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UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: FEATURES, CHALLENGES, PRIORITIES

Selected expert assessments of the state and prospects
of Ukraine's partnership with the EU, the United States, and NATO

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This expert study on the specific features and key directions of Ukraine's foreign policy was prepared by members of the Public Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA) with the participation of the Razumkov Centre, the Open Politics Foundation and the NATO-Ukraine Civic League, supported by Hanns Seidel Foundation.¹ The study generally focuses on trends and priorities in Ukraine's European integration, the specifics of the US-Ukraine partnership, as well as the state and prospects of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.² It follows on from a previous joint project on Ukraine's foreign policy issues.

Obviously, relations with the EU, the US and NATO do not encompass all aspects of Ukraine's policy on the world stage, but they remain central to the agenda, as outlined in particular at the annual Conference of Ambassadors in July 2025 and, beyond exaggeration, are of crucial importance in the context of war.

Ukraine's diplomacy is compelled to operate under the difficult conditions of large-scale Russian aggression, geo-economic turbulence, and contradictory regional and global processes that affect the country's international policy and its foreign policy positioning. Overall, recent developments demonstrate growing challenges in advancing Ukraine's interests along its principal foreign policy directions. From a formal perspective, the June summits of the EU and NATO underscored the challenges facing Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration prospects. Meanwhile, relations with Washington, despite certain positive tendencies, remain unstable. The peace negotiation process remains contradictory and unpredictable due to Russia's aggressive neo-imperial policy, offering both opportunities and serious risks for Ukraine.

When discussing Ukrainian war diplomacy, it is reasonable to note the peculiarities of its functioning under prolonged martial law, in particular, the transition of foreign policy system to a military footing and the centralisation of management structures. Furthermore, in July 2025, alongside a government «reboot», the Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent major structural and functional transformations, accompanied by massive personnel changes in the diplomatic corps. Clearly, these internal factors, combined with external ones, affect the nature and specifics of Kyiv's activities in key foreign policy areas, including relations with the EU, the US and NATO.

It is reasonable to assert that, in the context of ever-changing geopolitical landscape and the escalating multifaceted threats from Russian intervention, the European vector of Ukraine's foreign policy is becoming a priority, including military-political and economic partnership with the EU, integration into the European community, acceleration and expansion of cooperation between the Ukrainian and European defence industries, etc.

Furthermore, it is of strategic importance for Kyiv to engage in productive and pragmatic

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dialogue with Washington, to capitalise on and consolidate certain positive trends in US policy towards Ukraine. Additionally, further consolidation of international military and political assistance depends on strengthening the country's cooperation with NATO, especially following the Alliance's July 2025 summit decisions to raise defence spending among member states.

This study does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of all areas and levels of Ukraine's cooperation with the EU, US and NATO. Rather, it outlines the current state, several key trends, and the main priorities of Ukraine's policy in these areas. At the same time, it is clear that both foreign and domestic processes are dynamic, with new circumstances and factors emerging that shape Ukraine's partnership with the European Union, the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance.

I. KYIV – BRUSSELS RELATIONS: REALITIES AND PLANS FOR UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The full-scale war has accelerated Ukraine's European integration. First, Russian aggression facilitated the pro-European unification of the nation, consolidating the positions of the government and society. Second, European integration has become both a critical motive for resisting a totalitarian empire and a driver for implementing democratic reforms. Third, the war brought about a new quality of military-political, economic and socio-cultural relations between Brussels and Kyiv.

Ukraine, having taken the brunt of the aggressor's military might and suffering colossal human and economic losses, has been defending the eastern flank of the EU and NATO for a long time, while upholding its European choice. It is no exaggeration to state that the future of Europe depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war.

