYTVYENKO,**  
*Advisor to the President  
of the National Centre  
for Euro-Atlantic Integration  
of Ukraine*

The latest elections witnessed kind of exhaustion of the socio-political and socio-economic model formed in Ukraine over the past 20 years and resting on the idea of transit: Ukraine, having parted with the totalitarian Communist past, moves to the bright Western liberal future.

In reality it appeared that Ukraine moved in a different direction and built a system that has huge oligarchic groups, a façade of democratic institutes, electoral democracy (but no participatory democracy), and substantial weakening of public institutes of governance.

I would not throw stones at previous leaders. Said processes may be more important than personal drawbacks and problems of the top state leadership. But that model is not transitional, it is kind of rooted. **And in fact, the task of the responsible political class lies in the change of that socio-political, socio-economic model.** Here lies the most important, for me, function of the foreign policy – since, as we know, one of the main functions of the foreign policy is to back the home policy.

One cannot but agree with the idea of dependence of Ukraine's policy on its foreign partners. We are not

in vacuum, and by and large, possibilities for an independent choice of the foreign policy course are rather limited.

So, some foreign policy accents cannot but change and will change but its fundamentals will remain the same under any circumstances. I agree with the opinion that is it high time to reassess the foreign policy.

**It is time to stop and solve current problems, to attain the set task, not to take fundamental strategic decisions.** Moreover that they are difficult to take in the conditions of an unstable and transient world, and it is very easy to make a mistake. That is why we can speak about invariability of strategy principles.

The past five years proved that a largely value-based policy, if perceived incorrectly, is ineffective. But probably there is a need to return to our foreign policy the inherent worth of the state and society, not to view the country as a means of implementation of some abstract ideas.

It is fair to say that, speaking of tomorrow's visit of the Ukrainian President to the Russian Federation, we stress the need of change of rhetoric, repudiation from Russophobia. But we should understand that policy is not determined by talk. The Russian course is determined by the home policy and socio-economic features of the Russian Federation. Even if we stress on fundamental changes in the tone of the dialogue with the Russian Federation, the course and task of the Russian foreign policy will not change. They will be pursued anyway.

To sum up, I wish to stress the following. *First.* We should seriously reassess the foreign policy situation and realise that the world has entered a period of far-going change. Ukraine's foreign policy must adapt to them. *Second.* The main task of the foreign policy is to promote transformation, create a more favourable socio-political model of the country development on the basis of the European experience. *Third.* We should be well aware that the capabilities of our foreign policy are limited by the interests and wishes of our partners. ■

Round-table, March 4, 2010



**TO ENSURE SOVEREIGN DEVELOPMENT OF OUR STATE, ITS INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**



**Yuriy KOCHUBEI,**  
*President of the Ukrainian Foreign Policy Association, Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine*

The name of this round-table somewhat irritates me. What is meant by the “new stage”? The historic science has long parted with the dynastic principle of naming specific periods of historic life of a nation. So, we should proceed from other criteria. Namely – the criteria of our geopolitical status and national interests of the Ukrainian state. That is what should shape our foreign policy.

Of course, the main foreign policy task is to ensure sovereign development of the state, its independence, territorial integrity. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry is to work on this basis.

The future meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian Presidents is good news. Those meetings were extremely important. The bad news however is that they meet in secrecy. And I believe that our relations with the Russian Federation should be absolutely transparent, for the public to know their details, for everyone to be able to know the situation emerging in bilateral relations. That is why it is highly important that the relations with all states (and first of all, with the Russian Federation) rest on the principles of transparency, UN principles and commonly accepted principles of the international law. If this is not the case, there will be no truly partner, equal, predictable and transparent relations.

Problems in Ukraine’s relations with other states were mentioned here. Indeed, current relations with Germany present a gap our foreign policy: Ukraine lost the reserve of positive contacts with the Germany. Of course, Angela Merkel is an uneasy partner but we should have worked with the leadership of that country more intensely and seriously.

Now, we are losing relations with Turkey – one of our closest neighbours and geopolitically a very important country for us.

Once, I expressed my thoughts on those problems in the presentation “Southern direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy”. The stand presented there was set out not by me but by Hrushevskyi in his treatise “On the threshold of a new Ukraine”. There, he argued that we should learn

from and cooperate with the Western countries but our practical steps, economic activity should focus on the South. This is very clever, since only there we can find markets, investments, and the like.

During our discussion it was mentioned that Ukraine should be a regional leader. But we did not manage to be a leader even in GUAM. I see it as another rather disgraceful page in our foreign policy of the recent years. We could not become a leader for the countries that agreed to follow us in that international organisation.

Cadre were also mentioned here. I believe that the cadre decide all – and I am not original. So, the Foreign Ministry should pay greater attention to the Diplomatic Academy that can raise the level of expert training, diversify methods of professional development – for our diplomats to rank with the best international professionals. ■

**UKRAINE SHOULD BE AN ACTIVE, FORESEEABLE AND ENTERPRISING PARTNER**



**Oleh BAI,**  
*Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*

Reviewing Razumkov Centre’s publications, I, *first of all*, recalled that I hear of new approaches, principles and stages for almost two decades now. *Second*, I noted striking differences in expert and public assessments. On this basis, the Ukrainian foreign policy of the recent years may be described as the one that “made a big step in all directions” – so, **imaginary verbal victories and practical loss of time and capabilities led, I guess, to some diversity in assessments and conclusions.**

Regarding new approaches, principles and stages (every new leader means a new stage). Stubborn neglect of long-standing groundwork of the Foreign Ministry, to which self-confident wisecracks assigned the role of Cinderella servicing their whims, unfortunately, did not help present Ukraine as a reliable, consistent, predictable and foreseeable partner. Even worse, everyone spoke whatever he wanted, often – diametrically opposite, on behalf Ukraine.

Regarding another “new stage” announced today, I will start with fundamental things – human resources. Almost everyone spoke about the ministerial level today, I will try to get to the top level. We have a star pleiad of ambassadors who have made Ukraine’s foreign policy since it gained independence. However, today,

due to the unwise human resources policy, we see among esteemed gentlemen representing Ukraine, unlucky (but personally devoted) ambassadors from secretariats, transport agencies, etc., including in key countries for us.

Once, there was a saying: "If you have nowhere to go, go teaching." Today it is for some reason applied to the corps of ambassadors. I wish to believe that at the "new stage," this will not happen, and there will be a transparent and clear procedure of passage of candidates and appointment of state representatives to ambassador posts. I think that the time of romantic amateurs (I was one of them) who came to diplomatic service 15-18 years ago, when the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry was made up of a handful of professional experts, and thriving bilateral relations were naked, has passed away. Now, the big and mighty Foreign Ministry needs no assistance in the form of "injections" of high-ranking dilettantes.

A few words about tomorrow's Moscow visit of Ukraine's President. In this respect, I am an optimist but a cautious one. On one hand, such visit is not quite well timed, since the new team hardly could deeply and comprehensively study all elements of Ukraine-Russian relations historically, in documents, in practical figures and so on. On the other – I do not share some desperate statements about the visit. As I had some experience of work in Russia, although a long time ago, I expect that the tough policy of the partners promoting national interests of the Russian Federation will make our home-grown Russofiles stand on firm soil. Attractive wrapping may hide bitter stuffing. I am sure that the new leader will be able to respond adequately.

Speaking about the European line of Ukraine's foreign policy, one should note that because of its arrogance and complacency, Europe "missed" Ukraine and now demonstrates total helplessness and questionable ability to cope with its own problems. That Europe should first of all in its own interests seek rapprochement with Ukraine – the state that does not knock at the door but positions itself as an active, foreseeable and reliable partner.

To sum up: Ukraine as an active, foreseeable, predictable and reliable partner should regain the image of an enterprising leader in the sectors that can unite society within the country, and the world community. ■

Round-table, March 4, 2010



## MAIN TASK TODAY – TO PRESERVE UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE



**Hryhoriy PEREPYLYTSIA,**  
*Director, Foreign Policy Institute  
at the Diplomatic Academy  
of Ukraine under the Foreign  
Ministry of Ukraine*

I agree with the periodisation of Ukraine's foreign policy building set out in course of the discussion. I wish to stress however that over all those periods, Ukraine's foreign policy course remained invariable and was shaped by the very essence of its sovereignty. **And our main task today is to preserve that foreign policy course.** I mean not only declarations of the new presidential authority but first of all invariability of the legislative basis. I guess that today, with a reformatted coalition, there will be a temptation to amend the Law "On National Security of Ukraine," removing some provisions, to pass a new Law "On Fundamentals of Foreign Policy," and to change the Military Doctrine of Ukraine.

So, we should spare no efforts for our foreign policy course to remain unchanged, first of all, legislatively.

**Another issue of invariability of the political course – preservation of the diplomatic cadre.** We have huge gains in this respect laid down by the first leaders of the Foreign Ministry, we have our diplomatic school, also being a guarantee of preservation of the present foreign policy course.

**Another important task – preservation of the democratic trend,** as a guarantee of preservation of the course meeting basic values of the state, the nation, and the country. It conceals both opportunities and challenges.

*On opportunities.* I guess that today, a window of opportunities opened up for Ukraine's European integration. The EU has never given us such opportunities and prospects as in the recent decisions of the European Parliament. I mean the possibility of application for membership, visa-free procedures and free trade area. We should focus on the use of those opportunities. Here lies the pragmatism of Ukraine's foreign policy.

*On challenges.* It is very risky to contrast European integration with Euro-Atlantic. They are two rails of one track. When we speak about the EU membership, we mean NATO membership as well. Without that, movement to united Europe is impossible. That is why I was pleased with the new President of Ukraine statement in Brussels, that the foreign policy course and our relations with NATO will remain in their current status.

I wish to remind you that from 2004, it has been the status of gaining NATO membership, set out by the Law “On National Security” and the Military Doctrine. Those acts removed the question of a non-aligned status for Ukraine. So, disputes of a non-aligned status should be dropped. In 1990s, we declared the intension of neutrality to avoid accession to (or drawing into) the Tashkent Treaty. However, today, a non-aligned status would be an obstacle for the road to NATO. And if we make emphasis on a non-aligned status, we simultaneously rule out integration in the EU, since the EU, implementing the European defence and security policy, is also building its alliance policy. We should be aware of that.

A non-aligned status involves more limitations of security guarantees than neutral. It gives no international legal guarantees of national security and deprives of military assistance in case of aggression. At the same time, it allows indefinite stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet – since, by contrast to the neutral status, does not require removal of foreign military presence. So, emphasis on the non-aligned status is incorrect today, since now, we cannot back guarantees of our security and defence with domestic defence resources.

