

NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE

№ 10
2000

Founded and published by:



THE UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES

President Anatoliy GRYTSENKO
Editor-in-Chief Oleksiy KIRICHENKO

This magazine is registered with the State
Committee of Ukraine on Information Policy,
registration certificate KB No. 4122

Printed in Ukrainian and English

Circulation: 1500

Editorial office:
9 Prorizna street, apt. 20, Kyiv 01034
Tel.: (380 44) 228-86-87
Tel./fax: (380 44) 244-34-53
e-mail: info@uceps.com.ua
WEB-site: www.uceps.com.ua

Reprinted and used material
must refer to the
"National Security & Defence"

The views expressed in this magazine do not
necessarily reflect those of UCEPS staff

Photos:
DINAU — pp. 49, 54, 67, 71, 95, 103;
The Ukrainian — p. 31;
IREX — pp. 38, 44, 45, 55, 56, 68, 69.

© UCEPS, 2000

CONTENTS

CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN UKRAINE: PROBLEMS OF RELATIONSHIP

(UCEPS analytical report)	2
1. THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN UKRAINE	4
2. INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS	29
3. THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY	40
4. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS	60

ARTICLES

RELIGION AFTER COMMUNISM: THE DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE VIKTOR YELENSKY	66
ATTITUDE OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY TO SECTS AND 'NEW RELIGIONS' BERTOLD VEIG	73
CHARISMATIC CHURCHES: A RELIGION OR THE KNOW-HOW OF MAKING ZOMBIES? KATERYNA SHCHIOTKINA	78
FAITH AND RELIGION IN LIFE OF THE UKRAINIANS NADIYA DUDAR, LIUDMILA SHANGINA	83
THE CHURCH AND THE ARMED FORCES: PARTNERSHIP OR ABSORPTION? SERHIY SIOMIN	99

Our analytical material
can be found in Internet:
www.uceps.com.ua

THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN UKRAINE: PROBLEMS OF RELATIONSHIP

The confessional and religious situation in Ukraine is different from that in most post-socialist countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Ukraine has no dominant Church, with which society or its majority could associate itself. Such a situation was conditioned by the historic division of Ukraine's territory between states with different cultural traditions. So, the confessional and religious situation in Ukraine is determined by factors the majority of which have originated in the country's cultural-historic specificity and the conditions of the transitional period of Ukraine's society.

1. More attention is paid to tradition, which is a consequence of the ruination of the previously established system of values and the search for a new basis for personal and public identification. The turning to tradition was one of the sources for the inter-Orthodox split, and the opposition between Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism, which was conditioned by the differences in the cultural and historic development of various Ukrainian lands. When applied to the regional historic and cultural specificity (to a large extent connected with the ethnic self-identification of the population in the regions), the religious factor bears a strong potential for conflict, which can seriously affect social stability.

2. The politicising of Church and religious problems, inter-Church and Church-state relations. Ukraine's society is in the process of a socio-economic and political quest. Opinion polls show the existence of different (and even opposing) public orientations, trends and positions with respect to the further development of the Ukrainian state and society. There is no unity as to the future shape of the Ukrainian nation — ethnic or political, and therefore, the Ukrainian state — the state of the titular nation, or of civil society. There is no clear idea of Ukraine's socio-economic prospects and geopolitical priorities. In this situation, the Church, or, rather, Ukraine's Churches, are viewed by different social groups from purely political positions. Political assessments are made of the Churches' past and of their relations. Therefore, historic prejudice and stereotypes are turning into factors of political reality, defining different political and geopolitical orientations for different social groups in Ukraine. Affiliation with a certain Church turns into a factor and indicator of a person's political identification and of the Church community itself.

3. The deterioration of the living standards of the majority of Ukraine's citizens, the loss of social perspective. This factor brings about socio-psychological changes: psychological instability, sensitivity, a need for outside support, and an inclination to absorb other people's views. This state of society, which can be called stressful, on the one hand, leads to the loss of trust in traditional social institutes, including traditional Churches; on the other hand, it is conducive to the spread of



mysticism and various eschatological teachings, which put the person beyond the framework of social life.

4. Strong pressure by new religious movements. This factor is caused by the active, well-organised and materially supported missionary activity of neo-religious groupings; a certain orthodoxy and social passivity of traditional Churches; the migration of neo-religious trends out of the CIS and Baltic countries, and the lack of legislative limitations on their activity in Ukraine. The spread of new religious trends in Ukraine, on the one hand, leads to contradictions between the neo-religious formations and the traditional Churches, and on the other hand, it illustrates the crisis experienced by the traditional Churches.

5. The increase in the level of society's religiosity does not correspond to the degree of public involvement in Church activity, particularly regarding the traditional Churches. Sociological surveys of the last decade show that the number of believers has risen significantly, compared to the past. The Church has permanently taken the lead position in ratings of public trust in social institutions. At the same time, the indicator of public trust in Church is much lower than the indicator of public religiosity: according to opinion polls conducted by UCEPS, 57.8% of Ukraine's citizens called themselves believers, but only 33.7% indicated their full trust in the Church.

The aim of this analytical report was to clear up the status and the nature of relations between the public and the Church, in the context of the prospects of forming civil society in Ukraine. The main tasks included: analysing the status and trends of the development of the Church and religious network, and the relations between Ukrainian Churches over the last decade; definition of the main directions and problems of the Church's activity as a social institute; review of the status and character of religiosity of Ukraine's society and society's attitude toward the Church. The UCEPS analytical report consists of four sections.

<i>In the first section</i>	the basic indicators that describe the status and main trends of the development of the Church and religious network in Ukraine are presented. It shows that the extensive development of religious institutions, characteristic of 1989-1993, is coming to a close: Ukraine has already formed an institutional network of religious organisations, adequate for meeting the religious needs of believers, and further on, this network will naturally reproduce itself.
<i>In the second section</i>	the main problems and trends in the development of inter-Church relations in Ukraine are analysed. Here, conflict zones and the factors of contradiction in relations between different confessions are defined.
<i>In the third section</i>	the main directions of the Church's social activity, the relations between the Church and the state, the Church and the Armed Forces, the Church and school are reviewed. The level and the nature of religiosity in Ukraine's society, and its attitude to the Church are analysed.
<i>In the fourth section</i>	conclusions were summarised, and proposals on improving legislation governing the freedom of conscience and religious organisations were introduced; forecasts with respect to the future confessional and religious situation in Ukraine and the relations between the Church and society were made.

1. THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN UKRAINE

PRESENT STATE AND TRENDS

This section presents an analysis of the basic indicators that describe the state of religious institutions in Ukraine: the number and dynamics of Churches and religious entities, their confessional affiliation, and territorial coverage.

This analysis is grounds for concluding that today, there is a network of Church and religious organisations¹ formed in Ukraine, sufficient to meet the religious requirements of believers. The dynamics of country-wide expansion of particular Churches demonstrates that extensive development of religious environment is over. The growth of Protestant and new religious organisations is outpacing the growth of traditional Churches, while the dominance of Orthodoxy, traditional for Ukraine, has been preserved. Virtually all of Ukraine's confessions have their regional structural networks. The centre of religious activity has clearly shifted to the western regions of the country, where only 19.7% of the population resides, but nearly 43% of all religious organisations is concentrated.

1.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL NETWORK: BASIC DATA

The religious situation is characterised, first and foremost, by the state and dynamics of expansion of the institutional network of *religious organisations*. Comparative analysis of relevant indicators for particular confessions makes it possible to forecast the basic trends in development of Churches in Ukraine.

Religious organisations

According to the data of State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs² as of the beginning of 2000, there were 52 *creeds*, in their framework acted 23543 *religious organisations* representing 90 *confessions, trends and directions*³ in Ukraine. Analysis of the dynamics of the number of religious organisations and growth of the spectrum of faiths in 1985-2000 shows that

Abbreviations

UOC — The Ukrainian Orthodox Church

UOC-KP — The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate

UAOC — The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

UGCC — The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church

RCC — The Roman Catholic Church

AUU EBC — The All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Baptist Christians

AUUC CEF — The All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals)

UUC SDA — Ukrainian Union Conference of Churches of Seventh-day Adventists

NRM — New Religious Movements (neo-religions)

¹ The notion "religious organisations" encompasses all "religious communities, administrations and centres, religious brotherhood, missions, theological educational establishments as well as unions, consist of above mentioned religious organisations" (The Law of Ukraine " On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations". From this point on we use the index of the number of communities, as primary elements of the religious network, when analysing the religious processes in more detail.


² Here and further statistics is presented as of January 1, 2000.

³ Creed — a system of dogmas, canonical rules and devotions; confession — a religious organisation, that has its own creed and religious practice.



the institutional religious network experienced its quickest growth rate in 1988-1990. In this period, the number of Churches and religious organisations increased by 41.7%. From early 1990s, this growth has slackened and become more stable, and now is some 5-8% per year. In particular, on the totals of 1999, the number of *religious organisations*, as compared to previous year, increased by 7.8% (Diagr. “The religious network in Ukraine: dynamics of growth”).

**The religious network in Ukraine:
dynamics of growth**



The distribution of Church and *religious organisations* by confessions shows that Orthodoxy occupies first place in Ukraine. It has 12,396 *organisations* (52.7% of all religious organisations). Today there is no single Orthodox

† **Russian Orthodox Old-believers' Church (the Accord of the White Well):** 54 communities, two monasteries with four monks, and 32 priests. The bulk of the communities are concentrated in the Odesa (15 communities), Chernivtsi (10), Vinnytsia (10), and Kirovohrad (four) regions; three communities — in the Khmelnytskyi region, two — in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; one each — in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, and in Kyiv.

Russian Orthodox Old-believers' Church (the Priestless Accord): 12 communities, eight priests, one Sunday school. The majority of communities (seven) are in the Zhytomyr region, three — in the Kharkiv region, one each — in the Transcarpathian and Zaporizhia regions.

Russian Free Orthodox Church (abroad): eight communities, five priests. Five communities are in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, one each — in the Luhansk, Sumy and Chernihiv regions.

Russian True Orthodox Church: 30 communities, two administrations, 28 priests, four Sunday schools, one periodical. Most communities are concentrated in the Odesa (eight), Zaporizhia (seven), Luhansk (four) regions and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (five), two communities are active in Kyiv, one each — in the Kyiv, Mykolayiv, Sumy and Kherson regions.

Apocalyptic Orthodox Church: four communities, three priests. Active in the Vinnytsia region.

The Church of the Transfiguration of the Holy Mother (Church of the Holy Mother): four communities, eight priests, one Sunday school, two periodicals. One community in each of the Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv regions and in Kyiv.


The Community of Innokentios in the Odesa region.

Greek communities of the UOC: two communities in Kyiv.

Independent Orthodox communities: five communities, two of them in the Donetsk region, one in the Kharkiv region (maintains a Sunday school and publishes one periodical), and one in the Khmelnytskyi region.


Church in Ukraine. Three large Churches exist: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), alongside eight smaller groupings that confess particular versions of Orthodox teaching† (Diagr. “The structure of Orthodoxy in Ukraine”).

**The structure of Orthodoxy in Ukraine,
% of religious organisations**



The second largest Church, by the number of *religious organisations*, is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church — 3,356 organisations, or 14.3% of the total number of *organisations*. More than one fourth (26.5%) of *religious organisations* belong to different denominations of Protestantism. With the exception of new religious formations, the present-day structure of the institutional religious network generally follows confessional distribution traditional for Ukraine (Diagr. “The confessional structure of the network of religious organisations”).

**The confessional structure of the network
of religious organisations**




Comparative analysis of the dynamics of increasing the number of *religious communities* of the Orthodox and Protestant trends as well as of the new religious *communities* (specifically of the Charismatic trend) shows a strong tendency toward outgrowing Orthodox communities. In

1999, the number of Orthodox *communities* grew by 6.7% (from 11,326 to 12,090), of Protestant — by 12.4% (from 5,279 to 5,944). The share of Orthodox *communities* in the total number of newly-established *communities* correspondingly fell from 63.3% in 1998 to 51.6% in 1999. By contrast, the number of newly established Protestant *communities* rose from 26.1% to 41.5% over the same period.

Houses of worship

At present, religious organisations own and possess 16,637 buildings and premises for prayer (including 3,693 architectural monuments). Within this figure, religious organisations own 59.4% of all such buildings — 9,886 (including 8,167 buildings specifically constructed as houses of prayer and 1,719 adapted for prayer), and use another 40.6% of buildings — 6,751 (4,404 buildings constructed as houses of prayer and 2,347 adapted to prayer); 284 (1.7%) of all houses of prayer are shared by various confessions and used on a rotational basis (*Diagr. "The number of houses of worship, including architectural memorials"*).


The number of houses of worship, including architectural memorials



In the period 1992-1999, authorities at different levels transferred (whether in ownership or for use) 4,300 houses of worship and over 10,000 various religious utilities; 2,597 temples and houses of prayer were built; and at the beginning of 2000, another 1,836 houses of worship were under construction (*Diagr. "The number of houses of worship under construction"*).

Analysis of the indicators of religious building construction shows that in the next several years, the present confessional and regional configuration of the Church and religious network will be preserved in Ukraine. The only exception are new religious groupings, first of all — the charismatic Churches, which mainly lease premises (as of the beginning of 2000, charismatic communities were building only five buildings, and other new religious associations — three).


The number of houses of worship under construction⁴



Priests

As of the beginning of 2000, *religious organisations* active in Ukraine employed 21,281 priests (including 650 foreign citizens). In general, the number of priests was increasing apace with the expansion of the network of *religious organisations*, first of all — *communities* (*Diagr. "The number of priests"*).

The number of priests



Limited (prior to the 1990s) possibilities for training personnel in Ukraine encouraged invitation of priests from abroad (by confessions whose centres are beyond Ukraine's borders: UGCC, RCC, Protestant communities and communities of national minorities).

Lack of priests is still a problem for Churches whose centres are situated in Ukraine, first of all — Orthodox Churches. As a result, today, the coefficient⁵ of provision of *Protestant communities* with priests is 1.4, while in Orthodox communities it is only 0.8. In Roman Catholic communities, 278 out of 428 priests are foreigners; out of 86 rabbis practising in Ukraine, 41 are citizens of foreign countries.

⁴ Apart from the buildings accounted for in Diagram, one building is being constructed by an Old-believers' Community.


⁵ The average number of priests per community.



Monasteries

In comparison with 1985, the number of monasteries has increased almost 28-fold, while the number of monks and nuns — only by 8.4 times. On average, each monastery has fewer than 20 monks and nuns. Such a disproportion in the rate of growth gives witness to the fact that monastery life of the Churches is still in its early stages (*Diagr. "The number of monasteries and monks"*).


The number of monasteries and monks



Theological schools

The increase in the number of communities, their insufficient staffing by priests, and the need for missionary work and evangelisation⁶ are forcing religious organisations to intensify personnel training. In 1993-1999, the number of clerical education institutions in the country rose from 34 to 121. The number of students at these theological schools of the various confessions rose four-fold — from 3,587 at the beginning of 1993 to 15,885 on January 1, 2000 (*Diagr. "The number of theological schools and students"*).


The number of theological schools and students



The dynamics of the increase in the number of theological educational establishments (and their students) varies by confession, and is not proportional to the dynamics of the growth in the number of *communities* and believers. For instance, while in 1993-1999, the number of Orthodox educational establishments rose more than two-fold — from 15 to 37 and the number of their students — almost four-fold — from 1,508 to 5,585, the religious organisations of Protestant denominations increased the number of theological schools more than five-fold — from 11 to 60, and the number of their students — 14 times, from 567 to 8,060.

These tendencies show a more aggressive, as compared to the Orthodox, pattern of Protestant organisations on missionary activities and evangelisation of the populace, which, in the long run, can lead to Orthodoxy losing its dominant positions in Ukraine (*Diagr. "Comparison of institutional networks of Orthodox and Protestantism"*).

Comparison of institutional networks of Orthodox and Protestantism



Sunday schools

The number of Sunday schools and the dynamics of their network development, among other things, indicate the reproductive activity of a religious organisation. The proportions of Sunday schools and communities prove the **higher activity of Protestant (with the exception of charismatic) and Roman Catholic communities at evangelising (catechising⁷) the young generation**: in the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, there is one Sunday school for every two *communities*, on the average, while in the Orthodox Churches, this ratio makes: for the UOC and UOC-KP — 1:3.5, for the UAOC — 1:4.3; for the Greek Catholic Church, this indicator is also low: 1:4.3. Meanwhile, for the Roman Catholic

⁶ Missionary work: actions at propagating a certain religious confession. Evangelisation: enrolment of a non-believer to confessing a particular faith.

⁷ Teaching the Law of God in the form of questions and answers.


Church, the ratio is 1:2.3; for the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelic Baptist Christians — 1:2; the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelic Christians — 1:1.8; for the Ukrainian Union Conference of Churches of Seventh-day Adventists — 1:1.8; for communities of the charismatic trend — 1:2.5.

Given the speed with which Protestant Churches are managing to provide priests/pastors for their communities, one can conclude that, as of today, Orthodox Churches lack specialists for extending their network of Sunday schools. This is a strong argument for actively promoting of the idea of teaching the Law of God at public schools. Regarding the small number of Sunday schools attached to the Greek Catholic communities, one can only note that in the regions dominated by the UGCC, a mandatory course of Christian Ethics has been taught at public schools from 1996, which generally corresponds to the requirements of the catechism.

Religious periodicals

In 1993-1999, the number of religious periodicals increased more than six times: from 31 to 194. The most part of periodicals is possessed by Orthodox Churches — 42.3% of total number. Protestant periodicals cover 25.2% of its quantity, UGCC periodicals — 11.3%, RCC — 5.7% (*Diagr. "The number of religious periodicals"*).

The number of religious periodicals



Publishing of mass media prints is an effective type of missionary work. The number of periodicals, to a certain extent, reflects the level of the Church interest in enticing of new believers and reproduction of confession environment. At the same time, official data do not always correspond to reality. Some religious communities import prints from abroad, thus their presence in Ukraine's religious information space is not entirely represented in official statistics.

Illustrated data give the opportunity to draw the following conclusions.

✦ **The stage of extensive development of religious life in Ukraine is over. The 1988-1990 period of activity, when the number of communities rose by 41.7%, was followed by**

a period of moderate growth of the religious network at a steady rate of 5-8% a year. Therefore, further expansion of the network of religious institutions now depends on the Church's ability to adopt new forms of evangelising, missionary work, and whether it raises educational requirements for priests, etc.

✦ **The network of Protestant and new religious organisations is expanding at a faster rate, than the Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic confessions.**

✦ **Comparative analysis of network growth indicators and the personnel of theological educational establishments confirms the greater activity of Protestant religious organisations in training priests, and, therefore, their determination to actively engage in missionary work.**

1.2 CONFESSIONAL DIMENSION

Nowadays there are religious organisations representing 90 confessions, denominations and trends active in Ukraine. Most communities belong to **traditional (historic) Ukrainian confessions, i.e., denominations that have existed in the country for generations, whose religious practices are well-known and which have become elements of the national culture.** Such confessions and trends encompass, first of all, Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism, as well as Roman Catholicism and such denominations within Protestantism as Baptists, Evangelicals (Pentecostals), Adventists and some others. The term "traditional confession" may also be applied to such confessions as Judaism, Islam, and the Hungarian Reformed Church, all of which have deep roots in Ukraine.

At the same time, over the last decade, previously unknown, non-traditional confessions and trends have appeared in Ukraine, some of them historically rooted in other countries (for instance, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Swedish and Anglican Churches), and others commonly identified as neo-religions (or New Religious Movements — NRM). **NRM — religious groupings established recently, whose worship practices are either unknown to believers, or so different from traditional ones that they cause alarm and sometimes active public opposition to their further expansion.** In 1992-1993, 23 new religions appeared in Ukraine.

Orthodoxy continues to occupy the pole position in the confessional and religious life of the country. At present, Orthodoxy has no united or single organisation and is represented by three Churches, not counting small groupings. Such a situation emerged in the early 1990s as a result of the renewal of the Ukrainian

Saturation of religious communities counting upon 10,000 people

0 1.6 3.2 4.8


Total in Ukraine
22,718
37.7%
8,490

As of January 1, 2000, the **Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)** had 8,490 communities, which accounted for 70.2% of all Orthodox communities in Ukraine⁸; 36 eparchial administrations, 113 monasteries with 3,396 monks and nuns, 15 theological educational establishments with 3,657 students; 55 periodicals; and maintained 2,393 Sunday schools. Pastoral service employed 7,122 priests.

Near one third (29.4%) of UOC communities are concentrated in the Southern and Eastern regions¹², where they are most numerous in the Odesa (395) and Donetsk (356) regions, and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (333 communities). In the Central region the main part is in the Khmelnytskyi (740 communities) and Vinnytsia (723) regions. Only a quarter (24.1%, 2,045 entities) of all UOC communities is situated in Western region. Compared to 1992, the UOC network in the region declined by 143 communities, primarily as a result of the UOC communities leaving the UOC jurisdiction and returning to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, or joining the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Regional distribution of the UOC communities is presented in *Map 1*.

¹² Hereinafter, the following regional division is applied: the West — Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi regions; the Centre — Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy regions; the North — Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv regions, and the City of Kyiv; the East — Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions; the South — Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the City of Sevastopol.

The development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church institutional network



UOC communities possess 7,407 religious building, of those 4,039 (54.5%) are owned, and 3,368 (45.5%) are in use; 27 temples are used by rotation¹³. In Ivano-Frankivsk (two out of 14) and Ternopil (eight out of 117) regions, the UOC owns the smallest number of houses of worships. In 1992-1999, 978 UOC temples were built (13.2% of all active Churches), another 759 are under construction. The coefficient¹⁴ of UOC communities' provision with religious buildings makes 0.87.

Although in the West of Ukraine, the UOC lost a significant number of communities, it retains a positive dynamics of institutional network development. The total number of its communities, as of the beginning of 2000, has risen more than 1.5 times, compared to 1992 (by 55.1%, or 3,017 communities); of monasteries — more than three-fold (from 33 to 113); of educational establishments — from seven to 15; of Sunday schools — from 1,248 to 2,393. (*Diagr. "The development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church institutional network"*).


There is a tendency toward stabilising the uneven presence of the UOC in the country's regions, particularly, in the reduction of its share in the West, first of all — in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions. First, this is demonstrated by the fact that the UOC owns only 20% of the houses of worship presently being built in the West of the country, while the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church — 33% of those. Second, out of 55 religious periodicals

published in the region, only nine belong to the UOC, and none — in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions. Third, only 23.6% of Sunday schools in the region are maintained by the UOC, in the Ivano-Frankivsk region — none, in the Lviv region — five out of 533, in the Ternopil region — 25 out of 655¹⁵.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). At the beginning of 2000, the institutional network of the UOC-KP had 2,491 communities, or 20.6% of all Orthodox communities in Ukraine; 17 monasteries with 87 monks and nuns; 15 theological schools with 1,649 students; 704 Sunday schools; 16 periodicals. The number of priests made up 1,978 persons.

The UOC-KP is headed by Patriarch of Kyiv and the Whole of Rus'-Ukraine Filaret (Denysenko), elected by the National Assembly of UOC-KP in October, 1995. The Cathedral Church of the UOC-KP is St. Volodymyr's Cathedral (Kyiv). The Patriarchal residence is also situated in Kyiv.

The UOC-KP was established by the National Assembly in June, 1992. It declared its autocephalous status, which however was not recognised by any of the Orthodox Churches that constitute the Orthodox Entirety.




¹³ Services are held by turns in the Transcarpathian (20 temples), Rivne (three), Ternopil (three) and Chernivtsi (one temple) regions.

¹⁴ Buildings per community, on the average.

¹⁵ In the West of the country, six out of 15 UOC educational establishments are operational, 40 of 113 monasteries, six Orthodox brotherhoods (three of them in the Lviv region), and a third (34.4%) of all UOC Sunday schools.

Map 2. The regional distribution of the UOC-KP communities




Communities of the UOC-KP have 1,852 religious buildings, 862 (47.2%) of them — in ownership, 963 (52.8%) — in use; as of January 1, 2000, communities of the UOC-KP held no services by turns. The most temples were transferred to the UOC-KP in ownership in the Lviv (174 out of 224) and Rivne (144 out of 201) regions, the least — in the Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (one temple each). In 1993-1999, 258 (14.1% of all presently active) temples were built, 217 are now under construction. The coefficient of UOC-KP communities' provision with religious buildings is 0.74.

In general, the institutional network of the UOC-KP is developing dynamically, although there were some fluctuations caused by the change of the Church's hierarch in 1995¹⁶ (*Diagr. "The development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate institutional network"*).

At the moment of its establishment, the UOC-KP looked like a regional Church. As of January 1, 1993, 87.3% of its communities were concentrated in the West of the country, only 9.2% (161 communities) were active in the East. During 1993-1999, the situation somewhat changed: at present, 56.5% of all UOC-KP communities are situated in the West. At the same time, the portion of UOC-KP communities has been increasing in the other regions of the country (*Map 2*).

At present, the UOC-KP is building few temples, with the exception of the western regions, where the majority of projects (65%) is constructed. The network of UOC-KP Sunday schools, beyond the West of the country, also does not expand, only one third (31.5%) of their total number (222 of 704) are active outside the western regions. Therefore, judging by the number and distribution of communities, gaining the status of the National Church by the UOC-KP is not a matter for the near future (if the possibility

The development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate institutional network



¹⁶ In July, 1995, Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) of the UOC-KP died. Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) was elected his successor. Some hierarchs and believers of the Church did not agree with that; as a result, a number of communities went to the UAOC.

of re-subordinating communities of other Orthodox Churches to the UOC-KP is not taken into account).

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). The UAOC has 989 communities — 8.2% of all Orthodox communities in Ukraine; two monasteries, with two monks in one of them; seven theological educational establishments with 279 students; 229 Sunday schools; seven periodicals. 602 priests care about their faithful.




Recently, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church suffered a heavy blow: on February 25, 2000, its hierarch, Patriarch of Kyiv and Whole of Ukraine Dymytriy (Yarema) died¹⁷. Metropolitan Mefodiy (Markevysh) was elected Guardian of the Patriarchal cathedra, and the duty of representing the Church in external relations and administering the Kyiv eparchy was charged to the UAOC Administrator, Archbishop of Kharkiv and

Poltava Ihor (Isichenko). The UAOC has no cathedral Church. Patriarch's residence was situated in Kyiv.

The present UAOC is in fact the successor of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, established in 1921 and restored in Ukraine in May, 1990¹⁸.

The network of UAOC communities has a clearly regional character: 78.8% of all communities are concentrated in the West of the country, mainly in the Lviv (342 communities), Ternopil (280) and Ivano-Frankivsk (125) regions. At the same time, there is only one community in the Transcarpathian region and none in the Chernivtsi region. In the North — 2.8% UAOC communities; in the Centre — 139 communities, or 14.1% of their total number; in the South — 2.2%; in the East — 2.1% of them; one UAOC community is active in the Zaporizhia region, two each — in the Luhansk region and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, none — in the city of Sevastopol (*Map 3*).

Map 3. The regional distribution of the UAOC communities



The indicators of Sunday school distribution and construction of new temples show that the regional character of the UAOC will continue for the near future: 85.3% of all UAOC Sunday schools (192 out of 225) are concentrated in the Ternopil (140) and Lviv (52) regions. 80.6% (83 out of 103) temples presently being built by the UAOC are located in the Lviv (55), Ternopil (15), Ivano-Frankivsk (11), Volyn (two) and Rivne (one) regions.

As the numbers show, the UAOC is presently in a rather tough situation. Compared with 1992, the number of its communities has fallen by 501 (from 1,490 to 989)¹⁹. The Church's cloister life is weak and stagnant (*Diagr. "The development of the the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church institutional network"*). At the same time, there

¹⁷ He was elected Patriarch of the UAOC in September, 1993.


¹⁸ In 1989-1990, the UAOC for the second time renewed its activity in Ukraine, as the successor to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, declared by the Decree of the Directory of January 1, 1919, and instituted by I All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Assembly in October, 1921. The authorities forced the UAOC to dissolve (at the III All-Ukrainian Church Assembly in January, 1930), but UAOC communities continued to exist in the Diaspora. The UAOC renewed its activity in Ukraine for the first time during World War II. Before late 1980s, communities and the episcopate of the UAOC were mainly concentrated in the U.S.A.; from 1971, the UAOC in Diaspora was headed by Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk).

In February, 1989, the Committee for UAOC Renewal was established in Kyiv. It was headed by Father B. Mykhailychko, who then lived in Latvia. After an unsuccessful attempt to re-register the first UAOC community in the Mykola Naberezhnyi Church in Kyiv, the Committee shifted the centre of its activity to Lviv, where the first community of the renewed UAOC was proclaimed in St. Peter and Paul's Cathedral on September 19, 1989. In 1989-1990, UAOC communities emerged in the Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions; secular structures in support of the UAOC were also created — the Brotherhoods of St. Apostle Andrew; magazine "Orthodoxy — Our Faith", and newspaper "Church and Life" began publishing. In May, 1990, the Council for Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic took a decision to register UAOC communities, and on June 5-6, 1999, the first All-Ukrainian Assembly of the renewed UAOC was held in Kyiv and elected Metropolitan Mstyslav the Patriarch, in his absence.

¹⁹ The number of UAOC communities fell mainly due to their outflow to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Most communities are in the West of the country: in the Ivano-Frankivsk region (-243), Lviv region (-236), Ternopil region (-113), Rivne region (-15), Chernivtsi region (-14) communities.




The development of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church institutional network



are prospects for reforming both the organisational structure²⁰ and the doctrinal foundations of the Church, with respect to strengthening its social position. Reform can be conducive for the UAOC's stabilisation and development.

UAOC communities have 661 religious building, 270 of them (40.8%) in ownership, 391 — in use; one temple's use is shared. The greatest number of houses of worship were transferred to UAOC ownership in the Lviv (140 of 185) and Ternopil (56 of 238) regions. As of the beginning of 2000, 103 UAOC temples were under construction. The coefficient of communities' provision with religious buildings is 0.67.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC)²¹. The Head of the UGCC is Ivan Myroslav Cardinal Liubachivskiy, who was appointed to this post in March, 1991. Taking into account the Cardinal's health, in 1996, the Synod of Bishops elected a Bishop-Assistant, to administer the Church's affairs, and delegated him the rights of the UGCC Head. This administrator is Bishop Lyobomyr Huzar. The UGCC



cathedral Church is St. George's Cathedral in Lviv; the residence of the UGCC Head is also situated in Lviv.

The UGCC resumed its activity in Ukraine, after the 1946 forced 'self-dissolution', in 1989-1991. This process was impetuous. During only three years, 2,506 communities were established; the number of communities rose from 138 in 1989 to 2,644 at the beginning of 1992. Later on, the rate of expansion of the UGCC institutional network declined sharply: in 1992-1999, only 596 communities were established




(Diagr. "The development of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church institutional network").

²⁰ There has been talk of a possible transition of the UAOC under the omophoros (supervision) of Metropolitan Kostyantyn (the U.S.A.), according to Patriarch Dymytriy's will. In his testament, he wrote that at the end of '80s, the UAOC was revived, as a part of the UAOC in the Diaspora, and exactly for this reason it recognised the head of the UAOC in the U.S. Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), as its Patriarch. Dymytriy bequeathed the episcopate, the clergy and laymen not to convene councils and assemblies without the participation of the Church in Diaspora, mention at service the present Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. Kostyantyn (Bahan), as their hierarch, and submit to his jurisdiction. It should be taken into account that since 1995, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. has been under the omophoros of the Oecumenical Patriarch, which, in its time, caused a strong-worded demarche on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate. The UAOC joining the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. can bring about a sharp aggravation of relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and Constantinople. In April, 2000, a document was made public, by which Metropolitan Kostyantyn confirmed the powers of Archbishop Ihor (Isichenko), and accepted the mention of his name in liturgy, as the Church hierarch, "in the hope that this will lead to eventual recognition of the UAOC in Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchy and the Orthodox World". See: Religion and Church in Ukraine: April. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.5, p.28.

²¹ In the Transcarpathian region, there is a separate Greek-Catholic eparchy with its centre in Mukachevo, which is not part of the UGCC, but is subordinate directly to the Apocrisiary of the Apostolic Capital (the Embassy of the Vatican) to Ukraine. The UGCC also controls 19 Greek Catholic eparchies of the Ukrainian Diaspora.

The development of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church institutional network



Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2000, the number of communities of this Church exceeded the pre-war level 3,237 communities. At the same time, the Church's organisational structure was consolidated, Metropolitanate, the Kyiv-Vyshhorod Exarchate, and six eparchies were established. At the beginning of 2000, the UGCC had 3,240 communities, 78 monasteries (1,188 monks and nuns); it maintained 12 theo-


logical educational establishments (1,588 students)²², 755 Sunday schools, and published 22 periodicals.

The slowdown in development of the UGCC institutional network is accompanied with the stabilisation of its regional nature. As of January 1, 2000, 96.9% of all UGCC communities (3,140 entities) were situated in Western Ukraine, with almost half of them (45.6%) concentrated within one region (the Lviv region — 1,433 communities), another 23.5% — in Ternopil (739 communities) and 21% — in Ivano-Frankivsk (651 communities) regions. Central Ukraine accounts for only 0.8% of all UGCC communities (25 entities), the South — 0.6% (21 communities). Out of 28 communities created in 1999, 25 were in the West, and only three — beyond that area: one — in the Kyiv region, two — in the Donetsk region (Map 4).

In comparison with Orthodox Churches, the UGCC owns a higher share of religious buildings used by this Church — 80.6% (2,192 out of 2,721), another 529 temples remain in use by UGCC communities, 252 temples are used in turns. The coefficient of communities' provision with religious buildings makes 0.84.

Taking into account the fact that out of 306 temples presently being built by the UGCC, 295


Map 4. The regional distribution of the UGCC communities



²² The largest educational establishment of the UGCC is the Lviv Theological Academy (LTA). There, 380 students are studying, close to 200 priests are raising their professional level; under the Academy, the institutes of the history of the Church, neo-Platonism, theological terminology and translation, religion and society, family and marriage, the Catechetical-Pedagogical Institute, and the Institute of the Italian language and culture are operational. The Academy graduates bachelors of theology. In 2000, LTA helped to establish a Centre of Cachetising attached to the Institute of Artificial Intellect in Donetsk; this Centre will train teachers of Christian Ethics for schools and kindergartens.



The development of the Roman Catholic Church institutional network



(or 96.4%) are situated in the West, as well as 96% (725 out of 755) Sunday schools, 100% educational establishments, and 20 out of 22 periodicals, the UGCC's status of a regional Church seems indisputable, at least in the near future²³.

The Roman Catholic Church (RCC). As a hierarchical structure, it has officially existed in Ukraine from 1375, when its first Metropolitanate was established. The history of the RCC in Ukraine is rather complicated. At the beginning of 1989, there was no RCC hierarchy in-country, and only close to 100 communities were active²⁴. In December, 1991, the Pope John Paul II renewed the activity of Roman Catholic dioceses²⁵ in Ukraine and appointed bishops to Lviv, Kamyanets-Podilskyi and Zhytomyr. In 1992, the first Apostolic Nuncio (Ambassador) to Ukraine was appointed.



In January, 1991, the Head of the Conference of Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, Archbishop Maryan Yavorskyi became the 43rd Lviv Metropolitan for Roman Catholics.

In the Transcarpathian region, there is an autonomous structure of the Roman Catholic Church (the Apostolic Administration of Transcarpathia, established in 1993), subordinated to Bishop-administrator Antal Maineku.

The RCC institutional network is developing dynamically (*Diagr. "The development of the Roman Catholic Church institutional network"*). In 1991-1999, the number of communities rose almost two and a half-fold. The Church's cloister life is active; much work is being done to educate Ukrainian priests, since there were virtually no priests active in-country at the moment of renewal of the RCC activity in Ukraine. For this reason, there are many foreign citizens among the RCC clergy in Ukraine.


The majority of RCC communities are in the Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Ternopil regions (77.2% of all communities). At the same time, their network is spreading across eastern and southern regions of Ukraine: in 1992-1999, 43 communities, four missions and two monasteries of the RCC were established in these regions (*Map 5*).

²³ At present, the problem of reforms has become key for the UGCC, particularly with regard to the service practice. The urgent organisational issue is the dilemma of gaining Patriarchal status, or unification. The Church's name is also a subject of discussion. The UGCC is distinguished by the activity of its laymen, and the understanding of priesthood as servicing: the Vatican documents mention serving priests (*sacerdotium ministeriale*), the Orthodox Church has no analogue to this.

²⁴ Historically, the Roman-Catholic tradition risked disappearing more than once: by the Tsarist government after the Polish uprising of 1836; by the reprisals of the 1920-1930s (before World War II, only one Roman Catholic church (in Odesa) was active in Ukraine; and, finally, by the anti-Catholic campaign of the 1950s-1960s.

²⁵ Diocese (eparchy) — an administrative unit of the Church, headed by a serving bishop.

Map 5. The regional distribution of the RCC communities



The RCC has 674 religious building, 387 of them (57.4%) — in ownership, 287 — in use; one temple is used by turns. In 1992-1999, 88 temples were built, and another 65 are under construction. The coefficient of communities' provision with religious buildings is 0.87.

PROTESTANTISM

Protestantism is represented in Ukraine by 33 denominations[†]. Some of them are strong and numerous, counting tens of thousands of adherents: Evangelical Baptist, Evangelical Christian, Adventist trends, Jehovah's Witnesses. There are also smaller groups that have not united with their co-religionists, or profess some specific versions of Protestantism. They include separate communities and other institutional

structures of the Protestant trend[‡], small Ukrainian Lutheran-Evangelical communities and groups that have appeared in Ukraine over the last decade but belong to classical Western Protestant trends and for this reason cannot be called neo-religions*.

Protestant communities now make up 26.2% of the total number of religious communities in Ukraine. The Protestant institutional network is expanding at a fast pace. In 1999 alone, 665 communities of different Protestant denominations were established, an annual increase of 12.6%. The institutional system of Protestant confessions is characterised by the absence of monasteries, and a relatively high share of missions. In contrast to the Orthodox and Catholic tradition, Protestant community life envisages fixed membership. In the overwhelming majority of Protestant trends, believers take the rite of christening voluntarily, at a conscious age.

In some of Ukraine's regions, Protestant communities either already outnumber other communities (in the Donetsk region they make up 50.8% of the total number of religious communities; in Kyiv — 50.4%), or are coming close to this and account for more than 40% of the religious network (in the Zaporizhia region, the share of Protestant communities makes up 43.6%; in the Kirovohrad region — 43.3%, Chernivtsi region — 41.6%). There are only three regions — the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil ones — where Protestant communities make up no more than 10% of the total number of communities (Map 6).

The activity of Protestant communities and associations is, first of all, characterised by their

[†] **Christian communities of the Protestant trend:** 52 communities, 51 ministers (incl. eight foreigners), four Sunday schools. 31 communities are active in Kyiv, six — in the Rivne region, four — in the Dnipropetrovsk region, three each — in the Crimea and Transcarpathia, one each — in the Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kirovohrad, Luhansk and Odesa regions.

The Assembly of Independent Christian Churches of Ukraine: active in Kyiv, consists of the Centre and a school with 50 students; two ministers.

[‡] **The Ukrainian Lutheran Church:** 13 communities, the Centre (Kyiv), nine priests, one seminary (Ternopil), six Sunday schools, two periodicals. Four communities are active in the Ternopil region, two each — in the Crimea, in the Mykolayiv region and in Kyiv, one each — in the Zaporizhia, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi regions. The Church's activity was renewed in 1993; it is headed by Bishop Yaroslav Shepeliavets.

The Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed Church: three communities, three ministers, two Sunday schools. Two communities are active in the Rivne region, one — in Kyiv.

* **The New Apostolic Church:** 55 communities, the Centre (in Kyiv), two administrations (in Kyiv and Odesa), 73 ministers (23 of them foreigners), 12 Sunday schools. Six communities are active in the Zaporizhia region, five each — in the Kirovohrad and Kherson regions, four — in the Khmelnytskyi region, three each — in the Volyn, Kyiv and Cherkasy regions, two each — in the Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk Transcarpathian, Poltava and Sumy regions, one each — in the Vinnytsia, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv regions, and in Kyiv.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons): 56 communities, the Centre (in Kyiv), 247 priests (including 85 foreign citizens),

32 Sunday schools. 16 communities are active in Kyiv, nine — in the Donetsk region, seven — in the Kharkiv region, three — in the Odesa region, two each — in the Crimea, Kyiv and Lviv regions, one each — in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv regions and in Sevastopol.