Support for Ukraine in confronting Russian aggression. From the onset of the full-scale

invasion, official Brussels has stepped up its political solidarity with Ukraine and increased its military and financial assistance in resisting Russian intervention. The EU and its member states have supplied a wide range of weaponry and military equipment to Ukraine. As of July 2025, the total volume of aid delivered by the EU and its individual members reached €158.6 billion, including €59.6 billion in military support.³ EU countries not only lobby for and defend Ukraine's interests in international forums (UN General Assembly, PACE, NATO, OSCE, G7, and others), but also contribute to the aggressor's political isolation, ensuring its exclusion from reputable international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Council, and others. European partners helped set up the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and played a key role in creating an important legal precedent through the condemnation of Russian aggression by the European Court of Human Rights (July 2025). Furthermore, during the years of war, the EU has expanded its humanitarian support for Ukraine through a number of grant programmes, loans, credits and relief supplies. Its Temporary Protection Directive remains in force, safeguarding more than four million Ukrainians in EU countries.

A key element of EU support is its sanctions policy, coordinated with other international partners. In particular, in July 2025, the EU adopted the 18th sanctions package against Russia targeting 22 Russian banks, 105 tankers of the «shadow fleet», and the Nord Stream project. Price caps on Russian oil were also introduced.⁴

Notably, along with expanding support for Ukraine, the EU has substantially transformed its foreign policy and security approaches. Influenced partly by Donald Trump's new approach, Europe has revived the idea of strategic autonomy and security self-sufficiency, compelling the European elites to reassess the continent's strategic priorities. Brussels adopted a new defence strategy – the White Paper for

³ Almost 60 billion for the army alone. Ukrinform, 26 June 2025 – <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/4008593-majze-60-milardiv-tilki-dla-vijska-u-es-rozpovili-pro-dopomogu-ukraini-z-2022-roku.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁴ The EU imposed sanctions on 22 Russian banks and film director Shakhnazarkv – Deutsche Welle, 19 July 2025 – <https://www.dw.com/ru/es-vvel-sankcii-protiv-22-bankov-rossii-i-rezissera-sahnazarova/a-73333430> (in Ukrainian).

European Defence: Readiness 2030, along with a five-stage Rearm Europe plan.⁵ The European Commission has increased investments in the European Defence Fund. The concept of the EU's Preparedness Union Strategy for civilians has been announced. In May 2025, the EU unveiled a new Black Sea Strategy aimed at strengthening security and stability in the region.

Nevertheless, it is important to underline that new European security programmes are hindered by bureaucratic procedures and are designed for the medium term, while the escalation of Russian aggression and terror against the Ukrainian civilian population continues right now.⁶ Moreover, Europe remains critically dependent on certain types of American military aid. Debates within the Coalition of the Willing have also highlighted the challenges of creating and deploying even a small joint military contingent.⁷

Be that as it may, it is the European dimension that is now becoming a priority for Kyiv for many reasons, primarily in view of the Washington's position. Europe is de facto Ukraine's key ally in countering Russian intervention.

Specifics and features of European integration reforms. After receiving the EU candidate status in June 2022, Kyiv activated a «turbo mode» of pro-European transformations. Notably, a number of key laws were adopted, including on national minorities, the media, and the Constitutional Court. A package of acts was introduced to align national legislation with EU standards across various sectors. Higher judicial bodies and anti-corruption institutions were reformed, and a state anti-corruption programme and strategy for reforming law enforcement agencies were approved. Ukraine and the EU have completed all procedures to open four negotiation

clusters, starting with the primary one – the EU accession «Fundamentals». On 14 May 2025, the Ukrainian government approved roadmaps for the rule of law, public administration, and democratic institutions reforms. A plan of measures to protect the rights of national minorities has also been adopted.⁸

Ukraine has recently taken other important steps along the European integration path. The government has approved a draft Customs Code aligned with EU customs legislation. An important European integration law – on vocational education – passed the second reading in the Verkhovna Rada. The draft Action Programme of the Government envisages readiness to commence negotiations on six clusters by the end of 2025. A new Director of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine has also been appointed.

However, Ukraine has recently fallen behind the planned reform schedule. As of July 2025, three of the 16 reforms under the Ukraine Facility programme – decentralisation, judicial reform and ARMA – were not completed. As a result, the EU reduced the next tranche of funding from €4.5 billion to €3.05 billion.⁹

Serious challenges remain in judicial reform, including filling vacancies in the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Justice, re-booting the Supreme Court, establishing creating specialised administrative courts, etc.