The world is moving to multipolarity but does this mean that we must return to a multi-vectored policy? In this context, the landscape of relations shaped by multipolarity on the European continent should be defined. Here, multipolarity means creation of a regional European bipolar system of relations. On one hand – NATO and EU, on the other – Tashkent Treaty (CSTO) and Single economic space (SES). If NATO and CSTO present two zones of Europe geopolitically, the EU and SES – geo-economically. Ukraine found itself sandwiched between NATO and the EU, on one hand, and Russia, CSTO and SES – on the other. And now, if we join the Customs Union, we will sustain the same losses as we did from the accession of the Baltic States and our other neighbours to the EU, when we lost a big deal of our trade turnover.

Now, the situation repeats itself, this time – in the East. Approximately 70% of Ukraine’s transit services falls on Russia. If we maintain the European trend, we risk losing business opportunities in the East. This involves loss of realities of the multi-vectored policy, and means that we should deepen economic relations with the EU.

Preservation of regional leadership. Unfortunately, the tough situation that arose with Georgia at the elections may harm bilateral relations. Furthermore, Russia already demands an end to Ukraine’s support for Georgia. But we should not lose the trend of regional leadership.

The southern vector of the foreign policy, mentioned already, opens up a possibility to offset reintegration in the post-Soviet space, in particular, with development of Baltic-Black Sea economic and political cooperation.

Relations with the Russian Federation. I guess it would be nice if President Yanukovich reiterates in Russia the position announced by him in Brussels. This would witness the consistency of Ukraine’s foreign policy and invariability of its foreign policy course, which Russia will have to reckon with.

I guess that the formula implemented by Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry over the past five years was absolutely correct – development of good-neighbourly relations with Russia in the context of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This was not achieved. But the Foreign Ministry was doing its best to defend the interests of this country. It was no Russophobia, it was a true information war unleashed by Russia. In that situation, the Foreign Ministry had to defend Ukraine’s interests. It was not Yushchenko who wrote the known letter to Medvedev but Medvedev did.

We should in fact do away with Ukrainophobia, since it undermines coordination and unity of action in the foreign policy. Ukraine’s foreign policy should rest on values, not on a balance of interests. If the category of interest is defined, it means conscious need. And a need arises and rests on values. Exactly on values should we build our country as a sovereign and independent state. Our values need to be defended.

There is a great risk that we will be overly carried away by economisation of the foreign policy. Like extension of the Black Sea Fleet stationing but at a higher cost. In such issues as security, there should be no economisation. Pragmatism of our foreign policy should be concentrated on concrete issues of Ukraine’s national interests promotion. ■

**WE SHOULD LEARN LESSONS FROM THE PREVIOUS POLICY AND LOOK ANEW AT THE CHALLENGES FACING THE COUNTRY**



**Anatolii HUTSAL,**  
*First Deputy Director,  
National Institute of  
International Security Problems*

**The main woe of our previous foreign policy, as well as of the home one, lies in its inadequacy.** Inadequacy of vision, perception and reaction, words and images, the world outlook and attitudes to developments. We lived in kind of an irrational world of the past and submerged in even greater archaic, which brought about a great deal of the problem.



First of all, phobias. A lot is being said about Ukrainophobia in Russia. But one should ask about its reasons. Could one expect a quiet reaction of Russian leaders to the massive negative emotional-information flow brought on them by our “free” press?

Another problem – stereotypes. The priority here belongs to “values”. But what are values in modern politics – not human and public life but in politics? In fact, they are a powerful tool of influence and transformation of entire societies (Ukraine is a showy example).

Another stereotype – accession to NATO as a way of security problem solution. What Alliance do we want? NATO steadily moves to the enhancement of its “peacekeeping” mechanisms, turning in fact a world gendarme. Afghanistan is a showy example. So, we should honestly answer the questions: is our society ready to sacrifice its soldiers for the sake of transnational interests of the Euro-Atlantic community; to bear moral responsibility for combat operations where Ukrainians take part; are our military ready to become global mercenaries? Maybe society will say “yes” but it should at least be asked.

The same refers to the drive to the EU. Can society and is it ready to restrict itself with tough limits of norms and procedures implemented in the EU on a growing scale? Furthermore, that organisation has rooted traditions and experiences of big empires – what we tried to part with in the whole period of independence.

**Such Ukrainian irrationalism is aggravated by another urgent problem – high foreign dependence of society in general, the elites and the expert community in particular.** Ukraine as a state got accustomed to the “financial needle” of international organisations and the “gas needle” of *Gazprom*. There are even more effective tools of influence – conditioned by “personal linkage” of the elite and oligarchs to foreign markets and accounts in foreign banks, as well as formation of expert opinions by Western PR schools. All this enables rather easy control of the situation in the country from outside.

In such situation, for effective use of the newly-opened “window of opportunities”, we should clean up the Augean stable of the past and rationally plan the future.

*First.* There should be the awareness that Ukraine can exist as an independent, sovereign state only on the condition of equilibrium of interests of the main external actors in its politics. Otherwise the country will either appear in the gravitation field of one centre of influence or will be torn apart, with each part drifting to “its” centre.

*Second.* **Interests of important for Ukraine centres of power (Russia, the EU and the USA) should be adequately understood and accepted.** Unfortunately, up until recently, Ukraine’s foreign policy has been guided solely by its own wishes and goals.

*Third.* No “white spots” may be left in our constitutional history, when it deals with the fundamentals of statehood, including non-alignment and neutrality problems. In early 1990s, the world saw Ukraine as a sovereign state, and the leading world centres gave it guarantees, guided by the principles set out in the Declaration of National Sovereignty of Ukraine. Ukraine’s independence was proclaimed in the relevant Act in pursuance of the Declaration, and on the basis of that Act, Ukraine’s Parliament passed the Constitution. So, one should be guided by a special logic to deny the chain of interrelated links, as removal of each of them may undermine the legitimacy of the state, and therefore – “nullify” international guarantees given to it. So, there should be a decision understandable for both Ukraine and the world. Maybe the Constitutional Court will dot the i’s here.

*Fourth.* A similar linkage exists between the Big Ukraine-Russian Treaty and the Black Sea Fleet Agreement. The situation with Ukraine’s CIS membership is entirely paradoxical. Was signing of the CIS Charter fraught with loss of Ukraine’s independence? Not at all. Georgia, having signed the Charter, afterwards freely quit the audience. The new authorities should dot the i’s in those issues, too.

*Fifth.* Strengthening of the security component of global and national development is a decisive factor of present-day civilisational processes conditioned by the spread of the global crisis. Today, the security policy presents kind of a visiting card of a country, an indicator of its ability to adequately respond to challenges of the time. Unfortunately, against this background, Ukraine’s position is very vulnerable. In fact, the foreign security policy was confined to the course of Euro-Atlantic integration. Reformatting of priorities prompts the need of building a new architecture of relations, involving Eastern partners. One should keep in mind that today, the main conflict ripens in the Asian and Pacific region, where the interests of the leading world powers come into collision. Additionally, one cannot ignore militarisation of the Black Sea region against the background of undiminishing conflicts there and active deployment of the American military presence, including in the AMD format.

*To sum up.* The modern world is developing mainly in two formats – national, and transnational. No matter how strong Ukraine pursues its national interests, one should admit that only the mighty can do that – the USA, Russia, China, etc. That is why the country should be ready to advantageously share powers with transnational corporations. We should part with phobias (such as the idea of the gas pipe as a guarantee of independence) and seek ways of joining the transnational world. And in general – learn lessons from the previous policy and look anew at the challenges facing the country. ■

**ONLY PRACTICAL REFORMS AND INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS WILL DRAW UKRAINE CLOSER TO EUROPE**



**Ihor ZHDANOV,**  
*President, "Open Policy"  
analytical centre*

The effectiveness of Ukraine's foreign policy depends not only on the availability of the corps of professional diplomats, an active Minister of Foreign Affairs, sufficient funding of the foreign office but also, and first of all – on the availability of some home policy preconditions.

The first of them – the political community consensus about geopolitical and geo-strategic interests or lines of the foreign policy, the therefore – the ability of the government and the opposition to speak in one voice on the international scene.

The second – some consensus in society supporting the state foreign political activity.

The third – a serious economic potential of the state, to back the effectiveness and efficiency of the foreign policy. Even previously, we could not speak about a sufficient economic potential of Ukraine, and now, in the conditions of a crisis and GDP decline, it is out of the question. But the absence of that potential gives Ukraine no chance to properly defend its national interests.

So, if we look at the existence of those preconditions now, the answer will be negative. The political class has no consensus about the main lines of Ukraine's foreign policy. It is also absent on the expert level, as demonstrated by today's discussion. We see that some political forces, some experts adhere to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, others make emphasis on relations with Russia.

The situation in society is the same. From sociological survey results, we see a clear geopolitical split: one part of society seeks relations with Russia, another – with the West.

**So, we on the expert level should try to decide where Ukraine's foreign policy interests lie, where it should move.** I would not say that the issue of accession to NATO is off the agenda for good. But although I stand for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance, I have to state that this will not happen in the middle run. First of all – for internal reasons, which I already mentioned. Furthermore, a new President came to power, whose programme clearly says that Ukraine will not be a NATO member, and Ukraine's relations with the Alliance will be confined to cooperation.

The accession issue is also postponed for foreign policy reasons – the French, German and Russian stand. This should be taken into account. So I believe that before 2015, any discussion of Ukraine's accession/non-accession to NATO will have a negative effect and reduce the probability of Ukraine's accession to that organisation.

**If we speak about CSTO, the Customs Union, SES, I guess that they offer no serious prospects to Ukraine for a number of reasons.** As far as the Customs Union is concerned, it is clear that after accession to the WTO Ukraine assumed some obligations, absolutely inconsistent with the rules applied in the Customs Union. Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus are not WTO members. So, that subject will be dropped, as well as that of CSTO. I am sure that in the middle run, in view of the realities of our home and foreign policy, Ukraine will remain *de facto* a non-aligned state.

I guess that the idea of the European integration might unite the elite, the political class and experts. Ukraine's accession to the EU primarily depends on Ukraine, its ability to reform itself. Unless Ukraine implements the judicial and legal, administrative, budget and tax reforms, unless we begin to effectively fight corruption, Ukraine's accession to the EU is out of the question – irrespective of the presence or absence of relevant budget planning in the EU.

