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CRIMEAN SOCIETY: DIVIDING LINES AND PROSPECTS OF CONSOLIDATION

The AR of Crimea is a special region of Ukraine, not only because of its autonomous status, but also thanks to its unique historic and cultural heritage, ethnic composition of the population, geopolitical situation. It may be said without exaggeration that the ability to integrate Crimea into the pan-Ukrainian political and socio-cultural space presents a key test of maturity and effectiveness of the Ukrainian state. This determines the extreme importance of Crimean segment in the Ukrainian policy. But unfortunately, there are no grounds to claim serious success in that domain; rather, things are developing in the opposite direction.

It may be stated that the socio-political situation in the AR of Crimea, after the relative stability of late 1990s – early 2000s, has deteriorated lately.

In the result of serious political contradictions, deregulation of the executive branch, lack of system and consistency in the Ukrainian state policy regarding Crimea, interaction between the republican and central authorities in some sectors is far from standards of constructive cooperation, which leads to continual non-execution or even open obstruction of decisions of the central authorities dealing with Crimea.

This brings to light drawbacks in the effective legislation describing the rights and powers of the AR of Crimea, regimenting the autonomy's relations with Kyiv, presentation and defence of its interests in the supreme bodies of state power.

Meanwhile, radical, first of all – pro-Russian public and political forces stepped up their activity in Crimea, manifested, in particular, in stronger opposition to actions of the state authorities aimed at rapprochement with Euro-Atlantic structures, and in moral support for Russia and its Black Sea Fleet during the armed conflict with Georgia in August 2008.

The problems of amenities for and social rehabilitation of repatriates, first of all – representatives of Crimean Tatars, are far from final solution. Despite the deep study of those problems by the Ukrainian authorities and representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people, full mutual understanding between its political leadership and the state authorities in the issues of restoration of economic, social, cultural and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people, definition of its place in Ukraine's legal framework and its state system is still absent. Given the evident deficiency of means of protection of collective interests available to Crimean Tatars, this undermines trust in the authorities, both Ukrainian and Crimean, and deteriorates inter-ethnic relations in Crimea.

The absence of strategic approaches of the Ukrainian authorities to comprehensive solution of Crimean problems, prevalence of the policy of situational response to separate problems or their neglect have an effect on the public consciousness of the Crimean residents in the form of growth of separatist and irredentist spirits, unpopularity of the prospects of further development of Crimea within the constitutional framework of Ukraine.

External influences on the situation in the AR of Crimea in economic, political, religious and information sectors are growing. Not all of them may be termed negative, but many of them are designed to entirely cut Crimea from Ukrainian political and socio-cultural space or to make the latter a factor of political and cultural disintegration of the Ukrainian society and state.

Against that background, Crimean society witnesses processes of transformation, in particular, consolidation of the main ethnic groups by socio-cultural features, growth of competition among them in the political, socio-economic and symbolic domains. Evolution of relations among the most numerous Crimean socio-cultural communities towards aggravation of contradictions will threaten the socio-political stability of not only Crimea but Ukraine as a whole, give a pretext for interference of outside forces in its internal affairs, moreover, given the precedents of implementation of similar political scenarios.

Study of the situation in the AR of Crimea, identification of factors influencing it and search of ways of the most optimal solution of the existing problems are all covered by the Ukrainian-Swiss project "Socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea –state, problems, ways of solution", jointly implemented by Razumkov Centre and University of Basel's Europainstitut¹. This Analytical Report deals with the second stage of the project.

Analytical Report consists of three sections.

First section

on the basis of data of sociological surveys identifies the main socio-cultural communities of Crimea, examines their mutual perception, the character and prospects of relations, prospects of emergence of a single Crimean identity.

Second section

analyses the main factors influencing the situation in Crimea – political, socio-economic, cultural, religious, information.

Third section

carries conclusions of the prospects of formation of the Crimean identity, specificities of the main socio-cultural communities of Crimea, the character and prospects of their relations, and presents proposals as to the ways and lines of improvement of the socio-economic and socio-political situation in the autonomy.

¹ Razumkov Centre compliments Professor G.Kreis (University of Basel's Europainstitut) for valuable advice and proposals at the stage of generation of the working hypotheses of this report and the study toolset.

1. DOMINANT COMMUNITIES OF CRIMEA: SELF-IDENTIFICATION, CHARACTER OF RELATIONS, PROSPECTS OF THEIR EVOLUTION (in Crimean and pan-Ukrainian contexts)

The first stage of the study performed by Razumkov Centre at the end of 2008 revealed a number of topical problems of public life in Crimea that required a deeper survey. The problems included, in particular, processes of formation of the Crimean regional identity and the character of relations among the main communities formed in Crimea¹. Meanwhile, the study demonstrated that the communities exerting “institutional” influence on socio-political developments in the autonomy are not always formed on ethnic grounds. Socio-cultural orientations, including language and cultural preferences, civic and religious self-identification, play the decisive role here.

This section describes features of the main socio-cultural groups of Crimean society distinguished by the results of studies conducted during the second stage of the project, their mutual assessments, ideas of the ways of solution of regional problems.

1.1. SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES OF CRIMEA: SPECIFICITY OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION AND PROSPECTS OF FORMATION OF A COMMON CRIMEAN IDENTITY

Prediction of socio-political processes in Crimea is impossible without a clear idea of self-identification of the residents of that region, since their self-identification is among the most important factors shaping the character of social behaviour of citizens, as they first of all follow the values, norms, beliefs, convictions dominating in the social group they affiliate themselves with. So, we examined specificities of the socio-cultural self-identification of the Crimean residents and singled out their socio-cultural communities². The results generally reiterated the preliminary conclusions of the first phase of the project, saying that “by mentality characteristics as well as regarding their attitude towards Ukraine, Ukrainian citizenship, Crimea’s perspectives, etc., the majority of Ukrainian and Russian residents present a unified social and cultural community”³, while Crimean Tatars substantially differ from them.

1.1.1. Criteria of distinction of socio-cultural communities

Language. The numeric prevalence of Russians in Crimea leads to the prevalence of the Russian-language environment in the autonomy; as a result, the overwhelming majority (85.1%) of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea consider Russian their native language, 98.5% speak it at home (among ethnic Russians – respectively, 99.6% and 98.4%). The share of Crimean Tatars considering Russian their native language is rather small (6%, although the share of those who mainly speak it at home is higher – 31.5%).

Affiliation with a cultural tradition. 75.9% of ethnic Russians affiliate themselves with the Russian cultural tradition, another 17.4% – with the Soviet. The majority (52.7%) of ethnic Ukrainians affiliate with the Russian cultural tradition (another 26.6% – with the Soviet cultural tradition, only 9.7% – the Ukrainian). Crimean Tatars distance themselves from the Russian cultural tradition – only 0.5% affiliated with it, 91.9% – with the Crimean Tatar.

¹ For more detail see: Crimea: people, problems, prospects (Socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea). Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, No.10, 2008.

² The Report builds on the results of all-Crimean public opinion polls representative of the adult population of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol by the key socio-economic indicators (age, sex, settlement type, nationality). The polls were conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service: on **July 29 – August 11, 2004** (3,143 respondents above 18 years polled in the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol, the sample’s theoretical error does not exceed 1.2%); **October 18 – November 9, 2008** (6,891 respondents above 18 years polled in the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol, the sample’s theoretical error does not exceed 1.2%); **May 7-20, 2009** (2,016 respondents above 18 years polled in the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol, the sample’s theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%).

Also used were the results of focus groups (group interviews) held by Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in Simferopol in May 2009 (three focus groups – of ethnic Russians (R), Ukrainians (U), Crimean Tatars (T)) and an expert poll (held by Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on May 23 - June 3, 2009, with 80 experts polled in Kyiv and Crimea).

Unless specified otherwise, cited are the results of the latest Crimean poll.

³ See: Crimea: people, problems, prospects (Socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea)..., p.11.

This gives grounds to note that the majority of Ukrainians in Crimea identify themselves as representatives of a common with Russians socio-cultural community, resting on domination of the Russian-language culture. When directly asked if they agree that there are actually no differences between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea, and they make one socio-cultural community, a positive answer was given by 73.7% of ethnic Ukrainians living in Crimea, the same opinion is shared by the majority (76.2%) of Russians (Table “*There is an opinion that there are almost no differences between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea...*”).

There is an opinion that there are almost no differences between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea, and they make a unified socio-cultural community. Do you agree with this statement?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Agree	37.4	34.1	40.1	28.8
Most likely agree	35.3	39.6	36.1	20.1
Most likely do not agree	9.8	12.4	7.3	18.5
Do not agree	4.5	5.2	3.9	7.6
Hard to say	13.0	8.7	12.6	25.0

Confessional self-identification. Confessional self-identification is an important aspect of socio-cultural self-identification. At that, self-identification with some religious community is often determined not by religious convictions but, rather, by the perception that affiliation with a certain religion is an attribute of affiliation with some ethnic community. For instance, according to the poll conducted by Razumkov Centre in November 2008, 58.4% of the polled Crimeans agreed that “the ethnic and religious affiliation of a person should be related with traditional perceptions, for instance, Russian – Orthodox, Pole – Catholic, Crimean Tatar – Muslim, etc”.

According to the May 2009 poll, 85.1% of ethnic Ukrainians and 84.9% of Russians called themselves Orthodox, while 97.8% of Crimean Tatars – Muslims (Table “*With what religion are you affiliated?*”).

With what religion are you affiliated?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Orthodoxy	76.5	85.1	84.9	1.1
Islam	9.5	0.2	0.2	97.8
I am just Christian	5.4	6.0	6.1	0.0
Roman Catholicism	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.0
Greek Catholicism	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
Protestantism	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.0
Judaism	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5
Buddhism	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
I am not affiliated with any religion	7.5	8.0	8.1	0.5

Socio-cultural communities. Proceeding from the above, one may distinguish the main socio-cultural communities of Crimea.

The most numerous group is presented by those representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian ethnoses who by their socio-cultural orientations gravitate to the Russian cultural and language identity, the geopolitical community that may be termed “the Russian world”. One may distinguish three main ideological reference points important for affiliation with the “Russian world”: (1) adherence to the Russian culture, Russian language; (2) support for Orthodoxy as the spiritual and uniting basis of the “Russian world”; (3) unity of the East Slavic world led by Russia. That group was conventionally termed “Slavic community” (58.7% of those polled).

The Crimean Tatar community (9.1% all of those polled) even in the conditions of forced long exile managed to preserve a high level of national self-identification and unity, the native language, the feeling of affiliation with the Crimean Tatar cultural tradition and traditional religion – Islam.

Namely the relations between those two socio-cultural groups (Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community) largely shape the public life in the autonomy in different sectors (cultural, social, political, etc).

Alongside with those two “core” groups, we distinguished rather a motley group of “others” (32.2% of those polled) that, being distinguished by the “negative” criterion (i.e., stay beyond the two former groups), is very heterogeneous by its structure. Within it, we separated another small group – “Crimean Ukrainians” (6.5% of those polled) that included Ukrainians unwilling to associate themselves with the “united Russian-Ukrainian community of Crimea”.

1.1.2. Specificities of self-identification of socio-cultural communities⁴

Slavic community

Individual criteria of self-identification. The importance of national, language and religious self-identification for representatives of different socio-cultural groups may be judged from answers to the question “*What group of people you can say about “That is us”, in the first place?*”. National self-identification was first in none of the groups, being the least important for representatives of the Slavic community – there, only 3% reported “We are representatives of our nationality” (in other groups – from 16% to 21%). For representatives of the Slavic community, the main individual criterion of self-identification is presented by the affiliation with a language community (“We are Russian-speaking” – 66%).

Affiliation with a cultural tradition. Three-quarters (74.6%) of representatives of the Slavic community affiliate themselves with the Russian cultural tradition. Quite many representatives of the Slavic community affiliate themselves with the Soviet tradition. However, the younger representatives of that group are, the less they

⁴ The summary results of the latest public opinion poll dealing with the specificity of self-identification of socio-cultural communities are cited in Annex 1, pp.10-13 of this magazine.



tend to identify themselves like that. For instance, among people above 60 years, affiliation with the Soviet cultural tradition was reported by 38.9%, while in the age from 18 to 29 years – by only 6.5%.

Territorial-spatial identity. The Crimean regional identity prevails among representatives of the Slavic community – 65.4% reported “Crimeans” as the group that could be termed by them as “us”. Only 7.4% in the first place called themselves citizens of Ukraine.

Somewhat different answers were produced when representatives of that group were asked what they associated themselves with in the first place. 35.9% associated themselves with Crimea – much fewer than those who said “we are Crimeans”, mainly because this question suggested answers that, on one hand, allowed deeper “localisation” of their identity – “with the place of residence (city, village)” (25.6%), and enabled identification with Russia (16.6%) or the Soviet Union (11.7%). Only 3.6% of them associated themselves with Ukraine.

Rather demonstrative for comprehension of the territorial-spatial identity of different socio-cultural groups were the answers to the question of their idea of what the Crimea is. 40.2% of representatives of the Slavic community said “Crimea is Russia”, 34.8% – “Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia”.

The prevalence of the local identity produces rather high share (41%) of people convinced that all Crimeans, irrespective of their ethnic origin, have common traits that differ them from Ukrainians, Russians, representatives of other peoples. At that, 36.9% believe that the existence of those common traits may with time lead to the creation of a single community – Crimean nation (the opposite opinion is shared by 26.1%).

Nearly two-thirds (65.7%) of representatives of the Slavic community believe that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

U: “Every nationality has such trait as love for the small Motherland. So, the specific character of Ukrainians and Russians in Crimea may be described as “Crimean patriotism”. I used to spend much time outside Crimea. We felt kindred because we were Crimeans, and only after that, Russians, [or] Ukrainians. That was the kinship based on the Crimean patriotism. Other residents of Ukraine did not understand that. In some companies, they called us...“Crimeans”. I mean that this factor of kinship...influences human consciousness”.

U: “When I was employed at one organisation (not in Crimea), we had a Tatar from Dzhankoy at work, and there happened to be a Russian from Crimea. When they met, they embraced each other, and were so happy. They had common subjects [for conversation], talked about nature, walked together, and when one got a job, and the other did not, they kept contact over the phone. People from Crimea are kind of more united than people from other regions of Ukraine”.

Attributes of the common Crimean identity.

Although in all socio-cultural groups those who believe that Crimeans have common traits that differ them from those living outside Crimea are in a relative majority, the perceptions of what exactly unites (or should unite) the Crimeans in one community substantially differ. For representatives of the Slavic community, the top five such “uniting” traits are: (1) “common language used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian”; (2) “positive attitude to Russia”; (3) “desire to see Ukraine in a union with Russia and Belarus”; (4) “common Motherland is Crimea”; (5) “negative attitude to NATO”.

That is, orientation to Russia and association of the Crimean community with the “Russian world” are seen as the main value-based pillars of the Crimean community. The negative perception of NATO appears among the main attributes of the unity of the Crimean community exactly because NATO is seen as a geopolitical alternative to the “Russian world”.

Civil identity. Only 27.3% of representatives of the Slavic community consider themselves members of the Ukrainian political nation (“Ukrainian people, including, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities”), while 44.2% do not feel like that.

Religious identity. The overwhelming majority (90.5%) of representatives of the Slavic community consider themselves Orthodox, although only 53.3% of representatives of the Slavic community who called themselves Orthodox affiliate themselves with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (43.5% do not affiliate themselves with any Orthodox church, saying “I am just Christian”).

Crimean Tatars

Subjective criteria of self-identification. Crimean Tatars first of all identify themselves as Muslims (61.4%), another 6.5% – as members of Ummah (the world Muslim community).

Religious identity. 97.8% of Crimean Tatars consider themselves Muslims. Half (50%) of Crimean Tatar followers of Islam believe that a faithful Muslim should follow such Islamic prescriptions as Sadaka (voluntary donations and alms to the poor) and Salat (namaz, five prayer, 49.2%). Sawm (the fast of the month of Ramadan) was mentioned by 42.5%, Shahadah (words of declaration of belief) – 30.6%, more rarely mentioned were Hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca, 16%) and Zakat (obligatory tax on property and revenues for the community benefit, 12.7%). The fact that faithful Muslims least of all tend to see Zakat as an obligatory prescription of Islam to be followed may witness poor control of Crimean Muslim leaders over believers.

Idea of the right stand of a faithful Muslim in public life. Half (50.6%) of Crimean Tatars who consider themselves Muslims believe that a Muslim should follow the covenants of Islam, while remaining a loyal citizen



of his country. 20% of representatives of that group believe that a Muslim should seek rearrangement of the state he lives in on Islamic principles, 25.6% – aspire restoration of Caliphate (World Islamic state). So, it may be assumed that Islamist convictions are rather widely spread among Crimean Tatars.

Affiliation with a cultural tradition. 91.9% affiliate with Crimean Tatar cultural tradition, only 0.5% – with the Russian.

Territorial-spatial identity. 78.3% chose “Crimeans” as the group termed “us”, only 7.6% consider themselves citizens of Ukraine in the first place. Somewhat different answers were produced when representatives of that group were asked what they associated themselves with in the first place. 38.3% associates themselves with Crimea – far less than those who reported “we are Crimeans”. Other options of self-identification at answer to this question were reported by still fewer representatives of that group, 22% remained undecided. The large share of undecided Crimean Tatars is in the first place attributed to those representatives of that group who share Islamist convictions – 45.1% of them were undecided⁵, while among Crimean Tatars who do not share Islamist views undecided made only 1.9%, whereas 58.9% of them in the first place associated themselves with Crimea.

For a relative majority (35.3%) of Crimean Tatars, the Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia. For every fourth (23.9%), Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia. Again, the answers substantially differ dependent on adherence to Islamist principles, first of all, concerning the option “Crimea is Ukraine”. Among those who share Islamist views, it was chosen by only 1.2%, among those who do not – 26.5%.

Crimean Tatars more than other groups tend to believe that the existence of common traits may with time lead to the creation of a single community – Crimean people (43.2%).

Attributes of a common Crimean identity. For Crimean Tatars, the top five traits making the Crimeans feel a single community included “common Motherland is Crimea”, “own territory is Crimean peninsula”, “historic place names”, “tolerable attitude to representatives of all nationalities and faiths living in Crimea”, “Ukrainian citizenship”, i.e., common territory, common history, tolerance, common Ukrainian citizenship. Meanwhile, speaking about historic place names, they mean restoration of Crimean Tatar names. As discussed below, that idea is rejected by the majority of representatives of the other Crimean socio-cultural groups.

Civil identity. Only 20.7% of Crimean Tatars consider themselves representatives of the Ukrainian political nation, and roughly as much (23.9%) do not. The majority (55.4%) remained undecided on that issue. The “doubts” of the majority of Crimean Tatars may stem from the fact that they still do not feel integrated into Ukrainian society. Also demonstrative, every tenth polled Crimean Tatar did not mention his Ukrainian citizenship.

If we examine groups of Crimean Tatars who share and do not share Islamist convictions separately, the difference is striking. While among those who do not share Islamist convictions, 37.3% considers themselves representatives of the Ukrainian nation, 30.4% do not, and 32.3% are undecided, no adherent of Islamism reported to be a representative of the Ukrainian political nation, 17.1% reported they were not, 82.9% were undecided. It may be assumed therefore that the popularity of Islamist views is strongly related with the non-integration of Crimean Tatars into the Ukrainian or Crimean society.

Social status and socio-economic standing⁶. The social status greatly depends on education. According to the survey results, Crimean Tatars differ from the other socio-cultural groups – they produced a somewhat lower than the Crimean average share of respondents with higher education, and a somewhat higher – with uncompleted secondary education. As a result, they have fewer professionals (respectively, 8.7% and 16.2%). 12% of Crimean Tatars reported that they had no job (among all those polled in the Crimea – 5%). A Crimean Tatar member of a focus group noted: “*When Crimean Tatars were coming back, it was difficult for them to find a job, because of a “taboo” to hire Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars proved industrious and began to create jobs for themselves*”. Crimean Tatars reported a higher than Crimean average share of entrepreneurs (respectively, 9.3% and 5.9%),

Financial standing and affiliation with a social class. Among Crimean Tatars, notably more respondents, describing the material standing of their family, give the answer “Hardly make ends meet, money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs” (60.3%). Among representatives of the Slavic community, they make 45%, among “other” – 35.8%.

Due to the low self-assessment of their well-being, Crimean Tatars more than representatives of other groups tend to affiliate themselves with the lower social class (58.2%, among all those polled – 43.1%).

⁵ The answer “hard to say” may witness either an undecided stand or the reluctance to frankly give an answer not shared by the majority of the population in some area or region.

⁶ Socio-demographic features of socio-cultural groups of Crimea are presented on the map, pp.8-9 of this magazine.



Group of “other”

By many features, the group of “other” is close to the Slavic community. For its representatives, too, the main individual criterion of self-identification is presented by self-identification with a language community (“we are Russian-speaking” – 46.5%). More than half (54.7%) of representatives of that group affiliate themselves with the Russian cultural tradition.

Among the attributes of the common Crimean identity, representatives of that group more often referred to “a common language used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian”, “common Motherland is Crimea”, “a positive attitude to Russia”, “tolerable attitude to representatives of all nationalities and faiths living in Crimea”, “negative attitude to NATO”, “own territory is Crimean peninsula”, “desire to see Ukraine in a union with Russia and Belarus”. That is, the stand of representatives of that group is very much similar to that of the Slavic community.

However, by contrast to the Slavic community and Crimean Tatars, a relative majority (44.2%) of that group consider themselves representatives of the Ukrainian political nation⁷.

So, social processes in Crimea, the public life in different domains (cultural, social, political, etc.) are largely determined by the character of relations between two socio-cultural groups – Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community. At that, for representatives of the Slavic community and “other”, the most important individual criterion of social self-identification is presented by the language criterion (“we are Russian-speaking”) as a symbol of affiliation with the “Russian world”, while for Crimean Tatars – the confessional criterion (“we are Muslims” or “we are members of Ummah”).

The Crimean regional identity generally prevails among the Crimeans. It dominates in all socio-cultural groups. The prevalence of the local identity makes many representatives of all socio-cultural groups sure that all Crimeans, irrespective of their ethnic origin, have common traits differing them from Ukrainians, Russians, representatives of other nations.

Meanwhile, there are two evidently different approaches to the building of the Crimean community: “Crimean Tatar” and “pro-Russian”. The former rests on the comprehension of the territorial, historic, civic unity and the need of national tolerance (with restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people); the latter (supported by the majority of the Crimean population) mainly relies on association of the Crimean community with the “Russian world” (with a negative perception of stay in Ukraine).

In such conditions, there can be no talk of the existence of a “single Crimean community” as a real, not declared Crimean identity, since the ideas of the principles of its building in Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian Slavic community are too different. Rather, it goes about the formation of two communities, two identities – Crimean Tatar and Slavic.



The majority of representatives of the Slavic community do not consider themselves representatives of the Ukrainian political nation. Among Crimean Tatars, the majority were undecided on that issue, possibly because they still do not feel integrated into Ukrainian society. The survey results leave place for the assumption that the spread of Islamist views is related with the non-integration of Crimean Tatars into both the Ukrainian and Crimean society.

Furthermore, support or non-support for Islamist principles by Crimean Tatars seriously influences their self-identification and perception of the key social problems.

The main socio-cultural communities of Crimea are in unequal socio-economic conditions. The standing of Crimean Tatars is evidently worse, which affects their social comfort and may pose a factor of destabilisation of the situation in Crimea.

CRITERIA OF DISTINCTION OF SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES IN CRIMEA




1. **Crimean Tatars** (by self-identification) (9.1% all of those polled).
2. **Slavic community** (58.7% all of those polled)
Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, who:
 - consider Russian their native language;
 - speak Russian at home;
 - do not affiliate themselves with the Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar or other ethnic cultural tradition;
 - agree that there is actually no difference between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea and they make one socio-cultural community;
 - when asked about religious affiliation, report that they are Orthodox, or just Christians, or do not affiliate themselves with any confession.
3. **Other** – all respondents not included in the two former groups (32.2% all of those polled).

In that group, we also distinguished the group of “**Crimean Ukrainians**” (6.5% all of those polled) – ethnic Ukrainians who do not share the opinion that there is actually no difference between Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea and they make one socio-cultural community.

⁷ The majority (59.5%) of “Crimean Ukrainians” (being a part of the group of “other”) consider themselves representatives of the Ukrainian political nation.





SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES
% of the polled in each





SOCIAL STATUS

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians
Civil pensioners	26.5	25.7	26.3	26.9	27.1
Specialist in humanitarian sciences (incl. economists, lawyers, specialists in education, arts, healthcare, etc.)	12.5	7.1	13.2	12.8	14.7
Pupil, student	10.4	12.6	11.2	8.2	15.5
Housewife	9.1	13.7	8.4	9.0	5.4
Skilled worker	8.9	4.9	10.4	7.4	5.4
Businessman	5.9	9.3	5.0	6.6	10.9
Employee	5.8	6.0	5.7	5.7	3.9
Off-the-job (not registered as unemployed)	4.2	8.7	3.0	5.3	4.7
Unskilled worker	3.9	1.6	4.3	3.7	6.2
Technical specialist	2.3	0.5	2.4	2.3	3.9
Specialist in natural sciences	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.1	0.0
Head (manager) of the department of an enterprise	1.1	0.0	1.4	0.9	0.8
Disabled (incl. invalids)	0.8	0.5	0.7	1.1	0.0
Officially registered as unemployed	0.8	3.3	0.7	0.5	0.0
Navy servants, servants of the State Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine	0.7	0.0	0.9	0.5	0.0
Agricultural worker	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.9	0.8
Pensioner of the Soviet Army, Navy	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.0
Pensioner of the Ukrainian Army, Navy	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0
Pensioner of the Russian Army, Navy	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.0
Head (manager) of the enterprise, establishment	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.0
Farmer, tenant	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
Servant of the Armed Forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0
Other	2.3	3.3	2.1	2.2	0.0
Did not answer	1.2	0.7	0.6	3.0	0.7





OF SOCIO-CULTURAL GROUPS OF CRIMEA, social group



FOR HOW LONG HAVE BEEN LIVING IN CRIMEA



	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians
Born in Crimea	66.0	34.2	75.8	57.1	55.7
Moved to Crimea before 1944	2.7	0.5	3.4	2.2	1.5
Moved to Crimea during 1944-1954	4.3	0.5	4.6	4.8	7.6
Moved to Crimea during 1955-1969	9.2	3.3	7.9	13.1	17.6
Moved to Crimea during 1970-1980	9.3	16.8	5.8	13.4	10.7
Moved to Crimea in 1990s	5.1	33.7	0.8	4.9	3.8
Moved to Crimea in 2000s	1.7	5.4	0.9	1.9	3.1
Hard to say/did not answer	1.7	5.6	0.8	2.6	0.0

FOR HOW LONG HAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF PREVIOUS GENERATIONS (parents, grandparents, etc.) BEEN LIVING IN CRIMEA

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians
Lived in Crimea before 1944	47.5	77.2	50.0	34.5	21.4
Moved to Crimea during 1944-1954	11.9	0.5	14.6	10.2	8.4
Moved to Crimea during 1955-1969	13.2	2.7	12.4	17.5	26.7
Moved to Crimea during 1970-1980	7.7	6.0	6.8	9.9	14.5
Moved to Crimea in 1990s	1.5	4.9	1.3	1.1	0.8
Moved to Crimea in 2000s	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.0
Representatives of previous generations do not live and did not live before in Crimea	8.5	1.6	6.0	14.8	13.7
Hard to say/did not answer	9.1	6.6	8.2	11.7	14.5

SETTLEMENT TYPE

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians
Town with population of 100-999 thousand persons	44.3	37.0	46.3	42.9	39.2
Town with population of 50-99 thousand persons	7.8	5.4	8.1	7.7	1.5
Town with population of 20-49 thousand persons	2.8	0.5	3.6	2.2	0.0
Town with population less than 20 thousand persons	0.7	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0
Urban-type settlement	12.5	15.8	12.6	11.4	13.8
Village	31.8	41.3	28.1	35.8	45.4



* Answer variant "Can afford actually anything we want" was not chosen by a single respondent.



SPECIFICITIES OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES

Annex 1

What group of people you can say about “That is us”, in the first place?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
We are Russian-speaking	54.0	2.7	66.0	46.5	34.6	54.6	51.3	55.6	53.1	55.0	54.2	54.4
We are Orthodox	26.9	5.4	29.8	27.7	26.9	25.7	27.4	24.4	27.7	28.7	26.2	27.6
We are the representatives of our nationality	8.9	20.7	3.0	16.2	19.2	8.6	9.8	9.3	9.6	7.7	8.7	9.3
We are Muslims	5.8	61.4	0.0	0.8	0.8	6.3	6.6	6.0	6.2	4.5	6.8	5.1
We are the representatives of ummah (the world's Muslim community)	0.6	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.3	1.5	0.6	0.6
None of the listed	2.1	1.1	0.5	5.4	13.8	1.9	2.0	3.3	2.0	1.7	2.8	1.6
Hard to say	1.7	2.2	0.7	3.4	4.7	2.9	2.6	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.4

With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Russian	61.4	0.5	74.6	54.7	46.9	73.7	70.1	58.0	54.9	49.5	60.6	62.2
Soviet	18.8	1.6	21.3	19.0	13.1	5.8	10.9	19.0	25.1	32.8	17.6	19.9
Crimean Tatar	8.7	91.9	0.0	0.9	0.8	9.2	8.6	8.5	9.3	8.3	10.0	7.9
Ukrainian	3.4	1.6	0.0	10.0	15.4	2.1	3.2	2.5	4.2	5.1	3.3	3.4
Pan-European	3.4	1.6	2.0	6.5	10.8	2.9	4.3	6.3	3.7	0.9	4.7	2.5
Other	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.2
Hard to say	4.1	2.8	2.1	8.3	13.0	5.9	2.9	5.7	2.2	3.4	3.6	3.9

What group of people you can say about “That is us”, in the first place?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
We are Crimeans	61.5	78.3	65.4	50.0	33.1	69.7	68.8	67.9	55.1	48.1	63.7	61.4
We are citizens of the former Soviet Union	19.8	1.1	22.3	20.7	15.4	4.8	9.5	16.2	28.0	39.5	19.4	20.5
We are citizens of Ukraine	10.4	7.6	7.4	16.7	31.5	14.0	10.6	9.6	10.2	6.6	9.5	10.9
We are Europeans	2.4	3.3	1.5	3.7	6.2	4.6	2.9	1.9	1.4	1.3	2.7	2.3
None of the listed	2.2	6.5	0.8	3.4	8.5	2.7	2.0	1.6	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.1
Hard to say	3.7	3.2	2.6	5.5	5.3	4.2	6.2	2.8	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.8


What of the following do you connect (identify) yourself with, in the first place?
% of the polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
With the region – Crimea	35.6	38.3	35.9	34.4	41.5	39.0	39.2	37.5	31.8	30.8	35.2	36.4
With town or village	26.5	15.8	25.6	31.0	27.7	25.6	24.8	23.8	29.0	28.8	26.9	26.2
With Russia	14.4	10.9	16.6	11.3	5.4	11.7	13.8	16.2	14.6	15.6	13.6	15.2
With Soviet Union	9.5	0.5	11.7	8.2	4.6	10.7	6.9	6.0	9.3	12.8	10.1	9.1
With Ukraine	5.5	2.7	3.6	9.6	15.4	4.0	7.2	7.4	6.2	4.1	5.8	5.4
With Europe	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.2
Other	2.0	9.3	0.6	2.5	0.8	1.3	2.9	1.4	3.9	1.1	1.6	2.2
Hard to say	6.2	22.0	5.8	2.5	3.8	7.1	5.2	7.4	4.6	6.8	6.3	5.3

With what of the following statements do you agree more?
% of those polled


	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia	32.8	23.9	34.8	31.9	26.7	31.8	29.7	35.6	32.0	34.8	33.1	32.9
Crimea is Russia	30.9	4.3	40.2	21.6	10.7	29.7	28.2	26.5	31.4	37.6	29.9	32.1
Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia	16.5	35.3	13.0	17.3	19.1	17.6	20.5	18.0	14.7	12.4	17.1	16.3
Crimea is Ukraine	9.8	14.7	5.1	17.1	26.7	11.1	10.1	10.5	9.9	7.9	9.9	9.9
With any of the statements	3.8	4.3	1.6	7.7	12.2	2.7	5.2	3.6	5.4	2.8	4.3	3.6
Hard to say	6.2	17.5	5.3	4.4	4.6	7.1	6.3	5.8	6.6	4.5	5.7	5.2

Do you think that all Crimeans, regardless of their ethnic background, have common traits which distinguish them from Ukrainians, Russians, representatives of other nations?
% of those polled




	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Yes	38.3	41.0	47.8	45.0	36.6	43.7	45.1	44.5	46.2	42.3	44.1
No	30.1	35.1	34.0	38.2	35.4	35.1	34.6	34.6	31.8	35.4	33.5
Hard to say	31.6	23.9	18.2	16.8	28.0	21.2	20.3	20.9	22.0	22.3	22.4

How do you think, are Russians and Ukrainians one nation (socio-cultural community), or they are two different nations?
% of those polled




	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
One nation	40.8	65.7	42.0	26.0	53.3	56.5	55.2	52.4	60.7	56.7	55.2
Two different nations	38.6	29.5	43.1	61.8	34.5	33.7	36.0	37.2	32.9	34.4	34.9
Hard to say	20.6	4.8	14.9	12.2	12.2	9.8	8.8	10.4	6.4	8.9	9.9

Do you think that existence of these common traits can lead in the future to the formation of a single community – Crimean nation?
% of those polled



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Yes	43.2	36.9	35.2	28.5	33.0	35.3	39.3	38.4	39.2	37.9	36.9
No	23.5	26.1	35.1	42.3	24.0	28.7	32.7	28.0	31.0	29.2	28.4
Hard to say	33.3	37.0	29.7	29.2	43.0	36.0	28.0	33.6	29.8	32.9	34.7

Do you consider yourself a representative of Ukrainian nation to which, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, belong citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities?
% of those polled



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Yes	20.7	27.3	44.2	59.5	35.2	34.8	29.9	29.3	30.6	33.4	32.5
No	23.9	44.2	34.6	21.4	32.5	37.6	44.1	40.6	42.6	38.8	41.4
Hard to say	55.4	28.5	21.2	19.1	32.3	27.6	26.0	30.1	26.8	27.8	26.1



How important for self-sentiment of Crimeans as a unified community is each of the following features?*
average mark

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Common language being used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian	4.69	4.29	4.87	4.45	4.26	4.67	4.68	4.68	4.67	4.73	4.64	4.72
Common Motherland is Crimea	4.58	4.75	4.69	4.34	4.16	4.57	4.53	4.57	4.61	4.62	4.57	4.59
Positive attitude to Russia	4.55	4.11	4.76	4.29	3.96	4.54	4.56	4.57	4.54	4.56	4.55	4.55
Own territory is Crimean peninsula	4.50	4.69	4.62	4.20	3.90	4.53	4.49	4.47	4.53	4.46	4.48	4.51
Negative attitude to NATO	4.45	3.82	4.67	4.20	3.86	4.38	4.39	4.47	4.45	4.57	4.42	4.48
Desire to see Ukraine in union with Russia and Belarus	4.45	3.58	4.73	4.19	3.88	4.38	4.44	4.49	4.34	4.60	4.43	4.47
Tolerable attitude to representatives of all nationalities and faiths living in Crimea	4.42	4.52	4.50	4.25	3.95	4.45	4.40	4.36	4.40	4.47	4.40	4.43
Common Crimean holidays	4.32	4.32	4.50	3.98	3.59	4.27	4.28	4.35	4.32	4.39	4.31	4.33
Desire to strengthen Crimean autonomy from Ukraine	4.31	4.21	4.50	3.99	3.80	4.39	4.25	4.33	4.26	4.30	4.33	4.30
Famous historic personalities connected with Crimea	4.30	4.22	4.51	3.92	3.68	4.31	4.22	4.30	4.24	4.38	4.32	4.28
Common history	4.29	4.39	4.44	3.99	3.76	4.33	4.26	4.36	4.21	4.29	4.29	4.30
Common traditions, customs	4.20	4.10	4.40	3.86	3.43	4.29	4.14	4.30	4.10	4.16	4.19	4.21
Authorities, Constitution of the AR of Crimea, official symbols of the AR of Crimea: Emblem, Flag, Anthem, etc.	4.16	4.19	4.34	3.81	3.64	4.22	4.10	4.18	4.12	4.15	4.18	4.14
Belonging to Orthodox church	4.12	3.57	4.42	3.68	3.20	4.15	4.09	4.10	4.08	4.17	4.09	4.15
Historic names of localities, geographic names	4.06	4.53	4.16	3.72	3.53	3.94	4.00	4.13	4.04	4.18	4.07	4.04
Negative attitude to being a part of Ukraine	3.99	3.65	4.25	3.60	3.22	4.02	3.94	3.96	3.97	4.05	3.97	4.01
Positive attitude to the Soviet past	3.95	3.75	4.11	3.70	3.62	3.86	3.86	4.07	3.94	4.03	3.98	3.93
Common psychology, national character	3.90	4.33	4.05	3.51	3.35	3.94	9.84	3.94	3.76	3.96	3.90	3.89
Ukrainian citizenship	3.53	4.46	3.44	3.44	3.19	3.46	3.50	3.57	3.58	3.54	3.52	3.53
Perception of current status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine	3.42	4.12	3.42	3.24	3.04	3.43	3.41	3.41	3.48	3.39	3.41	3.43

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "not important at all", and "5" – "very important".

With what religion are you affiliated?
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Orthodoxy	76.5	1.1	90.5	72.3	81.7	73.9	77.5	78.8	74.4	78.0	74.3	78.1
Islam	9.5	97.8	0.0	1.7	0.0	9.8	9.2	9.6	10.1	8.8	10.7	8.7
I am just Christian	5.4	0.0	3.9	9.7	7.6	5.8	4.3	4.7	5.4	6.4	4.2	6.3
Roman Catholicism	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.2	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.2
Greek Catholicism	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
Protestantism	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.1
Judaism	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.3
Buddhism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Hinduism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Paganism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
I am not affiliated with any religion	7.5	0.5	5.6	11.4	10.7	9.0	7.5	4.7	7.9	6.0	8.5	5.8
Did not answer	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.3

With which Orthodox denomination are you affiliated?
% of those who consider themselves Orthodox

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Ukrainian Orthodox Church	49.1	0.0	53.3	39.4	41.9	45.8	45.9	49.0	54.5	51.0	50.0	50.2
I am just Orthodox	45.8	0.0	43.5	51.4	48.6	50.0	47.0	46.5	41.7	43.0	46.6	46.3
Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchy	2.2	0.0	0.5	6.2	6.7	2.0	3.7	1.7	1.5	2.5	2.3	2.2
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Do not know	2.7	0.0	2.6	3.0	2.9	1.6	3.4	2.7	2.2	3.6	0.9	1.2

What of the listed is obligatory for every Muslim?*
% of Muslims

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
			18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Sadaka (<i>voluntary donations and alms to the poor</i>)	50.7	50.0	52.2	48.5	50.0	58.3	43.9	48.4	52.5
Salat (namaz) (<i>five prayer</i>)	49.5	49.2	42.6	53.1	54.3	47.2	52.5	50.0	49.0
Sawm (<i>the fast of the month of Ramadan</i>)	43.7	42.5	44.7	37.5	50.0	41.7	43.9	54.3	33.7
Shahadah (<i>pronouncing words of declaration of belief</i>)	32.5	30.6	25.5	34.4	31.4	30.6	40.0	32.3	32.7
Hajj (<i>pilgrimage to Mecca</i>)	18.0	16.0	14.9	15.2	25.0	19.4	17.1	18.3	18.2
Zakat (<i>obligatory tax at a fixed rate in proportion to the worth of property, collected from the well-to-do and distributed among the poor Muslims</i>)	14.8	12.7	10.6	15.6	11.4	25.0	12.2	15.2	14.1
Nothing of the listed	0.7	0.6	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Hard to say	3.2	3.3	6.4	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.2	4.0

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants.

Which of the three assertions listed below corresponds the most to your own convictions?
% of Muslims

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
			18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
A faithful Muslim is to obey the commandments of Islam, at the same time being a loyal citizen of his country	50.5	50.6	54.2	42.4	55.6	48.6	45.0	54.3	48.0
A faithful Muslim is to obey the commandments of Islam, and work for renewal of Caliphate (World Islamic state)	25.1	25.6	27.1	36.4	16.7	18.9	27.5	23.9	26.5
A faithful Muslim is to obey the commandments of Islam, at the same time striving to rebuild the country he is living in according to the principles of Islam	20.4	20.0	14.6	18.2	19.4	27.0	25.0	18.5	22.4
None of the listed	1.1	1.1	2.1	0.0	2.8	2.7	0.0	1.1	1.0
Hard to say	2.9	2.7	2.0	3.0	5.5	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.1

1.2. SPECIFICITIES OF COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN DOMINANT SOCIO-CULTURAL GROUPS

The nature and forms of relations between different socio-cultural groups depend on the specificity of their self-assessments and mutual perception, stereotypes and biases, ability to understand the opinions and needs of the other group.

Each of the main socio-cultural groups has a specific set of perceptions of moral and socio-psychological features of itself and of other groups it coexists with. The content of those perceptions exerts direct influence on the relations between representatives of those groups.

Similarly, each of those groups has its opinion of sensitive for its self-identification issues concealing a conflict potential in relations between them. Such issues in the Crimean context include: language, assessments of certain historic events, values and symbols, ideas of the autonomy's future.

Assessment of specific features of representatives of different socio-cultural groups⁸

Self-assessment and assessment of other communities by Crimean Tatars. Representatives of Crimean Tatars ascribe to their national community such positive traits

as goodwill, religiousness, ability to defend their own interests; less intrinsic are the striving for justice, hard-working, ability to understand the interests of others.

Specific of **Russians**, as seen by Crimean Tatars, are goodwill, striving for justice, hard-working, to a far smaller extent – religiousness, national unity.

Among the main good features of **Ukrainians**, Crimean Tatars mentioned hard-working, openness, religiousness, ability to defend their own interests; the least inherent – striving for justice.

By and large, Crimean Tatars tend to ascribe to Ukrainians more positive qualities than to Russians. However, they more readily ascribe all positive qualities to their own community than to the other two mentioned communities.

Results of discussions in focus groups made up (separately) of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars show that Crimean Tatars treat Russians and Crimean Ukrainians rather tolerantly and amicably. The tension arising in communication is usually attributed to the historic heritage in the form of distorted stereotypes of mutual perception, negative media reports, etc. At that, they note that in everyday life, relations will gradually normalise when people better know each other.

⁸ See Table "Specificities of identity of dominant socio-cultural groups of Crimea", pp.22-28 of this magazine.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

T: "After the mass arrival of Tatars, the situation began to stabilise little by little. People began to see Tatars as their neighbours. Now, my Ukrainian friends say: "Tatars are hard workers, hospitable people, always ready to help".

T: "In everyday life, everything is more or less good, all talk to each other. The mistrust observed 20 years ago is beginning to fade away".

T: "If we come back to the Russian people, it is openness, amicability, support".

T: "Russians are very quiet people, they are very passive in Crimea, posing no threat, they are immigrants. The authorities have always decided instead of them, that is why they are not dangerous. While previously, they were reserved, let nobody on threshold, now, as I come, they right let a man in, serve coffee. Rather industrious, many learned people you can talk to".

T: "The more you deal with Russians, the better. They are sympathetic at work. Treat little children with awe".

By and large, Crimean Tatars clearly distinguish perception of Russians (and Ukrainians) in everyday life and in public. In the former case, they are generally viewed as equals, facing the same troubles as Crimean Tatars, which makes it easy to come to terms with them, in principle.

Publicly, Crimean Tatars associate Russians with the deportation of their people and identify them with the Crimean authorities, treated mainly negatively. For Crimean Tatars, the authorities – central to the smaller and local to the greater extent – are a source of violation of their rights. Regarding the growth of tension in inter-ethnic relations, a great deal of fault was vested on radical Slavic (mainly, Cossack) organisations, and on some mass media.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

T: "When I graduated from the institute, nobody took me to work here, on national grounds, so I had no record of work. They did not say it to me outright but this was felt at conversations, meetings".

T: "It so happens in Crimea that if a Tatar is appointed minister, his deputy can never be Tatar. This is also discrimination, because selection should be made by professional qualities".

T: "My father had an accident in 2001 – he was hit [by a car]. We went to the investigator who ... spoke rudely to us. They arranged different tests, invented some rain. Then they said that he was in dark clothes, and there was a young man driving, not the one they showed him".

T: "In 2003, before the election of the President of Ukraine, skinhead structures appeared here. Right here, in Crimea. First, there were cases of attacks on Palestinians, than on Armenians, than on Crimean Tatars... My personal opinion is that it is a Russian project, used before elections to divide society into several parts... And those Cossacks ... It is an organised group of people that can be set against, creating a conflict situation".

T: "The situation is provoked, Cossacks are used to pull down tent camps, our guys are treated badly".

T: "Such political figures as... (a Crimean politician – Ed.) also speak up from time to time and stir up the situation. Before the elections... (a Crimean politician – Ed.) spoke on Lenin square and said that if you elect Yuschenko, tomorrow NATO will be here and will trample you Russians down, if Yuschenko comes, there will be only Crimean Tatars here, while Russians will be deported. There is a video recording but those people are not brought [to responsibility, although] this is clear destabilisation in the region, and it is deputies who do this".

While in everyday life, Ukrainians are seen by Crimean Tatars on par with Russians (although Crimean Tatars disapprove assimilation of Ukrainians), publicly, Crimean Tatars distinguish Ukrainians from Russians and treat them more positively, since they, in the opinion of the focus group participants, from the very beginning positively treated Crimean Tatars. However, this refers to Ukrainians by and large rather than Crimean Ukrainians.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

T: "I also noted that the Ukrainians I meet consider themselves Russians. They are shy to speak Ukrainian and sometimes oppose the Ukrainian language more than Russians do".

T: "I do not like that, one should not forget his ancestors. Otherwise, they are kind people".

T: "Ukrainians may claim to be Ukrainians but try to think and act like Russians. If one asks: "You are Ukrainian, why do you act like that?", he says "It is better for me this way, more convenient".

T: "They were simply said that they were Russians for 70 years, and such life stereotype arose".

T: "Good for them, they treated us well from the very beginning. The only [bad] thing is that they are absent here, despite the claimed 23%".

T: "After resettlement to Crimea, my sister's family lived a whole winter in a Ukrainian family. They even now maintain good relations".

T: "Russians are viewed by Crimean Tatars as a people involved with deportation. Next, Tatar stereotypes: mistrust in any authorities, because Crimean Tatars were not let to power. And today, Russians are in power in Crimea. Regarding Ukrainians, many Crimean Tatars took a pro-Ukrainian stand".

Self-assessment and assessment of other communities by Slavs⁹. In the opinion of representatives of the Slavic community, the main good features of Russians are goodwill, openness, striving for justice, while the least inherent traits are religiousness, ability to defend their own interests and national unity. Focus group results also demonstrate low assessments of the national unity of Russians and their ability to defend their interests.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: "We Russian-speakers are just kind of calm, quiet. Tatars need not be compelled to rise. If you just tell them at 8 AM, they all stand at 10:00 ... We are not".

Moderator: "What is good in the nature of a Russian man?"

R: "They tolerate long".

R: "I just wanted to say, patience. No matter whom, they tolerate, I do not know why".

R: "Slavs! Slavs keep on tolerating. We are very patient: we are humiliated, to tell the truth, and lowered our heads".

Moderator: "And what traits do you consider negative in Russians?"

R: "We have no negative traits".

R: "May I mention tolerance?"

R: "And plenty of love, because we can love, carouse, suffer – all from the heart".

Representatives of the Slavic community consider more specific of Crimean Tatars their ability to defend their own interests, national unity, feeling of national pride and religiousness, less – the ability to understand interests of others and openness.

⁹ Analysing the answers of representatives of the Slavic community, one should keep in mind that their assessments of the ethnic groups of Russians and Ukrainians to some extent (dependent of the share of representatives of each ethnos in that socio-cultural community) present a self-assessment, while assessments of Crimean Tatars characterise their attitude to "other".



During focus group discussions, Russians mainly negatively described Crimean Tatars, stressing that their unity in the defence of their interests, in the opinion of the panellists, often goes together with aggressiveness towards representatives of other nations. Negative assessments of Crimean Tatars also prevailed in the Ukrainian focus groups.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: On Crimean Tatars: "what Russians call baseness, they call wisdom, cunning... Many Turcomans, not only Crimean Tatars ..., actually all. Evidently, the roots are somewhere in Islam. Just in religion".

R: "I can tell you what Tatars exactly are: ill-mannered crumps, they behave like kings of the nature".

R: "Another trait, kind of instilled – permissiveness".

R: "They are indeed well-organized to go out to meetings, we all see this regularly".

R: "If you touch Tatars, they get organised very quickly. And will override us, trample us down".

U: "I would call them more aggressive. Stay here till the 18th of May [mourning meeting in commemoration of victims of deportation – Ed.], and we will see what you say".

U: "Aggressiveness is bad, the ability of Tatars to achieve what they want is good to me. Not all methods are good though".

U: "We all go to market. Who sells radishes? And who resells it? Did any Russian buy radishes from a Tatar [for resale]? Their industriousness, mainly Tatars trade in the market, but this does not mean that they grow all this".

U: "I want to intercede. A Tatar laid tiles in my bathroom ... "clever fingers" – laid tiles like that. Earning for his family... He may shoot, too, if something happens".