The Church of the New Jerusalem (Svedenborg's teaching): two communities (in the Donetsk and Lviv regions); two ministers.

Presbyterian Church: 28 communities, 31 ministers, 10 Sunday schools, one periodical. Five communities are active in both the Mykolayiv and Odesa regions, four each — in the Kirovohrad region and in Kyiv, two each in the Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv regions, one each — in the Donetsk, Sumy, Cherkasy and Chernihiv regions.

The Methodist Connection: 10 communities, seven ministers, four Sunday schools. Four communities are active in the Transcarpathian region, three — in the Crimea, one each — in the Luhansk and Poltava regions, and in Sevastopol.


Mennonites: two communities in the Zaporizhia region, two ministers.

Communities of Spiritual Christians - Molokans: four communities (three in the Zaporizhia region, one in the Vinnytsia region), four priests.

The Cathedral of Independent Christian Evangelical Churches of Ukraine: the centre and theological school — in Kyiv.

Communities of Nazarenes: nine communities (six — in the Chernivtsi region, one each — in the Donetsk and Zaporizhia regions and in Kyiv), administration (in Kyiv). A Sunday school is active at the Donetsk community.

Map 6. The regional distribution of the Protestant communities



clear determination to engage in active missionary work and evangelising, which is manifested through the dynamic development of the network of schools, their students, involving rank-and-file community members in missionary work, etc²⁶. Furthermore, Protestant teachings do not recognise the concept of “canonical territory”, and see the entire territory of Ukraine,

as the room for promoting their version of the witness of Christ²⁷.

The majority of communities belong to Evangelical Baptist Christians — 2,222 entities; Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) — 1,460, and Seventh-day Adventists — 784. Today, these groupings are the face of traditional Protestantism in Ukraine.

Evangelical Baptist Churches and unions

Protestantism of the Evangelical Baptist trend encompasses a group of numerous, structurally formed groupings — the All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Baptist Christians, the Church of Christ, the Brotherhood of independent Churches and missions of Evangelical Baptist Christians, and small independent or united communities that profess specific versions of Evangelical Baptist teaching[†].

The All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Baptist Christians (AUU EBC)²⁸. This is the largest Protestant entity in Ukraine — its communities unite close to 125,000 believers²⁹. The Union consists of 25 regional associations of Evangelical Baptist Churches. After Ukraine gained independence, five Ukrainian associations of Baptist Churches in the Diaspora — in the U.S.A.,

† Communities of the former Council of Evangelical Baptist Christians:

33 communities; 46 ministers, eight Sunday schools. Nine communities are active in the Poltava region, seven — in the Kyiv region, four each — in the Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava regions, three each — in the Volyn and Donetsk regions, two — in the Zaporizhia and one — in the Lviv region.

Independent communities of Evangelical Baptist Christians: 80 communities, one mission, one brotherhood, one theological educational establishment (44 students), 111 ministers, 37 Sunday schools. 12 communities are active in the Luhansk region, 10 each — in the Zhytomyr and Chernivtsi regions; eight communities and the theological school — in the Odesa region; seven — in the Rivne region, five — in Kyiv, four each — in the Zaporizhia and Cherkasy regions, three each — in the Vinnytsia and Lviv regions, two each — in the Volyn, Donetsk, Mykolayiv and Sumy regions, one each — in the Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions.

Religious communities of the Church of Christ: 70 communities, 101 priests, 29 Sunday schools, one periodical. The majority of communities (43) are concentrated in the Donetsk region, they employ 78 ministers, maintain 27 Sunday schools; four communities — in the Luhansk and Poltava regions, three — in the Dnipropetrovsk region, two — in the Cherkasy region, one each — in the Crimea, Zhytomyr and Sumy regions; seven communities and two Sunday schools are active in Kyiv.

The Association of Missionary Churches of Evangelical Christians:

Administration and two communities of this grouping are located in Kyiv.

The Brotherhood of Independent Churches and Missions of Evangelical Baptist Christians: unites 15 communities (11 in the Donetsk region, four — in Kyiv), Kyiv also hosts its centre, administration, an educational establishment (60 students) and 11 Sunday schools of the Brotherhood; 48 ministers care about their flock.

Communities of Evangelical Christians: 73 communities and one brotherhood (in Transcarpathia) are independent; they employ 100 ministers, maintain 30 Sunday schools, issue one periodical (in Zaporizhia). The greatest number of independent communities is concentrated in Kyiv (21), in the Donetsk (19), Kyiv (10) and Zaporizhia (nine) regions; independent communities are also active in the Crimea (two), the Transcarpathian (four), Poltava (one), Kherson (two), Cherkasy (three) and Chernihiv (one) regions.

The Missionary Evangelising and Charity Centre of the Union of Christian Churches "The Word of Life" is active in Kyiv (the centre, three missions, an educational establishment (27 students), three ministers) and in the Donetsk region (one mission).

The Cathedral of Independent Evangelical Churches of Ukraine: two communities (one in the Rivne and one in the Sumy regions), centre, mission and brotherhood in Kyiv, four priests, one Sunday school.


²⁶ For instance, the newspaper of the Seventh-day Adventists in Ukraine "Visnyk Myru" wrote: "In the world, there are 1,300 territories not explored by the Church of Seventh-day Adventists, and only one out of ten missionaries is Adventist. Therefore, there are many unaccomplished tasks before us, and we must gain momentum for their attainment... We should admit more students for teaching, in all ways encourage the expansion of activity of writing Evangelists, work out and widely promote programmes of missionary service involving rank-and-file members." See: "Appreciate Communication in God's Family". — *Visnyk Myru*, 1998, No.12, p.2.

²⁷ When analysing the indicators of development of the Evangelical Baptist movement in Ukraine, the Head of the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Baptist Christians H.Komendant stated: "It's very small in comparison with more than 50 million people and 20 thousand towns and villages, where there are no Evangelical Churches yet. The people of Ukraine are waiting for the homily of the Good News." See: The General Council of the European Baptist Federation. — *Yevanhelska Nyva*, 1998, No.4, p.14.

²⁸ Before 1994 — the Union of Evangelical Baptist Christians of Ukraine.

²⁹ Christian Churches of Ukraine. On the occasion of 2000 years of Christmas. Without requisites, p.14.

The development of the All-Ukrainian Union of Association of Evangelical Baptist institutional network



Canada, Australia, Argentina and Paraguay — joined the Union. The AUU EBC is a member of the World Baptist Union, where Baptist associations from 140 countries are represented, and also of the European Baptist Union and the Eurasian Federation of Unions of EBC.

The Head of the AUU EBC is Hryhorii Komendant.




The institutional network of the AUU EBC is expanding steadily. In 1991-1999, the number of EBC communities increased almost two-fold, the number of theological educational establishments rose from one to 32, and the number of students — 140 times (*Diagr. "The development of the AUU EBC institutional network"*).



The highest concentration of communities of the AUU EBC per 10,000 persons is observed in 11 Ukraine's regions: the Vinnytsia — 0.68, Volyn — 0.84, Zhytomyr — 0.64, Kirovohrad — 0.53, Kyiv — 0.71, Rivne — 0.69, Sumy — 0.50, Khmelnytskyi — 0.85, Cherkasy — 0.88, Chernivtsi — 1.48, and Chernihiv region — 0.53. 56.7% of all of the Union's communities are located in these regions (*Map 7*).

Communities of the AUU EBC have 1,219 houses of worship, 831 (68.2%) of them — in ownership, 388 — in use; besides, 663 premises are being leased for worship. Between 1992-1999, 327 houses of prayer were built (26.8% of all those presently operational), another 160 are under construction. The coefficient of communities' provision with religious buildings is 0.63.

Map 7. The regional distribution of the AUU EBC communities



The development of the All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) institutional network



Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal) churches and unions

This Protestant trend is represented in Ukraine by a powerful association — the All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) — and a number of smaller entities (the Union of Free Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith, the Union of God's Church of Ukraine, God's

Church in Prophecies in Ukraine); 230 Pentecostal communities are independent[†].



The All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) — AUUC CEF was formed in 1995. Communities united in the Union have approximately 120,000 believers. From 1990 the Head of the Union is Mykola Melnyk. Archbishop of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) — Mykhailo Panchenko.

The institutional network of the AUUC CEF is expanding steadily. In 1991-1999, the number of their communities and priests increased two-fold. What is demonstrative is that the number of priests is 1.3 times bigger than the number of communities. While in 1992, there were only two educational establishments, at the beginning of 2000 their number increased to 11, and the number of their students — 15-fold (see Diagram "The development of the All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals) institutional network").

The centre of the Union's institutional network has clearly shifted to the west: more than a third (36.3%) of its communities are concentrated in three western regions of Ukraine — the Rivne, Volyn and Ternopil regions (Map 8). Communities of the All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals) have 668 houses of worship, 478 (71.6%) of them — in ownership, 190 — in use; besides, 303 premises are being leased for worship. Between 1992-1999, 225 religious buildings


[†] The Union of Free Churches of Christians of the Evangelical Faith: 76 communities, a centre in Kyiv, one administration (in the Poltava region), six missions, one brotherhood ("The Arc"), two educational establishments (286 students), 104 ministers, 30 Sunday schools. Most communities are concentrated in the Poltava (21), Kyiv (10), Transcarpathian (seven) regions and in Kyiv (10), four communities and three missions are active in the Donetsk region, six communities — in the Dnipropetrovsk, five — in the Luhansk, four — in the Vinnytsia, two each in the Zhytomyr and Khmelnytskyi regions, one each — in the Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv regions. More than 13,000 members. The Head — Presbyter of the Union V. Raichynets. The Union was established in November, 1990.

Independent Pentecostal communities: 230 communities, one administration (in the Transcarpathian region), 288 ministers, 63 Sunday schools, four periodicals. Communities are active in the Crimea (16), Vinnytsia (43), Volyn (eight), Dnipropetrovsk (11), Donetsk (four), Zhytomyr (14), Transcarpathian (31), Zaporizhia (eight), Kyiv (four), Kirovohrad (six), Luhansk (12), Lviv (seven), Mykolayiv (nine), Odesa (four), Poltava (10), Rivne (two), Ternopil (eight), Cherkasy (14) regions, in the cities of Kyiv (18) and Sevastopol (one).

The Union of God's Church of Ukraine: 20 communities, one centre, 26 ministers, 10 Sunday schools, one periodical. The Union's structures are mainly concentrated in the Donetsk region (centre, eight communities, eight Sunday schools, the periodical), five communities are active in the Kirovohrad region, six — in the Chernivtsi, one — in the Kharkiv region.

God's Church in Prophecies in Ukraine: 17 communities, one centre, two missions, 24 ministers, three Sunday schools. Seven communities are active in the Cherkasy region, four each — in the Donetsk and Kherson regions, two — in Kyiv, where the centre and a Sunday school of this Church are situated; one mission is active in the Kyiv region.

Map 8. The regional distribution of the AUUC CEF communities



were built (33.7% of presently active), another 90 are under construction. The coefficient of communities' provision with religious buildings makes 0.6.

Adventist unions, Churches and communities

Adventism is represented in Ukraine by two unions: the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists and the Church of Seventh-day Adventists of the Reform Movement. There is also one independent community[†]. A branch of the World Adventist Aid

and Development Organisation³⁰ is also active in Ukraine. It engages in social and charitable activity, first of all — assistance to those who have suffered from natural disasters. Among other events in Ukraine, this branch organised treatment of children who suffered from the Chornobyl nuclear power plant accident, arranged soup kitchens for the poor, and rendered assistance to flood victims in the Transcarpathian and Volyn regions³¹.


Adventists pay special attention to evangelising, promotion of the healthy way of life, charitable and benevolent activities.

The Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (UUC SDA) The institution was established (registered) in 1988. It includes six regional conferences: Eastern, Central, Western, Chernivtsi, Podillia and Southern. Communities united in the Conference have some 60,000 believers. The UUC SDA is a part of the Eurasian Division of Seventh-day Adventists.



The President of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists is Volodymyr Krupskiy (elected in 1993).

The development of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists institutional network




† The Church of Seventh-day Adventists of the Reform Movement: 54 communities, the centre, 45 ministers, six Sunday schools, one periodical. Communities are mainly concentrated in the Transcarpathian (26) and Chernivtsi (17) regions. four communities are active in the Dnipropetrovsk region, three — in the Odesa, one each — in the Crimea, the Kyiv, Mykolayiv regions and in Kyiv, where the Church's Centre is also situated.

The independent community of Seventh-day Adventists with three ministers exists in the Chernivtsi region. It has a Sunday school.

³⁰ Active in Ukraine from 1985, registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine as a branch of the international organisation in 1993.

³¹ The Church of Seventh-day Adventists spends significant sums on charity, as it is one of the few Christian Churches that have preserved the practice of tithing.

Map 9. The regional distribution of the UUC SDA communities



The institutional network of the UUC SDA is expanding steadily (*Diagr. "The development of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists institutional network"*). In 1991-1999, the number of its communities has increased almost five-fold; two theological schools have been founded; and the publishing house "Dzherelo Zhyttia" ("The Source of Life") issues numerous religious books.

The highest concentration of UUC SDA communities, per 10,000 residents, is in four regions of Ukraine: the Chernivtsi (0.9), Vinnytsia (0.4), Transcarpathian (0.4), and Cherkasy (0.3) regions: a third of all communities of the Ukrainian Conference (33.7%) is concentrated in those regions (*Map 9*). Communities of the UUC SDA have 375 religious buildings, 259 (69%) of them — in ownership, 116 — in use; besides, 357 premises are being leased. Between 1992-1999, 114 religious buildings were built (30.4% of presently active), another 62 are under construction. The coefficient of communities' provision with houses of worship is 0.51.


Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses in Ukraine

The organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses is one of the so-called "problem" communities, sparking controversy amongst the public, which is accompanied by public discussion and often with court trials. The negative attitude toward this organisation is primarily caused by its rather aggressive methods of missionary work (the large circulation and the wide variety of its publications, their distribution through private mailboxes, in the streets, on

public transportation, visits to people's homes, phone calls, etc.), and rather strict limitations regarding the way of life and medical treatment (for instance, the ban on blood transfusion, which sometimes endangers the lives of adherents of this organisation).

The first communities of Jehovah's Witnesses appeared in Western Ukraine in the 1920s. In the Soviet times, this organisation was prohibited, and communities acted without registration. The Church was registered in 1991, and since then has been expanding rather dynamically (*Diagr. "Institutional network of the Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses"*). It is worth noting that the official indicators do not fully reflect the true scale of the organisation's activity. For instance, in Ukraine, only one publication of Jehovah's Witnesses is registered, but hundreds of thousands of copies of the magazine "Probudys!" ("Wake up!"), tens


Institutional network of the Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses



of thousands of booklets, books, leaflets, etc. are regularly brought from abroad and distributed free throughout the country.



Map 10. The regional distribution of the Jehovah's Witnesses communities



Communities of the Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses exist in all of Ukraine's regions, but are mainly concentrated in three western regions: first of all, in Transcarpathia, where 22.9% of all communities are situated, and also in the Lviv and Chernivtsi regions. In all, 42% of the entire network is located there (*Map 10*). The highest saturation of Jehovah's

Witnesses' communities per 10,000 residents is observed in the Transcarpathian region (1.08); the lowest — in the Cherkasy region (0.01).

New religious movements

New religious movements (NRM, neo-religions) usually emerge on the basis of existing religions, as their synthesis (syncretising) or modernisation. This is how one distinguishes between neo-orientalist trends, based on oriental religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.), neo-Christian, neo-pagan and synthetic (syncretic, the "New Age") religions.

Neo-religions are mainly followed by youths, people with a higher education, intellectuals. They show a high level of religious activity, engage in missionary work and charity³². Heads of neo-religious groupings take into account the suspicious stance of the public and authorities, and for this reason demonstrate their interest in problems of national and cultural revival, and loyalty to the authorities³³.

Virtually all neo-religious trends known in the world are represented in Ukraine: there is a network of religious communities of the Oriental trend[†], of neo-Christian[‡] and synthetic^{*} nature. Various pagan trends built on the Slav mythology can also be treated as new religious movements, since this mythology has long lost its religious tradition, and its rites have partly become folk tradition, and have been partly

† **The Community of Krishna Consciousness:** 38 communities, the Centre and an educational establishment (43 students) in Kyiv; 34 priests, seven Sunday schools, two periodicals. Four communities are active in the Crimea, the Donetsk and Zaporizhia regions, three — in the Odesa region, two each — in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Sumy, Kharkiv regions, one each — in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Transcarpathian, Kirovohrad, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv regions, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

Vishnaite community in Kyiv.

Communities of followers of Sri Chinmoy: one community in the Zaporizhia and one in the Chernivtsi region.

Buddhist communities: 33 communities, two centres (in the Donetsk and Transcarpathian regions), 26 priests, three Sunday schools. Seven communities exist in the Donetsk region, four each — in the Luhansk, Kharkiv, Cherkasy regions, three each — in the Odesa and Zaporizhia regions, one each — in the Crimea, Transcarpathian, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Kherson, Cherkasy regions, cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

Taoist communities: three communities, two of them in Kyiv, one — in the Crimea; two priests.

"Chaitani's Mission": one community in the Lviv region, three priests.

"The Faith of Light": one community in Kyiv; one priest.

The Movement of Dharma Kalka: one community in the Volyn region; one priest.

Panchama Veda (Tantrists): one community in the Donetsk region; one priest.

Communities of Satya Sai Baba's followers: one community in the Kherson region.

Guhyasamaja: one community in the Crimea; one priest.

‡ **The Church of the Last Commandment ("Visarionivtsi"):** two communities (in the Zaporizhia and Poltava regions); one priest.

* **The Universal Church of the Great White Brotherhood (USMALOS):** one community in Kyiv with two priests.

Communities of the Bahayi Faith: 12 communities, Centre (in Kyiv), five priests. Three communities are active in the Poltava region, two — in the Crimea, one each — in the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, Odesa, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi regions, and in Kyiv.


Sahaja-Yoga (Universal Pure Religion): five communities, three priests. One community in each of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Cherkasy regions, and in Kyiv.

³² The study of new religions in Ukraine's large cities (Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Donetsk, Mykolaiv and Sevastopol) has revealed specific social and demographic features of its bearers: the majority of them are young people (51%), with higher and uncompleted higher education (54.1%), intellectuals (teachers, doctors, scientists, cultural workers — 29.2% of the polled) and students (close to 20%). Nearly 40% are people of middle age (30-49 years); among respondents, only 9.1% were workers, 6.7% — employees, 0.7% — peasants. Every third polled neo-Protestant (30.2%) and every second follower of Krishnaism and Buddhism engages in missionary and/or charitable activity. It is interesting to note that almost half (49.3%) of those polled denied participation in any public or political activities. See: Babiy M. New Religious Trends and Cults in Present-day Ukraine (based on sociological surveys). — *Ukrayinske Relihiyevnavstvo*, 1996, No.1, p.19.

³³ For instance, the newspaper of the Church "The Word of Faith" (Pastor — Sunday Adelaja) publishes on its front page "The Prayer for Ukraine's Authorities", blessing the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers and "all the authorities in this country". See: *Slovo Very*, August, 2000, p.1.



The development of the Christian Churches of the Charismatic trend institutional network



assimilated by Orthodoxy[†]. Some new religious movements act in Ukraine as public organisations³⁴.

Recently, one of the most widespread and debated trends has been the Charismatic movement, which belongs to neo-Christian trends.

Christian Churches of the Charismatic trend
The Charismatic movement is steadily expanding in Ukraine. As of January 1, 1992, 27 communities of the Charismatic trend were registered, and between 1992-1999, the number of communities rose more than 18-fold, of priests — from 40 in 1993 to 636 at the beginning of 2000. After 1994, Charismatic entities began establishing schools. Today, there are more than 1,500 students at seven such schools (*Diagr. "The development of the Christian Churches of the Charismatic trend institutional network"*).

As of the beginning of 2000, there were two Church unions of the Charismatic trend in Ukraine: The Church of the Full Gospel, and The Church of the Living God; there are also more than 100 independent communities[‡].

Communities of the Charismatic trend have 124 houses of worship, 18 of them — in ownership, 106 — in use; besides, 412 premises are being leased for worship. The coefficient of communities' provision with houses of prayer is 0.2. In 1992-1999, only three religious buildings were built, another five are under construction.

Communities of Charismatic Churches are active in all of Ukraine's regions. Many of them (23%) are concentrated in the Donetsk region, where they make up 11.7% of all religious communities active in the region (*Map 11*).

The spread of the Charismatic movement is being met with suspicion on the part of the public. According to the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs, the flow of

[†] **Native Ukrainian National Faith (RUN-vira):** 51 communities, two centres (in Kyiv and Cherkasy), 45 priests, seven Sunday schools, two periodicals. 10 communities are active in Kyiv, seven — in the Vinnytsia region, six — in the Zaporizhia, five each — in the Poltava and Cherkasy regions, three — in the Khmelnytskyi region, two each — in the Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa regions, one each — in the Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Luhansk, Lviv, Rivne, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi regions.

Ancient Slav religious communities: three communities (in the Zhytomyr, Kharkiv regions and in Kyiv — one each), three priests, one Sunday school.

Zoresvitne Christianity - Free Religion: one community in the Luhansk region; one priest.

Ukrainian Pagans: two communities (in Kyiv and in the Chernihiv region), two priests; one periodical.


Svyatoslavna Tserkva: one community in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

[‡] **Communities of the Charismatic trend:** 139 communities, three missions, one brotherhood, two educational establishments (158 students), 161 priests, 48 Sunday schools, three periodicals. The majority of the communities are active in the South and East of the country: in the Odesa (23), Mykolayiv (22), Zaporizhia (17), Luhansk (eight) regions, and the Crimea (13); many communities are active in the Cherkasy region — 14; eight each — in the Dnipropetrovsk and Chernivtsi regions, five — in the Vinnytsia, three — in the Volyn, two each — in the Kirovohrad and Khmelnytskyi, one each — in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Chernihiv regions.

The Church of the Living God: 30 communities, one Administration, 25 priests, 20 Sunday schools, one periodical. Communities are concentrated in the Transcarpathian region, where the Administration and Sunday schools are located, and the newspaper is published; one community is active in the Lviv region.

³⁴ For instance, in Kharkiv, a branch of the Scientology Church is registered as a public organisation (under the name of "Hubbard's Humanitarian Centre"); two branches of scientologists are active in Kyiv: one — as a public organisation, another — without registration. See: Petryk V. The Church of Scientology. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.4, p.39-44.

Map 11. The regional distribution of the Christian Churches of the Charismatic trend communities



complaints against Charismatic Churches by different religious organisations and individual citizens to the bodies of state power remains uninterrupted from the very moment of their

registration³⁵. At the same time, Charismatic structures are getting support from some political parties and deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, actively merging with business circles, enrolling businessmen and famous names. All this helps Charismatic organisations to withstand the negative attitude of the public³⁶.

Ukraine is a multinational and multicultural country. Within its territory exist different non-Christian Churches, trends, movements of the countries of origin of some of Ukraine's citizens[†].

Different non-Christian confessions are also represented in Ukraine. The most widespread among these are Judaism and Islam.

Judaism

In Ukraine, Judaism is represented by several institutional structures and trends. The most numerous are The Association of Judaic Religious Organisations in Ukraine, The All-Ukrainian Congress of Judaic Communities, The Hasid Association Khabad Liubavych of Judaic Religious Communities and Organisations of Ukraine*.

† **The Anglican Episcopal Church:** one community in Kyiv, one priest.

The Armenian Apostolic Church: 15 communities, Administration (in Lviv), eight priests. Six communities are active in the Crimea, two — in the Odesa region, one each — in the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Poltava, Kharkiv regions, and in Kyiv.

The Armenian Catholic Church: one community in Lviv.

The Transcarpathian Reformed Church (Hungarian): all structures of the Church are concentrated in the Transcarpathian region; 104 communities, the Centre, three administrations, 80 Sunday schools, one periodical, 52 ministers.

Karaim Communities: four communities, three of them — in the Crimea, one — in the Kharkiv region; one priest.

The Korean Baptist Church: three communities — two in the Crimea and one in Kyiv; three priests.

Krymchak community — active in the Crimea.

The German Evangelical Lutheran Church: 41 communities, 31 priests (including seven foreigners), 14 Sunday schools, one periodical. Nine communities are active in the Crimea, four each — in the Odesa and Mykolayiv regions, three — in the Kherson region, two each — in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Poltava, Kharkiv regions, one each — in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Luhansk regions, the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

The Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church: one community in the Kherson region.

The Baptist Evangelical Church: two communities (one in the Mykolayiv and one in the Odesa region), two priests, one Sunday school.

* **The Association of Judaic Religious Organisations in Ukraine:** 64 communities, one centre and one mission (in Kyiv), one educational establishment (20 students), 26 rabbis (including 17 foreign citizens), 20 Sunday schools, five periodicals. 10 communities are active in the Transcarpathian region, eight — in the Chernivtsi, six each — in the Poltava, Sumy and Cherkasy regions, five — in the Vinnytsia, three each — in the Khmelnytskyi region and in Kyiv, two each — in the Crimea, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv and Chernihiv regions, one each — in the Zhytomyr, Odesa and Ternopil regions. The Association is headed by the Rabbi of Kyiv and Whole Ukraine Yakiv Dov BlaiKh (a U.S. citizen).

The All-Ukrainian Congress of Judaic Religious Communities: seven communities, one centre (in Kyiv), four rabbis (three of them foreigners), one Sunday school, one periodical. Three communities are active in the Cherkasy region, two each — in the Luhansk region and in Kyiv.


The Hasid Association Khabad Liubavych of Judaic Religious Communities and Organisations of Ukraine: 40 communities, one centre (in the Dnipropetrovsk regions), six administrations, 35 rabbis (18 of them — foreigners), one educational establishment (eight students), 24 Sunday schools, 10 periodicals. 10 communities are active in the Donetsk region, seven — in the Kherson, five each — in the Zhytomyr and Kharkiv regions, four — in the Mykolayiv, three — in the Odesa, two each — in the Dnipropetrovsk and Rivne regions, one each — in the Crimea and the Vinnytsia regions.

³⁵ Religion and Church in Ukraine: August. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1999, No.9, p.29.

³⁶ Pastor of the Church of the Full Gospel V.Shushkevych: "We have no need to look for justification, we are open for dialogue, and everything that we make, we make openly. Nobody is brought to our Churches by force, they [Churches] are officially registered by the authorities, and everybody can come to our gathering, to hear and see everything by himself. We perform large-scale charitable projects and help people both materially and spiritually. If a person felt something wrong with his soul after our sermons... he would have never come to us for the second or third time, would have not stayed with us. So far, our greatest problem is the structures that could host all who come to our services... Indeed, there are quite a few known people in our communities. I can mention the singers Katya Buzhynska and Viktor Pavlik, the kick-boxer Parkhomenko — this list is not final... Probably we differ from other Churches by a higher share of successful people in our ranks." See: Pastor and Politics. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.3, p.50.



The development of Judaic communities institutional network



There are also small communities of different reform trends in Judaism[†].

The institutional network of Judaic synagogues is characterised by a steady growth. In

1992-1999, the number of communities increased more than three-fold, of rabbis — five-fold. Such a situation was conditioned by the need to provide rabbis for communities that had no such at the end of 1980s. Since training of rabbis in the country takes much time, at present, almost half of rabbis are foreign nationals. As of January 1, 2000, educational establishments founded by Judaic synagogues had 28 students (*Diagr. "The development of Judaic communities institutional network"*).


Communities of Judaic synagogues exist in all of Ukraine's regions, but in none of them do they make up a significant share of the overall structure of religious communities (*Map 12*).

Islam

Muslim institutions in Ukraine developed rapidly in 1993-1996. This was caused, first and foremost, by the repatriation of Crimean Tartars. The dynamics of institutional network growth is rather high and stable. The number of muezzins and imams is increasing at a faster pace, compared to the number of communities. From 1994, the priesthood is trained in Ukraine (*Diagr. "The development of the Islamic communities institutional network"*).

The confession has no single institutional structure, with three independent centres: in Kyiv (The Spiritual Administration of Ukraine's Muslims, headed by Sheikh Tamim Ahmed Mohammed Mutah), Donetsk (The Independent Spiritual Administration of

Map 12. The regional distribution of Judaic communities




[†] **Judeo-Christian communities:** 12 communities, 12 rabbis, four Sunday schools. Six communities are active in Kyiv, two — in the Kharkiv region, one each — in the Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Luhansk, and Odesa regions.

Religious communities of Progressive Judaism: 15 communities, one centre (in Kyiv), seven rabbis, seven Sunday schools. Seven communities are active in the Crimea, two — in the Kirovohrad region, one each — in the Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Mykolayiv, Ternopil regions and in Kyiv.


Communities of Messian Judaism: five communities (one each — in the Crimea, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Rivne and Kherson regions), one centre (in the Rivne region), three rabbis, one Sunday school.

The development of the Islamic communities institutional network



Ukraine's Muslims, headed by Rashid Bragin), and Simferopol (The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Crimea, headed by Mufti Emir Ali Efendi). In February, 1998, these centres agreed to co-ordinate their activities³⁷.

Map 13. The regional distribution of the Muslim communities



Despite the substantial overall presence in Ukraine (1.5% of all religious communities in the country), the confession has a clearly regional character: 78.3% of communities are concentrated in the Crimea, and in 10 out of 25 Ukraine's regions, not a single community has been registered (*Map 13*).

Foreign, and particularly Turkish Islamic structures are interested in the situation with Islam in Ukraine³⁸. The Simferopol Madrasah is under the Turkish influence: its curriculum is based on the programmes of Turkish lyceums that train imams, lectures are delivered by professors invited from Turkey, and the graduates normally continue their education in Turkey³⁹. Istanbul's Mufti Salahutdin Kaya took part in the Donetsk Islamic University opening ceremony⁴⁰.

1.3 REGIONAL DIMENSION

The analysis of indicators of religious organisations' spread in Ukraine's regions demonstrates: (1) clear regional differences in the saturation with religious institutions; (2) a shift of the Church and religious life to the west of the country; (3) the actual absence of mono-confessional zones (regions, areas) in Ukraine; (4) the


³⁷ The Declaration made by the participants of the meeting of Heads of Spiritual Administrations reads: "For the sake of unity of actions of Ukraine's Muslim organisations, and further prosperity of Islam, the members of the meeting... agreed to pursue concurrent and co-ordinated activities in all directions". See: "Slaviansky Mir" News Agency, May 20, 1999.

³⁸ For instance, on the part of the Turkish Islamic organisation "Nurju", whose leader Fetullah Gulen is simultaneously the leader of the religious enlightenment movement "Nur", advocates the pan-Turkic idea, and aims at establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. As Mr. Tkach witnesses, on the territory of Ukraine the interests of "Nurju" are advocated by the Turkish company "Cag", and the joint-stock company "Ukrainian Education Association "Cag", established with the support of its management. This structure finances the Turkish college in the Crimea and Turkish language courses attached to Odessa State University; "Cag" establishes religious enlightenment centres in different regions of the country, renders material assistance to some religious communities, staying under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Crimea. See: Tkach R. Religion and Commerce. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1999, No.10, p.13.

³⁹ See: Vaskovskiy V. Theological Education in Ukraine: Problems and Trends. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1998, No.10, p.28-29.

⁴⁰ The First Islamic University in Ukraine. — *Robitnycha Hazeta*, September 7, 1999, p.3.

The number of communities, by regions
% of total number of communities in Ukraine



presence of evidently dominant confessions in some regions, and at the same time (5) the absence of a confession (Church), holding dominant position in all of Ukraine's regions.

Although in 1992-1999, a trend was observed toward closing the gap between regions in the number of communities, a clear regional difference persists (*Diagr. "The number of communities, by regions"*). The largest number of communities (9,758, or 42.9%) are active in the West of the country, where only 19.7% of Ukraine's population lives. Almost one fifth of all religious communities (18.2%, or 4,141 communities) are concentrated in the Central region of the country, 14.8% (3,372 communities) — in the North, 13.1% (2,964 communities) — in the East, 11% (2,483 communities) — in the South.

Regional differences in the number of religious communities per 10,000 people are also evident. This indicator is the highest in the country's West: 10.1 communities per 10,000 people (the highest figure — 13.1 — in the Ternopil region, the lowest — 8.1 — in the Ivano-Frankivsk region). In the centre, this indicator makes up 5.4 (the highest — 8.7 — in the Khmelnytskyi region, the lowest — 3.2 — in the Kirovohrad region). In the North, this index is equal to 4.2 (the highest — 6.4

— in the Zhytomyr region, the lowest — 1.7 — in Kyiv); in the South, it makes up 3.0 (the highest — 4.0 — in the Crimea; the lowest — 1.5 — in Sevastopol); in the East — 1.9 (the highest — 2.6 — in the Zaporizhzhya region, the lowest — 1.5 — in the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions).

The Western region

It is not confessionally homogenous. Despite 96.9% of all UGCC communities are concentrated there, only in the Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions this confession dominates, at least numerically: Greek Catholic communities make up 55.1% of the entire number of religious communities. In the Ternopil region, Greek Catholic communities make up almost half (48.6%).

In the Volyn, Transcarpathian and Rivne regions, the UOC retains the lead position, with 47.3% (475 communities), 36.5% (511) and 44.8% (494 communities), respectively. Protestant communities are the second largest denomination in those regions, with 28.3% (284), 35.5% (496), and 30.2% (333 communities), respectively. In the Chernivtsi region, Protestant communities are in a relative majority, with 42%; second place belongs to the UOC, with 39.8% (378 communities).

The dynamics of changes in the confessional network of the West shows a steady tendency toward decreasing the share of Orthodox communities: in 1992-1999, it fell from 51.5% to 35.4%. The share of Greek Catholic communities also decreases: from 33% in 1992, to 32.8% at the beginning of 2000. At the same time, the share of Protestant communities is on the rise: from 16.4% to 20.2%, respectively. The share of Roman Catholic communities has been stable since 1996, at 3.7%.

The Southern region

Here, the UOC is in the lead position. It controls 46% of all religious communities within the area (1,144). It is followed by Protestant communities — 27.2% (676 units). Islam occupies the third place: 8.6% (290 communities) of Ukraine's Muslim communities are concentrated in the region. They make up 11.7% of all communities in the area, and one-third (34%) — in the Crimea.

Representation of the UOC-KP in the area is limited: 5.8% (144 communities); the UAOC has 0.9% (22 communities). In general, the share of Orthodox communities in the region makes up 52.8% (1,310 entities).

The North

Almost half of all religious communities belong to the UOC — 49.8% (1,679 communities). Protestant communities occupy the second place: 26.7% (899 communities).

The presence of UOC-KP in the region is also noticeable: its communities make 13.6% (458) of the total number. In general, the share of Orthodox communities in the area equals to 64.3% (2,167 entities).

The Centre

The share of the UOC communities makes up 54.7% (2,265). Protestantism is the second largest confession, with 26.4% (1,092 communities of different trends). Here, RCC communities are active, making up 5.6% (232 entities).

In general, the Orthodox share in the area makes up 65.8% (2,724 communities).

The East

45.8% (1,357 communities) within the entire religious network belong to the UOC. All in all, the Orthodoxy, with its 1,539 communities, makes up 51.2% of communities within the area. 39.2% (1,162 communities) are Protestant, representing different trends.

The above data lead us to the following conclusions.

Regional differences in the spread of different confessions and trends, that manifested so acutely in late '80s - early '90s, are not about to vanish.

In Ukraine, there is no Church prevailing in all of the country's regions. Each of the Churches is of a regional character, their spheres of influence remain limited. The UOC is the closest to the status of the national Church, if judged by the degree and evenness of its presence, but it does not have a dominant position in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions.

Over the recent years, in some of the country's regions, Protestant communities make up the majority or a weighty share of religious organisations (more than 40% of the entire religious infrastructure) — in the Donetsk region, in Kyiv, in the Zaporizhzhya, Kirovohrad, and Chernivtsi regions).

The country's coverage by neo-religious organisations essentially differs from the established confessional configuration, which is clearly shifted westwards; instead, neo-religious formations are likely to cover Ukraine's territory with their communities evenly.

2. INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS

THE PROBLEMS AND TRENDS

This section analyses the problem areas of inter-Church relations in Ukraine, designates the main factors of inter-confessional confrontation, and outlines ways of overcoming problems and the prospects of relations between Ukrainian Churches.

Ukraine is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state. In conditions of social and economic transformation, this makes inter-Church relations especially important. The negative experience of some post-socialist countries (former Yugoslavia, Russia) shows that the confessional and religious factor, combined with the national, ethnic and political ones, can provoke tough and lengthy civil opposition.

Despite the rather complicated confessional situation, Ukraine managed to avoid significant social conflicts on religious grounds. At the same time, if one puts aside several examples of political conflicts, it was exactly the sphere of inter-Church relations where forcible clashes between adherents of different Churches took place. Some of them involved paramilitary formations of UNA-UNSO and Ukrainian Cossacks, whose units supported different Churches⁴¹. This proves the existence of conflict-fraught problem areas in inter-Church relations in Ukraine.

The analysis of confessional conflicts that took place over the last decade shows three levels of contradictions: first — between traditional Churches and new religious movements; second — between traditional Churches of different confessions; third — between Churches of the same confession.

2.1 CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL CHURCHES AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Today, opposition of the first level is typical for many countries. This opposition is caused by the spread of various neo-religious formations, which sometimes sharply differ from established traditional forms of religious practice. The aggressive character of missionary activities of these new-born trends, their non-recognition of such notions as canonical territory or proselytising⁴² are often causing negative attitude on the part of traditional Churches.

In Ukraine, neo-religious formations are spreading rapidly. In 1999 alone, the number of religious communities of the new trends increased by 15%. Ukraine is within the field of influence of foreign neo-religious missions and centres: in 1999, close to 2000 missionaries representing new religious trends came here. The new teachings are broadly represented in Ukraine's informational space, particularly on television. Monitoring performed by UCEPS experts has shown that the volume of neo-religious broadcasting in 1999 rose against the previous year by 50% and amounted to nearly 18 hours a week.

⁴¹ At a press-conference at UNA-UNSO headquarters it was reported that in the incident on St. Sophia Square during Patriarch Volodymyr's (Romaniuk) funeral on July 18, 1995, close to 360 UNSO members suffered. See: No More "Bloody Saturday"! — *Vseukrainskie Vedomosti*, July 22, 1995, p.2. There also were media reports that Ukrainian Cossacks guarded the Patriarch's tomb. See: Militia Considers Accusations Groundless. — *Kievskie Vedomosti*, August 11, 1995, p.17.

⁴² Proselytising: conversion of believers of a different faith into a certain confession. Canonical territories: recognised by canon law as such to which a certain Church has predominant right on the basis of tradition.

The traditional Churches (first of all, the Orthodox Churches, the Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church) have taken a position of principled non-acceptance of the new trends, especially of neo-Christian tint. In different ecclesiastic publications and secular mass media, representatives of traditional Churches criticise their teaching and the practice of worship from the position of their own dogmas. In March, 1998, hierarchs of traditional Churches turned to the President of Ukraine with a joint Declaration, where they spoke about the need for authorities' interference with the process of uncontrolled spread of various religious practices harmful for mental and physical health of people in Ukraine. They also demanded restricting the unimpeded propagation of new religious teachings in mass media.

The position of traditional Churches with respect to new religious trends has been supported by some public organisations⁴³ and political parties. The public also supports their position. According to the results of a poll conducted by the UCEPS sociological service in August, 2000, the majority (59.6%) of those polled expressed their negative attitude toward mass sermons practised by neo-Christian groupings.

Nevertheless, the new religious formations already enjoy the support of some parties, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada and business circles in Ukraine. For this reason, any attempts to criticise them (on the part of traditional Churches, public organisations and mass media) regarding possible harm of the new religious practices is met with counter-accusations of religious discrimination and encroachment on the democratic principle of the freedom of conscience.

Given the rapid spread of the new religious trends, their determination to expand missionary activity and coverage of the entire territory of Ukraine, it can be predicted that the conflict between the traditional and new Churches will not fade away. Under the pressure of the traditional Churches and the public, the state will have to take measures prescribing the degree and the nature of new religious practices' influence on the health and social behaviour of Ukraine's citizens.