I am sure that if we manage to make an agreement of free trade area, visa-free procedures with the EU, ensure defence of the rights of our citizens in the EU countries and Ukraine's participation in its political decision-making – the context of the bilateral dialogue will change fundamentally. I stress once again – **only practical reforms and introduction of European economic and social standards will draw Ukraine closer to Europe and ensure its accession to the EU.**

**TO CONCENTRATE ON ATTAINMENT OF THE SET PRIORITIES**



**Oleksandr SUSHKO,**  
*Director, Institute for  
Euro-Atlantic Cooperation*

Specific of present-day Ukraine is discussion of values – since we lie between Russia and Europe that have different views of those dominant things. At that, for some, democracy, democratic principles, rule of law are unconditional values, for others – a myth that may be neglected.



But on the other hand, there are grounds to note the emergence of elements of certainty in the foreign policy, and (it may be too optimistic) we have the grounds to depoliticise the discourse concerning the key goals and means of the foreign policy.

**If we speak about the EU and NATO, we have a sufficient toolset with those organisations, enabling concentration on attainment of the set priorities in the middle run.** And maybe we should drop this irritating discourse of the date of accession or membership. With NATO, such toolset is already in place – the renewed Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, decisions of the Bucharest summit, the Annual National Programme format. And if the President says that we will abide by the available formats, implementation of said Programme gives a framework for some socio-political-bureaucratic consensus. So, we do not speak at this stage about the accession date but also do not refuse from the tools that can draw that date closer in the future.

We also came close to elaboration of the long-term format of cooperation with the EU provided by the Association Agreement. **It will be the most ambitious international document of Ukraine and the most ambitious agreement of the EU with any partner, a big step forward.** But it also poses a big challenge: how will that Agreement work, given the national legal framework? This challenge is to be met through the work of the new President and the future Government. Nobody has used such format of relations, so, a question arises – will Ukraine manage to get maximum benefits from the new format that in fact makes it possible, on one hand, to mitigate the acuteness of the geopolitical choice and deadlines of membership, on the other – to concentrate on attainment of practical priorities?

By contrast to relations with the EU and NATO, we failed to formalise relations with Russia. We have serious differences with the Russian Federation about the goals of cooperation. Russia is trying to invent a formula of Ukraine's involvement in the Customs Union. To be sure, technically, this is entirely impossible, since Ukraine has joined the WTO, and the Customs Union member states have not. Furthermore, Ukraine is negotiating a free trade area with the EU and is unlikely to retreat from those talks. At the same time, it is clear that no country of the Customs Union can wage negotiations on its own about free trade with anyone, moreover – with the EU. So, we will see attempts of inventing some special status for Ukraine.

**So, we should be very cautious not to lose the sovereignty that lets us pursue the policy of European integration and meet other international commitments of Ukraine.**

Turning back to the subject of NATO, I will remind you that a few days ago, during an expert meeting in Berlin, one of the leading German experts asked: "We realise that under Yanukovich Ukraine will not join NATO, probably he wants to "present" this issue to Russia – but why is

he doing that for free?" This is indeed a big question: why does not the Ukrainian side condition slowdown of its Euro-Atlantic course by some concrete commitments on the part of Russia? For instance, one could raise the question as follows: Ukraine does not join NATO but Russia in response does not raise the issue of extension of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea. Meanwhile, there is a danger that the issue of the fleet will again be bargained in exchange for gas, and those things are absolutely incompatible.

By and large, we should keep in mind that today, despite the unstable situation around Ukraine, there are some tested tools, much stronger than those available 10-15 years ago, when Ukraine was in vacuum.

So, there are grounds to hope that the President, the Government and Parliament will do their best to effectively use at least what is available and move forward by small steps, if big steps are not possible today. ■

#### TO IDENTIFY THE COUNTRY'S INTERESTS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTOR



**Volodymyr FESENKO,**  
*Chairman of the Board,*  
*"Penta" Centre for Applied*  
*Political Studies*

Where do we go? I have heard these questions actually since the declaration of Ukraine's independence. **So far, my impression from the first weeks of Yanukovich's presidency is as follows: we are moving, as before, to Europe but face Moscow.** One can imagine what the pace and effects of that movement will be.

What basis should Ukraine's foreign policy rest on – of values or interests? I agree with colleagues – it is not a Ukrainian discussion. This is a global theoretical and practical discussion between realists and utopians in the theory and practice of international relations. But in the Ukrainian context, it is actually a discussion what the foreign policy should be like – ideological (if value-based), or pragmatic (if interest-based).

If we proceed from the assumption that we are building the foreign policy on values, a counter-question arises: what values and, respectively, what foreign policy should be expected from the new President? If he pursues a value-based policy, the ideology of the Party of Regions and its voters, we will get something entirely different than expected. In this connection, there is another problem to which I wish to draw the panellists' attention: it is good that they in the Administration of the new President understand

his mission as the head of state and as a politician. I mean the visit to Brussels and some statements made there. And they in the Foreign Ministry understand the country's interests. This is very well.

What arouses concern today? **The first problem – uncertainty in HR management.** We don't know who will be the new Minister of Foreign Affairs tomorrow, who will supervise foreign policy in the Presidential Administration. But we already see that there are people who will influence the foreign policy so that we can get a multi-vectored approach not in the foreign policy but in influence on foreign political decisions of the President.

**What concerns the most is complete uncertainty of interests.** Certainty lacked, for a number of reasons, under president Yushchenko, and lacks today. It is not a matter of NATO or a non-aligned status. This is not an interest. The interest is to guarantee of country's security. How to do this, in view of the current internal and external circumstances? With what toolset? After all, neither NATO, for the external reasons mentioned here, nor a non-aligned status will guarantee Ukraine's security. That is, the issue is much more difficult than discussion of the alternative: NATO or non-aligned status.

**A more topical issue for the nearest future is to promote our foreign economic interests.** I disagree with colleagues who rule out accession to the Customs Union. Russia will insistently raise that issue and try to draw us, in one or another way, into the Customs Union. So, we should clearly identify Ukraine's interests in promotion of foreign economic interests. Is this movement to creation of a free trade area with the EU, or discussion of full-scale participation in the Customs Union? Can those processes be combined, or not? And if they are combined, in what form? This is a very important question and, possibly, a subject of a separate discussion.

Even the new party of power has no unity on this issue. And the expert community should formulate our vision of the national interest. I think that if the present internal and external status of Ukraine is assessed impartially and realistically, interests should be in the first place. So, we should in the first place, at least in general, identify Ukraine's interests in foreign policy. And on that basis set goals and priorities. ■

Round-table, March 4, 2010



**TO PRODUCE THE POSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN EXPERT COMMUNITY**



**Dmytro SHULHA,**  
Senior Manager  
of the International  
Renaissance Foundation  
European Programme

When we speak about Ukraine's foreign policy "at a new stage", a natural question arises about the essential novelty of that policy. It is worth reminding that President Yanukovich during his election campaign repeatedly made emphasis on three points: creation of a trilateral consortium on the basis of the Ukrainian GTS, Ukraine's accession to the Customs Union, and extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in Ukraine. Those points correlate with the positions of experts who are sure that Russia's main interests in cooperation with Ukraine lie in the energy, trade and security sectors. But does this meet Ukraine's interests?

Unfortunately, the subject of the Ukrainian GTS was not dealt with today. But in reality, it is a strategic issue. And if strategic state property is non-transparently given under foreign control, how will this influence Ukraine's entire foreign policy? I guess that this issue requires a serious discussion. This is the *first* point.

*Second* – the Customs Union. From the logical viewpoint we cannot simultaneously be in the WTO and the Customs Union, made of states that do not belong to the WTO. Being a Customs Union member, we cannot hold talks about a free trade area with the EU if the Customs Union itself does not hold such talks. But there will be attempts to draw Ukraine into the Customs Union. This also prompts a question: what will the stand of the Ukrainian expert community be like in such situation?

*Third* – stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. This problem was assessed by Ukrainian experts during Razumkov Centre's poll. Very interestingly, actual consensus may be reported on this issue: two-thirds (66%) of the polled experts is sure of the necessity of strict observance of the Agreement on the status and conditions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine, that is – in 2017, the Fleet is to leave the Crimea. I am sure that with such consensus we may reasonably appeal to the new state leadership and demand account of the expert opinion in the state policy.

I agree with the opinion that the urgent task for the Ukrainian expert community is to identify the country's national interests in relations, first of all, with the EU, Russia and other partners, and on the world scene in general.

And one closing comment: what may the "red lines", lines of retreat be in the foreign policy? For instance, on what conditions and for what term may the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea be extended? I think that emphasis on economic benefits in this issue is irrelevant. Economisation of the foreign policy should not apply to security issues. I see no subject for discussion here. ■

## FOREIGN POLICY SECTOR IN EXPERT ASSESSMENTS

Evidently, the lines of the national foreign policy effectiveness enhancement include more intense use of the intellectual potential of Ukraine's expert community. That is why Razumkov Centre studies in the foreign policy sector always include expert polls, enabling identification of the general stand and expert forecasts of the key foreign policy issues, monitoring of the dynamic of expert assessments.

This is especially important at the current stage of the country government's change, when the state political elite, expert circles, society discuss enhancement of foreign political activity effectiveness, new accents in the foreign policy course of the new leadership. Interesting in this context are the results of the latest expert poll held by Razumkov Centre right after the presidential elections.<sup>1</sup>

During the poll, experts assessed the state and prospects of the foreign policy, the situation in the key foreign policy domains, named the ways of perfection of the authorities' activity on the world scene, and assessed the effectiveness of the national foreign office leadership.

Results of the conducted poll give grounds for the following conclusions.

**First.** Experts mainly critically describe the effectiveness of the foreign policy under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. In their opinion, development of relations with the Russian Federation, formation of a positive international image of the country, provision of external conditions for development of society, the state, the national economy were all ineffective. Experts argue that today, Ukraine has no reliable foreign guarantees of independence and sovereignty.

**Second.** In experts' opinion, the national foreign policy is worst of all affected by internal factors: home policy instability; inconsistency and controversy in the stand of the country leadership; differences in foreign policy positions of the lead political forces.

**Third.** According to experts, Ukraine's accession to the EU meets its national interests, and integration in the European Union may become a national idea uniting all regions of Ukraine. However, the current pace of integration in the EU is criticised.

**Fourth.** The expert community critically assesses the state of relations with the Russian Federation. According to expert assessments, Ukraine's policy in relations with Russia is uncertain and controversial. In its turn, the Russian Federation pursues an unfriendly policy towards Ukraine. The Russian interests in cooperation with Ukraine are purely pragmatic – transit of energy resources to the EU, taking Ukraine out of the Western influence, and use of the Ukrainian market for sale of Russian goods.

**Fifth.** Ukraine-US relations are assessed by experts mainly positively, a relative majority of those polled terms them as good.

Meanwhile, the absolute majority is sure that Ukraine should deepen cooperation with the United States.