Although Russians in focus groups mentioned aggressiveness of Crimean Tatars, they also admitted aggression on the part of representatives of the Slavic community. They also noted the negative role of politicians in the instigation of inter-ethnic conflicts. However, negative descriptions of Crimean Tatars prevailed, there were even statements of the need to evict them and fears that "they will evict us".

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: "My neighbour was beaten up. They just took him for a Tatar, although he is a Jew. A mob gathered... Beat him up on purpose, abused, called him Tatar, so and so".

Moderator: "Between representatives of what nationalities did such problem situations arise?"

R: "It appears, Orthodox and Muslim".

R: "We now mainly have conflicts ... from the Crimean Tatar population".

R: "I never had a conflict with anyone. My opinion about this... we are all people. Every nation has good and bad people. No matter who you are: Russian, Ukrainian or Tatar. People are susceptible to influences, someone said something into the microphone – and they all run as a mob to beat Russians, or Tatars, or Ukrainians, or, all together, Jews".

R: "Yes, this is done intentionally, such is my opinion. They above designed it, and we here live with all that".

R: "Poor Russians, for Tatars, we are not humans, for Ukrainians, we are inferior, a minority, I want to feel like human".

R: "They [Crimean Tatars] came here to dictate... They came here as masters". "They came offended, misfortunate, deported. In their opinion, it is not Stalin who is to blame, not the regime but we all are to blame, because we appeared here somehow... They came as masters, we are inferiors for them, they always look at us, well, as if – when they have a leader who will pack us in trains... Say, I certainly dislike, ... dislike their, as I put it, those extremes (Islam). My God, you cannot evict them somewhere! Previously, there was Russia, the Soviet Union, a lot of space, but where here in Small Russia?"

R: "Western Ukraine loves them a lot".

R: "Send them there!"

R: "Tatars do not understand, on one hand, that Ukrainians, especially nationalists, first, fight Moscovites, and then: "Wait comrades, you are not that many, we will deal with you later".

R: "Have you heard anything about the united Arab Caliphate, that idea now in the air? And how much money the Islamic world "plugs" in that subject: Tatar problem, creation of that Caliphate, that crazy idea".

R: "We will give you money, but you, if something happens, will go kill Russians".

Representatives of the Slavic community mentioned among the main virtues of Ukrainians national pride, hard working and amicability, least of all – openness. By and large, by assessments of representatives of the Slavic community, all good qualities are manifested in Ukrainians more evenly than in Russians and Crimean Tatars.

The results of focus groups show that Russians distinguish Ukrainians living in Crimea from those living in other regions of Ukraine, stressing that "ours", i.e., Crimean Ukrainians "are just like us". Meanwhile, assessments of Ukrainians are influenced by the stereotypes of perception of "Western Ukrainians": Russians consider them "nationalists", imparting that term a negative meaning ("they, Western, are certainly terrible nationalists").

This fact may lead to extension, transfer of assessments of Western Ukrainians to "locals". As a result, representatives of the Slavic community, suggesting that there is actually no difference between Russians and Crimean Ukrainians, more rarely than Russians ascribe to Crimean Ukrainians the qualities undoubtedly seen as positive (goodwill, openness, ability to understand the interests of others, striving for justice). The assessment of Ukrainians may also be influenced by the negative perception of Ukrainisation.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: "We have no Ukrainian people here, I at least never met them. Never met them, as a people. Some individuals, but just some – they consider themselves residents of Crimea – and do right".

R: "Even if they are Ukrainians, they do not consider themselves such".

Moderator: "What good traits of the Ukrainian national character, Ukrainians, could you mention in the first instance?"

R: "Good – singing".

R: "I do not see a single good trait. I live in Ukraine, that is why I do not see a single good trait".

R: "I dislike [the Ukrainian people] ... I try to avoid Ukrainians. Because I do not know the Ukrainian language, I do not learn it on principle... do not read, do not watch Ukrainian movies. What I dislike about Ukrainian is that I am forced to listen... to the radio only in the Ukrainian language.... I cannot stand them, dislike with all of my soul".

R: "Genuine Ukrainians" are all rather amicable, hospitable, always ready to share"... For me, Ukrainians are anyway divided into Western and "ours" who, in my opinion, are just like us".

R: "I am very happy that so far, they [nationalists] still keep in Western Ukraine... For instance, I would be happy [to divide Ukraine] right along the Dnieper, in a civilized way, all willing, even Kyiv might be given [to Poland]".

Meanwhile, Ukrainians in focus groups demonstrated rather a vague idea of their national identity and unwillingness to be distinguished as a separate national group.



**EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS
OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS**

U: *"The specific character of Ukrainians and Russians in Crimea may be termed "Crimean patriotism".*

U: *"My personal opinion is that people should not be divided by nationality".*

U: *"I studied at a university, department of Ukrainian language and literature, and till the junior year we did not know who Russian was, who – Ukrainian, although there were Crimean Tatars, too. We never divided".*

U: *"I am more frightened when we Ukrainians are set against Russians".*

U: *"I guess that neither Russian nor Ukrainian have a specific character".*

Knowledge of cultures of Crimea's peoples and interest in them

Representatives of the main socio-cultural groups of Crimea belong to different cultural traditions. That is why mutual knowledge of their cultures, traditions, customs, and desire to learn more are important for maintenance of an inter-cultural dialogue, mitigation of tension in relations.

Crimean Tatars demonstrated the best knowledge of the culture of their people – the overwhelming majority of them know a lot about it, while the number of those who know little is meagre. They also reported rather good knowledge of the culture of Russians and Ukrainians, of which the overwhelming majority of Crimean Tatars knows much or "something".

The overwhelming majority of Crimean Tatars is highly interested or tends to be interested in the cultures of other peoples of Crimea. Among peoples of whose culture they would like to learn more, they mainly mentioned Karaites and Greeks, less often – Krymchaks and Germans, and very rarely – Ukrainians and Russians (maybe because Crimean Tatars consider their knowledge in that field deep enough).

The overwhelming majority of representatives of the Slavic community reported good knowledge of the culture of Russians and Ukrainians. Far fewer reported good knowledge of the culture of Crimean Tatars, while more than half have some knowledge of it.

Meanwhile, they are more than Crimean Tatars eager to learn more about the culture of other peoples. They mainly reported the desire to learn more about the culture of Karaites and Krymchaks, less – Greeks and Bulgarians, but quite many would like to learn more about the culture of Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians alike.

Stand of socio-cultural groups in the language issue

There are only two numerous language groups in Crimea – Russian-speakers and Crimean Tatars. The Ukrainian language is on the outskirts in all sectors – public life, culture, education, everyday life, etc. Even among ethnic Ukrainians, the number of those who consider Ukrainian their native language is rather low, of those who speak it at home – meagre. Such standing of the Ukrainian language in Crimea contrasts with its official status that, however, does not allow its total neglect.

For instance, in all socio-cultural groups of Crimea more than half or nearly half believe that every state servant in the authorities and local self-government bodies

of the autonomy should know the Ukrainian language, and this conviction is the strongest among Crimean Tatars (57.6%). Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Crimeans believe that every official should also know the Russian language. However, the opinions of the officials' duty to know the Crimean Tatar language show substantial disparities: while the majority (67.4%) of Crimean Tatars admit such need, in other socio-cultural groups this opinion is shared by no more than a quarter.

Similar disparities exist in the opinions of different socio-cultural groups on the obligatory command of specific languages by every resident of Crimea and their obligatory teaching in all Crimean schools, irrespective of the main languages of studies. The necessity of the Russian language arouses the least differences in the former and latter cases. In all groups without exception, the overwhelming majority believe that every resident of Crimea should know it, and it should be taught in all schools.

Big differences, however, are recorded regarding obligatory teaching of the Ukrainian language and its knowledge by every Crimean. More than half of Crimean Tatars consider it necessary both in the former and in the latter case. The Slavic community supports the former by 10%, the latter – by 30%. Even greater disparities are observed in the opinions of Crimean Tatars and Slavs about the obligatory knowledge and teaching of the Crimean Tatar language.

The Russian language is evidently recognised as the language of inter-ethnic communication in Crimea by all socio-cultural groups. However, while representatives of the Slavic community tend to freeze the language situation in the autonomy, Crimean Tatars would be happy with wider use of their native and the official languages.

The fact that Crimean Tatars more often than representatives of other socio-cultural groups consider use of the Ukrainian languages in the key public sectors and its knowledge by citizens and state servants obligatory illustrates the attitude of Crimean Tatars to the Ukrainian state, largely resting on hopes that the state will be the institute that will ensure fully-fledged integration of Crimean Tatars on their historic Motherland. At that, focus group result show that Crimean Tatars are often puzzled and irritated by the stand of many Crimean Ukrainians who, in their opinion, largely lost their national consciousness.

During discussions in focus groups ethnic Russians, speaking of their idea of the language policy, mainly stressed the expediency of several official languages (Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian or only Russian and Crimean Tatar) – often suggesting however that this will require from officials not mandatory knowledge of all official languages, but sufficient command of at least one of them (as well as study of only one language at school). They also suggested that Russian should be the only state (official) language.

Ukrainians during discussions in focus groups spoke out for the use of the Ukrainian languages in state service and education, stressing that this should be done gradually, and that there should be a choice. They also suggested that higher educational establishments should teach students of Slavic nationalities the Crimean Tatar language, too.



EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: “Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar. I would refuse from Ukrainian, but who will let me do that? Ukrainian may be dropped. Nobody here speaks it. There might be two languages: Russian and Crimean Tatar, let them calm down”.

R: “Only the Russian language would be ideal. What we have now: my child studies Ukrainian, and if Tatar is added – must he study Tatar?”

U: “Not everyone can immediately start speaking Ukrainian, they should begin with the younger generation. Gradually, quietly, without collisions. And, of course, the prestige of being Ukrainian must be shown”.

U: “It seems to me that the [Ukrainian] language should of course be introduced. They just want to do it fast... Teaching Ukrainian at school should be introduced gradually... Moreover, I guess that the Tatar language should also be delivered to children of Slavic nationalities at higher educational establishments. That nation exists and is big enough, one should at least understand what two persons say behind your back”.

R: “Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar may be admitted, but a man should always have the right of choice of one or another language in paperwork”.

U: “There should be a choice in the language and in education”.

R: “A Slav is really unable to learn the Crimean Tatar language, moreover adult”.

R: “There should be official languages, at least in Crimea, spoken by the majority of people. If we, say, make a majority, of course, it must be the Russian language. A developing language (all linguists will say) can never be official, while it is developing”.

R: “One official language (Russian)”.

U: “One cannot live in society and be free from society. Of course, as a Ukrainian, I believe that everybody should know the official language. State servants – “fluent command of the [Ukrainian] language is mandatory”. But how to learn the language? It should be started from kindergarten, gradually adding at school. There should be a planned policy, special programmes prepared for that”.

T: “Now, Crimean Tatar children speak Ukrainian best of all. At all events devoted to Shevchenko, Crimean Tatar children read verses, Crimean Tatar children take part in competitions”.

Regarding limitations on the use of the native languages, Crimean Tatars are in the worst situation, since the majority of them face limitations in everyday life – at work, during studies, in public activity, communication with representatives of the authorities, law-enforcement, judicial bodies (most often), doctors, sales people, employees of utility services. The majority of representatives of all other socio-cultural groups reported absence of such limitations.

Ability to bring up children in cultural traditions of their people

The majority of Crimean Tatars and more than half of representatives of the Slavic community reported that they did not have enough possibilities to bring up children in the cultural traditions of their people. Only a fifth of the former and more than a quarter of the latter believe that they have such possibility.

In secondary and higher education, Russian is the most desired language for the main socio-cultural groups of Crimea, to a different extent though. The absolute majority of representatives of the Slavic community and a relative majority of Crimean Tatars would like their children to study at school or a higher educational establishment in that language.

The difference between the socio-cultural groups is that only a bit more than a quarter of Crimean Tatars would prefer the language of their people as the language of secondary and higher education for their children.

Perception of the problem of “Ukrainisation of Crimea” and idea of its signs


The problem of Ukrainisation remains sensitive for Crimea. Representatives of all socio-cultural groups agree or tend to agree that this phenomenon exists, and this opinion is widely shared even by Crimean Tatars, although much less than in the Slavic community.

In all socio-cultural groups, the majority (actually the same share) sees forcible Ukrainisation in the ban on broadcasting of Russian TV channels in Ukraine whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of the Ukrainian legislation. Also, nearly half of Crimean Tatars and the majority of representatives of the other groups referred to translation of prescriptions, manuals, description of goods in Ukrainian and dubbing movies on TV and in the cinema.

More than half of representatives of all socio-cultural groups, except Crimean Tatars, also see Ukrainisation in translation of business documentation to the Ukrainian language.


The focus group results revealed different perceptions of Ukrainisation by the main ethnic groups of Crimea. In Russians, it arouses flat rejection, even aversion. Ukrainians are generally not against Ukrainisation as such but against extremes and haste accompanying it, in their opinion. Crimean Tatars are the most receptive of Ukrainisation, but suggest that it should be accompanied with the development of Crimean Tatar education, wider use of the Crimean Tatar language. In its absence, Ukrainisation will only do harm to the Crimean Tatar people.

Do you have enough possibilities to bring up your children according to the cultural traditions of your people?
% of those polled



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
					18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Yes	21.7	29.2	42.2	33.6	28.9	32.0	33.8	34.5	35.0	32.5	33.1
No	67.9	53.3	33.2	37.4	40.8	53.6	50.3	51.1	47.4	46.9	49.5
Hard to say	10.4	17.5	24.6	29.0	30.3	14.4	15.9	14.4	17.6	20.6	17.4

Did you personally experience restrictions in use of your native language?
% of those polled



		Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
In communication with representatives of bodies of power, law-enforcement and judicial authorities	Yes	71.2	40.1	35.0	33.1	37.7	41.8	42.6	38.6	45.7	43.1	40.6
	No	20.7	54.7	56.5	56.2	53.8	52.2	51.6	54.6	49.4	52.5	53.2
	Hard to say	8.1	5.2	8.5	10.7	8.5	6.0	5.8	6.8	4.9	4.4	6.2
During studies	Yes	62.0	34.0	25.2	28.2	39.5	34.3	33.0	29.6	30.8	37.2	34.5
	No	30.4	56.0	65.1	59.5	52.7	55.3	61.5	61.1	54.7	59.2	60.9
	Hard to say	7.6	10.0	9.7	12.3	7.8	10.4	5.5	9.3	14.5	3.6	4.6
In public activity	Yes	58.2	29.5	21.5	13.1	29.7	27.1	30.2	29.1	30.6	30.8	28.9
	No	31.0	62.8	70.1	76.2	60.5	64.8	64.3	61.3	61.5	62.9	63.1
	Hard to say	10.8	7.7	8.4	10.7	9.8	8.1	5.5	9.6	7.9	6.3	8.0
In communication with healthcare, sales, communal services' personnel	Yes	53.6	21.7	17.6	15.4	20.7	23.3	20.3	26.8	25.6	23.6	23.3
	No	36.1	69.1	69.0	69.2	68.1	66.3	69.2	64.7	62.2	65.8	66.7
	Hard to say	10.3	9.2	13.4	15.4	11.2	10.4	10.5	8.5	12.2	10.6	10.0
At work	Yes	46.7	16.3	17.4	12.3	17.7	19.5	23.4	21.0	17.3	20.1	20.4
	No	42.9	66.8	72.5	80.0	65.1	68.4	63.9	66.9	68.2	67.9	69.9
	Hard to say	10.4	16.9	10.1	7.7	17.2	12.1	12.7	12.1	14.5	12.0	9.7

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: "Ukrainisation is a problem of not only Crimea, it is a problem of the whole country. The Ukrainian language never existed and probably never will. The whole of Ukraine speaks Pidgin Ukrainian, only its nature changes dependent on the region... There is no single Ukrainian language as such..."

R: "We are forcibly ukrainised. Pity our children who enter institutes... Not all lecturers at higher educational establishments can teach in Ukrainian. I guess, if English were imposed upon us like that, we would similarly dislike English".

U: "Ukrainisation should not go on at such a pace in Crimea. Although we should support it... I noticed that as soon as they began to translate movies, that sector [cinema] became loss-making in Crimea. One should take into account not only political importance of issued laws, but also economic".

U: "It seems to me that Ukrainisation should be a process of building the Ukrainian self-identification. For a man to be Ukrainian and think Ukrainian. Best of all is to begin with mass media. But on the other hand, why do we deprive other peoples, say, Russians, of the right to bring up their children in their language?"

T: "Ukrainisation in Crimea goes on very slowly, but it does. I see that children now without difficulty watch and understand everything in the Ukrainian language. It may be difficult for our parents but easy for a child. The next generation will be ukrainised... If Crimea is in the Ukrainian state, the only second official language may be Crimean Tatar after Ukrainian ... Ukrainisation should be adapted to Crimea".

T: "Ukrainisation is hostile to our people. My niece in Crimea learns verses about Kyiv. Why not about Crimea, mosques, even in the Ukrainian language? And another thing: I will welcome Ukrainisation if it goes along with Tatarisation. In the result of Ukrainisation alone, nothing will be left from my people tomorrow".

Attitude to historic heritage and assessment of historic events

The problems of historic heritage, assessments of historic events are of special importance because they fall within the segment of so-called "historic myths", being a vital element shaping consciousness of socio-cultural groups. Those problems, as a rule, arouse great interest and expressive emotional response even in those who little

care about the problem of history, since they touch value symbols in human consciousness.

Assessment of deportation of Crimean Tatar people. The majority of representatives of Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community disagree that deportation of Crimean Tatars was a justified act of the Soviet leadership. However, the degree of disagreement in those groups substantially differs. While nearly half of Crimean Tatars entirely disagree with that statement, among Slavs, only half tends to disagree, and only 7.3% disagree entirely.

Deportation is justified by more than a quarter of representatives of the Slavic community and nearly one-fifth of Crimean Tatars.

So, despite some differences, deportation is not justified by the majority in all socio-cultural groups.

Approaches to restoration of historic Crimean Tatar place names in Crimea. Opinions of Crimean Tatars and Slavs regarding the expediency of restoration of historic (Crimean Tatar) place names in Crimea are diametrically opposite. Some 70% of Crimean Tatars see it expedient, and actually as many representatives of the Slavic community – inexpedient.

This is a contentious subject for representatives of those socio-cultural groups, since the change of place names will witness a change in "symbolic value space" in Crimea to the benefit of one of them, and command of that space means control of the material space, with all its resources.

Idea of the Crimea's future. A relative majority of Crimean Tatars remained undecided on the most desired for them option of the Crimea's future. Roughly equal groups (a bit more than 10% each) chose such options as secession of Crimea from Ukraine and getting the status of an independent state, transfer to Russia, transformation into a Crimean Tatar autonomy within Ukraine, preservation of the current status with expanded rights and powers.



The least desired for Crimean Tatars are the prospects of transfer of the Crimea to Turkey and granting it the status of a region within Ukraine¹⁰.

Among representatives of the Slavic community, more than a third would like Crimea to be part of Russia, nearly a quarter – be transformed into a Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine. The least wanted are such options as the *oblast* status for the Crimea and transfer to Turkey. Very few people would like Crimea to stay an autonomy within Ukraine with the existing rights and powers or to be an independent state. None of the polled would like Crimea to be the Crimean Tatar national autonomy.

So, by and large, the stand of the Slavic community looks more definite than of Crimean Tatars, and that stand, judging by the two most acceptable for that community options of the Crimea's future, is evidently pro-Russian. The unpopularity among representatives of both communities of once the most acceptable option of preservation of the present status of the autonomy with wider rights and powers witnesses threatening trends in the social consciousness of the Crimeans, in particular, disbelief of the majority in positive prospects of Crimea staying within the state system of Ukraine.

The main Crimean socio-cultural groups are highly ethno-centrist. This is seen in self-assessments and mutual assessments of human qualities inherent in socio-cultural groups, their attitude to cultural traditions, languages, problems of other socio-cultural groups.

Assessments of human qualities of representatives of other group by the main socio-cultural and ethnic groups substantially differ from self-assessments of those groups: as a rule, representatives of their group are ascribed more positive qualities, while otherwise positive qualities associated with representatives of other communities in the end acquire a negative tint. At that, Crimean Tatars assess Russians and Ukrainians much better than they are assessed by representatives of those nations. Russians demonstrated least of all tolerance and amicability to the other national groups.

Ukrainians in Crimea are actually not seen by representatives of other communities as a separate socio-cultural group, and their own national self-identification is weak. At that, Crimean Tatars generally treat Ukrainians more positively, Russians – more negatively.

Representatives of the main socio-cultural communities demonstrated rather good knowledge of the culture, traditions, customs of the main ethnic groups of Crimea – Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars. At that, Crimean Tatars know the culture, traditions, customs of Russians and Ukrainians somewhat better than representatives of the Slavic community – the culture, traditions, customs of Crimean Tatars.

Representatives of the main socio-cultural and ethnic groups of Crimea, in principle, are united regarding mandatory knowledge and desirability of study of the Russian language, while serious differences

are observed concerning other languages. At that, Russians are happy with the present situation of actual monolingualism in the Crimea. Ukrainians would not mind wider use of their native language, gradual though. Crimean Tatars support wider use in Crimea of their native and the official languages. They also face the toughest limitations in the use of their language in actually all social sectors, while the majority of Ukrainians and Russians never encountered such problem.

Meanwhile, the majority of representatives of the main socio-cultural groups of the Crimea recognised that they did not have enough possibilities to bring up their children in the cultural traditions of their people.

Along with some differences in assessments of the rationale of deportation by the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities, there are fundamental differences between them regarding the restoration of historic Crimean Tatar place names. Contradictions in symbolic values conceal a significant potential of conflicts.

1.3. IDEAS OF WAYS TO HARMONISE INTER-ETHNIC AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS IN CRIMEA

The attitude of the main socio-cultural groups to the institutes of governance, their influence on the situation, views of the ways of solution of existing problems present the basis for development of the situation in the field of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy.

In this context, the depth of differences between groups may present both a precondition for search of a common stand, and a factor of their division. In particular, their opinions are similar as soon as they deal with economic and social problems, and differ as soon as they deal with political problems and problems of inter-ethnic relations¹¹.

Assessment of the focus of central and Crimean authorities

The attitude of representatives of actually all socio-cultural groups may differ only in the range from critical to very critical.

Central authorities. Nearly 40% of representatives of all socio-cultural groups believe that the policy of the central authorities in Crimea pursues interests of oligarchic clans. A bit fewer people (21-23%) in the main socio-cultural groups believe that it pursues the interests of Ukraine as a whole. There is notable difference between assessments of Slavic and Crimean Tatar groups, on one hand, and the group of “other” (7.4%). The number of Slavs and Crimean Tatars who believe that that policy pursues interests of specific ethnic groups is small. Only some of the “other” and “Crimean Ukrainians” believe that that policy pursues interests of Ukrainians – 7.9% and 17.4%, respectively.

Crimean authorities. Perception of the policy of local authorities by representatives of all socio-cultural groups is more critical, compared to the attitude to Kyiv's policy. Almost half of representatives of the Slavic and Crimean

¹⁰ For more detail on the attitude of the Crimeans to the autonomy's problems see: Crimea: people, problems, prospects. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, No.10, 2008.

¹¹ Results of the previous phase of the project show that the main Crimean ethnic groups differently see the desired future status of the peninsula, and some alternatives acceptable for a specific group, if attempted, can cause serious conflicts, including with the use of force. For more detail see: Crimea: people, problems, prospects..., pp.19-22.



Tatar communities believe that Crimean authorities pursue a policy in the interests of oligarchic clans. However, in the Slavic community, twice more people (10.9%) believe that it pursues the interests of the Crimeans.

Therefore, representatives of all socio-cultural groups have similar, rather critical assessments of the policy of both central and Crimean authorities. Representatives of the Slavic community more often note the “pro-Crimean” nature of actions of the local authorities, compared to representatives of the other communities.

Ideas of ways to enhance the effectiveness of the Crimean authorities

Differences in the assessments of measures at improvement of operation of the central and local authorities by representatives of different socio-cultural groups are not fundamental and mainly deal with their importance and priority.

Central authorities. Representatives of the **Slavic community** mentioned among the most effective measures at enhancement of the effectiveness of operation of the central authorities in Crimea formulation and implementation of the strategy of development of the Crimea (24.4%), elimination of corruption (20.5%). They attach less importance to the issues of organisation and human resources (11-16%): replacement of executives with more professional; extension of greater powers to the Crimean authorities, wider representation of Crimea in the central bodies of power, reversal of the party affiliation and political course of the central authorities. The stand of the group of “other” is very much the same.

The stand of **Crimean Tatars** in that issue differs by that they attach the highest priority to fighting corruption (36.2%), and see reversal of the party affiliation and political course as the main organisational and HR step (17.3%).

Noteworthy, Crimean Tatars pay less attention than the Slavic community to wider powers for the Crimean authorities and stronger representation of Crimea in the central bodies of power – only some 4%.

Crimean authorities. Representatives of the Slavic community mentioned as the most important measures at enhancement of the effectiveness of the Crimean authorities: elimination of corruption (50.2%), working out and implementation of the Crimea’s development strategy (46.7%), replacement of its leadership with more professional (39.3%). The opinions of “other” and “Crimean Ukrainians” are close, the main difference being that they consider replacement of its leadership with more professional the second most important step.

The difference in the stand of **Crimean Tatars** lies in their emphasis on measures at broader representation of the deported peoples in the Crimean authorities (54.3%), where they are supported by only 3-5% of representatives of the other groups.

Representatives of different groups are generally united in their perceptions of the need and ways of enhancement of the effectiveness of the central and Crimean authorities. Crimeans prioritised removal of corruption, making the authorities’ policy strategic and personal changes for their improvement.

Interestingly, Crimean Tatars, emphasising their greater involvement in local authorities, pin little hope on representation of the Crimea in central bodies of power.

Ideas of ways to solve problems in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations

The most important for all Crimeans, from the viewpoint of influence on inter-ethnic relations, are problems in two sectors: political and socio-economic. Crimean Tatars also attach greater importance than representatives of other groups to measures in the cultural, language and educational sectors.

Socio-economic sphere. The majority of all Crimeans are united that inter-ethnic relations in Crimea may get better with the recovery of industry and agriculture. The main socio-cultural groups also show little differences in the assessment of the importance of such measures as rise of wages and pensions, development of the recreational sector and, interestingly, fair solution of the land problem to the benefit of representatives of all nationalities.

Meanwhile, **representatives of the Slavic community and the group of “other”** far more often than Crimean Tatars noted the urgency of the problem of dealing with unemployment (58.1% and 62.6% against 29.3%, respectively).

On their part, **Crimean Tatars** see it more urgent, compared to representatives of the other communities, to increase funding of measures aimed at amenities for repatriates and solution of land problems.

Political sphere. **Crimean Tatars** consider as the most important political measures: establishment of a commission for solution of inter-ethnic, religious and political conflicts involving representatives of the authorities and public organisations; conduct of presidential elections and change of the President of Ukraine; fighting corruption at land allotment; passage of a programme of Crimea’s development, taking into account the interests of all strata and ethnic groups; equal treatment of representatives of all national groups living in Crimea by the central and Crimean authorities; fighting corruption in the authorities as a whole.

The fact that “replacement of the President of Ukraine” was mentioned by 43.5% of Crimean Tatars largely witnesses the assessment of not only the President but all supreme bodies of power in Ukraine in solution of problems of the deported peoples, including Crimean Tatars.

Among the key political measures that could have a positive effect on inter-ethnic relations in Crimea, **representatives of the Slavic community** the most often mentioned extension of the Agreement of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol after 2017; presidential elections and change of the President of Ukraine; fighting corruption in the authorities as a whole; Ukraine’s accession to the Federal State of Russia and Belarus; fighting corruption in law-enforcement and judicial bodies.

Therefore, **the Slavic community and Crimean Tatars share the urgency of eliminating corruption and change of the President.**

The main socio-cultural groups substantially differ by their perception of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea. Representatives of the Slavic community (75.5%)



view that factor as a guarantee of an acceptable for them status of Crimea. Here, they are supported by 47.6% of the group of “other”. Among Crimean Tatars, only 19.6% consider that it exerts positive influence on inter-ethnic relations.

Legal sphere. Almost a third of **Crimean Tatars** see as the most important measures granting the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine for the Crimean Tatar people and official recognition of Majlis by the Ukrainian state as a plenipotentiary representative body of the Crimean Tatar people. Here, they are supported by only 1-3% of representatives of the Slavic community and the group of “other”.

Representatives of the **Slavic community** more often mention in that field: greater activity of law-enforcement bodies at suppression of activity of public organisations instigating inter-ethnic hatred in Crimea; limitation of activity or prohibition of such organisations; cancellation of registration of mass media whose materials instigate inter-ethnic hatred; permission of dual citizenship (Ukrainian and of another state at their choice) for Crimean residents.

Those measures were also mentioned by 19% to 27% of Crimean Tatars, but proceeding from the results of focus groups, when Crimean Tatars and representatives of the Slavic community speak of the need to ban extremist national organisations and publications stirring up inter-ethnic hatred, they mean different organisations and publications: representatives of the Slavic community – Crimean Tatar, Crimean Tatars – pro-Russian.

Cultural, language, information spheres. The most important measures, as seen by **Crimean Tatars**, include an effective possibility of study in the native language for all who wish so; refusal from Ukrainisation of the Crimean information space and educational sector; legislative provision of obligatory command of the Crimean Tatar language for state servants and officials of local self-government bodies, its obligatory study at secondary schools.

Representatives of the Slavic community see as the most important measures: refusal from Ukrainisation of the Crimean information space and educational sector; an effective possibility of study in the native language for all who wish so; the status of Russian as the second official language in Ukraine. Here, their opinions coincide with those of the **group of “other”**.

So, representatives of all socio-cultural groups are united by the negative perception of Ukrainisation of the information sector (although the support for that step among Crimean Tatars is twice lower than in the Slavic community – 27.7% and 58.7%, respectively).

Sphere of inter-confessional relations. Specific of that sector, the importance of the proposed measures for each socio-cultural group substantially differs.

For instance, representatives of the Slavic community consider much more effective than Crimean Tatars the following measures: refusal of registration of religious organisations whose doctrine and ideology contain calls for forcible spread of their religion, establishment of a theocratic state, intolerance to representatives of other religions and non-believers (24.2% and 10.9%,

respectively); introduction of the practice of consultations of the state bodies with leaders of the main churches and religious organisations of Crimea at registration of new religious organisations, communities (17% and 4.9%, respectively); refusal of the leadership of churches and religious organisations from missionary outreach among representatives of other confessions (11.9% and 1.6%, respectively).

Crimean Tatars consider the most effective introduction in the secondary school curricula of a subject dealing with the history and fundamentals of teaching of traditional religions of Crimea (22.8%, against 16.6% in the Slavic community).

By contrast to the two former groups, representatives of the **group of “other”** attach greater importance to measures at expansion of mutual contacts of churches and religious organisations of Crimea, development and implementation of common social, charitable, cultural programmes and enhancement of the educational level of the clergy.

Therefore, representatives of the Slavic community are somewhat greater than the other groups worried by the problem of spread of other religions in Crimea. Representatives of Crimean Tatars emphasised spread of knowledge about the traditional for Crimea religions, including Islam, among youths, representatives of the group of “others” are more disposed to the inter-church dialogue and accord.

Representatives of all socio-cultural groups are generally united in views of the ways of enhancement of the authorities’ effectiveness and solution of socio-economic problems (while Crimean Tatars stress the need of greater attention to the problems of repatriates).

In the policy sector, the opinions of the Slavic community and Crimean Tatars coincide in admission of the need of defeating corruption and change of the President. The greatest contradictions between Slavs and “other”, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other, are caused by the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

In the legal field, the desire of Crimean Tatars to get the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine and to secure official recognition of Majlis by the Ukrainian state is shared by very few representatives of other communities of Crimea.

Representatives of the main socio-cultural groups feel cautious about each other, which is manifested in the implications of their desire to ban public organisations instigating inter-ethnic hatred in Crimea – meaning organisations that do not belong to their group.

Representatives of all socio-cultural groups reported a mainly negative perception of Ukrainisation of the educational and information sectors. Serious differences are observed in the attitude of the socio-cultural communities to the status of the Crimean Tatar language. While many Crimean Tatars see it necessary to legislatively provide for obligatory command of the Crimean Tatar language for state servants and officers of local self-government bodies, its obligatory study at secondary schools, among representatives of the Slavic community, support for this opinion is extremely low. ■



SPECIFICITIES OF IDENTIFY OF DOMINANT SOCIO-CULTURAL GROUPS OF CRIMEA					
	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	CRIMEA IN GENERAL
IDENTIFICATION DIMENSIONS					
"Crimean identity"					
Do you consider yourself a representative of Ukrainian nation to which, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, belong citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities?	Hard to say (55.4%) No (23.9%) Yes (20.7%)	No (44.2%) ... Yes (27.3%)	Yes (44.2%) No (34.6%)	Yes (59.3%) No (32.1%)	No (39.3%) Yes (32.1%)
What group of people you can say about "That is us", in the first place?	We are Crimeans (78.3%) We are citizens of Ukraine (7.6%) None of the listed (6.5%) ... We are citizens of the former Soviet Union (1.1%)	We are Crimeans (65.4%) We are citizens of the former Soviet Union (22.3%) We are citizens of Ukraine (7.4%)	We are Crimeans (50%) We are citizens of the former Soviet Union (20.7%) We are citizens of Ukraine (16.7%)	We are Crimeans (33.1%) We are citizens of Ukraine (31.5%) We are citizens of the former Soviet Union (15.4%)	We are Crimeans (61.5%) We are citizens of the former Soviet Union (19.8%) We are citizens of Ukraine (10.4%)
What of the following do you connect (identify) yourself with, in the first place?	With Crimea (38.3%) Hard to say (21.3%) With the place of residence (15.8%) With Russia (10.9%) ... With Ukraine (2.7%) With Soviet Union (0.5%)	With Crimea (35.9%) With the place of residence (25.6%) With Russia (16.6%) With Soviet Union (11.7%) ... With Ukraine (3.6%)	With Crimea (34.4%) With the place of residence (31%) With Russia (11.3%) With Ukraine (9.6%) With Soviet Union (8.2%)	With Crimea (41.5%) With the place of residence (27.7%) With Ukraine (15.4%) With Russia (5.4%) With Soviet Union (4.6%)	With Crimea (35.6%) With the place of residence (26.5%) With Russia (14.4%) With Soviet Union (9.5%) ... With Ukraine (5.5%)
Do all Crimeans, regardless of their ethnic background, have common traits which distinguish them from Ukrainians, Russians, representatives of other nations?	Yes (38.3%) ... No (30.1%)	Yes (41%) No (35.1%)	Yes (47.8%) No (34%)	Yes (45%) No (38.2%)	Yes (43%) No (34.2%)
How important for self-sentiment of Crimeans as a unified community are the following features?	Common Motherland is Crimea 4.75 Own territory is Crimean peninsula 4.69 Historic names of localities, geographic names 4.53	Common language being used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian 4.87 Positive attitude to Russia 4.76 Desire to see Ukraine in union with Russia and Belarus 4.73	Common language being used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian 4.45 Common Motherland is Crimea 4.34 Positive attitude to Russia 4.29	Common language being used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian 4.26 Common Motherland is Crimea 4.16 Positive attitude to Russia 3.96	Common language being used by the majority of Crimeans is Russian 4.69 Common Motherland is Crimea 4.58 Positive attitude to Russia 4.55
With what of the following statements do you agree more?	Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia (35.3%) Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia (23.9%) ... Crimea is Ukraine (14.7%) Crimea is Russia (4.3%)	Crimea is Russia (40.2%) Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia (34.8%) Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia (13%) ... Crimea is Ukraine (5.1%)	Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia (31.9%) Crimea is Russia (21.6%) Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia (17.3%) Crimea is Ukraine (17.1%)	Crimea is Ukraine (26.7%) Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia (26.7%) Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia (19.1%) ... Crimea is Russia (10.7%)	Crimea is both Ukraine and Russia (32.8%) Crimea is Russia (30.9%) Crimea is neither Ukraine nor Russia (16.5%) Crimea is Ukraine (9.8%)



<p>Which variant of the Crimea's future is the most preferable for you? Would you like Crimea to...?</p>	<p>Hard to say (36.3%) Secede from Ukraine and become an independent state (11.4%) Secede from Ukraine and join Russia (10.8%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with expanded rights and powers (10.3%) Become Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine (10.3%)</p>	<p>Secede from Ukraine and join Russia (37.1%) Become Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine (24.7%) Hard to say (16.3%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with expanded rights and powers (12.3%)</p>	<p>Secede from Ukraine and join Russia (29.8%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with expanded rights and powers (17.3%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with existing rights and powers (13.9%) Become Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine (13.4%) Hard to say (11.6%)</p>	<p>Secede from Ukraine and join Russia (26%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with existing rights and powers (19.8%) Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with expanded rights and powers (19.8%)</p>	<p>Secede from Ukraine and join Russia (32.3%) Become Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine (19.5%) ... Preserve its current status of the autonomy as a part of Ukraine with expanded rights and powers (13.8%)</p>
<p>Socio-cultural identity of Crimea's social groups</p>					
<p>What group of people you can say about "That is us", in the first place?</p>	<p>We are Muslims (61.4%) We are representatives of our nationality (20.7%) We are representatives of ummah (<i>world's Muslim community</i>) (6.5%)</p>	<p>We are Russian-speaking (68%) We are Orthodox (29.8%) We are representatives of our nationality (3%)</p>	<p>We are Russian-speaking (46.5%) We are Orthodox (27.7%) We are representatives of our nationality (16.2%)</p>	<p>We are Russian-speaking (34.6%) We are Orthodox (26.9%) We are representatives of our nationality (19.2%)</p>	<p>We are Russian-speaking (54%) We are Orthodox (26.9%) We are representatives of our nationality (8.9%)</p>
<p>With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself?</p>	<p>Crimean Tatar (91.9%) ... Ukrainian (1.6%) Pan-European (1.6%) Soviet (1.6%) Russian (0.5%)</p>	<p>Russian (74.6%) Soviet (21.3%) ... Pan-European (2%) Ukrainian (0.0%) Crimean Tatar (0.0%)</p>	<p>Russian (54.7%) Soviet (19%) Ukrainian (10%) Pan-European (6.5%) Crimean Tatar (0.9%)</p>	<p>Russian (46.9%) Ukrainian (15.4%) Soviet (13.1%) Pan-European (10.8%) Crimean Tatar (0.8%)</p>	<p>Russian (61.4%) Soviet (18.8%) Crimean Tatar (8.7%) Ukrainian (3.4%) Pan-European (3.4%)</p>
<p>Language orientations</p>					
<p>Knowledge of what languages is required from every citizen of Crimea?</p>	<p>Russian (70.1%) Crimean Tatar (63%) Ukrainian (53.3%)</p>	<p>Russian (77%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from Crimeans (20.6%) Ukrainian (10.3%) Crimean Tatar (4.4%)</p>	<p>Russian (68.8%) Ukrainian (30.3%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from Crimeans (24.9%) Crimean Tatar (12.3%)</p>	<p>Russian (49.6%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from Crimeans (38.5%) Ukrainian (33.1%) Crimean Tatar (9.2%)</p>	<p>Russian (73.7%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from Crimeans (21.8%) Ukrainian (20.7%) Crimean Tatar (12.3%)</p>
<p>Knowledge of what languages is required from every official of bodies of power and self-government bodies in Crimea?</p>	<p>Russian (77.2%) Crimean Tatar (67.4%) Ukrainian (57.6%)</p>	<p>Russian (87.2%) Ukrainian (49.8%) Crimean Tatar (25.7%)</p>	<p>Russian (71.1%) Ukrainian (44.7%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from officials (21.8%) Crimean Tatar (19.9%)</p>	<p>Russian (53.1%) Ukrainian (45.8%) There is no need to require an obligatory knowledge of a language from officials (29.2%) Crimean Tatar (16.8%)</p>	<p>Russian (81.1%) Ukrainian (48.9%) Crimean Tatar (27.7%)</p>

1 On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "not important at all", and "5" – "very important".



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	CRIMEA IN GENERAL
What languages should be obligatory for teaching in all schools of Crimea regardless of the main language of instruction?	Russian (78.3%) Crimean Tatar (73.4%) Ukrainian (59.2%)	Russian (76%) Ukrainian (30%) Crimean Tatar (18.7%)	Russian (74.2%) Ukrainian (39.4%) Crimean Tatar (19.2%) Crimean Tatar (14.4%)	Russian (58.8%) Ukrainian (39.2%) Crimean Tatar (31.3%) Crimean Tatar (10.8%)	Russian (75.6%) Ukrainian (35.7%) Crimean Tatar (22.3%)
What language of instruction would you prefer for your children in the middle school?	Russian (42.9%) Crimean Tatar (29.3%) Hard to say (24.1%) ... Ukrainian (0.5%)	Russian (95.3%) Ukrainian (2.1%) Crimean Tatar (0.0%)	Russian (70.8%) Ukrainian (14.6%) ... Crimean Tatar (0.5%)	Russian (70.8%) Ukrainian (14.6%) ... Crimean Tatar (0.8%)	Russian (85.2%) ... Ukrainian (4.4%) Crimean Tatar (2.8%)
What language of instruction would you prefer for yourself or for your children in the higher educational establishment?	Russian (42.9%) Crimean Tatar (27.2%) Hard to say (1.9%) ... Ukrainian (1.6%)	Russian (94%) ... Ukrainian (1.9%) Crimean Tatar (0.3%)	Russian (77.4%) Ukrainian (9.6%) ... Crimean Tatar (0.5%)	Russian (70.8%) Ukrainian (13.1%) ... Crimean Tatar (0.8%)	Russian (84%) ... Ukrainian (4.4%) Crimean Tatar (2.8%)
INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS					
How well are you acquainted with culture, traditions, customs of representatives of the following peoples inhabiting Crimea?					
Russians	Know a lot (46.2%) Know something (38%) Know very little (14.1%)	Know a lot (82.9%) Know something (15.3%) Know very little (0.6%)	Know a lot (71.1%) Know something (24.9%) Know very little (3.1%)	Know a lot (76.2%) Know something (20%) Know very little (3.8%)	Know a lot (78.8%) Know something (20.5%) Know very little (2.6%)
Ukrainians	Know something (50%) Know a lot (36.4%) Know very little (11.4%)	Know a lot (70%) Know something (26.5%) Know very little (1.9%)	Know a lot (56.4%) Know something (36.4%) Know very little (5.5%)	Know a lot (63.4%) Know something (30.5%) Know very little (5.3%)	Know a lot (62.6%) Know something (31.8%) Know very little (4%)
Crimean Tatars	Know something (86.4%) Know something (11.4%) Know very little (1.6%)	Know something (63.2%) Know very little (23.6%) Know a lot (16.7%)	Know something (45.4%) Know very little (24.7%) Know a lot (17.9%)	Know something (31.5%) Know very little (29.2%) Know a lot (28.5%)	Know something (46.9%) Know a lot (23.4%) Know very little (21.9%)
Are you interested in culture, traditions, customs of other peoples inhabiting Crimea? ²²	Interested (66.3%) Not interested (25%)	Interested (80.5%) Not interested (10.3%)	Interested (60%) Not interested (31%)	Interested (54.2%) Not interested (36.7%)	Interested (72.6%) Not interested (18.4%)
Culture, traditions, customs of what peoples inhabiting Crimea would you like to know more about?	Hard to say (39.7%) Karaites (20.7%) Greeks (19%) Know enough, there is no need to know more about culture of any of the peoples (15.8%)	Krymchaks (35.7%) Karaites (32.3%) Hard to say (23.5%) Greeks (23.5%) Greeks (22.1%)	Hard to say (30.3%) Karaites (27.5%) Krymchaks (23.5%) Greeks (20.9%)	Hard to say (34.6%) Karaites (30.5%) Krymchaks (28.5%) Greeks (20%)	Krymchaks (30.4%) Karaites (29.7%) Hard to say (27.2%) Greeks (21.4%)



To what extent each of the following qualities is pronounced in the peoples listed below? ³	Russians	Crimean Tatars	Ukrainians
Ability to defend their own interests	Goodwill 3.48 Striving for justice 3.43 Hard-working 3.41 Ability to defend their own interests 3.37	Goodwill 4.43 Openness 4.26 Striving for justice 4.26 Sense of national pride 4.10	Goodwill 4.51 Openness 4.21 Sense of national pride 4.16 Striving for justice 4.06
	Goodwill 4.37 Openness 4.15 Striving for justice 4.12 Sense of national pride 4.05	Goodwill 4.46 Openness 4.22 Sense of national pride 4.02 Hard-working 3.94	Goodwill 4.37 Openness 4.25 Sense of national pride 4.18 Religiosity 4.16
Ability to defend their own interests	Goodwill 4.48 Religiosity 4.32 Ability to defend their own interests 4.32 Sense of national pride 4.30	Ability to defend their own interests 4.48 National unity 4.43 Sense of national pride 4.33 Religiosity 4.18	Ability to defend their own interests 4.48 National unity 4.43 Sense of national pride 4.33 Religiosity 4.18
	Goodwill 4.18 Hard-working 3.61 Openness 3.61 Religiosity 3.56 Ability to defend their own interests 3.55	Goodwill 4.14 Hard-working 4.08 Sense of national pride 4.08 Striving for justice 3.78	Goodwill 4.07 Sense of national pride 4.06 Goodwill 4.02 Religiosity 3.86
Did you personally experience restrictions in use of your native language?	Yes (46.7%) No (42.9%)	No (66.8%) Yes (16.3%)	No (72.5%) Yes (17.4%)
During studies	Yes (62%) No (30.4%)	No (65.1%) Yes (25.2%)	No (59.5%) Yes (33.7%)
	Yes (58.2%) No (31%)	No (70.1%) Yes (21.5%)	No (62.3%) Yes (29.5%)
In communication with representatives of bodies of power, law-enforcement and judicial authorities	Yes (71.2%) No (20.7%)	No (56.5%) Yes (40.1%)	No (52.2%) Yes (41.3%)
	Yes (53.6%) No (36.1%)	No (69.1%) Yes (21.7%)	No (66.1%) Yes (23.3%)
Do you have enough possibilities to bring up your children according to the cultural traditions of your people?	No (67.9%) Yes (21.7%)	No (42.2%) Yes (33.2%)	No (48.2%) Yes (32.7%)
	Do not agree (58.9%) Agree (18.9%)	Do not agree (51.1%) Agree (26.9%)	Do not agree (52.3%) Agree (24.4%)
Is it reasonable to return historic (Crimean Tatar) place names (toponyms) in Crimea?	Yes (68.5%) No (10.3%)	No (58.6%) Yes (10.3%)	No (59.5%) Yes (12.8%)

² In this question answer variant "interested" is made up of sum of answers "very interested" and "most likely interested", and "not interested" – of "not interested" and "most likely not interested".

³ On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "not pronounced at all", and "5" – "very much pronounced".

⁴ In this question answer variant "agree" is made up of sum of answers "agree", and "do not agree" – of "do not agree" and "most likely do not agree".