Furthermore, some actions by Ukrainian authorities in the anti-corruption sphere have had adverse domestic and international repercussions. On 22 July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada passed, and the President signed a law granting control over the NABU and SAPO to the Prosecutor General. This provoked a negative reaction from the EU and sparked widespread public protests across Ukraine.

⁵ T. Vysotska, T. Oliynyk, EU leaders support new defence plan for large-scale defence investments. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 6 March 2025 – <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/03/6/7501653/> (in Ukrainian).

⁶ Y. Yakymenko, M. Pashkov US-EU relations as a factor of Europe's geopolitical self-identification.

European Council Experts' Debrief – Issue XV – <https://tepsa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/EUCO-Debrief-II-2025-1.pdf>.

⁷ Europe would struggle to put 25,000 troops on the ground in Ukraine. *The Times*, 30 April 2025 – <https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/europe-uk-peacekeeping-troops-ukraine-6tp2cfcgg5>.

⁸ Website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – <https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/olha-stefanishyna-and-eu-commissioner-marta-kos-discuss-preparations-for-the-opening-of-the-first-negotiating-clusters/>.

⁹ The Ukraine Facility assistance tranche to be cut short because Kyiv has not implemented all promised reforms. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 25 July 2025 – <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/07/25/7523426/> (in Ukrainian).

Independence of both agencies was eventually restored on 31 July 2025. This temporary deviation from the European integration path neither advanced the negotiation process nor strengthened trust between Ukraine and the EU.

When discussing the significance of European integration reforms, at least two important factors should be kept in mind. **First**, the ongoing regime of martial law imposes restrictions on citizens' rights and freedoms.¹⁰ The war has made national and local elections impossible. A certain degree of government control over the information sphere has been a necessary measure under Russian intervention. On the other hand, one could observe the centralisation, the concentration of powers in the Presidential Office, the weakening of political competition and other questionable trends.

Under these circumstances, the European integration «safeguards» become even more important. These include a) further implementation of pre-accession pro-European reforms, including under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; b) fulfilment of obligations under the Ukraine Facility Plan; c) application of screening sessions results to ensure the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with EU law; and d) implementation of roadmaps for the rule of law, democratic institutions, public administration reform, etc.

Second, Donald Trump's business diplomacy has shifted partnerships with allied countries onto a purely commercial track. The United States has abandoned the protection and promotion of democracy globally and rolled back soft power and humanitarian aid tools that were implemented through the now defunct USAID. On 24 May 2025, Trump gave a speech at West Point stating that the US armed forces would not fight for freedom and democracy in other countries, and that the US would no longer export democracy around the world «at gunpoint».¹¹

It so happened that today the EU remains the principal global centre for supporting and promoting democracy, freedom, justice, human rights and fundamental human values. In essence, this represents the EU's global, civilisational mission in the new world reality.

Problems and prospects of Ukraine's European integration. On June 26, 2025, at the EU summit, 26 member states endorsed the Commission's assessment that Ukraine was ready to open the «Fundamentals» cluster. However, the formal start of accession negotiations was blocked by the Hungary's leadership. Its veto was hardly unpredictable, given the long-standing hostile anti-Ukrainian campaign waged by Viktor Orbán's regime, including the manipulative so-called government referendum on Ukraine's EU accession.¹² Ukraine's integration was de jure put on hold. While the practical movement towards Europe has not stopped, the duration of political uncertainty regarding formal accession negotiations remains unclear. In wartime, this is an unfavourable factor affecting both the pace of pro-European reforms and public sentiment.