**Sixth.** Experts, by contrast to the general public, support the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration. They believe that accession to NATO meets Ukraine's national interests. However, at the current stage, it should not force the process of accession to the Alliance, concentrating instead on implementation of annual national programmes and associated information campaigns.

**Seventh.** Experts formulate a number of foreign policy priorities for the new President – promotion of Ukraine's economic interests on the world markets, formulation of the foreign policy strategy, deepening relations with the EU, guarantee of the national security.

**Eighth.** Among the Foreign Ministry's main tasks, experts in the first place mention promotion of the interests of Ukrainian manufacturers on the world markets, enhancement of international security guarantees, defence of the rights of Ukraine's citizens abroad. Enhancement of the Foreign Ministry effectiveness requires: economisation of the foreign policy, provision of adequate funding of the Foreign Ministry, enhancement of the effectiveness of diplomatic missions.

**Ninth.** Expert circles mainly positively assess the work of the new Foreign Ministry leadership. Petro Poroshenko's activity is generally hailed. Respondents believe that the Foreign Ministry leadership by and large managed to improve the situation in the key foreign policy domains.

### Assessments of foreign policy and Ukraine's place in the world

**The national foreign policy under Yushchenko generally missed the set goals.** Quite expectedly, experts assess the most critically development of relations with Russia. Contacts between Kyiv and Moscow were unstable and confrontational, the political-diplomatic dialogue was full of mutual criticism, accusations, ultimatums. According to experts, the authorities were insufficiently effective at formation of a positive international image of the country, provision of external conditions for domestic socio-political and economic development, defence of compatriots abroad.

Experts assess a bit more positively the country's leadership efforts at promotion of peace and stability in the region, development of relations with the USA and the EU, Ukraine's integration in the world economic space.

Noteworthy, the overwhelming majority (79.8%) of the expert community representatives is sure that **today, Ukraine has no reliable external guarantees of security.**

**Foreign policy is worst of all affected by domestic factors.** Experts see the main problem in home political instability. Evidently, tough confrontation in the President-Parliament-Government triangle, governmental and parliamentary crises, permanent domestic conflicts seriously impaired the country's international stand, affected its foreign policy. Experts also

<sup>1</sup> The expert survey was held by Razumkov Centre on February 8-19, 2010. 109 experts were polled – representatives of the executive and legislative branches, ministries and agencies, media, leading state research institutions and non-governmental think-tanks in Kyiv and regions. Some estimations are compared to previous expert surveys held by Razumkov Centre in 2006-2009 and published in the National Security and Defense journal (2008, №6; 2009, №4).

noted inconsistency of the leadership, foreign policy differences among the key political forces.

The cited opinions correlate with assessments of Ukraine's present place in the world. **Experts mainly describe Ukraine as an unimportant European country looking for its place in the world.** Many respondents see Ukraine as a "buffer" state between Europe and Asia. Only 6.5% of experts termed it as an "important European country". Such uncertain, transitional state of the country in the conditions of the complex home political and socio-economic situation, geopolitical instability is dangerous.

### European integration of Ukraine

**The pace of Ukraine's movement to the EU is unsatisfactory.** Over the period under review, from December 2006 till February 2010, experts steadily reported the low pace of Ukraine's integration in the EU.<sup>2</sup> The latest poll witnessed some deterioration in assessments. In particular, the expert opinion is proven with the fact that the three-year Ukraine-EU Action Plan was implemented partially and selectively, no systemic progress was achieved in all sectors of cooperation.<sup>3</sup> It is also evident that the pace of the country's movement to the EU is influenced by domestic factors and complex transformational processes in the EU itself.

**The EU interest in cooperation with Ukraine is rather pragmatic.** According to experts, it mainly focuses on transit of Russian energy resources, the Ukrainian market for the EU goods, joint struggle illegal migration, enhancement of security on the European continent. Experts assess the most sceptically the EU interest in imports of Ukrainian products.

The overwhelming majority of experts believes that accession to the EU meets the country's national interests, and the idea of the European integration can unite Ukraine's regions. The latter may be taken for granted, provided that the country's leadership concentrates its political will on implementation of the idea of the European integration, the authorities act pragmatically and logically, proper financial and resource support is provided, and movement to the EU brings concrete effects that will be felt by citizens in their everyday life.

### Problems and prospects of relations with the Russian Federation

**Experts negatively assess the state of bilateral relations.** None of those polled called them good. Critical assessments of the present state of Ukraine-Russian cooperation are in response to the recent aggravation of relations between Kyiv and Moscow, escalation of conflicts, inability to solve a number of long-standing problems, confrontation in the top level dialogue.

**Ukraine's policy towards Russia, as well as the Russian policy towards Ukraine, is not open, good-neighbourly and friendly.** Most experts term Kyiv's actions with respect to Moscow as uncertain, controversial, and the Russian policy towards Ukraine – as clearly unfriendly. The dynamic of the relevant comparative indices adds no optimism – no changes for the better were observed in the period under review. Apparently, the primary task of both countries' leadership is to find "points of contacts", ways and mechanisms of improving Ukraine-Russian partnership.

**Rapprochement of Ukraine and the Russian Federation will in the first place be promoted by politico-economic factors – community of economic interests and political will of the country leaders.** According to experts, a far low "effect of rapprochement" is produced by the socio-cultural and religious domains – family ties between residents of both countries, proximity of cultures and languages, Orthodoxy. Experts rather sceptically view the factor of political interests community, realising that the policies of Ukraine (European and Euro-Atlantic integration) and the Russian Federation (domination in the post-Soviet space) have different goals and thrusts.

**According to the majority of experts, Russia has clear economic and geopolitical interests in cooperation with Ukraine – transit of energy resources to the EU, taking Ukraine out of the Western influence, promotion of Russian goods on the Ukrainian market.** The Russian Federation is somewhat less interested in the use of Ukraine's human potential and natural resources, even less – in imports of Ukrainian products. Russia is least of all interested in democracy and market reforms in Ukraine. Hence, the Russian Federation is trying to keep Ukraine in its sphere of politico-economic influence, viewing it as an area of its "privileged interests".

**The Black Sea Fleet must leave the Crimea in 2017.** This opinion is shared by the majority (66.1%) of the polled experts, at the same time stressing strict observance of the relevant bilateral agreements. Every sixth expert supports a compromise formula – conversion of the Black Sea Fleet base in the Crimea into an international (antiterrorist) centre under the UN auspices by 2017. Only 1.8% of those polled took a radical stand, insisting on early withdrawal of the Fleet from Ukraine's territory.

### Ukraine-US cooperation

**Relations of Ukraine and the USA are mainly positive.** A relative majority (45.9%) of experts termed them "good", 39.4% – "unstable". However, the prevalence of positive assessments is small. The optimistic stand may rest on memories of steadfast support for Ukraine from the previous US leadership. And pessimists, evidently, keep in mind the decline of the new US Administration interest in the East European region.<sup>4</sup>

**The absolute majority (84.4%) of experts is sure that Ukraine's policy towards the USA should pursue deeper cooperation** Experts realise the importance of development of relations with the world leading nation. Ukraine is interested in US political, financial-economic, scientific-technological support, broader attraction of US investments and technologies.

### Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine

**According to the overwhelming majority (75.2%) of experts, accession to NATO meets Ukraine's national interests.** 43.1% of those polled fully agrees with that, another 32.1% tends to agree. Opinions of experts in international relations on this issue seriously contrast with the negative public attitude to Ukraine's accession to NATO. The differences are attributed, in particular, to the better, fuller and more professional expert knowledge of positive and

<sup>2</sup> For details see: European integration of Ukraine: expert assessments. – National Security and Defence, 2008, №6, p.31.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.33.

<sup>4</sup> On July 15, 2009, former leaders of East European countries turned to the US President Obama with an open letter, in which they expressed concern with the decrease in the US interest in the East European region. The authors of the letter stressed: "at times we have the impression that US policy was so successful that many American officials have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all – and that they could "check the box" and move on to other more pressing strategic issues... That view is premature". See: USA may lose support of East-Central Europe because of Russia – letter to Obama (in Ukrainian). – UNIAN, July 16, 2009.

negative sides of the Alliance membership. Meanwhile, the results of national polls show that citizens mainly term their awareness of NATO as low.<sup>5</sup>

**Ukraine should concentrate on deeper cooperation with NATO, avoiding forced efforts at accession and at the same time pursuing a PR campaign to that end.** Experts, generally supporting of the country's accession to NATO, are aware that accession to that organisation is not on the agenda of Ukraine-NATO relations due to the evident unreadiness of both sides.

### Main tasks and prospects of Ukraine's foreign policy

**Experts believe that Ukraine's new President should concentrate on protection of the country's economic interests on the world markets, formulation of the strategy and perfection of foreign policy mechanisms.** The emphasis on economisation, clarity and practical effectiveness of the foreign policy entirely correlate with preliminary expert assessments. Such approach is not unreasonable, given that the foreign policy conceals a huge potential of promoting economic growth of the country. On the other hand, foreign policy itself was often managed "manually", lacked strategic approaches to development of relations in the key foreign policy domains.

It should be noted that among the geographic domains of the foreign policy, experts prioritise the EU. It is followed by provision of national security and defence. In this context, experts see it expedient to begin the process of international search of concrete mechanisms backing security guarantees declared in the Budapest Memorandum.

Experts believe that the new President should make the first visits to Moscow, Brussels, Washington, Warsaw, Berlin, Beijing and so on.<sup>6</sup> Evidently, that list generally fits to the key geopolitical domains of the Ukrainian foreign policy – EU, the Russian Federation, the USA.

**According to experts, regions of the top priority for Ukraine's foreign policy include the EU, CIS (first of all, evidently, the Russian Federation), North America (the USA) and the Asian-Pacific region.** The main tasks of the national foreign policy include expansion

Expert discussion, March 4, 2010



of the geographic scope of political, trade and economic, scientific-technological contacts, promotion of products of national manufacturers on the most promising world markets, deepening cooperation with developed countries of the world for import of innovative technologies, attraction of investments.

**The tasks faced by the Foreign Ministry are generally the same as of the new President – promotion of interests of Ukrainian manufacturers on the world markets, identification of the key lines of the foreign policy, strengthening international security guarantees, protection of Ukrainian citizens abroad.** Noteworthy, experts also prioritised enhancement of the foreign policy effectiveness: effective coordination among bodies of power on the world scene, strengthening the information component of the foreign policy implementation, etc.

**Enhancement of the Foreign Ministry effectiveness in the first place requires: intense economisation of the foreign policy, adequate funding of the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy activity, greater effectiveness of embassy operation, strict coordination of executive bodies' activity in the foreign policy sector by the Foreign Ministry.** Those priorities, named by experts, are absolutely clear, given that provision of external conditions for economic growth in the country presents the main task of the foreign office, and attainment of that task requires proper funding and perfection of diplomatic institutions' activity.