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	CRIMEA IN GENERAL
Do you agree with the statement that the population of Crimea is enduring forced Ukrainisation? ⁵	Agree (77.2%) Do not agree (19%)	Agree (92.9%) Do not agree (5.2%)	Agree (73.3%) Do not agree (22.2%)	Agree (66.2%) Do not agree (29.2%)	Agree (85.3%) Do not agree (12%)
How is it demonstrated? ⁶	Termination of broadcasting in Ukraine of the Russian TV channels, whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation (64.3%) Translation of prescriptions, leaflets to medications and goods into Ukrainian language (51%) Dubbing of feature films on television and in the movie theatres in Ukrainian language (47.9%) Ban on using other languages in citizens' communication with bodies of power, law-enforcement and judicial authorities (39.4%)	Termination of broadcasting in Ukraine of the Russian TV channels, whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation (67.5%) Translation of prescriptions, leaflets to medications and goods into Ukrainian language (65.6%) Dubbing of feature films on television and in the movie theatres in Ukrainian language (64.8%) Making the local mass media to change to Ukrainian language (51.6%)	Translation of prescriptions, leaflets to medications and goods into Ukrainian language (70.5%) Termination of broadcasting in Ukraine of the Russian TV channels, whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation (66.7%) Dubbing of feature films on television and in the movie theatres in Ukrainian language (62.9%) Translation of business documentation into Ukrainian language (59.8%)	Translation of business documentation into Ukrainian language (62.8%) Translation of prescriptions, leaflets to medications and goods into Ukrainian language (55.8%) Making the local mass media to change to Ukrainian language (54%) Termination of broadcasting in Ukraine of the Russian TV channels, whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation (50%)	Termination of broadcasting in Ukraine of the Russian TV channels, whose programmes were not adapted to the requirements of Ukrainian legislation (67%) Translation of prescriptions, leaflets to medications and goods into Ukrainian language (65.8%) Dubbing of feature films on television and in the movie theatres in Ukrainian language (62.9%) Translation of business documentation into Ukrainian language (51.8%)
AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC INSTITUTES/TRUST IN THEM					
Public institutes and organisations					
Do you trust the following public institutes and organisations? ⁷					
Church	Trust (41.6%) Do not trust (20%)	Trust (43.2%) Do not trust (26.4%)	Trust (39.3%) Do not trust (28.8%) Do not trust (47.2%)	Trust (38.9%) Do not trust (24.4%)	Trust (41.7%) Do not trust (26.6%) Do not trust (38.6%)
Trade unions	Do not trust (38.6%) Trust (17.9%) Trust (42.1%)	Trust (38.4%) Do not trust (33.9%) Do not trust (57.3%)	Do not trust (41.2%) Trust (20%) Do not trust (53.6%)	Do not trust (41.2%) Trust (13.8%) Do not trust (55.4%)	Do not trust (30.6%) Trust (53.2%)
National-cultural communities, unions, organisations	Do not trust (26.3%) Trust (42.9%) Do not trust (29.4%)	Trust (17.6%) Do not trust (60.5%) Trust (16.4%)	Trust (18.6%) Do not trust (58.2%) Trust (16.5%)	Trust (6.2%) Do not trust (56.5%) Trust (5.3%)	Trust (20.2%) Do not trust (56.9%) Trust (18.9%)
Public organisations	Do not trust (69.8%) Trust (10.2%)	Do not trust (65.6%) Trust (4.8%)	Do not trust (71.4%) Trust (11.9%)	Do not trust (65.4%) Trust (10%)	Do not trust (79.6%) Trust (7.6%)
Political parties					
ATTITUDE TO THE AUTHORITIES					
In the interests of who is the policy of central Ukrainian authorities being led in Crimea?	Oligarchic clans (40.2%) Ukraine in general (20.7%) Other (16.8%) ... All population of Crimea (2.7%) Ukrainians (2.2%) ... Russians (0.0%) ... Crimean Tatars (0.0%)	Oligarchic clans (37.4%) Ukraine in general (23.4%) Hard to say (13.7%) ... Ukrainians (4.3%) Ukraine in general (2.5%) ... All population of Crimea (0.5%) Crimean Tatars (0.2%) Russians (0.2%)	Oligarchic clans (40.7%) Ukraine in general (17.3%) Hard to say (7.9%) Ukrainians (7.4%) Ukraine in general (4.5%) ... All population of Crimea (0.9%) Crimean Tatars (0.8%) Russians (0.8%)	Oligarchic clans (35.6%) Ukraine in general (17.4%) Hard to say (14.4%) ... Ukraine in general (6.1%) ... All population of Crimea (3%) Crimean Tatars (3%) ... Russians (0.0%)	Oligarchic clans (38.8%) Ukraine in general (18%) Hard to say (14.3%) ... All population of Crimea (4.2%) Ukrainians (4.2%) ... Crimean Tatars (0.6%) Russians (0.4%)



<p>In the interests of who is the policy of local authorities being led in Crimea?</p>	<p>Oligarchic clans (50.5%) Hard to say (10.5%) ... (4.9%) Ukraine in general (4.3%) All population of Crimea (0.0%) ... (0.0%) Ukrainians (0.0%) Russians (0.0%) Crimean Tatars (0.0%)</p>	<p>Oligarchic clans (48.4%) Hard to say (12.9%) All population of Crimea (10.9%) ... (7.3%) Ukraine in general (1.2%) Ukrainians (0.7%) Crimean Tatars (0.3%) Russians (0.3%)</p>	<p>Oligarchic clans (41.7%) Hard to say (21.7%) ... (5.9%) All population of Crimea (3.1%) Ukrainians (2.6%) Ukraine in general (0.5%) Crimean Tatars (0.5%) Russians (0.5%)</p>	<p>Oligarchic clans (32.6%) Hard to say (21.9%) Ukrainians (8.3%) Business of other countries (8.3%) ... (3.8%) Ukraine in general (3.8%) All population of Crimea (0.8%) Russians (0.0%) Crimean Tatars (0.0%)</p>	<p>Oligarchic clans (46.5%) Hard to say (15.4%) ... (8.7%) All population of Crimea (5.6%) Ukraine in general (1.7%) Ukrainians (0.6%) Crimean Tatars (0.3%) Russians (0.3%)</p>
<p>What is to be done in the first place to raise the effectiveness of central authorities' work in Crimea?</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (36.2%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (18.9%) Fundamentally change the party contingent and lines of policy (17.3%)</p>	<p>Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (24.4%) Eliminate corruption (20.5%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (15.9%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (20.6%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (18.5%) Eliminate corruption (17.7%) Fundamentally change the party contingent and lines of policy (15.4%) Give more powers to Crimean authorities (15.4%)</p>	<p>Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (18.5%) Eliminate corruption (17.7%) Fundamentally change the party contingent and lines of policy (15.4%) Give more powers to Crimean authorities (15.4%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (22%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (21.7%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (15.9%)</p>
<p>What is to be done to raise the effectiveness of Crimean authorities' work?</p>	<p>Ensure broader representation of deported peoples in the bodies of power of Crimea (54.3%) Eliminate corruption (46.2%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (33.7%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (50.2%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (46.7%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (39.3%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (51.2%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (45.8%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (38.1%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (45.8%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (45.8%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (36.6%)</p>	<p>Eliminate corruption (50.2%) Work out the strategy of Crimea's development and implement it (42.4%) Replace the executive staff by more professional (40.9%)</p>
<p>VISION OF WAYS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CRIMEA'S SOCIO-CULTURAL GROUPS</p>					
<p>Taking measures in which of the following spheres can most positively influence inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?</p>	<p>In political sphere (25.4%) In socio-economic sphere (21.6%) ... (18.4%) In cultural, language, information sphere (14.1%)</p>	<p>In political sphere (32%) In socio-economic sphere (28.3%) In legal sphere (17%) In cultural, language, information sphere (12.6%)</p>	<p>In socio-economic sphere (29.4%) In political sphere (22.6%) In legal sphere (13.1%) In cultural, language, information sphere (12.4%)</p>	<p>In socio-economic sphere (30.5%) In cultural, language, information sphere (19.8%) ... (18.3%) In legal sphere (13%) In political sphere (13%)</p>	<p>In political sphere (28.4%) In socio-economic sphere (28%) In legal sphere (15.5%) ... (13%) In cultural, language, information sphere (13%)</p>
<p>Which of the suggested measures in the political sphere can positively influence inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?</p>	<p>Creation of the commission for solving inter-ethnic, religious, and political conflicts, which would include the representatives both from the authorities and public organisations (52.2%) Conduct of presidential elections and change of the President of Ukraine (43.5%) Lowering the level of corruption in the sphere of land allocation (40.8%)</p>	<p>Prolongation of the treaty of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol after 2017 (75.5%) Conduct of presidential elections and change of the President of Ukraine (51.6%) Lowering the level of corruption in bodies of power (50%)</p>	<p>Lowering the level of corruption in bodies of power (53.1%) Prolongation of the treaty of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol after 2017 (47.6%) Adoption of the programme of Crimea's development which takes into account the interests of all strata and ethnic groups (44.3%)</p>	<p>Lowering the level of corruption in bodies of power (48.5%) Adoption of the programme of Crimea's development which takes into account the interests of all strata and ethnic groups (46.9%) Lowering the level of corruption in law-enforcement and judicial authorities (43.1%)</p>	<p>Prolongation of the treaty of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol after 2017 (61.4%) Lowering the level of corruption in bodies of power (49.7%) Conduct of presidential elections and change of the President of Ukraine (47.5%)</p>

5 In this question answer variant "agree" is made up of sum of answers "agree" and "most likely agree", and "do not agree" – of "do not agree" and "most likely do not agree".

6 This question was answered only by those who gave answers "agree" and "most likely agree" to the previous question.

7 In this question answer variant "trust" is made up of sum of answers "trust" and "most likely trust", and "do not trust" – of "do not trust" and "most likely do not trust".



	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	CRIMEA IN GENERAL
Which of the suggested measures in the socio-economic sphere can positively influence inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?	<p>Rebirth of industry and agriculture (61.4%)</p> <p>Increase in salaries and pensions (57.1%)</p> <p>Development of resort industry (56%)</p>	<p>Rebirth of industry and agriculture (69.4%)</p> <p>Increase in salaries and pensions (59.6%)</p> <p>Development of resort industry (58.8%)</p>	<p>Rebirth of industry and agriculture (72.4%)</p> <p>Lowering the unemployment rate (62.6%)</p> <p>Increase in salaries and pensions (59.4%)</p>	<p>Rebirth of industry and agriculture (77.9%)</p> <p>Lowering the unemployment rate (63.4%)</p> <p>Lowering the prices for goods and services (59.5%)</p>	<p>Rebirth of industry and pensions (69.6%)</p> <p>Increase in salaries and pensions (59.3%)</p> <p>Lowering the unemployment rate (56.9%)</p>
Which of the suggested measures in the legal sphere can positively influence inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?	<p>Granting Crimean Tatar people the status of indigenous people of Ukraine (32.6%)</p> <p>Official recognition of Crimean Tatar Majlis by Ukrainian State as a fully legitimate representative body of Crimean Tatar people (30.4%)</p> <p>Restriction or banning the activity of Crimean intolerant⁸ socio-political organisations (26.6%)</p>	<p>More active steps of law-enforcement bodies toward suppression of the activity in Crimea of the intolerant public organisations (46.3%)</p> <p>Restriction or banning the activity of Crimean intolerant socio-political organisations (44%)</p> <p>Withdrawal from registration of the intolerant mass media (43.3%)</p>	<p>More active steps of law-enforcement bodies toward suppression of the activity in Crimea of the intolerant public organisations (51.2%)</p> <p>Withdrawal from registration of the intolerant mass media (39.6%)</p> <p>Restriction or banning the activity of Crimean intolerant socio-political organisations (30.1%)</p>	<p>More active steps of law-enforcement bodies toward suppression of the activity in Crimea of the intolerant public organisations (52.3%)</p> <p>Restriction or banning the activity of Crimean intolerant socio-political organisations (39.2%)</p> <p>Withdrawal from registration of the intolerant mass media (38.5%)</p>	<p>More active steps of law-enforcement bodies toward suppression of the activity in Crimea of the intolerant public organisations (45.9%)</p> <p>Withdrawal from registration of the intolerant mass media (40%)</p> <p>Restriction or banning the activity of Crimean intolerant socio-political organisations (37.9%)</p>
Which of the suggested measures in the cultural, language, information sphere can positively influence inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?	<p>Real ensuring the opportunity to study in native language for those who wish so (46.7%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's education sphere (34.8%)</p> <p>Legislative recognition of the need to know Crimean Tatar language for officials of the state bodies of power and local self-government bodies, obligatory study of the language at schools (33.7%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's information sphere (27.7%)</p>	<p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's information sphere (58.7%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's education sphere (51.2%)</p> <p>Real ensuring the opportunity to study in native language for those who wish so (48.1%)</p> <p>Giving Russian language the status of the second state language on the territory of Ukraine (42.7%)</p>	<p>Giving Russian language the status of the second state language on the territory of Ukraine (47.9%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's information sphere (44.4%)</p> <p>Real ensuring the opportunity to study in native language for those who wish so (37.5%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's education sphere (36.4%)</p>	<p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's information sphere (64.2%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's education sphere (42.3%)</p> <p>Giving Russian language the status of the second state language on the territory of Ukraine (41.2%)</p> <p>Real ensuring the opportunity to study in native language for those who wish so (41.2%)</p>	<p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's information sphere (51.3%)</p> <p>Refusal from Ukrainisation of Crimea's education sphere (44.9%)</p> <p>Real ensuring the opportunity to study in native language for those who wish so (44.5%)</p> <p>Giving Russian language the status of the second state language on the territory of Ukraine (41.5%)</p>
Which of the suggested measures can positively influence inter-confessional relations in Crimea?	<p>Hard to say (28.3%)</p> <p>Introduction to the middle schools' curricula of a subject giving knowledge about history and fundamentals of beliefs in traditional religions of Crimea (22.8%)</p> <p>Refusal to register intolerant and disloyal religious organisations⁹ (10.9%)</p> <p>Refusal of church and religious organisations' leadership to place religious attributes outside the cult buildings' territory (9.8%)</p>	<p>Hard to say (27%)</p> <p>Refusal to register intolerant and disloyal religious organisations (24.2%)</p> <p>Introduction by government authorities of practice of consultations with leadership of major churches and religious organisations of Crimea while registering new religious organizations, communities (17%)</p> <p>Introduction to the middle schools' curricula of a subject giving knowledge about history and fundamentals of beliefs in traditional religions of Crimea (16.6%)</p>	<p>Refusal to register intolerant and disloyal religious organisations (25.8%)</p> <p>Hard to say (22.3%)</p> <p>Broadening of mutual contacts of Crimea's churches and religious organisations, development and implementation of joint social, charitable, cultural programmes (21.6%)</p> <p>Improving the educational level of clergymen (20.1%)</p>	<p>Refusal to register intolerant and disloyal religious organisations (29.2%)</p> <p>Improving the educational level of clergymen (23.8%)</p> <p>Broadening of mutual contacts of Crimea's churches and religious organisations, development and implementation of joint social, charitable, cultural programmes (22.9%)</p> <p>Hard to say (20%)</p>	<p>Hard to say (25.6%)</p> <p>Refusal to register intolerant and disloyal religious organisations (23.5%)</p> <p>Introduction to the middle schools' curricula of a subject giving knowledge about history and fundamentals of beliefs in traditional religions of Crimea (16.8%)</p> <p>Broadening of mutual contacts of Crimea's churches and religious organisations, development and implementation of joint social, charitable, cultural programmes (16.1%)</p>

⁸ Which by their actions contribute to the incitement of ethnic hatred.

⁹ Whose beliefs and ideology have calls to forced spread of their religion, creation of theocratic state, intolerable attitude to representatives of other religions and non-believers.

2. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SITUATION IN CRIMEA

The events of 2005-2009 in the AR of Crimea bear some resemblance to early 1990s, first of all, from the viewpoint of weakening influence of the central authorities on Crimean developments, growing activity of pro-Russian forces, growth of conflicts in social and especially inter-ethnic relations.

The “intermediate” stage of 1994-2004 brought some stabilisation of the situation. However, starting from 2005, the vector of its development changed, and in the second half of 2008, it might be termed as pre-conflict.

In such conditions, contradictions in different sectors of public life – political-administrative, socio-economic, humanitarian – turned into factors of aggravation of tension in the relations between dominant socio-cultural groups in the AR of Crimea.

2.1. INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL PROCESSES IN CRIMEA

Management of social processes in Crimea bears a number of shortcomings directly and indirectly contributing to the aggravation of social relations in the autonomy. The main of those shortcomings are the ineffectiveness of the central and Crimean authorities and their interaction, lack of effective mechanisms which consider the needs of Crimean Tatars, corruption in the bodies of power.

Low effectiveness of the authorities (both central and Crimean) at solution of the key problems of Crimea, poor interaction among the institutes of governance of Ukraine and the autonomy stem from many long-standing problems resolved in Ukraine very slowly or not resolved at all. Such problems include, first of all: absence of a systemic approach in the authorities’ activity; organisational problems of institutional interaction; ineffectiveness of the mechanisms considering the interests of the AR of Crimea during state policy formulation; political contradictions; low executive discipline.

Absence of a systemic approach in the authorities’ activity. Although yet in 1994-2004, the situation in the AR of Crimea was somewhat stabilised, this was done through tactical measures effective in the short run, at the expense of accumulation of “delayed problems”, manifested now, in their combination and in a new quality¹.

The need of a systemic, strategic approach to solution of complex problems is realised very slowly, and its practical implementation is hindered on all levels of the bureaucratic machinery. Apparently, the absence of an overall strategy of Ukraine’s development is the main outside factor seriously complicating the planning of Crimean development strategy.

The central authorities still have no effective and clear policy with respect to Crimea and no strategy of the autonomy development within Ukraine. Such situation largely deprives the autonomy of the right reference points and gives it an opportunity to set their own ones, that may run contrary to the prospects of development of Ukraine as a whole, as seen by the central authorities.

Say, Ukraine’s Parliament has not passed the Law “On Fundamentals of Home and Foreign Policy of Ukraine” and conceptual legislative documents (concepts, principles of the state policy) in the most sensitive for Crimea sectors: ethno-national, language, information, religious.

Only at the beginning of 2006, the President of Ukraine announced plans of working out a strategy of development of the AR of Crimea, specified its key parameters and made some practical steps². However, those plans remained just plans.

Instead, in 2006-2008, the President of Ukraine issued a number of decrees effectuating NSDC decisions on Crimean issues. Those documents mentioned a wide

¹ Application of this approach, also known as “crisis management”, has become “a chronic disease” of the entire state and authorities on all levels in the years of Ukraine’s independence. It is most vividly manifested in “replication” of great many concepts, strategies, programmes, not related with each other and having no common basis – a strategy of development of Ukraine. It is contrasted by a systemic approach that provides for elaboration of a set of interrelated measures, backed with resources and encompassing the entire range of state (region, branch, etc.) development objectives.

² On February 21, 2006, Ukraine’s President V.Yushchenko had a meeting with the autonomy leadership, where a decision was taken to set up a working group for drafting the Strategy. The working group was led by then head of the Presidential Secretariat O.Rybachuk and NSDC Secretary A.Kinakh. According to then NSDC Secretary A.Kinakh: “...Special attention at the Strategy development will be paid to improvement of the investment climate, creation of new working places, development of the tourism and recreation industry, fair solution of the land issue, promotion of extraction of energy resources..., the strategy will provide for creation of mechanisms of cooperation between the authorities and the public, an effective human resources policy, maintenance of law and order, fighting corruption..., particular attention will be paid to harmonisation of inter-ethnic relations, creation of proper conditions for representatives of deported peoples without violation of legitimate interests of the present population of Crimea”. See: Working visit by the Head of Secretariat to the AR of Crimea. – Press Service of the President of Ukraine, February 27, 2006, <http://www.president.gov.ua>

range of problems topical for the autonomy. However, the great number of assignments given to the authorities in pursuance of those decisions looked like an attempt to solve all problems at a time, each dealing with a set of different problems (for instance, distribution of land resources, creation of new working places, guarantee of the right to education in the native language, etc.), and required special preparation and everyday attention³.

Deemed strategic, with some reservations, may be the State Programme of Socio-Economic Development of the AR of Crimea through 2017 approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in August, 2007.⁴ But in absence of a strategy of development of entire Ukraine, the Programme targets of budget funding cannot be considered at least tentative, and the designed plans – realistic⁵.

Regarding the problems of repatriates, transition of the central authorities in 2002 and Crimean authorities in 2006 from programmes of solution of important but local tasks guaranteeing the rights of Crimean repatriates to comprehensive programmes of their settlement and amenities was a positive step⁶. However, the funding of those programmes is insufficient to call them effective (Table “Budget expenditures on programmes of amenities for repatriates”⁷): absolute growth of budget expenditures is offset by inflation and growth of prices of land and housing⁸; actual satisfaction of programme requirements during the implementation of the latest Programme gradually goes down (from 80% to 70% – for national and from 99% to 54% – for Crimean); state budget funds are allocated irregularly (mainly in the last quarter, which complicates their use).

Budget expenditures on programmes of amenities for repatriates, UAH million

Budgets	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 plan
State	40.0	46.0	50.0	61.4	53.1	66.3	64.4	53.3
Republican	10.5	18.3	19.8	21.3	24.5	26.0	30.0	

Lack of realism in the programmes of settlement and amenities for repatriates (including construction of housing and utility infrastructure, schools, healthcare establishments, etc), absence of practical results of the land reform (inventory and development of the land cadastre, land management, rational development of recreational and preserve areas, urban construction⁹) lead to differences between programmes of development of the humanitarian sector, other programmes and plans. In addition to the imposed deficit of resources for social needs, including of repatriates (and associated rivalry for resources), such situation prompts excessive politicisation of social relations, corruption, growth of radical protest spirits in society¹⁰.

So, absence of a strategic, systemic approach to solution of problems on the central and republican levels leads to their gradual accumulation, aggravation, affecting the character of social relations in the AR of Crimea.

Legal and organisational problems of institutional interaction between the central and Crimean authorities.

Tension in the relations between the central and Crimean authorities has been evident since Ukraine’s independence. It is prompted by the vagueness and controversy of some provisions of the fundamental documents – the Constitutions of Ukraine and the AR of Crimea – and other Ukrainian laws specifying the powers of the Verkhovna Rada of the autonomy. In particular, the Constitution the AR of Crimea refers to its competence some functions not provided by the Constitution of Ukraine, including participation in the formulation and implementation of Ukraine’s foreign policy, which results in legal collision and aggravation of political confrontation¹¹. The Law of Ukraine “On Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea” (item 2, Article 9) vests the exclusive right to amend the Constitution of the autonomy to the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea. At that, pursuant to the same Law (Article 1), the Verkhovna Rada of the autonomy is to act “within powers specified by the Constitution and laws of

³ President of Ukraine Decree “On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of February 8, 2006 “On Social Situation in the AR of Crimea” No. 154 of February 28, 2006.

⁴ Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution No. 1067 of August 30, 2007.

⁵ For more detail see: Competitiveness of the regions of Ukraine: state and problems. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, 2008, No. 4, pp.2-31.

⁶ Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution “On Approval of the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deported Crimean Tatars and Persons of Other Nationalities who Returned for Residence in Ukraine, their Adaptation and Integration into Ukrainian Society through 2005” No. 618 of May 16, 2002. The following Programme through 2010 was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution No. 637 of May 11, 2006. The Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolution No. 102-5 of June 21, 2006, approved a programme of the same title, funded from the republican budget.

⁷ Report by the Director of Department for Affairs of Former Deportees on Ethnic Grounds of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions “Implementation of the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deported Crimean Tatars and Persons of Other Nationalities who Returned for Residence in Ukraine, their Adaptation and Integration into Ukrainian Society”. May 8, 2009, www.scnm.gov.ua/article/132148?annId=132149

⁸ According to the State Statistics Committee, in 2008, the inflation rate in the AR of Crimea hit 23.2%, as of May, 2009 – 8.9%. In the beginning of 2008, land and housing prices in the autonomy were growing by some 45% per annum. See: “...from 2008, all operators expect intense growth of prices in Crimea (up to 50% per annum)”. Real Estate in Crimea. – Kyiv and Ukrainian Real Estate Portal, <http://freehouse.com.ua/9>

⁹ Such problems (and more of them) are specific of Ukraine as a whole. For more detail on the problems of the land policy in Ukraine see: State land policy in Ukraine. – Working materials of Razumkov Centre for the Round-table “State and strategy of today’s land policy in Ukraine”, May 21, 2009, pp.4-13.

¹⁰ M.Dzhemilev: “It may be said that a state policy regarding Crimean Tatars is actually absent. I would not call it discriminatory. There is no thought-over policy. That is the problem. And the lawlessness taking place here, gross violations of human rights are authorised not from Kyiv but from local chauvinist pro-Russian-minded elements”. See: Artemenko M. “Third force” trying to make Crimean Tatars separatists? – “Holos Kryma”, March 14, 2008.

¹¹ For more detail see. Crimea on the political map of Ukraine. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, 2001, No. 4, pp.14-17. On June 6, 2006, the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea passed a declaration protesting against the presence of units of the US and NATO armed forces on the territory of the autonomy, calling for declaration of Crimea a NATO-free territory and demanding cancellation of the military exercise *Sea Breeze 2006* in the autonomy. See: Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea refuses to cancel its decision declaring Crimea “a NATO-free territory”. – UNIAN, September 5, 2006. A group of members of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea initiated a Crimean referendum on declaration of the autonomy a “NATO-free territory”. See: Conduct of a local referendum on Ukraine’s NATO membership does not fall within the competence of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea. Representation of the President in Crimea. – UNIAN, October 9, 2006. See also: Crimean Parliament calls for boycott of the National Council decision which bans broadcasting of Russian TV channels. – UNIAN, October 23, 2008.



Ukraine”. However, the absence of laws on some domains (e.g., on fundamentals of home and foreign policy) and internal controversy of the current legislative framework of Ukraine give Crimeans a free hand in the promotion of their initiatives and political interests.

Meanwhile, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine’s Parliament may, under certain conditions, terminate powers of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea ahead of time (item 28, Article 85), and the President is entitled to invalidate acts of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea (item 16, Article 106). In practice, however, there have been no such precedents.

There are serious drawbacks in the organisation of the system of governance in the autonomy. For instance, the Council of Ministers and local state administrations in the AR of Crimea, on one hand, are elements of the state executive branch¹². Meanwhile, according to Crimean Constitution, the Council of Ministers is formed by the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea and is accountable to it. District state administrations (DSA) in Crimea belong to the single system of executive bodies of Crimea. Those bodies and their heads report and are accountable to the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea¹³. Meanwhile, DSA heads are appointed by the President of Ukraine upon the submission by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, their deputies – by DSA heads, but upon coordination with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Therefore, the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea and DSAs *de jure* have dual subordination and powers, whose division with central executive bodies and procedures of exercise are not always clear, lack mechanisms of control and responsibility. In particular, this refers to the management of budget funds (central agencies) and responsibility for implementation of programmes and plans (Crimean executive bodies).

Insufficiently clear division of areas of responsibility between the central and Crimean authorities, in presence of political contradictions between them, creates preconditions for disregard or even wilful obstruction to implementation of decisions of the central authorities on the territory of the autonomy by Crimean bodies of power. One example here is presented by the practice of disregard of some decisions of the central authorities by local bodies of power or even opposition to them rooted in 2006-2008 (especially in “politically sensitive” sectors, such as foreign, information, educational policy)¹⁴.

Furthermore, according to the Constitution of the AR of Crimea (Article 26), heads of some territorial units of central executive bodies (ministries, state committees, etc.) active on the territory of the autonomy are appointed and dismissed with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea¹⁵. Experience proves that differences on specific candidates may also cause tension in the relations between Kyiv and Simferopol¹⁶.

Therefore, legal uncertainty and imperfection of the system of governance in Ukraine at different levels strongly contribute to ineffective institutional interaction between the central and Crimean authorities. The supreme Ukrainian authorities do not fully employ their available powers and possibilities for implementation of the state policy in the autonomy.

Absence of mechanisms of account of Crimean interests in the formulation of the state policy. The Constitution of the AR of Crimea (Article 3) guarantees “account of the specificity of the AR of Crimea envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine by Ukrainian bodies of state power passing decisions concerning the AR of Crimea”, and “participation in formulation and implementation of the main principles of home political, foreign economic and foreign political activity of Ukraine in issues concerning the AR of Crimea”¹⁷. However, the mechanisms of such participation are poorly specified or ineffective.

For instance, Crimea is represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by 11 MPs¹⁸ who belong to different parliamentary factions (not more than three in each) and, given the ideological differences and political contradictions among parliamentary factions, cannot act as a united “Crimean lobby”.

There is a consultative-advisory body under the President of Ukraine – the National Council for Interaction between the State Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies, whose main task lies in “review, discussion and generation of a coordinated position on issues of state and regional importance”¹⁹. Crimea has six representatives in that body²⁰. However, the Council acts rather formally (it met only once), and practical results of its activity are absent.

According to the Constitution of the AR of Crimea, the autonomy has its Permanent Representation in Ukraine’s capital. However, its duties are mainly confined to organisational support for the interaction of Crimean

¹² According to the Law “On Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” (Article 1), the Government of Ukraine “exercises executive power directly and through ministries, other central executive bodies, the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea and local state administrations, directs, coordinates and controls the activity of those bodies”. Furthermore, according to Article 41 of that Law, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “directs and coordinates the activity of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea at implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine and acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the territory of the AR of Crimea”.

¹³ Regulations of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea (Article 33), approved by a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea of September 23, 1998.

¹⁴ Volkova A. Ministry of Education of Crimea allowed teachers not to follow Kyiv’s order of Ukrainisation of schools. – “Krym-Novosti” internet publication, August 27, 2008, <http://from.crimea.ua>

¹⁵ E.g., Head of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea, Head of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Justice in Crimea, General Director of “Krym” State Television and Radio Company. The candidacy of the Public Prosecutor of the AR of Crimea is agreed only during his appointment.

¹⁶ E.g., the conflict concerning the appointment of M.Ilyichov the Head of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea.

¹⁷ Constitution of the AR of Crimea (Item 3, Part 1, Article 18). We do not consider here the correspondence of this provision to the Constitution of Ukraine, emphasising that the provision is valid and gives the AR of Crimea the relevant rights.

¹⁸ All colours of the nation. Full list of national deputies of the 6th convocation (prepared by “Expert Centre”). – “Obkom” internet publication, October 16, 2007, <http://www.obkom.net.ua>

¹⁹ President of Ukraine Decree “Issue of the National Council for Interaction between the State Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies” No. 241 of March 20, 2008.

²⁰ The are: Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea A.Hrytsenko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea V.Plakida, People’s Deputy of Ukraine M.Dzhemilev, Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea L.Zhunko, Simferopol City Mayor H.Babenko, Head of Sevastopol City State Administration S.Kunitsyn.

authorities and their leaders with the central Ukrainian authorities, including document circulation.

The Permanent Representation of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea, with its status and powers (mainly controlling and information-analytical),²¹ can contribute to consideration of the specificity of the peninsula and the opinion of Crimean authorities during passage of the relevant decisions by the central authorities. However, in 2005-2008, the representation saw frequent personal changes, which impaired the ability of that body to be a sound “communicator” between the President and Crimean authorities²².

Therefore, the mechanisms of consideration of interests of the autonomy at formulation of Ukraine’s state policy are either not used, or used ineffectively, which widens the split between central and regional authorities, including political, and disables tools of solution of urgent problems.

Political contradictions between central and Crimean authorities. Some normalisation of the situation in the AR of Crimea in late 1990s - early 2000s rested on the relative loyalty of the local authorities to the central. Not least of all, such loyalty was ensured by the electoral support of Crimeans for the President elected in 1994 and 1999 (at the former elections, L.Kuchma won support of 83% of Crimeans, at the latter – slightly yielded to P.Symonenko: 34% against 38%).

After the elections-2004, the situation changed fundamentally. The overwhelming majority of Crimean voters (81%) in the repeated second round of elections of the President of Ukraine (December 26, 2004) voted for V.Yanukovych, while V.Yushchenko, elected Ukraine’s President, got votes of 15% of Crimeans; in particular, in Sevastopol, the ratio was 89% to 8%²³.

Therefore, the majority of Crimean residents did not support the new “Orange” rulers (including the Government led by Yu.Tymoshenko and other authorities led by representatives of the “Orange team”), which affected the relations between Kyiv and the autonomy²⁴.

In 2005, the relations between the central and Crimean authorities resembled a “wait-and-see” policy, due to the forthcoming elections of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and local self-government bodies, whose results could influence the character of those relations.

The results of the elections held in March 2006 added to the confrontation between the central authorities, on one hand, and the authorities and local self-government bodies of Crimea – on the other. The elections gave the majority in the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea to the political forces opposing the central authorities. The coalition formed the Council of Ministers of the autonomy led by V.Plakida.

The opposition to the central authorities also got control over the majority of city and district councils in the autonomy²⁵. The early parliamentary elections- 2007 only deepened the rift.

Ideological positions of the central (the President, the parliamentary coalition and the Cabinet of Ministers formed by it) and Crimean authorities on a number of sensitive for society issues (language, foreign political orientation of Ukraine, attitude to the historic past) proved **irreconcilable**. The rift ran along the lines “wider use of the Ukrainian or Russian language as the second official language; accession to NATO or to the Federal State of Russia and Belarus”, etc. Advocacy of those positions during election campaigns contributed to the split in society and prompted further complication of the situation in the autonomy.

The conflict was further aggravated by the fact that the political forces that came to power in Crimea (the Party of Regions) saw Crimean elections as kind of a “revenge” for their defeat at the election of the President of Ukraine²⁶. The same were the feelings of the majority of Crimeans who, as we noted above, disapproved the “Orange authorities”.

This laid down the conflict background for the relations of the central and Crimean authorities, against which, ineffective management of social processes, concentration of the authorities on political “battles” shattered respect for them in society, impaired tools of influence on the situation and prompted citizens to solve problems by their own efforts.

Low executive discipline. In 2005-2008, a number of decisions were passed whose implementation could contribute to normalisation of the situation in the autonomy, solution of some problems or neutralisation of conflicts’ factors. However, those decisions were never implemented – in part, due to their poor planning, in part, because of the low executive discipline.

The low executive discipline is showily demonstrated by the above-mentioned Decrees of President V.Yushchenko on Crimean issues²⁷. While the first of them, following an NSDC decision, set tasks for the state authorities covering the whole range of problems of amenities for Crimean Tatar repatriates and their integration into Ukrainian society, the other two stated non-implementation (or late implementation) of the previous and set new tasks that were implemented not much better.

In particular, the President of Ukraine Decree No. 154 of February 28, 2006, assigned the Government to draw up and submit “within four months a bill of fundamentals of the ethno-national policy”. Such a bill prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine six months later – only on December 30, 2008.

²¹ Law of Ukraine “On Representation of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea”.

²² In 2005-2008, five permanent representatives of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea changed seats. The post was occupied by V.Kulich (September 2005 – May 2006), H.Moskal (May 2006 – January 2007), V.Shemchuk (February 2007 – May 2007), V.Khomenko (July 2007 – December 2007), L.Zhunko (since January 2008).

²³ Data of the official web site of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua>

²⁴ According to then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea S.Kunitsyn, the situation in Crimea in late 2004 – early 2005 “was so tense that one wrong move could lead to bloodshed”. See: Kunitsyn believes that after the Orange Revolution, information and political freedom appeared in Ukraine. – UNIAN, November 22, 2006.

²⁵ For more detail see: Tyshchenko Yu., Khalilov R., Kapustin M., Socio-political processes in the AR of Crimea: key trends. Kyiv, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, 2008. – <http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua>

²⁶ Election to Ukraine’s Parliament of a number of politicians known for their extreme “anti-Orange” stand during the presidential elections-2004 (e.g., N.Shufrych, D.Tabachnyk) also contributed to that process.

²⁷ President of Ukraine Decrees “On Social Situation in the AR of Crimea” No. 154 of February 8, 2006; “On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of September 20, 2006 “On Implementation of the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of February 8, 2006 “On Social Situation in the AR of Crimea” No. 822 of October 9, 2006; “On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of May 16, 2008 “On Progress of Implementation of Decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine on Situation in the AR of Crimea” No. 589 of June 26, 2008.



Presidential Decree No. 589 assigned the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to officially investigate the reasons for non-implementation of NSDC decisions and subsequent decisions of the Government concerning the AR of Crimea and take appropriate measures upon its results, including bringing those guilty to responsibility. So far, nothing has been reported about the results of the official investigation and associated penalties.

Parliament's attention to the problems of the AR of Crimea and parliamentary control in that sector is clearly insufficient. It is suffice to remind that the latest parliamentary hearings on those issues took place on April 20, 2000, their recommendations were implemented only in part, and the reasons for non-implementation are unknown²⁸.

In some cases, low executive discipline causes additional tension in society. The most recent example was presented by a Crimean Tatar picket at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (from April 11, 2009) in response to non-fulfilment of the Prime Minister's promise to solve the land issue in Crimea²⁹. Escalation of events is demonstrative – evolution of pickets with purely land requirements into a hunger strike and protest under political slogans: demands of picketers to allot Crimean Tatars 845 hectares of land managed by the central authorities yielded to slogans “We will do our best for the world to know true face of Ukrainian authorities”, “We will cut Ukraine's road to European Union”³⁰.

Low executive discipline, along with political obstruction of decisions of the central authorities on Crimean issues, make those decisions actually no-go, depriving the authorities of trust of citizens who ever more resort to protest actions.

Disregard of needs of Crimean Tatars

Poor regard of the needs of Crimean Tatars is one of the factors of growth of tension in social relations in the AR of Crimea. Its main reasons include limited representation of Crimean Tatars in the bodies of power, their deprivation of the ability to solve problem issues by referendums and bias of local authorities to their rights and needs.

Limited representation of Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian bodies of power. The political leadership of Crimean Tatars seeks a higher status for national self-government bodies of Crimean Tatar people – **Kurultay** and **Majlis**³¹ – and greater effectiveness of their interaction with the central and Crimean authorities. However, those aspirations meet little support from the central and Crimean authorities.

For instance, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 6th convocation, the interests of Crimean Tatar people are represented by one MP – Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev (parliaments of previous convocations had no more than two Crimean Tatars).

The Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar People under the President of Ukraine was established in 1999³². During L.Kuchma's presidency, it met rather regularly, although far from all assignments given upon the meeting results were executed, which was from time to time brought to the attention of the Presidential Administration by the Majlis Legal Service. However, over the entire term of presidency of V.Yushchenko, the Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar People met only once – in the first half of 2005, and since then, the President has issued only one document relating to formal aspects of its activity³³.

There is the Council for Ethno-National Policy under the Head of State, including one representative of Crimean Tatar people³⁴. However, so far, that body exerts little influence on policy making and implementation in that sector.

Therefore, the mechanisms of interaction of national self-government bodies of Crimean Tatars with Ukraine's state authorities are still confined to participation of their representatives in consultative-advisory bodies under the President of Ukraine, whose activity is mainly declarative.

Representation of Crimean Tatars in bodies of power of the autonomy³⁵ (Insert “*Legal framework for participation of Crimean Tatars in bodies of power*”). After the latest (2006) elections held on a proportional basis, seven representatives of Crimean Tatars were elected to the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea. For comparison: at the elections-1998 held under the majority system (after the cancellation of the national quota), only one Crimean Tatar was elected to the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, with support of Crimean republican CPU organisation. After the elections-2002, also held by the majority system, eight Crimean Tatars were elected to the Supreme Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, six of them – supported by Kurultay of Crimean Tatar people. It was much more than local experts expected, but very few, in the opinion of Crimean Tatar politicians – half of Crimean Tatar's share in the population of the autonomy.

The Permanent Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea for Inter-Ethnic Relations and Problems of Deportees (15 persons) includes three representatives

²⁸ For the results of the Parliamentary hearings see: official web site of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, <http://portal.rada.gov.ua>

²⁹ On the road to Crimean Tatar autonomy. – “Odná Rodina” Internet project, December 18, 2008, <http://odnarodyna.ru/articles/6/415>;

³⁰ Crimean Tatars promise to cut Ukraine's road to the European Union. – “Ukrainska Pravda”, June 9, 2009, <http://ua.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/9/96170>; Crimean Tatars will complain to the EU and UN about Ukraine. – “Glavred”, June 9 2009, <http://ua.glavred.info/archive/2009/06/09/100523-18>

³¹ **Kurultay** of Crimean Tatar people – national congress, supreme plenipotentiary representative body of Crimean Tatar people. **Majlis** of Crimean Tatar people is the only supreme plenipotentiary representative body of Crimean Tatar people in-between Kurultay sessions. It is elected by Kurultay from among its delegates. The hierarchy includes local Majlises subordinated to Majlis of Crimean Tatar people. See: Procedures of Kurultay... and Regulations of Majlis... – Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, <http://www.cidct.org.ua>

³² President of Ukraine Decree “On Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar People” No. 518 of May 18, 1999

³³ President of Ukraine Decree “On Amendment of Regulations of Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar People” No. 767 of September 21, 2.006

³⁴ President of Ukraine Decree “On Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar People” No. 428 of May 22, 2005.

³⁵ Third Report of Ukraine on implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 2009 – official web site of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions, http://www.scnm.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=131306.



of Crimean Tatars (including the Commission Chairman R.Ilyasov), the Permanent Commission for Restoration of Rights of Rehabilitated Persons (nine members) – one.

Under the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, there is the Council for Human Safety and Development acting as a consultative-advisory body in the field of inter-ethnic relations (22 members) that includes two representatives of Crimean Tatar people. In 2007-2009, the Council held two meetings (dealing with the land issue and problems of housing and utility services) and a round-table on the role of small business.

Representatives of Crimean Tatar people hold rather high posts in the highest echelons of executive power in Crimea³⁶, but their representation is of political, sometimes – of personal rather than legal character. Since the Council of Ministers is formed by the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, representation of Crimean Tatars on the upper levels of the executive branch entirely depends on the political will and interests of the majority in Crimean Parliament. The executive authorities of Crimea, including in Council of Ministers of the autonomy, ministries and committees, now employ 140 state servants who are repatriates (12.9% of all officers of those bodies).

Republican executive bodies employ 27 state servants of category I-III from among repatriates, including one First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea; one minister; three heads of republican committees.

On the level of local state administrations (in particular, district – DSA), Crimean Tatars are represented among DSA heads and deputy heads, first of all, in districts where their share of the population is high enough. Representation of specific national groups in DSAs depends on the political will of Ukraine's President and the Government. 18 repatriates work at 14 DSAs in Crimea as heads, first

deputy and deputy heads of district state administrations, two of them – DSA heads. All in all, DSAs and executive bodies of local councils employ 165 state servants who are repatriates (12.4% of all officers).

125 Crimean Tatars are members of city and district councils. Out of 309 elected settlement and village elders, 24 (7.7%) are Crimean Tatars (for data of the share of Crimean Tatars in local self-government bodies of the AR of Crimea see map, pp.42-43).

There is a large disparity in the number of Crimean Tatars in elected bodies of power of Crimea: in the Verkhovna Rada – 7%, in local self-government bodies – from 5.6% to 22%, which is 1.5-2.5 times below their share in the population of the autonomy and its separate districts.

Participation in referendums. In principle, some problems of Crimean Tatars may be solved by direct manifestation of people's will, without mediation of the authorities – through all-Ukrainian, republican and local referendums. However, the effectiveness of that method is doubtful.

The Law “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums” envisages, apart from all-Ukrainian, a republican referendum in the AR of Crimea and local referendums. A Crimean republican referendum may concern adoption, amendment or cancellation of decisions on issues referred by the Ukrainian legislation to the competence of the AR of Crimea. A local referendum may concern adoption, amendment or cancellation of decisions referred by the legislation of Ukraine to the competence of local self-government bodies of the relevant administrative-territorial units.

However, proceeding from the norms of the effective legislation, a national minority can initiate a referendum,

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATION OF CRIMEAN TATARS IN BODIES OF POWER

The Law of Ukraine “On Election of Members of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, Local Councils and Village, Settlement, City Mayors” provides that members of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea are elected under the proportional system, i.e., its members are elected by election lists of republican organisations of political parties and election blocs of organisations of political parties in the multi-mandate election district whose boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the AR of Crimea. The Law prohibits any direct or indirect privileges in election rights, including on ethnic grounds.

Members of district, city district and city councils in the AR of Crimea are elected under the proportional system, members of village and settlement councils – under the majority system in single mandate constituencies, into which the territory of the concerned settlement or a rural community uniting residents of

several villages is divided. Voting rights require affiliation with the concerned territorial communities, permanent residence on the territory of the concerned administrative unit (in the given case – the AR of Crimea).

According to the Ukrainian legislation, entitled to serve in local self-government bodies are persons who have the appropriate education and professional training, command the official language in the scope sufficient to discharge official duties. The Law does not envisage any privileges on ethnic grounds for employment at local self-government bodies*.

The Law of Ukraine “On State Service” specifies few but clear criteria of getting the right to state service – appropriate education, professional training, competitive selection. No other privileges for state service are envisaged, including on ethnic grounds.

* Law of Ukraine “On Service in Local Self-Government Bodies”. Under certain circumstances, the procedure of employment enables indirect application of the ethnic criterion. For instance, pursuant to Article 10, on as-needed basis, with the parties' consent, an official of a local self-government body may be moved to an equivalent or lower position or position of an advisor of consultant without competitive selection. The very procedure of competition specified by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution “On Approval of the Procedure of Competition for Vacant Positions of State Servants” No. 169 of February 15, 2002, allows application of subjective, including ethnic, criteria during competitive selection, for instance, during interviews with candidates.

³⁶ Namely, the Minister of Labour and Social Policy, the First Deputy Minister of Housing and Communal Services, a Deputy Minister of Economy, a Deputy Minister of Culture and Arts, a Deputy Minister of Education and Science, a Deputy Minister of Health, the Head and Deputy Head of the Republican Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deportees, the Head of the Republican Information Committee, the Head of the Republican Committee for Waterwork Construction and Irrigated Farming, a Deputy Head of the Republican Committee for Land Resources, a Deputy Head of the Republican Committee for Religions.



and moreover, secure the required result, only if it manages to convince in its rightfulness the necessary number of representatives of other ethnic groups, or (in case of a local referendum) if it makes a majority of the population of the concerned administrative-territorial unit. In such conditions, Crimean Tatars actually have no chances to succeed at an all-Ukrainian, Crimean republican referendum or local referendums in Crimea³⁷.

Therefore, Crimean Tatars have no adequate representation in the authorities and self-government bodies of Crimea, their ability to influence the authorities in issues concerning their interests is limited. This prompts representatives of that community to resort to other forms of defence of their interests, including those that can stir up a conflict between Crimean Tatars and representatives of the Slavic community of Crimea.

Bias of Crimean authorities in sensitive for inter-ethnic relations issues. In 2004-2009, most decisions of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea dealing with inter-ethnic problems dealt with the language issue. Twelve out of fifteen such documents pursued protection and development of the Russian language in different sector, two – Ukrainian, one – Crimean Tatar³⁸. Analysis of the content of those decisions gives grounds for the conclusion of bias of that body in language issues, in particular, its focus on protection of the interests of only one, Russian-speaking community³⁹.

Also demonstrative in this respect were some resonance decisions on foreign policy and humanitarian issues⁴⁰. They fully match the system of values of the “Slavic community” dominating on the peninsula. That approach may be deemed to contribute to conflicts in inter-ethnic relations.

In the issues of amenities for repatriates, Crimean authorities as a matter of principle insist on solution of socio-economic issues, irrespective of nationality (while Crimean Tatars insist that they were deported on national grounds).

In that period, Crimean Council of Ministers passed more than 30 resolutions on inter-ethnic relations. Those decisions mainly dealt with amenities and socio-cultural development of repatriates (approval of annual plans of

implementation of the relevant programmes of amenities, measures at commemoration of anniversaries of the deportation, preservation and development of languages and cultures, etc), solution of concrete problems in specific districts and settlements of the autonomy. In the result of ineffectiveness of inter-budget relations and limitations of the republican budget, most of those decisions remain on paper.

In the field of socio-economic relations, most violations that may conventionally be attributed to ethnic reasons are observed on the level of local authorities and local self-government bodies. They mainly deal with land issues and provision with housing.

In the result of ineffectiveness of the central and Crimean authorities, excessive politicisation of their relations and lack of constructive interaction between them, an unhealthy situation has been formed in Crimea with access of citizens and communities to basic life resources: administrative-legal (representation in the bodies of power, employment), material (land, housing), socio-cultural (education, sources of information in native language). Crimean Tatars suffer greater discrimination in access to those resources.

Corruption in Crimean bodies of power

The high rate of corruption in Ukraine in general is recognised within the country and by the international community, and requires no proof. The official statistics is unreliable and produce no idea of the true scale of that phenomenon. The data obtained during expert and public opinion polls deserve more trust. According to the expert poll, the problem of corruption is the second important (32.5%) for Crimea (after land problems – 36.2%), while public opinion polls ranked corruption first among the socio-political problems that bother Crimeans. The urgency of solution of that problem in the authorities is generally recognised by 49.7% of those polled, in law-enforcement and judicial bodies – by 38,5%, in the field of allotment of land – by 34.8%.

People consider the worst hit by corruption the sectors immediately dealing with human life (land as the place of residence and a life resource, healthcare, education, transport, utilities)⁴¹.

³⁷ International organisations, in particular, OSCE, worked out recommendations for effective participation of representatives of national minorities in socio-political life. In this connection, the difference of the status of national minorities and indigenous peoples important for Crimean Tatars is disregarded, with the emphasis made on the mechanisms of involvement in socio-political life instead.

³⁸ See, in particular: resolutions (decisions) of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea: “On Approval of the Programme of Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language in the AR of Crimea in 2004-2010” No. 856 of March 17, 2004; “On Appointment of a Republican (Local) Consultative Referendum on the Initiative of Citizens of Ukraine Permanently Living in the AR of Crimea” No. 1578 of February 22, 2006; “On Progress of Implementation of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolution of April 15, 1998, No. 1505 “On Guarantee of Functioning of the Official, Russian and other Languages in the AR of Crimea” No. 214 of October 18, 2006; “On Progress of Implementation of Resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea on Issues of Use the Official, Russian and other Languages in the AR of Crimea” No. 391 of March 22, 2007; “On Use of Languages at Organisation of Educational Process in Educational Establishments of the AR of Crimea” No. 905 of June 18, 2008; “On Appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Need of Conduct of External Independent Evaluation of Progress in Studies of Graduates of Educational Establishments of the AR of Crimea in the Languages of Study” No. 962 of September 17, 2008; “On Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendment of the Law of Ukraine “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” No. 3963 of September 17, 2008, and “On Constitutional Inquiry about Correspondence to the Constitution of Ukraine (Constitutionality) of Parts One and Two of Article 42 of the Law of Ukraine of December 21, 1993, No. 3759 “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” No. 1042 of November 19, 2008; “On Measures in Support for the Russian Language in the Field of Education in the AR of Crimea” No. 1248 of May 20, 2009.

³⁹ For more detail see subsection 2.2 of this section.

⁴⁰ In particular, the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Decision “On Inadmissibility of Conduct on the Territory of the AR of Crimea of the Ukrainian-US Military Exercise *Sea Breeze 2009*” No. 1211 of April 22, 2009; “On Barring Propaganda of Fascism and Racial Intolerance, Rehabilitation and Glorification of Fascist Collaborationists” No. 1213 of April 22, 2009 (the Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved by that Decision expresses protest against actions aimed at rehabilitation of OUN-UPA “and their leaders S.Bandera and R.Shukhevych”).

⁴¹ Crimea: people, problems, prospects. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, 2008, No. 10, pp.36-38

Corruption, creating artificial preferences or impediments for access of rank-and-file citizens to land resources, seriously aggravates tension in relations between different ethnic groups. Actually all publicised conflicts between representatives of different groups recorded in Crimea in the recent years stemmed from the land issue. The same is witnessed by the differentiation of answers of respondents from different socio-cultural groups: among Crimean Tatars, facts of corruption in land issues were encountered by 71% of those polled, among Russians – 63.1%, Ukrainians – 59.7%⁴².