2.2 CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL CHURCHES OF DIFFERENT CONFESSIONS

The practice of inter-Church relations shows the existence of tension practically between all confessions present in Ukraine: between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Orthodoxy

and Greek Catholicism, Greek and Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism, Orthodoxy and Islam. This tension does not always display itself in overt confrontation between Churches as institutions. Sometimes it is manifested through local confrontations on the level of communities, eparchies, etc. On the other hand, confrontation at the top does not always reach lower church structures.

Analysing the development of existing conflicts and arguments of the confronting parties leads to the conclusion that contradictions between Churches of different confessions are caused by a complex set of dogmatic, canonical and property factors, but their main reason is the combination of the confessional-religious factor with ethnic and political factors. **Two problems come to the front in relations between Churches: their attitude to Ukraine's statehood and the perception of its national character.**

Contradictions between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches are mainly based on property issues. After the forced self-dissolution of the UGCC in 1946, its property and religious buildings were partly transferred to communities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Resumption of UGCC activities in 1989 brought about the problem of restitution. Since at that time former UGCC buildings were used by communities of two Orthodox churches — the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which renewed its activities simultaneously with the Greek Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church — this caused conflicts which sometimes have taken on violent forms and have been resolved through the use of force. With the establishment of the UOC-KP (1992), contradictions between the Orthodox and Greek Catholics reached the third 'battlefront' — between the communities of UGCC and UOC-KP. At the same time, these confrontations are each of a different character.

UGCC property claims against the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church from the very beginning were connected with national, ethnic and historical factors: the ROC was accused of participating in the Russification of Ukraine and persecution of the Greek Catholic Church. Self-administration, granted to the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, and its renaming into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, failed to change the situation. In 1989-1993, the UOC was gradually forced out from the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions, sometimes with violent seizure of houses of worship (even those that historically belonged to the Orthodox

⁴³ Since 1993, the public organisation named "Poryatunok" (Salvation) has been active. Its main purpose is to inform the public about the destructive character of some neo-religious formations, consulting parents whose children were involved into 'problem' religious organisations, and promoting social rehabilitation of young people affected by destructive religious movements.

Church)⁴⁴. The UOC lost near two thirds of its communities in the region. Actions of the UGCC and local authorities that supported this Church were strongly condemned by the Head of the UOC and the Moscow Patriarch, and turned into one of the main reasons for increased tension between the Roman Catholic Church and World Orthodoxy in general, and between the Vatican and the Moscow Patriarchy in particular.

Contradictions between Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church are caused, apart from the dogmatic differences, by the problems of the Union of Brest, primarily those related with the UGCC, and by problems tied to proselytising and canonical territories⁴⁵. The Moscow Patriarchate (and, correspondingly the UOC) consider Ukraine the canonical territory of the Orthodox Church, and see the activity of the restored UGCC and any intensification of the RCC mission as proselytising. At the same time, the position of the Moscow Patriarchate regarding the Union as an "abnormal" phenomenon in Christianity, and is confined to demanding that the Vatican recognise the non-canonical character of the UGCC and cease "persecution of the Orthodox by Greek Catholics"⁴⁶.

The problems of relations between the RCC and Orthodox Churches are reviewed within the framework of the International joint (Orthodox-Catholic) theological commission established in 1979⁴⁷. At its first meetings (Freising, 1990; Balamand, 1993) documents were adopted whereby the RCC admitted that Union was not a way of attaining unity between the Orthodox and Catholics. However, it refused to recognise the non-canonical character of the UGCC. In 1993-2000, the Commission did not meet because of the acuteness of the issue of Greek Catholicism. After a seven-year break, in July, 2000, the Commission met in Baltimore, U.S., but failed to adopt any constructive decisions. The Commission only ascertained the preservation of contradictions and lack of compromise in both parties, on the level of the top hierarchy of the Churches⁴⁸.

Despite the fact that the negotiation process on the top level appeared deadlocked, there are

trends toward establishing a dialogue between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy on the level of Churches in Ukraine. The RCC has expressed its readiness to communicate with all Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. There is also a tendency towards more active dialogue between the UGCC and the UOC. The dialogue was initiated by Catholic structures. In July, 1998, UOC and UGCC delegations met in Vienna on the initiative and with support of the "Pro Oriente" Catholic foundation. When discussing the religious situation in Western Ukraine, the parties, first of all, unilaterally condemned violent actions for dispute resolution, second, agreed on the possibility of co-operation between the UGCC and the UOC in charitable activities and education of the youth and in the Armed Forces. At the beginning of 2000, UGCC Bishop-Assistant L.Huzar turned to Metropolitan Volodymyr with a proposal to establish a bilateral consulting commission for a permanent dialogue between the UGCC and the UOC. The UOC Synod supported the address, and in April, 2000, such a group was established under the presidency of Metropolitan Volodymyr.



Therefore, there are some positive tendencies in the relations between the main players in the confessional conflicts of 1989-1993 — the UOC and the UGCC. At the same time, further development of those tendencies can be impeded by the negative attitude to the autocephalous status declared by the UOC Bishops' Council (July, 2000), and the UGCC determination to move eastwards in order to counter the influence of the UOC as a structure subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate⁴⁹.

⁴⁴ For instance, in 1990, the UGCC obtained Svyato-Onufriyevskiy monastery in Lviv, built prior to the Brest Union (1596).

⁴⁵ The Orthodox Churches are virtually united in condemning the spread of non-Orthodox teachings on traditional Orthodox territories. This position was reiterated in the Anniversary Message of Heads of 11 Orthodox Churches to the world, signed during their meeting in Jerusalem in January, 2000. The Message condemns proselytising, especially within regions where Orthodox Churches "for centuries extended their pastoral care". See: *Interfax*, January 5, 2000.

⁴⁶ In July, 2000, Patriarch Aleksei II of the Russian Orthodox Church said: "The precondition for Russia's Church consent to John Paul II visit to Russia is giving up Catholic proselytising on traditional Orthodox soil and stopping the prosecution of the Orthodox by Greek Catholics". See: Borovskiy O. "A "No" to Ecumenism: ROC Is Against the Pope's Visit to Russia." — *Ukrayina Moloda*, August 8, 2000, p.2.

⁴⁷ The Commission was established at the initiative of Pope John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios I. In 1979-1993 the Commission met seven times.

⁴⁸ See: *Between the East and the West*. — *Novy Vek*, September 19, 2000, p.18.

⁴⁹ UGCC Bishop A.Sapeliak said: "The East of Ukraine must be made conscientious, and it is the Church that will do this. Who Russified Eastern Ukraine? Not the government, not tsars, but priests, who have been serving liturgy in Russian until recently. Who made Western Ukraine Ukrainian? First of all, the Church. We need missionaries who would Ukrainianise the East with Sunday services, sermons, and catechising". See: *Ukraine Will Be a Wondrous Paradise*. — *Bulletin of the Centre of Religious Information*, 1999, No.9, p.44.

The Orthodox-Catholic dialogue can be damaged by the Vatican's Declaration "Dominus Jesus" of August 27, 2000, which speaks about the dominant role of the Catholic Church in the world Christianity⁵⁰. The Declaration was criticised by the World Council of Churches, whose leadership believes that this Vatican's document casts doubt upon the very fact of the Churches' common service in the world⁵¹.

Tension is observed in relations between the Crimean Eparchy of the UOC and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Crimea (SAMC). SAMC announced the suspension of its participation in the Crimean Inter-Confessional Council "Peace Is the Gift of God"⁵². Mufti Emir Ali Efendi argued that it was impossible to stay "within the same association with persons who do not encourage peace and confessional concord on the peninsula, but are taking steps in the opposite direction". The problem is that the Crimean eparchy of the UOC sponsors mass installation of 'patriarchal crosses' and billboards along Crimean highways and in historic sites reading "The Crimea Is the Cradle of Orthodoxy!". SAMC believes that, first of all, "the unilateral attempt of one of the religious organisations to install throughout the Crimea its symbols beyond the territory of their temples resembles an attempt to impose certain religious ideology on the peninsula"; *second*, "no religious organisation, no confession cannot and should not claim religious hegemony, including through imposing its symbols upon society which is being built on civil rather than religious principles". Actions of the Orthodox eparchy were also criticised by the leader of Crimean Tartars M.Dzhemilev.



Contradictions between the Crimean Muftiate and the Crimean Eparchy of the UOC cannot be viewed as a tendency toward emergence of a permanent source of tension between Orthodoxy and Islam on the confessional level. At the same time, given the overall situation in the Crimea, the role of the ethnic factor, the unresolved socio-economic problems of Crimean Tartars who make up the Muslim population of the peninsula, it can be said that the conflict requires prompt resolution on the basis of effective legislation and tolerance in society.

2.3 CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN CHURCHES OF THE SAME CONFESSION: THE ORTHODOX SCHISM

The long coexistence of three large Churches of the same confession is simultaneously an indicator and the source of a split in society.

The first institutional division of Orthodoxy was caused by the resumption of UAOC activity in Ukraine (June, 1990), which absorbed part of the episcopate and communities of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the ROC. The revival and activity of the UAOC was strongly supported by nationally-minded and western-oriented political and public circles which viewed the Ukrainian Exarchate of the ROC as one of the institutes of 'eastern influence'. The position of adherents of the UAOC has not changed even after the Ukrainian Exarchate was granted self-administration rights.

In October, 1990, the ROC Bishop's Council, in response to a request of the Ukrainian episcopate, decided to grant the Ukrainian Exarchate independence and self-sufficiency in administration. The Exarchate obtained official self-administration status and was given the name "Ukrainian Orthodox Church". The Exarch (Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych Filaret) obtained the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv and Whole Ukraine. It was planned to present the letter (Thomos) of Patriarch Aleksei II on the independence of the UOC to Metropolitan Filaret and the Synod of the UOC in St. Sophia Cathedral on October 28, 1990. On that day, the first large-scale violent clashes between the Orthodox (adherents of the UOC and the reborn UAOC) in Ukraine's newest history took place. Active participation of Verkhovna Rada's deputies in this event and the

⁵⁰ The Declaration says: "The Catholic Church is the mother of other Christian Churches, and cannot be treated as a "sister". The term "Sister Churches" cannot be applied to relations between Catholics, the Orthodox and Protestants. One can only speak about the Catholic Church as such, and some doctrines in the East". See: *ITAR-TASS/RADONEZH*, September 2, 2000.

⁵¹ *NTV*, September 6, 2000.

⁵² The Crimean Inter-Confessional Council was established in 1992. It united representatives of the Muslim, Orthodox (UOC), Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Judaic, Adventist and Baptist religious organisations.

What is your attitude to initiatives on the unification of the Churches made by the President of Ukraine, political parties and individual politicians?

P o i n t o f v i e w



Rector of the Kyiv Theological Schools of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Hierarch Mykola ZABUHA

The President spelled out what is needed clearly, honestly and openly. It is exactly the position of the Church leadership. Regarding the unification initiatives put forward by other people, the issue of autocephalous status is a purely ecclesiastic matter, especially given that the Church and state are separate.

During the period following the 1992 schism, this issue became associated with personalities, political factors, national factors, state factors, emotions, geographic and geopolitical realities, and became an excuse for attaching labels. As you can see, the issue became more and more clouded, for each aspect affects somebody's interests, and because of this there has been no movement. The restoration of Orthodox unity is a realistic question. I say this officially as a participant in the negotiations. I am only bound to remain silent. If I name the conditions, or preconditions, or even points at issue, and they appear in your magazine, new factors will immediately appear, new winds will blow...

The trilateral commission comprising representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the two schisms have had several calm meetings. Everyone is worried by the present situation. We now have to correct what others have done. We cannot whip the bones of Peter I because he insisted on moving the center of the faith from Constantinople to Moscow, we cannot whip the bones of Ivan Mazepa who directly participated in this process. We must turn this past into a bright future.

Some people are sure that what we are doing in a rush today will become the monument to their lives. Earlier, monuments were erected to the living only by a decision of the Politburo of the Communist Party. These people want autocephalia to be their monument. I will not mention any names. I only say that it will be a forced amalgamation, not a unity. If negotiations are underway, they should achieve an indestructible unity which is not subject to challenge and has legitimacy, and Eucharistic unity — Communion from a single chalice — should be restored. This is an internal ecclesiastic problem. It has been artificially stirred up, exploited and compromised through poor performance.

And what about the proposals of some People's Deputies regarding subsequent unification with the Greek Catholic Church? I spoke with the Nuncio and told him that recent statements by the Uniates about their desire to restore unity with Orthodoxy in Ukraine in a single Ukrainian Independent Church, without saying what kind of Church this would be, represent a deception of the public, since the Vatican will never let Uniates simply leave. The adjective "Ukrainian" does not refer to faith, it refers to nationality. It's an issue of a Christian Church, either Orthodox or not. Some people propose parliamentary rather than ecclesiastic methods of unification, like the merger or split of factions. Such methods are alien to the Church. They are speculating on political terms and models for unification. It's merely a deception of the people. God willing, Uniates will voluntarily leave Rome and return to Orthodoxy. But can you imagine this? I can't. The Vatican Nuncio cannot imagine it either. He said it could be possible in the distant future. In the next millennium. We spoke about this approximately a month ago. Meanwhile, people on rostrums are trying to give us a tag. Some people would like to make it appear that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church alone does not want unity.

Hence, the process of unification requires calm, tolerant and cautious assessment. All sides could be formally united within a single day, and this will make headlines. But it will not resolve the problem in reality. The problem can only be resolved legitimately on the basis of canon law.

slogans manifested by the adherents of the UAOC ("No Church — No Nation, No Church — No State") showed that the church situation in Ukraine's Orthodoxy had acquired a clear political colouring, and became a factor of political rather than religious life.

The second division of the Orthodoxy was caused by the virtual split of the UOC in 1992 and attempts at uniting part of it with the UAOC in a new church institution — the UOC-KP. In an attempt to gain autocephalous status, at the end of 1991 Metropolitan Filaret applied to the Moscow Patriarchy. However, the ROC Bishops' Council (April, 1992) refused to grant autocephalous status to the UOC. Metropolitan Filaret was accused of schism and defrocked. On orders of the ROC Synod, the Metropolitan of Kharkiv and Bohodukhiv convened the UOC Bishops' Council in Kharkiv on May 27, 1992, where Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) was elected the new Head of the UOC, Metropolitan of Kyiv and Whole Ukraine.

In this situation the authorities resorted to creating an autocephalous Church alternative to the UOC by uniting the UAOC and the bishops and communities who had left the UOC togeth-

er with Metropolitan Filaret. **The Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declared the decisions of the Kharkiv Council unlawful.** With strong assistance by a group of People's Deputies, in May, 1992, a Congregative Assembly was held, which announced the creation of the Ukrainian autocephalous Church — the UOC-KP. However, only five of 13 UAOC bishops were present at the Assembly. The majority of UAOC bishops and communities refused to recognise the unification and continued to act independently, although their Church's registration was refused. Therefore, an attempt at uniting the Churches by administrative means had had a boomerang effect: in fact, it was another Orthodox split, and since 1992, three large Orthodox Churches have been active in Ukraine. Their relations are rather complicated.

There are no dogmatic or ritual differences between the Orthodox Churches. From the ecclesiastic point of view, the only difference is their status within the World Orthodoxy: as we've already mentioned, the UOC, in contrast to the UAOC and UOC-KP, is recognised as canonical. In practice, this is manifested in international relations amongst the Churches,



Administrator of the Patriarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Kyiv and Poltava
IHOR (Isichenko)

The words of the President of Ukraine, spoken at a solemn meeting in the "Ukraina" palace conceal a huge potential. They don't contain any arrogance or imperative with regard to Churches, often present in declarations of other politicians of a smaller scale. Although those words were met with a mixed reaction outside Ukraine, Ukrainian hierarchs noticed therein the care of a person from an Orthodox family concerning the future of the Church of the Kyiv tradition and his desire, as a member of this Church, to encourage the centripetal process, as far as possible. By the way, they were highly praised in the Ukrainian Orthodox Diaspora. In May, 2000, representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA Archbishop Vsevolod and Archbishop Antony brought the President a letter with a response to his initiatives.

I am afraid that we lost our chance, when the President failed to meet the delegation of the Church staying under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. I have a feeling that the potential of implementing the presidential proposals is disappearing with every passing day due to the unreadiness of the Presidential Administration to search for alternatives to their previous project of obtaining independent status blessed by the Moscow Patriarch. There is also a danger of imposed unification of Churches at an accelerated pace (we need only look back to 1992) on purely political grounds. We hope for the President's wisdom and feeling of responsibility before God, as a Christian.

Other initiatives hardly deserve serious mention. This is political ballast, sometimes of a momentary or dilettante tint. It is noteworthy that, when speaking about "unification", the authors in reality represent the interests of only one religious organisation, and demonstrate their arrogance toward the position of other Churches. It is shameful to bring this up yet again, but ignorance of the canon law, Church history, heritage of our Apostolic Fathers cannot be replaced by any number of patriotic words. And certain persons should even be reminded about the need to carefully read the Bible. It contains many answers to the new 'centripetal initiatives' under the command of an ambitious person.

and also during disputes for Orthodox communities within the country sometimes accompanied by conflicts centred around temples and church property⁵³. The inter-church relations are further aggravated by extra-canonical factors, primarily of national and ethnic character.

Public discussion of confessional and religious problems actively speculates on the idea of a "national Church", whose essence lies in absolutising the role of the Church in the building of the Ukrainian nation (as an ethnic community) and the Ukrainian state (as the state of the titular nation). This leads to the division of Churches into "national" and "anti-national", or anti-state ones. The UAOC, UGCC and UOC-KP are normally included into the first group; assumed "anti-national" are the UOC (for its subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate) and new religious movements (for their cosmopolitanism). The final document of the all-Ukrainian scientific and practical conference "The Idea of the National Church in Ukraine" (Kyiv, October 1997) stated: "History has proved more than once, that the national Church presents a powerful spiritual force in the formation of live national cells fighting for freedom and national independence. The bearers of the national idea are the UOC-KP, UAOC, and UGCC"⁵⁴. The scientific conference "Christianity and Culture" (Ternopil, December 1998) "condemned any attempts at using poly-confessionality to mislead the faithful through the search for cosmopolitan spirituality. True culture-bearing fundamentals of Christian spirituality for the sake of peace and concord in our

common home — Ukraine — can flourish only on the basis of organic combination of the national idea and nationally-oriented Churches"⁵⁵. The final document of the international symposium "Christianity and the National Idea" (Ternopil, October 1999) wrote: "Participants of the symposium express their concern with the facts of strengthening of the de-nationalising role of the religious factor (neo-religions, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate) in present-day Ukraine, manifested in language policy, cultivating values not inherent in Ukrainians, and forming the complex of inferiority in our people"⁵⁶.

The Churches defined as "national" sometimes also resort to emphasising their national character⁵⁷.

In the context of the idea of the "national Church", the problem of inter-Church relations is shifted from the domain of confessional and religious (dogmatic, canonical, etc.) issues into the political sphere, which encompasses inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine, the problems of different social groups' attitude to Ukraine's statehood and its perception as the state of the titular nation, or of civil society (the political nation). Finally, the language issue remains acute.

The division of Churches by ethnic and political criteria makes any inter-Church dialogue for the co-ordination of purely ecclesiastic issues impossible and unnecessary. It can only deepen the existing conflicts between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches. Furthermore, the idea

⁵³ For instance, the clash on August 4, 1999, between the communities of the UOC and UOC-KP around the house of worship in the village of Novoukrainka in Odesa region involved UNSO units. See: Ishchenko S. Does the Church Dispute Implicate "Devilish" Forces? — *Sehodka*, August 7, 1999, p.4. A similar clash also occurred in Lviv around St. Volodymyr's church. See: Appeal of Faithful of the UOC - Parishioners of St. Volodymyr's Church. — *Novy Vek*, July 22, 2000, p.10.

⁵⁴ The Idea of the National Church in Ukraine. — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, 1997, No.6, p.65.

⁵⁵ Scientific Conference "Christianity and Culture". — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, 1999, No.10, p.94.

⁵⁶ Christianity and the National Idea. — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, 1999, No.11, p.108.

⁵⁷ See, for instance, the UOC-KP press-service declaration of September 5, 2000, where the UOC-KP is called "a national Church of the Ukrainian people", and the positive attitude to UAOC is explained by the fact that the latter has "made clear its national position".



Patriarch of Kyiv and the Whole of Rus'-Ukraine FILARET

Our Holy Church greets efforts of political parties and individual politicians aimed at the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, this initiative was first demonstrated not by politicians, but by us, meaning the Church. The initiative of President Kuchma and political parties on unification of Orthodoxy followed our initiative, long after we started persuading statesmen that such unification is needed not only for Orthodox Ukrainians, but also for the state. Thank God, that politicians recognised our arguments. Many finally realised that the light-minded attitude towards the religious situation in the early 1990s, when politicians looked for political capital by dividing the Ukrainian Orthodox into three parts, brought bitterness instead of those benefits, not to even mention the sufferings of the Church itself. Now, it is time to correct this grave and terrible mistake, but it will be much more difficult than preventing it would have been in 1991-1993.

In March 2000, representatives of the Constantinople and Moscow Patriarchies met in Geneva (Switzerland), to discuss the Ukrainian issue. They decided to convene a six-sided meeting in Geneva on July 15, 2000, with the participation of delegations from the Constantinople Patriarchy, the Moscow Patriarchy, Ukraine's state delegation and the three Orthodox Churches from Ukraine: the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Representatives of the Moscow Patriarchy attempted to block the participation of delegations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church from participating in the July negotiations in Geneva, but their demand was refused. The second meeting between representatives from Constantinople and Moscow took place in Geneva on June 23. It saw a very tense discussion: Moscow began to openly oppose negotiations aimed at creating a single independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After the 23 June meeting, the Synod of the Constantinople Patriarchy declared Ukraine its canonical territory, having once again confirmed the illegality of Moscow's incorporation of the Kyiv Metropolitanate in 1686; earlier, other Constantinople Patriarchs (Grigorios VII in 1924 and Dimitrios I in 1990) also spoke on their non-recognition of that act. Then, the Moscow Patriarchy requested that Patriarch Bartholomeos of Constantinople postpone the mentioned multilateral meeting from July 15 to the end of August 2000. As we know, this meeting did not take place. The negotiations with the Moscow Patriarchate aimed at creating a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine were failed.

In contrast to this unfavourable development, the scenario of which has been written behind Ukraine's back, without Ukraine and to the detriment of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate proposes a clear and straight path to unifying the three branches of Ukraine's Orthodoxy at a special nation-wide synod. There is no problem in unifying the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; the problem emerges with the third party — the UOCMP. It should give up scenarios written for the benefit of Russia and to the detriment of Ukraine. Archpriests and the clergy of that Church should recognise their responsibility before God and history for the Ukrainian people, and serve this people, not the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church under the mask of "independent administration" and "autonomy". God Himself blesses us, Ukrainian Orthodox, to unite this glorious year of the second millennium of the birth of the Son of God. After unification in a Single Independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, neither bishop, nor clergyman from any of the three Churches will have rights infringed, or be deprived of his congregation and legitimate privileges. Ukraine is large; regions with many parishes can be divided into several eparchies; parishes will become larger, opposition will disappear, morality will improve, and entirely new conditions will emerge for glorifying our all-merciful God on our sacred Ukrainian land.

of the "national Church" is unacceptable as a matter of principle for Protestant groupings⁵⁸, and can only cause a new line of confessional tension.

Despite the conflicts in inter-Orthodox relations, one cannot but point out positive trends toward dialogue and the search for common positions aimed at drawing closer and possible uniting the Churches.

Since 1996, there have been permanent negotiations and talks between the Orthodox Churches, where each Church makes clear its position regarding the unification and related autocephalous status of the would-be single Church. In 1996, the first consultations between the UOC and the UAOC began. Patriarch Dymytriy formulated the rather moderate position of UAOC, containing only one principled requirement: "The UAOC will not return to the Moscow Patriarchate"; dialogue can take place only if the UOC agrees to unification under the auspices of Constantinople. "And let Russians

serve liturgy in Russian, Ukrainians — in Ukrainian. There would be one administration, there would be unity"⁵⁹.

The UOC position with respect to the initiatives of unification was formulated by the Holy Synod's Session in August, 1995, and has remained virtually unchanged. The UOC believes that negotiations may begin only on the following conditions: (1) termination of the struggle for communities, temples and church property; (2) ruling out interference of politicians; (3) exclusion of Patriarch Filaret from negotiations; (4) dialogue on the basis of canonical rules and prescriptions⁶⁰.

At the same time, in December, 1996, the UOC Bishops' Council came to a decision on the non-expediency of autocephalous status in the situation of Orthodox schism existing in Ukraine⁶¹. This decision was motivated by allegations that where there exists political opposition between the Orthodox Churches, a part of believ-

⁵⁸ Rector of the Kyiv Theological Seminary of Evangelical Baptist Christians A.Prokopchuk wrote: "Sometimes, even in the evangelic environment one can hear that we have "national" theology, with reference to Eastern Church fathers... This is presented as an antithesis to the conceived "western" theology... Such an approach is not far from the appearance of "Ukrainian" Christians, who, in our historical situation, can soon become very much like so-called "German Christians", who in pre-war years supported the dictatorship in Germany, and the Church that it disgraced". See: Prokopchuk A. Jesus Christ Yesterday, Today and for All Eternity the Same! Abstract of the 23rd Congress of Evangelic Baptist Christians of Ukraine. — *Evangel'skaya Niva*, 1998, No.3, p.11.

⁵⁹ See: Avrakhov T. There Will Not Be a Collective Farmers' Meeting Or the Pereyaslavska Rada, But Will There Be a Ukrainian Independent Orthodox Church? — *Kievskie Vedomosti*, April, 23, 1996, p.3.

⁶⁰ See: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Is Ready for Dialogue. — *Kievskie Vedomosti*, August 17, 1995, p.3.

⁶¹ This decision was approved by the majority of bishops, with the exception of the Bishop of Cherkasy and Kaniv Sofroniy. The Council's position was made public by Metropolitan Volodymyr: "Here, talk is also heard about the establishment of the Ukrainian Independent Church, but without the agreement of the faithful this cannot be done, otherwise the schism will deepen. Many would like to stay with the Russian Orthodox Church".



Bishop-Assistant to the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
Lubomyr HUSAR

Initiatives regarding the unification of the Church are clearly for the nation's benefit, therefore it is perfectly understandable and justified that state and political circles express an interest in this subject. However, the public, including officials, must realise that religious unification can only be voluntary by its nature, it should be based on religious convictions and decisions only.

ers disagreeing with the national and ethnic character of the would-be Ukrainian autocephalous Church and its pro-Western orientation would move to the omophoros of the Moscow Patriarchate and, therefore, a new split of UOC will have taken place.

Consultations between the UOC and UAOC failed to bring practical results, but witnessed the need for long-term work aimed at co-ordinating the different positions of the countries with the canonical rules of gaining autocephalous status.

The position of the UOC-KP flows out of its understanding of the essence of the future united Church as a national and state Church, and therefore presumes appealing to authorities with regard to the state's participation in the process of unification. According to Patriarch Filaret, the Ukrainian national Church must be an element of national ideology and the practice of nation-building⁶². For this reason the state should participate in its creation. In August, 1997, Patriarch Filaret publicly called the unification of Orthodoxy into an autocephalous Church the duty of the state authorities: "The issue of establishing the Single Independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine is not purely ecclesiastical. That's why the bodies responsible before the Ukrainian state for national security should directly deal with this matter"⁶³. The process of unification under the auspices of UOC-KP involved kindred public organisations, associations of People's Deputies and political parties. For instance, in October, 1995, a Parliamentary group called 'For the Single Independent Church' was created. The declaration of its establishment was signed by 56 People's Deputies of Ukraine.

In 1996, Kyiv businessman M.Kravets made an attempt to unite "nationally-minded Churches".

He established a missionary association — "Foundation of Ukraine's Spiritual Unity". He planned to involve the UGCC as well. The Foundation was supported by a number of nationally and state-minded political and public structures: OUN, the Officers' Union of Ukraine, the Maecenas League, etc. The UOC refused to take part in the Foundation's initiatives aimed at unification, motivating its stance by the "non-Orthodox view on the unification of Orthodoxy"⁶⁴. Its activity resulted in the "Memorandum of Heads of the UOC-KP and UAOC on the Unification of the Churches into a Single Ukrainian Independent Orthodox Church with a Patriarchal Rule", signed by Patriarchs Dymytriy and Filaret, and by Mr.Kravets himself. It declared the intention of uniting the UAOC and UOC-KP. The Memorandum envisaged convening National Assemblies of the Churches in 1998, and the establishment of a pre-assembly bishops' conference on the basis of parity. This conclave would define the mechanisms of unification and work out the Statute of the united Church. However, on April 30, 1998, Patriarch Dymytriy's statement denouncing the Memorandum was made public. The UAOC Patriarchal Council rejected the proposal of immediate convocation of the National Assembly, and calling, jointly with the UOC-KP, a pre-assembly conference. Instead, it proposed a long-term four-stage programme of unification of the Orthodox Churches.

In 1999-2000 the unification process was reinvigorated. The formal reason was the Bi-millennium of Christianity. The political reason was that in March, 1999, the President of Ukraine expressed his positive attitude towards unification of the Orthodox Churches⁶⁵. There was also an internal ecclesiastic factor: the growing activity of Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarch



⁶² See: Levytskyi M. Patriarch Filaret: "For Us, Ukrainians, Especially Desirable Is the Union with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church". — *Chas*, July 21, 2000, p.5.

⁶³ *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.6, p.7.

⁶⁴ Rechinsky S. "Spiritual Unification" of Ukraine around "Kievrezina" Goes on. — *Nezavisimost*, May 27, 1997, p.13.

⁶⁵ It happened during his visit to Zhytomir region. Later, at a Solemn Anniversary Academy devoted to the Bi-millennium of the Nativity (January, 2000) the President of Ukraine called for the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches into a single Independent Church.



Bartholomew I in the solution of the problems of the World Orthodoxy. In 1995, he accepted the UOC in the USA and the UAOC in Diaspora into his jurisdiction, and renewed his jurisdiction over the Orthodox Autonomous Apostolic Church of Estonia, which resulted in the suspension of communication between Moscow and Constantinople in prayer. These events were the pretext for Patriarch Aleksei's refusal to take part in two meetings of Heads of Independent Churches. Only in September, 1997, the Patriarchs met in Odesa where Bartholomew I confirmed his recognition of the UOC (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate) as the sole canonical Church on Ukrainian territory.

However, during negotiations between the representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates (Zurich, June 2000), representatives of the Constantinople Patriarchate proposed holding negotiations involving the representatives of the UOC, UOC-KP, UAOC, and Ukraine's authorities in order to resolve the problems of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

At that time, information about the possible transition of the UAOC under the omophoros of the Constantinople Patriarchate by means of its unification with the UOC in Diaspora became widely known.

The increased influence of the Constantinople Patriarchate on the solution of the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy met with a sharp reaction of the Moscow Patriarchate and, correspondingly, of the UOC.

Upon discussing the issue of the Churches' unification, the UOC Bishops' Council (July, 2000) declared that it considered such a step premature, given the possibility of a new schism, and requested the Ecumenical Patriarch not to interfere into the affairs of Ukraine's Orthodox Churches.

Therefore, consultative meetings between Ukraine's Orthodox Churches and Bishops' Councils of Orthodox Churches revealed the different positions of the parties regarding the basis for negotiations and for the unification. UOC hierarchs believe that the acceleration of the Orthodox Churches' unification is inspired by politicians and ignores intra-Church regulations and the sentiments of believers. The UOC insists on negotiating on a theological basis. This position is shared by the UAOC. By contrast, the UOC-KP would like to conduct negotiations in an extradogmatic, essentially political manner⁶⁶. Further discussion of the problem while the parties remain in different "modes" is virtually impossible.

Public opinion on the issues of creation of (and, consequently, essential support for) the Single Independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine remains undecided. The poll conducted by the UCEPS sociological service in August, 2000,

showed that the idea of establishing a Single Independent Orthodox Church was supported by 39.9% of respondents and not supported — by 42.8%. Every fifth adherent of unification (22%) could not specify which of the existing Churches might become the centre of such unification. 47% of those who supported the idea of unification named the UOC-KP, 17.9% — the UOC, 9.9% — the UAOC.

Only 14.4% of those polled consider the unification of the Churches the authorities' duty, 63.1% are sure that the authorities should not interfere into the relations between the Orthodox Churches, 32.3% of those are sure that such interference excessively politicises the problem and has nothing to do with the interests of religion, faith, and the Church.

It is beyond doubt that the existence of three Churches of the same confession is an abnormal phenomenon. However, it only reflects certain abnormal social and political realities of Ukraine, that cannot be removed through administrative means.

The "multi-confessional" nature of Orthodoxy reflects historically conditioned, regionally fixed differences in the way of life, mentality, language and cultural preferences and geopolitical orientations of the populace of Ukraine, the West and East of the country.

The specificity of regional distribution of communities of the three Orthodox Churches presented in Section 1 shows that the Churches, termed "national", are mainly concentrated in the West of the country. The UOC has been forced into eastern, central and southern territories, with the exception of Transcarpathia with its extremely multi-ethnic and multi-cultural population. Over eight years (from the moment of formation of the three Orthodox Churches), their regional coverage in Ukraine has virtually remained unchanged. This means, *first and foremost*, that the "multi-confessional" nature of the Orthodoxy, once a result of regional differences between the East and the West, is turning into a factor of conservation and reproduction of those differences, in other words, into a factor of Ukraine's regionalisation. *Second*, the unification of the Orthodoxy is possible only on a basis that would exclude ethnic, language/cultural, and political grounds, substituting civil solidarity in their stead. Otherwise, any attempts at uniting the Orthodox Churches could lead to the aggravation of inter-Orthodox relations and new splits.

2.4 THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS

In Ukraine, inter-Church relations present a problem not only of domestic character. There are a number of factors, which move **inter-Church**

⁶⁶ See: Bishop Sofroniy: "First, One Should Be in Peace with God". — *Region*, October 2, 1999, p.11.

**relations into the sphere of international relations.**

First, international treaties to which Ukraine is a party require abiding by the principle of the freedom of conscience. So, Ukraine's ability to ensure inter-Church concord and guarantee the freedom of conscience impacts its international image. *Second*, centres of many religious organisations active in Ukraine are situated beyond its borders, while institutes of Ukrainian Churches exist on the territories of other countries. For this reason, tensions in relations between the religious organisations and in their relations with the authorities of those countries have an effect on international relations, moreover that the parties to those conflicts are attempting to win the sympathy of the ethnically kindred Diaspora in other countries (or, in the case of a national minority, the sympathy of the country where the ethnic majority resides). Therefore, these conflicts acquire an international character, and impact international relations. This particularly refers to the UOC-KP communities in Russia⁶⁷ and to the disputes between the UOC and UGCC, as well as the Orthodox schism in Ukraine.

The humanitarian aspects of Russian-Ukrainian relations are affected not only by the language problems, but also by the problems of ethnic Russians' right to the freedom of conscience, which is connected, among other things, with the status of the UOC. The problems of international relations also include the issue of Islamic growth in Ukraine, particularly in the Crimea. Muslim communities are under the influence of different Islamic structures, some of them

of a fundamentalist or extremist tint. This refers to such organisations as the "Grey Wolves", "Muslim Brothers"⁶⁸ and others connected with international terrorism and combat operations on the territories of other countries⁶⁹. Any activity of those organisations in Ukraine can cause complications in Ukraine's relations with countries on whose territories there are conflicts between state authorities and Islamic extremist organisations. For instance, some Russian mass media have long been aggravating the situation in the Crimea with their reports on ties between the Crimean Tartars and Chechen militants⁷⁰.

Religious organisations are sometimes used to inspire separatist sentiments among some ethnic groups on Ukraine's territory. For instance, there were reports about the support of the Ruthenian movement in Transcarpathia on the part of the UOC⁷¹.

In the early 1990s, several eparchies on the territory of the Chernivtsi and Odesa regions that before 1940 was part of Romania, went under the jurisdiction of Patriarch Theoktist of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The church communities are under the influence of the Christian-Democratic Alliance of Romanians, and the Association "For Bessarabia and Bukovina", whose headquarters are situated in Romania. With their assistance, children in many Moldavian and Romanian villages of the Odesa region learn with Romanian textbooks, in some schools the fable of "Greater Romania" is taught. This situation can have a negative impact on Ukrainian-Romanian relations.

Separation of the Church from the State does not mean rejection of their mutual responsibility. The character of inter-Church relations has an impact on the international image of Ukraine, and influences its international policy.

2.5 FACTORS THAT CAUSE TENSION IN INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS

The analysis of inter-confessional and religious conflicts that took place over the last decade makes it possible to identify the key reasons for such conflicts.

⁶⁷ In Russia, there are two episcopates of the UOC-KP: of Belgorod and Moscow, and of Yenisey and Tobolsk. In 1997, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, the UOC-KP community in the town of Noginsk was deprived of its temple, as one that had left the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. On this occasion, Ukrainian mass media, some public organisations and political parties of the national-democratic orientation noted their protests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine sent a note to the Russian side, expressing its concern about the discrimination of the community of the Ukrainian Church.

⁶⁸ In 1990-1997, 11 public organisations of the Muslim trend, in one way or another connected with the "Muslim Brothers" party, were established in Ukraine. In Summer, 1997, an international conference was held in the town of Irpin, with participation of near 40 representatives of Ukraine's Muslim extremist groupings, as well as delegates from Sudan, Syria and Lebanon. See: Singaevsky A. Wahabism Is Primitive Like a Pillar, and Aggressive Like Sulphuric Acid. — *Fakty*, January 20, 2000, p.14.

⁶⁹ The problem of Islamic extremism influence was discussed at the 2nd Kurultai of Crimean Muslims (Simferopol, December 1999). The Mufti of Ukraine's Muslims Ahmad Tamim said in this respect: "We oppose any extremities and extremist trends which unfortunately exist". See: *UNIAN*, December 12, 1999.


⁷⁰ "In Crimean mosques calls for Jihad are heard. Youths are enlisted for dispatch to the Caucasus... According to the "Krymskaya Pravda" newspaper, at least forty "soldiers of Allah" are already in Wahabi camps in Chechnya". See: Yadukha V. Zones of Rehabilitation for Terrorists: The Crimea May Turn into a Seedbed of Islamic Extremism. — *Russian News Bureau*, October 25, 1999.

⁷¹ Havrosh O. Road to Nowhere: The Attempt to Create a New Ethnos Ended in Failure. — *Polityka i Kultura*, 2000, No.27, p.26-27.



Religious organisations lack houses of worship

The return of some religious buildings (previously used for purposes other than designated) and church property to the Churches and religious organisations, and active construction of new religious buildings significantly mitigated the problem of the lack of temples. The improvement of the situation is illustrated by the constant decrease in the number of so-called “hot spots” — settlements where inter-confessional conflicts take place on property issues (see *Diagram*).



At the same time, confrontation in this sphere is more and more centred around a select few sites in the national (public) domain. As a rule, such confrontation carries a political colouring. An example of this is the conflict between the UOC and UOC-KP with regard to the Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra in July-August, 2000.

The level of tolerance in inter-Church relations is rather low

This especially displayed itself in the situation around the invitation of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine. Immediately after the information about the possibility of such a visit was made public, top hierarchs of the Orthodox Churches made statements of its unacceptability.

Metropolitan Volodymyr stated: “None of the 15 countries staying under the omophoros of Orthodoxy have received Popes on their soil. Why should Ukraine, where Orthodoxy has been flourishing for over a thousand years, receive the

highest messenger of the Vatican?”⁷². Patriarch Filaret also expressed his view: “I believe that under the present complex relations between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches, Pope’s visit to Ukraine is impossible. The time for him to come here has not come yet”⁷³. Later, Patriarch Filaret said: “The Pope has no contacts with the Kyiv Patriarchate, and in such a situation his visit will only consolidate the Orthodox schism. Furthermore, conflicts between the Orthodox and Greek Catholics in the western regions of Ukraine should be removed first. We should stop blaming each other, and set unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy as our goal”⁷⁴.