**Activity of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry leadership had a positive effect** – this opinion dominates in the expert community. Assessing actions of the foreign office leadership from October 2009 till February 2010, most of all experts believe that Ukraine's relations to a smaller or greater extent improved with the EU, Russia, the USA. That is, in the key foreign policy domains, some progress was achieved. At the same time, it should be noted that quite many respondents could not give a definite answer, probably suggesting that it was too early to produce assessments.

**The activity of personally Petro Poroshenko as the Foreign Minister was assessed mainly positively.** This assessment was produced by the majority (53.2%) of experts, nearly a third (29.4%) reported a neutral assessment of the professional activity of the Foreign Minister, only 4.6% of those polled were dissatisfied with the minister's work. It may be assumed that assessing actions of the foreign office head, experts took into account, *inter alia*, progress in legal delimitation of Ukraine's borders, optimisation of the political-diplomatic dialogue with the Russian Federation, activity in the European domain, etc.

Comparative assessments of the activity of Ukraine's Foreign Ministers are cited mainly for illustration. So far, Poroshenko was praised higher than others. However, one should note two aspects here. *First*, assessment of the actions by those persons may not be free of the effect of the "acting minister", whose actions are broadly covered in the media. *Second*, nearly a quarter of those polled remained undecided as to the activity of the current Foreign Minister.

<sup>5</sup> For details see: public opinion survey, generalised in this journal's article "Ukraine's foreign policy in public eyes".

<sup>6</sup> As it is known, after the inauguration Viktor Yanukovich made his first official visit to Brussels.

**ASSESSMENTS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY, ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD. SECURITY ISSUES**


**To what extent did Ukraine's foreign policy under President Yushchenko ensure...?\***  
% of the polled experts

	Average mark	Assessment					Hard to say
		"1"	"2"	"3"	"4"	"5"	
Development of relations with the USA	3.42	0.9	14.7	28.4	42.2	6.4	7.4
Peace and stability in the region	3.36	3.7	16.5	27.5	35.8	11.0	5.5
Integration in the global economic space	3.33	0.9	16.5	34.9	34.9	7.3	5.5
Development of relations with the EU	3.26	0.9	11.9	50.5	28.4	5.5	2.8
Security, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the country	3.21	6.4	17.4	35.8	21.1	14.7	4.6
Integration in the global information and cultural space	2.93	5.5	22.9	43.1	20.2	3.7	4.6
Simplification of visa procedures for Ukrainian citizens, optimization of border controls	2.93	5.5	17.4	56.9	15.6	2.8	1.8
Development of mutually advantageous partner relations with neighbour countries	2.81	7.3	22.9	47.7	17.4	0.9	3.8
Reliable protection of Ukrainian citizens abroad	2.48	14.7	34.9	33.9	13.8	0.0	2.7
Favourable external conditions for the development of society, the state, national economy, enhancement of the country's competitiveness	2.38	13.8	42.2	33.9	7.3	0.9	1.9
A positive international image of the country, influence and respect in the world community	2.37	15.6	38.5	35.8	8.3	0.0	1.8
Development of relations with the Russian Federation	1.92	33.0	43.1	14.7	5.5	0.0	3.7

\* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" is the lowest mark, "5" – the highest.


February 2010

**What factors exert the greatest negative effect on Ukraine's foreign policy?\***  
% of the polled experts




\* Experts were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

**Does Ukraine have reliable external guarantees of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity now?\***  
% of the polled experts



February 2010

**To what extent do you agree with the following assessments of the present place of Ukraine in the world?\***  
% of the polled experts




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


UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION


Does accession to the EU meet Ukraine's national interests?  
% of the polled experts




How would you assess the pace of Ukraine's integration in the EU?  
% of the polled experts



Could European integration become a national idea which would unite all regions of Ukraine?  
% of the polled experts



Is the EU interested in cooperation with Ukraine? Where does that interest lie?\*




\* Experts were supposed to give no more than three acceptable answers.

\*\* Experts were supposed to give all acceptable answers.




**UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS: STATE, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**


**How would you assess Ukraine's current relations with Russia?**  
% of the polled experts



**What decision regarding the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in the Crimea is the most optimal?**  
% of the polled experts




**How would you assess Russia's policy towards Ukraine and vice versa?**  
% of the polled experts




\* In questionnaires of May 2006 and April 2009 such option was not proposed

**Is Russia interested in cooperation with Ukraine? Where does that interest lie?\***  
% of the polled experts



\* Experts were supposed to give all acceptable answers.


**What can drive rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia most of all?\***  
% of the polled experts




\* Experts were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

**STRENGTHENING COOPERATION WITH THE USA**

**How would you describe the current relations of Ukraine and the USA?**  
% of the polled experts




**What should Ukraine's policy be like towards USA**  
% of the polled experts




**UKRAINE'S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION**

**Does accession to NATO meet Ukraine's national interests?**  
% of those polled experts




**How should Ukraine act with respect to NATO?**  
% of those polled experts






## MAIN TASKS AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY

**On what foreign policy lines should the new President concentrate in the first instance?\***  
% of those polled experts




\* Experts were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

**To what capitals of the world should the new President of Ukraine pay official visits in the first place?\***  
% of those polled experts



\* The question was posed as open.

**Should the new President of Ukraine put forward an initiative of holding a top-level International Conference involving states – parties to the Memorandum on security guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty (Budapest, 1994) – the Russian Federation, the USA, Great Britain, China, France – to specify concrete, legally binding mechanisms guaranteeing Ukraine's security declared in the Memorandum?\***  
% of those polled experts



**What regions of the world should be prioritised in Ukraine's foreign policy?\***  
% of those polled experts

	Average mark	Assessment					
		"1"	"2"	"3"	"4"	"5"	
EU countries	4.74	0.9	0.9	1.8	15.6	79.8	1.0
CIS countries	4.51	0.0	0.9	6.4	32.1	57.8	2.8
North America	3.99	2.8	4.6	16.5	39.4	33.0	3.7
Asia and Pacific	3.70	2.8	6.4	26.6	39.4	19.3	5.5
Middle East	3.27	0.0	14.7	43.1	30.3	4.6	7.3
South America	3.22	1.8	17.4	39.4	21.1	10.1	10.2
North Africa	3.09	3.7	14.7	45.0	22.9	3.7	10.0
Other African states	2.46	8.3	16.5	15.6	2.8	2.8	54.0
Australia	2.26	13.8	39.4	28.4	3.7	0.0	14.7

\* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" is the lowest mark, "5" – the highest.

**What are the most important tasks now faced by Ukraine's foreign ministry?**  
 % of those polled experts



	Very important	Rather important	Unimportant	Hard to say
Promotion of the interests of Ukrainian manufacturers on the world markets, encouragement of investments, attraction of capitals and innovative technologies	80.7	16.5	0.9	1.9
Identification of the key domains of the foreign policy, development of a clear strategy of action in those domains	77.1	19.3	1.8	1.8
Strengthening international guarantees of Ukraine's security, sovereignty and territorial integrity	75.2	22.0	2.8	0.0
Effective protection of Ukrainian citizens' rights abroad	75.2	22.0	0.0	2.8
Simplification of visa procedures with the EU countries	67.0	30.3	0.9	1.8
Effective coordination of executive bodies active in the field of foreign policy	62.4	31.2	0.9	5.5
Enhancement of Ukraine's international authority in the world	60.6	31.2	3.7	4.5
Enhancement of the information component of the foreign policy course implementation	53.2	33.9	7.3	5.6
Simplification of border and customs control on frontiers with the neighbour countries	36.7	56.0	0.9	6.4
Promotion of "popular diplomacy", encouragement of wider international contacts between public organisations, direct human contacts	33.0	52.3	10.1	4.6
Perfection of regional cooperation mechanisms	29.4	52.3	8.3	10.0
Settlement of regional conflicts, guarantee of security and stability of the European continent	27.5	55.0	11.0	6.5
Optimisation of the legal framework of bilateral and multilateral relations	25.7	56.9	8.3	9.1
Enhancement of effectiveness of Ukraine's participation in the activity of international organisations	22.0	67.0	6.4	4.6

February 2010

**What should be done, in the first place, to enhance the effectiveness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine?**  
 % of those polled experts

	Very important	Rather important	Unimportant	Hard to say
Intensification of efforts for promotion of the national economic interests on the world scene (economisation of the foreign policy)	70.6	20.2	1.8	7.4
Provision of proper funding for the Foreign Ministry and foreign political activity in general	69.7	22.0	0.9	7.4
Enhancement of the effectiveness of Ukrainian diplomatic, trade and economic missions abroad	61.5	32.1	0.0	6.4
Strict coordination of executive bodies active in the field of foreign relations by the Foreign Ministry	56.0	33.9	3.7	6.4
Professional development of the diplomatic corps	48.6	39.4	1.8	10.2
Rise of salaries for Foreign Ministry officers	38.5	37.6	6.4	17.5
Strengthening discipline of officers of the central staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions abroad	33.0	41.3	9.2	16.5
Optimisation (structural and staff rearrangement) of the activity of Ukrainian missions at international organisations	29.4	47.7	8.3	14.6
Provision of transparency, publicity in the Foreign Ministry activity	26.6	53.2	11.0	9.2
Provision of transparency, publicity in appointments within the Foreign Ministry	26.6	49.5	15.6	8.3
Intensification of cooperation with public organisations	22.9	52.3	13.8	11.0
Renovation of personnel	17.4	56.9	11.0	14.7

February 2010

**Did the new Foreign Ministry leadership manage to improve the situation in the following foreign policy domains?**  
 % of those polled experts

**How do you assess the activity of Petro Poroshenko on the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine?**  
 % of those polled experts

**How would you assess the activity of Ukrainian Foreign Ministers, starting from 1990?\***  
 % of those polled experts

	Average mark	Assessment					Hard to say
		"1"	"2"	"3"	"4"	"5"	
Poroshenko	3.91	1.8	4.6	10.1	40.4	18.3	24.8
Zlenko	3.78	0.9	5.5	21.1	35.8	17.4	19.3
Udoenko	3.56	1.8	8.3	29.4	33.0	13.8	13.8
Hryshchenko	3.49	1.8	7.3	32.1	36.7	8.3	13.8
Tarasiuk	3.24	8.3	11.9	31.2	23.9	12.8	11.9
Yatseniuk	3.10	4.6	18.3	35.8	19.3	8.3	13.8
Ohryzko	3.05	8.3	16.5	34.9	21.1	8.3	11.0

\* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" is the lowest mark, "5" – the highest.