In 2003, the Committee on Fighting Organised Crime and Corruption of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine noted the actual absence of reaction of Crimean law-enforcement bodies to the spread of unlawful acts and “evident corruption of officials of local authorities” in the land sector, replacement of fighting organised crime and corruption with “disclosure of minor crimes and administrative responsibility for corrupt acts of secondary officials”⁴³.

After the presidential elections of 2004, the new authorities pledged to step up efforts at fighting corruption. Within a year after the inauguration of President Elect V.Yushchenko, the supreme bodies of power passed a number of acts intended to step up that fight⁴⁴. Problems of corruption in Crimea were dealt with in

the NSDC decision of October 26, 2006, stating the need of implementation of a set of “additional measures at detection, prevention and suppression of cases of corruption and organised crime in the AR of Crimea”⁴⁵. In pursuance of anti-corruption initiatives of the central authorities, authorities of the AR of Crimea passed some decisions and took a number of measures⁴⁶.

For instance, according to the head of Crimean police M.Ilyichov, in the result of a special operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine on the territory of the AR of Crimea conducted on June 12, 2008, a “record” bribe in the amount of \$5.2 million was documented. That bribe was demanded by “functionaries from Partenit for allotment of 17 hectares of land”⁴⁷.

Departmental statistics of law-enforcement bodies and reports of Crimean authorities give corruption data in different forms, mixed with other data (e.g., of economic crime, see Insert “*Dynamics of economic crime in Crimea in 2005-2008*”), which complicates comparison of data and assessment of the real situation. For instance, the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the AR of Crimea presented in Insert reveal different assessments, and therefore, different approaches to fighting corruption.

Dynamics of economic crime in Crimea in 2005-2008				
	2005	2006	2007	2008
Detected crimes,	2,067	1,562	1,550	1,439
<i>in that, grave and especially grave</i>	1,011	657	588	565
Appropriation, embezzlement or capture of property through abuse of official powers,	418	267	282	332
<i>in that, on an especially large scale</i>	29	29	16	19
Legalisation (laundering) of proceeds of crime	13	10	13	14
Violation of legislation on the budget system of Ukraine	5	2	3	1
Official crimes,	982	745	648	571
<i>in that, abuse of power or office</i>	288	185	124	79
<i>bribery</i>	145	154	112	98

Source: “State and structure of crime in Ukraine” in the period of 2005-2008 (by year). – Official web site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, <http://www.mvs.gov.ua>

REPUBLICAN REPORT OF PROGRESS OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN 2008

“In 2008, compared to the previous year, the number of detected corrupt acts among state officials and representatives of local self-government bodies **increased by 11.2%** (139 cases in 2008 against 125 – in 2007). 43 out of 139 offences were closed in accordance with the procedure established by the law”.

The most common offences included: provision of unlawful preferences to individuals or legal entities at preparation and passage of relevant decisions; denial of information extension of which is envisaged by legal acts to individuals or legal entities; intentional delay of getting information; presentation of untrue or incomplete information; violation of the procedure of declaration; unlawful extension of bonuses and preferences to subordinates or unlawful obtaining of bonuses, awards upon the results of work; issue, signing of fake reports, forms, certificates; issue of various permits to individuals and legal entities without sufficient grounds; unlawful interference in activity of other state bodies or officials with the purpose of prevention of discharge of their powers.

* *Source:* Information on the work of executive bodies of the AR of Crimea, local self-government bodies and district state administrations in the AR of Crimea in 2008 in pursuance of the Law of Ukraine “On Fighting Corruption”, assignments of the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on that issue in 2008”, <http://www.crimea-portal.gov.ua>

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Decision of the Committee on Fighting Organised Crime and Corruption of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of November 19, 2003.

⁴⁴ See, e.g.: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution “On Progress of Fighting Organised Crime in 2004-2005” No. 3070-IV of November 3, 2005; President of Ukraine Decree “On Priority Measures at Legalisation of Economy and Countering Corruption” No. 1615 of November 18, 2005 and “On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of November 25, 2005 “On Establishment of Interdepartmental Commission of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine for All-Round Solution of Problems in the Field of Fighting Corruption” No. 1865 of December 28, 2005.

⁴⁵ See: President of Ukraine Decree “On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of September 20, 2006 “On Implementation of Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of February 8, 2006 “On social situation in the AR of Crimea”” No. 822 of October 10, 2006.

⁴⁶ See, e.g.: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea “On Organisation of Implementation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Directive No. 657p of August 15, 2007” No. 837 of December 13, 2007, <http://www.crimea-portal.gov.ua>

⁴⁷ N.Ilyichev: “Police has never had easy times”. – Public Relations Department of the Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea, <http://www.crm-mia.gov.ua/>



Proceeding from public assessments and media reports of facts of corruption in Crimea, it may be said that fighting corruption left the bulk of corrupt officials in the AR of Crimea intact. Isolated attempts of law-enforcement bodies to reach corruption on the upper levels of Crimean authorities were vain⁴⁸. It is proved by the answers of Crimeans to the question “*In the interests of who is the policy of central and local authorities being led in Crimea?*”. The relative majority of the polled, in view of the course of central and local authorities’ policy, put in the first place (with substantial prevalence) “interests of oligarchic clans” – 38.8% and 46.5%, accordingly.

The most publicised such case was the attempt to bring to responsibility for corrupt acts Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the autonomy A.Hrytsenko, that turned a public scandal⁴⁹. Apart from the failure of that attempt, some leaders of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea even proposed “steps in response” against Crimean law-enforcement bodies⁵⁰. This is not a unique case when actions of law-enforcement bodies persecuting for corrupt acts officials, even detained during commitment of a crime, met counteraction of local Crimean authorities⁵¹.

Such facts prove that fighting corruption has not become a priority for the central and local authorities alike. Meanwhile, the Crimean residents believe that elimination of corruption should be a priority task among the steps aimed at enhancement of the effectiveness of the central and republican authorities – respectively, 22% and 50.2%. The rating of other measures at enhancement of the effectiveness of the Crimean authorities looks as follows: development and implementation of the Crimea’s development strategy (42.4%), replacement of executives with more professional (40.9%) and accretion of powers of the autonomy authorities (23.7%)⁵².

Specific Crimean reasons of corruption include: ties between Crimean leaders and representatives of supreme Ukrainian institutes of power, leading political forces, enabling attainment of economic and property interests of the latter in Crimea⁵³; disinterest of representatives of Crimean authorities and local self-government bodies in liquidation of corrupt schemes in the most economically attractive sectors; corruption in the law-enforcement bodies and judicial system in Crimea⁵⁴.

Dependent on the nationality of corrupt officials and interested parties (that gained or suffered), cases of corruption may become a catalyst or even grow into inter-ethnic tension⁵⁵.

Therefore, fighting corruption in Crimea so far has produced no notable changes in the situation for the

better. Corruption was and still is one of the serious factors of conflicts on the peninsula, since it complicates solution of Crimean problems in general, especially where interests of representatives of different socio-cultural groups of the autonomy come to collision. Corrupt acts reduce the amount of resources, being the source of conflicts (first of all, land).

Absence of effective opposition to corruption undermines respect for the authorities (both central and Crimean), and therefore, their efforts at prevention of ethnic conflicts or their settlement.

2.2. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION OF CRIMEAN TATARS INTO UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

The growth of conflicts in social relations in the AR of Crimea is caused by the passivity and sometimes inconsistency of the central authorities at solution of political-legal, socio-economic and ethno-national problems, their attempts to escape interference in conflict situations, in the result of which disputable issues were solved not through the concerned institutes of power but by means of direct demonstration of the will and forcible actions of separate groups and entities.

All this causes accumulation of the critical mass of problems and protest potential, and the authorities cannot but interfere any more. And given the specificity of political preferences and the structure of central and Crimean authorities, unavailability of reliable assessments of the situation and effective tools of influence on it, such interference in many cases is inadequate, sometimes – biased against some national groups, which causes further escalation of tension.

Unsettled issues of legislative restoration of rights of repatriates, political and legal status of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, their national self-government bodies

Settlement of those issues is critical for the “temperature” of social relations in Crimea, since the absolute majority of repatriates are Crimean Tatars claiming the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine, as provided by the Ukrainian Constitution.

The political leadership of Crimean Tatars spoke of the need to solve those issues actually right after the beginning of the mass return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland. In particular, the Bill “On Measures at Practical Restoration of Rights of the Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities Subjected to Deportation and Genocide in the Years of World War II” prepared

⁴⁸ See, e.g.: Samar V. Babylon XXI. – “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya”, September 27, 2008.

⁴⁹ See, e.g.: Speaker Beat Up Witness, When Familiarised with Possible Corruption Case. – *Ukrayinska Pravda*, September 18, 2008, <http://www.pravda.com.ua>; Samar V. With Verbal Process. – “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya”, August 9, 2008.

⁵⁰ Vice Speaker of Parliament of the AR of Crimea proposes suspension of funding of Crimean militia. – UNIAN, October 2, 2008.

⁵¹ See, e.g.: Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea requests General Prosecutor of Ukraine to investigate validity of participation of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in detention of a village council chairman in the autonomy. – UNIAN, October 2, 2008.

⁵² By contrast to rank-and-file citizens, experts prioritised other measures at enhancement of the effectiveness of the Crimean authorities: development and implementation of the Crimea’s development strategy – 66.3%, elimination of corruption – 53.8%, replacement of personnel with more professional – 47.5%, change of the party contingent and lines of policy – 28.8%, expansion of powers – 17.5%.

⁵³ E.g., according to former Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea H.Moskal, “stand of some executives of the General Prosecutor’s Office enabled release from custody of a member of the Supreme Council of the AR of Crimea O.Melnyk detained by a special group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor’s Office investigating notorious crimes of past years, considered the leader of one of former Crimean organised criminal groups *Seilem*”. See: Karavan V. “Moskal. Not a Ceremonial General”. – “Fokus”, November 6, 2006, <http://focus.in.ua>

⁵⁴ See, e.g.: Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Yevdokymov calls upon Crimean police to clean their ranks of turncoats. – UNIAN, September 7, 2006.

⁵⁵ See, e.g.: Samar V. Minefield guide. – “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya”, August 30, 2008.

by Majlis in 1992 contained a set of interrelated key provisions, providing for the following⁵⁶:

- Ukraine's condemnation of deportation and assumption of responsibility for practical restoration of rights of repatriates, while respecting rights and interests of all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their nationality;
- creation on the central and republican levels of mechanisms to control the observance of the Law, involving Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people; recognition of Majlis as a party representing the Crimean Tatar people in solution of all issues dealing with the exercise of its rights;
- development of a State Programme of return and restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people with the purpose of effective and planned use of resources needed for practical restoration of rights of persons subjected to repressions;
- recognition of the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-identification and restoration of its statehood on the ground that it was formed on the territory of the Crimean peninsula (i.e., recognition of its status as an indigenous people, although the term is not used in the document);
- specification of the forms, scope and mechanisms of reimbursement of material and moral damage inflicted to repatriates by deportation.

Over the period of independence, bills on those issues were submitted to Ukraine's Parliament (mainly by MPs representing the Crimean Tatar people), but they remain unsettled even now (see Insert "*Legislative initiatives aimed at settlement of political and legal problems of the Crimean Tatar people*", p.40).

Those problems caused complication of the situation in the AR of Crimea, first of all, intensification and radicalisation of the protest activity of Crimean Tatars⁵⁷. By the beginning of 2000s, the situation was only somewhat mitigated, but the conflict potential in the Crimea remained high⁵⁸.

In April, 2000, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine hosted parliamentary hearings "Problems of legislative regulation and implementation of the state policy of guarantee of rights of Crimean Tatar people and national minorities that were deported and voluntarily return to Ukraine".

The Recommendations of the hearings, *first*, noted that the Ukrainian state "should establish a set of political and legal conditions guaranteeing preservation and development of the Crimean Tatar ethnos in Ukraine and its equal participation in political, economic and cultural life of the state", given that "the historic Motherland of Crimean Tatars where they were formed as an ethnos lies on the territory and under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian state"⁵⁹. *Second*, the document contains two provisions fundamental for settlement of political and legal problems of Crimean Tatars:

- the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was advised to "take measures for development and passage of laws dealing with implementation of provisions of Article 11, 92 (Item 3) of the Constitution of Ukraine (*concerning indigenous peoples and state guarantees of their rights – Ed.*), and guarantee of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people and national minorities that were deported and voluntarily return to Ukraine";
- the President of Ukraine was advised to "give assignment of signing of the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries" (*prior to the adoption of the relevant UN Declaration, that document made the core of the international legal framework on the status and rights of indigenous peoples. – Ed.*).

So, Ukraine's Parliament yet in 2000 admitted legal grounds for satisfaction of the main political and legal requirements of Crimean Tatars. However, recommendations of the Verkhovna Rada are not implemented even now.

So, compared to early 2000s, the situation with solution of the key political and legal problems of Crimean Tatars actually did not change⁶⁰. It is shaped by the stand of the parties to settlement of political and legal problems of Crimean Tatars, namely: political leadership of the Crimean Tatar people, on one hand, and the Ukrainian authorities – on the other.

Specific of the stand of the political leadership of Crimean Tatars are clear strategic goals, push and insistence at their achievement. The main means of their attainment include legislative initiatives pushed through representation in the bodies of power, presence in the public political space (statements, declarations, forums) and ties with international organisations⁶¹.

⁵⁶ Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars. <http://www.cidct.org.ua/ru/publications>

⁵⁷ See: The Crimea on the political map of Ukraine..., pp. 8-9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

⁵⁹ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution "On Recommendations of Parliamentary Hearings "Problems of Legislative Regulation and Implementation of the State Policy of Guarantee of rights of the Crimean Tatar People and National Minorities that Were Deported and Voluntarily Return to Ukraine"" No. 1660 of April 20, 2000.

⁶⁰ See: The Crimea on the political map of Ukraine..., pp.17-20.

⁶¹ See, e.g.: Appeal of the Crimean Tatars people "Defend us from discrimination – help restore our rights". – OSCE Conference on Combating Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, Romania, Bucharest, June 7-8, 2007. http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2007/06/24962_ru.pdf. The Appeal mentions the key problems of Crimean Tatars: extinction of rights at privatisation; absence of compensation of lost property; discrimination at employment; discrimination of the Crimean Tatar language; eradication of the cultural heritage; distortion of historic place names; evasion of legislative establishment of the status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine and restoration of its rights.



The political leadership of Crimean Tatars views the status of an indigenous people as a key precondition for preservation of the Crimean Tatar people and all-round exercise of its rights⁶². The rights of Crimean Tatars are to be exercised through national self-government bodies recognised by the state – Kurultay and Majlis – that should have effective channels of interaction with the Crimean Tatar community, Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, the Diaspora and international organisations⁶³.

The stand of the authorities in those issues may generally be termed as rather passive. In the legislative activity, it takes the form of “reaction” to legislative initiatives of Crimean Tatars⁶⁴, showing no practical interest and making no sufficient practical efforts for solution of the existing problems⁶⁵. In particular, Crimean Tatars argue that the “Ukrainian state over the years of independence has not passed a single legislative acts aimed at restoration of political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Crimean Tatar people, which is the reason of preservation of actual inequality and discrimination of Crimean Tatars”⁶⁶.

Those statements are reasonable insofar as they deal with the main political and legal requirements of Crimean Tatars, since there are no legislative acts aimed at restoration

of rights of repatriates and on the status of indigenous peoples of Ukraine. Such stand of the authorities may stem from: the absence of an integral idea of the ways to problem solution; fear of their possible consequences (both socio-political and socio-economic); assessment of available resources as insufficient to support legislatively provided measures at satisfaction of the requirements of Crimean Tatars. Of course, the political factor may also play a role.

Passivity of the central authorities leads to conservation of the situation and resultant growth of tension in society. Some signs of breaking the ice appeared at a meeting of Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yu.Tymoshenko with Majlis Leader M.Dzhemilev on October 31, 2008. During the meeting, the parties considered and came to an agreement on issues of restoration of social and political rights of “Crimean Tatars as an integral indigenous people of Crimea”, legal provision of those rights, return to Crimea of 100 thousand Crimean Tatars staying in places of deportation”, etc.⁶⁷

But non-performance of the promises given by the Government made Crimean Tatars picket the Cabinet of Ministers in May 2009, which with time evolved into a political protest action⁶⁸.

Problems of Crimean Tatars and approaches to their solution are closely interrelated and require systemic, considerate and well-reasoned decisions. The most controversial political issue is the legal status of indigenous peoples of Ukraine and their national self-government bodies⁶⁹, especially in view of perception of their solution by the Slavic community of Crimea.

Meanwhile, the need of solution of the problem of restoration of rights of deported peoples as directly dealing with basic human rights is beyond doubt, and opposition to its solution is mainly caused by different forces fighting for natural resources in Crimea. The central and republican authorities should primarily concentrate on the removal of that impediment⁷⁰.

⁶² “If we want to preserve Crimean Tatars as a people with a rich original culture, provide economic and political conditions for true equality, such decisions (*passage of the law on the status of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people of Ukraine – Ed.*) are inevitable. And we are proposed to confine ourselves with the status of a national minority, which means assimilation and ethnic death. Of course, we will never agree to that”. See: Bekirov N. Crimean Tatar problem in connection with legislative support for rights of nationalities in Ukraine. – Materials of the conference “Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian society: problems of political and social integration”. – Kyiv, November 26-27, 1998, p.28.

⁶³ Procedures of Kurultay and Regulations of Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people. – Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, <http://www.cidct.org.ua>

⁶⁴ We leave beyond the scope of this study actions of the authorities dealing with amenities for repatriates and satisfaction of their socio-economic and socio-cultural needs.

⁶⁵ For more detail on its possible reasons see subsection 2.1 of this section.

⁶⁶ Resolution of the all-Crimean mourning meeting devoted to the memory of victims of the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people – deportation of May 18, 1944, and decades of its forcible retention in the places of exile. See web site “Crimea and Crimean Tatars”, May 18, 2009, <http://kirimtatar.com>

⁶⁷ On the road to the Crimean Tatar autonomy. – “Odnarodina”, December 18, 2008, <http://odnarodyna.ru/articles/6/415>. Many political figures and experts have doubts concerning the risk of the reached arrangements becoming a subsidiary coin at the following presidential elections. See: Power play: Presidential Secretariat prepares mass riots of Crimean Tatars to overthrow Tymoshenko? – Relying on the materials of RIA “Novyi Region”, April 4, 2009, <http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/main/20094/0124>

⁶⁸ Crimean Tatars promise to cut Ukraine’s road to the European Union. – “Kyivska Pravda”, June 9, 2009, <http://ua.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/6/9/96170>

⁶⁹ See, e.g.: Decision of Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar people “On Situation Concerning the Law of Ukraine “On Restoration of Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds”. – Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, <http://www.cidct.org.ua>

⁷⁰ For more detail on the possible ways to solve political and legal problems of the Crimean Tatar people see the article by Yu.Yakymenko published in this magazine.

LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES AIMED AT SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE

Bills on the status of the Crimean Tatar people¹

Since 1999, two bills “**On the Status of the Crimean Tatar people**” have been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The first one was drawn up by Ukraine’s MP R.Bezsmertnyi, **No. 4041 of September 10, 1999. Main features:** definition of the legal status of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people of Ukraine; creation of the State Register of the Crimean Tatar people (on a voluntary basis); guaranteed representation of the Crimean Tatar people in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (not less than 15% of total deputies); recognition of Kurultay and Majlis as representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people and powers of Majlis in relations with Ukrainian state authorities; commitments of the state with respect to the Crimean Tatar people.

The bill was not put on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and, respectively, not considered by it.

The second was the bill prepared by people’s deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 4th convocation R.Bezsmertnyi, M.Dzhemilyov, V.Taran and R.Chubarov **No. 4098 of September 3, 2005.**

The bill mainly repeated provisions of the previous one.

Meanwhile, it also listed grounds for recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as indigenous (Article 2), specifically:

- its historic Motherland – the territory where it was formed as an ethnos – entirely lying within the borders of the Ukrainian state;
- preservation of its ethnic identity, different from the identity of the Ukrainian nation (title ethnos) and a national minority of Ukraine, and aspiration for conservation and development of such identity;
- unique language and culture;
- conservation and development of its own traditional ethnic institutes;
- absence of an ethnically identical national state or Motherland beyond Ukraine;
- self-perception of an indigenous people of Ukraine.

The bill also introduced the notion of local Majlises, representing interests of Crimean Tatars on the level of administrative-territorial units.

Article 3 laid down the key principles of the state policy with respect to the Crimean Tatar people: “establishment of a new type of relations between the state and indigenous people, resting on recognition of its ethnic, cultural, language and religious uniqueness”; “guarantee of effective involvement of the indigenous people in the process of decision-making of the state authorities and local self-government bodies pertaining to its life activity”.

Article 9 named representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people: **Kurultay** – the national congress of the Crimean Tatar people; **Majlis** of the Crimean Tatar people elected by the Kurultay delegates.

The latter bill was criticised by the Main Scientific Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada: “...passage of such Law can make an impression of legal inequality between the Crimean Tatar people, that has a separate Law “of its own”, and other peoples of Ukraine that have no such laws... In case of passage of this Law it is not ruled out that representatives of other national minorities will also demand passage of similar laws concerning their peoples”².

In June 2005, in the new political situation, the bill “On the Status of the Crimean Tatar People” **was termed by the newly elected President V.Yushchenko as urgent, but Parliament did not consider it.** In the Verkhovna Rada of the present convocation, relevant bills were not even registered.

Bills on restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds

In 2004, two Bills “On Restoration of Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds” were submitted for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, No. 4526 and No. 4526-1, respectively, by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and national deputies M.Dzhemilev and R.Chubarov. The governmental bill was taken as the basis and finalised with account of some provisions of the second bill, in particular, concerning categorisation of repatriates on the basis of their belonging to the Crimean Tatar people, and a few articles added, specifying the concrete forms of restoration of rights of repatriates (e.g., compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction) and concrete obligations of the state in that respect (the bill of M.Dzhemilyov and R.Chubarov mentioned among such forms restitution – an issue concealing a serious conflict potential; the term was removed from the agreed bill, although the essence of the relevant form of restoration of rights was preserved in the article dealing with compensation).

The law was passed by the Verkhovna Rada and sent to President L.Kuchma for signing. **The President returned it** with reservations and proposals. One of the most serious reservations was that it “grants a special status to deportees and specifies the procedure of compensation of their associated losses, **proceeding from affiliation of the persons with the Crimean Tatar people**, not from facts of violation of human rights committed with respect to such persons. This directly contradicts provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine and may question the constitutional definition of the Ukrainian people as the community of Ukrainian citizens of all nationalities”. With the President’s proposal, the Law might be adopted. However, that did not happen because of political developments of late 2004 - early 2005.

In 2005, Ukraine’s MPs M.Syatynya and S.Ratushnyak submitted the Bill “**On Restoration of Rights of Ownership of Individuals Forcibly Taken by Bodies of the USSR**” No. 8332 of October 21, 2005. It **received a negative conclusion of the Cabinet of Ministers and was not reviewed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.**

In 2008, the **Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine** submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration the Bill “**On Restoration of Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds**” No. 3142 of September 11, 2008. It defined the category of deported persons as those “who were citizens of the former USSR and in the period of 1941-1944 were deported on ethnic grounds from places of permanent residence within the present territory of Ukraine, and settled in another place prescribed by the authorities of the former USSR (special settlement)”. Therefore, ethnic grounds were not used to define deported persons.

By and large, the bill was rather concise: by contrast to the one passed in 2004 and vetoed down by L.Kuchma, it contained only the general lines of the state policy of restoration of deported persons’ rights and specified powers of the authorities and self-government bodies at its implementation without mentioning concrete measures. That is, from the viewpoint of interests of the Crimean Tatar people, it may be seen as a step back, compared to the previous one.

Meeting Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yu.Tymoshenko on October 31, 2008, the Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev suggested **withdrawal of that bill from the Verkhovna Rada**, to be replaced with a new version drawn up on the basis of the bill passed by the Verkhovna Rada in 2004. According to media reports, “**the participants of the meeting agreed to work out new approaches to this issue in the near future**”³.

On May 13, 2009, the draft Law of Ukraine “On restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds” No. 3142 submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was considered by the Committee on European Integration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The bill was termed as not contrary to the European law, and recommended to be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine after finalisation, for basic passage.

¹ For the texts of the bills, memos and expert conclusions see: Official web site of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, <http://www.rada.gov.ua>

² Some scholars see the variety of interpretations of the mentioned categories and the vagueness of conceptual principles of political nation and civil society building in Ukraine as a deficiency of Ukraine’s Constitution itself, and note the controversy of introduction of the term of “indigenous nations” thereto. See, e.g.: Kotyhorenko V. Crimean Tatar repatriates: problem of social adaptation. – Kyiv, 2005, p.189; Nahorna L. Regional identity: Ukrainian context. – Kyiv, I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2008.

³ “Tymoshenko Interested in Meetings...” – “Avdet”, November 3, 2008.



Hindrance of provision of amenities for repatriates⁷¹

Starting from 1991, they in the AR of Crimea built for repatriates at the expense of state and republican budget funds 444.5 thousand m² of housing (against the required 700-800 thousand m²), seven schools for 2,043 pupils, laid 873.6 km of water supply lines, 1,181.5 km of power lines, 44 km of roads, 340 km of gas supply lines, commissioned other social and cultural facilities⁷².

The effectiveness of measures aimed at provision of amenities for repatriates, especially Crimean Tatars⁷³, is insufficient. According to the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, at provision of amenities for repatriates in 2007-2008, planned terms of commissioning of housing and utility facilities, water, gas and electricity networks were disrupted. Some social facilities and residential buildings remain non-operational, so that repatriates cannot get proper services⁷⁴.

The unemployment rate remains high – according to the Razumkov Centre polls, 12% of Crimean Tatars are unemployed (among Slavs – 3.7%; “Crimean Ukrainians” – 4.7%; Crimean average – 5%). 60% of Crimean Tatar families do not have enough money even for food. For many of them, pension and retail trade are the main sources of subsistence.

One should admit that similar problems are experienced by the rest of the Crimean population. However, Crimean Tatars are seen as a special problem group because of the controversy of issues of their settlement, provision with land and housing. Hindrance of solution of those issues causes social tension in the AR of Crimea, gaining traits of a pre-conflict situation.

Settlement. Acuteness of the problems of settlement of Crimean Tatars is caused by the legislative uncertainty of the rights of deportees, passivity of the central authorities and reluctance of some bodies of the Crimea to solve issues of Crimean Tatars to the detriment of the rights of

the Russian-speaking population on whose support they rely, and the main thing – to the detriment of their own “business projects” of distribution of land plots. **Crimean Tatars rest their requirements** on the fact that they “not simply return to Crimea, they return to their roots. But the **Crimean authorities** do not take into account the national interests of Tatars and settle them on land at their discretion”⁷⁵.

There are 300 localities and areas of compact residence of repatriates in Crimea now. Most of all Crimean Tatars (15 thousand people and more) live in Simferopol, Bahchysarayskiy, Bilogirskiy, Dzhankoyskiy, Krasnogvardiyskiy, Sakskiy rayons (districts) (66% of all repatriates). Crimean Tatar city population is mainly concentrated (2.5 thousand persons and more) in the cities of Simferopol, Sudak, Feodosiya, Alushta, Dzhankoy, Kerch, Yalta (some 20%). In no district of Crimea, they are in a majority, making from 33.7% in Bilogirskiy district to 9.2% – in Dzhankoyskiy district.

The problem of settlement of Crimean Tatars has two dimensions: the “problem of the South-Eastern coast” and the problem of settlement in rural areas – in their turn, closely related with provision of Crimean Tatars with land and housing.

“Problem of the South-Eastern coast”. According to the 1939 census, 218.9 thousand Crimean Tatars lived in the Crimean ASSR, 75% of them – in villages, 25% – in cities. All in all, Crimean Tatars made 10.2% of the total city and 29% of the village population of the republic. They mainly lived on the South-Eastern coast of Crimea. In rural areas, Crimean Tatars were concentrated in Sudakskiy (89.2% of the district population), Yaltinskiy (81.4%), Bahchysarayskiy (79%), Sevastopolskiy (63.7%) and Karasubazarskiy (46.8%) districts. Among the city population, Crimean Tatars were in a majority only in Bakhchysaray (71%) and Gurzuf (54.7%). In other cities of the South-Eastern coast their share in the population made 12-43%⁷⁶.

⁷¹ Official data of provision of resources for repatriates in Crimea are fragmentary, varied, their trustworthiness arouses doubts, which complicates or even bars their summarisation. Absence of a cadastre registration system in land management and land relations makes any statistics in that sector unreliable. That is why the study mainly relied on estimates of trends (not absolute figures) of separate indices, and prudent use of official data and their comparison with data from independent sources.

⁷² Report by Director of Department for Affairs of Former Deportees on Ethnic Grounds “Implementation of the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deported Crimean Tatars and Persons of Other Nationalities Who Returned for Residence to Ukraine, their Adaptation and Integration into Ukrainian Society”. May 8, 2009, <http://www.scnm.gov.ua/article/132148?annId=132149>. On the need for housing, see: Formation of ethnic tolerance in Crimea through joint activity of national cultural societies. *Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative*, <http://lgi.osi.hu/ethnic/csdb/doc/rkoroste.doc>. The possibility to buy housing for own funds was extremely limited: as of June, 2002, the value of 1-2-bedroom apartments in Central Asian cities where repatriates used to live ranged from \$650 to \$1,500, in the Crimean cities – from \$7,000 to \$12,000 (on the South-Eastern coast – 15-20 times more). The average value of movement of a family of four exceeded \$1,000. See: Representative of Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people in Central Asia. Reference “On issues and problems faced by deported Crimean Tatars returning from the Republic of Uzbekistan to Ukraine” of July 22, 2002. – “Crimea and Crimean Tatars”, http://www.kirimtatar.com/Problems/spravka_2207

⁷³ According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, as of January, 2009, there were 253.95 thousand deportees in the AR of Crimea, including 249.7 thousand Crimean Tatars and 4.2 thousand persons of other nationalities.


⁷⁴ Programme of amenities for repatriates in Crimea is not implemented. – Accounting Chamber Press Service, February 11, 2009, http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=1372474&cat_id=411

⁷⁵ Chubarov calls upon the central authorities to pay attention to the problem of illegal use of land resources in Crimea. – UNIAN, November 12, 2007.

⁷⁶ Khayali R. Crimean Tatar people in the population of the Crimean ASSR (1921-1939). – http://www.nbu.gov.ua/Articles/Kultnar/knp66/knp66_74-80.pdf. See also: Kabachyi R. From the other world. Non-violent return to Crimea became the cause of several generations of Crimean Tatars. – “Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden”, February 27, 2000, pp.42-43.



STATE OF SETTLEMENT AND AMENITIES




FOR CRIMEAN TATARS IN CRIMEA

Volumes of TV and radio broadcasting by state companies in Crimea *

	TV BROADCASTING, incl.			RADIO BROADCASTING, incl.		
	Daily average, hours	% in Ukrainian	% in Russian	Daily average, hours	% in Ukrainian	% in Russian
1999	9.5	11.7	76.3	5.5	5.5	80.0
2001	7.3	35.6	52.1	2.7	18.5	66.7
2003	7.0	42.9	47.1	2.4	22.1	59.6
2005	8.45	37.9	53.8	2.26	26.6	53.5
2007	14.0	52.9	40.7	3.00	26.7	50.0

* Source: Main Department of the State Statistics Committee in the AR of Crimea.





During repatriation, Crimean Tatars returning to their homeland were 90% channelled to the Steppe Crimea, three quarters – to rural areas⁷⁷. Some 60% of repatriates who before deportation and in exile lived in cities had to settle down in villages and city suburbs⁷⁸, competing with the local population on the labour market and in access to material benefits. Combined with ineffectiveness and inadequate actions of the authorities, **this prompts escalation of social tension, growth of the protest potential in the area, causes emergence of local conflicts.**

The number and intensity of such conflicts grew in 2006-2008. According to then Permanent Representative of Ukraine's President in the AR of Crimea H.Moskal, from January till October, 2006, there were 9,636 mass protests, which is three times more than in the same period of 2005 (3,047). 8,846 actions (91.8%) were organised by Crimean Tatars⁷⁹.

Protests were radicalising; at times, they grew into open clashes involving law-enforcement bodies (sometimes inadequately, with arms and even armoured vehicles)⁸⁰. The most publicised were the incidents in Bakhchysaray on July 8, 2006,⁸¹ and the conflict on the Ai-Petri plateau in November, 2007.⁸²

Problems of settlement in rural areas. According to the 2001 census, the ratio of the village and city population of Crimean Tatars in the AR of Crimea was 2:1, of Russians – 1:2.4, Ukrainians – 1:1.4. Now, some 72% of Crimean Tatars live in rural areas. The Chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea for Inter-Ethnic Relations R.Ilyasov said in his presentation at a Congress of the Crimean Tatar people on May 20, 2009, that three quarters of settlements housing Crimean Tatars were provided with running water and some 98% – with electricity. The level of provision with gas does not exceed 15%. Only 12% of settlements have paved roads. Sewerage networks are actually absent. Issues of transport communication and telephone lines in settlements also remain unresolved⁸³.

Amenities in villages are a common Crimean problem. Monitoring of rural areas showed that 568 out of over 1,000 villages and urban-type settlements accommodating nearly 38% of the autonomy's population as of May 26, 2008, had no educational establishments, 485 – post offices, 483 – pharmacies, 296 – healthcare establishments, 188 – shops. 143 settlements were not provided with public transport, 135 – with running water⁸⁴.

Rural areas report a high unemployment rate. The most critical situation with employment is observed in Kirovskiy, Krasnoperekopskiy, Sovetskiy, Chornomorskiy districts⁸⁵. 55% of Crimean Tatar families living in rural areas do not have enough money even for foodstuffs (in the "Slavic community" – 52%, Crimean average – 46.8%)⁸⁶. Many of them have to live on a pension and proceeds from retail trade, while pensioners make the most numerous group of Crimean Tatars – almost 32% (in the "Slavic community" – 23%, Crimean average – 26.1%). For Crimean Tatars, the situation is aggravated by alleged discrimination at sharing of farming land (see below).

Poor living conditions are another reason "driving" villagers, including Crimean Tatars, from rural areas in search of a better life to cities, mainly on the South-Eastern coast. Along with the desire to return home and attractiveness of the southern territories of the peninsula, this exerts additional pressure on internal migration, mainly directed from the Steppe Crimea to the South-Eastern coast (see map, pp.42-43), densely populated by representatives of the Slavic community, leading to the growth of tension between the two socio-cultural groups.

Provision of repatriates with non-farming land plots is the acutest Crimean problem.

According to representatives of the **republican authorities and local self-government bodies**, Crimean Tatars are already provided with land better than representatives of all other ethnic groups, but try to get

⁷⁷ Data of the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Persons under the Council of Ministers of Crimea, <http://www.comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua>

⁷⁸ Integration of Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society: problems and prospects. Analytical assessments of the National Institute of Strategic Studies. – Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005, <http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/krim.htm>

⁷⁹ Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea H.Moskal suggests that the situation with squatters on the peninsula went out of control. – Interfax Ukraine, October 24, 2006.

⁸⁰ See: Ishyn A., Bednarskiy O., Shvets I. On the issue of manifestations of ethno-political contradictions in Crimea at the present stage. – Simferopol, Regional branch of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005, p.34.

⁸¹ S.Kunitsyn: "Bahchysaray events are the result of distortions and mistakes in inter-ethnic relations" – UNIAN, August 17, 2006.

⁸² Confrontation in Crimea: armed "Berkut" attacked Ai-Petri. – UNIAN, November 6, 2007.

⁸³ Presentation by the Chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea for Inter-Ethnic Relations R.Ilyasov at the Congress of the Crimean Tatar people. – <http://hatanm.org.ua/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=1827.0>

⁸⁴ Crimean Public Prosecutor's Office drew up a map of socially unfit regions of the peninsula. – REGNUM news agency, <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1006356.html>

⁸⁵ On socio-economic standing of the AR of Crimea in 2008. – Main Statistic Department in the AR of Crimea, Simferopol, 2009.

⁸⁶ The financial crisis substantially deteriorated the standing of Crimean Tatar families; the number of families who do not have enough money even for food increased among Crimean Tatars 3.3 times, against 1.6 times in the Slavic community. Estimate made by comparison of the results of polls of October 18 – November 9, 2008 and 2009.



more land, seizing attractive land plots for subsequent resale⁸⁷, intentionally provoking “land” conflicts⁸⁸. In particular, the stand of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea is that the land issue in Crimea should be solved irrespective of the nationality of citizens⁸⁹, and therefore, Crimean Tatars have no special rights to land plots on the peninsula.

On their part, **representatives of Crimean Tatars** refute reports of the Crimean authorities saying that Crimean Tatars are well provided with land⁹⁰ (insert “*Provision of repatriates with non-farming land*”). They stress that squatting is prompted by the poor

material standing and sense of injustice at division of land for the benefit of persons connected with the authorities⁹¹.

The scanty reserve of land intended for repatriates, non-transparency of the process and low effectiveness of control of the authorities greatly sharpen the problem, contributing to the flight of land to the grey market using corrupt schemes⁹² and provoking Crimean Tatars to squat land. According to the Minister of Environmental Protection of Ukraine, as of April, 2009, 74 cases of squatting land with the total area of 1.7 thousand hectares were recorded in Crimea⁹³.

PROVISION OF REPATRIATES WITH NON-FARMING LAND

As of December, 2008, total of 400.8 thousand land plots with an area of 48.4 thousand hectares were allotted for individual housing construction. Repatriates received 82.4 thousand plots (20.5% of total) with an area of 9.8 thousand hectares (12%).

For commercial activity, 8,294 land plots with an area of 1,650 hectares were allotted, in that, 1,055 plots (nearly 12%) with an area of 65 hectares (4%) – to repatriates.

By and large, land plots for individual housing construction and commercial activity were granted to 58% of the repatriates who expressed such need, or 21% of their total number.

The issue of allocation of land plots is especially acute in big cities (Alushta, Yalta, Sudak, Simferopol, Feodosiya), where the number of applications for land plots exceeds the number of local repatriates, in particular, in the result of intra-regional migration.

To solve that, a stock of land should be created. In pursuance of the President of Ukraine Decree¹, the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea drafted a programme of provision of repatriates with land for individual construction², providing for the allocation of land plots with the total area of approximately 3,920.4 hectares. The task can partially be solved at the expense of land controlled by some state and non-state structures but not needed to them or used ineffectively.

For instance, according to the State Land Inspection in the AR of Crimea, as of May 28, 2009, 1,127.4 hectares of the lands mentioned in the draft programme were permanently used by various state and non-state structures, including:

- the Ministry of Agricultural Policy of Ukraine – 413.4 hectares;
- the Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the AR of Crimea – 598 hectares;

- the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine – 62 hectares.

Another 41 hectares belong to forest lands, 13 hectares – to the natural reserve stock³. The State Land Inspection in the AR of Crimea reported that all those lands were used ineffectively or non-productively, but their transfer was impossible without passage and coordination of relevant decisions by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the AR of Crimea, republican authorities and local self-government bodies. However, those efforts continuously meet artificial bureaucratic barriers.

The main roots of problems in provision of repatriates with land plots include:

- uncompleted cadastre registration system, inventory of land, delimitation of land staying in state and communal ownership;
- uncompleted register of repatriates entitled to and claiming social assistance, housing and land plots for individual housing construction (as of January, 2009, the electronic database of the consolidated register of repatriates and their families contained data of only 115.9 thousand persons, or less than 40% of their total number);
- absence of regulatory provided mechanisms of refusal of owners or users from land plots offered for the programme of provision of repatriates with land and their transfer to local self-government bodies for subsequent allocation to repatriates;
- slow pace of development of city planning documentation necessary for passage of decisions of land allocation for housing construction, etc.

¹ President of Ukraine Decree “On Additional Measures to Guarantee Observance of the Right to Land for Citizens Living on the Territory of the AR of Crimea” No. 435 of May 14, 2008.

² Draft Comprehensive Regional Programme of Allocation of Land Plots for Individual Construction to Citizens Deported on Ethnic Grounds and their Descendants Who Returned for Permanent Residence in the AR of Crimea and Previously Obtained no Land Plots for Construction and Maintenance of Residential Buildings, through 2010.

³ Information report by the State Land Inspection, <http://www.dzi.com.ua/page25.html>

⁸⁷ Crimean Tatars sell out land “won over” from the authorities by squatting and mass riot. – “Novyi Region – Krym”. August 30, 2006.

⁸⁸ Crimean Vice Premiere: There is no inter-ethnic enmity in the autonomy, but a desire of the Crimean Tatar leaders to create a conflict. – UNIAN, August 10, 2006.

⁸⁹ See: Crimean Parliament believes that the situation with allotment of land on the peninsula did not approve and shows a worsening trend – Interfax-Ukraine, December 20, 2006.

⁹⁰ See: Crimean Tatars cut Yalta-Simferopol road, demanding solution of land issue. – UNIAN, March 17, 2007.

⁹¹ See: Majlis leader told who seized land in Crimea, and how much of it is held by deputies. – “Ukrayinska Pravda”, March 17, 2009, www.pravda.com.ua

⁹² See, e.g.: Kunitsyn told how Yanukovych and Azarov got land “for free”. – “Ukrayinska Pravda”, March 3, 2009, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/3/3/90585>. According to the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the AR of Crimea, inspections of observance of the land legislation in 2008 revealed new facts of abuses in land management, unlawful withdrawal of territories protected by the law, use of fake documents and unreasoned court rulings for illegitimate seizure of land. Facts of use of fake decisions of local authorities, applications and lists of citizens were revealed in Bahchysaray and Simferopol districts, the city of Simferopol. All in all, in 2008, Public Prosecutor’s Offices in the AR of Crimea initiated 15 criminal cases for violations of the land legislation. Numerous violations were revealed in the activity of officials of executive and local self-government bodies – unlawful decisions of allotment of territories of the preserve and forest stock and withdrawal of land from state enterprises were cancelled.

⁹³ 74 cases of squatting land with the total area of 1.7 thousand hectares were recorded in Crimea. – Ministry of Environment. – Information agency “RBK-Ukraine”, April 15, 2009, <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/newsline/2009/04/15/531519>



In many instances, grey dealers (high-ranking officials, influential politicians, Ukrainian and Russian businessmen), using the hard material standing of Crimean Tatar families, buy up land intended for repatriates for a song⁹⁴. Meanwhile, grey operations with land more than once involved Crimean Tatars⁹⁵, which causes indignation in the Slavic community and provides an argument for rejection of Crimean Tatar claims to land.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

R: "Indeed, there is no problem as such, until someone is trying to earn with the "hymn of national minorities". It appears that if they seize land, everything gets by, nobody is punished. If Ukrainians or Russians did that, I guess that tomorrow, a militia regiment would raze them to ground..."

U: "...Crimean Tatars sooner than we push decisions for their benefit ... No Ukrainian or Russian will go, write an application and get a land plot, even in bad need, as fast as a Tatar will do... I know no Ukrainian or Russian who affords behaving like that, and who is allowed to behave like that".

T: "... If we file documents to get a land plot as envisaged by the law, they do not even put me on the queue, as a Crimean Tatar, I don't know on what grounds. Or they accept documents, and then say: "you are refused", referring to lots of unclear clauses".

More than that, squatting is specific of not only Crimean Tatars – it is ever more used by representatives of the Slavic community. According to the Majlis estimates, Crimean Tatars are responsible for only a quarter of cases of squatting⁹⁶. Meanwhile, republican law-enforcement bodies persecute mainly Crimean Tatars⁹⁷.

Provision with farming land. According to estimates made by activists of the Crimean Tatar national movement, before the beginning of forced deportation in 1944, over 90% of Crimean Tatars lived in rural areas⁹⁸. All the adult population of Crimean villages was made up of members of collective farms and other agricultural enterprises with the total area of 732.4 thousand hectares⁹⁹.

According to the State Statistics Committee of the AR of Crimea, in 2000, the rural population of Crimea

was **16.2%** made up by Crimean Tatars (158.3 thousand persons, more than 75% of them – able-bodied adults). At the time of land sharing, 199.3 thousand Crimean collective farmers were entitled to land tenures, including **18.3** thousand Crimean Tatars. Certificates for land tenures were issued to 191.8 thousand Crimeans, including **16.9** thousand Crimean Tatars, making only some **9%** of all certificate holders, or nearly **14%** of the adult able-bodied Crimean Tatar rural population¹⁰⁰.

According to the Republican Committee for Land Resources, by 2003, the situation somewhat improved: 77.2 thousand Crimean Tatars got land plots (or permits for their allotment) with an area of 178.1 thousand hectares¹⁰¹. As of December 2008, due to migration and changes in the structure of land ownership¹⁰², the number of land plot owners among Crimean Tatars decreased (to 72.2 thousand persons), while the area of the plots increased (to 186.1 thousand hectares)¹⁰³. The average area of a personal farmstead of repatriates is 1.71 hectares (Crimean average – 1.96 hectares)¹⁰⁴.

Low quality of land granted to Crimean Tatars¹⁰⁵, poor living conditions in villages, problems with water supply for irrigation, practical absence of assistance from the central and republican authorities greatly complicate farming activity of Crimean Tatars and **contribute to the growth of social tension in and beyond places of their compact settlement.**

Provision with housing. In 1991-2008, nearly 6.1 thousand repatriate families got housing at the expense of budget funds of all levels, 36.7 thousand families solved their housing problem for their own expense¹⁰⁶. Before 2002, amenities for Crimean Tatars were provided under various annual plans and programmes (of housing, utility services, roads, etc). Starting from 2002, mid-term programmes of settlement and amenities for deported Crimean Tatars and persons of other nationalities that returned for residence to Ukraine, their adaptation and integration into Ukrainian society are implemented in Crimea¹⁰⁷. Despite the annual growth of absolute funding (except last year), there is

⁹⁴ Ryabov M. Majlis told how much land Yanukovich has in Crimea and how Russia buys up the peninsula. – "Novyi Region", March 17, 2009, <http://new-region-2.livejournal.com/39748338.html>

⁹⁵ M.Dzhemilev: "Being aware that the authorities will not give them the land anyway but they can earn at least something, some Crimean Tatars agreed to those disgraceful deals. However, given their hard social standing, I do not want to comment their actions. They got for such mediation almost nothing – not more than a thousand dollars for 400-600 square metres". See: Russians buy up Crimea, covering themselves with Tatars. – Rustbelt-Ukraine, March 17, 2009, <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/03/17/626354>

⁹⁶ M.Dzhemilev: "According to the Crimean Republican Committee for Land Resources, as of April 1, 2007, land seizures by Crimean Tatars accounted for 37% of all cases. Other seized territory falls on the Russian-speaking population". See: Majlis leader told who seized land in Crimea, and how much of it is held by deputies. – "Ukrayinska Pravda", March 17, 2009, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2009/3/17/91470>.

⁹⁷ "Many cases of unlawful occupation of land were covert, for bribes to functionaries or by an order from above and with silent consent of those who are supposed to protest aloud and write applications to public prosecutor's offices". See: Kasyanenko M. Sources of "carve-up". – "Den", January 24, 2008, <http://www.day.kiev.ua/195154>

⁹⁸ Those data differ from the data of the 1939 census cited above.

⁹⁹ Abduraimov V. Land and freedom? – "Ostrov Krym" almanac, No.1, 2002, <http://www.ok.archipelag.ru/part1/zemlya>

¹⁰⁰ Economic and legal problems of social adaptation and integration of Crimean repatriates. – Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, <http://www.cidct.org.ua/uk/publications/Etnopolitika/18>

¹⁰¹ Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Persons. Information on provision of previously deported persons with land plots in the AR of Crimea as of March 21, 2003. – <http://www.comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua/uk/index.php?v=1&tek=5&par=0&l=&art=48>

¹⁰² On problems of the land market, see: State land policy in Ukraine. – Working materials of Razumkov Centre for the Round-table "State and strategy of today's land policy in Ukraine", May 21, 2009, pp.4-13.

¹⁰³ Provision of previously deported population of the AR of Crimea with land plots. – State Committee of Ukraine for Land Resources. – <http://dkzr.gov.ua>

¹⁰⁴ Data of the Republican Committee for Land Resources and State Committee for Land Resources of late 2008 - early 2009.

¹⁰⁵ "Now, according to our surveys, Crimean Tatars in rural areas have per capita on the average 2.5 times less land than non-Tatars, let alone the quality of fallows and remoteness of land plots from places of residence". See: M.Dzhemilev: "We should have been thanked for having done everything we could to neutralise separatism in Crimea". – "Dzerkalo Tyzhnya", May 21, 2005, <http://www.zn.ua/1000/1030/50110>

¹⁰⁶ Report of the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Persons on implementation of the Programme ... in 2008, <http://www.comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua/rus/index.php?v=1&tek=5&par=0&l=&art=180>. According to the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea, some Crimean Tatars solved their housing problem with foreign assistance – from Turkey (1,000 families) and UAE (20 families).

¹⁰⁷ Cabinet of Ministers' Resolution "On Approval of the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deported Crimean Tatars and Persons of Other Nationalities Who Returned for Residence to Ukraine, their Adaptation and Integration into Ukrainian Society through 2005" No. 618 of May 16, 2002. The subsequent Programme through 2010 was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 637 of May 11, 2006. Now, two programmes are implemented in the AR of Crimea: governmental, funded from the state budget, and approved by a Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea No. 102-5 of June 21, 2006 – from the republican.



a trend towards underfunding of programme activities (both from the state and republican budgets), compared to the programme targets (Table “*Progress of implementation of the Programme of settlement of and amenities for deported Crimean Tatars...*”).