Other reasons that cause tensions in relations among Churches, including those of historic, political and social character, are widely discussed in mass media and partly presented in sections 1 & 3 of the analytical report.

CONCLUSIONS

The confessional and religious life in Ukraine still conceals a number of acute and latent problems fraught with conflicts.

Many conflicts in the sphere of church and religious life originate from the Orthodox schism. It can be stated that the Orthodox schism will remain in the near future, and cause tension in inter-Church and Church-state relations.

The schism of Ukraine’s Orthodoxy and the confrontation between the Orthodox and Greek Catholics reflect the state of Ukraine’s society, the differences in its national, political and geopolitical self-identification. Confessional affiliation is turning into a factor of political identification and self-identification of Ukrainian citizens.

When applied to regional differences in historic and cultural specificity, the religious factor bears a significant conflict potential, that can seriously affect the stability in Ukrainian society.

The issue of ownership is also fraught with conflicts, and remains acute for Ukraine’s religious organisations due to their lack of religious buildings.

⁷² Metropolitan of Kyiv and Whole Ukraine Volodymyr Sabodan. — *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 26, 1996, p.1.

⁷³ See: Ivaniv D. The Road to Elections, As the Road to the Temple. — *Ukrayina Moloda*, December 6, 1996, p.3.

⁷⁴ See: *Styazh*, 1999, No.3, p.5.

3. THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY

This section addresses issues on legislative fundamentals of the freedom of conscience and the activity of religious organisations in Ukraine, analyses the Church's relations with state institutions and educational establishments, and deals with the political and social aspects of the Church's activity.

3.1 LEGISLATIVE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE ACTIVITY OF RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

Activity of Churches and religious organisations (as legal entities), inter-confessional and Church-state legal relations are governed by the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 35) and the Law of Ukraine "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations"⁷⁵. Separate issues related to the activity of religious organisations and the exercise of people's right to the freedom of conscience are regulated by other legislative acts⁷⁶.

Ukraine's effective legislation on the freedom of conscience is generally democratic and corresponds to the norms of international law, particularly the General Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights, recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No.190 (1995).

At the same time, the practice of inter-church relations and the people's exercise of their right to the freedom of conscience under conditions of the spreading of new religious trends shows that the effective legislation does not entirely take into account the present-day

realities of the confessional and religious life, inter-church disputes, and the effects of some destructive neo-religious formations.

Participants of the UCEPS permanent Round-table "Religion and the authorities in Ukraine: the problems of relations" more than once addressed legislative grounds for the activity of religious organisations and practical exercise of the freedom of conscience⁷⁷. The panel participants named the following main drawbacks in the effective legislation.

❖ *Non-recognition of the Churches possessing hierarchic structures as independent subjects of legal relations⁷⁸*. This not only contradicts the internal regulations of hierarchic Churches, but also complicates control of communities on the part of higher Church bodies, and enables virtually unimpeded change of community subordination to one or another religious centre, which causes inter-confessional tension. Meanwhile, **in case of a Church's recognition as an integral and independent subject of legal relations, the supreme body of the Church administration would assume all responsibility for the activity of sub-units within its structure**. This would allow to avoid the state's participation in the internal organisational affairs of Churches⁷⁹.

⁷⁵ The Law was adopted on April 23, 1991, and amended in 1992-1995.

⁷⁶ Satisfaction of military servants' religious needs is governed by the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Military Servants and their Dependents"; performance of the military service liability by believers of some religious trends — by the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Non-military) Service"; the character of education at educational establishments instituted by religious organisations — by the Law of Ukraine "On Education".

⁷⁷ Final documents of the Round Table meetings of June 25 and November 16, 1996.


⁷⁸ Under the effective legislation, religious communities are assumed legal entities. Churches are treated, as unions of religious organisations, and as such are not recognised legal entities. Legislators do not distinguish religious organisations possessing hierarchic structures (they include the largest Ukrainian Churches — Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Catholic) from religious formations, mainly of the Protestant trend, in which every community can exist autonomously.

⁷⁹ The proposal to recognise hierarchic Churches as legal entities was flatly rejected by only one hierarchic church — UOC-KP. See: Final document of the Round Table meeting of March 30, 1999 "Religion and the Authorities in Ukraine: The Development of Legal Grounds for Mutual Relations in the Draft Law of Ukraine "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations".



❖ *The state's interference into the issue of rotating use of religious buildings* which is legislatively fixed in the 1993 amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations". This was done because of the insufficient number of temples provided to religious communities (*see Diagram*). The Law allows for the virtually forcible introduction of rotating use of services in temples owned by the state by virtue of the decision of local authorities⁸⁰.

The number of religious buildings where service is held in turns



The experience of using temples in turns was replete with conflict. Servicing by turn is often used as a pretext for seizure of the temple by one of the communities, usually encouraged by local authorities⁸¹. Refusal from rotating service can be used to cancel the registration of a religious community for not observing legitimate instructions of the authorities⁸².

UCEPS experts believe that rotating use of temples and religious buildings should be considered an internal affair of the Church, and should be applied solely with the consent of both parties, without any interference on the part of state structures.

❖ *The effective legislation does not regulate the mass propaganda of scholars and the religious practice of new religious movements in Ukraine.* Despite the fact that the trial of the "White Brotherhood" leaders recognised the destructive effect of the religious practice of this neoformation on people's mental health, the Law of Ukraine "On Psychiatric Assistance" adopted in

1999 does not envisage such situations, and the law on psychological protection of citizens from destructive influence has not even been drafted yet. The "mass healing", which is an element of religious practice of some new religious groupings, remains officially undefined. Meanwhile, vivid discussion of the issue in mass media and the controversy of public opinion require the appropriate reaction on the part of the state authorities.

According to the results of a poll held by the UCEPS sociological service in August, 2000, 59.6% of those polled negatively assess the activity of foreign preachers of neo-religious trends; 43.5% considers their actions fraud, bringing their organisers material benefits; 23.2% considers the propaganda of "mass healing" extremely harmful, since many people are made to hope for a miracle, they are not cured and therefore risk their health, or even lives. Almost 14% of those polled are sure that mass sermons accompanied by a demonstration of healing negatively affect people's mental health. Only a quarter (25.8%) of respondents within this group believes that preachers' activity should not be banned, since people should be given a choice and bear responsibility for the consequences; almost half of the polled believes that such activities should be legally prohibited. Almost 40% of respondents are sure that religious propaganda in electronic mass media should be banned, and all religious sermons and rites should be held only within religious buildings and not broadcast to a mass audience.

In order to protect people against the destructive influence of some new religious trends, the law on psychological protection of citizens should be developed. It is also expedient to establish a state research structure to study the effect of the new religious practices on human health and inform the public about potential threats.

3.2 THE CHURCH AND THE STATE

The Constitution laid down such fundamental principles of state-Church relations as the separation of the Church from the state and the priority of human rights.

⁸⁰ The Law provides that "A religious building and property owned by the state can be transferred to two or more religious communities to be used by turns with their mutual consent. Lacking such consent, the executive body determines the procedure of use of the religious building and property by making a separate agreement with each community".

⁸¹ For instance, communities of UOC-KP seized temples in the town of Ostroh in the Rivne region (October, 1997), and in the village of Oryshkivka, Lanovetskyi district of the Ternopil region (March, 1999) — in both cases UOC communities were deprived of access to the temples; in the village of Khomyakivka, Tysmenytsia district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, a dispute about alternate use of a temple in January, 1997, ended in a clash between the communities of UGCC and UAOC, involving more than 400 persons.

⁸² For a refusal from alternate service, registration of the UAOC community in the village of Verkhnie Stynove, Stryi district, Lviv region was cancelled, and the temple that it used was transferred to the UGCC community.

The principle of separation of the Church from the state provides for their mutual non-interference into each other's competence: the state does not interfere in the issues of religious teaching, cult, and internal structure of the Church, including human resources management; the Church does not interfere in the activity of state bodies, including with regard to ensuring the freedom of conscience for the people.

The priority of human rights with respect to the freedom of conscience envisages the supremacy of human rights, particularly the freedom of conscience, over the rights of the Church (as an institution) to perform activities provided by its Statute. There are three basic principles of interaction between the Church and the state originating from this. *First*, no Church can claim special status, and the state must abide by the principle of equality of Churches. *Second*, the state must allow religious organisations to exercise their mystical functions by resolving legal, property and other problems falling under its competence. *Third*, the state must interfere in the event of violation of human rights in the religious practice of the Church (for protecting against destructive psychological influence, non-admission of confessional enmity or confrontation between believers and non-believers).

For ensuring human rights to the freedom of conscience, **the state has to co-operate with the Church in the field of religious education** (state recognition of religious education, as professional, and creation of conditions for religious education).

Given the constitutional principle of separation of the Church from the state, co-operation of the state and the Church in the field of charity and moral and ethical education is possible only on the basis of good will, abidance by the law, and public support.

The period of building of Church-state relations in Ukraine is practically over. Institutes have been established that co-ordinate the relations between the Church and the state: on the part of the state — the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs; on the part of the Church — the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches, which is an independent consulting

and advisory body entitled to approve recommendatory decisions.

The relations between the Church and the state are assuming features of equal dialogue. Testimony to this is the practice of meetings between the Churches' representatives and senior leadership of the country, as well as positive feedback on certain proposals of the Church by the state authorities⁸³.

The address of the President of Ukraine, announced on June 11, 1999 at a meeting of the All-Ukrainian Church Council, also had a positive effect on Church-state relations. On behalf of the state, President L.Kuchma spoke about the necessity of moral and political rehabilitation of the Church as a social institute, and condemned the policy of violence toward religion, the Church and believers. The Churches appreciated the President's address as an act of repentance of the country's leadership.

The rather tough but balanced position of the country's leadership and law enforcement bodies in the situation that arose around the sanctification of the Assumption Cathedral in August, 2000 also deserves a positive assessment.

At the same time, the practice of confessional and religious life is testimony to certain negative instances in Church-state relations.

A trend toward forming "regional legislation" on religious organisations is in existence. In some instances local authorities take sides, supporting one or another confession to the detriment of others, for instance, in registration of religious communities or their change of subordination, allocation of land plots for the construction of temples, or granting local tax privileges⁸⁴. Such actions of the authorities are testimony to the ambiguity of some provisions of the effective law on the freedom of conscience making their interpretation ambiguous, as well as to violations of the law by local authorities.

The process of return of religious buildings and property to the Church is neglected. There are instances of non-execution of the Presidents' orders regarding the return of religious buildings used for other than designed purposes to Churches. The issue of restitution of land and real estate to the Church remains judicially

⁸³ For instance, the authorities took into account the negative attitude of some Orthodox believers to taxpayer identification codes, when close to 52 thousand people filed applications refusing to obtain their codes on religious grounds.

⁸⁴ For instance, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the issue of land plot allocation for a UGCC temple remains unresolved since 1995; in Lviv, local authorities impede the construction of a UOC temple, and simultaneously support transfer of the plot to the UOC-KP community. See: Appeal to the President of Ukraine L.Kuchma by Archpriest Volodymyr Kuzio. — *Novy Vek*, July 22, 2000, p.10. The engagement of local authorities in the West of the country was also mentioned in public statements of Metropolitan Volodymyr: "In some regions and districts, especially in Western Ukraine, there is no proper concord yet... In some instances, temples are seized, Orthodox laymen and the clergy are persecuted. Local authorities often make inadmissible compromises, registering parallel communities of different confessions with the right to use the same temple. This brings new conflicts". See: A Temple Is Not a Cramped Municipal Flat. — *Kievskie Novosti*, January 26, 1996.

How do you assess (a) clergymen or believers running for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and local Councils; (b) support for political parties, individual candidates, presidential candidates, and recommendations regarding responses to referendum questions from clergymen and the Church leadership?

Point of view



Head of the Synod
Theological Commission
of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church,
Archbishop of Lviv and
Halych AVGYSTYN

In Ukraine the Church is separated from the state, but not from the people and society. At the moment, relations of peaceful co-existence and mutual understanding between the Church and state are being formed for the first time in a long while. One should realise that every rash word about the authorities uttered from the pulpit can lead to a deterioration in these relations.

The Church should always use words of peace and in no way criticise the existing system. The Church has a word of consolation for the depressed, a calming word for the anxious and troubled. A sermon based on condemnation is of no value in Ukraine at the moment.

At the same time, the Church cannot view with indifference a situation where the authorities transgress certain limits, for instance committing "sins that appeal to Heaven for vengeance", or assist in committing such sins as maltreating the poor, widows, orphans and those owed wages and pensions. In this case, the Church — through its patriarchs — raises its voice to defend the meek and oppressed, requests the authorities to rethink and calls on them to perform their basic duties with respect to the country's citizens consciously and decently.



Administrator of the
Patriarchy of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox
Church, Archbishop
of Kyiv and Poltava
IHOR (Isichenko)

The Church does not approve election of clergy to the office of President and to councils of various levels, since service at an elected post makes it impossible to entirely devote oneself to a priest's or pastor's mission. Some canons directly prohibit priests to assume certain public duties. There was an example in recent history when the head of an Independent Orthodox Church, Archbishop Makarios, was the President of the Republic of Cyprus for some time. However, the Church itself assesses his experience rather critically.

The Orthodox Church looks favourably at the active participation of its faithful in political life, as candidates for the Presidency or MP, party members, activists of election campaign teams. To the extent that all these are manifestations of effective service to one's neighbours in the field of public life. However, the Church, as a universal form of people's unity in the mystical Body of Christ, cannot associate itself with a certain part of the faithful, finding itself in opposition to their other parts. In election campaigns, its believers, including clergymen, do not act as representatives of the Church. They all exercise their personal freedom of choice, defend Christian values in political battles, but do not possess a monopoly right to represent the Church.

The Church sees that the greatest danger of every referendum or election campaign in social turmoil, which kills the spirit of love and Christian solidarity. Moreover, the Church has always looked upon the choice of the majority with caution. The wisdom of history produces countless examples of the choice of the majority turning out to be wrong. Jesus Christ was condemned to crucifixion by the will of the majority of the people, expressed at a kind of referendum. For this reason, the results of a referendum may not be considered indisputable truth, nor may the rights of the minority be ignored. These rights must always be protected in a democratic state.



Patriarch of Kyiv and
the Whole of Rus'-
Ukraine FILARET

Our Holy Church is against participation of bishops and the clergy in the Verkhovna Rada, local councils and executive authorities at all levels, from the Cabinet of Ministers to village councils. First of all, because Church canons prohibit confusing, substituting and combining temporal and ecclesiastical power. Secondly, bishops and the clergy are not experts in state governance and administration. We had an example of someone in a white hood 'sitting' in the Verkhovna Rada. We know how he voted, what he said: nothing good came out of this, and this compromised the Verkhovna Rada. Representatives of the Church have duties different from those of politicians, and they should not go into power.

Staying removed from political power and beyond politics, bishops and the clergy should never take part in campaigns in favour or against certain political parties, candidates for Parliament, local councils or presidential candidates. Neither should they give recommendations regarding answers to referendums. But all this is just one side of the coin. The reverse of the coin is conditioned by the fact that a Church, in all its structures, acts within the territory of a certain state, and all its elements — from the head to the layman — are members of society, that is, voters. So, the Church, as a community of citizens, is entitled to have its own position on which politicians and political groupings stand for virtue, and which are against it.



President of the All-
Ukrainian Union of
Associations of
Evangelic Baptists
Hryhoriy KOMENDANT

It is impermissible that representatives of the Church should stand for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or local councils, since that is a theocracy. When elected, such people should leave the cloth and never again claim to act in the name of the Church. "No man can serve two masters", the Gospel says; it is unseemly for the Church and its leaders to support any political party or individual candidates belonging to that Church at Parliamentary elections. Presidential candidates in Ukraine should always be non-partisan, in order to be equally accessible and acceptable to all the people.

Specific recommendations for believers regarding voting in elections and referendums are also undesirable. The only advice — abide by own CONSCIENCES, since "conscience, is the voice of God within man", according to Hryhoriy Skovoroda. However, it is highly sensitive, and stops speaking as soon as it is not listened to". This must be assisted with civil MATURITY and a national CONSCIENCE. And it is the Church's duty to wake these up and hone them.

What is your attitude to political parties that have the word 'Christian' in their names and to associations of people's deputies that proclaim the defence of the interests of one or another Church, as their goal?

Point of view



Administrator of the Patriarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Kyiv and Poltava I HOR (Isichenko)

For me, as a citizen of Ukraine, it is unclear how lobbying groups based on the idea of unconstitutional interference in the internal affairs of religious organisations separated from the state and promoting confessional hostility, may exist in the highest legislative body of my country. Why can not an MP group called, let us pretend, "For the Monopoly of Gazprom" be registered, but an identical group called "For the Single Independent Church" may? This is a highly absurd situation, which proves, in the first place, the immaturity of Ukrainian democracy and the Komsomol-like ambitions of certain MPs, ready to assume administration of Church affairs as Stalin did in 1943. Another demonstrative sign of the state of affairs: the Patriarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church learns about documents issued by these groups from Catholic and foreign political press. The groups of MPs and authors of those statements, declarations and concepts do not bother to consult in advance with the Orthodox Churches that they intend to unite. They even do not inform these Churches of their decisions.

The competence and correctness of political parties in Christian-democratic portion of the political spectrum is too varied to produce a common assessment. The emergence of such parties in Ukraine is obligatory. However, their perception of their position with respect to the Church often deserves criticism. Sometimes, some of their leaders are not against subordinating the Church or solving purely ecclesiastical matters by party-style methods (for instance, the issue of Church unification). They would be not averse to confining the role of the Church to the decorative presence of the highest hierarchy at a party forum, as a dummy figure.

At the same time, we have positive examples of turning to the Church for pastoral care. I fully support the idea of Mr. Valeriy Babych, of establishing a Spiritual Council composed of representatives of different confessions under the All-Ukrainian Christian Union. However, this Council is not very active so far, although the idea itself is good. It is pleasant that the Christian People's Union has begun turning to the Patriarchy in organising a variety of courses, seminars, conferences, and inquiring about our position on separate aspects of social life. Other political forces that call themselves 'Christian' continue to mention the Church only before elections.



unsettled. Sometimes, former Church property and buildings are privatised by temporal structures and private persons. This practice does not consolidate the Church's trust in authorities, and can create tension in Church-state relations.

The issue of state recognition of theological education also remains unresolved. The procedure of attestation of theological schools has not been drafted yet. On this ground, state bodies actually refuse to recognise certificates of higher and secondary theological education. This makes professional employment of theologians at state educational establishments impossible and consequently limits the abilities of personnel training by religious organisations.

The state must ensure unflinching (and unbiased) abidance by the laws on the Church, and rule out their violation by regional authorities.

3.3 THE CHURCH AND POLITICS

Political division of society is characteristic of the transitional period. At this stage, the Church can be a stabilising factor, due to its sig-

nificant moral authority and public trust. However, in contrast to post-communist countries, where Churches played a consolidating role in the period of democratisation and 'velvety revolutions', in Ukraine, political division was accompanied with confessional and religious split. **The Churches attracted political and civil structures with different views of the independent Ukraine. The split centred around two issues: the national character of the state (should Ukraine be the state of the title nation, or the political nation?) and its geopolitical priorities (orientation toward the West or closer ties with the CIS?).**

Adherents of the national, West-oriented state actively supported the rebirth of UGCC and UAOC, and, later, the establishment of UOC-KP. These Churches enjoy the support of right, extreme right and some right-centrist parties: the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian National Assembly, the Social-National Party of Ukraine, the 'Bratstvo' party, the Ukrainian National Conservative Party, the Republican Christian Party, the People's Rukh of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the 'Sobor' party and some others. The association of People's Deputies "For the protection of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy" speaks out in support of UOC-KP.

Opponents of the national state and pro-Western course of Ukraine lined up around UOC. This Church has strong ties with People's Deputies' association "In support of canonical traditional Churches", mainly made up of leftist deputies representing the Socialist Party of



Patriarch of Kyiv and the Whole of Rus'-Ukraine FILARET

We support all political parties of truly (not declaratively) democratic and nation-building orientation, for there is no higher mission for all of us in this earthly life, than to promote people's good, and the Ukrainian state, for whose revival we prayed and fought for centuries. We especially support Christian parties. There are several of these in Ukraine, and they more or less actively support certain Christian Churches and confessions. This does not mean however that each party with the word "Christian" in its registered name is such in reality, in the full sense of this word. It is pleasing to know that the word "Christian" has become so respected and even fashionable, since we remember the times when this word was feared and avoided. Now, matters have turned 180 degrees, and this can be dangerous, for the word 'Christian' is sometimes used by heretics, concealed and obvious blasphemers and members of aggressive sects. If, God forbid, they begin infiltrating into Ukrainian parties that have the word 'Christian' in their names, such parties should not count on any support from us.

Tell me, how can a leader or a member of a Christian party avoid going to church or miss the sermon? He can say: "I pray at home". All right, but why then build temples, if we all begin praying at home? No, it is not enough to pray at home. Going to church is not going for a walk or attending a club. This is an act of belief, a road to salvation. By failing to take part in liturgy, in its highest saving moment — the Holy Eucharist with a confession and communion, a Christian deprives himself of the main road to God, as if going in a roundabout way. I, as an archpriest, the Patriarch, am pleased to see renowned politicians and public figures praying in a temple, confessing, giving Eucharist in accordance with Orthodox canons, even if they don't belong to a Christian party. Again, I wonder: why I never see leaders of Christian parties in a temple?



Associate Profesor of Kyiv Theological Academy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metrophorian Archpriest Vasilii ZAEV

Church does not associate itself with any social or state system, or with any political power. It is above the 'right' and 'left'. The Church does not participate in political struggle, does not call to vote for or against one or another party, does not associate itself with party or private interests. This does not mean, however, that the Church does not have its own position on political issues, that it has nothing to say to politicians, and that Orthodox Christians have nothing to do in political life.

With respect to the issue of "Christian" parties, I believe that at present there is no party in Ukraine that is Christian not only by name, but also in its core. The very idea of creating such parties was borrowed from the West, along with many other realities of our present life, and was not intrinsic to Orthodoxy. A good tradition of our people was the creation of church brotherhoods, which once (for example, in the 16th-17th centuries) played a weighty role in the balance of political forces in this country. I believe that speculating with the word "Christian" only damages truly faithful people and the Church in general.

I consider attempts to draw the Church into political struggle, or manipulating the slogan of "defending the Church" by some groups of people's deputies unacceptable. The Church should be protected from the interference of non-church forces in internal church affairs, since such interference sometimes leads to catastrophic consequences. The Church must be the conscience of society — such is its destiny.

Ukraine, the Peasant Party of Ukraine, and the Communist Party of Ukraine. The Slavic Party declares the necessity of uniting the Orthodox around UOC, the Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine takes a similar stance. Recently, UOC has mobilised the support of one of the leaders of the "Labouring Ukraine" party A.Derkach through public foundation "Our Future" created by him⁸⁵. UOC is also supported by the Congress of Russian Organisations, Zaporizhian Cossacks and some other public organisations.

Churches are engaged in supporting candidates at parliamentary and presidential elections. 1999 — the year of presidential elections in Ukraine — witnessed the greatest number of public events involving Churches. The fact of Churches' employment in election campaign was mentioned by the press-secretary of the UOC Metropolitanate S.Rechynskyi: "The present attitude of temporal authorities to the Orthodox Church to a large extent remains consuming.

Bureaucracy is first of all interested in believers' votes at elections. The Church is promised much in exchange for votes, but after elections... promises remain unaccomplished"⁸⁶.



On the other hand, **Churches turn to the authorities for support of their position in inter-confessional confrontation**⁸⁷. One can observe competition among Churches for the right of rep-

⁸⁵ The Foundation supports UOC communities in the Sumy region. See: *Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine*, August 12, 2000, p.5; *Novy Vek*, August 12, 2000, p.10.

⁸⁶ See the UOC WEB-site: www.orthodox.org.ua/win/analits/rechinsky_4.html.

⁸⁷ Sometimes such appealing takes shape of open pressure. Speaking out against the Pope's visit to Ukraine, Bishop Pavlo (Lebed) said: "The President of Ukraine... will never invite him, for the head of state must listen to the thought of the majority, to the dominant Church, the state Church — the Ukrainian Orthodox Church". See: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, August 9, 2000, p.5.



President of the All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelic Baptists
Hryhoriy KOMENDANT

Nowadays, it is fashionable to call oneself a Christian, and prestigious to call oneself a politician. That's why so-called politicians are becoming so-called Christians. They use the word "Christian" in the names of their political parties. This is done with the sole purpose of winning over naive Christian support. This is nothing but politicising, since true Christians can create only a Church, and never a political party or union. Neither populist names nor Christian slogans can affect this fact. And their protection of the interests of specific Churches violates the constitutional principle of equality of all faiths before the law. This can lead to confrontation between the various faiths. Moreover, the Church is not allowed to interfere in state structures or command the services of lobbyists.

Another thing is definite: a DEPUTY is the elected representative of the people. He should not serve a political party, union or movement, however nice a name they may have. He must be a servant of the people. And the Bible teaches us the best way to do this. Therefore, the Church's sacred duty is to put the Law of God into the hands of every legislator, and not only into his hands, but also into his soul, mind, feelings and will.



President of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventist Churches
Volodymyr KRUPSKYI

As far as attitudes to different political parties and unions are concerned, the best example was given by Jesus Christ. He stood apart from all Judaic parties and groups. He affiliated neither to the Pharisees - pietists, nor to the Essayists - mystics, nor to the Sadducees - rationalists, nor to the Herodians - politicians, nor to the Zealots - radicals, or the Samaritans - schismatics, although they all wanted to see the young and promising Teacher in their party. But Jesus did not allow anyone, including his closest friends and relatives, to command His life, for He knew that this would hamper His special mission — the salvation of humanity, and the restoration of God's similitude in man. Christ entrusted His followers to continue this great mission. So we must all look more attentively to Jesus.



Bishop-Assistant to the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
Lubomyr HUSAR

The duty of the clergy is to serve all faithful. That's why its involvement into politics hinders its openness for the people. Instead, I would be happy to see all members of the Verkhovna Rada and other councils become believers and act professionally, on the basis of their religious convictions.

The duty of the Church is to teach God's truth and God's laws. Their application to concrete political situations rests with the politicians. That's why the Church should not intervene in the political process as a matter of principle, with the exception of cases of human right violations.

Politicians and political parties must act within the framework of their competence and not attempt to become substitutes for the Church in performing its functions.

resentation (participation) in mass state and public events, official ceremonies, for spiritual care over cultural and educational establishments, and military structures. Mutual decoration with honourable distinctions became a 'norm' in Church-state relations. The public tends to disapprove such practice that does not enhance the authority of Churches and their leaders.

Despite rather close ties of Churches with certain political forces and the authorities, **the Church's influence on politics and political orientations of the public remains limited.** This was particularly demonstrated by the results of the 1998 election campaign. Four parties and blocs whose names and programmes declared adherence to a certain confession and obligation to base the state policy on its fundamentals took part in the elections: the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Republican Christian Party, election bloc "Forward, Ukraine!" and the Party of Ukraine's Muslims. All in all, they collected less than 4% of votes.

According to the poll conducted by UCEPS in August, 2000, only 11.5% of polled believers confirmed the influence of the religious organisation on their political convictions, 15.2% denied such influence, another 26.8% answered: "I form my political views by myself".

In general, the Churches' confrontation involving the use of political levers does not cause serious political storms, for the overall influence of the Churches on political views of the population remains low.

3.4 SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE CHURCH'S ACTIVITY

In the period of social transformation and socio-economic crisis, the social activity of the Church is especially important and expected by the populace, that has to make a socio-political, cultural and moral choice.

The Church's social activity covers two main spheres: charity and education. Education

Do you believe pastoral activity to be the only mission of the Church, or should the Church be actively engaged in social activities as well? Is such service an end in itself for the Church, or means of conversion to the faith? What is your attitude to the belief that the Church, as the most respected of public institutions, should have a weighty say in the protection of citizens against violation of their constitutional and human rights?

P o i n t o f v i e w



Patriarch of Kyiv and the Whole of Rus'-Ukraine FILARET

No, social service is not the main mission of the Church, despite its importance. If social service had been the main task of the Church, it would have been yet another, among many, charities, little different from the rest. The main mission of the Christian Church is saving people's souls for eternity, since our earthly life is just an instant in eternity, and the main events will occur there: either in the lights of God's endearment, or in the darkness of sufferings.

Today, our Holy Church stands through thick and thin for the observance of constitutional and general basic human rights. This refers not only to the faithful of our Church, but also to all citizens, without exception. We are solidly behind the implementation, not just declaration of Article 10 of the Constitution confirming the official status of the Ukrainian language. In our temples, liturgy is served in our native Ukrainian language, although this was not easy to achieve, given centuries of use of the Old Slavonic and Russian languages. Despite our poverty, during decade we issued worship books in the Ukrainian language, without a single hryvnia of state assistance. Further on, we spoke out against the non-payment of salaries, pensions, stipends, for such non-payment is a grave sin: no one can stop the mouth of a working bullock. Without interfering with politics, party life and the functions of state and local bodies of power, in accordance with applicable laws, the Church in its sermons calls upon violators of human rights to reconsider their actions, to escape God's punishment and embark on the road to salvation, leaving the road leading to Hell.



General Vicar of the Kyiv and Zhytomyr Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, Bishop Stanislav SHYROKORADIUK

The Church has done a lot in this respect. Socially defenceless people, the sick and those forgotten by the state find assistance only in the Church; nobody else cares about them. Only in the Church can they find medicines, clothes and even food. We are determined to improve the Church's social role. At the same time, the Church plays an important role in fighting social injustice. Nowadays, social injustice is seen everywhere. For example, when a small business closes down because it cannot pay taxes, or other jobs are cut. The Church always speaks out about the responsibility before God for such social unfairness. Listen to priests' sermons: they cite examples and explain to people that delaying the payment of wages to a worker is a grave sin crying out to Heaven for vengeance. God will punish such sin. If someone delays somebody else's salary, he should pay not only the salary arrears, but also the interest that he has earned — that is the Church's moral. Delayed payments, other people's tears, other people's kopecks will never bring good to a man. The Church is preaching this today. If its voice were heard, if it were not involved in political shenanigans during elections, and then forgotten afterwards, things would have been much better.

The social service of the Church also involves education. We educate not only priests. Today, the Church is helping poor people to receive education in order to become good lawyers or good teachers. There is a Church assistance programme for those who cannot afford to pay for their education. It helps them get educated in this country and abroad. This programme breeds new people, new experts, who will also go on to serve people, apply their knowledge and say that they learned and obtained their education due to the Church.

is understood as religious education. It takes place primarily in the youth environment: among youth movements, at school and in the Army.

Virtually all Ukraine's religious organisations established their structures (missions) for performing charitable projects. The main forms of charitable activity include: organisation of children's rest and treatment; assistance to the poor; establishment and maintenance of orphanages, homes for the aged, kindergartens for orphans, and social rehabilitation centres; charitable activity in the places of detention; humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and to refugees.

❖ **Rest and treatment of children**, first of all — orphans, children from lower-income families and sufferers of the Chernobyl NPP accident. In 1999, summer camps of Evangelical Christians in the Kharkiv region alone provided rest and treatment facilities for more than 10 thousand chil-

dren. Religious organisations of Transcarpathia established 19 summer camps for children from low-income families.


❖ **Assistance to the poor.** In all regional and the majority of district centres, in many towns, religious organisations organised soup-kitchens. In 1999, only religious organisations of Transcarpathia opened 20 soup-kitchens for the poor, 10 pharmacies and first aid stations, nine mini-bakeries selling bread at low prices⁸⁸. As part of "Food for Life" programme, the International Community of Krishna's Conscience everyday provides soup for approximately 200 lonely and lower-income people in Kyiv alone (by the lists of district administrations). In the first quarter of 2000, the *Salvation Army* provided meals for almost 28 thousand people, distributed 27.6 tons of foodstuffs valued \$17 thousand.

❖ **Establishment and maintenance of orphanages, homes for the aged, kindergartens for**

⁸⁸ 1999 Information Report of the State Committee for Religious Affairs. Abstract. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.1, p.35.



Administrator of the Patriarchy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Kyiv and Poltava IHOR (Isichenko)



Deputy Head of the All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Baptists Volodymyr MATVIYIV



President of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventist Churches Volodymyr KRUPSKYI



Bishop-Assistant to the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Lubomyr HUSAR



Head of the Synod Theological Commission of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Lviv and Halych AVGUSTYN

Archbishop IHOR (Isichenko): Pastoral activity is just one of many aspects of apostolic service of the Church. Assistance to one's neighbour, irrespective of his faith, is the norm for the Christian presence in the world. Within the framework of such assistance, there is a whole range of applications of the energy of Christian love and self-sacrifice. Without a doubt, among these are human rights protection, promotion of the ideals of social justice and their concrete embodiment in the Church's own activity and in the policy of the existing regime. All those services are not and cannot be self-centred and self-sufficient, they are subordinate to the general polarity of the apostolic mission of the Church — effective presence of God's Kingdom on the Earth. Evangelic sermons and conversion to Christianity are intrinsic to this mission. However, pragmatic subordination of assistance to one's neighbour as a method of involving him in the religious community seems immoral and inorganic to the Orthodox idea of social service.

Volodymyr MATVIYIV: In fact, pastoral activity is the Church's central mission. According to the teaching of the Founder of the Church Jesus Christ, SOUL (life) is the most valuable thing that God gave man at Creation. There is nothing of equal value that a man can give instead. Therefore, care for the human soul, the spirit and a decent and devout life, in accordance with God's and human laws, is the main duty for the pastor of any Church. But not the only one. There is also charity — serving through benevolent acts that include not only the priest, but the entire Church. As a matter of fact, this was the beginning of Christ's evangelism. This really was the unique, striking GOOD NEWS (a translation of the Greek word Gospel).

Its programme consists of only two concepts: WORDS and DEEDS, which must be in harmony and not contradict each other. For this reason, the Church uses both concepts equally, since a good WORD awakens the human soul to a new life, and a good DEED heals it. Nowadays, people need good acts more than good words. Only the true Church can give this, with a detailed charity programme: "He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do likewise" (the Gospel, Luke 3:11).

Of course, this is not easy. It is easier to give one coat if you own ten rather than two. It is easier to share meat when you are wealthy than in today's time of need. However, the Church was, is and will be doing this, because this is in fact its essence. Such service is not and in no way can be a means of making converts, since the Church's CHARITY, according to its Founder's design, must also be given to its enemies.

The Church's duty is to produce law-abiding citizens, especially regarding human obligations. The state must guarantee every person's rights and rule out any kind of violation. If such violations occur, the Church should raise its voice to defend human rights, but only through lawful and civilised means. The Church must also bear at least moral responsibility for believers' non-observance of their obligations before the law.

Only through the joint efforts of the CHURCH and the AUTHORITIES can the supremacy of law be ensured, and a strong legal state be built. To this end, knowledge of the basic laws of both the Church and the state are equally necessary for everyone.

Volodymyr KRUPSKYI: Pastoral activity does not take place in a vacuum. The example of Jesus Christ, our good Pastor, shows that His actions comprised both homily and assistance to the needy. These are the two elements of pastoral activity. When talking about priorities, preference should certainly be given to the spiritual aspect.

When constitutional human rights are violated, the Church must come down on the side of human rights and freedoms.

Bishop-Assistant Lubomyr HUSAR: The duty of the Church is to help believers to realise their religious convictions in all possible ways and as fully as possible. It encompasses all aspects of human life. As an ancient proverb says: "Nothing human is alien to me". Social service is a part of every believer's life. Using social service in fishing for human souls, so-called proselytising, is a betrayal of religion. Buying the faithful is as dishonest as buying votes at elections.

The Church as a community of believers must safeguard the morals of society as a whole. It is entrusted with the right and the duty to protect all mistreated persons, but in order to achieve this, it should spare no efforts to be abreast of the level of its religious teaching.

Archbishop AVGUSTYN: Social service is a requisite element in the activity of the Church, which is "the source of love". For the Church, it is neither an end in itself, nor the means of conversion. Social service is just a natural manifestation of the Church's existence in society. It is as natural for the Church to care about the disabled, sick and miserable, as for the sun to give warmth or for water to quench thirst.



orphans, and social rehabilitation centres. UOC, jointly with the Southwest railway, initiated a project of building chapels and shelters for homeless at railway stations. In 1999, religious organisations of Transcarpathia opened 11 shelters and kindergartens for orphans. In Ivano-Frankivsk, the UGCC has been keeping a crisis centre of the Christian charity foundation "Solidarity" for three years now. The centre is engaged in treatment and social rehabilitation of drug addicts.

Shelter and medical assistance to the homeless, poor and disabled is offered as part of the renewed traditional charitable activity of monasteries. For instance, Archangel Michael's Monastery in Odesa has a 50-bed hospital for homeless. The Salvation Army maintains three social-medical centres for aged people and three treatment and rehabilitation centres for homeless, drug addicts and alcoholics.

❖ **Charitable activity is gradually coming to the places of detention.** For instance, UAOC is active in a colony in the town of Tovmachyk, Ivano-Frankivsk region.

❖ **Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and to refugees.** Foreign religious organisations sent almost 4,600 tons of humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 1999 flood in the Transcarpathian region. In 1999, the assistance and development organisation of Seventh-day Adventists rendered humanitarian aid to Ukraine's population valued \$550 thousand⁸⁹. The volume of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine from foreign religious organisations is steadily rising: while in 1998, Ukraine's religious organisations obtained 602 charity shipments weighing close to 10 thousand tons, in 1999, there were 749 shipments weighing over 11.5 thousand tons⁹⁰.


According to the results of the poll conducted by the UCEPS sociological service in August, 2000, in 1986-1999, 5.4% of the polled obtained humanitarian assistance. It is worth noting that among believers, 6.5% of respondents obtained humanitarian assistance, among non-believers — three times less (2.2%).

If the scales of charitable activity are compared, more active are organisations that belong to powerful international structures or have religious centres outside Ukraine. There are three reasons for this. *First*, possibilities of the Orthodox Churches are limited due to the lack of funds, caused by the low incomes of their parishioners. *Second*, charitable activity of the 'domestic' Churches is hampered by the state policy in this field: the absence of state subsidies for the Church's charitable projects, and the absence of tax privileges with regard to donations. *Third*, the low activity of the Orthodox Church is conditioned by the absence of the idea of care about human earthly life in its teaching: the Orthodoxy continues to adhere to the unconditional supremacy of the mystical service of the Church⁹¹.

The Church could use its authority for insuring more active involvement of laymen (and non-believers) in assisting the state social service, or creating its own social protection network on voluntary basis, to care about lonely and elderly people, and homeless children. It is evident that the Church can do a lot to this end.

3.5 THE CHURCH AND THE YOUTH

The Church pays significant attention to working with the youth. Next to all religious organisations have special structures that care about children, teenagers and youths. Their main duty is the organisation of religious education and leisure of young people⁹².



⁸⁹ Tokarev Y. How Religious Organisations Help Lower-income People. — *Nasha Gazeta*, August 26, 2000, p.12.

⁹⁰ 1999 Information Report of the State Committee for Religious Affairs. Abstract. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 2000, No.1, p.35.

⁹¹ Patriarch Filaret of UOC-KP said in this connection: "Protestant confessions confine Christianity to social service. Care about people and their wellbeing is good. However, such service alone cannot defeat the evil. It is inside man... All who were baptised in the Orthodox faith should not sell their faith — the faith of our ancestors — for humanitarian sops. In this way, one can lose the essence of Christianity, lose that for which the Son of God... Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem. He came to defeat evil in human nature itself, not to create the Earthly Kingdom, as Jews had expected. Christ did not promise a life of ease to His followers". See: *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, 1998, No.1-2, p.34.

⁹² The Patriarchal Youth Commission of UGCC, jointly with the Family and Youth Department of the Lviv Region State Administration and youth structures of other traditional Churches, organise different educational events. For instance, in 1999, they held the Round table "Christian Family", a spring voluntary improvement session devoted to Easter, the happening "Easter for All", etc.; the Youth Department of the Ukrainian Union in 1999 held 29 camp sessions which involved 2,680 youths, nine youth camps "were entirely devoted to missionary activity". The All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelic Baptist Christians established "The Association for Evangelisation of Children", and is creating a network of Sunday schools and institutions of children's rehabilitation, combined with religious education.