February 2010

## UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PUBLIC EYES

Razumkov Centre's long-term foreign policy studies include monitoring of the public opinion performed since 2000. Poll data illustrate the dynamic of geopolitical preferences of citizens, their assessments of the authorities' effectiveness in the main foreign policy domains.

The latest poll was held during the presidential election campaign. During the poll respondents noted the main lines of the national foreign policy, assessed the quality of the authorities' activity on the world scene, the factors influencing the pursuance of the foreign policy course, the state of affairs and prospects of relations with Ukraine's main partners – the EU, the Russian Federation, the USA, NATO. Citizens also expressed their opinions concerning improvement of the country's foreign policy.

Evidently, foreign political activity requires reformation to enhance its effectiveness, transparency, clarity for the public. Dialogue with foreign partners needs pragmatism and economisation. This is a priority task for the new Ukrainian authorities.

But there is another evident thing, too – effective pursuance of the foreign policy course is impossible without due regard to the public opinion, wide and steadfast public support for the new President on the world scene.

Summary survey results allow us to produce some observations and conclusions.<sup>1</sup>

### Geopolitical orientations of Ukraine's citizens

**Two foreign policy lines: Russia and the EU.** Analysis of the dynamic of assessments over the past 10 years allow us to say that Ukrainian society strongly tends to prioritise foreign policy cooperation in two main lines: with Russia, and the EU countries.

The level of support for contacts with the EU countries saw serious fluctuations. Periods of election campaigns saw a decrease in the number of adherents of the European integration, which may be attributed to the boom of anti-Western rhetoric, large-scale speculations on pro-Russian spirits in the eastern regions of the country. The latest poll recorded the all-time lowest support for contacts with the EU countries (23.8%) and the highest – with the Russian Federation (52.5%).

The priority of the Russian direction may largely be attributed to the current critical state of the relations between Kyiv and Moscow, and citizens are aware of the importance of their improvement. Meanwhile, the trend towards a decrease in the number of European sympathies in Ukrainian society may be explained, in particular, by the lack of practical effects of the course of rapprochement with the EU, which in fact discredited the very idea of movement to Europe.

**Regional specificity.** In the country's West, sympathies for cooperation with the EU steadily prevail, while in the East and South, spirits in favour of development of relations with Russia clearly dominate. In the recent years, that trend became rooted. In November, 2009, the ratio of European sympathisers and adherents of priority contacts with the Russian Federation in the country's West made approximately 4:1, in the South and the East, on the contrary – approximately 1:5 and 1:7, respectively.

The Centre produced kind of parity in geopolitical orientations of citizens: roughly equal shares of respondents stood for cooperation with the Russian Federation and contacts with the EU (except 2005 that brought a tide of European sympathies). But from December, 2008, adherents of promoting contacts with Russia are in a clear lead.

Regional polarisation of foreign policy preferences of citizens is largely conditioned by civilisational, ethnic, confessional specificity of regions. It was aggravated by controversial multidirectional foreign policy under the presidency of Kuchma, and sharply worsened during presidential elections in 2004. Inertia of inter-regional confrontation persisted (increased during Yushchenko's office). Inter-regional differences were also speculated on by political forces during presidential (2006, 2007) and presidential (2009-2010) campaigns. Results of the recent elections of the head of state proved the existence of a "watershed" between Ukraine's regions.

**Demographic specificity.** In the most socially active age group – youth (18-29 years) – adherents of contacts with the EU remained in a majority till April, 2008 (at that, compared to May, 2006, their number seriously increased, and in February, 2008, reached all-time high – 47.1%). However, the latest surveys (December 2008 – November 2009) showed some advantage of respondents standing for priority contacts with the Russian Federation.

Similar dynamic of assessments is observed in the middle age-groups of respondents (30-39 years, 40-49 years). In the other groups (50-59 years, 60 years and older), cooperation with the Russian Federation steadily dominates. In those groups the number of adherents of contacts with Russia in November, 2009, reached its maximum.

### Assessments of Ukraine's foreign policy, its place in the world. Security problems

**The poll results show that people rather critically assess the effects and effectiveness of the country's foreign policy, its independence and authority, correspondence to national interests.** Summing up survey results, the following may be said.

<sup>1</sup> Building on the results of polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service from February, 2000, till November, 2009. The latest poll was held on October 26 – November 1, 2009, in all regions Ukraine. 2,010 respondents aged above 18 years were polled. The sample's theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.

All polls whose results are cited in this material were conducted in all regions of Ukraine, the city of Kyiv and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under a multi-stage sample with quota selection of respondents at the final stage, representative of the adult population of Ukraine in terms of the key social and democratic indicators (area of residence, settlement type and size, age, sex). The theoretical error of each sample does not exceed 2.3%.

The regional division is as follows: the **West**: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions, the **South**: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolayiv regions, the **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Kharkiv regions, the **Centre**: city of Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions.

*First.* Over the surveyed period (November 2004 – November 2009), respondents rather critically (except April, 2005) assessed the quality of Ukraine's foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> The current policy of the country on the world scene is especially critically assessed by respondents in the South.

*Second.* Society tends to believe that Ukraine's foreign policy does not meet its national interests. Say, while in 2002-2004, respondents who shared that opinion made 36-38%, in 2009, more than half (58.3%) of citizens stuck to that. The most critical attitude is observed in the country's South. At the same time, residents of different regions evidently have different ideas of the national interests.

*Third.* Traditionally, respondents rather sceptically assess Ukraine's independence in formulation of its foreign policy. The overwhelming majority (79.4%) of respondents considers Ukraine to be not quite independent or even totally dependent in its foreign policy.

*Fourth.* People suggest that the national foreign policy is most of all affected by domestic factors – the difficult socio-economic situation, differences in the foreign policy stand of the leading political forces, home political instability, controversial positions of the Ukrainian leadership. External factors of negative influence include mistrust of foreign partners in the current state leadership. Such mistrust is evidently conditioned by conflicts in the Ukrainian leadership, its inability to stabilise the situation in the country.

**Assessing Ukraine's place in the world, the majority of citizens tends to term the country as an uninfluential European state looking for its place in the world.** Noteworthy, such "transitional" definition of Ukraine tops the list for 10 years in a row. Ukraine's second most popular description – "a country staying under the Western influence". Russian influence was noted by much fewer respondents. Only 10.9% of those polled described Ukraine as a more or less influential European state.

**The majority (60.4%) of respondents is sure that today, Ukraine has no reliable external guarantees of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.** Among factors that make the country feel secure, respondents in the first place mentioned good-neighbourly partner relations with countries of the world. A peaceful and effective foreign policy went second, and a mighty, well-equipped army – third. Far less important security factors, in people's eyes, were a neutral status, guarantees of the world leading countries, membership in military blocs. However, the ratings of those factors in the West and South somewhat differ.

### European integration of Ukraine

**Citizens generally critically assess the state of relations with the EU and the pace of the European integration.** In 2005-2009, the share of optimistically-minded respondents fell almost three-fold (from 35.3% to 12.9%). Meanwhile, the number of those who term Ukraine's relations with the EU unstable or bad increased. No wonder, respondents similarly critically assess the pace of Ukraine's European integration – mainly as "low" or "none".

**Respondents suggest that the EU interest in cooperation with Ukraine is pragmatic.** The rating of the main factors of the EU interest in cooperation with Ukraine little changed over the

examined period. People think that the EU interests focus on: Ukraine's natural resources; the Ukrainian market for the EU goods; transit of energy resources; use of the intellectual and scientific potential, manpower. Analysis of the dynamic of assessments over the period of 2005-2009 reveals the following. *First*, citizens with traditional restraint assess the EU interest in joint fight with illegal migration, terrorism, strengthening security on the European continent. They also consider rather low the EU interest in promotion of democracy and market reforms in Ukraine. *Second*, doubts remain about the EU interest in imports of Ukrainian goods (in November, 2009, such interest was reported by 11.1%). *Third*, the number of people convinced that the EU is not interested in cooperation with Ukraine has increased recently.

**Ukraine's integration in the EU is mainly hindered by domestic problems.** In the recent years, the rating of factors that slow down Ukraine's movement to the EU did not change seriously. It is topped by the low level of economic development and slow pace of reforms, a high rate of corruption in Ukraine was second, the level of democracy inconsistent with the European – third. Citizens assessed the negative influence of the "Russian factor" with the greatest restraint.

**The idea of accession to the EU generally finds support among Ukraine's citizens.** The recent years witnessed a few periods of a decrease in public support for Ukraine's accession to the EU – in November 2004, September 2005 and November 2009 (respectively: the 2004 presidential election campaign, the split in the team of European integrators and resignation of Tymoshenko's Government, the presidential campaign of 2009-2010).

Accession to the EU is more welcome in the West, where this idea is steadily supported by the majority of respondents, and in the Centre.

In the South and East, the dynamic is mixed: till November, 2004, adherents of accession to the EU prevailed in both regions, but with time, the ratio of European sympathisers and opponents of accession to the EU changed to the benefit of opponents.

Ukraine's membership in the EU is supported by socially the most active population, especially respondents in the youngest (18-29 years) and medium (30-39, 40-49 years) age groups.

**People's attitude to integration as an idea that could unite Ukraine is mixed.** Generally, respondent assessments show negative dynamics. While in April, 2005, opinions on that issue split almost equally (36% of those polled agreed that the European integration could unite the country, 39.2% disagreed), later, pessimists steadily prevailed.

**The majority of citizens does not feel like Europeans, is unaware of their community with the European culture and history.** In the recent years, the picture of people's self-assessments actually has not changed – nearly a third (31.4% – in November, 2009) of those polled to a smaller or lesser extent identify themselves as Europeans; more than half (63.4%) deny their affiliation with the European community. Apparently, this is prompted by the awareness of the huge socio-economic distance between Ukraine and the EU countries, a gap in living standards.

<sup>2</sup> The survey held in April, 2005, recorded a generally positive attitude of citizens to then foreign policy of the country. This was explained by the high level of trust in the new authorities, rise of positive expectations from the new foreign policy course, a strong interest in the world to Ukraine in general. With time, that euphoria fizzled out.

In the West, people more tend to identify themselves with Europeans than in other regions, where a “non-European” self-identification traditionally dominates. In terms of age, perceived as more European are respondents in the youngest (18-29 years) age group.

**Citizens suggest that by the key features, Ukraine is not a European country yet.** The majority of those polled suggests that Ukraine is not a European state in cultural, political, economic and social terms. The majority of citizens traditionally mentions Ukraine's “Europeanism” only in geographic and historic terms.