Beyond the «Hungarian factor», a number of internal and external factors also influence the tempo of Ukraine's EU progress, both directly and indirectly. **First**, persistent challenges remain in areas sensitive to Brussels — judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts, decentralisation, and public administration reform. The above-mentioned attempts by the authorities to subjugate anti-corruption institutions have also slowed momentum. For the sake of objectivity, however, one should keep in mind that Kyiv is compelled to concentrate enormous political, diplomatic, financial, and human resources on countering Russian invasion. Amidst the ongoing «war of attrition» and given the limited domestic resources, European integration had to be implemented on a reduced scale.¹³

Second, dynamics within the EU also have a direct and indirect bearing. In 2025,

¹⁰ Decree of the President of Ukraine «On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine» of 24 February 2022 — <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/642022-41397>.

¹¹ Trump: The US will no longer impose democracy by force. Deutsche Welle. 25 May 2025 — <https://www.dw.com/ru/trump-ssa-bolse-ne-budut-nasazdat-demokratii-siloi/a-72661187> (in Russian).

¹² Hungarian PM claims 95% of citizens oppose Ukraine's EU accession in Voks2025 referendum. Ukrainska Pravda, 26 June 2025 — <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/26/7518820/>.

¹³ For more detail see European Integration in Times of War: Challenges and Prospects. Razumkov Centre, December 2022 — <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2022/12/28/2022-MATRA-IV-KVARTAL-7.pdf> (in Ukrainian).

electoral campaigns across Europe revealed the strengthening of the activity and influence of Eurosceptic and far-right forces. Parties such as Alternative for Germany, France's National Rally, Poland's Confederation and Romania's Alliance for the Union of Romanians gained popularity. In Portugal, the far-right Chega party won the snap parliamentary elections in May 2025. The polarisation of the European political landscape was further evidenced in July when right-wing groups in the European Parliament – Patriots for Europe and European Conservatives and Reformists – initiated a motion of no confidence against the European Commission and its leadership, which garnered a notable 175 votes.¹⁴

The EU obviously cannot ignore the strengthening of right-wing radical and populist sentiments in European politics that foster scepticism regarding further EU enlargement and affect Brussels-Kyiv relations in various areas.

Third, the situation around Ukraine's accession negotiations raises the issue of veto power and the EU's consensus-based decision-making mechanism. This chronic weakness hampers joint foreign policy, devalues and complicates the EU's institutional functioning, and leaves Brussels vulnerable to authoritarian pressure. Despite regular calls for reform – notably, replacing unanimity with qualified majority voting – no tangible progress has been achieved.

Currently, options for bypassing Hungary's veto are actively discussed in European political circles, including the possibility of «technical» informal accession negotiations with Ukraine. Certain expectations now rest on the September meeting of the EU Council. For the time being, however, the issue remains unresolved.

In summary, despite significant external and internal challenges, military-political partnership with the EU and eventual integration into the European community remain of paramount strategic importance for Ukraine.

II. THE AMERICAN VECTOR OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY

Specific Features of the new US Foreign Policy

Amidst the formation of a new world order and the emergence of global threats and challenges, US President Donald Trump and his team have sought to formulate a new strategy that departs radically from the approaches of their predecessors. In broad terms, the new US foreign policy is marked by several defining characteristics.

First, US foreign policy is distinguished by pronounced American-centrism and the commercialisation. Trump's election in 2024 brought not only significant changes in practices and methods of US foreign policy but also produced a fundamental shift in ideology. Pre-Trump US diplomacy combined American and allies' interests with a value-based approach grounded in democratic principles, human rights and freedoms. In many ways, these values traditionally determined the direction and specific actions of the State Department and the White House under successive presidents. By contrast, under Trump, US foreign policy has drifted towards dollarisation (commercialisation), whereby its success is measured almost exclusively by the profitability of deals concluded and the billions of dollars secured for America. At the same time, long-term strategic interests, often not reducible to financial metrics, are overlooked; instruments of soft power, such as USAID, have been dismantled; and Washington has withdrawn from humanitarian organisations, including UNESCO.

Second, contemporary US foreign policy is shaped by the competing influence of two groups – isolationists and Reaganites. The isolationist camp, aligned with Trump's MAGA base, tends to disregard soft power and human rights, prioritising short-term financial gain and favouring autarky. A notable example was Vice President J.D. Vance's controversial speech at the Munich Security Conference in

¹⁴ Attack on Ursula: how the first attempt by «Putin's friends» to decapitate the EU ended. European Pravda, 10 July 2025 – <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2025/07/10/7215668/> (in Ukrainian).