The Orthodox Churches that call themselves 'national' are determined to educate young people in the spirit of patriotism and nation-building. Patriarch Filaret of UOC-KP said: "The youth is our present. It can become our future, when we help the state to intensify the work with young people aimed at the formation of spirituality, national self-awareness and patriotism... In 1996, in support of national programmes, the Synod decided that Sunday schools for youths and children should be established at all parishes in Ukraine"⁹³. The UAOC Patriarch Dymytriy treats education likewise: "The Church sees its cultural mission in view of spiritual rehabilitation of the nation, pastoral activity among intellectuals, youth, and the military. Special attention is paid to the mission in the russified East. Restoration of the religious tradition is the basis for and the guarantee of the cognition and restoration of the identity"⁹⁴. The process of education absorbs all the problems causing confrontation between the Churches (see Section 2).

In relations with the youth, **the Church is actively using mass media**. Close to 30% of religious periodicals target the child and youth audience. There is a radio station "*Resurrection*" and a youth television and radio station "*The Church in the World*". The Church interacts with temporal youth publications. For instance, UOC-KP jointly with "*Ukrayina Moloda*" newspaper organised a contest of students' and pupils' works devoted to the bi-millennium of the Nativity.

Confessional youth organisations and movements are being created. For instance, after the renewal of the UGCC activity in Ukraine, in 1990, a Foundation of Greek Catholic youth "*Ukrainian Youth to Christ*" was established. In 1990-1996, it held several congresses in Lviv, and at the 4th World Congress of Ukrainian youth organisations (Kyiv, 1998) put forward the initiative of convening a Congress of Ukraine's Christian Youth. In 1997, the Union of Ukraine's Orthodox Youth was established by UOC, its branches are active in next to all eparchies.

In September, 1999, the first Congress of Ukraine's Christian Youth was convened. The Forum of Christian Youth held within its framework decided to establish the Inter-confessional Council of Christian Youth, which got together representatives of eight Christian con-

fessions and a number of temporal youth organisations. The main task of the Inter-confessional Council was defined as promoting confessional peace and forming religious tolerance among youths⁹⁵. In August, 2000, UGCC and RCC jointly organised pilgrimage to Rome to take part in the celebration of the 15th International Day of Youth. The Ukrainian inter-confessional group included near 50 youths representing eight confessions.

Special attention is paid to the problems of young families. At the Church of Agapit Pechersky (UOC) in Kyiv, the Orthodox Family Centre has been established. Within the structure of the Lviv Theological Academy, there is the Institute of Family, which trains specialists who render social and psychological assistance to young families.

Summer children's camps are organised. One of the instances is the "God's Bee" Orthodox camp of the Kherson eparchy of UOC, that has been active for two years now.

The Church is becoming involved in sports affairs. UOC has established co-operation with the State Committee of Ukraine for Youth Policy, Tourism and Sports, and with the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine. Today, every Olympic complex has a religious building.

The declared level of young people's religiosity is rather high. According to the poll held among youths by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Studies and the Social Monitoring Centre, 69% of young people called themselves believers, but only 54% of those professed a certain confession; 16% called themselves non-believers, 1% — staunch atheists; 14% could not define their attitude to religion. Out of the respondents professing a certain religion, the majority (67%) identified themselves as Orthodox, 13% — Greek Catholics, 1.5% — Roman Catholics, 7% — Protestants of different trends⁹⁶. 70% of young people with deep religious convictions and active religious practice live in the West of Ukraine. Their share is the least in the South of the country⁹⁷.

The significance of religion within the system of values of young people tends to decline. In 1996, 51% of polled young people called religion an important element of their life, in 1999

⁹³ Congress of Christian Youth. — Kyiv, 1999, p.3.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.5.

⁹⁵ Christian Youth Calls for Unity. — *Bulletin of the Centre of Religious Information*, 1999, No.9, p.42-43.

⁹⁶ On the Status of the Youth in Ukraine (by the results of 1999): Annual Report to the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. — Kyiv, 2000, p.58.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.109.



Do you consider expedient the Church's participation in school education, if so — in what form and on what legal grounds?

P o i n t o f v i e w



Director, Higher Education Institute of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine Viktor ANDRUSHCHENKO

Under current legislation, there is a separation of the Church from the state. This means that religious institutions or representatives of religious organisations cannot engage in any educational activities at state educational establishments. It doesn't mean, however, that they are not present there. They are present, in violation of the law. Such cases are few and far between, but they do exist.

At present, a new law on higher education is being drawn up by people's deputies, higher education institute directors and experienced lecturers. The present version of the draft law does not cover the religious and theological sphere at all. We say that there should be tolerance towards different forms and levels of knowledge; so why should we reject non-rational knowledge? Why do we exclude it from college and university education? Banning non-rational knowledge is not the right approach to be employed today. Representatives of the Church should take the initiative in this respect.

I would not put the blame on former teachers of atheism or scientific communism who are now teaching courses in religious studies. Moreover, if a lecturer teaches the history of religion and draws students' attention to the fact that there is a similarly large sphere of atheism, this is quite normal. But if we assign the conduct of these courses to representatives of the Church, they will teach theology, rather than religious studies. Furthermore, they will teach the course as representatives of their own particular faith. Given the current level of inter-faith disputes, this will surely affect the spiritual world of students. We cannot tolerate this. The Church, for its part, can help in retraining lecturers reading religious studies courses.



Patriarch of Kyiv and the Whole of Rus'-Ukraine FILARET

I believe that participation of the Church in the educational process at secondary schools and higher educational establishments is not only expedient, but also necessary. Many of today's social problems, related to youngsters, are conditioned by the fact that youth do not know true morals and the Gospel truth borne by the Church. The Church has always taught and continues to teach only virtue, not evil.

I know that a qualified working group has been set up within the Ministry of Education and the State Committee for Religious Affairs, called to conceive programmes whereby the subject of Christian Ethics will be taught in all classes of secondary school; discuss opening theological faculties at leading universities of Ukraine; and clear up the issue of the state recognising diplomas bestowed upon graduates of higher ecclesiastical establishments of Ukraine's Churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is actively involved in this working group and has submitted its proposals on all issues reviewed by the working group. Other Churches have assessed our proposals positively, and we, on our part, have agreed with the proposals of other Churches. Unfortunately, the work has stalled at this point — not because of some fault on the part of the Churches, but due to someone else's fault.

Law on the separation of the Church from the State and school from the Church in no way prevents teaching virtue, born by the Christian religion. If the Church claimed a monopoly in teaching disciplines, this could violate the present Law. But none of the Churches claims this: we can help the state to organise the educational process, but not to manage it. Christian Ethics should be taught at schools, and theological disciplines be taught at higher educational establishments by teachers and lecturers of those establishments. We are ready to consult and help them, render assistance in retraining (or additional training), but not take the system of theological education within the state education system under our control. This is the way it is in developed Christian democratic countries, without breaking the law in any way.

— **only 40%.** In the system of qualities that need (in young people's opinion) to be brought up in children, religiosity occupies one of the last positions, yielding even to "good manners". Only 16% of respondents called problems of religious faith a topical subject discussed in the youth audience (for comparison: problems of culture and arts were mentioned by 25%)⁹⁸.

Therefore, the Church is rather active in the youth audience. At the same time, polls show that, despite the high declared level of youths' religiosity, the degree of their confessional identification is low. Recent years have brought a tendency toward decreasing the significance of religion within the value system of young people.

In general, there is a clear gap between faith as personal persuasion of young people, and the Church: many youths who declare their religiosity in reality do not belong to the Church. The effectiveness of the Church's activity aimed at enrolling young people through different structures centred


around the Church is rather low. This makes the Church to seek to spread its influence over the network of public educational establishments.

3.6 THE CHURCH AND SCHOOL

In Ukraine, the problems of relations between the Church and school are mainly centred around **religious education of children and youths**. At the same time, the social problems of education remain out of focus of the Church. Those include, for instance, the increasing number of children who do not attend school for one or another reason (reduction of the school network in rural areas, homelessness, financial problems within family).

The constitutional principle of separation of school from the Church means the non-religious, temporal essence of education offered by public educational establishments. At the same time, the effective legislation allows for the institution of confessional educational establishments,

⁹⁸ It is worth noting that in 1996, the share of young people who considered religion an important value exceeded this figure for the adult population — 49%; in 1999, the indicator of the adult population rose and made up 51%.



Deputy Head of the All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Baptists
Volodymyr MATVIYIV

In Ukraine, school is a public institution, and the law separates school from the Church and prescribes secular education. Subjects related to religion can be admitted into the curriculum if they are not accompanied by religious worship. These rules are absolutely democratic and, if observed, preclude the possibility of inter-faith problems arising.

The subject called "Christian Ethics" is focused not on the Biblical fundamentals of ethics, behaviour and morality but on the practice of different rites, rituals, traditions and customs of one particular faith. This is a violation of the law. The teaching of such subjects should be informative only, and exclude the practical elements of any rites. The subjects should be optional, and be taught not by psychics and healers, or by clergymen, but by people who have relevant qualifications.

Maybe the time has come to set out a legal and legislative framework for establishing private Christian schools. A number of Churches and faiths seem to be ready for this. The Evangelical Baptist Church believes that its duty in the field of education is to follow the commandment of the Teacher of the Church: "Go ye therefore, and teach all the nations" (Mathew 28:19). This school is the Church, the Teacher is Jesus Christ, and the textbook — the Holy Gospel! The only thing that the Church must do is give this textbook to teachers and pupils, put it into their minds and hearts, and encourage them to live according to His commandments.



President of the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventist Churches
Volodymyr KRUPSKYI

According to the Ukrainian Constitution, the Church is separated from the state, which is customary for any civilised country. When we address the issue of the Church's participation in school education, we are surely talking about clergymen. Here a question arises: Who should teach and what should be taught? The programme should be taught by school teachers, not by outside lecturers. Although the mass media sometimes write ironically that teachers cannot do things that require a special theological education, we believe that the teachers' role should not be underestimated when we are dealing with pan-human values, not with special theological disputes. The programme should not be saturated with information about rites and traditions. There are other subjects where pupils learn about folklore, ethnic traditions, popular customs, etc. Meanwhile, pan-human values always remain as such whether for a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, or even for a person who professes no religion whatsoever.

without prescribing the character of education. Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Education" states: "In Ukraine, educational establishments, irrespective of the form of ownership, are separated from the Church (religious organisations), are temporal, *with the exception of educational establishments instituted by religious organisations*". **Therefore, proceeding from the democratic principles, the right of people to free choice of temporal or religious education is provided by the law.** Furthermore, the Church has an opportunity to organise religious education of children and youths at Sunday schools, catechising groups, etc.

Such a model of co-existence of secular and religious education, that could be called **alternative**, has its adherents among the public, in scientific and church circles⁹⁹. It was formulated in detail, in particular, in the concept of religious education proposed by the Rector of the Eparchial Catechetical Institute of UGCC¹⁰⁰. The concept envisages two stages of religious

education (catechising) of children and youths: first — establishing a network of Sunday schools with an eight-year programme of education; second — establishing Catholic schools that would provide secondary education recognised by the state. The author believes that this will allow for overcoming the state monopoly in the sphere of education and ensuring parents' right to give their children religious education.

However, the alternative model provides that citizens or the Church have economic capabilities to establish and maintain private or confessional religious schools. Today, neither the people nor national Churches possess such capabilities. Furthermore, some public, pedagogical, clerical and political circles **tend to identify religious and moral (in a broader sense, spiritual) education**, and for this reason insist on spreading religious education to cover the network of public academic schools. They motivate by the need for overcoming the consequences of the recent policy of state atheism, manifested, among other

⁹⁹ For instance, the Final document of the international scientific conference "Religion in the Context of Social and Spiritual Realities of Today" (May, 1995) reads: "Attention should be paid to the threat of clericalism in some spheres of social life. First and foremost, this refers to infant schools, academic schools..., falling under influence of different Churches, missions, preachers, which creates the atmosphere of confrontation and tension in society. Legislative fundamentals of the secular character of education in Ukraine should be strictly observed, and parents' and children's right to choose the possibility of religious education be retained, but beyond public educational establishments". See: Religion in the Context of Social and Spiritual Realities of Today. — *Ukrayinske Relihiestnavstvo*, No.1, 1996, p.38. Participants of the International Scientific and Practical Conference drew the conclusion: "There is a need to lay down clear constitutional guarantees of the freedom of religion... The key principle must be the separation of the Church from the state and of public school from the Church. The state should strictly abide by the principle that religious convictions are an entirely personal affair of every individual. See: "International Scientific and Practical Conference "Religious Freedom in Post-socialist Countries: Legal and State Guarantees". — *Ukrayinske Relihiestnavstvo*, 2000, No.13, p.4

¹⁰⁰ Bendyk M. The Prospects of Religious Education in the Sambir and Drohobych Eparchy of UGCC. — *Zhyva Voda*, 2000, No.7, p.7.



Rector of the Kyiv
Theological Schools of
the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, Metropolitan
Archpriest
Mykola ZABUHA

At school, we learn the history and culture of ancient Rome and Greece. At all higher educational establishments, ancient and foreign literature are taught, which is considered normal by any Ukrainian citizen, irrespective of his or her ethnic background. Meanwhile, learning the culture and ethics of our own people presents a problem. And what are ordinary Ukrainians' ethics? They have been formed by Orthodoxy — the attitude to the family, to one another, love for one's neighbour... All this was formed by Orthodox ethics, our way of life and thinking. Orthodoxy led the nation to the end of the second millennium in physical, intellectual, moral and mental health. And this must be made known, at least through the subject of "Christian Ethics". But schools ignore it.

Let there be a non-denominational teaching of Christian Ethics, of what is good and what is evil — but even this variant is a no-go. I am astonished with the formal stance taken by the bodies responsible. We are moving all the time, but cannot attain our goal. Everyone is aware of this, everyone agrees, but initiatives take the shape of trials, experiments, options, somewhere in the regions... This subject cannot obtain national status at schools and other educational establishments, even as an option. The Church has no impact on the public education system and does not claim to have. However, we should make a contribution to the educational process and do everything we can to avoid foreign gentlemen with alien names teaching us who we are, and Orest Subtelny and the like writing our history. We need things that are nation-building, Ukrainian, ours. We may admire other's values, but we cannot afford to admire others' interests. No, we can't. We have our own Ukrainian interests, our Ukrainian soul, and God above us all. That's where we proceed from.



Bishop-Assistant to the
Head of the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church
Lubomyr HUSAR

Studying religion is an essential part of every person's education. The family represents the first "school", a particular religious community is the second, and the general education school must be the third. Given that our state is multi-confessional, I believe that the idea of a "Christian Ethics" course for primary and secondary school is the best solution, as this would be a religious, cultural and informational course. Every citizen of Ukraine ought to be familiar with the cultural foundation upon which his country developed. Since such a course is brief and informational (informal), it presumes no prayer or other exercise of religion in the classroom.

things, in the inability of a modern family to give (or choose) religious education for the children¹⁰¹. On these grounds, other models of religious education at public academic schools are put forward (and partly implemented). They may conditionally be divided into compromise and tough ones.

Compromise models presume implementation of religious education at public educational establishments on a voluntary basis. Such a model was proposed, among others, by the participants of the International scientific and practical conference "Religious Freedom in Post-socialist Countries: Legal and State Guarantees" (Kyiv, 1999). The Final document of the Conference, in particular, says: "The study of religion should not be put beyond the framework of educational programmes of academic schools, since such an approach places religion beyond the boundaries of the national culture, and waters down the spiritual world of a person". At the same time, the document warns: "Religious science and religious education should have no political colouring, be connected with missionary activities and evangelisation". "There should be no violence at religious education, that is, mandatory study of a certain confession by all

pupils, since they may belong to different religions and have different worldviews. The state must provide parents with a free choice of religion learned by their children"¹⁰².

The compromise model is advocated by UAOC, whose Bishops' Council in 1998 decided to support introduction of God's Law at public schools and higher educational establishments on a voluntary basis.

Tough models of religious education provide not only the study of religion, as a mandatory element of educational programmes at public educational establishments, but also the restructuring of secular education on religious grounds. To a certain extent, the tough model is already being implemented in Ukraine. From 1996 on, local authorities introduced a mandatory school course of Christian Ethics in some Western regions. A system of teachers' training for its teaching was created. From 2000, teachers of Christian Ethics for schools and kindergartens will also be trained at the Centre of Catechising attached to the Institute of Artificial Intellect in Donetsk created with the assistance of the Lviv Theological Academy on the initiative of UGCC¹⁰³. Some public educational establishments employ priests

¹⁰¹ Sverstiuk Y. The Soul Starts Working in Childhood: Interview. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1998, No.9, p.5.

¹⁰² International Scientific and Practical Conference "Religious Freedom in Post-socialist Countries: Legal and State Guarantees". — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, No.13, p.93.

¹⁰³ Rykova N. Catechism for the Children. — *Kievskie vedomosti*, August 10, 2000, p.4.

and missionaries of different confessions for teaching¹⁰⁴.

The very principle of separation of school from the Church is increasingly debated and denied. The Orthodox Pedagogic Association (of UOC) in March, 1999, held an ecclesiastic-public conference "Christian Values in Education", which discussed the idea of introducing not a separate ecclesiastic course but the whole Christian worldview into the system of education, and substantiated the need for the Church's participation in the drafting of school programmes on humanitarian subjects (literature, ethnology, etc.)¹⁰⁵.

At the same time, Ukraine witnesses trends toward establishing the tough model of religious education at public educational establishments, and also toward introducing religious fundamentals into the programmes of educational subjects. There are even attempts at substantiating the necessity for "writing natural study and humanitarian textbooks on the alternative basis"¹⁰⁶. The Pedagogic Association named after H.Vashchenko and the All-Ukrainian Educational Association "Prosvita", both close to UOC-KP, actively popularise pedagogical heritage of H.Vashchenko, built on the paradigm of the Church's control over education of the youth¹⁰⁷.

Tough models of religious education at public educational establishments actually ignore the principle of the freedom of conscience, and recognise only one of its elements — the freedom of religion. For this reason alone, introduction of such educational models in a democratic state, which Ukraine has proclaimed itself, is imprac-

ticable. In case of implementation of mandatory teaching of religion at public schools, a theological problem arises connected with preaching in a 'captive audience', incompatible with the principle of independent and voluntary advent of man to faith (the freedom of will).

The present state of inter-confessional relations in Ukraine should be taken into account, and this is characterised by the manifestations of intolerance, which can be extended to school in the event of introducing mandatory religious education¹⁰⁸.

The public opinion regarding the study of religion at public educational establishments remains ambiguous and controversial. According to the poll conducted by the UCEPS sociological service in April, 2000, less than half (41.3%) of respondents agree with the introduction of the mandatory course of God's Law into the school academic programme; almost a third (31.1%) of the polled believe that this course may be introduced, as optional; 22% of respondents flatly reject the teaching of God's Law at school on any basis; 5.6% could not give a definite answer. Therefore, **the majority (53.1%) of the polled do not agree with the tough model of religious education at public school.**

UCEPS experts believe that the tough models of religious education at public educational establishments are incompatible with the principle of the freedom of conscience, whose abidance presents a pre-requisite for building a democratic state ruled by law, and forming civil society in Ukraine. The alternative model of religious education suits the present state of Ukraine's society the most. This presumes establishing a network of Sunday schools, private religious educational establishments, and legal provision of the possibility of optional religious education at public educational establishments. Public academic school should also provide a mandatory course of religious science.

The state should participate in the funding of confessional educational establishments, for instance, by channelling part of school tax, planned to be introduced in 2001, to their maintenance. The mechanism of distribution of the school tax between the state and confessional educational establishments should be target-oriented, and determined by taxpayers.



¹⁰⁴ Inspection of the abidance by the law on education, conducted by Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office in June - July, 1998, revealed instances of active involvement of religious organisations in the educational process at some educational establishments. See: Religion and Church in Ukraine: August. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1998, No.9, p.27.

¹⁰⁵ Archbishop Makariy: "Ukraine Has Always Been an Orthodox State". — *Region*, March 20, 1999, p.17.

¹⁰⁶ International scientific and practical conference "Raising the Young Generation on the Principles of Christian Moral in the Process of Ukraine's Revival" (May, 1996, town of Ostroh). — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, 1996, No.3, p.41.

¹⁰⁷ "Ukrainian family, kindergartens, school and youth organisations must act under the cover of the Church, that unites all believers and brings them up in the spirit of Christ's teaching". See: Vashchenko H. Education of the Will and Character. — Kyiv, 1999, p.276.

¹⁰⁸ The reality of this prospective is witnessed by the following thesis from the Declaration of the Zaporizhya city organisation of 'Prosvita' on the intention to create an all-Ukrainian committee for the renewal of God's Law at school. The Declaration reads: "Justice tells us that God's Law can be only in the form of Ukrainian Orthodoxy". See: Let Us Bring Our Children Back to God. — *Chas/Time*, May 24, 1996.

3.7 THE CHURCH AND THE ARMED FORCES

In Ukraine, the problem of relations between the Church and the Armed Forces has several dimensions. *First of all*, given the preservation of conscript service in Ukraine's Armed Forces, it is important *to ensure the rights of believers, who cannot take up arms because of their religious convictions*. To this end, the state legislatively provides and guarantees the possibility of alternative (non-military) service. In Ukraine, this problem is practically resolved¹⁰⁹.

The second dimension encompasses *exercising believer servicemen's right to satisfy their religious needs (worshipping, communicating with priests and coreligionists, reading religious texts, etc.)*. This dimension is rather important, since **the Ukrainian military shows a tendency toward higher religiosity**. According to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, between 1992 and 1996, the share of believers in the Army rose from 4% to 29%. According to the results of the poll performed by the Kyiv Humanitarian Military Institute in 1996, 35.5% of the polled in Ukraine's Armed Forces considered themselves believers, another 26.6% could not give a definite answer¹¹⁰. According to the Internal Troops Commander-in-Chief V.Povazhniuk, between 36% and 43% of his subordinates reported their religiosity in course of sociological survey¹¹¹.

The effective legislation¹¹² provides overall regulation of believer servicemen's possibility to satisfy their religious needs. The State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs did not register any cases of violation of the legislation on the freedom of conscience, regarding servicemen's rights. According to the head of the MoD press-service S.Nahoryanskyi, "presently, nobody will persecute a believer officer or a conscript for his religious convictions... When a new draft comes in, deputy commanders for education find out to what confession their wards belong, and give the



guys an opportunity to communicate with God in their out-of-duty hours"¹¹³.

The third dimension is *the Church's participation in educational and socio-psychological activity in the Armed Forces*. Today, this is the most complex and controversial aspect, as judged by the public and experts. *The proposals regarding the introduction of the institute of chaplains in the Armed Forces* are motivated by the requirements of military servants' education (and not only by the problem of satisfying believers' needs).

The restoration of the institute of chaplains with the purpose of spiritual, moral and patriotic education of the military was mentioned in a resolution of the Round table "Spiritual Unity of Ukrainian Churches", held within the framework of the 3rd World Forum of Ukrainians (July, 1997)¹¹⁴. Priests' participation in the process of education and training is provided by the Declaration of intentions of co-operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, signed in February, 2000¹¹⁵.

The necessity of strengthening the educational and socio-psychological work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is beyond any doubt. First, the

¹⁰⁹ The right to alternative service is provided by Ukraine's Constitution and governed by the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Non-military) service" (1991). Resolution of Ukraine's Government No.360 of June 30, 1992, approved the list of spheres where Ukraine's citizens may serve alternative service, and the list of religious organisations, active in Ukraine, whose religious teaching prohibits taking up arms and serving in the Armed Forces. This list includes organisations of Seventh-day Adventists, Reformer Adventists, Evangelic Christians, Evangelic Baptist Christians, Christians of Evangelic Faith and Christians of Evangelic Faith (Pentecostals), Jehovah's Witnesses, and adherents of Charismatic churches.

¹¹⁰ Utkin O. Conflicts on National and Confessional Grounds in Ukraine's Armed Forces and Measures for Their Prevention. — *Ukrayinske Relihieznavstvo*, 1997, No.5, c.52.

¹¹¹ Religion and Church in Ukraine: February. — *Liudyna i Svit*, No.3, p.33.

¹¹² The Law of Ukraine "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations" (Article 21); the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Military Servants and their Dependants" (Article 6).

¹¹³ Kucherenko V. "The Institution of Chaplains in the Army Is Premature", Believes the Head Department of Education of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. — *Kievskie vedomosti*, November 14, 1998, p.10.

¹¹⁴ "With a thought of the National Armed Forces, as the guarantor of national security of the Ukrainian state, the Forum of Ukrainians recommends restoring the institute of chaplains in the Army, opening temples at military schools, and through diligent work of the priesthood, bringing up high spirituality, morale, chivalry and patriotism..." See: Information Bulletin of UOC-KP, 1997, No.8, p.8.

¹¹⁵ Religion and Church in Ukraine: February. — *Liudyna i Svit*, 1999, No.3, p.33.



general crisis in society has a negative impact on moral and psychological state of the military. The survey of the Ukrainian officers' social spirits proves that they are rather negative, more close to apathy and depression, than to animation and enthusiasm¹¹⁶. The social prestige of the military service is falling. The educational level of conscripts goes down. The existence of non-statutory relations and numerous cases of suicides testify to the negative socio-psychological state of the military serving a regular term. The servicemen transferred to the reserve need assistance: according to sociological survey data, the mortality level decreases fourfold among this category of citizens, the number of suicides grows noticeably¹¹⁷.

Second, at present the Ukrainian Army has no comprehensive doctrine of educational work. The problem of the educational work in the Army is not solved at the ideological and conceptual levels. The fact that the Concept of the educational work in the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine¹¹⁸ does not define the essence of military servants' education proves that. It is reduced to the following general tautological formula: "The cultural-educational and instructive work ensures fostering high spiritual, cultural and moral qualities and patriotic feelings with the servicemen, loyalty to the traditions of the Ukrainian people, satisfaction of their aesthetic requirements by holding cultural and enlightenment events and organisation of leisure time for the enlisted per-

sonnel." It is no doubt that the sociological survey of the military carried out in 1998 testified to the absence of the leading hereditary tradition which should be the basis of education for the personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces¹¹⁹.

Third, the army environment is a subject of a keen interest on the part of various destructive semi-religious groups. It is proved, in particular, by the recently published information on "Guh'yasamaja" organisation active in Simferopol, whose doctrine and worship practice, to experts' opinion, is very close to the teaching and practice of "Aum Sinrikyo." This organisation, created by a former Navy officer, involves preferably servicemen¹²⁰. There are reports about the activities of groups of the Church of Moon ("The Unification Church") in the form of various public formations, which were close to penetrating into the Ukrainian Army educational structures¹²¹.

Thus, the necessity of moral and psychological assistance to servicemen, strengthening the educational work in the Army is obvious. But the involvement of Church in these activities through introducing the institute of chaplains remains a discussion problem.

There is no unanimity on the form and extent of the Church's presence in the Armed Forces. According to results of servicemen's polling by the Institute of Sociology under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, only 8.3% of respondents agree that religion should become an element of the Army education system, the majority favours the presence of priest instructors in the Armed Forces, but a considerable part, while advocating the possibility of having religious ceremonies in the Army, considers the institute of chaplains inadmissible. In their opinion, it will actually mean creating state Church and aggravating contradictions on the religious basis among the military¹²². The poll among servicemen held in 1999, testified that only 24% of respondents agree that chaplains would be able to positively influence the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, and 48.6% expressed negative opinion on this issue.

¹¹⁶ Razumtsev O. Social Aspects of Reforms in the Army: the Spiritual State of the Ukrainian Officers. — *National Security and Defence*, 2000, No.2, p. 40-48.

¹¹⁷ Vaulina O. Social and Psychological Rehabilitation: to See the Goal, to Disassemble the Obstacles. — *Holos Ukrainy*, February 19, 1996, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No.981 of September 4, 1998.

¹¹⁹ Only close to 15% of those questioned consider that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have their own traditions (some 53% more have chosen the answer "partially have"); close to 3% are sure that traditions of the Ukrainian Cossacks are the traditions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (26.7% — partially); about 1% indicated the traditions of the Russian Czar Army (18% — partially), 2% — traditions of the Ukrainian People's Republic (12% — partially), 0.3% — of the Ukrainian Galizia Army (6% — partially), 1% — the Ukrainian Rebel Army's traditions (7% — partially). The majority of respondents pointed to the traditions of the Soviet Army — close to 33% (55.7% — partially).

¹²⁰ Sadovsky V. Guru Behind the Monastery Wall. — *Narodna Armiya*, July 21, 2000, p. 5.

¹²¹ See: Zolotariov V. Doctor Moon and Hetman Mulyava Take Care of the Ukrainian Family. — *Den'*, December 3, 1996, p.2; Rechynsky S. The Church and the Army. A Way to the Unity. — *Region*, August 29, 1998, p. 17.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p.53.



None of the Churches made public its own concept of the military priesthood, its aim and tasks. Agreements that are concluded between individual Churches and military structures are actually not known to the public. There are no materials testifying that the Church, while expanding its presence in the Armed Forces, assumes, at least partly, the duty of civilian control over the Army.

The public opinion also did not make certain about the expediency of chaplains. The survey performed by the UCEPS sociological service in June 2000 showed practically the same number of the adherents to and opponents of the idea of introducing the institute of chaplains: 51.3% against 48.7% respectively.

Arguments in favour of introducing the institute of chaplains are normally based on the historical and foreign experience¹²³. The fact, that in foreign armies, the religious concept of patriotism and military service to Homeland is not the only one, and only complements the thoroughly thought-over secular version, which is the main, an extra- and super-confessional one, is not taken into account. In absence of such a version, there arises a possibility to clericalise the educational work in the Army. In addition, foreign experience proves that legislative provision of chaplaincy for the country's dominant confessions (Poland, Germany, Great Britain), or inter-confessional mutual understanding and tolerance within society (U.S.) are the necessary prerequisites for the institution of chaplains.

Arguments against the introduction of the institute of chaplains are based on the present-day realities of Ukraine. *First*, the Ukrainian legislation envisages secular character of education in state institutions, including the Army. *Second*, the presented data of sociological surveys prove that if not the majority, then the essential part of servicemen do not identify themselves as believers. This fact is not taken into account by the advocates of the Church's participation in the educational process in the Army. In the meantime, if the religious factor is included into the educational process, the aforementioned problem of preaching in a 'captive audience' will arise with regard to those people, from the ecclesiastic point of view, and the problem of violation of the freedom of conscience, from the judicial

viewpoint. *Third*, the conflict character of the present-day religious environment in Ukraine can involve the Army. *Fourth*, the politicising of the religious life may lead to political confrontation in the military units. *Fifth*, the mechanisms of introducing the institute of chaplains and its consequences are insufficiently studied, and there is no respective systematic research programme till the present time in Ukraine.

At the same time, the position of the Church in the issue of interaction with the Army is rather active. Special structures, responsible for the organisation of activities in the Armed Forces, are created by actually all confessions. In some Churches (for instance, UOC-KP) these departments are called departments of "spiritual-educational work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine". Theological educational establishments teach theological subjects for the officers of the Armed Forces responsible for the educational work in the Army units¹²⁴. Numerous conferences are held where addresses are adopted to the state authorities and the Armed Forces command, proposing to introduce the institute of chaplains. As the analysis of these conference materials proves, the Church efforts are not primarily directed at satisfying religious needs, but on their formation, i.e. at religious education of servicemen. At the same time, the problems of world-view pluralism, religious and civil tolerance are not being actually discussed.

The Churches' split has an impact on their activities in the Army. The Churches that are in conflict sign agreements on co-operation with different military formations. It can negatively influence the entire educational process in the military formations and bring tension of inter-Church relations into the Army. In addition, the Church rivalry for the dominating influence on the Army is becoming ever more critical. Thus, the UOC actively fights for its prevailing right for the chaplaincy. "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as the traditional and the most numerous Church in our state, in correspondence with the principles practised in other civilised countries, should become the basis for the institute of chaplains in Ukraine," reads the Address of the UOC clergy meeting participants, responsible for the organisation of spiritual and educational work in the Armed Forces, other military formations of Ukraine and in the reformatory estab-

¹²³ "The idea of chaplains is not a subjective figment of individual persons or a consequence of some reflections by the scientists or theologians. It reflects aspirations of the national patriotic forces to revive the traditions of military priest activities observed in the Zaporizhian Host and the Ukrainian People's Republic Army. It is a manifestation of an important tendency in the development of educational process with the use of religion in the modern units of many countries." See: International Scientific and Practical Conference "Religious Freedom in Post-socialist Countries: Legal and State Guarantees." — *Ukrayinske Relihiyoznavstvo*, 2000, No.13, p.92.

¹²⁴ In 2000, the first students graduated from the Theological Courses under the Kyiv Theological Academy (UOC-KP), where 25 officers of the Armed Forces and other Ukraine's military structures studied. The graduates studied the Holy Scripture, catechism, apologetics, liturgy, the history of Church and other theological subjects. See: Maksimenko O. Theologians with Epaulettes. — *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, 2000, No.7, p.6.

lishments, to the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada and to the leaders of the military ministries¹²⁵. On its part, UOC-KP openly censures leaders of the military structures for concluding agreements on co-operation with UOC. "The position of the military," Patriarch Filaret claims, — arouses surprise. They categorically suspend the national Churches and, at the same time, actively enrol the Moscow Orthodox Church"¹²⁶.

If one takes into account the fact that political forces of various orientations are behind each Church, it is possible to admit that the Church confrontation (with its subsequent pressing) may have a negative impact on the Army, bring forth contradictions on the ethnic, confessional or political bases.

UCEPS experts believe, the introduction of the institute of chaplains is premature in the present-day conditions in Ukraine. Either Army, or society, or Church are not ready to make this step, since the achievement of inter-confessional reconciliation, establishment of tolerance among Churches and believers, and between believers and non-believers are the necessary prerequisites of the chaplains' presence in the Army.

The growth in the number of believers and expansion of clergymen presence in the Army



requires respective changes in the system of special training of officers, in particular, including religious subjects in the programmes of military educational establishments.

The analysis of the position taken by the Church in the sphere of political and social activities proves that it has a certain inessential influence on the public opinion and behaviour. The public is divided, regarding the Church's initiatives concerning religious education in school, chaplains in the Army, the Church support to certain political forces, participation of clergy in the elections. This falls for a more detailed analysis of the population's religiosity.

3.8 RELIGIOSITY OF UKRAINE'S POPULATION

The intensification of the church and religious life at the turn of the '80s-'90s had resulted in a considerable, as compared to the Soviet times, rise in the level of the Ukrainian society's religiosity. In the '70s, concrete case studies fixed the Ukrainian population's religiosity within 15-20% level, while 55-60% of respondents identify themselves as believers from early '90s. Taking into consideration the fact, that respective monitoring results remain stable during the last decade¹²⁷, it is possible to state that religiosity level of the population is stable and corresponds to the European indicators.

According to the results of the poll carried out by the UCEPS sociological service in August, 2000, **57.8% of respondents identified themselves as believers; 22.5% considered themselves to be in-between belief and unbelief; 11.9% of those inquired identify themselves as non-believers, 3.2% — as staunch atheists**¹²⁸.

The confessional belonging was given by **77.3% of believer respondents**: 66% of those questioned called themselves Catholics; 7.6% — Greek Catholics; 0.5% — Roman Catholics; 2% were of different Protestant orientations; 0.7% belongs to Islam; 0.3% — to Judaism; 0.1% — to Paganism, and 6.9% of respondents called themselves "Simply Christians".

It is notable, that **while indicating a rather high declared level of religiosity, respondents showed a considerably lower level of trust in the Church — only 33.1% of those questioned fully trusts in it, only 48% — among believers.**

Religious activity of believers is not very high: the religious services, gatherings and ser-

¹²⁵ Rechynsky S. The Church And the Army. A Way to Unity. — *Region*, August 29, 1998, p.17.

¹²⁶ *Polityka i Kultura*, 1999, No.3, p.26.

¹²⁷ See: Holovakha Ye. Panina N. Trends of the Ukrainian Society Development (1994-1997): Sociological Indices (Tables, Illustrations, Comments). — Kyiv, 1998, p.84.

¹²⁸ Another 2.6% of respondents testified their indifference to faith, 2% — did not give any definite answer.



mons are attended by 69.4%, and only 39.1% go to church not less than once a month, almost half of believers (49.6%) attend the services only during religious holidays. **Only 17.6% of those questioned (24% of believers) consider it obligatory for a believer to attend religious services and to have a deep knowledge of the religious teaching principles (i.e. to be involved in church ceremonies).** Instead, almost one third of respondents (27.9%) are sure, that a believer may avoid attending services, participating in ceremonies and knowing the principles of religious teaching (21% of believers).

The majority of respondents do not consider it obligatory to determine confessional belonging of their religious faith, motivating that a person may simply be a believer without belonging to any particular religion: 64.4% of respondents agreed with this, as well as 58.1% of believers.

Only a little more than half of believers (53.2%) need Church to communicate with

God, 12.7% testified that a “tete-a-tete” conversation with God is enough for them. Just 7.7% of believers think that faith gives them “a feeling of community in religion and spiritual family,” i.e. in Church as such.

Thus, there are grounds to conclude that there exists a rather large gap between people's religiosity and their actual participation in Church activities. This gap is an explanation why the majority of those believing they are Christians (55%) do not consider themselves to be members of any Orthodox denomination, 7.7% do not know what jurisdiction they belong to, and inter-confessional conflicts worry only 2% of respondents.

On the whole, religiosity of Ukraine's society is far from being high. Either conscientiously, or otherwise, people consider faith to be rather a personal, not public, affair, and even not a Church affair.

A comparatively high level of religiosity demonstrated today by the Ukrainian population is not generally and sufficiently connected with the recognition of religion as a fundamental vital value, the waymark in life and daily behaviour. The indices of believers' confessional affiliation and the general level of trust in the Church do not correspond to the manifested level of religiosity.

Hence, the Church factor is yet on the periphery of social activity and by itself is unable to make a noticeable influence on the population's social behaviour. It means, that, in particular, the Church factor alone cannot cause social disturbances. Inter-confessional confrontation is manifested by a small part of active parishioners (not more than 3-5% of believers according to expert estimates).

4. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

The analysis of the confessional and religious situation in Ukraine makes it possible to draw the following conclusions.

The confessional and religious situation in Ukraine is different from the one that formed in the majority of Central-East European post-socialist countries: in Ukraine, there is no dominant Church, that society or the majority of the population associates itself with. Each of the Churches has, to a smaller or larger extent, a regional character, and has a limited sphere of influence. The UOC is the closest to the nation-wide status, given its spread and the presence in the regions, but even this Church does not have a dominant position in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions.

In Ukraine, a network of Churches and religious institutions has been formed, that is sufficient for satisfying the religious needs of believers: 52 denominations are represented, 23,543 *religious organisations* of 90 confessions and trends are active in the country. Religious organisations possess 16,637 religious buildings. Conditions exist for reproducing the religious network: Churches have enough priests, and close to 16 thousand students are trained at 121 theological educational establishments.

The expansion of the religious network has stabilised, which fact bears witness to the completion of its extensive development. The 1988-1990 period of activity, when the number of *religious organisations* increased by 41.7%, was followed by a moderate growth at a rate of 5-8% annually. The further growth of the religious network is conditional on the Church's ability to employ new forms of evangelisation, missionary work, and higher qualification of priests.

The dominant role of Orthodoxy, inherent in Ukraine, persists. This religion

encompasses 52.7% of all *religious organisations*. 70.2% of all Orthodox *communities* belong to the UOC, 20.6% — to the UOC-KP, 8.2% — to the UAOC. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has the second largest number of *religious organisations* — 14.3%. More than a quarter of all *religious organisations* (26.3%) belongs to different Protestant trends.

Compared to the traditional Churches, Protestant and neo-religious organisations are expanding more rapidly. In some of Ukraine's regions, Protestant communities either outnumber other communities (in the Donetsk region and in Kyiv), or are coming close to the level of dominant confessions (the Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad and Chernivtsi regions). The activity of Protestant organisations is first of all characterised by their clear determination to engage in active missionary work.