Given such funding, the high inflation rate in Crimea (in 2008 – 23.2%, as of May 2009 – 8.9%¹⁰⁸) and significant growth of prices of land and housing in the autonomy (at the beginning 2008 – some 45% a year¹⁰⁹), one may hardly hope for a higher pace of repatriate provision with housing than now – 340 apartments a year. If this pace persists, satisfaction of housing needs of repatriates will take 23 years (now, the housing queue includes some 7.8 thousand families of repatriates, or nearly 10% of all Crimean residents who need better housing conditions¹¹⁰).

Progress of implementation of the Programme of settlement of and amenities for deported Crimean Tatars..., as of December of the relevant year

	2006	2007	2008	2009 (plan)
State Budget, plan* UAH million	66.4	82.0	94.8	53.3
in fact, %	80.0	80.8	67.9	
Republican budget, plan* UAH million	24.5	26.0	30.0	
in fact, %	99.5	73.4	53.9	
Total, plan* UAH million	90.9	108.0	124.8	
in fact, %	85.1	79.0	64.5	
Construction of housing, M ²	7,803.7	11,520.5	5,971.4	7,800
Buyout of housing, M ²	5,737.3	1,254.1	823.7	
Power lines, km	5.6	9.9	7.3	5.8
Water supply networks, km	28.4	24.7	25.8	30.7
Gas supply networks, km	77.0	75.3	50.4	22.9
Telephone lines, km	–	1.25	–	–
Radio networks, km	–	1.25	–	–
Sewerage, km	0.7	–	–	–
Roads, km	2.6	–	–	–

* Envisaged by the Programme.

Source: Information of the Republican Committee for Affairs of Nationalities and Deported Persons on implementation of programmes of settlement of and facilities for deported Crimean Tatars and persons of other nationalities... for the relevant years, <http://www.comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua>

The State Budget allocated to the Programme implementation in 2009 UAH 58.3 million less than envisaged by the Programme (some 48% of the need). See: web site of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions. – <http://www.scnm.gov.ua>

Proceeding from the results of audit of the programme implementation, the main factors of unsatisfactory fulfilment of plans of amenities for repatriates included¹¹¹:

- organisational deficiencies – uncertainty of relations between the body responsible for the Programme (Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Persons) and the body managing budget funds (State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions) bars their effective interaction, management of the Programme and control of its implementation;
- non-target and ineffective use of financial resources by management bodies at all levels, resulting in underfulfilment of tasks, impairment of the quality

and delay of terms of provision of repatriates with housing and utility services;

- ineffective management of property created for budget funds and intended for repatriates by the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions, republican authorities and local self-government bodies in the AR of Crimea, its unlawful use for the benefit of other individuals and legal entities;
- absence of effective and transparent mechanisms (in particular, accounting and registration systems) for settlement of repatriates and satisfaction of their needs.

The main consequences hindering the processes of provision of amenities for repatriates include:

- rise of corruption, joint irresponsibility, uncontrolled division of land resources, which substantially sharpens rivalry of rank-and-file citizens for resources;
- growth of legal nihilism in land relations and among citizens, including on ethnic and confessional grounds;
- loss of public trust in the authorities and a growing feeling of the need to rely on own powers, prompting radicalisation of social relations and ever more leading to extremist behaviour of some social groups;
- political and social instability, escalation of the pre-conflict situation (on evolution of actions dealing with land issues into political ones see subsection 2.1 and item 1 of this subsection).

Legal and economic factors seriously contribute to aggravation of the situation in the AR of Crimea. There are resources for problem solution, but they are used ineffectively, not for their target use, for selfish personal and corporate interests.

Given the absence of a clear migration policy, registration of repatriates and their needs, a timely created land and housing stock, lack of funds, the problem of settlement of Crimean Tatars remains unresolved, causing strong social tension and adding to confrontation between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities.

The situation is aggravated by confrontation of political forces, imperfect legal and practical mechanisms of solution of land issues, non-transparent activity of the authorities. Those drawbacks enable unlawful modification of the target use of land, its uncontrolled allotment for non-target use, present one of the main factors of corruption, causing indignation of citizens, prompting them to illegal acts and stirring up enmity among social groups.

In view of all this, the acuteness of the pre-conflict situation concerning the settlement of and amenities for Crimean Tatars cannot be assessed by the frequency of disputes and protests alone. It should be considered in the context of the general institutional, socio-economic and political processes in the Crimea and whole of Ukraine.

¹⁰⁸ Data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.

¹⁰⁹ “...All operators expect intense growth of prices in Crimea (up to 50% per annum)”. Real Estate in Crimea. – Kyiv and Ukrainian Real Estate Portal, <http://freehouse.com.ua/9>

¹¹⁰ Now, 77.3 thousand persons who need better housing conditions are on the housing queue in Crimea. – e-Krym information agency, June 10, 2009, <http://e-crimea.info/2009/06/10/23257.shtml>

¹¹¹ Why is the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deported Crimean Tatars and Persons of Other Nationalities Not Implemented? – Accounting Chamber Press Service, June 13, 2005, http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article/main?art_id=468127&cat_id=41434

2.3. FRAGMENTATION OF INFORMATION SPACE OF CRIMEA AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The situation in the information space of the AR of Crimea reflects developments in society. On the other hand, behaviour of some actors in the information space contributes to formation of relevant spirits, including negativist, in society.

The information space of the autonomy is evidently dominated by the Russian language and pro-Russian ideology. There are several reasons for that: (a) the nature of the audience, almost totally understanding Russian¹¹²; (b) an active policy of Russian-language mass media and pro-Russian organisations; (c) absence of an active and effective information policy of the central authorities.

Crimean media actively employ the “language of enmity”, making them a catalyst of social tension.

Description of media resources¹¹³

Crimean media resources are distinctly structured by language. This especially applies to the printed media, where the state information policy is very poorly represented. That policy is more felt on TV and radio, namely – in the language issues.

Printed media. Russian-language printed media present the biggest and rather stable segment; the Crimean Tatar segment is smaller, but growing; Ukrainian-language is the smallest. Such segmentation is observed in actually all kinds and elements of media resources.

The aggregate (one-time) circulation of Russian-language printed products published in the Crimea exceeds 1.5 million copies. Meanwhile, the total circulation of printed periodicals in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages does not exceed 7.2% of the total volume (Insert “*Publication of printed output in Crimea in 2005-2008*”).

PUBLICATION OF PRINTED OUTPUT IN CRIMEA IN 2005-2008*												
Books and brochures												
Language of editions	2005		2006		2007		2008					
	Number, units	Circulation, thousand copies	Number, units	Circulation, thousand copies	Number, units	Circulation, thousand copies	Number, units	Circulation, thousand copies	Number, units	Circulation, thousand copies		
AR of Crimea, incl.:	170	196.3	241	319.3	188	211.3	477	430.8				
Ukrainian	19	25.7	38	20.7	18	7.9	55	77.2				
Russian	119	145.7	161	264.5	131	163.0	343	300.9				
Crimean Tatar	14	14.9	19	24.0	19	31.4	24	25.6				
Sevastopol, incl.:	92	75.9	112	114.8	132	99.4	142	101.2				
Ukrainian	3	2.6	9	6.5	6	3.8	6	1.0				
Russian	72	56.8	81	90.9	100	91.2	108	27.6				
Crimean Tatar	1	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Newspapers												
Language of editions	2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies
AR of Crimea, incl.:	48	2,357	1,324.4	48	1,825	1,124.9	53	2,555	1,019.7	50	2,420	1,040.2
Ukrainian	2	95	14.3	2	80	19.5	2	95	14.6	3	107	16.0
Russian	46	2,262	1,310.1	46	1,745	1,105.4	51	2,460	1,005.1	47	2,313	1,024.2
Crimean Tatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sevastopol, incl.:	6	125	782.5	3	109	9.0	5	335	297.1	5	273	170.2
Ukrainian	1	6	3.3	1	10	5.0	1	12	5.0	1	7	5.0
Russian	4	69	777.2	1	51	2.0	3	223	290.1	3	166	163.2
Crimean Tatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Periodicals												
Language of editions	2005			2006			2007			2008		
	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies	Number of editions, units	Number of issues, units	Total average (one-time) circulation, thousand copies
AR of Crimea, incl.:	33	99	25.2	38	155	69.4	37	154	35.6	43	144	39.6
Ukrainian	1	3	0.3	1	3	0.2	1	1	0.1	3	7	1.8
Russian	14	55	15.3	19	86	59.0	19	65	24.6	17	49	23.4
Crimean Tatar	-	-	-	1	4	1.2	-	-	-	1	3	1.8
Sevastopol, incl.:	12	42	3.0	9	32	3.6	16	39	6.0	15	41	5.5
Ukrainian	-	-	-	1	4	1.0	1	3	1.0	1	6	1.0
Russian	6	18	1.9	4	11	1.1	6	14	2.0	7	16	2.5
Crimean Tatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Source: The Book Chamber of Ukraine.

¹¹² According to the sociological survey, 90.8% of Crimean residents speak Russian at home. According to the Crimean poll of 2008, 91.5% of Ukrainians and 79.9% of Crimean Tatars are fluent in the Russian language.

¹¹³ Unless specified otherwise, data are taken from the official web site of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, where information is presented as of the end of 2008, <http://comin.kmu.gov.ua>. Data of the Book Chamber differ from the data of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and are cited here as an estimate of summary data and for illustration of the dynamic of periodicals.



Only two newspapers in Crimea are published in the Ukrainian language – “Krymska Svitlytsya” and “Budmo”.

Published only in the Crimean Tatar language are newspapers “Maarif Ishler”, “Yanyi Donya”, “Uchan-Su” (an attachment to newspaper “Vremya, vpered”) and magazines “Tasil” and “Qasevet”.

Quite many printed Crimean Tatar periodicals are published in several languages (Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, Russian), including newspapers: “Qirim/Krym”, “Hidayet”, “Areket”, “Kerch Haberjisi”, “Tesir”, “Yurt”, “Vatan Hatima”, “Maalm”, “Qasaba/Selyshche”, “Kurman”, “Altin Yaruq/Zoloty Blysk”, “Halq Sedasi”, “Baladar Dunyasi”, “Gezlev”, “Zaman”, “Dialog”, “Golos Molodiozhi”, “Haberci”, “Avdet”, “Devir” and magazine “Tan”¹¹⁴.

All-Ukrainian and Russian printed periodicals are also distributed in Crimea, including versions of the latter registered in Ukraine, more preferred by Crimeans, as compared to the Russian.

Printed products are distributed by 2 inter-regional, 2 republican, 27 city, 33 district, 9 inter-district organisations. The biggest media distribution networks are operated by “Krymposhta” (postal agency) (distribution of subscribed publications, municipal newspapers and printed periodicals) and “Krymsoyuzpechat” (sells in Crimea 70% of all Crimean periodicals and 30-50% of Ukrainian periodicals).

TV and radio resources. There are 86 TV and radio companies registered and operating in Crimea, including: 14 air TV companies; 15 air radio stations; 12 radio studios; 44 cable TV and radio companies; 1 air-cable TV and radio company.

TV COVERAGE OF THE CRIMEAN TERRITORY

TV networks

national: UT-1 – 97%; UT-2 (“Studio 1+1”) – 80%; UT-3 (“Inter”) – 80% of the Crimean territory;

regional: “Krym” State Television and Radio Company – 74.63%; “Chornomorska” Television and Radio Company – 84.11%; “Zhysa” Television and Radio Company – 30% (Simferopol, more than 30 TV channels, including from Russia and other countries).

Mountainous villages housing almost 160 thousand Crimeans have poor air coverage (or no coverage at all)¹¹⁵.

Radio networks

national: UR-1 – 86%, UR-2 – 82% of the Crimean territory;

regional: “Trans-M-Radio” – 70%.

TV and radio companies are especially active in Simferopol city and district, with five regional and local TV channels, 17 FM radio stations.

The Crimean retransmission network operates more than 200 transmitting devices, 185 of them used for state broadcasting. TV and radio programmes are mainly retransmitted by the state enterprise Radio and TV Transmission Centre of the AR of Crimea.

There are 259,915 wired radio outlets in the Crimea. The number of wire radio subscribers in Ukraine steadily goes down. The wire network, especially in rural areas, is in a poor state.

The Crimean TV and radio space is dominated by the Russian language, although Ukrainian gradually gains ground, at least on state TV channels (Table “*Volumes of TV and radio broadcasting by state companies...*” on map, pp.42-43). According to the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, today, no broadcaster in Crimea except “Krym” State Television and Radio Company observes the legislative norm of not less than 50% of “national audio-visual products or musical compositions by Ukrainian performers” in total air¹¹⁶.

Purely Crimean Tatar audience is targeted by ATR TV channel (planned 80% coverage of the autonomy’s territory) and “Meydan” radio station (only the central and steppe part of the Crimea). A Crimean Tatar national editorial board of “Krym” State Television and Radio Company is active.

Internet resources. According to the public opinion poll, 16.4% of Crimeans (over 310 thousand persons) have Internet access at home, which fits the data of Internet user registration¹¹⁷. Internet is available mainly in big cities and resorts of the South-Eastern coast of Crimea. For instance, in Simferopol, some 20% of families are Internet users, while the Crimean average rate is 4%¹¹⁸.

In the recent years, there appeared more personal web sites of political figures, public organisations, heads of big state and non-state structures that somewhat changed the socio-political content of the Crimean Internet space¹¹⁹. 350-400 printed media, TV and radio companies have Internet versions. The Internet is dominated by the Russian language.

The Internet is mainly used by youths and people of the middle age. Due to its global nature and democracy of communication with the audience (“read not what I am given but what I find”), the Internet promotes language mobility of the mentioned groups of the population. Meanwhile, saturation of its content and relative accessibility of the Internet pose a risk of spread of xenophobic information, which arouses ever greater concern¹²⁰.

¹¹⁴ Third Report of Ukraine on implementation of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe concerning Protection of National Minorities (2009), p.67

¹¹⁵ Interview with H.Ioffe, Chairman of the Permanent Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea for Parliamentary Ethics and Mass Media, during the Round-table “Crimean TV: yesterday, today and tomorrow”. – “Krymskoe Ekho”, September 11, 2008, <http://kr-eho.info/index.php?name=News&op=article&sid=1404>

¹¹⁶ According to the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, TV programmes of “Krym” State Television and Radio Company are 65.5% transmitted in the Ukrainian, 5% – Crimean Tatar, 29.5% – Russian and other languages. Radio programmes: 42% – Ukrainian, 38.7% – Russian.

¹¹⁷ As of February, 2009, the Ukrainian Internet audience totalled 10.9 million persons; with the share of Crimean users making 2.9%, or nearly 316 thousand persons. Data of the Ukrainian portal *Bigmir.net* “Global statistics of Ukrainian Internet” for February, 2009. – UNIAN, March 10, 2009.

¹¹⁸ Bohdanovych O. Internet in Ukraine: Crimean autonomous access. – Proceedings of V.I. Vernadskyi Tavrian National University, Simferopol, No.1, 2008, pp.310-313.

¹¹⁹ Information space of the AR of Crimea as an element of the Ukrainian information space: problem of balance. Memorandum of the Simferopol Regional Branch of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, May 2008 – Official web site of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, <http://www.niss.gov.ua>

¹²⁰ See, e.g.: Third report on Ukraine. European Commission against racism and intolerance, Strasbourg, February 12, 2008, p.7.

Do you have access to Internet?*
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Do not use Internet	65.7	63.6	64.3	68.8	61.5	37.2	51.9	65.6	78.5	95.1	60.9	69.3
Have access to Internet at home	16.4	11.4	15.1	20.4	24.6	29.7	24.8	15.7	9.3	2.6	18.1	15.0
Have access to Internet at work, at the educational establishment	14.2	15.2	16.4	9.7	12.2	23.8	20.5	15.1	11.0	1.5	15.9	13.0
Use Internet at the Internet-café	4.9	10.9	5.8	1.7	3.8	11.9	6.3	3.8	1.7	0.0	6.7	3.6
Use Internet at the post-office	0.5	1.1	0.3	0.9	1.5	1.5	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.9	0.3
Hard to say	1.4	0.5	1.4	1.9	0.8	2.1	0.9	1.7	1.4	0.9	1.3	1.6

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants.

Information agencies. Information products for mass media are professionally offered mainly by four information agencies: Crimean branch of Context-Media Information Agency (all-Ukrainian), Crimean News Agency, Crimean Information Agency (republican), Information-Analytical Agency “Novyi Region – Crimea” (Russian). There is a Crimean Tatar agency QHA (*Qirim haber ajansi*, registered as “Crimean News” Agency), the only one in Ukraine entitled to provide information in five languages (Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, English and Crimean Tatar, using however mainly the Russian and Turkish languages, with some reports translated in English)¹²¹.

According to assessments of the Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea, the Crimean journalist corps 90% consists of Russian-language journalists working in the Russian-language press; the rest works in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages, the latter making a meagre part¹²². **The most demanded are Crimean Tatar journalists** commanding their native, Russian and Ukrainian languages, more tolerant in communication and less biased in coverage of events and the general situation¹²³.

Media owners. By the form of ownership, mass media are divided into state, municipal and private.

State: newspaper of the Verkhovna Rada of the autonomy “Krymskie Izvestiya” (in Russian, with Ukrainian-language attachment “Krymskyi Dialog”), distributor of printed periodicals “Krymposhta”, and state TV and radio company “Krym”.

Municipal: 27 municipal publications and seven municipal radio studios founded by local bodies of state power.

Private: the overwhelming majority of printed mass media, the main distributors of printed products

(“Krymsoyuzpechat”, “Krymkniga”) and 78 TV and radio companies are privately owned. Private Crimean mass media are owned by a few persons closely related with certain political forces and lobbying political and business interests via the controlled media¹²⁴.

Ideological content of media space

The Crimean media space, as a reflection of social relations in the autonomy, is extremely polarised, bears elements of intolerance and even aggression. This is witnessed by conclusions of many political figures, political scientists, analysts in the field of socio-political relations, results of polls of Crimean residents and special focus group studies, including those conducted by Razumkov Centre¹²⁵.

Mass media made a huge “contribution” to inadequate mutual mental perception by representatives of different Crimean social groups, creating an unfavourable background for the development of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea. The main reasons for that include excessive politicisation of those relations, outside influence on mass media, mainly passive reaction of the state authorities to violations of the Ukrainian legislation, and internal problems of the Crimean journalism, all together resulting in intentionally distorted coverage of events and developments in the autonomy and growth of tension in society.

In particular, according to experts, “tides of conflicts in the field of inter-ethnic relations largely stemmed from provocative behaviour of some politicised groupings and mass media, and witness non-professionalism and short-sightedness of many actors of political and information processes”¹²⁶. The dynamic and subjects of Crimean media reports in the field of inter-ethnic relations largely depend on PR activity of ethnic organisations (Diagram “*Information activity of national public and political organisations of Crimea in 2008*”). In turn, the frequency

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² From presentations at the Radio “Svoboda” Round-table “Problems of Crimean Mass Media”. – Radio “Svoboda”, April 2, 2009, <http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/transcript/1601398>

¹²³ Presentation by the Head of the Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea. – *Ibid.*


¹²⁴ Mentioned among big owners of Crimean media (or political figures they serve) are A.Senchenko, Yu.Yekhanurov, V.Horbatov, A.Tretyakov, V.Shklyar, I.Khaibullayev, S.Kunitsyn and others. See: Sergeev G. Who owns Crimean media. – “Pervaya Krymskaya”, August 8, 2008, <http://1k.com.ua/236/details/6/2>

¹²⁵ For more detail see section 1 of the Analytical Report.

¹²⁶ Monitoring of Crimean mass media, conducted in April-December 2008 by the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies together with Partkom Information Agency as part of the study “Social adaptation of Crimean Tatar repatriates: challenges for the state policy”. The monitoring covered 23 printed periodicals, five news agencies and Internet sites of the autonomy.



Information activity of national public and political organisations of Crimea in 2008*, number of messages



* Source: survey "Social adaptation of Crimean Tatar repatriates: challenges for the state policy".

and character of media coverage of sensitive for Crimean society land and language issues present an important factor of the conflict potential and growth of tension in relations among socio-cultural groups.

General media coverage of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea. Now, the situation in that field may be termed as dangerous instigation of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance in inter-ethnic relations by mass media.

According to the results of special surveys¹²⁷, the lack of tolerance is one of the acutest problems of the Crimean media, and the "language of enmity" has become a common thing in the information space of the autonomy, where many publications cover national problems in a biased manner, and the ethnic component is present all too often, not always reasonably, in materials about everyday life, historic articles, features about specific persons, descriptions of Ukraine's residents, even in ads¹²⁸.

From October till mid-December 2008, in 32 out of 35 publications selected for monitoring nearly 800 reports

were discovered, containing elements of the "language of enmity", signs of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. The list of periodicals whose materials contain the most frequent and "harsh" expressions is led by Crimean publications "Avdet", "Krymskoye Vremya", "Golos Kryma", "Krymskaya Pravda"¹²⁹.

Internet with its "feedback" capabilities occupies a special place – on forums, readers can present their opinions and assessments. The practice of discussion of inter-ethnic problems on such forums shows that they often become a platform for xenophobic spirits, tactless and openly hostile expressions about representatives of other nations.

Furthermore, it is no secret that on some web sites one can find all kind of instructions, from cooking to terrorist. And in that case, nobody mentions language or any other discrimination.

Political aspect. Despite the above-mentioned formal division of mass media in the Crimea into state, municipal and private, in reality, they are divided by control of certain political and business circles and their representatives. Now, this division is actually over¹³⁰. Political affiliation of media owners influences the trend and nature of their products. Under their influence, especially to gain votes before elections, the mentioned media often speculate on the problems of inter-ethnic relations¹³¹.

According to the Chairman of the Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea V.Prytula, "the main distinction of Crimea is that the information market here is developing not as a business but as an ideological battlefield used for information wars"¹³². The "language of enmity" has become an indispensable element of political discourse in the Autonomy. It is present in speeches in the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, activists at meetings, in the air of TV channels, in the press¹³³. Mass media has become a tool of attainment of political goals.

The development of journalism and mass media in Crimea is badly affected by the local authorities. The main problems here include¹³⁴:

¹²⁷ Starting from 2002, Information and Research Centre "Integration and Development" performs all-round monitoring of periodicals (Crimean and national) to detect the "language of enmity", signs of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. The latest monitoring was conducted in October-December, 2008. See web site of the Information and Research Centre "Integration and Development", www.integration.org.ua. In early 2008, the Association of Polish Journalists in Ukraine on the order of public organisation "Information Press Centre" conducted in Crimea a focus group study "Identification of the degree of tolerance of Crimean mass media, signs of ethnic and religious xenophobia in materials of journalists". See: Language of Enmity against Inter-Ethnic Relations. – Association of Polish Journalists in Ukraine, June 1, 2008, <http://www.sdpnu.org.ua/?subpage=155>

¹²⁸ Crimean press – a den of misanthropes? – *Novosti Kryma* Crimean News Agency, November 19, 2008, <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2008/11/19/1227080640>; Klymenko N. Crimean media demonstrate national intolerance. – *e-Crimea* information agency, March 17, 2009, <http://www.e-crimea.info>

¹²⁹ Anti-Tatar and anti-Ukrainian publications in newspapers "Krymskaya Pravda" and "Krymskoye Vremya" were considered by the Commission for Journalist Ethics yet in 2004. The Commission's statement of July 19, 2004, termed actions of journalists and managers of those newspapers as "conscious violation of norms of journalist ethics, absolutely inconsistent with principles of professional ethics". – Web site of the Commission for Journalist Ethics, www.cje.org.ua/statements/20

¹³⁰ Meanwhile, the Crimean media market is being monopolised through consolidation of producers and distributors of information products. E.g., the largest distribution company ("Krymssoyuzpechat") was bought by *Kartel* group of companies. The group structures include All-Ukrainian Subscription Agency, uniting some 300 retail outlets selling press in Ukraine. *Kartel* belongs to *IFD Kapital* group allegedly owned by LUKOIL top managers. See: *Kartel* publishing group bought press sale network in Odesa. – "Kommersant-Ukraina", July 24, 2007, <http://www.kommersant.ua/doc.html?DocID=789399&Issued=41355>

¹³¹ Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Monitoring of Crimean mass media...

¹³² Interview with V.Prytula, Chairman of the Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea. – Web site *Marketing Media Review*, August 15, 2008, <http://mmr.net.ua/interview/id/51/index>

¹³³ For more detail see: Antonenko K. Racism, chauvinism and xenophobia, ethnic discrimination in the AR of Crimea: specificity of the region and new challenges for Ukrainian statehood in 2008 – Simferopol, Crimean Independent Centre of Political Scientists and Journalists, April-September, 2008.

¹³⁴ Yearbook "White Book of Crimean Journalism 2008". – Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea, Simferopol, 2008. According to the White Book of Crimean Journalism 2006, in 2006, such pressure was experienced by "Krymskaya Gazeta", "Krymska Svitlytsya", "Golos Kryma", "Yanyi Donya", "Qirim".

- existence of censorship as a system of control on the part of the authorities in actually all state and municipal media of Crimea and many independent publications;
- preservation of the trend towards political pressure on journalists and physical impediment for their legitimate professional activity, and absence of an adequate reaction to that on the part of law-enforcement bodies;
- growing non-publicity of the authorities, violation of the right to free collection of information by restriction of journalist access to it;
- limitation or threat of limitation of publication funding.

But despite the strong influence of the political factor on inter-ethnic relations, the public gradually realises the manipulative nature of the information policy of some media and views them accordingly.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

U: "The problems we see on TV and read about in the Crimea seem artificial".

T: "The level of relations now depends on mass media and politics".

T: "As far as mass media are concerned, I advise looking through periodicals since the return of Crimean Tatars. *Krymskaya Pravda* and *Krymskoye Vremya* newspapers... are pursuing a target-minded policy of instigation of ethnic enmity".

T: "If the Crimea is for one year isolated from mass media, from news... I am 99% sure that the opinion of everyone, Ukrainians, Russians, all, will change. The level of relations now depends on mass media and politics".

External influence. The most effective tools of influence on the Crimean information space are available to Russia. Active use of those tools not only meets no counteraction but presents a priority of Russia's foreign policy and an important method of influence in its relations with Ukraine¹³⁵. Information influence is exerted not only directly, via Russian printed and electronic media, but also through actualisation of certain subjects, ideas, problems in the local media, determination of the character and sequence of their coverage (influencing the editorial policy of controlled publications, PR-events of concerned ethnic public organisations, etc). The latter is much more dangerous than direct influence, since problems imposed in such way from outside are seen by the Crimean residents as their own, that cannot be ignored but must be solved somehow.

The Ukrainian state lost influence in Crimea even on the media where it was a founder. They are often used for propaganda against Ukraine's European choice, accession to NATO, in support for the Russian status of Crimea¹³⁶.

The level of external information threat is witnessed by an extract from the decision of the Board of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting "On the State of Information Space of the AR of Crimea" of May 29, 2008: "The territory of the peninsula is under strong information influence of the neighbouring countries. The autonomy's territory is the scene of information-psychological campaigns deceiving society, posing a threat to the territorial unity of the country, hindering pursuance of the state policy of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration"¹³⁷.

The problem lies not only in the scale and depth of foreign influence, but first of all – in the absence of an adequate by scale and quality policy of the central Ukrainian authorities, from the viewpoint of prevention of negative consequences, and an adequate response to dangerous trends:

- **absence of safeguards** is mainly seen in the lack of system (and logic) in actions of the authorities, absence of a strategy of socio-economic development, regional and ethno-national policy, in particular, in Crimea, and a system of protection of national interests in line with that strategy. In such conditions, local authorities and external actors are free to pursue their policy¹³⁸. Collision of their interests gives rise to confrontation of different political forces seeking support from voters, which in the end affects citizens and their relations. More than that, actions of the central authorities sometimes look provocative due to the neglect of the Crimean specificity¹³⁹;
- **inadequate reaction of the authorities** is manifested in the absence of adequate legal assessments and proper actions on the part of both central (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine, National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting) and republican (Republican Committee of the AR of Crimea for Information) authorities.

Internal problems of Crimean journalism. Along with the influence of external and internal political factors, development of journalism and mass media in Crimea, enhancement of their role in civil society building are hindered by problems related with their breach of the Ethic Code of a Ukrainian Journalist, in particular:

- selective presentation of information, disrespect for the right of society to full and unbiased information about facts and events;
- distortion of reality, mixing facts, personal judgements and authors' assumptions in publications;

¹³⁵ Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation through 2020. – Web site of Russia's Security Council, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>; Defence and popularisation of the Russian language is a priority task of Russian Foreign Ministry – Lavrov. – UNIAN, November 3, 2008. The Russian language and Russian culture are promoted by 50 Russian centres of science and culture and 26 representative offices of "Roszarubezhstsentr".

¹³⁶ Interview with V.Prytula, Chairman of the Committee for Monitoring of Freedom of Press in Crimea ...

¹³⁷ Web Site of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, http://comin.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/printable_article?art_id=64968

¹³⁸ See: Artemenko M. "Third force" tries to turn Crimean Tatars separatists? – "Golos Kryma", March 14, 2008.

¹³⁹ The biggest echo in Crimea was caused by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Order No.461 of May 26, 2008 "On Approval of Branch Programme of Improvement of Study of Ukrainian Language in General Educational Establishments with Study in Languages of National Minorities for 2008-2011" and the National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting Decision "On Non-Implementation by Programme Service Providers of Decisions of the National Council and Articles 40 and 42 of the Law of Ukraine "On Television and Radio Broadcasting". The appearance of those documents and their inconsiderate fulfilment met a negative response of not only the Crimean authorities but the wide audience of Russian-language mass media.



- bias and partiality in materials, disparity in coverage of opposite opinions and assessments by independent experts;
- intentional shift of emphasis in information about events in domestic and criminal sectors, etc. to inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, which may be seen as discrimination on language, racial, religious and ethnic grounds and an attempt to provoke or step up tension in society¹⁴⁰.

Information preferences of Crimeans¹⁴¹

Fragmentation of the audience of Crimean mass media is caused by the specificity of identities of socio-cultural groups of the Crimea, it takes the form of preference and trust of Crimeans in some sources of information and therefore secures fragmentation of the information space.

Trust in mass media. According to public opinion poll, Crimeans tend to trust Ukrainian, Crimean and Russian media, distrust – Western and, to some extent, Turkish media¹⁴². The Russian media are the most respected in Crimea (they are trusted by more than half of those polled). They are followed by the Crimean and Ukrainian media, trusted by more than 40% of Crimeans.

Meanwhile, the level of trust in mass media among representatives of different socio-cultural groups seriously differs. For more than half of representatives of the Slavic community and for “Crimean Ukrainians”, Russian media are the most respected. Crimean Tatars less trust mass media (the level of trust does not exceed 40%), and if they do, they trust Ukrainian and Crimean media. Russian mass media enjoy trust of less than a quarter of the Crimean Tatar audience. The Turkish media enjoy similar trust, while the Western media are trusted by less than one-fifth of Crimean Tatars.

Main sources of socio-political information. The main sources of socio-political information for Crimeans are television and local press. Ukrainian TV channels were noted as such by almost three-quarters of respondents, local – nearly two-thirds, Russian – a bit more than half.

The local press (Crimean, city, district newspapers) serves as a source of socio-political information for more than half of Crimeans, all-Ukrainian newspapers – a bit more than a quarter, Russian newspapers – less than 5%. Local radio stations are a source of socio-political information for approximately a quarter of Crimeans, Ukrainian and Russian – nearly one-fifth.

Those who get socio-political information from the Internet mainly take it from Russian, Ukrainian and local Internet sites. Differences among socio-cultural groups regarding Internet access are small.

Level of trust in news reports on TV. More trusted by Crimeans news programmes include Ukrainian, local, and Russian alike. The most trusted among TV news are “Podrobytsi Tyzhnya” and “Novyny” on “Inter”

TV channel, “Volna” programme of “Chornomorska” Television and Radio Company – they are trusted by half of the total TV audience. Noteworthy, only 5% of Crimeans watch “Novyny” on UT-1 state TV channel – mainly, “Crimean Ukrainians”.

The second group of TV news programmes includes: TSN (“Studio 1+1”) – trusted by a third of Crimeans; “12 Minutes of News” (“Krym” State Television and Radio Company) and “Vremya” (ORT) – more than a quarter.

Less trusted are such programmes as “Segodnya” (NTV); “Vesti” (“Russia” channel); “Fakty” (ICTV); “Vikna-Novyny” (STB).

With few differences, representatives of both the Slavic community and Crimean Tatars most of all trust news reports of local and all-Ukrainian channels.

The most popular printed media. The popularity rating of printed media among Crimeans is undoubtedly led by “Krymskaya Pravda” newspaper. “Pervaya Krymskaya”, “Vecherniy Gorod”, “Fakty i Kommentarii”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine”, “Kommunist Kryma” are also rather popular. Less but still popular are newspapers “Krymskie Izvestia” (official publication of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea) and “Segodnya”.

There are some differences in the popularity of printed media among representatives of different socio-cultural groups. For instance, “Krymskaya Pravda”, local versions of Russian publications (first of all, “Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine”), and “Kommunist Kryma” are much less popular among Crimean Tatars, compared to the Slavic community. Instead, “Poluostrov” newspaper is more popular¹⁴³.

The Crimean information space is evidently divided by language. The absolute majority of Crimean media are published in the Russian language. The Crimean Tatar segment is on the rise. The Ukrainian segment in the Crimean media space is minimal.

Actually all Crimean media are influenced by the authorities or political structures and used as a tool of direct or concealed manipulation of the public opinion by political forces struggling for power and resources in the region.

Crimean media often stir up inter-ethnic tension by publications in the “language of enmity”, promoting xenophobia, instigating anti-Tatar and anti-Ukrainian spirits.

The Crimean media space is subject to strong foreign, mainly Russian, influence exerted directly by Russian and via local Russian-language mass media. Ukraine’s influence on the Crimean information space is minimal.

Such fragmentation of the Crimean information space not only reflects the division of Crimean society into socio-cultural communities but deepens it by instilling ethno-centric feelings and forcing tension.

¹⁴⁰ Results of monitoring of xenophobia in Crimean Mass Media by the Information and Research Centre “Integration and Development”. – “Novosti Kryma”, November 19, 2008, <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2008/11/19/1227080640>

¹⁴¹ For summary data of the latest public opinion poll dealing with information preferences of Crimeans, see Annex 2, p.54 of this magazine.

¹⁴² Those media have respectively a positive or negative balance of trust (difference between the aggregates of “Trust” and “Most likely trust”, and “Do not trust” and “Most likely do not trust” to the question “Do you trust the following mass media?”).

¹⁴³ This Russian-language newspaper is linked to the Crimean Tatar political organisation “Milli Firka”. See: Information space of the AR of Crimea as an element of the Ukrainian information space: problem of balance ...



INFORMATION PREFERENCES OF CRIMEANS

Do you trust the following mass media?
% of those polled?

		CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
							18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Russian mass media	Trust	12.3	4.3	13.4	12.8	9.2	13.4	8.1	11.3	12.4	15.1	12.5	12.4
	Most likely trust	39.6	19.5	43.5	38.1	42.3	35.8	40.6	43.5	44.9	35.8	39.0	40.5
	Most likely do not trust	17.8	27.6	14.7	20.5	29.2	18.7	21.0	16.3	16.7	16.0	19.4	16.3
	Do not trust	13.5	16.2	11.8	15.9	14.6	13.8	14.1	13.8	11.6	14.1	13.1	14.0
	Hard to say	16.8	32.4	16.6	12.7	4.6	18.3	16.2	15.1	14.4	19.0	16.0	16.8
Crimean mass media	Trust	9.0	6.5	9.9	8.0	0.8	10.3	7.5	7.2	8.5	10.7	8.7	9.3
	Most likely trust	40.2	31.4	42.9	37.9	54.6	38.7	39.1	43.5	44.6	36.8	41.5	39.7
	Most likely do not trust	19.0	14.6	16.1	25.7	29.2	18.2	21.0	18.7	19.5	18.2	18.7	19.0
	Do not trust	14.7	14.1	13.9	16.1	10.0	13.8	16.1	15.2	12.7	15.4	14.3	15.1
	Hard to say	17.1	33.4	17.2	12.3	5.4	19.0	16.3	15.4	14.7	18.9	16.8	16.9
Ukrainian mass media	Trust	7.4	3.8	8.5	6.6	4.6	7.7	5.2	6.9	7.9	8.8	7.7	7.2
	Most likely trust	38.1	34.8	41.3	32.9	36.6	35.4	37.4	40.8	44.8	34.6	37.8	38.5
	Most likely do not trust	22.5	15.2	18.9	31.0	40.5	22.4	26.4	21.8	20.0	22.2	22.7	22.4
	Do not trust	16.6	15.2	15.7	18.5	13.0	16.1	16.1	17.9	14.6	17.3	16.4	16.8
	Hard to say	15.4	31.0	15.6	11.0	5.3	18.4	14.9	12.6	12.7	17.1	15.4	15.1
Western mass media	Trust	1.8	2.7	1.4	2.2	3.8	3.1	2.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	2.7	1.2
	Most likely trust	21.7	14.7	25.3	17.3	16.8	20.9	24.2	28.1	20.8	16.2	21.2	22.5
	Most likely do not trust	24.0	16.3	25.0	24.4	36.6	22.8	26.2	16.3	28.5	26.3	24.4	23.8
	Do not trust	29.6	22.8	29.9	31.0	19.1	28.5	25.9	32.5	28.7	31.8	30.3	29.5
	Hard to say	22.9	43.5	18.4	25.1	23.7	24.7	20.8	22.0	20.9	24.6	21.4	23.0
Turkish mass media	Trust	0.9	2.7	0.2	1.5	3.1	1.5	1.1	1.4	0.3	0.2	1.2	0.7
	Most likely trust	5.0	19.5	4.4	2.0	0.8	5.8	6.0	4.1	6.5	3.0	5.6	4.5
	Most likely do not trust	22.7	11.4	24.5	22.7	27.7	20.5	25.9	21.4	25.6	21.5	21.6	23.9
	Do not trust	35.0	19.5	37.1	35.5	28.5	35.9	32.2	36.8	32.1	36.9	35.1	35.8
	Hard to say	36.4	46.9	33.8	38.3	39.9	36.3	34.8	36.3	35.5	38.4	36.5	35.1

What mass media are the main source of information about the events in Crimea for you?*
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
Ukrainian TV channels	73.7	67.9	81.3	61.3	57.7	72.2	73.2	75.3	75.7	73.3	75.2	72.7
Local TV channels (Crimean, city)	60.6	58.2	64.1	54.8	59.5	56.3	57.1	64.8	64.4	61.7	59.4	61.7
Local newspapers (Crimean, city, district)	54.0	52.7	61.2	41.1	29.2	46.9	52.7	55.5	56.3	59.2	54.4	53.6
Russian TV channels	52.5	51.6	55.2	47.7	37.7	54.8	53.6	54.3	49.3	50.4	53.9	51.5
Central Ukrainian newspapers	26.5	17.4	30.5	21.9	19.2	25.9	28.8	33.8	25.6	20.3	28.4	25.0
Local radio (Crimean, city)	23.0	31.5	22.7	21.0	16.8	23.8	21.9	21.4	25.1	22.4	24.0	22.3
Ukrainian radio	20.9	16.8	24.5	15.4	13.0	28.5	23.6	17.9	20.8	13.1	23.9	18.5
Russian radio	18.4	16.3	22.2	12.1	8.4	28.0	21.0	15.1	16.3	10.5	20.9	16.5
Russian Internet sites	12.6	14.7	12.2	12.7	14.6	25.3	18.4	10.7	6.5	1.3	16.2	10.0
Ukrainian Internet sites	10.0	13.0	10.5	8.3	6.2	20.1	14.9	8.0	5.4	1.3	13.2	7.7
Local Internet sites (Crimean, city)	9.6	14.1	9.8	8.0	7.6	17.8	16.1	8.0	5.4	1.1	11.7	8.1
Other foreign Internet sites	6.3	7.6	6.1	6.3	4.6	12.3	10.1	6.0	2.3	0.6	8.5	4.7
Russian newspapers	4.9	1.1	3.7	8.0	5.4	3.8	4.0	8.0	3.7	4.9	5.2	4.6
Other foreign radio	2.7	5.4	3.0	1.5	3.1	6.1	3.7	2.2	1.1	0.2	3.8	1.9
Other foreign TV channels	1.1	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.5	2.7	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.2	1.8	0.5
Other foreign newspapers	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.7
Other	1.4	4.3	1.0	1.4	0.8	1.7	0.6	1.1	2.0	1.5	1.4	1.5
Hard to say	5.8	4.3	4.2	9.1	13.7	4.6	6.3	5.2	4.5	8.3	5.4	6.3

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants.

What news programmes do you trust?*
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
"Podrobnosti", "Novyny" ("Inter" channel)	51.0	59.2	53.9	43.3	42.3	48.4	52.0	52.5	50.1	52.8	52.9	49.6
TSN (Studio "1+1")	33.6	41.8	33.3	31.6	33.1	33.5	34.9	37.1	34.6	28.8	33.5	33.6
"Volna" (ChernomorskayaTRK)	49.1	52.2	51.8	43.2	40.5	46.2	49.9	51.9	45.4	52.2	49.3	49.2
"12 minut novostey" (GTRK "Crimea")	27.6	33.7	32.0	17.9	14.6	26.5	25.1	28.6	31.0	27.6	27.8	27.8
"Vremya" (ORT)	26.2	27.7	26.5	25.3	14.6	27.8	25.9	25.3	24.2	27.1	25.6	26.6
"Segodnya" (NTV)	20.5	26.6	19.0	21.6	18.3	21.5	23.3	20.3	20.8	17.1	21.4	19.7
"Vesti" ("Russia" channel)	18.2	12.5	22.0	13.1	9.2	18.6	17.2	19.0	14.4	21.2	19.0	17.7
"Facts" (ICTV)	17.7	10.9	19.4	16.5	14.6	17.3	20.4	16.8	18.6	15.6	19.8	15.9
"Vikna-novyny" (STB)	14.4	19.6	13.6	14.4	12.2	16.1	13.0	19.6	11.0	12.4	16.4	13.0
"Haberler" (GTRK "Crimea")	6.5	69.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	6.5	7.2	5.0	7.6	6.4	6.8	6.3
"Nashy novosti" ("ITV" channel)	6.3	0.5	7.8	5.1	1.5	4.0	5.7	6.6	5.9	8.8	5.8	6.4
"Sobytiya" (TRK "Ukraine")	5.6	8.2	4.6	6.8	4.6	5.0	7.8	5.8	5.9	4.3	5.6	5.6
"Novosti" (TRK "Neapol")	5.3	9.8	3.8	6.8	4.6	8.1	4.6	6.0	2.3	4.9	5.8	5.0
"Novyny" (UT-1)	5.1	2.7	5.7	4.9	8.4	3.1	4.0	7.4	6.8	5.3	5.5	4.8
"Nashe vremya" – "Nash chas" (Sevstopol GTRK)	4.3	0.5	5.6	3.2	3.1	4.0	2.3	5.5	5.9	4.3	3.6	4.9
"Reporter" ("New channel")	4.1	1.6	5.3	2.8	0.8	7.3	4.9	3.0	3.1	1.9	5.1	3.4
"Vremya novostey" – "Chas novyn" (5th channel)	2.9	12.5	1.4	2.6	6.2	1.9	2.3	3.0	3.4	3.8	3.7	2.2
News channel "24"	2.8	6.5	2.3	2.6	0.8	1.3	3.7	3.3	2.3	3.8	2.6	2.9
"Sevinformburo" ("NTS" channel)	2.1	0.5	2.5	2.2	0.8	2.1	2.9	2.2	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.1
"Novyny" (TRK "Briz")	1.7	0.0	1.8	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.1	2.5	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.8
"Odyn den. Novyny" ("K1" channel)	1.5	6.5	0.9	1.1	0.0	1.9	2.3	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.6
Information programme "24" (RenTV)	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.0	1.2	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.0
"Yaltinskiy objective" ("Yalta-TV" channel)	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.6	0.0	0.8	0.3	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.7
Other	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.4
Do not trust any news programme	6.6	3.3	6.6	7.4	5.4	6.5	6.3	6.3	8.5	6.0	7.9	5.6
Do not watch news programmes	3.3	1.1	2.6	5.2	10.0	3.8	4.9	2.7	2.3	3.0	2.9	3.5
Hard to say	3.6	5.4	0.8	8.3	7.6	5.2	3.2	3.3	2.8	3.0	3.3	4.0

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants.

What newspapers have you read or looked through during the last two weeks?*
% of those polled

	CRIMEA	Crimean Tatars	Slavic community	Other	Crimean Ukrainians	Age (Crimea)					Gender (Crimea)	
						18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female
"Krymskaya pravda"	22.8	10.3	26.1	20.2	14.6	13.8	22.2	26.1	24.9	28.4	23.7	22.1
"Pervaya krymskaya"	12.9	11.4	13.5	12.2	17.6	12.1	17.5	17.4	13.8	6.0	13.8	12.2
"Vechniy gorod"	12.4	6.5	14.6	10.0	6.2	13.0	10.7	11.8	13.0	13.2	12.8	12.1
"Facts i komentarii"	11.8	10.3	14.3	7.4	9.2	13.2	14.1	12.9	13.8	5.8	13.2	10.6
"Kommunist Kryma"	10.3	0.0	14.1	6.0	0.0	1.5	4.0	8.2	13.0	23.5	8.9	11.4
"Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine"	10.2	3.8	12.0	8.7	13.0	15.7	11.2	11.6	6.2	5.6	11.4	9.3
"Krymskie izvestiya"	7.3	7.1	8.5	5.4	0.0	4.4	6.1	8.5	9.0	9.0	6.9	7.8
"Segodnya"	6.0	6.5	6.7	4.8	9.2	5.0	9.2	7.2	7.1	3.0	6.8	5.5
"Slava Sevastopolya"	4.7	0.5	4.9	5.4	5.4	3.8	4.3	5.5	5.6	4.5	5.0	4.3
"Krymskaya gazeta"	4.3	7.6	3.5	4.9	4.6	3.3	2.9	5.2	3.4	6.4	3.8	4.8
"Izvestiya - Ukraina"	2.5	0.5	3.8	0.8	0.8	4.8	2.6	1.9	2.3	0.6	2.9	2.2
"Region – Sevastopol"	2.0	0.5	2.3	1.9	0.0	1.5	1.7	2.5	1.7	2.8	2.3	1.5
"Krymskoye vremya"	1.9	1.6	2.0	1.7	0.8	2.7	1.1	2.5	1.7	1.5	2.0	1.9
"Poluostrov"	1.9	6.0	1.6	1.4	0.0	3.3	2.6	1.9	1.7	0.2	2.1	1.8
"Golos Kryma"	1.7	11.4	0.7	0.8	0.0	2.3	2.3	0.5	2.0	0.6	1.9	1.3
"Krymska svitylytsya"	1.7	0.5	1.9	1.7	3.1	4.4	0.9	1.4	0.6	0.9	2.3	1.3
"Pravda Ukrainy"	1.4	0.5	2.2	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.6	2.2	1.1	2.4	1.8	1.1
"Vechni visti"	1.0	0.0	0.8	1.7	3.1	1.3	0.3	1.4	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1
"Golos Ukrainy"	1.0	0.5	0.8	1.5	3.1	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	1.1
"Veteran Sevastopolya"	1.0	0.0	1.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.1	0.6	2.6	1.3	0.8
"Sevastopolskaya pravda"	1.0	0.0	1.4	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	2.1	0.6	1.3
"Podrobnosti"	0.9	4.3	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.6	1.2	1.1	0.3	1.1	1.4	0.4
"Sevastopolskiy meridian"	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.1
"Zerkalo nedeli"	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.9	1.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.5
"Sevastopolskaya gazeta"	0.7	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.5	0.5	1.0
"Avdet"	0.6	4.9	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.9	0.4
"Flag Rodiny"	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.2
"Krasnaya zvezda"	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.2
"Trud-Ukraina"	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.3
"Panorama"	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.2
"Sevastopolskie izvestiya"	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.5
"Den"	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
"Zerkalo"	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
"Flot Ukrainy"	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
"Koleso"	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
"Nash vzglyad"	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Other	15.6	4.9	16.1	17.9	12.2	13.8	12.4	19.0	17.5	16.0	14.4	16.7
Any newspaper	27.4	28.8	24.3	32.6	38.5	29.5	31.7	23.4	26.3	26.1	26.6	27.9
Do not remember	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.0	6.2	10.5	6.3	7.4	5.1	5.3	7.0	7.1

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants.

2.4. DISPARITIES IN THE EXERCISE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL RIGHTS AND NEEDS IN CRIMEA

The nature of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea greatly depends on the confidence of the main socio-cultural groups in their ability to preserve/revive and leave to descendants their identity, language, culture, traditions. If this possibility seems doubtful, there arises a feeling of estrangement of a group from Ukrainian and/or local society, and it looks for a way out, including beyond the constitutional framework of Ukraine.

Educational needs

The ability of meeting educational needs is an important factor influencing social feelings of citizens, ensuring preservation of their national and ethnic originality. According to the results of public opinion polls, residents of the Crimea rather critically assess the ability of getting education in the mother language, with Russians and Crimean Tatars feeling less satisfied than Ukrainians¹⁴⁴.

The actual provision of the right of the Crimean residents to education in native language is witnessed by statistic data (Table “*Figures of study in different languages at Crimean educational establishments*”)¹⁴⁵.