**Ukrainian citizens see benefits of Ukraine's accession to the EU both for themselves and for the whole country.** However, despite the invariance of the general Ukrainian trends, there are noticeable regional and age differences. In the West and Centre, people mainly positively assess possible effects of accession both on the personal and national level (especially in the West). In the South and East, sceptical spirits dominate.

Benefits from accession to the EU, for themselves and for the country, are more evident for Ukraine's youth (18-29 years).

**Ukrainian society shows great interest in the EU.** Over the past five years, the majority of citizens expressed a desire to learn more about the European Union. In particular, in November, 2009, this was reported by 59.9% of those polled.

**Citizens rather cautiously assess the prospects of relations with the EU in the forthcoming years.** The greatest share of those polled believes that those relations will remain the same, improvement is expected by nearly a third (30.7%) of respondents. Respondents in the Western regions view the prospects of relations with the EU more optimistically.

### Ukraine-Russian relations: the state, problems and prospects

**Ukraine's citizens rather critically assess the state of the Ukraine-Russian relations.** Respondents steadily term them as “unstable” or “bad”. In November, the aggregate of such assessments made 89.9%, and the share of those who described those relations as “bad” reached record high 39%. Critical assessments dominate in all regions, contacts of Kyiv and Moscow are described especially negatively by respondents in the South.

**Citizens call Ukraine's attitude to the Russian Federation and Russia's to Ukraine mainly negative.** The dynamic of comparative features of Ukraine's policy towards Russia and, respectively, the Russian policy towards Ukraine reveals rooted problems in bilateral relations. The majority of respondents, assessing the policy of Kyiv and Moscow, chose the terms “uncertain, controversial”, “clearly unfriendly”. Respondents in the Western regions are more critical about the Russian policy towards Ukraine, in the South and East – about the Ukrainian policy towards Russia.

**The Russian interest in Ukraine is assessed rather pragmatically.** People suggest that Russia is primarily interested in transit of Russian energy resources, the Ukrainian market for its goods, taking Ukraine out of the Western influence, use of Ukraine's intellectual, scientific potential. Far less interesting are imports of Ukrainian goods, promotion of democracy and reforms in Ukraine.

**Among the main factors of rapprochement of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, citizens mentioned community of economic interests, family ties between citizens of the two countries and**

**a common historic past.** Noteworthy, in November, 2009, the share of those who prioritised the economic factor seriously increased. Far less importance is paid to humanitarian factors – proximity of cultures, languages, and the factor of religion. In the South, they prioritise family ties and a common historic past, in the West – community of economic interests and a common border.

**Ukrainian society generally demonstrates a positive attitude to the Russian leadership.** Medvedev enjoys sympathy of 50.4% of Ukrainians, Putin – of 58.7%. In the regions, perceptions of those persons fundamentally differ: in the West, they are treated mainly negatively, in the East and South – positively.

**The majority of citizens is sure that the situation in bilateral relations should be changed for the better.** Over the period under review, the share of respondents convinced in the need of deepening contacts with the Russian Federation exceeded 60%, and in November, 2009, reached its maximum – 77.9%. In terms of region and age, no fundamental differences are observed. Development of relations with the Russian Federation enjoys greater support in the East and South, among age groups – among elder respondents.

**Citizens mainly optimistically assess the prospects of the Ukraine-Russian relations,** as witnessed by the latest poll results. However, one should keep in mind that during previous polls, respondents produced rather restrained and controversial opinions.

### Assessments of Ukraine-US relations

**Citizens produced mixed assessments of the quality of Ukraine-US relations.** A relative majority (43.8%) of those polled called them unstable, a third (34.4%) – good. Noteworthy, compared to December, 2005, in November, 2009, the number of sceptically minded respondents notably increased.

**Society tends to believe that Obama's coming to power generally had a positive effect on the US policy in the world.** This opinion is shared by 41.9% of citizens, no effect at all was reported by 34.2%. Only a small share (7%) of those polled disapproved the current US leader. Such picture of assessments is observed in all regions of Ukraine (the greatest sympathisers of the US President live in the country's South).

**So far, society has no unity as to what policy Ukraine should pursue in relations with the US.** Respondent opinions on this issue split almost equally – deeper cooperation is supported by 35.3% of those polled, maintenance of the present level of relations – 38.2%. There are notable regional and age differences. The majority of respondents in the Western regions supports deeper contacts with the USA. In the Centre and South, the shares of adherents of development relations and those standing for conservation of the current level of cooperation are roughly equal, in the East, a reserved approach to further cooperation with the USA prevails. Supporters of deeper relations with the USA dominate only in the youngest age group.

### Attitude to NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration

**NATO's perception by Ukrainians is mainly critical.** In June, 2002, citizens viewed the Alliance mainly positively – 42.5% of respondents saw it either as a defence union or a peacekeeping organisation, more than a third (34.8%) – as an aggressive military bloc. With time, those assessments changed to the benefit of those who treat NATO as an aggressor.

There are notable regional and age differences. In the country's West, the majority of respondents reports a positive attitude to the Alliance, viewing it as a defence union or a peacekeeping organisation, in the other regions, the majority of citizens views NATO as an aggressive military bloc. In the youngest (18-29 years) group, almost equal shares of respondents describe the Alliance positively and critically. In the other groups, negative assessments dominate.

**The majority (70.8%) of citizens believes that accession to NATO does not meet Ukraine's national interests**, every fifth sticks to the opposite opinion. Only in the West of the country, that issue divided respondents almost equally, in the other regions, a negative opinion prevails.

**Traditionally, the idea of accession to NATO does not enjoy broad support in society.** The majority of respondents to a smaller or greater degree disapproved the country's accession to the Alliance. Approval was reported, on the average, by a bit less than one in five respondents, "mixed approval and disapproval" – by one in nine.

**People's awareness about NATO (self-assessed) is low.** A relative majority of respondents described their awareness about NATO as low or reported that they had no information about the Alliance whatsoever. Meanwhile, the number of those who describe their knowledge of NATO as medium slowly goes up.

Noteworthy, the shares of those who want to learn more about NATO and those who do not care are equal – 46% and 46.7%, respectively. The greatest interest to NATO is traditionally observed in the country's West. The Alliance is more interesting for the youngest respondents and those with higher or uncompleted higher education.

**The level of direct support for joining NATO is low.** According to the latest poll, at a hypothetical referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO, less than one-fifth (18.1%) of citizens would vote "for" it, more than half (61.1%) – "against". Over the examined period, the rate of support was the highest (32%) in June, 2002, the lowest (15.1%) – in November, 2004. In the subsequent years, it never exceeded 22.3% (August 2008).

Adherents of accession to NATO prevail only in the country's West (38.1%, against 28.2% of opponents). In the other regions, the majority of citizens stands against accession. The majority of respondents in all age groups opposes Ukraine's accession to NATO.

The weak support for Ukraine's movement to the Alliance is conditioned by many factors: regional differences, low awareness about the Alliance, election-related speculations on the NATO subject and organisation of mass anti-NATO campaigns, a split of the state and political elite on this issue, burden of the old post-Soviet stereotypes, etc.

### Prospects of foreign policy, ways of enhancement of its effectiveness

**The absolute majority (80.8%) of citizens is sure that Ukraine's current foreign policy course should be changed.** This opinion correlates with the above-cited critical assessments of the authorities' actions on the world scene that, according to respondents, are inconsistent and inconsiderate, unclear for citizens and partner countries. In all regions, the majority of respondents sees it necessary to change the national foreign

policy course. However, in different regions those changes are apparently seen differently.

**People suggest that the new President should concentrate on: deepening relations with the Russian Federation; formulation of the foreign political strategy, perfection of foreign political activity mechanisms; promotion of Ukraine's economic interests abroad; improvement of relations with neighbour countries.** Regional differences regarding some lines of activity are substantial. In the West, respondents prioritise deeper relations with the EU and creation of a positive image of the country in the world, while relations with the Russian Federation almost close the list of the priorities. In the East and South, on the contrary, the Russian issue tops the list, while deeper contacts with the EU are not even in the top five. For respondents of the youngest age group, relations with the Russian Federation, formulation of the foreign political strategy and Ukraine's economic interests are of equal importance. With the growth of the respondent age, the importance of contacts with the Russian Federation goes up. For respondents with higher education, contacts with the EU, with the Russian Federation and the other above-mentioned domains are equally important. With the educational level going down, the priority of the Russian policy goes up.

**The majority of respondents believes that the President, the Government and Parliament should exert greater influence on the development and passage of foreign policy decisions.** The influence of public organisations, mass media, business and regional leaders in this respect is assessed controversially.

**According to citizens, enhancement of the Foreign Ministry effectiveness in the first place requires: more active promotion of economic interests, professional development of the diplomatic corps and higher effectiveness of diplomatic and trade missions.** Among other important lines, citizens mentioned guarantee of the coordinating role of the Foreign Ministry, transparency and publicity in its activity, and higher discipline of its officers.

**According to citizens, today's most important tasks of the Foreign Ministry include: growth of Ukraine's international authority, promotion of the Ukrainian business interests, development of relations with countries of the world, provision of reliable guarantees of the country's sovereignty.** Other tasks of the foreign office rated as follows: protection of rights of labour migrants in the Russian Federation and the EU, Ukraine's more active participation in international organisations, settlement of regional conflicts on the European continent. "Popular diplomacy" closed the list of important tasks of the Foreign Ministry.

**Assessment of the Foreign Ministry's new leadership was largely an advance.**<sup>3</sup> A relative majority (43%) of respondents reported a neutral attitude to the appointment of the new Foreign Minister. Evidently, the reason is that Petro Poroshenko just began his activity on that post during the poll. Among regions, the Centre gave the only distinction in assessments, producing the highest positive mark – 25.9%, and the lowest negative – 16.6%. In the other regions, the new minister's appointment was viewed similarly: neutral assessments prevailed. Controversial and rather uncertain are people's assessments of the new minister's ability to raise the effectiveness of the Foreign Ministry and improve the situation in the main foreign policy domains. Evidently, people's opinions will depend on concrete results of the work of the Foreign Ministry's new leadership.


<sup>3</sup> Poroshenko was appointed on October 9, 2009. The national poll was started on October 26, 2009.






What direction of foreign policy is a priority for Ukraine?