In Ukraine, neo-religious formations are spreading rapidly. The country is within the field of influence of foreign neo-religious missions and centres. The new teachings are broadly represented in Ukraine's information space: the volume of neo-religious broadcasting in 1999 rose against the previous year by 50%. The aggressive character of missionary activities of these new-born trends, their non-recognition of such notions as canonical territory or proselytising are often causing negative attitude on the part of traditional Churches. *The spread of new religious trends in Ukraine is also an indicator of traditional Churches' crisis.*

Practically all confessions in Ukraine are regionally structured. The centre of religious life is clearly shifted to the Western regions: with only 19.8% of Ukraine's pop-



ulation, this area houses close to 43% of all religious communities. Characteristic of the new religious trends is their attempting to evenly cover the entire Ukraine's territory.

Over the eight years that passed after the establishment of the three Orthodox Churches, the regional nature of their presence in Ukraine has remained virtually unchanged: **the “poly-confessional” character of Orthodoxy remains a factor conducive to Ukraine’s regionalisation.**

The intensification of the Church and religious life at the turn of the ‘80s — ‘90s had resulted in a considerable, as compared to the Soviet times, rise in the level of the Ukrainian society’s religiosity. In recent years, the level of religiosity has been rather stable (55-60%), and generally corresponds to the European indicators. However, respondents showed a considerably lower level of trust in the Church — only 33.1% of the polled fully trust it, and less than half (48%) of believers do so. The generally high level of religiosity indicated by Ukraine’s population is not backed by the perception of religion as a fundamental life value that determines everyday behaviour. Hence, the church factor is yet on the periphery of social activity and by itself is unable to make a noticeable influence on the population’s social behaviour.

Religiosity of modern Ukraine’s society is far from being active: people consider faith to be rather a personal, not public, affair, and even not a Church affair. The majority of citizens do not consider necessary even confessional determination of faith: 64.4% of all polled agreed that a person can be a believer without affiliation with a concrete religion. More than half of believers (58.1%) shared this position.

The appearance of this trend can be explained by the Church’s involvement into the party and political struggle, and by the Church’s inadequate attention to the most urgent social problems, which results in **the absence of a true dialogue between the Church and society.** On the one hand, no significant activity on the part of the Church is observed in such spheres as human rights protection against authorities’ abuse; the Church is very cautious regard-

ing the socio-economic reform, accompanied with infringement of social rights of citizens. On the other hand, some socially significant initiatives of the Church are debatable, and find no unanimous support in society. For instance, public opinion is split on the issue of mandatory study of the Law of God at public schools: 41.3% of respondents spoke out in support of this initiative, 22% flatly rejected the proposal, another 31.1% of the polled believe that such a course may be taught as optional. The Church’s initiative regarding the introduction of the institute of chaplains in the Armed Forces was met in a similar way: the number of adherents and opponents of this idea is virtually the same — 51.3% against 48.7% of the polled.

Inter-Church relations in Ukraine are characterised by noticeable confrontation. Contradictions exist between traditional Churches and new religious movements, between traditional Churches of different confessions, and between Churches of the same confession. Tension is not always displayed on the global level of Churches’ confrontation, as institutions. Sometimes it is manifested in the form of local disputes between communities, eparchies, etc. On the other hand, global confrontation does not always reach the level of lower Church structures.

Contradictions between Churches of different confessions are caused by a complex set of dogmatic, canonical and property factors, but their main reason is the combination of the confessional-religious factor with ethnic and political factors. Two problems come to the front in relations between Churches: their attitude to Ukraine’s statehood and the perception of its national character.

The property issue is also fraught with conflicts, given the lack of religious buildings that can be used by religious organisations. Their intense construction in the recent years has significantly mitigated the problem. At present, confrontation is mainly centred around a limited number of religious building of national patrimony. Such disputes usually have political colouring.

Orthodox schism remains the source for contradictions. Existence of three Churches within one denomination in Ukraine is an abnormal phenomenon. Still it only reflects some Ukraine's historic, social and cultural realities. In the context of the idea of the "National Church", the problem of inter-Church relations is shifted from the domain of confessional and religious issues and loyalty to the Ukrainian state into the political sphere, which makes the inter-Church dialogue aimed at solving ecclesiastic problems impossible.

The idea of unification of the Orthodox Churches into a Single Independent Orthodox Church has not been practically implemented yet. Counterparts have entirely different views regarding the fundamentals and terms of unification, prospects for canonical gaining the autocephalous status, and the Church that would grant this status for the would-be united Church. Public opinion on the issue of creating a Single Independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine remains undecided: this idea was supported by 39.9% of respondents, not supported by 42.8%. Only 14.4% of those polled consider the unification of the Churches to be the authorities' duty, 63.1% is sure that the authorities should not interfere in the relations between the Orthodox Churches, 32.3% of those are sure that such interference excessively politicises the problem and has nothing common with grievance over religion, faith, Church. Under these circumstances unification of the Orthodox Churches is almost impossible.

UCEPS experts believe that the unification of Orthodoxy is possible only on the basis of civil (but not ethnic) solidarity. Otherwise, any attempts at uniting the Orthodox Churches could lead to the aggravation of inter-Orthodox relations and new splits. There are reasons to believe that the Orthodox split will not be overcome in the near future.

Given the rapid spread of the new religious trends, their determination to expand missionary activity and coverage of the entire territory of Ukraine, it can be predicted that the conflict between the traditional and new Churches will not fade away.

Under the pressure of the traditional Churches and the public, the state will have to take measures prescribing the degree and the nature of new religious practices' influence on the health and social behaviour of Ukraine's citizens.

Society's demands to the Church are gradually shifted from the purely ecclesiastic domain to the social sphere: today, society needs not only pastoral care, but also social service of the Church. More than half (51.7%) of all citizens believe that religious organisations are inadequately engaged into social activities; close to 40% of respondents are sure that the Church does not play a significant role in society. Therefore, the prospects of further development of the Church to a large extent depend on its social activity and involvement in the solution of problems that worry Ukrainians the most, at the present time.

The intense expansion of the church and religious network is accompanied with the Church's penetration into all spheres of public life that were previously closed for it. Today, the Church's social activity covers two main spheres: charity and education. Education is understood as religious education. It takes place primarily in the youth environment: among youth movements, at school and in the Army.

Virtually all Ukraine's religious organisations established their structures (missions) for performing charitable projects. The main forms of charitable activity include: organisation of children's rest and treatment; assistance to the poor; establishment and maintenance of orphanages, homes for the aged, kindergartens for orphans, social rehabilitation centres; charitable activity in the places of detention; humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and to refugees. If the scales of charitable activity are compared, more active are organisations that belong to powerful international structures or whose religious centres are located beyond Ukraine's borders.

The Church could use its authority for insuring more active involvement of laymen (and non-believers) in assisting the state social service, or creating its own social pro-



tection network on voluntary basis, to care about lonely and elderly people, and homeless children. It is evident that the Church can do a lot to this end.

The Church pays significant attention to working with the youth. Next to all religious organisations have special structures that care about children, teenagers and youths. The Orthodox Churches that call themselves “national” are determined to educate young people in the spirit of patriotism and nation-building. In relations with the youth, the Church is actively using mass media. Close to 30% of religious periodicals target the child and youth audience. **The effectiveness of the Church’s activity aimed at recruiting young people through different structures centred around the Church is rather low. This makes the Church to seek to spread its influence over the network of public educational establishments.**

The problems of relations between the Church and school are mainly centred around religious education of children and youths. At the same time, the social problems of education remain out of focus of the Church. The public opinion regarding the study of religion at public educational establishments remains ambiguous and controversial. **UCEPS experts believe** that the model providing for establishing a network of Sunday schools, private religious educational establishments, legal provision for the possibility of optional religious education at public educational establishments, and teaching the course of religious studies at public academic schools suits the present stage of Ukraine’s society the most.

There is an evident trend toward politicising Ukraine’s religious environment. Churches attract political and public structures with different views of the independent Ukraine. The split centred around two issues: the national character of the state and its geopolitical priorities. Churches are engaged in supporting candidates at parliamentary and presidential elections. Despite rather close ties of Churches with certain political forces and the authorities, the Church’s influence on politics and political orientations of the public remains limited.

In general, the Churches’ confrontation involving the use of political levers does not cause serious political storms, for the overall influence of the Churches on political views of the population remains low. Inter-confessional confrontation is manifested by a small part of active parishioners (not more than 3-5% of believers, according to expert estimates). Confessional affiliation often turns into a factor of political self-identification of citizens. When applied to the regional historic and cultural differences, and contradicting political interests, the religious factor is fraught with conflicts, which can seriously affect the stability of Ukraine’s society.

The Ukrainian military shows a tendency toward higher religiosity. The necessity of moral and psychological assistance to servicemen, strengthening the educational work in the Army is obvious. But the involvement of the Church in these activities through introducing the institute of chaplains remains a controversial issue. Among the military, there is no unanimity on the form and extent of the Church’s presence in the Armed Forces. The public opinion also did not make certain about the expediency of chaplains. At the same time, the position of the Church regarding its interaction with the Army is rather active: special structures, responsible for the organisation of activities in the Armed Forces, are created by actually all confessions, theological schools teach theological subjects for the military officers responsible for the educational work in the Army. Agreements signed between separate Churches and military structures are closed for the public. Noticeably, **the Churches that are in conflict sign agreements on co-operation with different military structures. It can bring tension of inter-Church relations into the military.**

UCEPS experts believe that the introduction of the institute of chaplains is premature in the present-day conditions in Ukraine. Either Army, or society, or Church are not ready to make this step, since the achievement of inter-confessional reconciliation, establishment of tolerance among Churches and believers, and between believers and non-believers are the necessary prereq-

quisites of the chaplains' presence in the Army. At the same time, the growth in the number of believers and expansion of clergymen presence in the Army requires respective changes in the system of special training of officers, in particular, including religious subjects in the curricula of military schools.

Ukraine's effective legislation on the freedom of conscience is generally democratic and corresponds to the norms of international law. At the same time, the practice of inter-Church relations and the people's exercise of their right to the freedom of conscience under conditions of the spreading of new religious trends shows that the effective legislation does not entirely take into account the present-day realities of the confessional and religious life, inter-Church disputes, and the effects of some destructive religious neo-formations. **The main shortcomings of the effective legislation could be considered the following ones:**

- ✧ non-recognition of the Churches possessing hierarchic structures as independent subjects of legal relations. This contradicts the internal regulations of hierarchic Churches, complicates administration of the communities by superior Church bodies and causes inter-confessional tension. Meanwhile, in case of a Church's recognition as an integral and independent subject of legal relations, the supreme body of the Church administration would assume all responsibility for the activity of sub-units within its structure. This would allow to avoid the state's interference in the internal organisational affairs of Churches;

- ✧ the state's interference into the issue of rotating use of religious buildings. UCEPS experts believe that rotating use of temples and religious buildings should be considered an internal affair of the Church, and should be applied solely with the mutual consent of religious organisations, without any interference on the part of state structures;

- ✧ lack of legal background for protecting citizens against the destructive effect of religious practice of some neo-religions. The nature of "mass healing", which is an element of religious practice of some new religious groupings, remains officially undefined. Meanwhile, vivid discussion of the

issue in mass media and the controversy of public opinion require the appropriate reaction on the part of the authorities;

- ✧ the issues of the Church property restitution remain legislatively unresolved.

The period of establishing the Church-state relations in Ukraine is actually over. Institutes that co-ordinate the Church-state relations have been created: on the part of the state, this is the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs; on the part of the Church — the All-Ukrainian Church Council. **The relations between the state and the Church are gaining the features of an equal dialogue, but at the same time, the practice of confessional and religious life bears witness to some negative sides in the Church-state relations:**

- ✧ restitution of religious buildings and property to the Church is being delayed. In some instances, instructions of the President of Ukraine regarding the return of temples used for other than designed purposes remain unaccomplished;

- ✧ the issue of recognition of theological education by the state remains unresolved. This impedes the professional employment of theologians at public institutions and, subsequently, limits the possibilities of personnel training for religious organisations;

- ✧ the unimpeded (and unbiased) observance of the effective legislation that governs the activities of the Church and regional authorities has not been ensured. Some local authorities are not unbiased, and support certain confessions to the detriment of others.

UCEPS experts believe that the following measures should be taken for harmonising the relations between different confessions, between the Church and the state, and for guaranteeing human rights and freedoms:

- 1) the Verkhovna Rada should expedite the review of draft Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations", with account of proposals worked out and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada by representatives of Ukraine's reli-

gious organisations; in particular, the provision of rotating use of religious buildings should be removed from the effective Law (paragraph 3, Article 17);

2) the authorities should concentrate on other ways of providing communities with religious buildings. In particular, the transfer of temples that stay in public property and are used for other than designed purposes should be speeded up;

3) the practice of local authorities hampering the allocation of land plots to communities that can build religious buildings on their own should be eliminated;

4) for regulating the activity of religious organisations, raising the responsibility of the highest bodies of Churches possessing hierarchic structures for the observance of legislation on the freedom of conscience by their subordinate units (communities), and bringing the provisions of aforementioned Law in compliance with internal regulations of the hierarchic Churches, the notion of “Church” should be included therein, and legal fundamentals of relations between separate Churches and the state on the basis of relevant agreements (concordats) be defined;

5) the effective legislation (on the freedom of conscience, on education) should be supplemented with the following provisions: (a) teaching of theological subjects at public educational establishments shall be made possible on optional basis, with the consent of children or their parents; (b) any forcible teaching of such subjects or involvement of pupils in rites shall not be allowed;

6) in order to protect people from the destructive influence of religious practices of some new religious trends: (a) draft law on psychological protection of citizens should

be worked out; (b) a state-sustained research institution for the study of new religious practices’ impact on the health and social behaviour of people and informing the public about possible threats should be established;

7) it is worth examining the issue of expanding the powers of the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs regarding the observance of the effective legislation at local authorities’ level. This would encourage formulation of uniform methods of applying the law, as well as timely revealing and elimination of its infringement in the regions;

8) it is worth examining the issue of the state’s participation in the funding of confessional secondary schools, for instance, through channelling part of the school tax intended to be introduced in 2001, to that purpose. The mechanism of school tax distribution between public and confessional schools could be based on its target-oriented planning, as defined by taxpayers;

9) the draft Concept of Ukraine’s state policy regarding the Church and religious organisations, worked out by the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs in 1997, should be finalised.

Inter-Church relations are not a purely internal problem, since their nature also impacts Ukraine’s foreign policy. At the same time, the state’s ability to maintain concord between Churches and guarantee the freedom of conscience for citizens has an impact on the international image of Ukraine. UCEPS experts believe that the implementation of these proposals will promote the harmonisation of Church-state relations in Ukraine, and improve the image of our country in the World.

RELIGION AFTER COMMUNISM: THE DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE¹



Viktor YELENSKY,
Editor-in-chief, "Lyudyna i Svit" magazine

The last decade has brought such crucial events as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 'velvet revolutions' in Central and Eastern European countries. These and many other terrific changes that took place in that region of the world had a significant impact on the relations between the state and the Church. This article presents an attempt to define the main tendencies in the state-Church relations in post-communist countries.

RELIGION IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: MODELS OF CO-EXISTENCE

The status of religious institutions in various countries of the Eastern Bloc seems similar only at the first glance. In reality, differences between them were more substantial than one could surmise from the political kinship of regimes in those countries, the absolute majority of which were tightly controlled by the Kremlin. In order to understand the reasons behind those differences, let us review the models of religious-social evolution in the countries of the Second World. In our opinion, there are five such models. We define them as secularist absolutism, tough and antagonistic separation of the Church from the state, unequal union between the state and the Church representing the majority of the population, the liberal model, and the Polish model.

Secularist absolutism. This model describes Albania under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, which in September, 1967, declared that all 2169 churches, mosques and preaching-houses were to be (and were) closed down. Albania thus became the first ever atheist state in the world. What made possible such a step by the Albanian dictator, not attempted even by Stalin or Mao Tse-Tung? Certainly, it was the political concept of the 'Albanian Way': the last bastion of Lenin-

Stalin, a kind of 'Communist 3rd Rome' in the boundless ocean of opportunists and revisionists.

However, scholars also paid attention to another peculiarity. Penetration of Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism into Albania was superficial, and those religions remained unasimilated by the Albanian ethnos, which to a large extent remained pagan. Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism (propagated correspondingly in the Arab, Greek and Latin languages) were seen by many as alien religions. In the end, there has been no religious institution in Albania perceived by everyone as a safeguard of the Albanian identity, culture, language, and which could play such a role in reality.

Tough and antagonistic separation of the Church from the state. This model was more or less consistently implemented in the Soviet Union. The amplitude of the Soviet religious policy was more than tangible: from bloody terror on one pole, which destroyed more than 50 thousand Orthodox priests alone, — to the imperial policy of implanting the "main Church of the leading nation" into the political system. From serious attempts at implementing a "final solution of the religious issue" — to so-called "new religious policy" and channelling priests to bringing up the flock in the spirit of Soviet patriotism. In its "mean values", this model

¹ The article was published in *Zerkalo Nedeli* newspaper on August 19, 2000. Here it is presented in a condensed version.



meant total control over the religious activities, and the limitation of religion to the sphere of worship; it repressed church dissidents and created a powerful infrastructure for eradication of “religious prejudices”.

We should pay attention to another issue: though unofficially, in the end Moscow admitted it was unrealistic to pursue the religious policy it pursued in the Slavic republics with regard to the Baltic region or Central Asia. In fact, despite incidental exposures of school directors serving as mullahs or regional communist party secretaries who took part in religious ceremonies somewhere in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, central authorities in the end submitted to their inability to change the way of life determined by Islam. Behind a decorous socialist facade, Muslim republics of the USSR always concealed polygamy, bride-money, almost total paring of boys, and vendetta in the Northern Caucasus. In other words, even in the times of the Soviet Union, which waged a tough and centralised war against religion, and where eradication of religiousness was an inalienable element of state policy, the status of religious institutions and religious-social development were to a very large extent determined by the character of religious culture of nations formed over centuries.

Unequal union between the state and the Church of the majority. Within the framework of this model, the state finally establishes a *modus vivendi* with the Church, traditionally representing the overwhelming majority of the population. In this case, the state employs ‘its’ Church to legitimise its existence, strengthen nationalism and justify the regime. This model was characteristic of the religious situation in socialist Romania, Bulgaria, and in some republics of Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia. The model was formed in three stages. They were: the period of preparation for the attack on the Church (the period of Popular Front in Romania and

National Front in Bulgaria); Stalinist terror against Churches and, finally, establishment of tough control over the Church of the majority, which, however, enjoyed a special status and was granted vast privileges. In that way, after Soviet-style attacks on religion, Balkan communist regimes returned to a system of relations between the state and the Church organic to their countries. A leading place in this system was occupied by the Orthodox Church, which played an exceptional role in the preservation and consolidation of the nation; its autocephalous status was seen as a mandatory attribute of statehood.

In contrast to Soviet leaders, both T.Zhivkov and N.Ceausescu stressed the role of the Orthodox Church in the history of their nations, in developing mass patriotism, and turned church structures into an appendix to the ideological department of the party and state machinery. At the same time, it is important to realise that this was achieved via great pressure on the Church, purges of the clergy, and censorship of theological thought. As a result, leading positions were occupied by entirely loyal hierarchs, and notorious syllogisms became spread, such as “A Christian is a new man; a new man is a Soviet man; therefore, a Christian is a Soviet man”.

The liberal model. It was implemented in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, some of the Yugoslav republics, and in the German Democratic Republic. After World War II, they also saw brutal pressure on Churches, arrests, tortures, purges, etc. In some countries the formation of the liberal (in very relative terms) attitude toward religious institutions took decades. For instance, in Hungary very strict limitations of religious activities in 1945-1948 were followed by Stalinist terror against the Church in 1949-1956. Then, a short period of liberalisation connected with the 1956 revolution gave place to reaction that lasted until 1963. Only then did it become possible to speak of a relative normalisation of state-Church relations in the “most lively barracks of the socialist camp”.

In the German Democratic Republic, attempts to establish more or less equal interaction between the “first state of workers and peasants on German soil” and the Church were seen only during the four post-war years. After that, there was a 30-year long march against Churches, and only during the last decade of its existence did the GDR witness some normalisation and certain expansion of religious freedoms.

The Czechoslovak Government began its activities in the sphere of religion with attempts to create a national Catholic Church that would cut all ties with Vatican.



Obviously, Churches in the countries falling under the mentioned model enjoyed (at least beginning from the 60s) freedoms and possibilities that were absolutely unattainable in the USSR. Religious institutions received subsidies from the government, were allowed to organise charitable and catechetical work, rather freely published religious and worship books. (An interesting detail: in the last twenty-five years of existence of the United Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, circulation of the Bible exceeded the edition of Marxist books.) The Church was granted comparatively normal conditions for existence in exchange for giving up any unauthorised political activities. The state considered it useful to encourage moral education, especially among youths, performed by the Church, its charity and benevolent projects, but kept religious institutions under vigilant control, introduced agents of special services into church administrations and persecuted church dissidents.

The final model of religious-social development and relations between the state and the Church in communist Central-Eastern Europe was characteristic of only one country — Poland. The essence of **the Polish model** is a constant and very active interaction between the Catholic Church and the state, characterised by situational forced co-operation or, more often, by acute competition. A lot has been written in Poland and abroad about the role of the Polish Roman-Catholic Church before and after World War II. We only would like to emphasise that Kosciol, as a bulwark of Polish identity, tempered and hardened in opposition to Russian Orthodoxy and German Protestantism in the stateless period after the division of Poland, in the communist era acquired one more important function. It substituted for civil society as the most organised, consistent and skilful oppo-

nent of the regime. On the one hand, the authority of Kosciol moved communism beyond the framework of the Polish heritage significant for the nation. On the other hand, it engaged in a dialogue with the authorities on behalf of all of society, waged a discussion, compromised, but also won concessions.

The Roman-Catholic Church, actively backed by Poles, opposed the authorities on issues that were simply beyond dispute between Churches and governments in other communist countries. One should remember the position of Cardinals S.Wysinski and K.Woityla in 1975-1976, who spoke out against constitutional amendments regarding “unbreakable and fraternal ties with the Soviet Union” and “the leading and governing role of the Polish United Workers’ Party”. But even in the period of Solidarnosc, whom Kosciol surely sympathised and encouraged, it resolutely refused the role of “co-pilot” to the famous trade-union. It is evident that Polish Kosciol emerged from the communist era enjoying arguably the greatest authority it has ever possessed over its entire history.

POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS

The nations that went through more or less intense quasi-atheistic experiment, show struggling in such indices as the declaration of belief in God, religious behaviour, affiliation with a certain religious organisation, the level of trust in the Church, etc.

By the integrated results of 14 indices, obtained in the course of pan-European surveys, ex-communist countries quite predictably appeared in their natural niches beside religiously and culturally kindred countries of the non-communist world.

The models of state-Church relations and interaction between the Church and society have changed accordingly. *De jure*, all post-communist European countries have proclaimed religious values encouraged by world democracies. However, there is a serious gap between declarations and the reality.

Different types of religious culture have spawned three main systems of state-Church relations: the Balkan, Central European and Post Soviet.

The Balkan type covers those countries that in communist times implemented the model of unequal union between the national-communist regime and the Church of the majority. Characteristic of this type are the following features: special privileges for the Church of the majority (factual or even legislative); in some



countries (Bulgaria, Macedonia and others) those Churches are specially mentioned in their constitutions. Countries of this group also apply more or less open restrictions on the activity of religious minorities. This type encompasses not only the Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia), but also some others, for instance, Georgia. It is noteworthy that it would be premature to speak about the freedom of faith in the spirit of the General Declaration of Human Rights and other international documents, with respect to the countries of this type and the wars they have gone through.

Central European type of relations. The system of relations between the state and the Church within this type is close to West European one. In some countries belonging to this type, special agreements have been made with the Apostolic Capital (Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, etc.), that give some privileges to the Catholic Church, as compared to religious minorities. In other countries of this group there are 'recognised' and 'unrecognised' religions (Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, etc.), probation period for 'unrecognised religions' acquiring official status (Lithuania, Estonia), and restrictions for communities whose centres lie beyond the boundaries of the state (Estonia). Some of those countries consistently reject the principle of separation of the Church and the state. (For instance, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the clergy was financed by the state even in the communist times.) At the same time, it is in these countries that the problem of restitution of church property is resolved in a most consistent manner. It would be erroneous to state, however, that those countries, although fundamentally similar, are on the same level of development of religious culture and religious freedoms.



The Post-Soviet type of relations is characteristic of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. In the first place, this type is characterised by tough legislative separation of the Church from the state and the absence of funding of religious organisations on the part of central authorities; legislative formulation of equality of religious institutions before the law; and relatively liberal legislation on the freedom of conscience, adopted on the romantic wave that accompanied the fall of communism. At the same time, they demonstrate relatively ineffective legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, an underdeveloped legislative basis, evident trends toward authoritarian methods of state administration, and a very slow pace of social transformation, which clearly affects fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The new post-Soviet laws, intended to dismantle the fundamentals of Stalinist legislation, which remained virtually unchanged since 1929, left serious problems of state-Church relations unsettled. It is a matter not only of the concrete legal definition of individual, surely important legislative provisions, but of the philosophy and conceptual ideas that compose the essential framework of such relations. For instance, if we recall the discussions that preceded the adoption of the USSR and Russian (1990) or Ukrainian (1991) laws on the freedom of conscience, we won't find there the issues that two or three years later turned into a source of exceptionally acute disputes between adherents of contradicting views on the fundamental problems of relations between the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldovan states, and their religious institutions. Discussions and, later, rather tough political struggle are centred around issues that previously were out of discussion: legislative protection of the historic Church (Churches) and granting it (them) privileges that would ensure a kind of 'bridgehead' in their struggle against competitors, tough restrictions on so-called non-traditional and alien religious institutions; more active involvement of "Churches of the majority" in the process of servicing state interests.

This struggle became a natural reflection of the larger scale and more acute struggle around the problem of national identity and very different, sometimes entirely contradicting, concepts of new 'Russian', 'Ukrainian' or 'Moldovan' draft laws.

The post-soviet model is less overshadowed by the memories of indisputable domination by the "main Church" than is the Balkan model, but much more so than the Central European model characterised by the desire to substitute the law with 'political expediency' and "national" ("state") interests. Finally, the post-Soviet model of state-Church relations is entirely



organic to the transitional status of the Moldovan, Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian societies, where the “end point” is not always in plain sight.

Until recently, the Russian Federation has been (and, despite all changes, remains) a natural member of the “club” of countries falling under this type. Meanwhile, after rather tough public and political discussion in 1997, Russia’s State Duma finally adopted the new version of the Law “On Freedom of Faith and Religious Organisations”, that allows speaking about the evolution of state-Church relations in the ‘Balkan’ direction. The two years that have passed after the adoption of the new version of the Law give reason to state that the discrimination of “non-traditional” religious communities, on the part of both the authorities and Orthodox Church structures, is becoming a more and more widespread phenomenon. The same refers to attempts to confine the Russian identity to Orthodoxy, while ignoring all its other sources.

THE DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

In our view, it is possible to mark out the following religious changes that have taken place in post-communist Central-Eastern European countries. Naturally, the first one is the cessation of reprisals and restrictions, and the development of church infrastructure, cloister life, theological education, and social service of Churches. Those changes are probably the most evident, for they at least can be presented in figures. The impetuous growth in the number of churches, monasteries, spiritual educational establishments, church schools, missions, etc. cannot be denied.

Less evident are mass thirst for the sacred, and radical increase in the number of individuals converted into faith. These changes can also

be numbered. Almost all post-communist countries witness an increase in the share of those who declare their personal belief in God (probably with the exception of Poland, where this indicator has no space for growth). What strikes the eye is that in the countries where sociological surveys have been conducted for a long time and with due diligence (Slovenia, Hungary), the figures of growth don’t look striking. Another interesting observation is that the indicators of religious behaviour over the 1990s have remained virtually unchanged: in Russia, in 1991 only 6% of the polled attended worship at least once a month, in 1999 — 7%.

Secondly, in many countries the share of those who consider themselves Orthodox or Catholics exceeds the number of people who called themselves believers. This means that for very many people actual affiliation with a large community that can be identified, among other, by the confessional indicator is more important than the faith, and, correspondingly, higher feelings. We must remember that many of today’s Orthodox, Muslims, etc. are yesterday’s Soviet people, who had no problem with self-identification, suddenly lost it and did not acquire a new one. They are not hypocrites, but their religious affiliation rather presents more an attempt to revive an interrupted tradition, than establish ties with God.

More evident are changes in the field where religion turns into a serious factor of political and ethnical mobilisation. This phenomenon distinctly manifested itself in some episodes of the post-communist decade.

Initially non-confessional military conflicts in former Yugoslavia, in the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia were given pronounced religious accents. Religion can be mobilised for military-political purposes in two ways: by turning a religious doctrine into a military-political programme, or by introducing religious symbols, rhetoric and motives into politics. It was exactly the last vector that defined the directions of interaction between religion and politics during the war in the communist Yugoslavia. Key political concepts got strong religious colouring: put into circulation were the ideas of “Holy Serbia”, “God-saved Croatia”, and “sacred struggle” against adherents of a different creed. In mass consciousness, a conflict turns into a collision of “different breeds”, with the opposing party being demonised. “Friends” appear to be performers of the God’s intention, “aliens” — of the Devil’s will. Similar rhetoric is always associated with the feeling of “victimisation”: the renowned investigator of religious changes in the region P. Moises stated, that “In Eastern Europe every national group feels like a victim. Christian nations often tend to identify their sufferings with



Christ's. One can often hear that no other nation on Earth suffered, like we did".

The war in former Yugoslavia led to great human sacrifices and ruination of temples, a redrawing of the political and confessional map of the country, and a serious undermining of Orthodox-Catholic and Christian-Muslim dialogues. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict around Nagorny Karabach also objectively led to deterioration of Christian-Muslim relations. This conflict developed into a large-scale war, as a result of which Azerbaijan lost 20% of its territory, 1.1 million of people in Armenia and Azerbaijan became refugees or lost their dwellings. Attempts of spiritual leaders of both countries — Catholicos of all Armenians Vazgen and Sheikh Allahsukur Pasha-Zade — to take steps toward settlement of the crisis at its early stage not only found no support, but were met with sharp criticism on the part of radical circles.



The attempts of the hierarchy of the Georgian Orthodox Church to stop the civil war in that country by declaring anathema on those Georgians who raise their hand against other Georgians also ended in failure. Calls of the highest leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church to avoid bloodshed in Moscow in October, 1993, were not heard either. The algorithm of Church involvement in the Yugoslav conflict was actually repeated in the first Chechen war. The Church appeared unable to stop the wave of chauvinism and aggressive nationalism, many of its priests actively and aggressively demanded 'a collecting of Russian lands'. As a result, calls of the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church to stop the war after its start were accepted as a formality.

Meanwhile, during the second Russian-Chechen war, the highest leadership of the

Russian Orthodox Church unconditionally supported the policy of the state authorities in Chechnya, called for a war until the victorious end, and justified actions of the Russian military. The position of the church hierarchy became extremely demonstrative of the character of military operations in the Northern Caucasus, which commenced in summer, 1999: Patriarch Aleksei II spoke of them in terms of an interstate war, not a counterterrorist operation, and entirely ignored the real sufferings of the peaceful population — Russia's citizens.

Therefore, although church hierarchs were making certain steps toward peaceful settlement at different stages of the conflict, they still bear a great share of responsibility for the conflict's development into armed opposition. Active and insistent employment of religion in the post-Yugoslav conflict give the lie to the view of the Church's purely "constructive" role in post-communist transformations.

The next element of the religious-political development of Central-Eastern European countries is a big change on the political map of Europe. The appearance of a number of new independent countries brought about a trend toward independence of church institutions in those countries. First and foremost, it refers to Orthodox Churches, whose autocephalous status has been perceived as an indirect recognition of state independence. The history of Georgia, Serbia, Bulgaria witnesses that the establishment of autocephalous Churches in those states coincided with the establishment of statehood, while the fall of statehood in the end led to the loss of autocephalous status. In many cases (Greece, Muscovy, Romania) the Church's role in gaining autocephalous status was not decisive, compared to the role of state authorities in this process.

The situation of the last decade of the 20th century was almost identical to the 19th century: after gaining independence, nations were striving for autocephalous status for their Orthodox Churches, while the church metropolis was dragging out and oversensitively reacted to its weakening. New elites were more or less persistently pressing for independence of their Orthodox Churches. Their interest in the canonical status of the Church was witnessed by letters of the President of Ukraine L.Kravchuk to the Patriarch of Moscow and Whole Rus' Aleksey II (1991) and Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarch Vartholomeos I (1993), the meeting of the President of Moldova P.Lucinski and the Ecumenical Patriarch in Odesa (1997), as well as statements of the President of Macedonia K.Gligorov in support of autocephalous status for the Macedonian Orthodox Church and more determined statements about the need for an

independent status for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine on the part of President L.Kuchma.

At the same time, preservation of jurisdiction of foreign spiritual centres over Orthodox Churches in new-born states caused concern to their governments about the possibility of undesired influence of church metropolises on the flock. First and foremost, such concern has been provoked in Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia by hypothetical and real activities on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church. Attempts to remove this factor of instability included steps that were not always correct from the political and judicial points of view, let alone pure canonical viewpoint. However, some political scientists caution against underestimating this threat, and even tend to overly dramatise it. For instance, the well-known kremlinologist A.Besanson argues that 'the international communist movement has now been eliminated, and was to a certain extent replaced by a spiritual force that can act in a much more limited sphere — the state Russian Orthodox Church. It retained powerful means of pressure on what is called the "near abroad" in Russia, i.e., on Ukraine, Belarus and some Baltic states. This influences the Orthodox arc of Europe — Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia'.

The desire to mobilise Orthodoxy, which is turning into an ideology of opposition to the West, and Orthodox institutions with the purpose of reintegrating the Eurasian space and creating a powerful pole of force, capable of competing with the 'imperialism of human rights' (as S.Huntington put it), the ideas of individualism, liberalism, free market etc. is clearly seen in the activities of the European Interparliamentary Orthodox Assembly. Attempts to modify relations between the church metropolis and the periphery on the part of the leaderships of Ukraine and Estonia have created a hotbed of tension on the religious map of Central-Eastern Europe.

Bishops and a significant part of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church constantly stress the 'unnatural' character of division of the USSR and present one of the most consistent and influential forces standing for the reintegration of East Slavic peoples into a single state organism.

Religious and political problems that emerged in connection with the changes on the European political map are further aggravated by problems caused by the internal political struggle in post-communist countries. This struggle had an effect on internal church processes, led to the creation of clear 'right' and 'left', pro- and anti-Western, liberal and conservative factions and groupings not only within Orthodox, but also within some

Catholic Churches of the region. (This process went especially far in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, where opposition between anticommunists and the Church hierarchy, formed with personal participation of T.Zhivkov, led to a split and the creation of two parallel synods).

As far as the largest of the present-day inter-Orthodox conflicts is concerned — opposition between Ukraine's Orthodox — in reality, it presents a conflict of identities, a reflection of a wide spectrum of contradictions existing in Ukrainian society, and conceals not only problems of post-communist development, but also ecclesiastic issues, which the Orthodox world attempted but failed to resolve in the 20th century.

Therefore, the changes in the social sphere, where religion becomes a factor of national (and sometimes political) identification, turns into a social force, are deeper than in the individual sphere. Their presence is indubitable, and in the countries that emerged on the ruins of the former Soviet Union they are more evident than in countries where religious culture never experienced such merciless ruination. However, we leave the question whether this is the 'religious renaissance' glorified by writers and journalists unanswered — first of all, because in this case we would have to resolve another issue: whether the 'religious renaissance' can be accompanied with a disastrous decline in public moral, avalanche-like increase in crime, corruption, violence and cynicism? This problem requires special analysis.

Religion and religious institutions have become serious players on the socio-political scene in post-communist countries.

In this respect, the Polish example is demonstrative. In that country Roman Catholic Church unleashed a true war around the laws on abortion, TV and radio broadcasting, and concluded a Concordat with the Apostolic See. And if in Russia successful attempts of the Moscow Patriarchate to push the new version of the Law on freedom of faith and unsuccessful attempts to ban demonstration of Scorsese's movie 'Last temptation of Christ', or in Ukraine — the campaign against taxpayer identification codes remained insignificant events, in Poland, such 'wars' seriously split society and undermined trust in Kosciol.

Probably, for some time to come Churches will build their relations with states, societies and with one another on the basis of centuries-long tradition. However, the force of inertia cannot last indefinitely in a situation where the Church itself has to serve in entirely different social conditions and in a world different from the one where it existed before the communist captivity.

ATTITUDE OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY TO SECTS AND 'NEW RELIGIONS'

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE



*Doctor Bertold VEIG,
Germany*

FOREWORD

Political, social and theological polemics with so-called sects, ideological groups and psycho-groups are complicated matters that sometimes resemble walking on a minefield. In the context of the difficult transition processes that former member countries of the Eastern Communist Bloc have undergone since 1991, the attitude towards "new religions" presents an example of how those countries attempt to "live through" processes and trends within a short term that took decades to develop in the West.

This is evident within the economic sector as well as various aspects of social life. If one remembers, that after the collapse of the Marxist-communist ideology there appeared a certain spiritual vacuum, the loss of orientation characteristic of that period would become more understandable. Numerous religious communities, ideological groups and psycho-groups are attempting to use this vacuum in order to establish themselves in society and pin down new recruits. Such attempts are gaining mass and intense character, so the state and society should treat this phenomenon seriously. At the same time, one should not forget about the vast differences between various religious communities, and should not treat them all alike.

Along with long-established large Churches and religious communities (Orthodox Churches, Catholic and Evangelic-Protestant Church, Muslim and Judaic communities), there is a

great number of smaller religious communities (free Evangelic Churches, Buddhist communities), which do not pose any danger for the state and society, although large Churches may be not very pleased with their presence, since they attempt to proselytise believers for themselves.

At the same time, there are also groups that, under the mask of a certain religion, pursue entirely different, mainly economic ends, for instance, the Church of Scientology, the sect of Moon, "Children of God", "Universal life", "Transcendental Meditation", and many others. Actions on the part of the state and society are called for only to protect individuals and entire groups against damage to their physical and mental health, as well as material losses.

Before reviewing in detail the capabilities we have in this respect in Germany, I would like to give some historic reference.

A HISTORIC EXCURSUS

The phenomenon of new, or alternative religiosity, born in the U.S. in the 1960s, spread to European societies. At first, it went almost unnoticed by politicians. In any case, those trends were seen as a far less problematic by-product of the youth movement. However, society soon encountered a number of well-organised religious and ideological groups.

In Germany, the first entities that began dealing with this phenomenon were the large Churches (Catholic and Evangelical). Commis-



sioners of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches charged with dealing with the activities of sects initiated actions with respect to those new religious groups. These initiatives were worked out to the request of people who suffered from such groups' activities (parents, relatives, friends and former adherents).

Moreover, the emergence of new religious groups coincided with a period of decreased interest in Church and departure from it. This aspect was connected with the fact that at first, new movements mainly appealed to youth. Later it appeared, however, that this was not purely a "youth problem". Issues related with assistance in 'overcoming hardships of life' became more and more evident. For some time this aspect was out of focus, since the "sectarian perspective" gave it a look of a purely religious phenomenon.

Public concern in Germany on the activities of the new religious and ideological groups and psycho-groups grew in the 1970s and pushed the state institutions to express their opinion on this subject. The response came in the form of educational booklets intended to inform the public about sects. In some Federal States, government institutions were created, their assignment was to deal with sect issues, including collecting, processing and presenting the necessary information to the public. At that time, however, there was no "state concept" with respect to this problem. To some extent, this lack is felt even today.

From the very beginning, the state institutions relied on the activities of authoritative Churches and the initiative of parents and other interested persons. It can be said that the state institutions were in many respects dependent on such assistance, as there was no fundamental scientific research on the problem developed at that time, and it was impossible to take all factors

into account when organising social activities of psychological and social consulting services. At the time, as well as today, the state relied on the competence of Churches in religious issues and their determination to deal with those issues, including with regard to general social processes. However, **any state attempting to maintain religious and ideological neutrality cannot rely exclusively on church experts. The state should assume more responsibility and become more knowledgeable on those issues.**

Until recently, it has been difficult to measure the effectiveness of state measures, since no clear political goals have been defined. So, what should and can be achieved by means of state interference into the activity of new religious and ideological groupings?