Figures of study in different languages at Crimean educational establishments				
Type of educational establishment	Total number of pupils/students	Study in the Ukrainian language	Study in the Russian language	Study in the Crimean Tatar language
General	177,863	12,860 (7.2%)	159,359 (89.6%)	5,644 (3.2%)
Evening	5,916	–	5,818 (98.3%)	98 (1.7%)
Higher educational establishments of I-II accreditation levels	8,600	348 (4%)	8,252 (96%)	–
Higher educational establishments of III-IV accreditation levels	58,981	6,170 (10.5%)	52,811 (89.5%)	–
Total	251,360	19,378 (7.7%)	226,240 (90%)	5,742 (2.3%)

The problems that immediately influence the exercise of rights and needs of Crimean Tatars in study in the native language include disparities in the number of educational establishments, lack of textbooks and poor quality of pedagogical training.

In particular, the Chairman of the Republican Committee for Affairs of Nationalities and Deported Persons S.Saliev said in May 2008, that in order to meet the general educational needs of Crimean Tatars, 10-12 schools with the Crimean Tatar language of study should be built and 15-20 schools should be overhauled and expanded in the near future¹⁴⁶. The main obstacle for that is presented by the lack of budget funds, caused by the absence of political

will to identify true priorities and allocate resources to their attainment. For instance, over the period of implementation of the Programme of Settlement of and Amenities for Deportees... through 2006-2010, school construction was planned only once – in 2006 (in Simferopol, for 200 pupils).

However, according to the First Deputy Head of Majlis R.Chubarov, even in the existing Crimean Tatar schools, the educational process is complicated by the lack of textbooks in general educational disciplines in the Crimean Tatar language, which complicates fully-fledged secondary education¹⁴⁷. However, according to the State Committee for Nationalities and Religions, the situation is gradually improving¹⁴⁸.

There is a problem of pedagogues for Crimean Tatar schools. Now, they are trained at the Crimean Engineering-Pedagogical University in the specialities “Teacher of Crimean Tatar language and Russian language”, “Teacher of Crimean Tatar language and Ukrainian language”, “Teacher of Crimean Tatar language and English language”, “Teacher of elementary school”, and in V.I. Vernadskyi Tavrian National University in the speciality “Teacher of Crimean Tatar language and literature”¹⁴⁹.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

T: “There are only 15 national Crimean Tatar schools, but even those schools are converted from old kindergartens. They do not meet sanitary-hygienic norms. They are called national only because of deeper study of the Crimean Tatar language, or Ukrainian, but teaching is in Russian...”

Another not less important problem dealing with education, development and use of the Crimean Tatar language lies in the absence of higher educational establishments with the Crimean Tatar language of study. The situation with teaching of the Ukrainian language in Crimea is also cheerless¹⁵⁰. However, while young Crimeans who learned in Ukrainian at school can continue education at higher educational establishments of Ukraine, their Crimean Tatar mates are deprived of this possibility. Furthermore, a language not used in higher education can hardly develop as a language of science, politics, administration and judiciary. This substantially impairs motivation to learn in the mother language that can later be used only in everyday communication.

EXTRACTS FROM RECORDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN FOCUS GROUPS

T: “When you send a child to school, you know that there are no... institutes... in the Crimean Tatar language – this makes it unnecessary”.

T: “Today, there is no higher educational establishment in Crimea where one could study in the Crimean Tatar language. I realise that this problem cannot be solved within a year or two but there must be a state policy aimed at gradual solution of the problem”.

¹⁴⁴ Crimea: people, problems, prospects... p.26.

¹⁴⁵ Third Report of Ukraine on implementation of the Framework Convention ...

¹⁴⁶ ARC Committee for Deportees: at least 10-12 more Crimean Tatar schools should be opened in Crimea. – UNIAN, May 28, 2008.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ “In 2008, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine issued for Crimean Tatar general educational establishments textbooks of the Crimean Tatar language and literature for pupils of the 8th form, translated into Crimean Tatar textbooks of Ukraine’s history, world history, algebra, geometry, biology, physics, chemistry, physical geography, Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar and Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian terminological dictionaries. They also developed textbooks of the Crimean Tatar language and literature for pupils of the 9th form and educational programmes for pupils of the 10th-12th forms of specialised schools”. See: Third Report of Ukraine on implementation of the Framework Convention ..., p.66.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.67

¹⁵⁰ In Crimean higher educational establishments, only 5% of disciplines are taught in the Ukrainian language. See: I.Vakarchuk: Crimean higher educational establishments do not respect Ukrainian language. – “Novyi Region” Information Agency, <http://new-region-2.livejournal.com/36359008>



Therefore, it may be assumed that the worst situation with satisfaction of the need for education in the native language is observed in the Crimean Tatar community, the best – in the Slavic (mainly – Russians and Russified Ukrainians). It would be logical to assume therefore that the local authorities should make efforts to remove disparities in the guarantee of one of the constitutional rights of citizens.

However, analysis of regulatory acts of the supreme representative body of the autonomy shows that it concentrated on an entirely different domain. The majority of resolutions, decisions and appeals of Crimean Parliament in 2004-2009 in one or another way dealing with inter-ethnic problems and devoted to the language issue mainly pursued protection and development of the Russian language – not only in the autonomy but in the whole of Ukraine¹⁵¹.

The language situation in the autonomy at the beginning of 2004 is described in the Programme of Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language in the AR of Crimea for 2004-2010¹⁵²: “The Ukrainian language is assigned a key role in nation-building. Meanwhile, its proper development has not been ensured in the recent years. The Ukrainian language, as official, has not become sufficiently spread yet in all functional domains on the territory of the AR of Crimea. Not everything has been done for full-scale introduction of the Ukrainian language in all sectors of public life”. The thrust of the above-mentioned resolutions passed in the subsequent years is entirely inconsistent with this conclusion.

The key measures suggested by those regulatory acts included¹⁵³:

- appointment of a republican (local) consultative referendum on the initiative of Ukrainian citizens permanently living in the AR of Crimea, with the question “Do you stand for the status of the second official language for the Russian language?”¹⁵⁴;

- guarantee of the right of citizens to the use of the official, Russian and other national languages in all sectors of public life in the AR of Crimea¹⁵⁵;
- approval of a plan of annual measures at free development and use of the Russian language in the fields of education and culture in the AR of Crimea in 2007-2010 and its budget. Local self-government bodies and district state administrations were advised to work out and approve plans of similar measures for the same term and annually allocate funds for those purposes during local budgeting¹⁵⁶;
- amendment of a number of Ukrainian laws for actual introduction of bilingualism in the judiciary, notary services, registration of family status, healthcare and advertising, documentation on labour safety, place names, etc.¹⁵⁷;
- planning and approval of measures at development and use of the Crimean Tatar language in the AR of Crimea in 2008-2010 with “funding at the expense of funds allocated to socio-cultural development in the Programme of Amenities for and Socio-Cultural Development of Deported Persons in the AR of Crimea for 2006-2010, and other sources of funding envisaged by the effective legislation”¹⁵⁸;
- indefinite postponement of introduction of independent testing in the official language in Crimea¹⁵⁹;
- permission for TV and radio companies to independently, in line with the programme concept, decide the hours for broadcasting in the Ukrainian language, no less than 51% of the total daily air (pursuant to the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” – 75%)¹⁶⁰;
- recognition of unconstitutionality of the requirement of adaptation of foreign programmes retransmitted

¹⁵¹ See subsection 2.1 of the Analytical Report.

¹⁵² Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea No.856 of March 17, 2003

¹⁵³ Unless specified otherwise, documents of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea are listed in the order of passage.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution “On Appointment of Republican (Local) Consultative Referendum on the Initiative of Ukrainian Citizens Permanently Living in the AR of Crimea” No.1578 of February 22, 2006.

¹⁵⁵ Resolution “On Progress of Implementation of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolution of April 15, 1998 No.1505 “On Support for Functioning of the Official, Russian and Other Languages in the AR of Crimea” No.214 of October 18, 2006, notes that “over the past eight years, the stand of the official language, actively used in all sectors of public life, substantially strengthened”. Meanwhile, it noted “neglect by state servants, especially employed in bodies of central subordination”, of Resolution 1998, which “results in regular and unjustified violations of rights of the majority of population of the republic, for which Russian is the native language”. Those violations were seen in the use of the official language in pharmacology, notary services, judiciary, trade, advertising, on radio and TV, in the activity of law-enforcement bodies, even in education. The text of the Resolution leaves an impression that the Ukrainian language in Crimea drove Russian out in all domains, which is not true.

¹⁵⁶ Resolution “On Progress of Implementation of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolutions on Issues of Use of Official, Russian and Other Languages in AR of Crimea” No.391 of March 22, 2007.

¹⁵⁷ Annexes to resolutions No.214 and No.391.

¹⁵⁸ Resolution “On Amendment of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolution of March 22, 2007 No.391 “On Progress of Implementation of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Resolutions on Issues of Use of Official, Russian and Other Languages in AR of Crimea” No.694 of December 19, 2007. The Plan of Measures for 2009-2010 was approved by the Council of Ministers’ Resolution No.108 of March 3, 2009. By the way, only three items of the plan envisaged measures that technically could not be implemented within set terms: preparation and publication of a 10-volume collection of works by classics of the Crimean Tatar literature; unification of orthographic and orthoepic norms of the Crimean Tatar language; integrated scientific expeditions and field studies for collection of Crimean Tatar folklore and dialectological material, socio-linguistic study of the Crimean Tatar language in Crimea.

¹⁵⁹ Decision “On Appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Need of Conduct of External Independent Evaluation of Progress in Studies of Graduates of Educational Establishments of the AR of Crimea in the Languages of Study” No.905 of June 18, 2008; “On Provision of Orderly Conduct of External Independent Evaluation of Progress in Studies of Graduates of Educational Establishments of the System of General Secondary Education of the AR of Crimea” No.1126 of February 18, 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Resolution “On Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendment of the Law of Ukraine “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” No.3963 of September 17, 2008.

in Ukraine to the requirements of the Ukrainian legislation, since, according to the authors, such adaptation presents a form of censorship¹⁶¹;

- approval of a Comprehensive Plan of Annual Measures at Development of the Russian culture, use of the Russian language, maintenance of Russian educational and cultural-historic sites and facilities in the AR of Crimea for 2009-2015¹⁶²;
- obstruction of the Law “On Concept of Official Language Policy of Ukraine” and “On Official Language and Languages of National Minorities of Ukraine”, since Crimean MPs believe that they overly expand the sphere of use of the official language at the expense of Russian and other languages of national minorities¹⁶³;
- an increase in the number of academic hours allocated to the Russian language and literature in general educational establishments of the AR of Crimea, and a demand “to provide for... placement of information... in the Russian language... in all educational establishments...”. Since this applies to all educational establishments, those steps may be seen as Russification of schools where teaching is conducted in the official language or languages of national minorities¹⁶⁴.

The situation in the language sector was aggravating with every step of the Crimean authorities in response to Kyiv’s. Another peak occurred after the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Order “On Approval of Branch Programme of Improvement of Study of Ukrainian Language in General Educational Establishments with Study in Languages of National Minorities for 2008-2011” No.461 of May 26, 2008. In particular, the Programme envisaged, for preparation of external independent evaluation of progress in studies of graduates of educational establishments studying in the languages of national minorities, to increase the number of academic hours allocated to the Ukrainian literature in senior classes and to introduce bilingual study of Ukraine’s history and geography. Junior classes (2-4) were to add academic hours for the Ukrainian language, others – to introduce bilingual study of Ukraine’s history, geography, maths. It was also planned to fully transfer to the Ukrainian language study of the history of Ukraine from the 6th form, geography – from the 7th. Later on, it envisaged gradual transition to teaching a number of subjects (history of Ukraine, geography of Ukraine, labour training, defence of Motherland, etc.) in the Ukrainian language.

The Crimean authorities harshly responded to the Order. In particular, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea S.Tsekov said that the Order broke rights of citizens provided by the Constitution of Ukraine, and suggested that the autonomy’s Parliament should pass a resolution in defence of the constitutional right of Ukraine’s

citizens to get education in the native language. Chairman of the Standing Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea for Science and Education A.Zhylin said that the Ministry of Education of Ukraine Order destroyed school education in national languages, and the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine I.Vakarchuk should resign¹⁶⁵. According to the Minister of Education of the AR of Crimea V.Lavrov, Crimea “left to pupils and parents the right of choice of the language of study in general and in separate subjects”, actually making clear that Crimean schools were allowed not to follow the Ministry of Education Order on wider use of the Ukrainian language at schools¹⁶⁶.

Such reaction of those officials looks quite natural, given that S.Tsekov heads the Russian Community of Crimea, A.Zhylin is his deputy, V.Lavrov – a CPU member. The Order was also criticised by the Association of Crimean Tatar Education Workers “Maarifchi”. Its statement said that the planned measures would have a negative effect on teaching in native languages. According to “Maarifchi”, the Order undermined the roots of the Crimean Tatar language, reborn in the historic Motherland. In the end, the statement demanded “restoration on the territory Crimea of the official status of the Crimean Tatar language and measures guaranteeing development of education in the Crimean Tatar language as a subsystem in the single system of education of the AR of Crimea and Ukraine”¹⁶⁷.

Parliament of the autonomy practically responded to the Ministry of Education Order with decisions noting the inadmissibility of performance of the Ministry’s orders¹⁶⁸.

Need of preservation/restoration of historic memory

The identity of any social group (from a political nation to an ethnic or confessional community) rests on historic memory, envisaging some interpretation of historic events and processes, a pantheon of heroes and prominent personalities, assessment of historic figures, ideas of enemies and allies, and so on. Respectively, a stable group identity requires preservation (restoration) and continuous actualisation of historic memory, materialised in the totality of objects of symbolic value – texts, monuments, memorial places, place names, etc.

On the other hand, historic memory belongs to the value structures of public and individual consciousness, and therefore, largely motivates social behaviour of a group and its separate representatives. So, **satisfaction of the right of social groups to preservation of their historic memory is critical for relations among them and for the integrity of entire society.**

Analysis of the Crimean situation from this viewpoint shows that the autonomy in fact witnesses competition between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities, in particular, for symbolic values and historic roots on the peninsula.

¹⁶¹ Resolution “On Constitutional Inquiry of Correspondence to the Constitution of Ukraine (Constitutionality) of Parts One and Two, Article 42 of the Law Ukraine of December 21, 1993 No.3759 “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” No.1042 of November 19, 2008.

¹⁶² Approved by Resolution No.1138 of February 18, 2009.

¹⁶³ Decision No.1207 of April 22, 2009.

¹⁶⁴ Resolution “On Measures at Support for the Russian Language in the Field of Education in the AR of Crimea” No.1248 of May 20, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Crimean politicians and pedagogues are indignant with orders from Ivan Vakarchuk. – Press Service of the Russian Community of Crimea, August 8, 2008, <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=123>

¹⁶⁶ Volkova A. Crimean Ministry of Education allowed teachers not to follow Kyiv’s order on Ukrainisation of schools. – “Krym-Novosti” Information Agency, August 27, 2008, <http://from.crimea.ua/obshhestvo/minobraz-kryma-razreshil-uchitelyam-ne-vypolnyat-kiievskij-prikaz-ob-ukrainizacii-shkol>

¹⁶⁷ Khalilova L. Notorious Order of Ministry of Education violates pupils’ rights. – Web Site of Crimean Youth, http://www.crimean.org/crimea/crim_news.asp?NewsID=7921

¹⁶⁸ Decision “On Use of Languages at Organisation of Educational Process at Educational Establishments of the AR of Crimea” No.962 of September 17, 2008.



That is why the issues of return, restoration and building of religious and memorial structures, erection of religious symbols and monuments to prominent figures of the past, return of historic names to populated localities, etc. are so important for Crimea. What is seen as restoration of historic justice or exercise of rights to satisfaction of religious needs by one community is sometimes presented by another as an act of aggression, humiliation of its national and/or religious feelings. A showy example of controversy in assessments of historic events and figures is presented by polemics about the person of Parthenius of Kiziltash (Insert “*Actualisation of historic events and figures in Crimea*”).

ACTUALISATION OF HISTORIC EVENTS AND FIGURES IN CRIMEA

Parthenius of Kiziltash – Hegumen of Kiziltash Monastery in the Eastern Crimea, murdered in 1866, according to then official version, by local residents – Crimean Tatars, as he did not let them illegally cut the surrounding forest and graze cattle on monastery pastures.

Instead, representatives of the Crimean Tatar community believe that the Crimean Tatars accused of the Hegumen's murder and sentenced to death were innocent victims of slander on the part of police informers, and their trial was a political process. In 1998, the Crimean Tatar community built a monument to them in the village of Dachne (Taraktash) of Sudakskiy district. On the other hand, in 2000, Bishop's Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) sanctified Parthenius of Kiziltash as a righteous martyr. In 2008, several issues of the newspapers “Golos Kryma” published an article by I.Abdullaev “Taraktash tragedy”. It negatively assessed the figure of Hegumen Parthenius considering it in a wider context of the ROC activity that “in mid-XIX century, with active support from colonial administration of Crimea, began another stage of the policy of seizure and appropriation of old Crimean Christian holy places, in that way laying claim to the more than millennium-old spiritual, historic and cultural heritage of indigenous peoples of the peninsula evicted in 1778 - Tats and Urums (Christians), Crimean Tatars (Muslims), Karaites”¹⁶⁹.

In response to that publication, the Press Service of the Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of UOC issued a statement saying that allegations of I.Abdullaev “cause moral sufferings to all faithful Christians of Ukraine and offend their religious feelings”¹⁷⁰. The polemic seems not to be over yet.

Such misunderstanding by the communities of the needs and interests of each other stems not only from historic stereotypes but from present-day circumstances – in particular, actual inequality in the communities' ability to satisfy their needs of preservation of historic memory as an integral attribute of their identity.

Furthermore, it may be argued that the authorities openly support claims of one community – Slavs – to symbolic values of Crimea. This is especially manifested in the support for Orthodoxy, represented by UOC, vs. restoration of Muslim shrines in Crimea.

The situation with construction of the memorial Grand Mosque (Cuma Camii) in Simferopol is demonstrative here. In 2004, the city Muslim community requested the City Council to allot for construction of the mosque a part of “Vorontsovka” park (Victory Square) where Crimean Tatars were brought in May 1944 for further deportation beyond Crimea. The City Council that previously transferred that square to the UOC community for restoration of the Cathedral of Saint Prince Alexander of Neva refused the Muslim community under the pretext of a ban on construction in the city's green areas. They allotted a plot for the construction of the mosque on the outskirts of the city, but in 2007, the City Council cancelled its own decision of allocation and qualified fencing of the site and keeping construction materials there as squatting¹⁷¹.

Demonstrative in this context was the statement of the Chairman of the Republican CPU Committee L.Hrach made in Simferopol at a solemn meeting on the occasion of celebration of the Victory Day in 2005: “Those who lift hand against our shrines, including Orthodoxy, should know: we are more than many, and nobody will ever conquer us”¹⁷².

Monuments symbolising the Crimean past in the Russian empire are restored and erected with assistance from the authorities. For instance, in June, 2008, a monument to Empress Catherine II was inaugurated in Sevastopol; in April 2009, events related with restoration of a monument to Catherine II were held in Simferopol. In this connection, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, leader of the Russian community of Crimea S.Tsekov submitted to Crimean Parliament a draft resolution of restoration of that monument and annual arrangement of Crimean-wide festivities devoted to the Manifest of Catherine II “On Admission of the Crimean Peninsula, Island of Taman and the Whole Side of Kuban under the Russian State” on April 19¹⁷³.

Those events, along with others, prompt radicalisation of the spirits and stand of both dominant communities and cause conflicts among their representatives, sometimes growing into violent clashes. The widest publicised conflicts occurred:

- in Bahchysaray in 2001 and 2004 – for the disputed territory claimed by the Assumption Monastery and Muslims for restoration of an old spiritual educational establishment – Zinjirli Madrasah; in 2006 – for the territory of a local market and removal of market structures from the territory of Azizler Muslim cemetery¹⁷⁴;
- in Feodosiya in 2006 – in connection with the erection of a monument to Apostle Andrew the First-Called – between Crimean Tatars, on one hand, and Cossacks and representatives of pro-Russian organisations, on the other.

¹⁶⁹ Abdullaev I. Taraktash tragedy. – “Golos Kryma”. September 12, 2008, <http://www.goloskrima.com/?p=884>

¹⁷⁰ Statement by Press Service of Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of UOC. October 10, 2008. – Web site of Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy, <http://www.crimia.orthodoxy.su/Chronica/2008-10-10-Zayavleniye>

¹⁷¹ See: US Ambassador visited would-be Grand Mosque Cuma Camii. – *Maidan* information web site, <http://maidan.org.ua/static/newskrym/1232642378>

¹⁷² Bobrov A. Cross-cutting in Crimea. – *Russkiy Dom* information web site, <http://www.russdom.ru/2005/200508i/20050832>

¹⁷³ Monument to Russian Empress Catherine the Great in Simferopol, Crimea, will be erected for budget funds. – “Krymskiy Analitik” information web site, <http://www.agatov.com/content/view/1353/63>

¹⁷⁴ Clashes in Bahchysaray on July 8 and August 12, 2006, involved 300 persons on each side. See: Bahchysaray events are the result of distortions and mistakes in inter-ethnic relations – Kunitsyn. – UNIAN, August 17, 2006. Meanwhile, thanks to interference of representatives of political forces in the conflict, in particular, leader of the Crimean Republican Organisation of Party “Russian Bloc”, member of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea O.Rodyvilov and representatives of the Russian Community of Bahchysaray, it was presented as national and shown like that by some Ukrainian and Russian TV channels. See: Regionals in the Crimean leadership discredited Yanukovich more than his opponents. – UNIAN, August 13, 2006.



Use of different place names by the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities poses a separate problem, since every place name involves some interpretation of the history of the concerned place (settlement). The very name “Tavrida” (Tavrian province) given to Crimea after its annexation by the Russian Empire appealed, bypassing Crimean Tatars, to the Greek cultural and historic heritage of Crimea, claimed by tsarist Russia as the successor of the Byzantine Empire.

Today, the Slavic community is using names that appeared in Crimea after the deportation of Crimean Tatars (traditional use, even in the Soviet times, of such Crimean Tatar name as Koktebel instead of official Planerskoe was an exception, along with some Crimean Tatar or Turkized Greek place names left in Crimea).

Instead, Crimean Tatars in media publications and official documents of their public and political organisations use old, mainly Crimean Tatar place names, and not only in case of relatively big cities, such as Akemesjit (Simferopol), Kafa (Feodosiya), Gezlev (Yevpatoriya), Karasubazar (Bilgirsirsk), but also mentioning former Crimean Tatar villages and settlements populated by Russians and Ukrainians after World War II. Therefore, Crimean Tatars are made to believe that Crimea is their historic land and will again be the one some day.

The demand of restoration of Crimean Tatar place names in Crimea was again put forwards at the mourning meeting in Simferopol on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of deportation, where the Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev called upon Crimean Tatars to collect money and erect at approaches to every locality in Crimea signs with historic names. At that, he “warned the anti-Tatar-minded part of the Crimean population against opposing efforts of Crimean Tatars at erection of road signs with historic place names”, hinting that in that case, Russian-language signs could be destroyed.

His first deputy R.Chubarov said that mass restoration of historic place names might begin as soon as within a month or two in all places of residence of Crimean Tatars. He stressed that the campaign was prompted by inaction of the authorities, and would not be accompanied with liquidation of Russian place names: “We will begin to restore our historic names. If the authorities do not want to do this, we will. We will not demolish anything, including names, but there will be centuries-old names nearby specific of Crimea, reflecting the Crimean Tatar culture, traditions and religion”¹⁷⁵.

Although the main socio-cultural groups of Crimea now recognise the Russian language as a language of inter-ethnic communication in the autonomy, they are not united on other aspects of the language issue.

The educational sector in the Crimean is entirely dominated by the Russian language. The official language is actually marginalised, due to the actual absence of public support for the development of education in the Ukrainian language. Education in the Crimean Tatar language, despite public support and demand, is developing too slowly and disproportionately.

The attitude of the Crimean authorities to the official and two most spoken in Crimea languages may be described as follows:

the official language – forced, often formal, support and assistance; Crimean Tatar – formal and limited assistance, a tribute to political correctness rather than the desire to solve a real difficult problem of preservation and development of the Crimean Tatar language that does not have a single literary standard or alphabet; Russian – full assistance and protection, first of all, from wider use of the Ukrainian language.

Rulings actually reversing decisions of central authorities in the autonomy may also be viewed in the context of emergence of a separate Crimean identity intended to oppose Crimea to Ukraine politically and culturally.

The acutest contradictions between the Crimean Tatar and Slavic socio-cultural groups are observed in the field of symbolic values, and exactly there, rivalry can have the gravest consequences.

2.5. TRENDS OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN THE ACTIVITY OF CRIMEAN PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS

Out of 589 registered and 205 legalised by notice Crimean public organisations, local branches of all-Ukrainian and international public organisations, more than 100 were established on ethnic grounds. We will focus on public associations of representatives of the peoples claiming domination or active involvement in socio-political life and management of affairs in the autonomy. Collision of their interests is the gravest, influencing not only the present situation but the future of Crimea¹⁷⁶.

Ukrainian public organisations are poorly represented in the Crimean socio-political space. They do not make a force that could noticeably influence the socio-political situation in the Crimea¹⁷⁷. More or less active are only the Crimean regional organisation of “People’s Movement of Ukraine” (Rukh) and the Crimean republican organisation of the All-Ukrainian Association “Svoboda”. Therefore, more attention is paid to pro-Russian (Slavic) and Crimean Tatar public associations that, according to public opinion polls and monitoring of socio-political activity, enjoy the greatest influence in Crimea (Annex 3 “Crimean organisations exerting the greatest influence on inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations”, p.66).

¹⁷⁵ Crimean Tatars erect on the peninsula signs with Crimean Tatar names of cities. – “Zavtra” media group, <http://www.zavtra.com.ua/news/1/121735>

¹⁷⁶ Less attention is paid to organisations of representatives of peoples of the former USSR living in Crimea (Azeris, Georgians, Lithuanians, Estonians, etc.) and indigenous peoples of Crimea (Karaites and Krymchaks). Those organisations are small, their interests lie beyond politics, and they exert little influence on inter-ethnic relations. The public influence of organisations of representatives of former deported national groups (Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans) also does not go beyond their national communities and has no political dimension.

¹⁷⁷ This conclusion coincides with the opinion of the Committee for Affairs of Nationalities and Deported Persons of the AR of Crimea, that representatives of the Ukrainian public “...are insufficiently involved in the inter-ethnic dialogues”, and as a result, “...the second largest ethnos actually does not influence the development of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea”. See: Information on inter-ethnic relations in AR of Crimea. – Internet portal “AR of Crimea”, <http://comnational.crimea-portal.gov.ua>



Pro-Russian organisations

The most active pro-Russian organisations are the Russian Community of Crimea (RCC), People's Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia", National Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia", Crimean regional organisation of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) and Party "Russian Bloc"¹⁷⁸, Crimean division of the Eurasian Union of Youth (EUY), "Proryv" organisation.

They target the Slavic community, to instil in the public consciousness of that ethno-social group a set of ideas: of historically reasoned and legitimate belonging of Crimea Russia and its accidental, short-timed stay in Ukraine; of Crimea as an integral part of the Russian socio-cultural and geopolitical space; of inadmissibility of spread of the Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea. In line with those goals, the Slavic community of Crimea, feeling affiliation with that space and valuing ties with Russia, should feel the only rightful and legitimate master of the Crimean land. So, any attempts of Ukraine to spread its language and cultural presence in Crimea and Crimean Tatar demands of restoration of their rights are viewed by the Slavic community of the autonomy as illegitimate encroachment on the rights of the Slavic community, its traditions, way of life, and meet a strong negative reaction.

Those ideas are disseminated through various forms of activity of public organisations and their activists: seminars, round-tables, press conferences; distribution of propagandist materials; participation in the work of representative authorities, first of all, the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, and executive bodies; interaction with Russian public and political organisations and authorities; mass events (meetings, demonstrations, pickets) for propaganda of their ideas among residents of Crimean cities, first of all, Simferopol; opposition to decisions of Ukrainian authorities contrary to those ideas, pressure on local authorities, e.g., the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, if they, in the opinion of leaders and activists of the mentioned organisations, demonstrate inconsistency or hesitation in the attainment of those ideas or oppose their attainment.

People's Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia" on January 31, 2007, together with EUY held a meeting near the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, demanding that Crimean MPs pass a declaration of reunification of Crimea with Russia, removal of "occupational", i.e., Ukrainian state symbols from the building of Crimean Parliament and obliging local authorities and their subordinate institutions to hang up state symbols of the Russian Federation.

In February, 2007, the People's Front jointly with the Crimean division of EUY announced an indefinite human rights campaign "Ukraine without Crimea" aimed at "an end to the annexation of the peninsula by Ukraine and return of Crimea and Sevastopol under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation by legal means"¹⁷⁹. The campaign

envisaged mass filing of administrative suits by the Crimean residents to courts demanding that they oblige the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to amend Ukraine's Constitution, removing Chapter 10 "AR of Crimea" and mention of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol from its text. In case of refusal, it planned to appeal to the ombudsman, international organisations whose member Ukraine is, and international courts.

At the beginning of the campaign, they mentioned resolutions of Russia's State Duma "On Legal Assessment of Decisions of Supreme Bodies of State Power of RSFSR Changing the Status of Crimea, passed in 1954" of May 21, 1992 and "On Status of Sevastopol" of July 9, 1993. Those documents were produced by organisers of the event as a legal argument backing stated claims.

On January 21, 2008, the Popular Front activists called press conference "On non-implemented results of referendum of January 20, 1991", where they proposed that Crimea goes to Russia in order not to appear in NATO together with Ukraine. Following the press conference, the Security Service of Ukraine initiated a criminal proceeding against the Popular Front coordinator V.Podyachyi and leader of the Russian Community of Yevpatoriya S.Klyuev under Article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – "encroachment on territorial integrity of Ukraine". The Security Service of Ukraine head V.Nalyvaychenko said that the investigators would request the court to impose a penalty of up to five years of imprisonment upon the defendants¹⁸⁰.

However, the prosecution did not bar V.Podyachyi to continue his campaign that involved suits against the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea and its Chairman A.Hrytsenko for their refusal to cancel the 1998 Constitution of the AR of Crimea "as contrary to the results of the Crimean referendum of January 20, 1991", and consider the issue "of passage of a Declaration of reunification of Crimea with Russia and an appeal to the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the State Duma and Verkhovna Rada demanding immediate talks of return of Crimea under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation"¹⁸¹.

Apart from the declared goal, the campaign was evidently designed to prove that activists of the Popular Front were trying to attain their objectives within the legal framework of Ukraine, so, their prosecution was groundless.

National Front (NF) "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia" held the campaign "Russian boycott of early elections" in 2007, to organise boycott of extraordinary elections of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It argued that no parliamentary party in Ukraine was defending the interests and rights of Russians, and subsequent elections would not change the situation, so, it was senseless to take part in them. Speaking at a press conference on October 3, 2007, the NF leader S.Shuvainikov said he was satisfied with the results of the event since, in his words, some 10%

¹⁷⁸ For more detail see: web site of the "Russian Movement of Ukraine" and Party "Russian Bloc" – http://www.rblok.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26

¹⁷⁹ We declare indefinite campaign "Ukraine without Crimea". – Web site "Russian Popular Assembly of Sevastopol", <http://sevrus.narod.ru>

¹⁸⁰ Fighting half-decay. Kyiv getting ready to try Russian patriots of Crimea. – *Lenta.ru*, January 22, 2009, <http://www.lenta.ru/articles/2009/01/22/skr>

¹⁸¹ "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia": Trial of invalidation of Constitution of the AR of Crimea held in Sevastopol. – "Novyi Region", <http://www.nr2.ru/ua/225923>

of Crimeans boycotted the elections, and due to the low return, the Party of Regions lost votes in Crimea. He warned that NF was planning to boycott all subsequent elections until a true “Russian party” appears in Ukraine, since “today, no political party is willing to recognise the legal status of the Russian people..., all are trying to forcibly assimilate Russian people in the constitutional notion of the “Ukrainian people”¹⁸². At the end of 2007 S.Shuvainikov announced his intention to establish the Russian Party of Ukraine¹⁸³.

Activists of the Crimean regional organisation of PSPU in July 2008, took an active part in protests against a joint Ukrainian-NATO military exercise in Crimea. On October 23, 2008, they jointly with activists of RCC, Russian Bloc party and other organisations held a meeting in Simferopol protesting against the National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting decision to ban from November 1 of that year transmission of Russian TV channels not adapted to the requirements of the Ukrainian legislation in cable TV networks.

In May 2009, PSPU leader N.Vitrenko announced the possibility of calling a referendum about secession of Crimea from Ukraine and joining Russia, if the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed a decision terminating the powers of Sevastopol City Council in response to its decision of May 19, 2009, obliging all city schools to teach in the Russian language.

Crimean division of EUY took part in anti-NATO events in Mykolayiv and Feodosiya in 2006, held a meeting in Sevastopol demanding withdrawal of the Ukrainian Navy from the Crimea in March 2007.

“Proryv’s” leaders in 2006 demanded from Russia’s President V.Putin denunciation of the Russian-Ukrainian “Big Treaty” signed in 1997. Later, the Sevastopol Business Court passed a ruling banning “Proryv”. However, despite the ban, “Proryv” remains active in Crimea, on a smaller scale though.

By and large, pro-Russian youth organisations are much more extremist and controlled by specific public and political forces of the Russian Federation. This prompts greater attention to them on the part of the Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies.

However, the effectiveness of Crimean pro-Russian organisations is impaired by their rivalry and mutual defamation. For instance, RCC was repeatedly criticised by NF “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”, and that organisation itself was established as an alternative to RCC that, according to one of the NF leaders S.Kompaniets, “is not interested in reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia, since it realises its own irrelevance, should such reunification comes true”.

Yet in 2002 NF leader S.Shuvainikov made a number of statements aimed at defamation of RCC head S.Tsekov, accusing him of corruption, in particular, uncontrolled

use of funds allocated by the Moscow Government for humanitarian activity of Russian organisations in the Crimea, and RCC in general – of refusal from protection of the interests of Russian residents of Crimea. The Popular Front, with which the National Front has much common in ideology and political goals, was termed as an organisation fit for nothing that “has nothing positive”.

NF “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” actually opposed itself to other Crimean pro-Russian associations and organisations. According to S.Shuvainikov, “there is no political force today pursuing a Russian policy in Crimea, that is why **Russian people need their representative body – an analogue of Crimean Tatar Kurultay and its executive body Majlis. It is not a public organisation, not a political party but a structure that will take into account the experience of Majlis and Kurultay defending the rights of their people**”¹⁸⁴.

In response, opponents called NF a clone of the People’s Front, and one of the leaders of the latter, head of the Russian Community of Kerch O.Tkachenko, said that “the National Front was established by special services of Ukraine as a political-technological counterbalance to the truly People’s Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”.

In connection with the above-mentioned boycott of early elections-2007, the Popular Front leader V.Podyachyi described the NF activity as follows: “A joint project of the Presidential Secretariat and the Security Service of Ukraine titled “Russian boycott of election of Ukrainian oligarch masters” let Ukraine have one foot in NATO!”¹⁸⁵.

The above-mentioned statement by N.Vitrenko of the possibility of a referendum about cessation of Crimea from Ukraine was criticised by one of the People’s Front leaders as indirect recognition of stay of Crimea in Ukraine’s legal framework.

Among the reasons for conflicts among Crimean pro-Russian organisations and their inability to unite, experts mention rivalry for funds coming from Russia, laying the blame for vanity of all attempts of unification first of all on the “the Kremlin politicians, unwilling to understand that grey funding has long turned patriotism into business on national feelings”¹⁸⁶.

However, despite serious differences and confrontation, Russian public and political organisations of Crimea and their leaders can display solidarity under certain circumstances. For instance, the Popular Front activists V.Podyachyi and S.Klyuev, when subjected to criminal prosecution, found a defender in the person of Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea and RCC leader S.Tsekov, although the Verkhovna Rada, RCC and Party of Regions, whose member S.Tsekov is, were strongly criticised by the People’s Front. Nevertheless, S.Tsekov turned to ombudsman N.Karpachova actually acquitting S.Klyuev and V.Podyachyi and requesting her to personally monitor their case¹⁸⁷.

¹⁸² “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” Front to blame for low return. – Crimean online news service, <http://news.allcrimea.net/comments/1191419719>

¹⁸³ “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” National Front leader wants to create Russian Party of Ukraine within a year. – *Crimean News Agency*, <http://www.start.crimea.ua>

¹⁸⁴ Tyshchenko Yu., Khalilov R., Kapustin M. Socio-political processes in the AR of Crimea: key trends. – Kyiv, 2008, p.70.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.64-70.

¹⁸⁶ Sergeev G. Russian linguists will be turned... politicians. – “Pervaya Krymskaya”, June 5, 2009.

¹⁸⁷ S.Tsekov asks Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Human Rights Commissioner N.Karpachova to personally monitor criminal case of Crimeans accused of separatism. – *Portal of Russian People of Ukraine*, <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/news.php?point=359>



Soon, the list of pro-Russian organisations may include one more – all-Ukrainian human-rights organisation “Russian-speaking Ukraine” (tentative name). The idea of its creation was announced during the Third Festival “Great Russian Word” recently held in the Crimean Livadia palace. According to the festival’s organising committee head S.Tsekov, the activity of the new organisation “will focus on protection of rights of Russian and Russian-cultural citizens of Ukraine”¹⁸⁸. Regarding the roots of that idea, S.Tsekov said that “the initiative in the given case was not Crimean”¹⁸⁹.

Cossack associations make a separate group of Slavic organisations. Among them, the greatest activity in the recent years has been displayed by the Crimean Cossack Union, the Association of Cossacks of the AR of Crimea “Krymska Palanka”, the Union of Cossacks of Feodosiya Region, “Sobol” Cossack Community.

The goals of **Cossack associations** somewhat differ from those of the above-mentioned pro-Russian organisations. While the latter have evidently political goals and pursue integration of the Crimea – if not immediately in the Russian state, than at least in the sphere of Russian geopolitical influence, the goals of Cossacks include: maintenance in the public consciousness of the idea of Crimea as an integral part of the Russian spiritual, religious and cultural space; protection of the Slavic population from “encroachments by unorthodox” (first of all Muslims (Crimean Tatars)) on its sanctuaries and land; assistance to the spread of religious and memorial symbols related with the idea of unity of Crimea and Russia in Crimea.

The main mechanisms of attainment of those goals include: educational and enlightenment activity; public events, including international; participation in mass events of other pro-Russian organisations; direct opposition to Crimean Tatars; safeguarding of political and religious events; cooperation with Russian Cossack organisations, first of all – the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad.

Actions of Cossacks in defence of memorial sites or prevention of their establishment – guarding monuments to Andrew the First-Called in Feodosiya (2006) and Catherine II in Sevastopol (2008), prevention of installation of a memorial board in Hrafska Pier in Sevastopol (2008) in honour of the 60th anniversary of the Black Sea Fleet raising Ukrainian ensigns, escort of cross-bearing processions at sanctuaries of the Eastern Crimea (since 2005) and other acts – well fit in the scheme of the “wars of symbols” intended to make the territory of residence of some ethnic group a space of symbolic value and at the same time prevent creation or restoration of symbolic values of other ethnic groups living on the same territory¹⁹⁰. Cossacks, too, are called to play the symbolic role of Christian warriors, defenders of the Russian land and Orthodox faith for the Slavic population of Crimea.

Evidently, the “Orthodox church” that allegedly needs defence from Muslim (Crimean Tatar) extremists in this case also means not a real religious institute but a national symbol necessary for instilment of the Russian identity of Crimea, its unbreakable connection with the Russian socio-cultural space. The image of Crimean Tatar “extremists” also plays a symbolic role in this context, personifying all negative the Russian mentality traditionally associates with the Muslim world. For instance, the above-mentioned report of the press service of the Union of Faithful Cossacks about the monument to Apostle Andrew the First-Called in Feodosiya says: “It is the monument from which last year’s confrontation of Cossacks with miscreants began”¹⁹¹. I.e., Crimean Tatar residents of Feodosiya who at the beginning of June 2006 picketed construction of the monument for religious reasons are presented as “miscreants” – representatives of Islam historically hostile to the Christian world.

Crimean Cossack organisations also have other functions closely related with the above. In Crimea and whole Ukraine, they present an outpost of the pro-Kremlin part of Russian Cossacks united in the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad, and an important link of Crimeans with the Russian socio-cultural and political space. The activity of those organisations dealing with inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea is largely determined by their relations with the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad led by the Ataman of the Great Army of the Don, Supreme Ataman of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad, a member of Russia’s State Duma and coordinator of the “United Russia” Party for ties with Cossacks V.Vodolatsky.

The nature of relations between the Crimean and Russian Cossacks is revealed by the following clauses of V.Vodolatsky’s order on guarding the monument to Catherine II in Sevastopol in July 2008: “1. All structural units of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and Abroad form and detach peacekeeping Cossack teams to Sevastopol to guard the monument to Catherine the Great. 2. Coordination of team actions rests with Ataman of the Association of Cossacks of the AR of Crimea “Krymska Palanka” military foreman S.N.Yurchenko”¹⁹².

Those relations are not sporadic but continuous, seen in events regularly held in the Crimea, in particular: II International Forum of Cossack Culture (May 31 - June 3, 2007), accompanied with laying of a memorial stone in Simferopol in the place of the would-be monument to Catherine II and floral tribute in Feodosiya to the monument to Apostle Andrew the First-Called; I International Cossack Forum (June 12-14, 2008) on the occasion of celebration of the Day of Russia (12 June) and 225th anniversary of Sevastopol; another International Forum of Cossack Culture is to take place in June 2009 in Poltava on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. V.Vodolatsky forbidden from Ukraine since 2008 will not

¹⁸⁸ Obukhovskaya L. God and Russian language are with us. – “Krymskaya Pravda”, June 11, 2009.

¹⁸⁹ Sergeev G. Russian linguists will be turned... politicians. – “Pervaya Krymskaya”, June 5-11, 2009.

¹⁹⁰ For more detail see: Why repeat Crimean wars. – OBKOM, May 29, 2007, <http://www.obkom.net.ua>; Sevastopol confrontation. Cossacks of the Don announced a march on Sevastopol. – Interfax, http://www.interfax-russia.ru/r/B/eventday/438.html?menu=5&id_issue=1208; From Toplu to Feodosiya. – web site *Russkaya Liniya*, December 8, 2008, <http://www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=113565>; Bohomolov O., Danylov O., Semyvolos I. Islam and policy of identities in Crimea: from symbolic wars to admission of cultural variety. – Analytical report, Kyiv, 2009.

¹⁹¹ International Forum of Cossack Culture in Crimea. – All-Russian Monarchic Centre, June 6, 2007, http://www.monarchruss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=664&Itemid=30

¹⁹² Monument to Empress Catherine the Great in Sevastopol guarded by Cossacks. – “Novosti Sevastopolya”, July 8, 2008, <http://sevastopol.su/news.php?id=5349>

be present at the forum, but he made its goal clear – to pay tribute to the Russian-Ukrainian history, “for nobody could repaint history the colours that may be to somebody’s liking or not”¹⁹³.

The trend of the Russian influence is witnessed by the “Common appeal of Atamans of Military Cossack associations of Russia and Ukraine to the President, Verkhovna Rada, Cossacks and People of Ukraine” of April 25, 2009, signed, in particular, by V.Vodolatsky, V.Cherkashyn and S.Yurchenko: “We cannot quietly watch rewriting and distortion of our common history, honouring in Ukraine people and events that left a black trace not only in the Russian and Ukrainian but in the World history... We cannot stay indifferent, when the official authorities of Ukraine support forces aimed against Russia, and in the end, against the Ukrainian people”¹⁹⁴.

The importance of the Cossack movement in Crimea in the eyes of pro-Russian forces is witnessed by the words of the Chairman of the Republican CPU Committee and All-Ukrainian Association “Heirs of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi” L.Hrach: “Today, the Black Sea Fleet and Cossacks are the only factor keeping Crimean Tatars from large-scale radical actions and implementation of the Kosovo scenario in Crimea. Since the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine do not effectively stop actions of Crimean Tatar extremists, Cossacks remain the only force that does not allow radicals to seize land and saw down crosses at Orthodox cemeteries”¹⁹⁵. One may add to that a phrase from a report by the press service of the Union of Faithful Cossacks and the Kyiv Monarchic Centre – an organisation cooperating with Crimean and Russian Cossack associations: “They [Cossacks] enjoy respect and love of the Slavic Orthodox population of Crimea. Not once or twice – regularly do Cossacks defend the Orthodox Church and people from Muslim extremists, from attempts to make Crimea another Kosovo”¹⁹⁶.

Crimean Tatar public and political organisations¹⁹⁷

The most active and influential Crimean Tatar public and political organisations are: Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Organisation of Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCTNM), “Adalet” party, “Avdet” public organisation, National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NMCT), “Milli Firka” party. They have common goals: return and amenities for Crimean Tatars on their historic Motherland; socio-economic, national, spiritual and cultural development of the Crimean Tatar people; restoration of its political rights. Some organisations (“Adalet”, “Avdet”) make particular emphasis on the rebirth of Islam in Crimea as one of their priorities.

Those goals are attained through: activity of national representative bodies (Majlis and local Majlises); work in Crimean and Ukrainian representative and executive bodies

(representatives in those bodies are mainly nominated by Majlis); participation in the work of consultative-advisory bodies of the authorities (in particular, the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine traditionally included representatives of Majlis); educational, enlightenment, scientific research and human rights activity; organisation of mass events (meetings, demonstrations, pickets) both in Crimea and in Kyiv; organisation of squatting of land plots with subsequent legalisation of those acts; active cooperation with international organisations (first of all, OSCE), public, political and governmental structures of other countries (first of all, Turkey).

Among Crimean Tatar public and political organisations, considered potentially contentious may be the activity of “Adalet”, “Avdet”, NMCT and “Milli Firka”.

- **“Adalet”** – due to the radicalism of some elements of its ideology, emphasis on physical training of the organisation members, association with paramilitary detachments of *askers* in the public consciousness.
- **“Avdet”** – due to connection with Crimean Tatar squatting, every time meeting tough reaction, sometimes – resistance of the Slavic community. The possibility of radicalisation of that organisation was confirmed by a statement of one of coordinators of a picket near Ukraine’s Government organised by “Avdet” (April 2009), R.Shaimardanov: “If Ukraine considers problems of Crimean Tatars little important, we will make the Crimean Tatar problem the main problem of Ukraine... We will cut Ukraine’s road to the European Union”¹⁹⁸.
- **NMCT and “Milli Firka”** – due to their pro-Russian orientation, denial of legitimacy of Kurultay and Majlis, defamation of their leadership. Although their activity is quite peaceful, it adds to political disorientation of Crimean Tatars, promotes centrifugal processes among them, stirs up anti-Ukrainian spirits.

Meanwhile, the activity of those organisations beyond their national community is very limited, compared to Slavic public and political and Cossack associations, and much less aggressive. That is why their conflict potential is considered to be much lower.

Crimean Tatar public and political organisations also compete for ideological leadership and influence. There are fundamental differences in the assessment of the legitimacy of Majlis as the representative body of the Crimean Tatar people (NMCT, “Milli Firka”). Some ideological opposition to Majlis is demonstrated by OCTNM, “Azatlyk”. Recently, “Avdet” has gained popularity and influence in the Crimean Tatar community. Majlis took a tough stand against NMCT – the Majlis leadership terms NMCT members as “traitors” and “provocateurs”, and the movement itself – as one of “political organisations in due time created by the Soviet KGB and opposed to the main Crimean Tatar national movement”.

¹⁹³ Ataman of the Don Cossacks barred from Cossack Forum in Poltava. – “Korrespondent”, January 5, 2009, <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/700404>

¹⁹⁴ Cossacks appealed to the President, Verkhovna Rada, Cossacks and people of Ukraine in connection with the unstable situation in the Ukrainian state. – Russians in Ukraine, May 8, 2009, <http://www.rus.in.ua/news/1245>

¹⁹⁵ Hrach L. Crimean “knot”. – “Yedinoye Otechestvo”, http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/statyi/2004_02/st_24_02. Ethnic, inter-confessional and even inter-civilisational differences are on the rise in Crimea.

¹⁹⁶ International Forum of Cossack Culture in Crimea...

¹⁹⁷ Alongside, there are Crimean Tatar non-political organisations, for instance: League of Crimean Tatar Women, League of Crimean Tatar Lawyers INICIUM, Crimean Human Rights Association “Arqadash”, Association of Crimean Tatar Education Workers “Maarifchi”, Society of Researches of History and Culture of Crimean Tatars, Information-Educational Centre “Borazan”. By contrast to Slavic, they are directly involved in the political life of their people, for instance, create election blocs or independently nominate candidates at election of Kurultay delegates.

¹⁹⁸ Kapustin M. Majlis has got a rival. – “Sobytiya”, June 12, 2009.



There are some differences in the terms of restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people and ideas of political forms of their exercise: both tactical (Majlis – OCTNM and “Adalet”) and strategic (Majlis – NMCT and “Milli Firka”).

One should separately mention organisations setting the goals of religious rebirth of the Crimean Tatar people, its rapprochement with the Muslim world – i.e., branches of the Islamic party “Hizb al-Tahrir”, Salafites (from the Arabic “salafa” – “original”), more often termed as Wahhabites, after the founder of that Islamic trend Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhab, followers of the “Tablighi Jamaat” movement (from the Arabic “*tabligh*” – “sermon”).