2025, reflecting such isolationist thinking.¹⁵ In contrast, representatives of the old Reagan geopolitical tradition argue that the United States must retain its role as a global power and world policeman, perceiving both China and Russia as potential threats to this status.

Third, US foreign policy is characterised by a chaotic and highly personalised style. Trump has infused diplomacy with his own subjective attitudes towards foreign counterparts. It is no secret that his aspiration to secure a Nobel Peace Prize shapes many of his actions. As the value-based approach in US foreign policy is increasingly sidelined, decisions are often driven by Trump's personal sympathies or economic pragmatism. A striking example is the relationship between Trump and Putin: the American president appeared convinced that peace between Ukraine and Russia could be brokered on the basis of his personal rapport with the Russian dictator.

The dismantling of the old international order and the formation of a new one, as well as the advent of a Trump presidency have produced significant, often radical, shifts in US foreign policy. The merging approach is commercialised, inconsistent and personalised, leaving open critical questions regarding America's long-term role in the evolving system of international relations.

The State and Trends in US-Ukraine Relations

Since the onset of Russia's full-scale aggression, the United States has supplied Ukraine with military equipment and weaponry worth approximately \$67 billion¹⁶ under various assistance programmes, as well as sharing

intelligence. Alongside the European Union, Washington played a leading role in initiating sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, the United States has provided Ukraine with \$31.5 billion¹⁷ in macro-financial assistance, while about 240,000 Ukrainian refugees have found shelter in the US.¹⁸

The previous administration of President Biden adhered to a *doctrine of limited strategic partnership with Ukraine*, under which the United States could not allow Ukraine to lose the war, but was not prepared to accept Russia's outright defeat. At least three considerations underpinned this policy.

First, Russia's nuclear blackmail, with repeated threats to use tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, the fear of Russia's uncontrolled collapse in the event of its defeat, leading to the loss of control over its nuclear arsenal and the transformation of Russian territory into a «grey area» of international terrorism.

Third, the conviction of many American experts that the principal threat to the US today lies not in Russia but in China, which requires concentrating forces and resources on the Chinese direction, with the objective of «detaching Russia from China».

This fear within the American *deep state* of the uncontrolled disintegration of Russia and the risk of escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war into a global nuclear confrontation prompted Biden's administration to apply said limited strategic partnership doctrine. It imposed artificial restrictions on the quantity and types of modern Western

¹⁵ Shock and humiliation. What the US Vice President said in Munich and why such a reaction – BBC News Ukraine, 14 February 2025 – <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/crm7yr8dewno> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁶ The supply of American weapons and equipment to Ukraine, which was allocated under President Biden's ISAI programme (weapons manufacturing contracts) still continues. Deliveries are scheduled to end in 2026. The most significant deliveries from the US include more than 1,400 Stinger MANPADS, over 5,500 Javelin AAWs, 90 155-mm howitzers and 184,000 shells for them, 31 M1 Abrams tanks, 190 Bradley IFVs, as well as large numbers of ammunition, grenade launchers, kamikaze drones, anti-tank systems and other equipment. See: The US has provided Ukraine with \$67 billion worth of weapons and \$31.5 billion in direct financial aid – Forbes, 19 February 2025 – <https://forbes.ua/news/ukraina-otrimala-vid-ssha-zbroyu-na-67-mlrd-ta-315-mlrd-byudzhetnoi-dopomogi-zelenskiy-19022025-27311> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ «There are very few options to stay here without breaking the law» – Ukrainians in the US whose right to stay is not being extended – Suspilne Media, 29 May 2025 <https://suspilne.media/1029711-variantiv-zalitsitsia-tut-bez-porusenna-zakonu-duze-malo-ukrainci-u-ssa-akim-ne-prodovzuut-pravo-na-perebuvanna/> (in Ukrainian)

weapons¹⁹ supplied to Ukraine and prohibited the use of American weapons deep inside Russian territory.