GOALS AND METHODS OF STATE REGULATION

State regulation in the field of religion is defined by the provision of neutrality, contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Basic Law gives no definition of "religion" or "world outlook". These notions may be treated arbitrarily, for the state is not the source of values. Even taking into account the interpretation of notions existing in the Christian tradition of Western Europe, it is evident that today, given the increasing pluralism of the cultural situation, religious and ideological activities may be restricted with great care. On the contrary, **the state must, first and foremost, guarantee freedom of religious convictions, especially for religious minorities.**

In Germany, there is no law on religion. Churches, religious and ideological groupings may be registered in two ways.

The first form of registration is as a "public-legal corporation", which opens broad opportunities for Churches possessing this status. For instance, it entitles the holder to collect a church tax through the state tax bodies. The issue of granting the status of a public-legal corporation is decided by the administrative bodies of Federal States (ministries of culture and senate departments). State bodies do not have unambiguous criteria for this purpose at their disposal. The main factor here is the compliance of the applicant grouping with the requirements of numerical strength and duration of existence. In other words, the grouping must have enough members (at least 30-40 thousand) and exist for some time, with prospects of further existence.

If a religious community fails to be recognised as a public-legal corporation, it may obtain the status of a “registered association for public benefit without the intention of obtaining profit (non-profit association)”. Religious communities in the form of such associations are exempt from taxes.

For registration in either legal form, the purposes of the religious community should not contradict the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In Germany, the role of the state lies in, among other things, protecting the individual and maintaining social peace. **In connection with conflicts in the field of new religious and ideological groupings and psycho-groups, there are four forms of state interference:**

- ❖ creation of a legislative framework;
- ❖ educational activities, information of the public about the activities of new religious and ideological groupings and psycho-groups and, whenever necessary, warning of their danger;
- ❖ assistance to victims or persons who have suffered from the activity of new religious groups, or those who, after lengthy membership in a closed group, are seeking to re-establish contact with society;
- ❖ if necessary — mediation in the event of conflicts between individual religious groupings, or between such groupings and individuals.

Therefore, actions of the state ease social tensions and create a balance between contradicting interests. The state must set reasonable objectives and create mechanisms for achieving these objectives.



INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

The main body dealing with new religious communities within the Federal Government of the FRG is the Federal Ministry for the Affairs of Family, Elderly People, Women and Youth. It publishes informational materials intended for the public. In addition to this, all Federal States offer informational services. In most Federal States, permanent divisions (Referats) have been created and charged with responsibility for public relations and dissemination of internal information.

Interdepartmental working groups on the Federal and State level, when dealing with new religious communities, or, for instance, with Scientologists, must first of all co-ordinate exchange of information between ministries and agencies. They must also examine possible action to be taken, and co-ordinate measures taken between different agencies. If a certain group poses extreme danger, the Verfassungsschutzamt (Constitution Protection Agency) may organise special control (monitoring) over that group.

LEGAL BASIS FOR INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

The Basic Law binds the state to neutrality in religious and ideological issues. The state may interfere with freedom of faith only by taking into account the (often contradictory) interests of the parties, and for the protection of constitutional rights of third parties and maintenance of constitutional order.

The Federal Government provides information about new religious and ideological groupings within the limits of its constitutional obligations and rights. In this connection, the Federal Constitutional Court on May 23, 1989 adopted a decision, which confirmed that, proceeding from its constitutional legal obligations regarding information of and elucidation for the public, the Government is entitled to spread information about new religious groupings and give warnings, without breaking the principle of neutrality. The European Commission on Human Rights shares this view. It reiterated that the state is entitled to “grant information about religious communities and sects in an unbiased but critical manner”. Such informational activity does not run contrary to Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, outlook and religion) of the Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

The above observations show that special legislative basis is not necessary for the state’s informational and elucidative activities.

ELUCIDATIVE ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Elucidative and educational activities of public institutions, that have the duty of informing individuals and associations about new religious groupings, must pursue a number of goals:


- ❖ elimination of danger;
- ❖ guaranteeing individual religious and ideological freedom through educational measures, which permits informed decision-making;
- ❖ guaranteeing freedom of thought in religious-ideological polemics by creating favourable conditions for such discussion;
- ❖ promoting peaceful co-existence of different religious and opinion/outlook groups and, whenever necessary, their integration into society.

The first two goals (elimination of danger and religious-ideological education) are especially important for the education and protection of youth.

Elucidative activities on the part of state institutions with respect to individual groups remain necessary. They are performed through publication of booklets, press-releases, organisation of conferences, etc. This work should focus on "popular" groups, whose potential danger is proved and can be clearly defined. Examples are presented by the threat of seduction of children in the group 'Children of God', or the danger to health and property posed by Scientology. In general, elucidative activities by state institutions should focus on concrete conflicts, for instance, the conflict between civil rights and the aspiration of individuals for self-realisation, on the one hand, and the attempts of one or another religious group to introduce tough abidance by certain rules and regulations, on the other hand.

While the public feels the need for information, some especially aggressive groups are waging misinformation campaigns, and some of them (VPM, 'Universal Life' and especially Scientology) even pursue the policy of intimidation with respect to their critics, at least through psychological pressure, claims and legal actions. For this reason, the participation of state institutions in the broadening of informational flow should be seen as the contribution to free formation of public opinion.

Educational work is also needed within state institutions themselves. It can be conducted in the form of departmental personnel training.



This is especially vital for judicial and investigatory bodies and agencies dealing with the youth and public health.

In this connection, the Federal Administrative Agency is entrusted with the following duties:

- 1) collecting and processing of materials necessary for the assessment of trends in the development of new religious groupings, as well as organisations legally or economically tied with such groupings, or having shared religious or ideological aims with them;
- 2) informing the state bodies, on the Federal and State level, and all public-legal corporations that set the goal of assisting people whose interests were damaged;
- 3) publication of informational booklets and other materials elucidating the danger of "new religious groupings" for the public.

CLASSIFICATION OF "NEW RELIGIONS", IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS AND PSYCHO-GROUPS

In Germany, the general term 'sect' is used to define all little known and new religious and ideological groupings. At the same time, the word 'sect' has a negative tint, presuming condemnation of one or another religious community in advance, as something evil and dangerous.

That is why it was agreed in Germany to speak in this context about "so-called sects and psycho-groups". The Bundestag of the 1994-1998 convocation established a special commission on this subject. It examined increasing threats posed by dubious groupings. The above recommendations are the result of the enormous work done by the Commission.



In order to work out the state's and society's positions toward new religions, the goals, teachings, and ethical principles of each must be carefully examined. First of all, the following questions should be answered:

- ❖ What is the purpose of the religious community?
- ❖ What religious or ideological teachings is it based upon?
- ❖ Do they conflict with the German Constitution?
- ❖ Should physical and mental damage to the community members be expected?
- ❖ Is there any basic economic goal?

Namely, is the examined religious community dangerous for individual people or for entire society, or is it only a matter of an inconvenient competitor on the open market of religious offers?

In the first case, the state must actively interfere. In the second case, the state must step aside, since it is obliged to maintain religious and ideological neutrality. In this event, let us use a more strong-worded definition: we witness competition between religious and ideological ideas and convictions, where the state cannot give preference to either party.

All religious communities should be classified accordingly. Roughly, three main categories can be distinguished:

- ❖ harmless and peaceful communities, that act within the framework of the Basic Law and have no dangerous intentions (for instance, Buddhist groups);
- ❖ complex, often 'inconvenient', actively proselytising communities (which, however, pose no danger to the state and society, but may attempt to enrol individuals through more or less intense psychological pressure). Here, elucidation

is needed, but on the part of society, not of the state;

- ❖ dangerous communities and psychogroups, posing a serious threat for the state and society, especially due to the existence of totalitarian administrative structures, absolute absorption of an individual and possible search for material benefits. In this case, the state and society should take proper actions.

WHAT SHOULD THE EXISTING CHURCHES DO?

Large Churches should rely on their own forces, when arguing against smaller religious communities. This is a matter of competition for the purpose of enrolling believers.

Churches should accept this challenge and treat it seriously. In a time of great transformations, it is no use mentioning the great historic role and significance of the Churches. It is much more useful to rely on their own forces and advantages.

Churches should be aware of their role, as sources of values and points of reference. They can do a lot for the development of the state and society. However, in order to do this, they must be ready to open themselves to the needs and troubles of each individual, and do not confine their activity to pastoral functions. Furthermore, they should demonstrate a readiness to accept the new realities of today's life, rather than to ignore them. In this particular case, Churches have something to offer society undergoing a period of transformation, liberalisation and pluralism. First and foremost, this refers to religiosity and basic values. If Churches take an active position toward the demands of individual citizens, society and the state, they will be able to win a comfortable position in the competition with other religious ideas, and will not be afraid of proselytising on the part of smaller movements.

CHARISMATIC CHURCHES: A RELIGION OR THE KNOW-HOW OF MAKING ZOMBIES?



*Kateryna SHCHIOTKINA,
Columnist, "Zerkalo Nedeli" newspaper*

Let us try to draw a more or less integrated picture of one small world — an isolated world that for the last 10 years has been constantly trying to expand internally determined boundaries through its special understanding of the term "faith", and covered from outside with layers of misunderstanding, unawareness, the feeling of having been cast out, and a deaf, almost mystical anxiety. In the end, all this is manifested as an attempt on the part of the "external" world to put on a brave face and pretend that nothing is going on, justifying this by the high ideals of "tolerance", "freedom of conscience" or, still worse, "individual roads to the Divine Kingdom".

As if in reality there is no problem of 'charismatic communities' in Ukraine — at least on an official level. These Churches are not a criminal gang, political party or trade firm, and so continue to avoid the attention of the authorities. Probably for this reason nobody has explained the phenomenon living in our house.

A SEPARATE REALITY

In fact, this separate reality is formed from inside. Those who believe charismatic Churches to be an ordinary gathering of people, like the one we see in traditional Churches on Sundays and holy days, are seriously mistaken. Likewise, those who suggest that the believers are attracted and retained through various types of pressure, are missing the mark as well. Upon coming to such a Church, the newcomer seems to enter an ideal state, with a strict hierarchy, socialisation, perfect ideology, etc. A person immediately finds himself in a

primary cell (home group), headed by a leader who directly communicates with the pastor. Through this leader, and in no other way, can an "ordinary believer" have contact with the pastor — at least, theoretically. Therefore, this structure is strictly hierarchical.

There is no space for doubt, as far as priorities are concerned: if your mission requires your presence at one or another place, you must be there. For this reason many adherents of charismatic Churches have experienced problems, including the loss of a good job. For the same reason, children abandon schools,



colleges and universities, leave their homes at an unsuitable age, etc. They seem entirely free — nobody directly forces them to do something, but in reality, their life is strictly regulated. “To live in the Word” means to unflinchingly obey instructions, which are formulated in words.

An individual’s incorporation into the charismatic community takes place by two ways: through a ‘ritual’, and through the employment of ‘gifts’. Sometimes, a person can realise his or her professional qualities, not needed in the other — “alien” — world. The charismatic movement has constructed several levels of ritual incorporation. The first one is the “background” or entry level — regular services of an ecstatic nature, providing the narcotic without which an addict cannot long do, since this is exactly the state in which a person communicates with the God. Prayers can last for many hours and may be accompanied with fasting — the entire arsenal, known to and tested by different religious systems, is used: an ordinary practice, intrinsic both to shamanism and Christian asceticism.

Another possible level of ritual incorporation is presented by regular gatherings of home groups, where, apart from the same prayer ecstasy (expressed more intensely than at large gatherings, believers say), penance and open “confession” of everyday problems of all group members “to God” are practised. Everything that burdens the soul is given utterance and “resolved” by means of a joint prayer for every individual. Here, people usually share their insights and revelations obtained in the ecstasy of prayer. All this occurs under the vigilant supervision of the leader, who “guides” every ward as to the “truthfulness” of his vision, and if anyone in the flock errs too gravely and does not heed the “voice of truth”, proclaimed by the leader, the matter is submitted directly to

the pastor, who knows how to “persuade” the impenitent and incorrigible.

ON CONFESSION AND HUMILITY

Receiving and using divine gifts, as a sign of recognition by God, is possible only within the Church system. Where else can one boast of speaking in tongues given by God, as the Holy Apostles did after the Descent of the Holy Spirit? Gifts, such as the ability to speak in tongues, to heal, to understand and interpret the Word of God, and even such simple things as singing, dancing and some applied skills, are given to those “accepted by God” at the moment of Baptism by the Holy Spirit. Everyone who comes to Church and becomes its staunch adherent undergoes subsequent additional stages of baptising with water and the Spirit — a kind of “initiation” ritual. Although such a person may already have been baptised in another denomination, the Symbol of Faith, which calls for a single christening, does not apply here.

Obtaining “gifts” is what most distinguishes adherents of charismatic Churches from other Protestant denominations. It is this, which draws newcomers to the charismatics’ parallel world. “To find alive God” and “To learn God” — these are the answers that charismatics usually give when asked “Why did you come here?” In reality, their intention is different: to call God’s attention to themselves, and to show His attention by allotting some special gift. This feature of charismatic Churches — belief without humility — particularly antagonises adherents of traditional Christianity. To be sure, a different sort of humility is present here. When speaking about God, charismatics most often mention ‘what God gave me’ or, in the best case, ‘what God did through me’. One way or another, these are speculations about ‘me and God’. For a traditional Christian, who is used to the idea of his lowliness in comparison to God’s Glory, this is incomprehensible.

As far as humility is concerned, it is dictated not by reverence, but mainly by hierarchy. The possibilities of a rank-and-file believer are always smaller than of a group, and those of a group are smaller than of the Church. So, if you want to be healed or implore healing for your neighbour, you need at least to come to a home group, or, better, to a Church service. “Baptism” is better still. If you come to a home group, you are very close to christening. You won’t get away that easy. The second type of hierarchy is a personal one. An ordinary believer can explain many things, but it is better to speak with a leader, and still better — to

listen to a sermon delivered by the pastor himself. Believers behave exactly this way: they consult the group and the leader on all issues of everyday life, including moving to another apartment or going on a business trip. If in a common prayer or the prayer of the leader God “showed” that something ought not be done, or should be done in a different manner, a true follower of a charismatic Church will do what God has “showed”, that is, what the pastor said.

There [in a charismatic Church] they give you a chance to realise your creative and professional potential. If you wish to sing — just sing, if you want to stage a “scenic performance” — you are welcome, if you are eager to spend time with children — okay! You will be assisted: the most advanced Churches open large and small firms of all kinds and profiles. You will be helped with a job and with leisure. Welcome to Paradise! Furthermore — and psychologists tend to see this as the basis for success of charismatic Churches among the populace — you will be relieved of the burden of home and social problems in your Church community. Another aspect of the “Living God” concept is that once you “come” to Him, He undertakes to defend you from the hostile outside world — the Kingdom of the Devil, and to solve all your problems. You only need to apply to Him directly, and everything will be just fine...

‘WE’ AND ‘THEY’

By the way, we have something to add to psychologists’ opinion. The search for the most incredible justifications for one’s inability to solve some problem, as well as psychological fatigue of those living in “societies in transition”, etc., are surely real problems. However, complete self-victimisation is not unavoidable

and is not an excuse to become detached from the real world. If this were so, our entire society would present such a “problem group”. Statistics show that such characteristics as intellect, educational, financial status, professional accomplishments and age are not accurate ways of predicting likelihood of joining a charismatic Church. Our references to “problem groups”, such as teenagers, drug addicts, lonely mothers, unemployed, etc., are only a tribute to tradition, a label that enables some form of social identification.

In fact, these Churches have not invented anything. They are doing an important thing: gather internally hapless people, and give them a chance to clearly define their place in the world. This parallel world gives people, what our — traditional — society cannot offer them. This is actually a state within state, much more perfectly designed and better organised. Their significant figure — Jesus Christ — is not transient, in contrast to the myth of any political leader. Their fundamental book — the Scripture — is not subject to revision.

Upon coming to the Church, one is given the chance to identify himself with respect to the “outside” world, and within the “inner” one as well. From that point on, there is only one, strictly structured and organised world — the Church world. It allows the new member to self-identify as a representative of the primary cell — a home group, a participant of special services specific to one’s biological group or social status: for schoolchildren, students, women, military servants, pensioners, etc. It allows for identification and socialisation, on the basis of a specific gift: healing, persuasion, care of children, work with drug addicts, alcoholics, etc. In this way the individual is supported by a strong and developed structure of internal relations, sanctified by religious ideology and therefore indisputable.

Most important of all, however, is that upon coming to the Church, members obtain the opportunity to identify themselves as a part of a certain “community of saved”, the only acceptable sphere of their present existence, on the basis of which they determine their position with respect to the rest of the world. In the best case, this is a “lost” world that must be evangelised; in the worst case, this world is unnecessary and superfluous.

The first version seems better only at the first glance: it rapidly turns into the second one, since those whom adherents of a charismatic Church have to deal with are not receptive to




their pressing evangelisation for a number of reasons. Furthermore, at the beginning of an evangelical sermon a man who has nothing to do with a charismatic Church is told about his inferiority, at least to the one who is giving the sermon, since within the terms of reference of a charismatic Church “coming to God” and “being saved” means “being different” and, consequently, “being better”. Therefore, relations between such believers and “non-believers” (i.e., non-adherents of a charismatic Church) automatically transform themselves into relations between Myself and The Alien, with all attaching consequences: the attitude to an alien is always either openly or latently hostile. In a developed culture, an encounter with an “alien” is covered with a fig leaf of tolerance, the primitive principles of consciousness of a charismatic adherent do not accept such tolerance: everything must correspond to the given values, or disappear. ‘Disappearance’ is interpreted in two ways: first, complete demolition as the result of a pending Doomsday (eschatological expectations of socially disoriented people are mercilessly exploited here); second, an inner and less noticeable disappearance — vanishing from the individual communicative field (leaving the family, retreating into oneself, etc.). This is the area of ordinary human tragedies, which in the eyes of our state evidently are not seen as signals of social danger.

Therefore, one can say that our entire society presents a ‘group of risk’, since few of us possess deep religious culture, i.e., clear self-identification with regard to the Church. This can be interpreted as a manifestation of general spiritual decline. Mass appearances of the “orphaned” and “poor in spirit” have always provoked active preaching of the imminent coming of the Divine Kingdom, because this has helped people to regain their sense of self-worth.

UTOPIA-X

All the above suffices for an understanding that we are speaking about sects of totalitarian nature. Alas, it so happens that when people feel incredibly happy and joyfully, there is usually something amiss. This was true even for Plato’s utopias. Two details impart a totalitarian character to the charismatic movement: the total transparency of every Church member’s life, and the absolute authority of the “superior” leader (for a primary cell) and of the pastor (for the entire Church). Believers act as they say, especially on the most important matters. Nobody forces them with a knife, but they



are carefully inculcated with a need to act in this way. And in some cases, the need is a more serious argument than a knife.

This is entirely different from the authority of a hierarch in any Christian confession, despite his great influence on parishioners, his “spiritual children”: a priest acts within the strict framework of the canons and hierarchy. He cannot retreat from the tradition he is confined to; should he break certain rules, hierarchy presumes some mechanisms of punishment, up to his complete dismissal from sermon. Here, we encounter the phenomenon of the “living word” in all its beauty. The pastor of any charismatic Church is not limited by external rules. He has no superior hierarchs to control him. Church associations should not be taken into account, since they do not entail control over the sermon. Furthermore, it is easy to leave such an association. Meanwhile, the very concept of the ‘live word’ presumes its maximum fickleness: the pastor is the man through whom God gives the Church grace and revelation. The pastor can interpret evangelic texts so that they contradict themselves, and this will shock nobody, since those words are said by a God-inspired person, one who communicates directly with the Lord, and therefore knows the objective truth.

A charismatic community is an ideal object for all kinds of speculations and experiments. It is a mini-state with its sovereign high priest, ideology, social structure, taxation, and, finally, economy. Here the fate of goods and trade marks, presidential candidates, etc. is decided by “blessing” or “damnation”. Here they teach and bring up children, make business, consume marriages. Here they live...

It seems that all this is accompanied with a shameful silence. The state remains silent, as a public does and that could try to persuade people do not risk their sanity for the opportunity to shift responsibility for their own problems to someone else. Particularly annoying is the silence (or near-silence) of the traditional

Church, which appealed to the President but has failed to appeal to the people, a dereliction of its sacred duty.

The state's reaction is simply paradoxical. It seems to disapprove this, but either is ashamed or does not consider it necessary to speak aloud, let alone act resolutely. And when it begins speaking about this, it looks dimly — probably, the state itself does not quite realise what it can do within the framework of its own law on the freedom of conscience. There is an impression that the state has no clear idea of what is wrong about this. It surely had such an idea, when during the 1998 election campaign, charismatic communities began supporting some figures, or even running their own candidates. Then, the state became indignant and noticed the existence of this real force. Mass media published a series of critical articles. Trials were initiated, involving heads of the most popular charismatic Churches. Instructions were given to “investigate” the matter, “perform expert examinations”, etc.

The elections passed, and everything calmed down. Sunday Adelaja and Henry Madava¹, whose photos decorated the central press, which often quite justly accused them, continued to fish for souls. Political parties, whose programmes in one or another form promised to oppose the domination of “alien cults”, have forgotten their promises, along with many others. It is worth noting that this calm is not a result of a calm in the charismatic movement: they are active, as before. They continue to obtain permits for public sermons at stadiums and on squares, teaching and preaching, healing crowds, presenting their voluminous works to the scientific library named after Vernadskyi. They go on prophesying from the screen in bad Russian or even worse Ukrainian. Most important, they continue their experiments with the human mind, testing it by the most primitive and quite monotonous ecstatic technologies.

On this background, the wording of the Presidential Decree on Regulation of Activities

in the Field of Popular and Non-traditional Medicine looks like the President is playing into their hands: this Decree suggests treating “prayers of healing” as a medical practice. Our nation, having survived the ‘White Brotherhood’, has failed to develop an immunity to such things, or at least to fear them. It is ready to suffer a super-state organism inside itself, only in order not to seem “undemocratic” on the delicate issue of the freedom of conscience. Meanwhile, the West, which for some reasons is not afraid of looking “undemocratic”, and is afraid of such new formations after a series of ritual suicides, has found levers for fighting sects. Those levers were found in the economic sphere, and they appear rather effective. Thanks to the active and timely interference of the state, the positions of the Church of Scientology and the Church of Moon were seriously undermined in Europe. However, such interference requires an adequate legislative base, a more or less transparent economy, and fear of religious exaltation and fanaticism.

Meanwhile, our state evidently would like to treat religious communities, like public organisations, which legally function, search for money, engage in publicly beneficial activities, and can be used, when this is needed, or so it appears to the unprejudiced eye. By the way, the texts of the law on the freedom of conscience in the section dealing with religious communities and the law on public organisations are very similar. Unfortunately, the true difference between the two is enormous. In this respect, attention should be paid to the psychological and ideological aspects of the problem, rather than to the medical one. On one occasion, a Commission of the Ministry of Public Health drew the conclusion that charismatic services “do not contain medical practice”. And this is the sacred truth. They do not deal with the body. Those services are aiming at the spirit, not at the body. And in the eyes of our state, unable to offer at least some minor ideological support, let alone psychological protection, the spirit still remains a “poor relative” attached to the body.

¹ S.Adeladga — Pastor of the Church “The Word of Faith”; H.Madava — Pastor of the Church “Victory”. Both of them are the citizens of African states, missionaries in Ukraine.

FAITH AND RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF THE UKRAINIANS



*Nadiya DUDAR,
Research Fellow,
Ukrainian Institute for
Social Research*



*Liudmila SHANGINA,
Director, Social Programmes,
Ukrainian Centre for
Economic and Political Studies*

Sociological surveys, as a rule, point the number of believers, based on their self-identification, at two thirds of the country's population. On the basis of these data clergy and scholars conclude that religiosity in the country is on the rise. In our opinion, this statement is discussible, since qualitative manifestations of today's mass religiosity have not undergone sufficient study. The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies conducted a special survey, intended to determine the nature of ordinary present-day believers' religiosity, their life, social orientations, value system and convictions. Results of the survey analysis are presented in this publication¹.


SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF UKRAINE'S POPULATION REGARDING FAITH AND RELIGION

First of all, let us acquaint with the data on self-identification of Ukraine's population with regard to faith and religion based on socio-demographic indices. The general picture of religious self-identification is presented in Diagram.

Sex

68% of females and 46% of males identified themselves as believers (non-believers made up 8% of females and 17% of males, hesitants between belief and disbelief — 21% and 25%, respectively). Such a disparity is natural, since women are more emotional, vulnerable and sensitive, while the male outlook is more rational and pragmatic.

Self-identification of Ukraine's population regarding faith and religion, % of the polled



¹ The survey was conducted in August, 2000. 2017 respondents aged 18 and older were polled. The sample was selected by geographic location and represents a cross-section of basic socio-demographic groups.

**Self-identification of Ukraine's population regarding faith and religion:
the socio-demographic indices,
% of the polled**

	All respondents	Sex		Age, years				Education			
		Male	Female	18-28	29-39	40-49	50 and over	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Secondary vocational	Higher
Believers	58	46	68	53	56	54	63	67	57	59	50
Hesitant between belief and disbelief	23	25	21	27	24	26	17	16	23	23	28
Non-believers	12	17	8	12	12	12	12	12	13	9	13
Staunch atheists	3	5	2	2	2	3	5	2	2	5	5
Indifferent to faith and religion	3	4	1	4	4	3	1	2	3	3	2
* Undecided respondents are not present in the Table, since their number is statistically insignificant.											

Age

The highest share of believers is among people aged 50 and over — 63%. The share of believers in other age groups is roughly equal and makes up 53-56%². Every eighth person, irrespective of age, is a non-believer. In general, people over 50 are more stable in their convictions and belief, since the share of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief in this age group is insignificant — 17%, while among youth (18-28 years old) and in the 40-49 age group — approximately one quarter³.

Education

The highest share of believers is among people with incomplete secondary education — 67%, 59% — among people with general secondary education; 57% — among people with secondary education; 50% — among people with higher and incomplete higher education. The smallest share of non-believers is among respondents with secondary vocational education — 9% (*Table "Self-identification of Ukraine's population regarding faith and religion: the socio-demographic indices"*).

Level of income

Most believers have below-average family incomes — 78%, 20% of believers have average incomes, and only 2% estimated their incomes above average level. Among people who defined themselves as hesitant between belief and disbelief, 71% have incomes below average, 25% — average, 4% — above average; among non-believers — correspondingly, 74%, 23% and

3%. This difference between believers' and non-believers' incomes inspire the thought that **material need is one of the factors conducive to conversion.**

Place of residence

The self-identification to a large extent depends on the place of residence. **The number of those who identify themselves as believers is the highest in the Western region — 84%.** Correspondingly, there are less non-believers — 3% and those who hesitate between belief and disbelief — 11%. Such indicators can be explained by the strong religious traditions in the region. **In the Central region and in the Crimea the share of believers amounts to almost two thirds** (believers make up correspondingly 13% and 10%, the hesitant — 23% and 21%). **The share of believers is relatively high among Kyivites — every second respondent, non-believers — 11%.** To a certain extent this can be the result of successful preacher activities, since Kyiv (unlike the traditionally religious West of Ukraine), was under aggressive atheistic influence for long period of time. The same factor explains the rather high percentage of the capital residents who have no defined position regarding faith — every third person. **In the East, the share of believers makes up 47%, the share of hesitant people is rather high — 26%, and the percentage of non-believers is the highest, as compared to other regions — 18%. The smallest share of believers is in the South — 44% (non-believers — 10%, hesitant — 30%).**

² 18-28 years — 53%, 29-39 years — 56%, 40-49 years — 54%.

³ 18-28 years — 27%, 29-39 years — 24%, 40-49 years — 26%.

Type of residence

Believers are mainly concentrated in villages (61%), townships (62%) and towns with a population up to 50 thousand people (68%). These indicators show that religious traditions have been preserved mainly in smaller settlements, where the steady way of life, customs and traditions are very important.

Character of upbringing in family

The study revealed a correlation between personal religious identification and family environment. Only one third of respondents was brought up in a religious environment. Among those who consider themselves to be believers, such people make up almost one half (48%), while among non-believers — only 4%, and among those who hesitate between belief and disbelief — 11% (Table “Were you brought up in a religious environment at home?”).


**Were you brought up
in a religious environment at home?**
% of the polled

	Yes	No	Hard to say
All respondents	31	66	3
Believers	48	49	1
Hesitant between belief and disbelief	11	86	3
Non-believers	4	95	1
Staunch atheists	4	91	5
Indifferent to faith	—	98	2

The rite of initiation in religion

Over 85% of the country's population has been “initiated” into one or another religion, and, although they generally went through this rite in a non-comprehending age, it has had an effect on the subsequent formation and understanding of these persons' attitude to faith (Diagr. “The age of the rite of initiation in religion”). Within the group of people who identify themselves as believers, 93% have undergone the rite of initiation in religion (a small share of those — in a conscious age), while among non-believers, there were 1.5 times fewer of those (66%), and among those who hesitate between belief and disbelief — 86%.

**The age of the rite of initiation in religion,
% of the polled**



Ukraine is a multi-confessional state with a strong Christian (mostly Orthodox) tradition. For this reason, 88% of those initiated were baptised in accordance with Orthodox canons. Another 9% were baptised in the Greek-Catholic Church, one per cent each — in the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches (mostly Jehova's Witnesses, Evangelic Christians and Evangelic Baptist Christians). Only 0.7% of respondents were initiated into Islam and 0.3% — in Judaism. Among believers, there are more people initiated into different faiths: 83% were Christened, as Orthodox, 13% — as Greek Catholics, 2% — as Protestants, 1% — as Roman Catholics, 1% were initiated into Islam, and 0.4% — into Judaism. Among respondents who hesitate between belief and disbelief, 97% were christened as Orthodox, 2% — as Greek Catholics, and very few — as Roman Catholics and Protestants. Among non-believers, the religions of initiation (normally in the infancy) are still less varied: Orthodoxy (97%), Roman Catholic (2%) and Greek Catholic Church (1%)⁴.

Confession

66% of all those polled affiliate themselves with the Orthodox Church. Prominent, one third of those who described themselves as non-believers also affiliated themselves with Orthodoxy, as well as 77% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief, 12% of those who called themselves staunch atheists, and 51% of those indifferent to faith. Among those who called themselves believers, the Orthodox made up 73%.

Such answers mean that quite often affiliation with a certain religion is declared by people

⁴ Indices on the level 1- 2% were below the processing level, since they do not exceed the standard of deviation admissible for this type of selection, therefore, they should be perceived as illustrative, rather than statistically significant.

who have no religious convictions at all and do not consider themselves believers, and for whom the fact of initiation alone is sufficient to affiliate them with a given faith. On the other hand, believers are not always adherents of some particular faith or denomination. They may consider themselves simply Christians (among believers — 7%, those who hesitate between belief and disbelief — 9%, and even 4% of non-believers), or simply believers without affiliation with any particular faith (the answer “I do not affiliate myself with any religious confession” have been chosen by 2% of respondents).

All of respondents, who described themselves as Orthodox were asked: “With which Orthodox denomination do you affiliate yourself?” It appeared that for two thirds, this does not matter (answer “I am simply Orthodox”); among believers, 55% gave this answer, among non-believers and hesitant people — 69%. Another 7% Orthodox answered that they didn’t know which denomination to affiliate themselves with, it was of no importance for them (among believers — only 4%, non-believers and hesitant — 13% each).

Such a division gives reasons to conclude that **inter-confessional contradictions between the Orthodox Churches are not always pursued to satisfy the spiritual needs of believers.** Perhaps this is the reason for the sharp increase in the number and influence of Protestant Churches and new Charismatic religions in Ukraine.

Among those for whom affiliation with a specific Orthodox denomination is important, the share of adherents of the Kyiv Patriarchate is somewhat higher — 18% of all respondents (believers — 22%, non-believers — 14%, hesitant people — 12%). Those who affiliated themselves with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church make up 14% of all respondents (16% — believers, 7% — non-believers, hesitant people — 10%). The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church accounted for only a few per cent of all Orthodox respondents, primarily representing the group of believers.

Every sixth respondent (16%) could not affiliate himself with any religion. The main reason for this is the existence of opposite convictions (40%), especially among non-believers (48%). **Every fifth respondent (19%) believes that religious feelings can be fully satisfied without the involvement of institutions of one or another religion.** This opinion was especially supported by the believers who did not affiliate themselves with a certain religion (47%). **Another 18% of respondents did not recognise affiliation with any religion, since they have not found one that meets**

their spiritual needs. Some respondents consider the principles of different religions too tough and difficult to follow (among believers, nobody named this reason).


Attract attention respondents’ answers to the question regarding contemporary perception of the essence of a believer, put to all respondents without exception. **64.4% of respondents maintained that “a person can simply believe without confessing any specific religion”.** This thought is shared by 58.1% of those who called themselves believers, but the largest share of adherents of this position is among those who hesitate between belief and disbelief — 82%. **The statement “a believer must confess one or another religion”, customary for the consciousness of people of older generations, was supported by 26%,** many of them believers — 36%, (non-believers — 10%, hesitant — 11%).

Therefore, according to the results of the survey, more than a half of Ukraine’s population consider themselves as believers. The highest share of believers is in the Western regions, the lowest — in the Southern regions. Believers are mainly Orthodox, and two thirds of these do not care about denominational allegiance. Among the factors that influence self-identification are religious education in the family, and the rite of initiation. Out-of-Church faith is widespread among believers.

MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGIOSITY AND THE LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY

In addition to confessional self-identification and affiliation with a certain religion, another criterion of personal religiosity is religious behaviour, particularly attending divine services.

Among those who hesitate between belief and disbelief, the number of people attending divine service is twice less than among believers (*Diagr. “Do you attend divine services?”*).



Among believers who attend divine services, the overwhelming majority does so during religious holidays — this answer was given by every second person calling himself a believer (*Table "How often do you attend divine services?"*)

How often do you attend divine services? % of those who attend them			
	All respondents	Believers	Hesitant between belief and disbelief
More often than once a week	4	5	1
Once a week	16	19	3
Once a month	13	15	4
On religious holidays	52	50	66
Once a year	8	6	16
More rarely than once a year	3	2	6
Other	3	3	4
Hard to say	1	—	—

Why do you attend divine services?
% of those who attend them

	All respondents	Believers	Hesitant between belief and disbelief
Communicating with God	45	53	12
Paying tribute to national traditions	29	27	39
Paying tribute to the traditions of my family	18	20	13
Today, attending divine services is customary, and I behave like other people	13	12	18
I attend divine services only on the anniversary of the death of my relatives, friends, etc.	11	10	14
For fun	2	1	5
I go there when I feel spiritual anxiety	20	20	16
I go there when I need to feel relief	20	22	15
Together with relatives, friends, and acquaintances	7	5	17
To confess and receive communion	24	27	11
I feel aesthetically comfortable there	8	9	6
Other	4	4	7

Every fifth believer (19%) attends service once a week, every seventh (15%) — once a month, another 5% attends divine services more often than once a week. Therefore, it can be said that at least 39% of believers show a high level of religious activity (only 8% of those who called themselves believers rarely attend divine services: 6% do this less than once a year, 2% — more rarely).

The main reasons for believers attending divine services and gatherings are: communicating with God (53%), religious sacraments of confession and communion (27%), paying tribute to national (27%) and family (20%) traditions, an attempt to calm spiritual anxiety (20%), feeling of relief (22%). Some believers (10%) attend divine services only on the anniversary of the death of their relatives, friends, etc. (*Table "Why do you attend divine services?"*). Some "modern" believers attend services only because the majority does so (12%), or together with relatives, friends and acquaintances (5%). One of the motives is attending divine services for satisfying aesthetic needs (9%).

One third of people who identify themselves as believers do not attend divine services. The reasons for this are presented in Table *"Why don't you attend divine services?"*

Material support for religious organisations also presents a kind of religious activity. Among believers, 15% regularly make material donations. And even 2% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief and of non-believers regularly grant material support for religious organisations. Almost half of believers (48%) sometimes help such organisations. 18% of believers, 19% of the hesitant, and 8% of non-believers make donations only on major holidays and pay for occasional rites. Every fifth person who calls himself a believer never grants material assistance to religious organisations.

The belief in the symbols of faith and dogmas is another indicator of a person's religiosity. The results of the poll show that, among the symbols of faith, people cast the least doubt upon the existence of God (this primarily refers to believers and those who hesitate between belief and disbelief), soul and sin — among all respondents those indicators make respectively 78%, 65% and 67%.

Structurally, the belief in the symbols of faith and dogmas among different groups of believers and those who hesitate between belief and disbelief is similar, although the level of belief among the latter is twice lower (*Table "Belief in religious dogmas"*). **98% of believers and 77% of those who**

Why don't you attend divine services? % of those who do not attend them*

	All respondents	Believers	Hesitant between belief and disbelief	Non-believers
I dislike the formality of the divine services	12	13	12	9
I don't believe in God	22	2	5	61
I don't like personal behaviour of priests	10	12	12	8
Divine services take up too much time, which I don't have	17	21	19	11
It seems to me that Church leaders pay more attention to politics than spiritual values	7	7	10	4
I don't like the participation of spiritual leaders of the Church in inter-confessional conflicts	4	5	6	1
I am satisfied communicating with God "one-on-one"	28	42	33	8
None of my friends or relatives attend divine service	8	7	10	8
I cannot attend due to the state of my health	9	19	4	2
There is no house of worship in my vicinity	4	6	5	2
I don't understand religious rites	18	11	26	18
Hard to say	7	2	5	0
Other	2	6	6	9

* The respondents could give all reasonable answers, so the aggregate could exceed 100%.

hesitate between belief and disbelief believe in the existence of God, 82% and 56% — in the existence of the soul, 81% and 59% — in the existence of sin, 63% and 34% — in the existence of the Devil, 60% and 26% — in Heaven, 59% and 29% — in the life hereafter; 59% of believers and 31% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief believe in the wonder-working power of sacred relics, 55% and 23% believe in Hell, 38% of believers and 22% of hesitant believe in the resettlement of souls (the idea of reincarnation is more intrinsic in the eastern, Buddhist worldview, rather than in the Christian one). This last observation particularly witnesses the mutual penetration of different cultural worlds and worldviews.

Thus, the group of people who called themselves believers is characterised by a rather high level of belief in the symbols of faith and dogmas. The group of non-believers is funda-

mentally different in its views on the symbols of faith and dogmas — they mainly deny them. At the same time, 36% of non-believers believe in sin, and every fifth non-believer (19%) believes in the existence of the soul. It is worth noting that 11% of representatives of this group answered that they believe in the existence of God.

During the poll respondents were asked about their belief in healing, specifically in the healing power of priests, preachers, fortune-tellers, wizards, popular healers etc. It appeared that less than half of the polled admitted the existence of human healing powers. Believers tend to believe more in the healing powers of priests — 42% (among hesitant people — 16%, among non-believers — 8%). Believers are equally convinced in the powers of popular healers — 42%. Among those who give preference to healing powers of popular healers were 38% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief and 24% of non-believers. Healing abilities of fortune-tellers and wizards are trusted by 22% of believers, 19% of those who hesitate and 10% of non-believers.

Perception of God. Let us remind that 78% of the polled believes in the existence of God. Respondents were directly asked (without any answers offered) how they see God in their imagination. In all, more than 100 different answers were given. **The most widespread perceptions of God were those of a live being (25%); a supernatural, higher divine force (18%); an invisible superman (9%).** For some people, God is an abstract notion that personifies love, grace, evil, purity, happiness, faith, calm, light, help, protection, care (10%). Theosophical ideas are felt in the answers of the God's perception, as the Highest Wisdom, Absolute, Idea, the law of creation of the World, unity of all powers, energy (7%). Some people see God exactly as depicted in temples and on icons, as Jesus Christ (7%), or as a grey-haired old man (3%). There is also a pantheistic perception of God, as the entire world, the nature (2%).