% of the polled



**What direction of foreign policy is a priority for Ukraine?**  
% of the polled, by age





ASSESSMENTS OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY, ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD. SECURITY ISSUES

How would you describe the present foreign policy of Ukraine?  
% of those polled

		UKRAINE				
		November 2004	April 2005	November 2006	April 2007	November 2009
Balanced along the main strategic lines – the USA, Russia, the EU	Yes	18.4	40.3	22.2	17.8	13.2
	No	44.4	30.0	46.4	57.5	68.1
	Hard to say	37.2	29.7	31.4	24.7	18.7
Transparent, public	Yes	15.8	47.4	23.3	15.3	12.2
	No	60.6	31.2	56.7	66.9	78.2
	Hard to say	23.6	21.4	20.0	17.8	9.5
Clear for society	Yes	14.7	42.0	19.4	13.6	12.1
	Hi	62.8	34.4	57.3	68.1	77.0
	Hard to say	22.5	23.6	23.3	18.3	10.9
Clear for partner countries	Yes	16.9	43.1	17.8	13.2	11.1
	No	42.5	20.1	46.7	56.2	67.7
	Hard to say	40.6	36.8	35.5	30.6	21.2
Consistent, considerate	Yes	21.1	49.2	24.8	16.1	10.0
	No	52.3	28.3	56.5	65.8	79.7
	Hard to say	26.6	22.5	18.7	18.1	10.3
Economically effective	Yes	15.0	36.2	17.9	13.3	6.1
	No	60.6	30.4	57.5	64.1	85.3
	Hard to say	24.4	33.4	24.6	22.6	8.6
Strong, respected on the world scene	Yes	6.8	35.7	12.2	9.1	5.9
	No	72.3	33.7	65.5	73.4	85.3
	Hard to say	20.9	30.6	22.3	17.5	8.8


		REGIONS (November 2009)			
		West	Centre	South	East
Balanced along the main strategic lines – the USA, Russia, the EU	Yes	16.2	15.5	8.6	11.5
	No	57.3	71.2	76.6	67.6
	Hard to say	26.5	13.3	14.8	20.9
Transparent, public	Yes	14.6	14.7	7.3	10.7
	No	68.1	79.3	85.4	79.7
	Hard to say	17.3	6.0	7.3	9.6
Clear for society	Yes	10.4	16.6	7.6	10.6
	No	71.8	74.8	82.1	79.8
	Hard to say	17.8	8.6	10.3	9.6
Clear for partner countries	Yes	9.1	10.9	7.6	14.2
	No	61.1	71.2	73.6	65.3
	Hard to say	29.8	17.9	18.8	20.5
Consistent, considerate	Yes	12.3	12.9	6.6	7.2
	No	68.1	79.1	90.1	82.2
	Hard to say	19.6	8.0	3.3	10.6
Economically effective	Yes	4.2	8.4	7.9	3.9
	No	79.3	85.6	88.4	87.2
	Hard to say	16.5	6.0	3.7	8.9
Strong, respected on the world scene	Yes	6.0	7.1	5.9	4.7
	No	79.8	86.0	88.4	85.8
	Hard to say	14.2	6.9	5.7	9.5

To what degree does the foreign policy of the Ukrainian leadership ensure...?  
average mark\*


	April 2005	November 2006	April 2007	March 2008	November 2009
Strengthening cooperation with the USA**	-	-	-	-	3.00
Security, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the country	3.62	3.37	2.86	3.05	2.97
Peace and stability in the region	3.61	3.46	2.86	3.11	2.93
Ukraine's integration in the world information and cultural space	3.47	3.00	2.69	2.97	2.75
Development of relations with the EU**	-	-	-	-	2.74
Development of mutually advantageous partner relations with neighbour countries	3.46	3.09	2.72	2.87	2.44
Simplification of the visa and border control procedures	3.41	2.88	2.37	2.70	2.36
Deepening of cooperation with Russia**	-	-	-	-	2.19
Positive international image of the country, its influence and esteem in the international community	3.67	2.80	2.48	2.68	2.16
Favourable conditions for the development of society, the state and the economy, high competitiveness of the country	3.26	2.77	2.46	2.52	2.02
Reliable protection of its citizens abroad	2.87	2.56	2.17	2.45	1.97
Implementation of the course of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration***	3.56	2.74	2.53	-	-

\* On a 5-point scale where "1" means extremely bad, "5" – very good.  
\*\* In 2005-2008 questionnaires such option was not proposed  
\*\*\* In 2008-2009 questionnaires such option was not proposed


Does Ukraine's current foreign policy correspond to its national interests?  
% of the polled



**Does Ukraine formulate its foreign policy independently?**  
% of the polled



**What are the factors that have the greatest negative influence on Ukraine's foreign policy?\***  
% of the polled




\* The respondents were asked to mark no more than three choices.

**Do you agree with the following statements about Ukraine's place in the world?**  
% of the polled


	Fully agree				Partially agree				Partially disagree				Fully disagree				Hard to say			
	2000	2004	2005	2009	2000	2004	2005	2009	2000	2004	2005	2009	2000	2004	2005	2009	2000	2004	2005	2009
European state that does not have very much influence and is still looking for a place in the world	20.5	28.4	23.6	<b>24.6</b>	53.5	41.5	41.8	<b>50.5</b>	12.5	11.8	14.4	<b>12.5</b>	3.4	8.2	7.7	<b>7.5</b>	10.1	10.1	12.5	<b>4.9</b>
Third-world country that does not have a clear foreign policy or influence	13.8	13.8	11.9	<b>18.1</b>	23.0	21.4	21.2	<b>31.4</b>	26.7	23.5	21.8	<b>22.1</b>	13.5	19.5	15.5	<b>13.7</b>	23.0	21.8	29.6	<b>14.7</b>
Country in the Western area of influence	16.9	8.1	16.6	<b>11.3</b>	43.9	25.7	34.8	<b>39.5</b>	20.4	32.5	19.2	<b>28.5</b>	5.6	15.6	9.7	<b>9.0</b>	13.2	18.1	19.7	<b>11.7</b>
Buffer state between Europe and Asia	5.8	12.1	9.6	<b>9.5</b>	26.0	23.6	26.6	<b>33.0</b>	30.1	32.3	19.9	<b>24.9</b>	7.6	11.9	11.7	<b>11.5</b>	30.5	30.1	32.2	<b>21.1</b>
Bridge state connecting Europe and Asia	5.6	11.5	10.4	<b>8.4</b>	26.0	23.6	26.8	<b>32.4</b>	30.1	22.3	18.1	<b>27.0</b>	7.6	11.6	13.0	<b>13.3</b>	30.8	29.2	31.7	<b>18.9</b>
Country in the Russian area of influence	7.3	12.5	5.0	<b>7.1</b>	31.1	29.7	19.0	<b>26.0</b>	33.9	29.7	31.1	<b>36.8</b>	14.4	14.1	24.7	<b>21.6</b>	13.3	14.0	20.2	<b>8.5</b>
Influential European state	2.5	5.2	5.4	<b>2.6</b>	9.0	9.3	11.5	<b>8.3</b>	39.8	34.7	32.8	<b>34.6</b>	38.4	42.0	37.9	<b>51.0</b>	10.3	8.8	12.4	<b>3.5</b>



**Do you believe that Ukraine now has reliable external guarantees of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity?**  
% of those polled




**What will best of all guarantee the country's security?\***  
% those polled




\* Respondents were asked no more than two answers.

**UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

**How would you describe the current relations of Ukraine and the EU?**  
% of those polled



**Is the EU interested in cooperation with Ukraine? What are the main factors of the EU interest in Ukraine?\***  
% of those polled




\* Respondents were asked to give all possible answers.

**What are the factors hampering the integration of Ukraine in the EU?\***  
% of those polled



\* Respondents were asked to give not more than three answers.

**How would you assess the pace of Ukraine's integration in the EU?**  
% of those polled






Should Ukraine join the EU?  
% of those polled

— Yes — No — Hard to say

UKRAINE



West



Centre




South



East




**Should Ukraine join the EU?**  
% of those polled, by age









**Can the EU become a national idea, uniting all regions of Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



**Is Ukraine a European country?**  
% of those polled





**Do you feel like a European, do you have a feeling of belonging to the culture and history of the European society?**  
% of those polled







**Would you personally win or lose if Ukraine joins the EU?**  
% of those polled




**By and large, would Ukraine win if it joins the EU?**  
% of those polled






Would you like to receive more information about the EU?  
% of those polled



November 2009


How would you assess the prospects of the Ukraine-EU relations development in the forthcoming years?  
% of those polled




November 2009

## UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS: STATE, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

How would you describe the current relations of Ukraine and Russia?  
% of those polled




How do you assess the policy of Ukraine towards Russia and of Russia towards Ukraine, of those polled






**What can contribute to the rapprochement of Ukraine and Russia the most?\***  
% of the polled




**Is Russia interested in cooperation with Ukraine?**  
**What guides this interest?\***  
 % of the polled



\* Respondents were asked to mark no more than three options.


**Your attitude to Dmitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin,**  
 % of those polled






What should Ukraine's policy towards Russia be?


% of the polled



**What should Ukraine's policy towards Russia be?**  
% of the polled, by age




**Assessment of relationships development prospects between Ukraine and Russia in the nearest future,**  
% of the polled






**ASSESSMENT OF US-UKRAINE RELATIONS**


**How would you describe the current relations of Ukraine and the USA?**  
% of those polled




**What should Ukraine's policy be like towards the USA?**  
% of those polled




**AGE**




**How would you assess the prospects of the Ukraine-US relations development in the forthcoming years?**  
% of those polled



**How do you think Obama's coming to power influences the US policy in the world?**  
% of those polled




**Your attitude to Barack Obama – President of the USA,**  
% of those polled




ATTITUDE TO NATO AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION


What is NATO in the first place?  
% of those polled




West




Centre




South



East




AGE




November 2009


What is your attitude to the Ukraine's accession to NATO?  
% of those polled



Does accession to NATO meet Ukraine's national interests?  
% of those polled




Centre




November 2009

**How would you assess your awareness on NATO?**  
% of those polled



**Would you like to receive more information about NATO?**  
% of those polled





If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next week, how would you vote?  
% of those polled

For accession to NATO



Against accession to NATO




Would not vote



Hard to say









**If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next week, how would you vote?**  
% of those polled






**If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next week, how would you vote?**  
% of those polled




**PROSPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY, WAYS TO INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS**

**Do you believe that the present foreign policy course of Ukraine should remain unchanged, or should be changed?**  
% of those polled




**How strong should decision-making in the foreign policy sector be influenced by?**  
% of those polled

November 2009






On what foreign policy lines should the President elected at the forthcoming elections concentrate in the first instance?\* of those polled




\* Respondents were asked to mark no more than three options.




**What do you think most critical tasks now faced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine are?**  
% of those polled




**What should be done, in the first place, to enhance the effectiveness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



**How do you assess the appointment of Petro Poroshenko the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



**Do you believe that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs will manage to enhance the effectiveness of the Foreign Ministry?**  
% of those polled



**Do you believe that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs will manage to improve the situation in the following foreign policy domains:**  
% of those polled