The main forms of their activity include sermon, study, religious education, charity, organisation of mass enlightenment events, distribution of the relevant literature.

The Muslim community of Crimea is especially concerned about the activity of Muslim groups sharing the ideology of “Hizb al-Tahrir” party. Despite peaceful rhetoric, representatives of that party do not reject the possibility of establishment of an Islamic state on part of Ukraine’s territory. They stress however that their goal lies not in building that state but solely in Islamic education, formation of new relations among Muslims, as the basis for establishment of an Islamic state. At that, “Ukraine, as an independent state, will itself establish relations with the Islamic state after its appearance, and this is not related with “Hizb al-Tahrir” party. Moreover that it [Ukraine] already has such historic experience. For instance, agreements made between Crimean Khan Islam Girey III and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi”.

Such a trend in the party activity runs contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine and, given the socio-political spirits in the autonomy, can have a negative effect. Furthermore, representatives of “Hizb al-Tahrir” indirectly admit legitimacy of violence as a means of spread of Islam and establishment of the Islamic rule: “As regards Jihad (*holy war against “infidels”* – Ed.), it is a method of spread of Islam all over the world, being a duty of an Islamic state”¹⁹⁹.

Such ideology is often considered extremist even in the countries where “Hizb al-Tahrir” party is not considered tied with terrorism and violence, and not officially banned. Furthermore, that ideology can be adopted by other political or religious groupings, unwilling to content themselves with peaceful methods of spread of Islam and restoration of Caliphate.

Regarding Crimean Tatar national problems, the Crimean adherents of “Hizb al-Tahrir” stress that Islam has always been the core of the Crimean Tatar national identity, and now, it alone, not secular national ideologies, can save

Crimean Tatars from assimilation. Spread of the ideology of “Hizb al-Tahrir” and expansion of its structure may complicate its relations with the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine and Majlis, destabilise the socio-political situation in the Crimean Tatar community of the autonomy.

In fact, “Hizb al-Tahrir” is a political opponent of Majlis, since it opposes the idea of restoration of the Crimean Tatar autonomy in Crimea, criticises the Declaration of National Self-Determination of the Crimean Tatar People, calling it “another self-deception”, and therefore totally discredits the Majlis activity²⁰⁰.

On March 27, 2008, draft resolution “On Draft Law of Ukraine “On Ban on Activity of Political Party “Hizb al-Tahrir”” was registered at the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea. The draft was criticised by First Deputy Head of Majlis R.Chubarov who said that it ran contrary to the Constitution and legislation of Ukraine and was intended to publicise its authors²⁰¹.

At the same time, R.Chubarov strongly criticised “Hizb al-Tahrir”, saying that its activity, “as well as of religious sects, is dangerous for Crimean Tatar society, since it threatens with “distortion of spiritual consciousness of Crimean Tatars”, and suggesting that the party was funded from abroad, from Russia. However, he mentioned “Hizb al-Tahrir” on a par with pro-Russian radical groupings, such as “Proryv” and the Eurasian Union of Youth²⁰². The latter proves that criticising the mentioned draft resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, R.Chubarov did not defend “Hizb al-Tahrir” but spoke out against a selective approach of Crimean MPs who sought a ban for extremist Crimean Tatar national organisations, leaving no less extremist pro-Russian organisations unattended.

Citizens’ attitude to non-governmental institutes

Results of the public opinion poll witnessed differences in the degree of trust of different socio-cultural groups in public organisations and low involvement of representatives of all socio-cultural groups in their activity²⁰³.

Public organisations, including national-cultural associations, enjoy the greatest trust among Crimean Tatars (more than 40%). Representatives of the Slavic community trust them far less (16-18%). Those institutes are least of all trusted by “Crimean Ukrainians” – a bit more than 5%, due to the low influence of Ukrainian organisations on the socio-political situation in the autonomy, and low public activity of the group itself, in particular, in the defence of their national-cultural interests.

The rather strong trust of Crimean Tatars in public organisations stems from the fact that those organisations were created for defence of their interests, and many of them really do that. Meanwhile, nearly a third of Crimean Tatars (mainly those who mistrust them) stays beyond their influence.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*


²⁰⁰ Emiruseinov R. National autonomy will not meet hopes of our people. – Portal of Muslims of Crimea, March 19, 2008, <http://qirim-vilayeti.org/content/view/171/97>

²⁰¹ Comments by R.Chubarov on the mentioned draft Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea. – Portal of Muslims of Crimea, April 3, 2008, <http://qirim-vilayeti.org/content/view/189/97>

²⁰² Majlis believes that Islamic extremists in Crimea are funded by Russia. – OBKOM, <http://obkom.net.ua/news/2008-04-07/1700.shtml>

²⁰³ For summary data of the latest public opinion poll of public perception of non-state institutes see Table “Specificities of identity of dominant socio-cultural groups of Crimea”, pp.22-28 of this magazine.

The rate of involvement of representatives of all socio-cultural groups in the activity of public organisations is low – 3-6%. This level is insufficient to speak of large-scale activity of public organisations, existence of a stabilising factor of civic activity or, moreover, signs of civil society. However, the reported level is sufficient for beginning of radicalisation of social relations and further escalation of tension.



Therefore, Slavic and Crimean Tatar public and political associations in Crimea have not just different but often conflicting and even opposite goals that cannot be attained in one political and legal environment.

Those parties compete not only for the Crimean political and economic space but also for symbolic values, more dealing with the national identity, national consciousness, that is why any actions of the opposite side in that space are met especially painfully and aggressively. Rivalry for symbolic values can make inter-ethnic contradictions inter-confessional, lead to their aggravation and involve new parties in the conflict.

Other factors of growth of inter-confessional tension may include superficial interpretation of Islamic ideological trends and unreasonable allegations of existence of cause-effect relations between them and extremist organisations and movements (of Crimean Wahhabites, “Tablighi Jamaat”). As a result, a distorted, frightening image of bearers of those trends is formed in the public consciousness, which may give rise to negative reactions – from fear to aggression – and stir up internal contradictions, growth of the conflict potential in the Muslim community of Crimea and aggravation of tension in inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations.

Both the Slavic and Crimean Tatar public and political communities have rather serious internal contradictions that, on one hand, undermine the effectiveness of the concerned organisations, on the other – politically disorient citizens making their social basis, creating background for breach of socio-political stability.

Annex 3

CRIMEAN ORGANISATIONS EXERTING THE GREATEST INFLUENCE ON INTER-ETHNIC AND INTER-CONFESSONAL RELATIONS

Russian public and political associations

Russian Community of Crimea (RCC). Established in 1993 (registered in 1994) on the basis of the Republican Party of Crimea. Enjoys the greatest influence among Russian public and political associations. RCC is led by S.Tsekov

The RCC ideology rests on nostalgia for the USSR, seen as the successor to the Russian Empire; idea of illegality of Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine in 1954; rejection of attempts of integration of the Crimea in the Ukrainian socio-cultural space; perception of Russia as their historic Motherland.

The organisation declares two main goals:

- restoration of political, economic, cultural ties of Crimea with the Russian Federation, cut during the break-up of the USSR;
- defence of the Russian socio-cultural space.

At elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea in 1998, pro-Russian forces, weakened by the crisis of mid-1990s, suffered a defeat, and in 1998-2002, RCC had no representation in the Crimean authorities.

At the 2002 elections, six representatives of the election alliance “Russian Bloc of Crimea” made on the basis of RCC,

Congress of Russian Communities of the Crimea (CRCC) and Party “Union” were elected to the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, including four RCC members. However, those MPs did not manage to form one faction. Later, confrontation within the Russian Bloc of Crimea resulted in the withdrawal of CRCC and political accusations of RCC leader S.Tsekov (of corruption, uncontrolled use of funds allocated by the Moscow Government to Russian organisations of Crimea for humanitarian purposes) and RCC as a whole (refusal from defence of the interests of Russian residents of Crimea).

In 2003, RCC admitted the Russian Movement of Crimea that greatly contributed to the victory of the “Russia” bloc at elections of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea in 1994.

In 2003, RCC supported at elections of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea election bloc “For Yanukovych!” (Party of Regions – Party “Russian Bloc”) that won 19 seats, and S.Tsekov was elected First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea.

People’s Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”. The organisation was established on August 24, 2005, by 10 public organisations of Crimea and Sevastopol, including the Russian Popular Assembly of Sevastopol, the Russian Popular Assembly of Simferopol, Sevastopol

and Yalta organisations of the Movement of Voters of Crimea and others. Its coordinator is V.Podyachyi.

The Declaration of establishment of the People's Front stated¹ that "Ukraine, of course, as all states, has the right to sovereignty, independence, but without lands stolen from Russia and millions of Russians compactly living there". It formulated the goal of the newly established organisation: "on the basis of domestic and international law, commonly accepted humanitarian norms, historic facts, as soon as possible, to restore historic justice – reunite Sevastopol, the Crimea with our Motherland – Russia".

That organisation is much more radical than RCC. Its activity is openly separatist; it set the goal of not defence of the socio-cultural space or restoration of Crimea's ties with Russia, but its transfer to Russia. The very Declaration of establishment of the Front was a breach of the Constitution of Ukraine.

National Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia". Established in November 2006 as a coalition of public and political organisations of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol that united 15 organisations, including CRCC, the Russian Front of Sergey Shuvainikov, the Union of Orthodox Citizens of Crimea, the Russian Community of Simferopol, Bilogirya and Sevastopol, Sevastopol Movement against Illegal Immigration. The alliance was led by S.Shuvainikov.

Goals of the alliance: struggle for recognition of the legal status of the Russian people and Russian nation in the Constitution and laws of Ukraine; an official status for the Russian language; "organisation of a representative body of Russian self-government – Russian Constituent Assembly of Crimea (national congress) and its executive body – Russian Duma of Crimea; restoration of historic justice and recognition of conformity of the status of Sevastopol and Crimea provisionally annexed by the Ukrainian state to international norms and popular will".

It plans gradual secession of Crimea from Ukraine and joining Russia: a new legal status for the Russian national minority within Ukraine's legal framework and creation of national self-government bodies; withdrawal from the legal framework of Ukraine (as a mirror image of the goals and methods of the Crimean Tatar movement).

Youth organisations. In the recent year, youth pro-Russian organisations have been active in Crimea, such as **the Crimean division of the Eurasian Union of Youth (EUY)** – Russian organisation of the chauvinist-imperial trend. The Crimean division of EUY is led by K.Knyryk.

Political goals and tasks of EUY suggest restoration of the Russian empire and separation of the Crimea from Ukraine for its salvation².

Youth organisation "**Proryv**" acts under the motto of unification of Crimea with Russia and anti-Ukrainian slogans. Its activity also covers other regions of Ukraine, where it "defends churches of the Moscow Patriarchate", confronts "Ukrainian nationalists", etc.

Cossack organisations of Crimea. There are 18 Cossack organisations registered in Crimea and five legalised by notice. A few more act without official legalisation. The most active were **the Crimean Cossack Union, the Association of Cossacks of the AR of Crimea "Krymska Palanka", the Union of Cossacks of Feodosiya Region, the International Union of Cossacks of Tavrida.**

Supreme Ataman of the Crimean Cossack Union V.Cherkashyn, denying the militarised and anti-Tatar nature of Crimean Cossacks and stressing that "all actions of Cossacks pursue peace, accord and order in Crimea", also terms defence of the Orthodox church as its priority: "Having come to the peninsula, you will see 30 strong organisations standing in defence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate"³.

Crimean Tatar public and political associations

Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People⁴. Established at the II Kurultay (national congress) of the Crimean Tatar people in June, 1991. Elected its leader was M.Dzhemilev, who occupies that post till now. Majlis to a large extent controls the political and public life of Crimean Tatars, actually represents them in relations with the central state authorities, has representatives in the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, supreme republican executive bodies.

Majlis may be termed as a public and political organisation only with serious reservations. By its functions, it is a plenipotentiary executive body of Crimean Tatar self-government – "the only supreme plenipotentiary representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, elected by Kurultay from among its delegates". It has its executive hierarchy – local Majlises, subordinated to Majlis of the Crimean Tatar People. In turn, Kurultay is the national Crimean Tatar congress, the supreme representative plenipotentiary body of the Crimean Tatar people.

In pursuance of the powers approved on November 10, 2001, Kurultay takes decisions on all material issues of socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and other aspects of life of the Crimean Tatar people. Furthermore, "decisions of Kurultay are binding on its delegates, their bodies and the whole system of national representation and self-government of the Crimean Tatar people: Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people, regional and local Majlises, committees for assistance with return of Crimean Tatars, their branches and bodies, representatives of Majlis in other states".

One of the main goals of Majlis lies in restoration of national and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people and exercise of its right to free national-state self-determination on its national territory. Therefore, the Crimean Tatar people is *a priori* termed as political nation that may seek own statehood. The intermediary political goal of Majlis is to secure "establishment of the status of Crimea in Ukraine by the national-territorial principle on the basis of exercise by the Crimean Tatar people of its inalienable right to self-government and guarantee of observance of rights

¹ For Declaration of establishment of the People's Front "Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia" see: Russian People's Assembly of Sevastopol, <http://sevrus.narod.ru/#v25>

² Knyryk K.: "To seek creation of an empire, first of all, to tear Crimea from Ukraine, for saving it". See: Khan R. Crimeanjugend: youth political organisations of the peninsula. – Eurasian Union of Youth, <http://www.rossia3.ru>

³ Kravchenko S. Cossack cover. – BOSPOR, January 31, 2008, <http://bospor.com.ua/articles/1089.shtml>

⁴ For documents on Kurultay and Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people see: web site of the Centre of Information and Documentation of Crimean Tatars, <http://cidct.org.ua>

and freedoms for all people, irrespective of their race, nationality, political views and faith”.

Kurultay and Majlis position themselves as Crimean Tatar national self-government bodies whose political goals deal with the whole Crimean Tatar people as the core of the future Crimean political nation.

Organisation of Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCTNM).

Established at the Fifth All-Union Conference of representatives of spearhead groups of the Crimean Tatar national movement held on April 29 - May 2, 1989 in the city of Yangiyul (Tashkent region, Uzbek SSR). M.Dzhemilev was elected the first OCTNM head. The first OCTNM congress was held on August 23-25, 1991. In 1991-1994, after M.Dzhemilev was elected Majlis leader, the post of the OCTNM head was entrusted to R.Chubarov. At that time, OCTNM and Majlis had no differences whatsoever.

OCTNM largely shares the Majlis ideology but is more uncompromising. It remains generally loyal to Majlis and its leadership and recognises their powers.

“Adalet” (“Justice”) Party. Established on August 19, 1995, at the 1st (constituent) congress. Its programme objectives include: assistance to “soonest return of Crimean Tatars to their historic Motherland”, “return to the Crimean Tatar people of all property criminally taken from it in the result of deportation of 1944”, “building in Crimea of a national state resting on the exercise by the Crimean Tatar people of its natural right to self-determination”. The party firmly stands on the Islamic position and opposes spread of other religious teachings, first of all, Christianity, among Crimean Tatars and conversion of Crimean Tatars to other religions. It advocates “purification” of Crimean Tatar society from alien (non-Islamic) morality, fighting crime and lechery, preservation and development of the Crimean Tatar language and culture.

“Adalet” is associated with the establishment of paramilitary units (so-called *askers*), tasked to defend Crimean Tatars from attacks of criminal groups and pro-Russian, first of all, Cossack, organisations. Meanwhile, Majlis praises participation of “Adalet” in the work of national self-government bodies and considers it one the most important and effective national parties.

Information and civil rights movement “Azatlyk” (“Freedom”).

Established in April 2005 to make the authorities free Crimean Tatars involved in the mass fight between Crimean Tatar and Slavic youths in Simferopol bar “Cotton club” and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. After the goal was achieved, the activity of the organisation went down.

The Movement’s conference in 2008 did not support the negative stand of its leadership (N.Bekirov, A.Mustafaev) towards the supreme representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people, which made those leaders to quit the Movement.

Public organisation “Avdet” (“Return”). Registered in April 2007, has 15 thousand members and 120 divisions. It has two priority lines of activity: enhancement of the well-being and revival of spiritual values

of the Crimean Tatar people. The organisation is especially active in the field of provision of repatriates with land (execution of relevant documents, legal support) and takes part in talks with the authorities, defence of activists of “fields of protest” from “arbitrariness of militia and officials”.

“Avdet” programme envisages assistance for revival of Islam and Islamic values on the peninsula, in particular: help in construction of a mosque in every populated locality of the Crimea and opening of a madrasah at it; restoration of historic Crimean Tatar place names; promotion and development of genealogical programmes⁵.

National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NMCT). Established, according to its representatives, on May 18, 1944 – in the first day of deportation. Before 1993, NMCT was led by Yu.Osmanov whose works, along with those by I.Gasprinskiy, N.Trubetskoy and L.Gumilev, are considered the ideological basis of the movement. NMCT does not recognise Majlis as the plenipotentiary representative body of the Crimean Tatar people.

By contrast to Majlis, NMCT took a pro-Russian stand and shares the idea of reintegration of the post-Soviet space under the auspices of Russia, popular in the Russian political community.

Coordinating Council of Public and Political Forces of the Crimean Tatar People (CC).

Established 2002 on the initiative of NMCT as an alternative to Majlis. CC does not recognise the legitimacy of Majlis and local Majlises, accusing it of indulgence towards the Ukrainian authorities, and is trying to discredit its leadership by all means. Its demands on the Ukrainian authorities are more radical than of Majlis. For instance, in the fall of 2002, CC submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for consideration draft Law “On Rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar People” providing for restoration in Crimea of the Crimean Tatar autonomy and proposed relevant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. Now, it has a low profile in the socio-political life of the autonomy.

“Milli Firka” (“People’s Party”). Established in 2007. The elected Chairman of its Board (*Kenesh*) is V.Abduraimov who before 2000 led NMCT. “Milli Firka” is in opposition to Majlis, accusing its leadership of usurpation of power in Crimean Tatar representative bodies, corruption and betrayal of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people. It described the World Congress of Crimean Tatars as a “vast international affair”⁶.

As well as NMCT, “Milli Firka” is very critical about the Ukrainian authorities, demanding from them full rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people. It mainly contacts with the Russian authorities. In September 2008, it transferred via the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in Simferopol an appeal to the Russian President D.Medvedev, Prime Minister V.Putin and President of the Republic of Tatarstan M.Shaimiev with a call “to defend on behalf of the Russian Federation the indigenous and other small ethnoses of the Crimea from endless genocide by the nationalist-minded official authorities of Ukraine”⁷. However, the organisation is not united on this issue.

⁵ For more detail see: Information-analytical portal of public organisation “Avdet”, <http://awdet.org/way.htm>

⁶ “Milli Firka” returned the leader who called upon Russia to defend Crimean Tatars from genocide on the part of Ukrainian authorities. – “Novyi Region – Crimea”, May 15, 2009, <http://www.nr2.ru/ua/232420>

⁷ Vovchenko P. “Milli Firka” calls Russian tanks to the Crimea?”. – “Sobytiya”, September 12, 2008, <http://www.sobytiya.com.ua/index.php?number=136&doc=1221207061>

Islamic organisations and movements

Party “Hizb al-Tahrir” (full name: “Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islam” – “Islamic Liberation Party”). Established in 1953 in Jerusalem by a judge of the Shariah court of appeal Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. Active in 40 countries of the world. The largest party branch operates in Great Britain (up to 10 thousand members). The party is banned in Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan. In some countries “Hizb al-Tahrir”, not officially banned, is persecuted, and its members are subjected to repressions (Libya, Syria, Uzbekistan). Meanwhile, it is active in such Islamic countries as Yemen, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, UAE and Palestinian Autonomy. In Europe (except Germany) and the USA, the party also functions legally. It is often criticized for extremist statements of its members, but no connection with terrorism and violence has been revealed.

The declared goal of “Hizb al-Tahrir” is to return Muslims to the Islamic way of life and spread Islam all over the world. That goal is to be attained through restoration of the Caliphate – a theocratic state uniting all Muslims of the world and built on the socio-political principles on which the Caliphate was built at the time of Prophet Muhammed and the first four righteous Caliphs – Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman and Ali. It proclaims purely peaceful methods of restoration of the Caliphate – building of party structures, propaganda and education, winning political support: “Hizb al-Tahrir” is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its activity focuses on ideological and political struggle without any physical action”⁸.

Adherents of “Hizb al-Tahrir” follow a fundamentalist approach to Islam, recognising as righteous only what was sermonised at



the time of its early dissemination and rejecting later novelties and local national traits.

Influence of the “Hizb al-Tahrir” ideology is periodically seen in separate communities and spiritual schools. This may be attributed not as much to special propagandist talents of missionaries of that organisation as to the fact that against the background of economic problems, social injustice, moral decay and unemployment hitting youths the most, slogans of equality of Muslims, social justice, purity and decency in personal and public relations, criticism of capitalism find an echo in the hearts of Crimean Tatars, especially of the younger generation.

Wahhabites. By contrast to the ideology and activity of “Hizb al-Tahrir”, wahhabism, often mentioned in discussions of the religious situation in Crimea, looks less than certain. It is often either not distinguished from “Hizb al-Tahrir”⁹, or described in general terms. The emergence of wahhabism in Crimea is associated either with Arab influence or penetration of Chechen fighters to the peninsula.

Assessments of the activity of Crimean Wahhabites are controversial. Some consider them remote from politics preachers carrying alien for Crimean Tatars religious perceptions and customs, others – a criminal-terrorist grouping¹⁰. Reports of military camps where armed Wahhabites led by foreign instructors studied the art of subversion and terrorism were not proven with facts.

Wahhabites in Crimea are not numerous, not united in one organisation and display little activity beyond religion.

“Tablighi Jamaat” Movement. Founded in 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi to disseminate Islam among poor Indian villagers who were nominally considered Muslims but converted by Hindus dominant in that region into their religion. “Tablighi Jamaat” rests on six principles: (1) invitation (“*tabligh*” – invitation, sermon) to Islam is not a task for theologians but a duty of every Muslim; (2) one should not wait while people come to sermon, a preacher should himself go to the people; (3) preachers should themselves care about their financial support; (4) representation of all social strata in the movement; (5) strengthening of the faith of Muslims; (6) main goal – unity of all Muslims; theological and political differences in the movement are prohibited¹¹.

Data of the Movement are rather controversial: some authors state that it acts “as a recruiter of *shahids* for Muslim terrorist organisations”, other describe it as “quite an apolitical Movement for moral perfection through diligent observance of religious canons”¹², and note that “the Movement does not recognise the idea of Jihad as a holy war against infidels. Instead, “Tablighi Jamaat” terms Jihad as efforts aimed at strengthening creed in the hearts of Muslims”.

⁸ Who is the true dissident? – Portal of Muslims of Crimea, August 4, 2008, <http://qirim-vilayeti.org/content/view/732/202>

⁹ Crimean Tatar Majlis loses influence: Wahhabites and “Hizb al-Tahrir” gain ever greater popularity on the peninsula. – “Yedinoe Otechestvo”, <http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/main/20085/2210.htm>; Dorofeev A. Wahhabites are already in Crimea. – Web site *Anti-Orange*, 28 June 2005, <http://www.anti-orange-ua.com.ru/content/view/928/67>

¹⁰ Crimea does not belong to Ukraine. – “Stolichnye Novosti”, July 6, 2004, <http://cn.com.ua/N316/resonance/resonanc>

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Litvinova E. Islamic organisations in Ukraine. – Information-Analytical Centre for Study of Socio-Political Processes in Post-Soviet Space, December 14, 2006, http://www.ia-centr.ru/archive/public_details5717.html?id=257

3. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

The results of the surveys show that the nature of socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the AR of Crimea is largely determined by the specific traits of the emerging identities of its residents.

Such specific traits in the first place originate from the emergence of the Crimean identity, actually in isolation from the formation of a common identity of Ukraine's citizens¹, the existence of two main "socio-cultural centres" of formation of such identity (identities) – the "Russian world", on one hand, and Crimean Tatar traditions, with the important role of affiliation with Islam – on the other.

In such conditions, two identities are actually being formed in Crimea. Common of both, they are spatially localised and claim the whole of Crimea as their territory and living space.

The main difference between them is that the Slavic community, whose identity, resting on the values of the "Russian world", sees Crimea as a part of Russia (formally or informally – as a Russian ethnic autonomy in Ukraine), while the "Crimean Tatar" community views Crimea as a part of Ukraine. At that, the bearers of both identities are not integrated into the Ukrainian socio-cultural space, with for former displaying actually a hostile attitude to it, the latter more disposed to integration, on the condition of preservation of their originality.

Evidently, if the *status quo* persists, the prospects of formation of a common identity of the Crimean residents as an integral part of the pan-Ukrainian identity will look doubtful. A more likely scenario presumes continuation of formation of the two main local identities described above.

In such conditions, the two dominant socio-cultural groups will remain the main actors of socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations – Slavic community, including almost all ethnic Russians living in Crimea and the majority of Crimean Ukrainians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other. The performed surveys show that the relations between those groups are tense, and from the viewpoint of potential dynamics, they may be described as pre-conflict.

The main dividing lines between those groups are: in the political domain – unequal possibilities for satisfaction

of their needs and interests through the Crimean authorities and self-government bodies; in the socio-economic – unequal access to the Crimean resources (first of all, land, work, housing); in the legal domain – legislative disregard of the specificities of the status of the parties and rights conditioned by that status; in the socio-cultural – evident disparity in the parties' opportunities in the sectors of education and information, and claims of each community to their "roots" in Crimea, i.e., to its symbolic values.

What is especially dangerous is that, *first*, the split goes between the two most numerous communities making the majority of the Crimean population; *second*, in most issues, one community (Crimean Tatar) is discriminated, which strengthens protest spirits in it; *third*, there is no mediator between the parties – the authorities cannot be the one due to the mistrust of both parties, and no other socio-cultural community in Crimea can perform that mission because of insufficient influence, uncertainty of its position, gravitation to Slavic community, etc.

Threatening, from the viewpoint of probability of a direct conflict between the main communities, are negative stereotypes of perception and bias against the other party in both communities (but much more – among Slavs). Those stereotypes are actively instilled by certain political forces, public associations, mass media, being an additional factor of tension. Absence of mutual interest, indifference of communities to each other's problems, lack of inter-group communication, in absence of traditions of life in a multicultural society, make them concentrate on their own problems and see each other only as rivals or even potential enemies.

Tension in relations between the main socio-cultural communities of Crimea may be stirred up by: absence of a thought-over strategy of Crimea's development in central authorities, fundamentals of the state policy in the most critical for the autonomy sectors, situational, sometimes chaotic reaction to developments, and inheritance of approaches of the previous years – abstention from passage of maybe unpopular for some part of the population but necessary decisions, resulting in growing accumulation of problems.

Inability of the central authorities to provide for implementation of the passed decisions concerning the

¹ Not least of all – due the dim image of a common identity of Ukraine's citizens on the national level, and therefore – absence of purposeful actions of the authorities for its formation.



AR of Crimea discredits them in the eyes of Crimean residents and, along with insufficient consideration of the Crimean specificity, adds to estrangement between the capital and the autonomy.

Corruption in the local authorities is the main factor exerting negative influence on the relations between the main socio-cultural communities, which restricts access to the main resources of the peninsula and toughens competition for them among different groups. Tension in relations between the main socio-cultural communities is also stirred up by decisions of the Crimean authorities biased against some group (groups), including justified by formal abundance by the principle of equality.

In such conditions, external influence on the situation can play a destructive role, given the susceptibility of both communities to it. Since much greater resources and tools of influence are available to Russia, seen as a socio-cultural – and largely geopolitical – model for the most numerous socio-cultural community of Crimea, this factor deserves particular attention.

The situation in Crimea in the recent years has been closely monitored by the expert community, many reasonable recommendations have been generated for the state authorities on different levels for solution of urgent problems of the autonomy. However, the degree of their implementation is extremely low – due to the neglect of those recommendations by the authorities for which they were made, their inability to provide for implementation of their own decisions, or for other reasons².

Razumkov Centre's experts believe that further conservation of the situation in Crimea is fraught with an acute conflict among representatives of different socio-cultural groups. The state authorities should formulate and implement an integral and reasonable policy in different domains. Presented below are the Centre's proposals as to the lines of activity and practical decisions that can have a positive effect on the situation in Crimea³.

Priority lines of the state policy that might have a positive effect on the overall situation in the AR of Crimea, socio-economic well-being of citizens and indirectly – on inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the autonomy:

- general improvement of the socio-economic situation in the AR of Crimea, development of the recreational branch, a decrease of the unemployment rate;
- comprehensive solution of existing problems in the land sector;
- fighting corruption in the state authorities, local self-government bodies, courts and law-enforcement bodies;
- implementation of programmes of amenities for repatriates, their full-scale funding at the expense of the central and republican budgets;

- pursuance by the central authorities of a balanced policy in the educational, cultural and information sectors aimed at satisfaction of the needs of different ethnic groups of the autonomy⁴.

Priority measures whose implementation could bring immediate positive effect:

- passage of a Law on restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds;
- soonest completion of development of the registration-cadastre system of land management, inventory of land, delimitation of state and communal land, coordination of plans of urban planning and development of territories;
- formation of a resource-backed state order for social advertising intended to weaken the influence of negative stereotypes of mutual perception by representatives of different socio-cultural groups;
- greater attention of law-enforcement bodies to preventive activities concerning public associations whose activity contributes to the growth of tension in relations among different socio-cultural, ethnic and confessional communities;
- prompt response of the concerned state bodies in line with the effective legislation to the actions of mass media conducive to aggravation of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tension.

In view of the approaching presidential election campaign, it would be nice if the candidates abstain from speculation on splits existing between the main socio-cultural communities in Crimea.

Measures that should be taken in the short and middle run:

Political-legal sphere

To pass to a system of strategic management of processes in the autonomy.

To amend the Constitution of the AR of Crimea and the effective legislation of Ukraine for removal of contradictions between the Ukrainian and Crimean Constitutions, clearer division of competences and powers of the central authorities and Crimean authorities. For generation of coordinated proposals, to establish a special commission involving MPs of Ukraine and of the AR of Crimea, representatives of the central and Crimean authorities, experts.

To expand possibilities for bringing to the attention of the central authorities of Ukraine and consideration at passage of decisions concerning the AR of Crimea the opinion of the authorities of the autonomy. With that purpose:

- given the special status of the Crimean autonomy, to consider giving the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea the legislative initiative in the Verkhovna Rada

² For instance, many of the current problems of Crimea are caused by the factors noted by Razumkov Centre yet in 2001, for the solution of which it put forward its recommendations. However, most of those recommendations were not implemented and remain on the agenda. See: The Crimea on the Political Map of Ukraine. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – "National Security & Defence", No. 4, 2001, pp. 35-39.

³ Since the state authorities passed many regulatory acts dealing with different sectors of life in Crimea, the emphasis is on the general lines of the state policy, presuming that the decisions passed must be implemented, without their duplication. Detailed down to the level of specific measures are only the proposals not yet reflected in the relevant state documents.

⁴ In the foreign policy domain, positive influence on the situation in Crimea can be made by normalisation of Ukraine-Russia relations, but this issue requires separate examination.



- of Ukraine on issues referred by the Constitution of Ukraine to the competence of the AR of Crimea;
- activate the National Council for Interaction of the State Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies under the President of Ukraine;
- step up activity on all levels and enhance the effectiveness of consultative-advisory bodies including representatives of the Crimean Tatar people;
- provide for stable and effective operation of the Permanent Representation of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea (increasing, if necessary, its staff, funding, etc.);
- expand powers of the Representative of the AR of Crimea in Kyiv, to empower him to attend and speak at sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Ukraine's NSDC at consideration of issues concerning the AR of Crimea;
- perfection of Ukraine's election system, to take into account the need of wider representation of regions, including the AR of Crimea, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- introduce the practice of consultations of the central authorities at preparation of decisions concerning the AR of Crimea with republican authorities of the relevant specialisation, representatives of Crimean academic and expert organisations;
- arrange in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine parliamentary hearings to consider the state of socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the AR of Crimea, analyse the progress of implementation of decisions of previous parliamentary hearings devoted to Crimean problems.

For regimentation of the legal status of indigenous peoples and their institutes, assistance with solution of problems of repatriates, as part of formulation of a single ethno-national and regional state policy, to work out and pass the Law on indigenous peoples of Ukraine, ensuring its conformity with international legal documents on the status of indigenous peoples and providing for regimentation of the status of institutes of ethnic self-government.

To provide for utmost de-politicisation of development of those laws, publicity and transparency, a qualified, expert approach to the content of the documents.

For better consideration of the interests of all ethnic communities of Crimea by the republican authorities and self-government bodies:

- amend the legislation on election of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea and local self-government bodies, providing for cancellation of proportional elections by closed lists and modification of the election system for greater influence of voters on personal membership of the corps of MPs;

- provide for nomination of candidates at elections of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea from public associations created on ethnic grounds;
- at passage of the new wording of the Law of Ukraine "On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums", to provide mechanisms enabling ethnic minorities to initiate referendums on issues concerning them;
- study the possibility of employment of foreign experience of representation of ethnic communities in state authorities and self-government bodies.

Socio-economic sphere

To work out and approve the Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the AR of Crimea as an integral long-term document. The document should be consistent with the national strategy of development of Ukraine and documents laying down fundamentals of the state policy in the sectors especially critical for the AR of Crimea: ethno-national, language, information, church and religious.

Till the passage of the Strategy, to provide for full-scale funding of the State Programme of Socio-Economic Development of the AR of Crimea through 2017 and implementation of measures envisaged thereby.

To review state programmes in different domains dealing with the AR of Crimea, for their mutual coordination. To ensure full-scale funding of programmes of settlement and amenities for repatriates from the state and republican budgets.

Socio-cultural sphere

For implementation of an integral approach to solution of problems in the field of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, language and information policy, creation of a conceptual basis for development of the legislation in the relevant sectors, including for solution of problems existing in the AR of Crimea, to pass the following legislative acts:

- the Law on the Fundamentals of the Ethno-National Policy in Ukraine;
- the Law on the Concept of State-Confessional Relations in Ukraine⁵;
- the Law on the Concept of the State Language Policy and a New Wording of the Law on Languages in Ukraine;
- the Law on the Concept of the Information Policy of Ukraine.

For study of the issue of preservation and restoration of the historic and cultural heritage of peoples of Crimea, to create a commission at the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea, including representatives of ethnic communities of Crimea, the authorities, local self-government bodies, scholars, experts.

Implementation of the above proposals would contribute to the solution of the most urgent problems giving rise to conflicts among representatives of the main socio-cultural communities of Crimea, mitigate tension in their relations, create favourable conditions for maintenance of a dialog. ■

⁵ For the relevant bill developed within the framework of the permanent Round-table "Religion and power in Ukraine: problems of relations" under the supervision of Razumkov Centre and supported by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations see: "National Security & Defence", No. 8, 2007, pp.2-9.

CRIMEAN PROJECT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: AN ATTEMPT OF POLICY RECONSTRUCTION ON THE BASIS OF *AD HOC* DECISIONS



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Crimea is a special region of Ukraine. Specific of the political process on the peninsula is the interconnection of common Ukrainian factors, a number of purely Crimean variables and the Russian influence. **Purely Crimean is combination, sometimes – confrontation of three nationalisms:** Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar.

Crimean peninsula is the only region where **ethnic Russians make a small but absolute majority** (up to 60%). Another important factor is produced by the presence in Crimea of a **politically organised (through the Majlis system) ethnic community** – Crimean Tatar people (up to 270 thousand persons), traditionally professing Islam in its Sunni version.

The situation on the peninsula is **seriously complicated by the weakness, sometimes – corruption of the state authorities, lack of consistency in their actions, low executive discipline and resultant non-implementation of state decisions**, including of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, decrees of Ukraine's President. All this goes together with the continuing **redistribution of property, first of all, local land resources**, whose value, according to independent estimates, hits tens of billions of dollars. In fact, those issues in many instances determine the level of political tension in Crimea.

Political developments are also influenced from abroad, first of all – from Russia. However, the **Russian factor**, understood as activity of governmental, non-governmental and business structures of the Russian Federation in issues dealing with Crimea, **is not decisive** for the socio-political processes on the peninsula, exerting adjusting influence, rather serious though.

This article is intended to identify the key features of the Russian factor in Crimean political process, or, rather, the specificities, priority goals and lines of the Russian external influence. Noteworthy, the notion of the Russian factor is wider, as its components may also include the demonstrative effect of revival of Russia's might, attractiveness of the Russian high culture, numerous personal, including family, ties, etc. By contrast, influence is understood here as the totality of conscious and sometimes unconscious actions of the Russian side pushing its interests¹.

Overall context

First, a number of introductory comments. The modern **Russian state** is the direct legal ideological and institutional **heir to the USSR**. This primarily refers to the pursuance of **foreign policy and security functions**

of the state, i.e., structures of the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces and special services** (Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service and Main Intelligence Department of Russia's Armed Forces). At that, continuity is realised and sometimes even emphasised, even officially.

¹ There is a number of Ukrainian and foreign surveys on allied issues. Among them, one should mention collective monographs, e.g.: by Bohomolov O., Semivolos I., Danylov S. Islam and identity policy in Crimea: from symbolic wars to admission of cultural variety. – Kyiv, 2009; Tyshchenko Yu., Khalilov R., Kapustin M. Socio-political processes in the AR of Crimea. Basic trends. – Kyiv, 2008; the work by Maigre M. Crimea – The Achilles Heel of Ukraine. – Tallinn, ICDS, November 2008; as well as the Razumkov Centre studies.

This article uses some ideas from the mentioned materials.

Specific of such continuity of the state is **conservation of the institutional memory**, *inter alia*, mechanisms of decision-making, including strategic². This in no way means invariability of policy goals and means, rather – kind of kinship and continuity of the ways of thinking, world outlook and style of decision-making. The present Russian leadership may hardly be termed as the continuer of Stalin's course, but the historic heritage continues to hang over the masters of the Kremlin and Presidential Administration.

That is why it makes sense to refer to historic precedents of the Russian (Soviet) policy towards “temporarily lost territories”. An interesting example is presented by Stalin's Baltic policy, perfectly analysed in E.Zubkova's monograph “*The Baltics and the Kremlin*”³. According to her conclusions, in late 1930s, J.Stalin was only aware of the strategic goal of his policy – establishment of full control over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. According to archives, there was no detailed plan of political, economic, military and other steps or even an approved strategy. Everything was done on-the-run, **decisions were made ad hoc, dependent on the situation**. At that, **every following step was prompted by the opponent's weakness**: where the Soviet policy met serious resistance, other ways and mechanisms were to be found.

Now, too, it may be assumed with a high probability that **the Kremlin has no distinct, clearly formulated programme of action with respect to Crimea and whole Ukraine**. Decided (although maybe not quite consciously) are only the key tasks, lines and applied toolset, while tactical and operational decisions are made dependent on the situation. This, however, does not rule out the existence of **a far-going goal and a target-minded policy, especially retrospective**.

This conclusion is proven with manifestations of the Russian foreign policy. *First*, K.Zatulin tried to outline the Ukrainian strategy of the Russian Federation⁴. Of course, a member of the Russian State Duma is not an official person, but his statements reflect the stand of quite influential Russian circles. K.Zatulin puts forward an ultimatum where preservation of territorial integrity of Ukraine is conditioned by its transition to “special relations”⁵ with the Russian Federation, in fact – the Russian protectorate over a weak Ukraine⁶. It is not an eventual plan of action but a set of strategic goals and tasks, lines and priorities. The specific current actions of Moscow (as seen by the circles represented by K.Zatulin) will depend on the developments, first of all – Ukraine's reaction.

Second, Russia's public and elites in their mass see **Crimea as an accidentally, unfairly lost territory**, “our land”, temporarily held by another state, in this case –

Ukraine, due to Khrushchev's whim⁷. Many Russians view (maybe not always consciously) restoration of control over Crimea as a strategic task of the foreign policy. So, the peninsula plays a key role in the Russian policy.

Third, the present-day Russian ruling circles, as always and everywhere, **have a “party of war” (“hawks”) and a “party of peace” (“doves”)**. **Reluctance of the Ukrainian side to work with Russia**, lack of effectiveness and target-mindedness of the state policy, sometimes apparent lack of professionalism, childish emotionality, no matter under what patriotic slogans they are disguised, **contribute to strengthening of the “party of war”**. Meanwhile, many problems in bilateral relations ensue from ill communication, weakness and ineffectiveness of the mechanisms of dialogue and coordination of positions.

Fourth, **officially, including on the top level, the Russian Federation more than once stressed its unconditional adherence to signed agreements and deep respect for current, legally agreed borders of Ukraine, including Crimean peninsula**. Meanwhile, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation clearly formulate the Russian interests in Ukraine in general and Crimea in particular. First of all, they include **barring of Ukraine's accession to NATO**, “defence of interests of the Russian-speaking population”, etc., that is, maintenance of Ukraine in the sphere of influence, “privileged interests” of Russia. Presented below is an attempt to reconstruct the actions of influential Russian political and economic groups, employing both state and non-state tools.

What is being done, and how

The analysis of developments makes it possible to single out the following main objectives of the policy of influential Russian circles regarding Crimea at the current stage.

- 1. Testing technologies of socio-political destabilisation.** At that, the peninsula is seen as kind of a testing range for new approaches and technologies.
- 2. Making Crimea an effective tool of influence on Kyiv's political and economic course** by means of inspiration of controlled, in a way even fake, socio-political instability in the region.
- 3. Assumption of control over the peninsula's economy**, its consistent reorientation on Russia.
- 4. Extension of deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and Crimea after 2017.** At that, the Fleet itself provides one of the mightiest tools of the Russian influence on the situation on the peninsula.

² Tilly Ch. Coercion, capital, and European states: 1990-1992. – Moscow, 2009.

³ Zubkova E. The Baltics and the Kremlin: 1940-1953. – Moscow, 2008.

⁴ Zatulin K. Russia's strategy in Russian-Ukrainian relations. – Presentation at the conference “Russian-speaking Ukraine: opportunities and problems of consolidation”, April 27, 2009, – www.materik.ru

⁵ The neutral status of Ukraine, its federalisation, an official status for the Russian language, preservation of the standing of the Moscow Patriarchy.

⁶ K.Zatulin states the Russian Federation policy objectives that may be reworded as: weakening of Ukraine's state machinery; consolidation of pro-Russian political forces with simultaneous marginalisation of pro-Western ones; curtailment of cooperation with NATO countries, first of all – the USA, especially in the security sector; adaptation of Ukraine's socio-cultural and economic sectors to the Russian standards, free access for the Russian capital, special status of the Crimea and Sevastopol as actually Russian-controlled territories, etc.

⁷ On May 11, 2009, Google web search facility in response to the inquiry “Ukraine Russia transfer” produced 21 thousand results, to “Ukraine Russia unlawful transfer” – 160 thousand results. The inquiry “Crimea Russia” produced 7,970 thousand, or almost 8 million entries, “Crimea Russia return” – 1,020 thousand.



To attain those objectives, activity is underway along the following main lines: gaining ground in the establishment and economy (buy-up of property); information-propagandist and cultural-educational steps; support for pro-Russian socio-political movements. Actions in those domains promote creation and consolidation of appropriate tools of influence.

Establishment. Advancement of the Russian hand in Crimean establishment is facilitated by its special status. Yet in the Soviet times, representatives of Crimean elites maintained direct ties with Moscow beyond Kyiv and had a privileged standing, thanks to the unofficial status of the South Coast of Crimea and, first of all, Yalta as the summer capital of the USSR, where actually all leadership of the Soviet Union and socialist states spent their vacations. Some ties and even embedment in the Russian social networks have persisted.

Economy. Over the years of independence, the presence of the Russian business on Crimean peninsula, especially the South Coast, was steadily growing – not only in the industry, recreational sector, other real estate, but, much more importantly, also in the land resources.

On one hand, the Russian economic presence on the peninsula surely presents a stabilising factor complicating resort to forcible means. On the other, defence of economic interests gives another pretext for foreign influence.

Information-propagandist and cultural-educational activity. Presently, out of some 1,500 media registered in Crimea, over 98% of newspapers, magazines and radio stations use Russian language. The autonomy sells up to 150 Russian printed periodicals, while Russian programmes proper account for up to 40% of its air. All this offers comfortable conditions for the Russian information and propagandist activities.

The relevant infrastructure has been set up and operates on the peninsula. There is a Russian Cultural and Information Centre. The Russian Black Sea Fleet publishes public affairs newspaper “Flag Rodiny”, a TV centre of the Black Sea Fleet is active, and its programmes are widely broadcast by local TV and radio companies.

Among local publications active in the tideway of Russian nationalism and actually involved in pro-Russian propaganda campaigns, one should primarily mention “Krymskaya Pravda”, followed by “Krymskoye Vremya” and “Russkiy Krym”.

Currently, the main subjects of the Russian propaganda include: instigation of anti-Western, first of all – anti-US and anti-NATO spirits, fomentation of xenophobia, mainly in the form of so-called “Tatar, Muslim threat”, inspiration of separatist and autonomist views among the Russian-speaking population of the peninsula, etc.

Pro-Russian media provide forum for numerous Russian figures: political scientists, philosophers, preachers, propagating appropriate ideological messages. Up until recently, the Russian information and propaganda activities have included repeated visits by such figures as Moscow’s Mayor Yu.Luzhkov, members of the Russian State Duma V.Zhirinovskiy, K.Zatulyn, S.Baburin, S.Markov.

In other words, the media policy aims at conservation and instigation of Russian nationalist views, and therefore, the associated public movement on the peninsula and attempts of indirect control of its activity. Specific of it are its, so to speak, reactive character, defensive drive, pessimistic, sometimes even catastrophic world outlook.

The real danger stems not from pro-Russian propaganda but from the weakness, sometimes – absence of a pro-Ukrainian, pro-European alternative. The actual monopoly of ideas of the Russian nationalism in the Russian-language Crimean media gives rise to unfavourable trends in political developments on the peninsula.

Russian structures remain active in the **cultural and educational sector**. There are up to 10 branches of Russian higher educational establishments, including the Black Sea branch of the Moscow State University. The Russian influence in the sector is facilitated by obvious reasons. The school statistics is demonstrative: according to the official data of the Ministry of Education and Science of Crimea, 12,860 pupils (7.2%) are taught in the Ukrainian language in Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian classes of other schools (largely fictitious), 159,568 (89.6%) – in the Russian language.

Controlled and ideologically kindred socio-political movements and non-governmental organisations present both an important tool and a domain of the Russian influence. What is meant here is the establishment and activity of structures institutionally supporting formulation, development and public representation of pro-Russian views (in fact, the Russian nationalism, mainly in its post-Soviet version) on the territory of Ukraine, including Crimea.

The best known such structures include the “Russian Bloc”, the Russian Community of Crimea, People’s Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”, revived “Proryv” (Breakthrough), the Eurasian Union of Youth (now active mainly in the Internet) and others. One should also mention the “Kyiv Rus” party, set to be joined by the “Proryv”. Although those structures are generally rather small and enjoy less support on the peninsula, compared to early 1990s, they rather effectively perform their function of public representation of the pro-Russian position and crystallisation (aggregation) of the Russian nationalism.

Radical organisations do not exist in vacuum. They are closely tied with more respectable political forces, often acting as kind of a lightning rod. And while Crimean republican organisations of CPU and especially PSPU themselves do not try to avoid harsh statements, for Crimean organisation of the Party of Regions, its allies from the “Russian Bloc” quite often serve, consciously or unconsciously, as rather a useful tool.

The Ukrainian state is taking necessary counter measures. In particular, in January 2009, Ukraine’s Security Service filed to court a criminal case of anti-state activity of the People’s Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”. Also through court, the Security Service stopped the activity of Crimean branch of the Eurasian Union of Youth.



One should also mention various Cossack formations that can well support some political events by means of force. The range of those quasi-military structures is rather wide: from allegedly Ukrainian-minded to members of the Union of Cossack Troops of Russia and the CIS.

Recently, new attempts have been made to set up pro-Russian organisations in Crimean Tatar community. Termed as such may be “Milli Firka” led by V.Abduraimov.

There are also attempts to attain Russian interests via **religious organisations**, first of all, structures close to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy. Although the leaders of the whole Church and its Simferopol eparchy have taken a considerate stand, some church and mainly quasi-church figures are trying to use the ambo for purely worldly purposes, including promotion of the ideas of the “Russian world”, or even undisguised service to the current political interests of Moscow.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is the key tool of the Russian policy in Crimea and the whole of Ukraine. The very presence of a Russian military task force on Crimean soil strongly promotes the Russian interests. What is meant here is the known effect of “demonstration of ensign”. The Fleet possesses appropriate intelligence and special propaganda units, pursues an active memorial and, as we noted above, information policy. Under certain conditions, the purely military, power component can prove no less important.

The issue of the degree of consistency and target-mindedness of the listed tools largely remains open. To be sure, attempts are being made to coordinate their activity, now more successful than before. The present state of the Russian society and the state presents the main limiting factor here.

What should Ukraine do?

Speaking of reasonable **priority measures of the Ukrainian state at neutralisation of negative consequences of the Russian influence**, one should stress the need to move from reaction to problems to pursuance of a target-minded state policy in all domains. At that, emphasis should be made not on restrictive and punitive but on encouraging and educational measures.

The **organisational and administrative potential** of the Ukrainian state in the autonomy should be enhanced. This primarily means fuller employment of the opportunities provided by the effective legislation, in particular, to the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea.

One should consider **greater integration of Crimean economy into the Ukrainian**, first of all, in production chains. It is high time to think and act for solution of socio-economic issues that will rise after the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, subsequent **demilitarisation of Sevastopol**, the need of moving that potentially very promising commercial city to another trajectory of economic development.