The importance of certain elements of the religious life. The essential faith and the level of religiosity of believers can be described by their own assessment of the importance of certain elements of the religious life (*Diagr. "The level of importance of the basic elements of religious life"*). For Christian believers, the most important thing is prayer (73%). The rite of initiation into faith — christening — is also very important (66%); for almost two thirds of believers, reading the Bible, wedding ceremony and the religious funeral rite (61%, 60% and 61%, respectively) are important. For more than a half of Christian believers, the




Belief in religious dogmas, % of the polled								
	All respondents		Believers		Hesitant between belief and disbelief		Non-believers	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
In the existence of God	78	20	98	2	77	18	11	86
In the existence of the soul	65	28	82	12	56	36	19	75
In the existence of sin	67	27	81	12	59	34	36	63
In the existence of the Devil	46	44	63	26	34	55	5	91
In the existence of Heaven	42	46	60	27	26	62	3	94
In the life hereafter	42	47	59	29	29	61	3	93
In the wonder-working power of sacred relics	44	46	59	30	31	58	9	83
In the existence of Hell	38	50	55	32	23	64	2	94
In the resettlements of souls	28	57	38	45	22	64	5	89

sacraments of confession and communion (55% and 57%) are important, for every second person — fasting. For 57%, the belief in supernatural higher power is important.


Less than a half of Christian believers consider it important to attend divine services (48%), and affiliation with a religious community is important for a fewer (40%).

The level of importance of the basic elements of religious life, % those who called themselves Christians



Regarding prayer, two thirds of all believers (not only Christian) know no more than three prayers (one — 30%, two-three — 26%), and 17% could not answer this question (*Diagr. "Knowledge of prayers"*). Perhaps these people turn to God in an arbitrary form (if he is personified). At least one prayer is also known to those who hesitate between belief and disbelief (39%), and even to non-believers (19%).

Knowledge of prayers, % of the polled



Although not always in the form of a prayer, but **83% of all polled turn in their thoughts to the Supernatural Power — the God.** 43% does this “often”, 40% — “sometimes”. 65% of believers communicate with the Supreme Power, the Lord, most often, and 33% — “sometimes”. The majority of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief “sometimes” turns to the Supernatural Power — 65% (“often” — 19%). Non-believers normally never turn to God or the Supernatural Power (62%), but every third atheist “sometimes” feels this need, and 5% does this “often”. The main motives behind turning to God are presented in Table “*Motives for turning to the Supernatural Power, the Lord*”.

Motives for turning to the Supernatural Power, the Lord,
% of those who indicated that they turn to them

	All respondents	Believers	Hesitant between belief and disbelief	Non-believers
When feeling danger or fear	43	56	45	41
When feeling spiritual anxiety	42	54	47	37
When feeling grateful for some events in my life	32	44	30	10
While praying	34	54	16	3
When I or one of my relatives falls ill	47	59	58	33
When I need somebody's assistance	28	37	29	19
When I feel lonely	15	21	11	11
When I feel irritated or nervous	11	15	9	3
When I am annoyed with someone	8	11	7	3
When I cannot make a decision	24	31	25	11
When feeling joyful and happy	24	32	20	8
When I want to apologise for breaking religious commandments	20	30	13	3
Other	3	3	3	8
Hard to say	1	1	1	2

These data of the sociological survey give the ground for the following conclusions.

✦ Religious holidays are the motives for attending divine services for half of believers. Every seventh believer attends services once a month, every fifth — every week, only 5% — more frequently than once a week. The main

motives behind believers attending divine services are communicating with God, religious sacraments of confession and communion, paying tribute to the national and family traditions, the intention to soothe spiritual anxiety, to feel relief.

✦ Almost half of all believers render material assistance to religious organisations on some occasions (15% does it regularly).

✦ Intrinsic of believers is the high level of belief in dogmas: in the existence of God, soul, sin, Devil, Heaven, hell, the life hereafter, and in the wonder-working power of sacred relics.

✦ Less than half of believers put faith in the healing power of priests, in the abilities of popular healers; only one in five believers trusts in the powers of fortune-tellers and wizards.

✦ The perception of God in the eyes of a modern man reflects simultaneously Christian, theosophical, pantheistic views, values and sensual-emotional tints, and the images often have a naive anthropomorphous nature.

✦ Christians are quite aware of the importance of the basic elements of the religious life. The most important, among them are: the prayer, christening, reading the Bible, wedding ceremony and the religious funeral rite, sacraments of confession and communion, the belief into the Supernatural (Supreme) Power, fasting.

✦ The majority of believers consider it not only important, but mandatory to exercise religious rites as benchmarks in human life — birth, marriage, or death.

✦ Two thirds of believers know from one to two prayers only.

✦ 65% of believers often turn to the Supreme Power, the Lord. As a rule, this is done while praying. Other motives for prayers are personal health problems or health problems of relatives, a feeling of danger, fear, and spiritual anxiety.

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY

With the change of the ideological paradigm in Ukrainian society, religion occupied a noticeable place in the socio-political life of the country and some of its citizens. Respondents were proposed several variants of assessing the role played by religion in today's life of society (Table “*Assessment of the role of religion in the life of society*”).

Assessment of the role of religion in the life of society,
% of the polled

	Believers			Hesitant between belief and disbelief			Non-believers		
	Agree	Disagree	No idea	Agree	Disagree	No idea	Agree	Disagree	No idea
Religion does not influence the life of society	24	66	10	34	56	10	46	42	12
Religion is one of the elements of a democratic society	53	22	25	43	34	23	28	43	29
Religion is an element of political life	45	32	23	49	30	21	56	27	17
Religious leaders do not take position on contemporary social problems such as prevention of pregnancy, abortion, AIDS, sexual education, etc.	35	48	17	36	42	22	40	35	25
Religious leaders must defend the poorest citizens, when authorities make decisions that lower the standard of living of the population	90	5	5	90	4	6	78	12	10
Religion is an important factor in the revival of national consciousness and culture	75	10	15	62	17	21	33	39	28
Religion raises the morality and spirituality of people	91	4	5	76	10	14	40	33	27
Religion makes people inactive, indifferent to what is going on in society	5	84	11	14	65	21	38	36	27
Religion is harmful, since it divides people by confessions	6	82	12	16	59	25	36	35	29
Religion is dying and will disappear in the future	4	87	9	7	72	22	19	51	30
Religion is not properly adapted to the needs of modern man	23	60	17	38	34	28	52	24	24
Religious organisations inadequately participate in social work: assistance to the needy, disabled, sick, and elderly people	46	38	26	63	18	19	59	20	21

The Influence of Faith on Life Orientation of a Man

The majority of modern people make the “local world” their first priority — the micro-sphere (the individual and family), and religiosity in no way influences this priority (Table “Priorities of life orientation of the population”). 81% of believers, 86% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief and 84% of non-believers “agree” that a person must, first of all, care about his or her family. And if we consider the answers “tend to agree”, the share of respondents within all three above groups, who spoke in favour of the family as the main value, amounts to 99%. Evidently this is due to the fact that in today’s complex conditions, the family presents the niche most able to preserve the harmony of a person’s world.

The share of those who “agree” that a person must, first and foremost, care for himself or herself is almost the same for believers, hesitant people and non-believers, and makes 52%, 54% and 50%, respectively. More than a third of respondents, irrespective of their religious identification, “tends to agree” rather than disagree with such statement.

Far less attention is paid to the macro-sphere connected with society problems. Believers firmly name servicing to society as a life priority slightly often than non-believers (27% and 21% respectively).

Respondents pay still less attention to the state. Twice as many believers as non-believers hold that a person must first of all serve his state (23% and 12%, respectively).

**Priorities in life orientation of the population,
% of the polled***

	Believers						Hesitant between belief and disbelief						Non-believers					
	Agree			Disagree			Agree			Disagree			Agree			Disagree		
	Agree	Tend to agree	Total	Tend to disagree	Disagree	Total	Agree	Tend to agree	Total	Tend to disagree	Disagree	Total	Agree	Tend to agree	Total	Tend to disagree	Disagree	Total
A person must first of all serve society	27	40	67	18	10	28	25	37	62	23	11	34	21	36	57	23	17	40
A person must first of all serve God	41	31	72	16	7	23	10	31	41	32	17	49	2	7	9	33	51	84
A person must first of all care about himself or herself	52	36	89	8	3	11	54	36	90	6	2	8	50	38	88	8	3	11
A person must first of all care about his or her family	81	18	99	1	—	1	86	13	99	1	—	1	84	15	99	1	—	1
A person must first of all serve his or her state	23	36	59	22	13	35	18	38	56	24	15	39	12	35	47	27	22	49

* Those who did not give a definite answer were disregarded.

Orientation objectives within the group of believers fundamentally differ from those of other groups, as believers point to serving God as the primary mission of a human being — 41%.

Attitude toward social phenomena

The overwhelming majority of those polled **disapprove forcible actions** in defending religious convictions, irrespective of religious identification: the answer “justifiable under no circumstances” was given by 89% of believers, 86% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief, and 88% of non-believers.



While all groups **reject official bribery**, a widespread phenomenon in the present day, believers are more intolerant, in comparison with

other respondents: believers — 78%, non-believers — 70%, hesitant — 74%.

Believers take a more critical stance on **problems related to deprivation from life: suicide, euthanasia⁵ and abortion**. While the number of respondents, who consider suicide unjustifiable under any circumstances, is only 6% higher among believers than among non-believers and those who hesitate (81% and 75%, respectively), the differences in the attitude toward abortion and euthanasia are fundamental. Among non-believers and those who hesitate, every fourth respondent considers euthanasia justified under no circumstances (25% and 24%, respectively), while among believers, their number is greatly higher (40%). One third of non-believers and those who remain undecided with regard to faith, entirely justifies depriving a sick person of life (with its consent). Among believers, there are such people, too, but their number is twice smaller.

The most controversial issue is **the interruption of pregnancy**. Although abortion is considered to be one of the gravest sins (in Christianity), almost a third of believers would permit it under certain circumstances, and 8% justifies abortion on demand. There is also a correlation between faith and attitudes toward abortion: **the stronger the religious convictions of a person is, the more critically he or she views abortion**. Those who see such an operation quite natural — “justifiable under any circumstances” — make up 14% among those who hesitate between belief and disbelief, and almost one forth (23%) among non-believers. By contrast,

⁵ Depriving a sick person of life with its own consent.


absolute rejection (“justifiable under no circumstances”) of pregnancy interruption was demonstrated by 39% of believers, 22% of those who hesitate, and only 18% of non-believers.

Most respondents negatively assessed **homosexuality**: believers — 72%, non-believers — 70%, hesitant — 65%.

Therefore, despite some “modernisation” of outlook on certain problems of public life, the presence of faith in a person makes him or her more prejudiced to problems relating to moral and ethical principles.

The results of the poll refute one of the widespread thoughts about the significant influence of religion and the religious organisation on political views and convictions. Only 7% of believers indicated that they take into consideration the political thoughts and ideas propagated by the religious organisation to which they belong. Only 4% noticed that the position of the religious organisation has some impact on their political choice. **Political convictions of a man are mainly formed under the influence of other, non-religious, reasons** (Diagr. “The influence of the religious organisation on political convictions of a man”).


The influence of the religious organisation on political convictions of a man,
% of the polled



CHURCH IN UKRAINE'S SOCIETY

Respondents were asked about the expediency of introducing in Ukraine, as in Great Britain, Sweden and Greece, the institute of a “State Church”. More than half of respondents consider this step inexpedient (Diagr. “Attitudes toward the introducing of the institute of a “State Church” in Ukraine”).

Attitudes toward the introducing the institute of a “State Church” in Ukraine,
% of the polled



Those who agreed with the expediency of the “State Church” in Ukraine, were asked to define which of the Churches ought to obtain this status. 38% named the Orthodox Church, without specifying its denomination. Another 5% believes that the status of the “State Church” should be granted to a new religious institution uniting all confessions. This again proves that **ordinary people perceive Orthodoxy as an integral religion, irrespective of who controls one or another branch of it.**

Those who disagreed with the idea of introducing the institute of a “State Church” in Ukraine, motivated their position by the freedom of conscience, since granting privileges to one of the Churches would cause discrimination against believers of other Churches. Believers abide by this position somewhat more than non-believers — 51% and 43%, respectively. **Every third believer and every fourth non-believer suggests that granting the status of the “State Church” to one of the Churches in the multi-confessional Ukraine would cause more tension in inter-Church and Church-state relations.**

When defining the role of the Church in contemporary Ukraine's society, fundamental differences in opinions were observed. 63% of believers, 37% of those who hesitate and only 14% of non-believers consider that the Church plays a positive role. By contrast, the share of those who don't see any positive role of the Church in today's society is higher among non-believers — 63%; among those who hesitate



between belief and disbelief — 47%, and among believers — 27%. **The share of those who negatively assess the role of the Church in Ukraine is generally low: 9% of all polled, the majority of them — non-believers.**


Believers support non-involvement of the Church in the affairs and interests of society and the state more actively than representatives of the other groups, since they see its main duty in serving God. This opinion was shared by 71% of believers, half of those hesitant, and only a quarter of non-believers. The opinion that the Church has some obligations before society and the state was mainly supported by non-believers — 46%, one third of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief, and 16% of believers. Some respondents (18%) could not define their position as to this question.

In order to find out what actions the public expects from religious organisations, respondents were directly asked: “What practical activity do you think religious organisations should perform in our society?” In this way, **priority directions** for operation were identified: helping the sick, disabled, elderly people, homeless children, pensioners, drug addicts.

Church should provide material (food, medicines, clothes, etc.) and moral assistance to them — considered 35% of respondents. Every sixth respondent (16%) believes the moral and spiritual education of a person to be the task of the Church, 14% — moral assistance and support in a difficult situation. Far less respondents (9%) suggest orienting the Church toward interpretation of the religious teaching, education and information about the history or religion and the Church, etc.

More than half of respondents, including almost half of believers (48%), believe that the Church and religion should not be nationally-minded. Therefore, in the consciousness of a modern man, the ideological religious paradigm is gradually changing from a local (state) level, to an open (civilisational) one. Alongside with that, 36% of believers, 27% of those who hesitate and 13% of non-believers tend to support a more conservative view of a nationally-oriented religion (*Diagr. “Should the Church, religion be nationally-minded?”*).

Should the Church, religion be nationally-minded?
% of the polled



The religious identification of a person definitely influences his or her attitude toward such an important aspect of Church-state relations **as the separation of the Church from the state and school from the Church.** Believers tend to assume that such a policy is incorrect (42%), while the majority of non-believers considers it to be an important prerequisite of a democratic state, and the right to the freedom of conscience (52%). Almost one third of all polled has no definite position in this respect, which again proves the low attention and indifference of the broad public to the problem of Church-state relations.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD NEO-RELIGIONS AND THEIR SPREAD IN UKRAINE

Of late, this subject has literally gained a national significance and attracted the attention of scholars, politicians, journalists, medics, and the authorities in Ukraine. The spread of neo-religious formations is arising polemics, and stimulates the growth of an anti-cult movement. There is a discussion on their recognition as non-religious, since their teaching and practice often do not correspond to the traditional perception of religion. At the same time, UCEPS poll showed, that the majority of the polled citizens have not heard anything concrete about the new-born religions (*Table "Attitude toward the religions and religious trends"*).

While the concrete names of new-born religious trends are known to few people, many are familiar with their activities, in particular, mass services and healing sessions in movie-houses, palaces of culture, at stadiums, in mass media (radio and TV). The public usually disap-



Attitude toward the religions and religious trends,
% of the polled

	Positive	Indifferent	Negative	Never thought about it	Heard nothing about this religion
Orthodoxy	77	15	2	6	—
Greek Catholicism	31	41	6	17	5
Roman Catholicism	28	42	7	18	5
Protestantism	14	45	14	20	7
Islam	14	44	14	22	6
Judaism	12	45	12	22	9
Church of Jesus Christ and Saints of the Last Days	6	24	11	14	45
Church of Christ	8	22	10	13	47
Church of Unity	4	21	10	11	54
Golgotha Church	3	18	9	9	61
Word of Faith	3	18	8	9	62
Victory Church	3	18	8	9	62
Charismatic Churches	3	18	9	9	61
Kyiv Centre of Christian Life	4	19	7	10	60
Krishnaism	5	25	15	17	38
Buddhism	11	33	11	21	24
Transcendental Meditation	5	20	10	11	54
Agni-Yoga	5	21	10	11	53
Different trends of "Era of Aquarius" and "New Era"	3	16	8	9	64

proves their activity: 59,6% of the polled, irrespective of religious identification, called their attitude toward them negative. Only 18% of respondents approve the activities of preachers of the new religious trends. They are mainly believers (21%). This view is also shared by 8% of non-believers and 15% of those who hesitate between belief and disbelief. The basic motive behind a positive attitude toward sermons and healing sessions is the conviction that such events enable people to come to faith (74% of those respondents who positively assess such events).

Only 18% of the polled believe that these events really help sick people to cure. The thought that mass sermons and healing sessions are nothing but fraud that brings material benefits to their organisers is especially spread among those people who negatively assess such actions, and does not depend on the religious identification of a person (43% of believers and 45% of non-believers).

Believers are a bit more than non-believers stuck to the opinion that the activities of foreign preachers of the new religions have a negative effect on the traditional faith of the population — every fifth believer named this reason (among non-believers — 11%). By contrast, the opinion that propaganda of ‘mass healing’ is harmful, since many people are encouraged to hope for a miracle, is more spread among non-believers — 30% (22% among believers). Significant number of those polled, irrespective of their religious

identification, assume that the events organised by the new religions in Ukraine negatively affect mental health of people. **Nearly one half of the respondents (irrespective of their attitude to faith), who negatively assess those events, consider that they should be prohibited by the law. 27% of believers and 22% of non-believers suggest that people should have a choice and bear responsibility for the consequences, so, there is no sense banning the events held by neo-religious preachers.**

16% of respondents who negatively assess such activities noted that the activities of new religious trends won’t be banned, since their representatives can materially “encourage” officials, and also because today, with healthcare being unaffordable, the authorities are interested in stoking the people’s faith in healers (10% of all respondents who negatively assess those activities).

Today, PR programmes and sermons of Churches not traditional to Ukraine, new religious preachers and missions are quite active in Ukraine’s information space, on the radio and TV. **The majority of those polled, when asked about their attitude toward such programmes, believes that religious propaganda on radio and TV should be entirely prohibited, all religious sermons, rites, etc. must be held in specially designed ceremonial buildings and that such proceedings should not be broadcast to mass audiences.** This view is especially advocated by non-believers (57%), and also supported by one third of believers (31%).

Every fourth believer views TV sermons as proselytising, and considers it unimportant which specific religious organisations prepare radio and TV programmes for this purpose. 17% of believers (15% of those hesitant and 9% of non-believers) spoke in favour of equal representation of the new religious organisations and traditional Churches on the private radio stations and TV channels. Only 10% of believers, 9% of those who hesitate and 5% of non-believers are sure that the numerical strength of religious organisations should be taken into account when deciding on their programmes’ broadcasting on radio and TV — in this case, we don’t mention the origin of preachers and the traditional or non-traditional character of religious teachings. 13% of the polled could not define their position regarding TV and radio broadcasting of religious sermons.




Is the right to the freedom of conscience observed in Ukraine? % of the polled												
	All respondents			Believers			Hesitant between belief and disbelief			Non-believers		
	Agree	Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Disagree	Hard to say
In Ukraine, there is complete freedom of conscience and equality of faiths before the law	66	20	14	67	22	11	68	19	13	67	17	16
Freedom of conscience and equality of faiths in Ukraine is declared but not secured	39	43	18	41	41	18	39	33	18	26	48	26
Religious organisations and Churches are abusing their rights and freedoms	37	39	24	37	42	21	40	37	23	39	27	34

OBSERVANCE OF THE RIGHT TO THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN UKRAINE

In late 1980s, the problem of religious freedom in Ukraine seemed to be quite simple. It meant the freedom from persecution for religious convictions and for faithfulness to one's Church. However, the transition from totalitarianism to broad religious freedom in 1991-1993

went too fast and could not avoid deformations. A new religious situation emerged, when people understood that they do not live in a confessionally homogenous society. Religious freedom was like an acid test that revealed the loss of traditional religious orientation of Ukrainians. Today's Ukrainian religious space is a conglomerate of faiths and confessions: traditional and non-traditional, archaic and modern-like, domestic and alien, of Christians and new pagans, believers and atheists, and those who do not affiliate themselves with one or another Church.

"Which of the following statements corresponds to your convictions?"
% of the polled



Respondents were offered to express their thoughts about actual observance of the right to the freedom of conscience (Table "Is the right to the freedom of conscience observed in Ukraine?"). The Table shows, that two thirds of the polled believe that complete freedom of conscience and equality of faiths before the law exist in Ukraine.

Demonstrative is the fact that the public opinion is generally convinced in the legitimacy of the right to existence for any religion, that proclaims the ideals of virtue, love, mercy, and does not endanger the existence of other people (Diagr. "Which of the following statements corresponds to your convictions").

ATTITUDE TOWARD INTER-CONFESSIONAL CONFLICTS

Inter-confessional conflicts is an important component of the religious life in Ukraine. Quite a few citizens (39% of those polled) believe that the main reason for conflicts

**The reasons of conflicts between different Churches,
% of the polled***

	All respondents	Believers	Hesitant between belief and disbelief	Non-believers
Because Church hierarchs are striving for power	39	36	43	48
Because the true Church must prove its superiority	9	9	10	7
Conflicts between Churches are purely political	20	21	20	15
The essence of the conflicts lies in the national problem	11	11	13	8
The conflicts are mainly focussed around property and buildings	23	22	25	21
Other	4	5	4	1
Hard to say	21	22	17	18
* Respondents could give all reasonable answers, so the aggregate exceeds 100%.				


between believers of different confessions is the lust for power on the part of Church hierarchs. Non-believers hold this opinion more than

believers (48% and 36%, respectively). Another reason for misunderstanding is presented by disputes around property and houses of worship (23% of those polled). Every fifth respondent sees political interests behind inter-Church conflicts (20%). Believers support this opinion more actively than non-believers (21% and 15%, respectively). 11% of respondents are sure that the essence of opposition between Churches lies in the national problem. Respondents least of all tend to believe that Church leaders engage in conflicts with the purpose of proving the “exceptional truth” of their Church (9%). 21% of those polled did not express their opinion on the problem of inter-Church conflicts (*Table “The reasons of conflicts between different Churches”*).

The results of this survey give grounds for concluding that the religious spirituality inherent in Ukrainians at the previous stages of historic development is presently undergoing a transformation. In the consciousness of a modern believer, the traditional perception of a faithful person, and requirements to his or her religious and social behaviour, coexist with a new outlook of religion and faith. It is based on principles of expediency, rationalism, practicability, and is integrally related with the realities of today’s social and political life⁶.

⁶ Interpretation of the results of such a scaled survey is not a simple task. It is also complicated by the contradictory situation in the religious environment of Ukraine's society, which cannot always be analysed and treated univocally. Therefore, the authors invite experts to jointly discuss the results of the UCEPS social survey which are presented in this material.

THE CHURCH AND THE ARMED FORCES: PARTNERSHIP OR ABSORPTION?



*Serhiy SIOMIN,
Ph.D. (Psychology), MA (International Relations),
Senior Consultant, National Institute for Strategic Studies*

According to the results of sociological surveys conducted in Ukraine by SOCIS-Gallup over the last four years, the most authoritative and influential institutions in Ukraine's society are the Armed Forces and the Church (they are trusted by 39% and 52%, respectively). Given this, it seems reasonable to analyse the principles of possible interaction between those institutions.

SPECIFICITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CHURCH

Democratic transformations in Ukraine's society and Army have entailed introduction of principle of freedom of religion in the country and provided possibilities for this process. The principle of separation of the Church from the state, and particularly from its military structures, as specific levers of power, should serve as an objective measure of real religious freedom in society.

In practice, however, we see attempts on the part of the Church to strengthen its influence on the military structures, and particularly on the Armed Forces.

In its time, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate), without participation of representatives of other Ukrainian Churches and confessions, signed "agreements on co-operation" with the Navy, Border Troops and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. During the meeting of the President of Ukraine with heads of Churches and religious organisations of the country, which took place on February 10, 1999, Church hierarchs openly demanded that L.Kuchma encourage "union" between the Church and the school system, and initiate the adoption of a law on obligatory teach-

ing of religious subjects at school. Religious leaders consistently stress that the Church would like to feel more "confident" in the Armed Forces, corrections institutions, hospitals and orphanages.

In April, 1999, Churches began to openly influence the leaders of Ukraine's military structures, when on Easter a member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Volodymyr (Sabodan) awarded with church orders such officials as Minister of Defence O.Kuzmuk, Minister of Internal Affairs Yu.Kravchenko, and [then] Head of the State Committee for Protection of the Border V.Bannykh "For Merits Before the Church" (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Moscow Patriarchate, which is a structural division of the Russian Orthodox Church). This event was organised in pursuance of a directive given by the Patriarch of Moscow and the Whole of Rus' Aleksei II at the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church (February 18-23, 1997), which clearly stated: "Our special area of action is participation in the life of the armed forces and law-enforcement institutions. We should also consider establishing stronger ties with armies and law-enforcement bodies not only in Russia, but also in the CIS countries"¹.

¹ See more detail on this matter at: http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/sobor_01.htm.

The state, on its part, has failed to work out an effective mechanism of interaction between these institutions, that would define political and legal fundamentals for such co-operation on a national level.

A truly democratic approach to this issue would involve: either going down the road of further mutually acceptable adaptation of the Church and the Army, or performing a principled and civilised delimitation of authority, in accordance with the norms of law. The Ukrainian nation, although traditionally Christian, has been multi-ethnic and multi-confessional. Ukraine, unlike the Russian Federation, has no single dominant Orthodox Church, to say nothing of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

UNDESIRABLE SCENARIOS OF DEVELOPMENT

Possible scenarios of development in terms of co-operation between the Armed Forces and the Church may involve:

❖ co-operation between the Armed Forces and one of Ukrainian Churches, perhaps the “State Church”;

❖ interaction on a regional level, that is division of Ukraine into spheres of predominant influence of one or another confession.

From the very beginning it must be stressed that realisation of either of the above scenarios would be a fatal error with grave consequences for the nation.

As far as the first scenario of Army-Church co-operation is concerned, none of the existing religious organisations in Ukraine can objectively claim the role of an all-Ukrainian Church, and so cannot enjoy an exclusive right of interacting with the military structures.

Today's Ukraine is a multi-confessional state. Historically, it is Orthodoxy that has been and remains the most traditional of religions, playing a significant positive role in the preservation of the Ukrainian ethnos, forma-

Do you believe that representatives of the Church should be present in Ukraine's Armed Forces? If so, what functions do you think they could perform there? What would you expect the results of their activity to be?

P o i n t o f v i e w



Head of the Synod
Theological Commission
of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, Archbishop of
Lviv and Halych
AVGUSTYN (Markevych)

No doubt, the presence of Church representatives in Ukraine's Armed Forces is necessary. Nowadays, the profession of state-funded army chaplain exists in many countries, including almost everywhere in Europe. For a number of reasons this institution cannot be introduced in Ukraine at present. It could become possible several years down the line, provided the Church and the state co-operate in the training of personnel. However, there is nothing to prevent us from doing what we can now.

In the Army, Church representatives would be able not only to care for souls, but also engage in patriotic education, cultural activities and enlightenment and help soldiers to use their spare time constructively.

Apart from ensuring the constitutional right of military personnel to observe their religion, the presence of clergymen in the Armed Forces would ease the assimilation of new recruits, help to eliminate bullying by older soldiers, reduce instances of suicide, bring together different military units and contribute to inculcating in soldiers the spirit of service to their nation on the basis of selfless devotion. By the way, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has already made agreements on co-operation with some military units. Those who still doubt the necessity of such work should ask the military who are already working together with clergymen for their assessment of this experience.




General Vicar of the
Kyiv and Zhytomyr
Diocese of the Roman
Catholic Church Bishop
Stanislaw
SHYROKORADIUK

Both the Church and the Army have a mission to serve. And it is this service — to people, to one's neighbours — that is most highly valued according to the Gospel and the teachings of Jesus Christ. When shall we finally understand that priests are needed in the Army? Their duty in the Army would be to minister to those who serve with arms in their hands, to help them to perform their military duty in the best possible manner, answering before God, to their consciences and to the people that entrusted them their arms. You know that there are many things wrong in the Army, that there is much injustice and an absence of moral concord. The teachings of the Church are needed here like nowhere else. All military personnel should have a chance to speak with a priest, open their hearts, share their spiritual problems, or maybe some other problems, including psychological ones. So, priests are necessary. You know that the [communist] institution of political commissars responsible for ideological education was created as an attempt to substitute for priests: priests were previously present in all the military units, carrying out educational duties. Nowadays, there is much talk about Ukraine's European direction. I know of no army in Europe which can do without chaplains.

From May 11 to June 3, 2000, we made a pilgrimage to Lourdes. This was organised by the Ministry of Defence and I took part. All ranks from cadets to colonels were involved — 86 people in total. We travelled throughout Europe — to Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Austria, Italy... — staying at military bases, living in barracks. And everywhere we went we were received by army chaplains. At every base we saw chapels. We even saw military bishops in action, and how the chaplains were trained. There are no problems with any faith, for there are Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant chaplains, working according to a single programme approved by the Ministry of Defence. The same military chapel is used by them all. A French general told us that no officer has the authority that a chaplain has. This answers the question of whether there should be chaplains in the Army. When this institution will appear in Ukraine is another question. It seems to me that it will take a long time — not because the Church is unprepared to serve, although we may lack specially trained priests — but because the Army is not ready, especially the high command, since they are still living in the past, and believe that 'commissar priests' are better. We must do our best to change this view.

**The number of foreign clergymen
in Ukrainian regions, persons**



tion of its self-consciousness and the mentality of its statehood. However, today, Orthodox Churches lack constructive co-operation, and are waging a tough struggle for the heritage of the ROC in Ukraine. As a result, none of the aforesaid Churches can objectively act as the sole spokesman for Ukraine's national interests.

The present-day religious situation in Ukraine is being aggravated not only by nation-

al Churches and confessions traditional to this country, but also under the deliberate influence of foreign religious expansion and intense activity by local representatives of new, non-traditional trends and cults. Over the last 3-4 years more than 300 branches of non-traditional cults were established in Ukraine with the participation of foreign missionaries. In 1999 alone, more than 11,600 representatives of foreign religious centres visited Ukraine, a quarter of whom actively engaged in missionary work, under the pretence of various forms of secular education (*see map*).

Many foreign preachers and missionaries come to Ukraine without any control, disguised as tourists, lecturers, medics, workers in the field of culture and representatives of commercial firms. Later, they begin religious activity in Ukraine, acting contrary to the law.

As far as the second scenario of Army-Church co-operation is concerned, the attempts to find a kind of 'canonical territory' for any Church will be seen exclusively as separatist manifestations, which can seriously damage the national interests of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine should not be divided confessionally, like Lebanon, Ulster or Indonesia, with politically and legally defined boundaries



*Administrator of the
Patriarchy of the
Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church,
Archbishop of Kyiv and
Poltava IHOR (Isichenko)*

Since there are faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church among officers and soldiers of Ukraine's Armed Forces, the Church is obliged before God to care for this flock irrespective of state legislation. The majority of Ukraine's Christian Churches are in a similar situation. The only problem is the development of a legislative basis for such activities. The basic principle should be the protection of a serviceman's personality from the imposition of spiritual guardianship by priests of other confessions or participation in rites of a religious organisation to which he does not belong.

The functions of an Orthodox chaplain lie, in the first place, in serving Liturgy on Sundays and holy days for the faithful of his Church, administering the Sacrament, especially during hostilities or emergency situations, and conducting regular meetings with groups of faithful and individual believers. The results of a well-run systematic spiritual guardianship over the military will manifest themselves mainly in the consciousness of servicemen's identity as Christians and Ukrainian citizens, greater respect for the rights of the individual, other people's dignity, and development of a feeling of social responsibility. A further result will be a harmonisation of interpersonal relations in the Ukrainian Army.



*President of the All-
Ukrainian Union of
Associations of
Evangelic Baptists
Hryhoriy KOMENDANT*

Ukraine's Armed Forces are a wholly state institution. They are created, maintained and used by the state. Their duty is to safeguard peace and civil calm and, if necessary, to defend their people and their land.

Evangelical Baptists in Ukraine and throughout the world abide by seven main principles. One of them is FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE for everyone. On this basis, our young men make a choice as their conscience dictates: to serve in the Army or to join up for alternative service. I wouldn't say that the second option is easier than the first as the length of service is twice as long, but we believe that diligent work over this period compensates adequately for the exercise of conscience. The Evangelical Baptist Brotherhood considers the presence of Church representatives in Ukraine's Armed Forces inexpedient and unnecessary. The two have different functions. History tells us what has happened when a statesman brandishes the cross and makes Christianity the state religion. There are also other instances where the Church has taken up a sword and gone on crusades. They are probably equally bad — a cross in the hands of the state and a sword in the hands of the Church. Another argument against is that young men of different faiths are serving in the Army, and it is simply impracticable to have representatives of so many different Churches in the Armed Forces.

between territories. This scenario is not welcome and harks back to events in the former Yugoslavia, where religious contradictions served as one of the factors increasing the territorial fragmentation of the country, and as moral justification for inhuman treatment of former compatriots.

STATE LEVERS FOR REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND MILITARY STRUCTURES

Upon declaring that they were building a democratic and rule of law state, the authorities faced the issue of real separation of the Church from the state, including from the Armed Forces. Freedom of conscious and freedom of thought, including the freedom to believe or not to believe in spiritual principles, the freedom to participate or not to participate in religious service — all these are rights of a free person. The freedom to believe or not to believe in no way decreases the ability of the state to create an effective system for patriotic

education of the defenders of the Fatherland. This does not mean however, that the President, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, should remove himself from resolution of religious issues and the practice of worship in military structures.

Undoubtedly, that people with religious convictions abide by their convictions, even when appointed to top positions in power ministries, and the President must have effective levers of constitutional pressure, which would make religious discrimination against minorities impossible. Moreover, organised activities by religious communities within the military structures violate military discipline, and undermine the principle of a single command. Furthermore, worship must be fully co-ordinated with the special nature of routine activities in the Armed Forces.

The interests of protection of the national security of the state require not only scientific examination of the institution of chap-



*Head of the Organisation of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine
Valentyna ARTAMONOVA*

What role can a priest play in the Army? I think it would be better if he were called a confessor. This should be a man whom the soldiers could accept. I don't know whether he should be a professional military or just a priest, but at any rate he should be ready first of all to defend the rights and dignity of soldiers. He could and should go to the commander and tell him if he is in the wrong. However, this presents a contradiction; confessions are confidential, and if a soldier confesses to the priest, the latter should not betray him to the person that has offended him. What can be done? In general, I am not sure whether a priest can understand the special features of military service. If he only visits the unit from time to time, in duty hours only, it is useless. He must be with the servicemen round the clock, 24 hours a day. Are the Church and priests ready for that? I am not so sure. As far as I know, at present priests visit soldiers only on holy days, that is, on formal occasions. Routine, everyday routine work rests with the military educators who do this unsatisfactorily.

Meanwhile, in the Bundeswehr, a chaplain is not so much of a priest as a man who defends the rights of individual servicemen, be it a soldier or an officer. He can rebuke commanders whose actions violate somebody's rights. And what do we have here? Generally speaking, it doesn't matter to me who it is: a priest, a psychologist, or a lawyer, but it must be an honest and decent person, qualified for the work and diligently defending soldiers' rights. Where can we find such people? Today nobody at all is heaven-sent.

We have a national organisation of Christian officers. They bring the word of God into the Army in a practical way. They are the 'men in uniform' whom soldiers trust. Maybe they can become the confessors, but there is a contradiction here, too. First and foremost, they are officers. According to regulations, they must obey their superior officers. If those in command do something wrong, they cannot contradict them. I asked one of the officers what he did in such a situation. He replied, "We can only pray". For this reason, priests probably should not wear shoulder straps.



*Bishop-Assistant of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
Lubomyr HUSAR*

Military personnel, as citizens, enjoy a constitutional right to confess and worship their religion. Since military personnel are bound by duty, that is their freedom of movement is restricted, they cannot freely participate in religious ceremonies and religious education. Hence, military superiors are constitutionally obliged to create appropriate conditions for worship at the place of service. The duty of a priest (military chaplain) is confined to providing religious services to the faithful of his confession, or other confessions, if they wish to utilise his services. Military personnel serving in the Armed Forces deprived of chaplain services suffer from lowered morale and moral standards.



BASIC PROVISIONS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CHURCH

❖ Ukraine must be a secular state, where the Church is truly separated from military structures. This in no way means a return to the times of 'militant atheism'; instead, this demonstrates the neutrality and unbiased position of the state with regard to any kinds of convictions of both a religious and non-religious nature. The secular character of the state should be more clearly defined by legislation and applicable regulatory documents that govern the activities of military formations in Ukraine.

❖ The President, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, has the right and duty, in accordance with mutually accepted international standards, and particularly Article 29 of the General Declaration of Human Rights, to define conceptual fundamentals and concrete limits of co-operation between the Armed Forces and the Church, to be observed by all adherents or organisations of any religious or secular nature. Relevant presidential structures must exercise strict control over the observance of those limits and the abidance by the law on the part of believers of all confessions, religious and secular organisations, and, if necessary, bring those who break the effective legislation to account.

❖ All forms of co-operation between the Armed Forces and the Church must stay within the legal and legislative framework, strictly defining the Church's participation in the spiritual and patriotic education of the military structures' personnel. The establishment of co-operation between the Armed Forces and the Church before the creation of relevant legislative basis is undesirable, and can seriously damage the military organisation of the state.

❖ Spiritual and patriotic education in the country should be conducted under a uniform and approved programme that would encompass stages of pre-conscription training, conscript service and reserve status. Any forms of "unprogrammed" co-operation should be treated as attempts at politicising Ukraine's military structures.

Furthermore, experts rightly say that "all Churches and confessions must clearly and unambiguously define their position on the issue of the armed defence of Ukraine by their believers. Those religious organisations, which hold that service in military formations of the state, is service to God and the people, should exercise pastoral care exclusively within the framework of a nation-wide programme. Those Churches which rule out the participation of their faithful in the armed defence of their Motherland should work out their common position with regard to spiritual care of those who were called up for alternative (non-military) service"³.

lains, pastoral service and various kinds of spiritual support for training by the Armed Forces, but also the urgent development of original methods of socio-psychological maintenance of everyday life of military personnel, taking into account Ukraine's confessional specifics.

Domestic historical experience proves that lack of understanding and control over the processes taking place in the sphere of ideology of the Armed Forces in general and in religious life in particular will unavoidably lead to the ruination of the military organisation of the state.

Priority tasks in building the moral and ideological potential of Ukraine's Armed Forces should be: neutralising the threat of separatist tendencies, raising the standard of living of military personnel, modernisation of the command and control system, and improving morale in military units. In this respect, the state policy towards Army-Church relations, and defence of the country's national interests in the spiritual and religious spheres are of particular importance.

Having embarked on the road of building a democratic society, Ukraine proclaimed freedom of worldview and faith for its citizens to be a fundamental principle of nation-building², and undertook to ensure this right, as well as to safeguard and defend aforesaid personal rights and freedoms. Proceeding from the strategy of Army-Church relations based exclusively on the ideology of peace, strengthening national unity and protecting national interests, the state must, first and foremost, seek the creation of an effective legislative basis of relations between the Armed Forces and the Church, and unbiased attitude to the freedom of belief for every serviceman.

Despite the temporary difficulties of the transitional period, Ukraine today can show an example of truly democratic solution of all-European problems by guaranteeing the religious rights and freedoms of its servicemen, and by serving as a model of adapting international norms in its domestic constitutional and legislative environment. Understanding that the

² Constitution of Ukraine, article 23.

³ Zdioruk S., Yaremchuk V. *Spiritual and Humanitarian Aspects of the Strategy of Development of Military Formations in Ukraine: Monograph*. — Kyiv, 1995, p.39.



establishment of mutually advantageous partner relations between the Armed Forces and the

Church is a prerequisite for successful nation-building in Ukraine, will help us to avoid mistakes and step to a qualitatively new level of state-Church co-operation.

The establishment of partner relations between religious organisations and military formations in Ukraine should take into account the specificity of military service under conditions of strict security, law and order, high morale, preservation of servicemen's health, in order to firmly guarantee the development of public morality, democracy and humanism in this country. Such activity should involve representatives of confessions and religious denominations, take into account the specificity of Ukrainian traditions, and be conditioned on the creation of a legal basis for the Church's participation in the spiritual and patriotic education of officers and soldiers of Ukraine's Armed Forces.