A quality Russian-language but Ukrainian-minded newspaper, radio station and TV studio are badly needed. The network of Ukrainian educational establishments should be expanded, creating new rather than converting the Russian ones. One should finally decide the issue of setting up branches of the leading Ukrainian higher educational establishments in Crimea and Sevastopol, including the Kyiv National University, the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, and others.

More opportunities should be created for **integration of Crimean youths of all nationalities in the pan-Ukrainian space**, in particular, by admission to the leading Ukrainian universities in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk.

Modern Russian cultural initiatives should be encouraged, **to form a Russian-speaking community in Crimea looking at Kyiv, not Moscow**; at Europe, not present Russia.

There should be a programme of **support for civil society institutes** on the peninsula, wider employment of the potential of Ukrainian non-governmental organisations for solution of Crimean problems, first of all, in the educational, information, cultural and other sectors, information-analytical support for the state policy.

To improve **the practice of movement/rotation of state officials across different regions of Ukraine**, giving Crimeans an opportunity to work in other regions of the country.

One should **develop a system of prevention and settlement of conflicts** on property (first of all, land), ethnic, religious grounds; introduce mechanisms of mediation between parties to potential and actual conflicts.

One should ensure **steadfast observance of the effective legislation**, including on information; provide for inevitability of lawful punishment imposed by the court for instigation of ethnic, racial, religious enmity, other illicit actions.

There are other domains for the activity of Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental structures as well. The main of them are counterintelligence and other special measures, effective enforcement of the current legislation of Ukraine on citizenship and passport procedures, etc.

To sum up, we once again stress that the nature and general outlook of socio-political processes in Crimea and Ukraine as a whole are mainly shaped by internal factors. By and large, the Russian, as well as any other foreign influence, is only secondary. External forces do not determine public processes but use available opportunities, first of all, let by the Ukrainian authorities. In principle, the effectiveness of foreign influence is limited by the Ukrainian society and Ukrainian state. So, most problems are of the domestic origin and therefore can be solved only in Ukraine and only by Ukraine. ■

CONFLICT ASPECTS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN CRIMEA: INTER-ETHNIC CONTEXT



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The general ethno-political situation in Crimea is shaped by the tangled contacts among the three biggest ethnic groups – Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians, and the problems arising in course of inter-ethnic, inter-cultural communication in the social, economic, socio-cultural, political spheres.

Problems in inter-ethnic contacts are also witnessed by data of public opinion polls. For instance, when asked “*May Crimea be called a conflict region?*”, 51% of Crimeans gave a positive answer, and only a third disagreed with that statement¹. Those who see Crimea as a possible hotbed of conflicts see their roots in: contradictions between the Ukrainian authorities and the population; contentiousness in the triangle of Crimean Tatars – other population – Ukrainian authorities; Kyiv’s nationalist policy, “arbitrariness of Majlis” and absence of effective authorities; land conflicts; non-democracy and “violence” by Kyiv’s authorities, mainly in the humanitarian life of Crimeans; inter-ethnic conflicts between Tatars and Slavs, growth of Islamic extremism. Among potential reasons for conflicts, a number of geopolitical factors were mentioned: “interests of many states meet in Crimea”. Some of the polled harshly spoke about the Ukrainian state – “occupation of Crimea by Ukraine”².

Problems of inter-ethnic contacts

Specific of inter-ethnic contacts in the region is a number of problem factors in social, cultural, political communication between Crimean Tatars, on one hand, and Ukrainians and Russians (“Slavs”) – on the other. Those problems lie in different ideas of the ways of solution of issues of local development, distribution of resources in the autonomy, socio-cultural changes, different foreign political orientations. By and large, problems arise in the following sectors:

- *socio-cultural* (revival of historic memory through restoration of Crimean place names, revision of the Soviet history, development of cultures of ethnic groups);
- *state governance* (coordination of relations of central and regional authorities at formulation and implementation of the state policy towards Crimea, activity of local authorities that may be guided by ethnic stereotypes in decision-making with regard to the public life);

- *socio-economic* (unemployment and its ethnic dimension, distribution of resources, especially land, in the autonomy);
- *language* (possibility of education in the native language for ethnic groups (Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians), support for the Ukrainian language on the peninsula, solution of the problem of domination of the Russian language in the political and public life, media space).

Inter-ethnic relations in Crimea are being shaped against the background of solution of problems of integration of Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian society, traditionally divided into:

- *political and legal* (legal non-rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people, definition of the status of the Crimean Tatar people, recognition of Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people of Ukraine, legalisation of Crimean Tatar representative bodies (Kurultay, Majlis), representation in the authorities, first of all – of the AR of Crimea, and law-enforcement bodies);

¹ Sociological survey held by *SOCIUM* Centre of Sociological and Marketing Studies on September 11-23, 2008, as part of a project to study the problems of economic, political and civil identification of the population in different regions of the CIS for study of the public opinion of the Crimean residents on the most urgent problems of current socio-political life.

The survey was held by quota sampling representative of the adult population of Crimea by the key socio-demographic indicators (age, gender, nationality). 1,478 respondents were polled.

² The question about the conflict potential was open-ended. Data were obtained soon after the military conflict in the Caucasus, which might influence respondent opinions. – Web site of *SOCIUM* Centre of Sociological and Marketing Studies, www.socium.info.

- *socio-economic* (inadequate provision of repatriates with land plots, high unemployment rate, poor infrastructure in places of compact residence);
- *language and cultural* (opening schools with the Crimean Tatar language of study, restoration of Crimean Tatar place names, provisions for use of the Crimean Tatar language in Crimea, return of cultural values, restoration of “holy places” – old mosques, azizas, and so on).

In the ethno-political sector, the main indicators of tension in the process of inter-ethnic communication and contacts between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic majority are: poor socio-economic standing of ethnic groups; perceptions and ideas of the socio-economic, politico-legal and cultural-language status of own ethnic group, compared to the perception of the status of other ethnic groups; dissatisfaction with the representation of own ethnic group in different branches of power³.

Interesting are the results of a survey of mutual perception and potential factors of conflict in inter-ethnic relations conducted in Crimea yet in 2003 among ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars⁴. In particular, serious differences were observed in the perception of unemployment by the Slavic and Crimean Tatar population. In Bilogirsk district, equal difficulties in employment for all ethnic groups were admitted by 33.3% of Crimean Tatars, in Krasnogvardiyskiy – 23.1%. 87% of Crimean Tatars in Bilogirsk and 84.6% – in Krasnogvardiyskiy districts noted serious problems looking for a job. This cannot be interpreted only as a result of perception of own socio-economic status as very low, compared to other ethnic groups. Both Russians and Ukrainians called the difficulties faced by Crimean Tatars in that issue more serious than their own. However, opinions about the employment of Crimean Tatars were sometimes fundamentally different. On one hand, they reported that it was difficult for Crimean Tatars to find a job. On the other – it was noted that getting a job depended on professional qualities, not on ethnic affiliation. Meanwhile, Russians and Ukrainians paradoxically reported a higher standard of life among Crimean Tatars, compared to Slavs. Such inconsistency in perception of the status and difficulties of Crimean Tatars, on one hand, and simultaneous description of that ethnic group as more successful in survival – on the other reflects negative stereotypes of the outgroup: “they are cunning”, “they get out”, and, in general, “they are dangerous”. However, perceptions of other communities by Crimean Tatars may also be termed

inadequate, to a smaller extent though. For instance, Crimean Tatars more than Slavs tend to describe the standard of life of their ethnos as low, while terming the standard of life of Slavs “above average” and “high”⁵.

Problems of integration of Crimean Tatars

Settlement. In connection with mass unorganised return of Crimean Tatars and entirely insufficient financial, material and technological backing of their settlement and amenities, the bulk of repatriates till mid-1990s settled in the submountane part of the peninsula, namely in Bahchysarayskiy, Bilogirskiy, Kirovskiy, Dzhankoiyskiy, Krasnogvardiyskiy and Simferopolskiy districts. **Places of compact settlement of Crimean Tatars mainly lie far from developed areas** hosting enterprises, educational, healthcare, cultural establishments, local self-government bodies. The situation is aggravated by poor provision with communication means, which greatly radicalises their spirits.

Legislation. The problem of legislative support for the process of return and amenities for repatriates and their rights under the national and international law remains pressing. The effectiveness of practical measures taken for solution of socio-economic and humanitarian problems is undermined by the absence of a definite regulatory-legal framework⁶. Representative bodies of Crimean Tatars (Kurultay, Majlis) are still not officialised, politically and legally. This gives their political opponents grounds to publicly present the national movement of Crimean Tatars as “national radicalism”, a “fascist” movement, allegedly seeking to “cut its [Crimea’s] ties with Russia and the Russian culture, uniting Crimean society in a comprehensive whole, forcibly tear it out of the East Slavic world”⁷. **Such rhetoric, reflecting and shaping specific spirits of the Crimean residents, leads to aggravation of the socio-political situation and kind of segregation of that region from Ukraine, conserves ideological clichés formed in the Soviet times.**

Land. The issue of allotment of land plots to Crimean Tatars for individual construction and business activity in the South coast of Crimea remains hot. The situation is aggravated by the sharp growth of internal migration (from Chornomorske, Rozdolne, Dzhankoy and other steppe districts to the Crimean coast). This is proven with squatting and other actions of protest in Sudak, Morske, Vesele, Simeyiz, Yalta, Alushta and other populated localities. Due to ethnic bias (and possible involvement in corrupt schemes), local authorities are reluctant to allot land to Crimean Tatars, especially in the southern regions of Crimea.

³ Chorny Ye. Conflict potential of inter-ethnic relations. – Web site of Ukrainian Centre of Political Management, <http://www.politik.org.ua/vid/magcontent.php3?m=6&n=21&c=195>

⁴ *Ibid.* Selected as the base for the pilot stage of the survey were Bilogirskiy and Krasnogvardiyskiy districts, with 150 persons polled in each district; proceeding from the figure, specifications of the sample by gender, age, ethnic affiliation, place of residence were determined.

⁵ Chorny Ye. Conflict potential of inter-ethnic relations. – Web site of Ukrainian Centre of Political Management, <http://www.politik.org.ua/vid/magcontent.php3?m=6&n=21&c=195>

⁶ The fate of the Law “On Restoration of Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds” is demonstrative in this respect. The Verkhovna Rada in 2004 passed that Law in the first reading but refused to approve it in the second. After the President of Ukraine proposal to speed up the process, the Law was passed on June 24, 2004. However, the President returned it for amendment, suggesting that MPs settle discrepancies of some provisions in the Law with norms of the Ukrainian Constitution. As a result, the basic document regimenting most aspects of repatriation is still absent.

⁷ See: Hrach L. Anniversary of Crimean referendum. – Web site “Leonid Hrach – leader of Crimean communists”, January 15, 2008, <http://www.grach.crimea.com/content/view/401/4/>



Noteworthy, conflicts or inter-ethnic tension are prompted by the problem of distribution of resources and provision of Crimean Tatars with land. In 2006-2007 the Crimea saw the second (since early 1990s) tide of seizure of land plots. It was the Crimean Tatar response to the activity of the Crimean authorities that often allotted large land areas to non-transparent structures and phony companies.

For instance, in November 2007, there was a conflict concerning a land plot in Balaklavska St. (Simferopol) between Crimean Tatars who got that land plot and a private firm that claimed it. The conflict situation is unresolved even now.

Another conflict occurred on Ai-Petri Plateau, where Crimean Tatar entrepreneurs erected their stalls (November 2007). Militiamen guided by a court ruling of demolition of one structure erected on the plateau without permission pulled down almost all structures there. On November 6, the plateau was attacked by nearly 950 policemen, against some 40 Crimean Tatars who tried to defend the structures, in the result, several Crimean Tatars were taken to hospital.

A time bomb under the land problem in Crimea was laid in the legislation. In particular, on September 12, 2006, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine basically passed the Law "On Amendment of the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Ukraine concerning Responsibility for Unauthorised Seizure of a Land Plot"⁸. The bill envisaged criminal responsibility for squatting and more effective protection of legitimate rights of land plot owners and land users. Majlis leaders strongly opposed passage of that law, arguing that it might be applied selectively: bypassing businessmen and officials who illegally got big land plots in Crimea, it would be used against ordinary people who cannot legitimately obtain land for housing construction. Crimea still does not have a single land cadastre, despite numerous directives and Decrees of Ukraine's President. The situation may be attributed to the fact that **today, both local and central authorities are not interested in an orderly and transparent system of land relations, since this would reduce opportunities for uncontrolled distribution of land and bar corrupt schemes.**

Representation. The problem of representation of Crimean Tatars in the authorities remains pressing. The Majlis leadership insists on adequate employment of Crimean Tatar specialists, in particular, in republican and local executive bodies, arguing that their current number is not only inconsistent with the share of Crimean Tatars in the population but expressly witnesses discrimination on ethnic grounds⁹.

Politicisation of problems of inter-ethnic contacts: factor of local policy and regional mass media

Issues of inter-ethnic relations are often speculated on by Crimean politicians who assume the role of defenders of the "Slavic population" for their political image, to gain votes in Crimea. During the focus group study "Topical issues of management of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea"¹⁰ the participants reported conflicts in everyday life between Slavs and Crimean Tatars but attributed them to socio-economic problems rather than inter-ethnic relations.

"Inter-ethnic passions are somewhat pumped before elections, to be true, when our high politicians begin to "work up" the population, canvass at elections. Of course, every community reaches for its party. Then, inter-ethnic tension is felt a little. Even among neighbours... People normally communicate before elections, everything begins as soon as politics interfere in people's lives" (Sovetskiy).

"We have to return to problems among parliamentary groups, among party organisations, that provoke. I would say, they provoke instability in inter-ethnic relations. Not the people. They provoke, lead a small group of people, and the media then blow up, saying that people follow them. I do not want to offend MPs but I think that 80% of MPs do not represent people. Our MPs represent their parties, and a party embodies plans and ideas of a group of people, not of the whole people" (Bilogirsk).

"A public meeting was held in Myrne, with information read out in a hall. Rodyvilov and others gathered people. There were seizures in Myrne, also by Russian-speaking, Slavs, of that land... They gathered people and told them that their land problem would be resolved. Everybody came to that hall, 500 people. And he began [saying] from the rostrum that land should not be distributed on ethnic grounds. He threw such words in the hall. Within 20 minutes, everybody realised that that meeting was intended not to solve the land issue, to move it somehow, but to aggravate and to earn an image among Russian-speakers, among Russians, to aggravate the conflict. Respectively, the other party says: on what grounds did you gather us? On what grounds did you take land from us? Again, polemics begin: who are you, who am I, and so on" (Bahchysaray).

Tension in inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula is stirred up by media, often used by politicians to create the required "public opinion" and form negative ethnic stereotypes. **Some media by their publications contribute to the spread of negative ethno-political stereotypes and myths.** Focus group participants in the first place attributed this to politicisation of inter-ethnic differences, political background, stand of media owners and existence of rather durable stereotypes in the consciousness of ethnic communities.

⁸ Law "On Amendment of Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine concerning Enhancement of Responsibility for Unauthorised Occupation of a Land Plot" passed on January 11, 2007. – *Ed.*

⁹ The total number of Crimean Tatar state servants (as of 2007) is 407 (7.9%), in that: in the Crimean executive bodies – 104 (8.4%), at District State Administrations – 178 (12.5%), in local self-government bodies – 114 (4.8%), in the AR of Crimea Property Fund – 4 (4.3%). Crimean Tatars elected national deputies of Ukraine – 1 person; members of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea – 7; city and district councils: 125 (by the People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) list), 2 (Crimean Tatar Bloc), 8 (BYuT), 2 (other parties); village and settlement councils – more than 900. 24 out of 309 elected village and settlement heads (7.7%) are Crimean Tatars. All in all, the share of Crimean Tatars among different council members in the AR of Crimea exceeds 15%.

¹⁰ For more detail see: Data of focus group study during the 4th phase of the project "Towards a peaceful and tolerant society in Ukraine. Inter-ethnic relations in the AR of Crimea: education and training". – UCIPR, April 2009.

“There is still a distinction between Crimean Tatars and the Russian-speaking population. And there are Crimean media that earn rating and make their image on that. Take any issue of “Krymskoye Vremya” newspaper, there will always be an article contributing to that, focusing attention” (Bahchysaray).

“Republican media, now I guess to a smaller extent than before but still, do not promote tolerance in Crimea. Because some of our newspapers, to put it mildly, misbehave with respect to some part of the population. We well understand that all media are sponsored. Those who begin to badmouth some part of the population today, unfortunately, lead to a split” (Dzhankoy)¹¹.

So, not last among the factors causing inter-ethnic tension in Crimea is presented by **numerous stereotypes in the consciousness of the Slavic majority of residents regarding the Crimean Tatar community**. The influence of that factor on the public opinion and inter-ethnic relations is aggravated by “a target-minded anti-Tatar and islamophobic PR-campaign, Russian-speaking Crimean publications in numbers carry materials that may be called not just incorrect or defamatory but stirring up inter-ethnic enmity”¹².

Language sphere

By and large, in view of the ethnic specificity, the ethno-language situation in the region differs from the rest of Ukraine. According to the all-Ukrainian census of 2001, 77% of the Crimean residents called Russian their mother language, 10% – Ukrainian, 11% – Crimean Tatar. The share of Russian-language schools in the autonomy exceeds the share of ethnic Russians due to Russian-language self-identification of representatives of other ethnic communities, first of all, Byelorussians, Jews, Germans, and so on. If we refer to the language of figures, Russian was reported as the native language by 97% of the Crimean Jews, 89% – Germans, 82% – Byelorussians, 79% – Koreans, 78% Bulgarians, 73% Greeks and 61% – Ukrainians. All in all, Russian was termed as the native language by 23% of the non-Russian population of the region¹³.

When asked “*Do you consider it necessary to grant the Russian language an official status in Ukraine?*”, 89% of Crimeans give a positive answer, only 4.4% – negative. According to sociological surveys, now, mainly the Russian language is spoken in Crimea by 92.3%, Ukrainian – 3.3%. 2.2% of citizens speak at home Ukrainian and Russian (as the case may be), 2.2% – other languages¹⁴. The specificity of the language situation influences the educational policy in Crimea, actually freezing mentioned specificity.

Crimean Tatars themselves raise the issue of an integral policy of preservation and development of the Crimean Tatar language. According to the Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev, “Relevant amendments to the effective Constitution of the autonomy should be sought to equate the status of the Crimean Tatar language to the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages”¹⁵. Article 10 of the Crimean Constitution proclaims that the AR of Crimea, alongside with the official language, provides for functioning, development, use and protection of the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages and languages of other nationalities on its territory. As is noted, “the Russian language as the language of the majority of the population convenient for inter-ethnic communication is used in all sectors of public life”, and Article 11 proclaims that according to the Ukrainian legislation, “official documents certifying the status of a citizen” in the AR of Crimea “are executed in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, and on a citizen’s request – also in the Crimean Tatar language”¹⁶. M.Dzhemilev noted that “the greatest problem lies in preservation of the national identity by our compatriots, if we fail to build a system of education in the native language and cover all our children with such education, the nation will face assimilation, dissolution in the Russian-speaking environment”¹⁷.

The authorities might see their task in search of a compromise in the language policy and educational sector. Instead, those sectors see an undeclared war of decisions of central and local authorities. For instance, the Concept of Development of Education in the AR of Crimea through 2012 bears only one provision concerning “creation of conditions for deeper study of the Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar languages”¹⁸. However, it does not elaborate the facts, causes and effects of the language disparity observed in the educational sector.

One may note improper support for education in the Crimean Tatar language on the peninsula, difficulties arising due to the absence of a regional approach to the language dimension of the educational policy in the Crimea. Shortage of teachers, lack of textbooks, limited financial capabilities of local self-government bodies to fund educational establishments also pose a problem.

Authorities

Local conflicts of the recent years in Crimea may also be interpreted as conflicts between Crimean Tatars and authorities taking place because of the reluctance of local self-government bodies to solve problems of repatriates.

¹¹ Survey held by *SOCIUM* Centre of Sociological and Marketing Studies on September 11-23, 2008, as part of a project of study of problems of economic, political and civil identification of the population in different regions of the CIS.

The survey was held by quota sampling representative of the adult population of the Crimea by the key socio-demographic indicators (age, gender, nationality). 1,478 respondents were polled. – Web site of *SOCIUM* Centre of Sociological and Marketing Studies, www.socium.info.

¹² Kresina I. On the issue of manifestations of discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds. – Web site of Ukrainian Centre of Political Management, <http://www.politik.org.ua>

¹³ Meanwhile, experts in language policy argue that “the census held in Ukraine in 2001 does not allow more accurate identification of the ratio of bearers of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, since the wording of questions describing language features of respondents did not take into account the fact that part of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians still reported Ukrainian as the native language, symbolically related with their national self-identification. The questions in Item 7 of the questionnaire describing the language identification respondents were formulated as follows: “Your language features: (a) native language; (b) if your native language is not Ukrainian, report if you are fluent in the Ukrainian language; (c) another language you are fluent in”. See: Masenko L. Language situation in Ukraine. – Independent culturological journal “*І*”, 2004, No.35.

¹⁴ 6.6% was undecided. Public opinion poll “Ukrainian society 2008” held by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in April, 2008, by the distributed polling method. 1,800 respondents above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine, the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol. The sample statistic error is 2.3%.

¹⁵ Speech by M.Dzhemilev at the 1st Session of the 5th Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar People (December 7-9, 2007).

¹⁶ Law of Ukraine “On Approval of the Constitution of the AR of Crimea”.

¹⁷ Speech by M.Dzhemilev at the 1st Session of the 5th Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar People ...

¹⁸ Approved by the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea Resolution No.215 of October 18, 2006.



Although such conflicts have purely economic grounds, they are “not protected” against use by political forces for getting potential electoral dividends through speculations on the known image of “defenders from aliens”.

Local conflicts were usually settled with interference of the central authorities, mainly not to prevent one but to soften a conflict that came into the open. What deserves attention however is that previously, the conflict between Crimean Tatars and the authorities was seen as inability to come to terms, first of all, with Crimean leaders. Now, the situation is changing due to stagnation of legal solution of the problems of Crimean Tatars. In particular, representatives of Crimean Tatars ever more note that the state authorities “openly ignore the rights of the Crimean Tatar people” due to “long non-passage of laws aimed at restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people, including its inalienable right to national-territorial autonomy within the Ukrainian state, persistent unwillingness to assist with return of tens of thousands Crimean Tatars, wilful delay of fair solution of issues related with provision of Crimean Tatars with land plots, absolute legal and judicial vulnerability of Crimean Tatars defending their legitimate rights and interests, tough opposition to restoration of Crimean place names inalienably connected with the historic memory of the Crimean Tatar people...”¹⁹.

The Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People under the President of Ukraine has not met the Head of State in full membership since 2004. **Regular, open communication of the Ukrainian political leadership with the Crimean Tatar representative bodies is absent.**

Despite efforts of the state at implementation of the State Programme of settlement and amenities for deported Crimean Tatars and persons of other nationalities who returned to Ukraine for residence, their adaptation and integration in Ukrainian society through 2010, local problems are being resolved too slowly. In their dialogue with Crimean Tatars, party leaders in Kyiv are often guided by possible electoral support, while noting disunity in voter opinions. **Present political contacts are motivated by tactical considerations regarding Crimean Tatar support for specific political leaders in official Kyiv.** There is no strategic vision of cooperation and low effectiveness of implementation of the policy of harmonisation of the overall socio-political situation in the AR of Crimea²⁰.

On the local level, there are isolated attempts of political contacts between leaders of the Crimean authorities (Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea, Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea) and political leadership of Crimean Tatars. They are, too, mainly related with current

implementation of the State Programme and attempts of extinguishing arising conflicts, first of all, in the field of land relations. One may cite as an example establishment of a joint commission of the Verkhovna Rada, Crimean Government and Majlis for solution of the land problem in Balaklavska St. (Simferopol, 2007), although it failed to help resolve the conflict.

Noteworthy, the policy of “measures of enhanced support” for repatriates, e.g., implementation of state and local programmes of amenities and integration, is quite often seen by the Slavic population as unjust, not as “evening rights”.

The mechanism of communication on the district level presents a system of public boards. For instance, for discussion of pressing for the district issues in Bahchysaray, a Public Board was established at the District State Administration, made up of representatives of national-cultural associations, local self-government bodies, political parties. Meanwhile, for constructive cooperation between the public and authorities on the district level, society needs understanding of the decision-making procedure, to pass from “jive talking and criticism” to expert assessment of solution of urgent problems in general and in the field of inter-ethnic relations in particular.

An inter-confessional board was established under the District State Administration Head in Dzhankoy, including representatives of Orthodox, Muslim, Protestant religious communities. Cultural events aimed at promotion of cultures of ethnic groups and communities (competitions, festivals, etc.) are held on the district level.

Paradoxically, it seems that **political communication and inter-ethnic contacts are obstructed on the higher levels of regional and central authorities, while poly-ethnic village communities show numerous examples of inter-cultural, inter-ethnic contacts and communication.**

Socio-cultural sphere

The situation with local place names, restoration of historic names in Crimea remains actually frozen. **In 1944, more than 90% of geographic names of populated localities were instituted by special decrees of the USSR Supreme Council** in order to “wipe from the face of the earth” all mention of existence of Crimean Tatars. Only one decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of RSFSR dated May 18, 1948, renamed 1,062 populated localities in Crimea. It produced similar names – Pionerskoe, Radostnoe, Pervomaiskoe, Tankovoe, Udachnoe, etc. Crimean place names reflecting its history were actually abolished. However, with the return of Crimean

¹⁹ Resolution of all-Crimean mourning meeting devoted to the memory of victims of the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people – deportation of May 18, 1944, and decades of its forcible retention in the places of exile. May 18, 2009, Simferopol, <http://www.kirimtatar.com>

²⁰ Another Decree of the President of Ukraine dealing with the Crimean issues “On Implementation of the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of February 8, 2006 “On Social Situation in the AR of Crimea” No. 822 of October 9, 2006, noted that “in the result of non-implementation of a great deal of tasks envisaged by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Decision of February 8, 2006, No. 154, the socio-political situation in the AR of Crimea continues to remain difficult and controversial, destabilising factors and sources of threats to the national security of Ukraine in the region are not neutralised”, and “activity of the concerned central and local executive bodies at attainment of tasks in that field is mainly ineffective”. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Decision of May 16, 2008, “On Progress of Implementation of Decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine on Situation in the AR of Crimea” enacted by Presidential Decree No. 589 of June 26, 2008, too, termed implementation of measures and provisions of that Decree ineffective. This first of all refers to “tasks of regimentation of use of land resources on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and development of the media space of the AR of Crimea”.

Tatars, old names again came into being and are unofficially used alongside with official. Nevertheless, the issue of restoration of place names remains on the agenda as a political demand of Crimean Tatars. Noteworthy, according to the effective legislation, decisions of renaming villages rest with local authorities and are passed at local referendums supporting such decisions, but such initiatives are not supported on the local level, first of all, by the Slavic population. Meanwhile, in cities and districts where Crimean Tatars are in a majority, streets have new Crimean Tatar names.

Three-dimensional problems of actualisation of historic heritage especially contribute to aggravation of the socio-political situation on the peninsula. On one hand, they include contradictions between the pro-Russian and Ukrainian interpretation of history and the historic-cultural heritage, on the other – the difference between the “pro-Slavic” interpretation of history and the historic memory of Crimean Tatars. One example is presented by elements of the “language of enmity” in history textbooks terming actions of Crimean Tatars as “conquests”, “raids”, of Ukrainian Cossacks and Russians – as “marches”.

Mass clashes in Bahchysaray in the summer of 2006 became a showy example of misunderstanding and disrespect for common history. There had long been a market on the site of an ancient Muslim cemetery, although the USSR Council of Ministers yet in 1963 entered the monuments located there in the register monuments, and in 2001, they were entered in the National Register of Real Property Facilities of Cultural Heritage of Ukraine. Muslims for years demanded transfer of the unauthorised market²¹, but when the market management began construction works in the conservation zone of one of the old mausoleums, Crimean Tatars blocked the entry to the market and arranges a mass picket, demanding transfer of the market to another place. The authorities reported readiness to allot land for market construction in another place, but the market management rejected the proposal. Picketers were assaulted by representatives of local Cossacks and the Russian Community. A few persons were injured. The conflict was settled on the level of the President and Prime Minister of Ukraine²².

In the Third Report on Ukraine, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance expressed concern about the situation in Crimea, where tension was very high in relations between Crimean Tatars and

ethnic Russians, also in connection with land and historic monuments. The document reads: “...it is also regrettable that some politicians, authorities and religious leaders have failed to act responsibly, by fanning the flames of ethnic hatred”. Hence, ECRI was concerned that “the gap between different communities living in Crimea has widened since its second report”. Although in 2006, then State Committee for Nationalities and Migration issued a statement condemning such actions after a spate of particularly violent ethnic clashes, the authorities should be more proactive in combating the climate of mutual suspicion and racial tensions that currently prevails in that region”²³.

Acts of vandalism were recorded at Christian and Muslim cemeteries. For instance, on February 11, 2008, trespassers ruined or damaged over 200 gravestones on a Muslim cemetery in the settlement of Nyzhnyogirske. Previously, acts of vandalism were recorded in the villages of Marfivka (satanic inscriptions on Slavic and Muslim graves) and Voikove (124 Slavic graves ruined) in Leninskiy district²⁴. Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev stressed the frequency of “vandalism against mosques, cemeteries, monuments to victims of deportation of Crimean Tatars, Majlis offices, etc.”. In particular, “since the convocation of Kurultay in 1991, Majlis central office in Simferopol alone suffered more than 10 night attacks... but none of those crimes was solved and no one was detained. More than that, attempts a being made to shift responsibility for those crimes to Crimean Tatars themselves”²⁵.

By and large, Crimea now actually witnesses a “war of monuments”, a conflict between symbols of the Soviet and imperial age, today’s Ukraine, and historic symbols of Crimean Tatars, also in the process of “appropriation of their history”. In particular, this refers to the erection of monuments to Catherine II in Simferopol and possible construction of a monument to Stalin in Livadia, opposed by the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar community. Yet in 1999 representatives of Crimean Tatars initiated inauguration of a monument to the human rights champion P.Hryhorenko, while party “Union” urgently began to prepare a site for a monument to Catherine II, in the eyes of Crimean Tatars personifying annexation of Crimea by Russia. The memorial sign in honour of the Russian Empress was established in Simferopol in 2007 on the initiative of the Simferopol Mayor’s Office, Moscow Mayor’s Office and Cossack formations from Russia, Ukraine and other CIS states.

²¹ The conflict situation arose yet 10 years ago. According to the Bahchysaray District State Administration Land Resources Department Head Aliev, the issue has long been considered in courts. Aliev reported that the market obtained from Bahchysaray authorities some 0.20 hectares of land, and seized another 0.47. Director of Bahchysaray Historic-Cultural Preserve Ye.Petrov noted that the market illegally occupied the territory of the ancient Muslim cemetery and an architectural complex of the national significance. In July, 2006, than Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea H.Moskal said that the autonomy leadership in the person of the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Ministers and Bahchysaray City Council kept aloof from the solution of the issue of the District Consumer Society’s market, which caused confrontation between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic population. On July 21, Ukraine’s President V.Yushchenko in a letter to the Crimean authorities requested information about the solution of a number of problems on the peninsula.

²² See: Land conflict and inter-ethnic confrontation in the AR of Crimea . – UCIPR web site, <http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua>; “Crimean electric ray”: problem of “hot spots” in Crimea. – *Ibid*.

²³ For more detail see: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. Third Report on Ukraine adopted on June 29, 2007, Strasbourg, 2008, p.18.

²⁴ According to official versions, cited cases have no “inter-ethnic or inter-religious grounds. The vandals were local residents living an asocial life, abusing alcohol, with a low consciousness”, Home Ministry reported. – UNIAN, February 11, 2008.

²⁵ Crimean Tatars in Crimea and the world: Problems and prospects of national revival. – Report by Majlis Head at the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, Simferopol, May 19, 2009.



Another example of the “war of monuments” deals with installation of a three-meter-high stele in memory victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Simferopol: “In memory of victims of the Soviet people fallen from the hands of Nazi aiders – OUN-UPA fighters and other collaborators”; funds for its establishment were collected by communists of Ukraine and Crimeans²⁶. The monument named “Shot in the back” was inaugurated in 2007 in Sovetskaya Square. PSPU was the first to oppose installation of the stele in that place²⁷.

Historic memory in the region is extremely politicised, also by geopolitical subjects. An example of such manipulations is presented by the recent events concerning commemoration of the Day of Victims of Famine. In particular, participants of the international campaign “Everburning Candle” brought to the Crimean peninsula a 200-kg symbolic candle. CPU activists tried to prevent the event, interpreting it as accusation of Russia and the Russian people of genocide of Ukrainians.

The state of most monuments of the Crimean Tatar history and culture is extremely poor and requires large-scale research and restoration²⁸. The issue of construction of the Grand Mosque in Simferopol remains unresolved due to the stand of the local authorities obstructing implementation of their own decisions of land allotment, problems exist with restitution of Islamic religious structures.

Conflict of identities

There is kind of a conflict of identities in Crimea between the Crimean Tatar and Slavic communities caused and motivated both by the age features of Crimeans and their political and ideological likings, as well as ethnic and cultural-historic factors. It is manifested in a set of socio-cultural and geopolitical inputs, such as foreign political preferences, since, by contrast to the Slavic majority, the Crimean Tatar community does not position itself as pro-Russian. “Our partners have always been political forces declaring ideas of democracy, in a word, I would term them the national democratic forces of Ukraine, speaking of accession to the EU and NATO” – says First Deputy Head of Majlis R.Chubarov²⁹. “A large part of the Crimean population is made up of people resettled here from internal regions of Russia after deportation of Crimean Tatars and their descendants. So, their gravitation to their historic Motherland is understandable. But by contrast to us, who 50 years fought for return to the Motherland, they want to return to their Motherland not as we did – having taken our suitcases and gotten on a train. They want to Russia together with our historic Motherland. And we can never agree with that. Please, go back, the road is open – but what does this have to do with our land? ... Some 70% of the Russian-speaking population of Crimea see its future in the Russian Federation, but this is not a reason for transfer of Crimea to another state”³⁰ – Majlis leader M.Dzhemilev said at the World Congress of Crimean Tatars.

Proposals

Harmonisation of the ethno-political situation in the autonomy requires a comprehensive strategic policy (language and cultural, information, socio-economic, regional) aimed at encouragement of a dialogue between representative bodies of Crimean Tatars and regional and central authorities. Within the framework of that policy, the issue of legislative restoration of the rights of Crimean Tatars should be solved. Furthermore, the following steps are needed:

- implementation of measures for enhanced support for repatriates and the Ukrainian community in Crimea – to level the socio-economic disparity in Crimean society, explain preferences for the Crimean Tatar community from the viewpoint of solution of the relevant problem. That policy should be transparent and publicly controlled, to avoid possible corrupt schemes;
- passage of the Law “On Restoration of Rights of Persons deported on Ethnic Grounds”, involvement of representative bodies of ethnic communities in Ukraine’s political and legal framework;
- provision of effective safeguards (for instance, “an agreement of the elites”) against political forces’ speculation on inter-ethnic contradictions (first of all, during election campaigns), which has a negative effect on the general climate in Crimea; introduction in Crimea of an educational policy upbringing tolerance, promoting inter-cultural dialogue, patriotic education, organisation and conduct of inter-regional exchanges – to enhance the awareness of society (first of all, children) about national traditions of the peoples of Ukraine, cultural exchanges and mutual enrichment of cultures;
- popularisation of cultures of ethnic groups and communities, support for initiatives of local communities for solution of social and economic problems;
- extension of interest-free loans to Crimean Tatars for housing construction (in the context of amenities for all repatriates);
- establishment of all-round cooperation between representatives of the local authorities with local and regional Majlises, implementation of measures in support for the study of the culture, history, language and religion of ethnic groups;
- development of cooperation with international institutions rendering assistance in solution of urgent issues of infrastructure development in the autonomy.

One should note, however, that those objectives cannot be attained without general democratisation of Ukrainian society, transparency of decision-making, a considerate human resources policy, removal of the effects of negative ethnic stereotypes, fighting corruption. ■

²⁶ Number of opponents of recognition of OUN-UPA goes down. – UNIAN, January 17, 2008. According to a public opinion poll, 13.4% of Crimeans fully or with reservations supports provision of privileges and status of participants of World War II to OUN-UPA fighters, almost 77% does not. – Sociological survey conducted by the Democratic Initiative Foundation and Ukrainian Sociology Service company on 5-18 December 2007 by personal interview. 1,800 respondents above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The sample statistical error does not exceed 2.3%.

²⁷ The reason however lied not in ideology but in business interests: a member of the City Council representing that party is the director of the “Simferopol” cinema house located nearby.

²⁸ As of 2003, there were more than 900 architectural sites – monuments of the Crimean Tatar history and culture in Crimea. According to experts, less than 10% of them are entered to the Register of National Cultural Heritage, kept on state registration and protected by the state. See: Brief review of the state of ethnic identity, cultural heritage, traditions and religion of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine (2003).

²⁹ Creation of national autonomy of Crimean Tatars in Crimea – indicative issue of pre-election in Ukraine. – Radio “Svoboda” web site, October 23, 2008, <http://www.svobodanews.ru>

³⁰ Interview with M.Dzhemilev “Significant part of Ukraine lied within Crimean Tatar Khanate”. – “Kievskie Vedomosti”, November 7, 2008, <http://www.kv.com.ua/archive/19093/political/19117.html>

POLITICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE: APPROACHES TO SOLUTION



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Problems of definition of the legal status of Crimean Tatar people as indigenous people of Ukraine, involvement of its institutes in the legal system and legislative restoration of the rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds remain unresolved. Uncertainty of the situation presents a factor of tension in the relations between the authorities and the political leadership of Crimean Tatar people, complicates creation of amenities for repatriates.

Meanwhile, solution of those problems requires consideration of some risks, in particular, its effect on inter-ethnic relations in Crimea and Ukraine as a whole.

The article examines possible ways to solve political and legal problems of Crimean Tatar people.

A national minority or an indigenous people?

It should be noted that the approaches to the definition of the status of indigenous peoples and legitimisation of the institutes of Crimean Tatar people cause more discussion than the issues of legislative restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds (repatriates).

The Ukrainian Constitution establishes the principle of equality of all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin; therefore, bills providing a special status for some ethnic group may be interpreted as contrary to that principle. Meanwhile, the wording of the Basic Law itself uses several terms to denote specific ethnic communities. Of particular importance in this respect is the reference, along with “national minorities” (Articles 10, 11, 92, 119), to “indigenous peoples” (Articles 11, 92, 119).

The term “national minorities” is defined in Article 3 of the Law “On National Minorities in Ukraine” as “groups of citizens of Ukraine who are not Ukrainians by nationality, demonstrate a feeling of national self-identification and community”. On this basis, all non-Ukrainian ethnic

groups living on the territory of Ukraine may be considered national minorities, enjoying an equal status.

However, the mention of “indigenous peoples” and “national minorities” in the Constitution enables their treatment as two different categories of communities¹. Furthermore, the Constitution (Article 92) expressly provides that the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as the rights of national minorities, are determined “exclusively by the laws of Ukraine”. Hence, the legislative uncertainty of the status and, respectively, rights of indigenous peoples may be seen as a gap in Ukraine’s legal framework, which gives representatives of peoples considering themselves indigenous grounds to demand legislative regimentation of their status².

Another reason for such demands is presented by the definition of the status of indigenous peoples, their rights and principles of relations with the state in documents of international organisations joined by Ukraine. The main such documents are the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) and the International Labour

¹ Scientists yet in 1996 noted the possibility of a discussion caused by introduction of the term “indigenous peoples” to the Constitution. For more detail see: Kotyhorenko V. Crimean Tatar repatriates: problem of social adaptation. – Kyiv, 2005, p.189.

² See, e.g.: Bekirov N. Crimean Tatar problem in connection with legislative support for rights of nationalities in Ukraine. – Materials of the conference “Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian society: problems of political and social integration”. – Kyiv, November 26-27, 1998, pp. 18-21.



Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989).

The ILO Convention preceded the UN Declaration and was genetically related with previous ILO documents dealing with narrower issues of protection of first labour, and with time – other rights of indigenous peoples³. Although the document is not ratified by Ukraine, in the opinion of foreign experts, it establishes the “legal international standard for the use of the term “indigenous”⁴.

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention (Item *b*), it applies to “peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions”. Important for identification of peoples as indigenous is part 2 of that Article, whereby “Self-identification as indigenous... shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply”.

Those criteria may well be applied to Crimean Tatar people. The relevant documents in the first place refer to peoples that inhabited some territories prior to their colonisation by other peoples, were driven from their places of residence by force, deprived of land, etc. In particular, the mentioned international documents derive the special status and rights of indigenous peoples from

“their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation...”⁵. Those documents imply definition of indigenous peoples as the ones that did not accept the ways of the “coloniser” peoples, preserved their own, different from them way of life, and their institutes.

Proceeding from the statements of its leaders, Crimean Tatar people consider “annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783” an act of conquest, terms the Russian rule as occupational and argues that that act caused mass emigration of Crimean Tatars from Crimea⁶. The community of the “conqueror”, or “coloniser”, enables perception of Crimean Tatar people in the same context with many peoples of Russia living on territories “conquered” by the former empire and, according to the federal legislation of the Russian Federation and legislation of the federation members, considered indigenous on those territories⁷. Furthermore, Crimean Tatar people suffered from another expatriation – total deportation on ethnic grounds in 1944.

While Ukraine did not sign the discussed ILO Convention, the UN Declaration does not require signing or ratification, and Ukraine must observe it as a member of that international organisation⁸. That is why passage of the Declaration was hailed by the leadership of Crimean Tatar people, who saw it as an “international legal document for solution of issues evaded by the authorities for the past 17 years”⁹.

DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution No.61/295 of September 13, 2007 (extract)¹⁰

Article 1

Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.

Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

Article 5

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

Article 7

1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.

2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.

³ For more detail see: The ILO and Indigenous and Tribal peoples. – UN Guide for Indigenous Peoples. Leaflet No.8, <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/racism/00-indigenousguide.html>

⁴ See: Dallmann W., Goldman H. Indigenous – native – aboriginal: Confusion and translation problems. – ANSIPRA Bulletin, June 2003, <http://www.npolar.no/ansipra>

⁵ See: Item *b*, Article 1 of the Convention.

⁶ See: Crimean Tatars in Crimea and the world: Problems and prospects of national revival. – Report by the Head of Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people at the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, Simferopol, May 19, 2009. – Web site “Crimea and Crimean Tatars”, <http://kirimtatar.com>

⁷ There is, however, some legal specificity dependent on the strength of a specific people. For more detail see: Dallmann W., Goldman H. Indigenous – native – aboriginal: Confusion and translation problems.

⁸ Ukraine abstained at voting for the Declaration.

⁹ R.Chubarov. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and assignment for Ukrainian politicians. – “Crimean Studies” web site, No. 3-4, June-September, 2007, <http://cidct.org.ua>

¹⁰ See: Official UN web site, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf



Article 8

1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;

(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;

(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.

Article 11

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.

2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.

Article 13

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.

2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.

Article 14

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.

2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.

3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.

Article 15

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information.

2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance,

understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society.

Article 16

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.

2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.

Article 18

Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 19

States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.

Article 20

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.

2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.

Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, *inter alia*, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.

2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Article 23

Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.



Article 27

States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.

Article 28

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.

2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.

Article 33

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.

Article 38

States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Article 39

Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this Declaration.

Article 40

Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.

Article 46

1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.

3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.

According to one of the Majlis leaders R.Chubarov, “clear norms of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly prove the legitimacy of many requirements of Crimean Tatars concerning restoration of their rights, including the right to self-determination on the condition of preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, and “bless” restoration of their national institutes, in particular, Kurultay of Crimean Tatar people”¹¹.

Therefore, both the national legislation (Constitution) and international legal documents open up the possibility of passage of a legislative act on the status and rights of indigenous peoples, as demanded by representatives of Crimean Tatars.

Issue of the institutes

The UN Declaration may also be of use to solve the problem of regimentation of the legal status of Crimean Tatar national self-government bodies— Kurultay and Majlis. The Ukrainian legislation does not allow establishment of self-government bodies on ethnic grounds, leaving space only for the establishment of such public associations, being the only way of legitimisation of Kurultay and Majlis of Crimean Tatar people in the present situation.

However, Crimean Tatar leadership continuously rejects that option, as inconsistent with the actual status, role and functions of those bodies. Palliative measures to that end (e.g., establishment of the Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine) are seen as provisional, and their effectiveness, as experience proves, largely depends on political factors (in particular, the person of the President and his stand on Crimean Tatar issue).

The UN Declaration contains a number of articles (e.g., 5, 20, 23) that admit the right of indigenous peoples to preserve and build their own political, economic, social and cultural institutes. Evidently, it may be applied to the national self-government bodies of Crimean Tatar people and gives grounds for their legalisation in that special quality.

Expected risks

Some provisions of the Declaration, in particular, dealing with the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination (Articles 3 and 4), may be viewed as additional legal justification of the intention of Crimean Tatar people to establish in Crimea, contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine, a national territorial autonomy.

¹¹ R.Chubarov. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and assignment for Ukrainian politicians. – “Crimean Studies” web site, No. 3-4, June-September, 2007, <http://cidct.org.ua>



However, Crimean Tatars argue that Ukraine already has one administrative-territorial autonomy – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and they, as an indigenous people, would like it to be national¹².

Design of the ways of solution of political and legal problems of Crimean Tatars should take into account the fact that a conflict can be provoked both by stagnation of the current situation, and by acts aimed at its change (e.g., passage of the relevant legislative acts).

For instance, a legal precedent of granting special status to some people living on the territory of Ukraine may prompt similar claims (even unreasoned) by other ethnic communities, heated disputes on those issues in the political community and society. The same refers to a special status of national self-government bodies of some national communities.

Data of public opinion polls show that for the majority of Crimeans, provision of the status of an indigenous people for Crimean Tatars and official recognition of Majlis may present a factor of conflict that will step up tension in inter-ethnic relations. Representatives of other ethnic communities of Crimea may view them as steps towards Crimean Tatar goal of establishment of their national territorial autonomy on the peninsula. The majority of Russian and Ukrainians in Crimea are ready to peacefully protest against such decision, and quite a few – even take up arms to fight it¹³. Therefore, the socio-political situation on the peninsula will become even more vulnerable to destabilising influences.

Possible solutions

In view of the above considerations, risks at solution of problems of Crimean Tatar people could be minimised by the sequence of the following steps.

First of all, one should delimit the issues of legislative definition of the status of indigenous peoples and restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds.

The first legislative act is to contain clear criteria of classification of peoples living on the territory of Ukraine as indigenous, define their status and specific (including collective) rights in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. That legislative act must in the first place provide:

- clear criteria of classification of ethnic groups as indigenous peoples of Ukraine and, respectively, their comprehensive list¹⁴;
- correspondence to the principles provided by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including not only the rights of those peoples and their guarantee by the state but also limitations on the exercise of such rights established by that document (Article 46).

The second law is to deal with Ukrainian citizens of all nationalities who suffered from forced deportation, to establish the mechanisms and scope of restoration of their rights. That law should reiterate that the Ukrainian state is not a legal successor to the former USSR and bears no legal responsibility for forced deportation of Crimean Tatars and other peoples from Crimea. Furthermore, that law and expected consequences of its effectuation should not result in limitation of legislatively provided rights of representatives of other ethnic groups living on the peninsula.

The former law should make emphasis on collective rights of indigenous peoples, in line with the spirit of the relevant UN Declaration, the latter – on individual rights of representatives of deported peoples. The spheres of legal regulation of those laws should not overlap. This will make it possible to avoid “privileges” for some people, since each law will deal with several ethnic communities and their representatives (*in the former case – indigenous peoples, in the latter – peoples subjected to deportation*).

To avoid negative socio-political response to the passage of the relevant legislative acts, their drafting should be made utmost transparent, employing politically unbiased scholars and experts¹⁵.

Another way to prevent possible negative consequences is to make the relevant laws an element of wider efforts at perfection of Ukraine’s legal framework in the field of ethno-national relations¹⁶. Evidently, that will require substantial improvement of the entire legal framework, including, if necessary, amendment of Ukraine’s Constitution. This approach might rest on the Concept of the State Ethno-National Policy of Ukraine, remaining unfinished and not approved for years¹⁷. Such approaches could promote a compromise between representatives of different ethnic communities in Ukraine. ■

¹² This circumstance was noted by R.Chubarov. See: Materials of the conference “Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian society: problems political and social integration”. – Kyiv, November 26-27, 1998, p.44.

¹³ See: Crimea: people, problems, prospects. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. – “National Security & Defence”, 2008, No. 10, p.21.

¹⁴ Elaboration of such criteria should build on the experience of preparation of the relevant bills. For more detail see: section 2.2 of the Analytical Report published in this magazine.

¹⁵ The following sequence of action is proposed: establishment of a working group for bill drafting, employing scholars, experts, representatives of the concerned ethnic groups; preparatory activities, including analysis of possible positive and negative effects of passage of the law; submission for parliamentary hearings in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea; submission for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

¹⁶ See, e.g.: Kotyhorenko V. Crimean Tatar repatriates: problem of social adaptation. – Kyiv, 2005, pp.200-203.

¹⁷ Two relevant bills have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada: “On the Concept of the State Ethno-National Policy” (No. 3581 of December 30, 2008) submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and “On Approval of the Strategy of the State Ethno-National Policy” (No. 3106 of September 2, 2008) submitted by National Deputy of Ukraine M.Papiyev.