Despite all the restrictions, **US-Ukraine cooperation under the previous administration was still characterised by a form of strategic partnership. At present, following Donald Trump's election, relations have undergone profound change. On the one hand, the partnership has become increasingly commercialised; on the other hand, it has been marked by inconsistency and contradictions, particularly in the context of peace negotiations** (more on this below).

The Ukrainian authorities, for their part, have made efforts to establish productive dialogue and restore partnership relations with the US. On 8 May 2025, the Verkhovna Rada ratified an agreement on cooperation in the field of mineral resources,²⁰ providing for the creation of a bilateral investment fund to support reconstruction and development of Ukraine's subsoil sector. Although received with mixed reactions domestically, President Trump welcomed the agreement, improving both the overall atmosphere of bilateral relations and his personal attitude towards Ukraine.

In general, one can observe some recent positive trends in relations between Kyiv and Washington. In particular, development of the US-Ukraine free trade agreement began in April 2025. In July, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth took part in the Ramstein Group meeting, while US Special Envoy Keith Kellogg joined a Coalition of the Willing meeting in Rome on 10 July. According to Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, three joint projects in the

extractive sector are currently being developed under the mineral resources agreement. The inaugural meeting of the Supervisory Board of the US-Ukraine Investment Fund for Reconstruction took place on 3 September 2025, and a visit of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) delegation to Ukraine is scheduled for later in September 2025.

The establishment of a new mechanism for arms deliveries has been another positive factor. As US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker announced, a Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List (PURL)²¹ has been created, enabling European countries to purchase American weapons for Ukraine through NATO coordination. Deliveries under this new mechanism have already commenced: on 5 August 2025, Norway, Sweden and Denmark financed a military support package for Ukraine worth €430 million,²² while the Netherlands announced a €500 million²³ package that includes components for Patriot systems.

Meanwhile, bilateral arms trade has been expanding steadily. In May, Washington approved the first direct commercial sale (DCS) of weapons to Ukraine worth \$50 million. Subsequently, the State Department authorised sales of equipment and services for Ukrainian F-16 aircraft worth \$310 million, and in July, approved agreed to sell air defence systems worth \$322 million. US-German negotiations are underway to supply Patriot systems to Ukraine. On 5 August 2025, during a telephone call between President Zelenskyy and President Trump, an agreement on the export of Ukrainian drones to the United States was discussed, with a potential value of up to \$1 billion.²⁴

¹⁹ Initially, Western countries, including the US, were firmly opposed to supplying 155-mm howitzers to Ukraine; then there were problems with HIMARS missiles, modern tanks and F-16 aircraft. After lengthy discussions with partners, all these types of weapons were eventually supplied to Ukraine.

²⁰ Law of Ukraine «On Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund» – Official portal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4417-20#Text> (in Ukrainian).

²¹ US ambassador to NATO declares upcoming wave of military aid packages for Ukraine, *Ukrainska Pravda* – 5 August 2025 – <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/08/5/7524826/>.

²² Denmark, Norway and Sweden to jointly finance a \$500 million military aid package for Ukraine – *Ukrinform*, 5 August 2025 – <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/4022416-dania-norvegia-i-svecia-spilno-profinansuut-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-ukraini-na-500-miljoniv.html> (in Ukrainian).

²³ The Netherlands will transfer the Patriot missiles and components to Ukraine – *European Pravda*, 4 August 2025 – <https://www.euointegration.com.ua/news/2025/08/4/7217295/> (in Ukrainian).

²⁴ Zelenskyy held a telephone conversation with Trump – *UNIAN*, 5 August 2025 – <https://www.unian.ua/world/zelenskiy-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-trampom-13088493.html> (in Ukrainian).

Therefore, some encouraging signs are evident in US positioning on Ukraine. However, the key question remains whether these trends will translate into a stable and consistent policy of solidarity and support. In general, the nature and atmosphere of relations between Washington and Kyiv continue to be defined above all by the progress of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

The Cost and Outcomes of American Initiatives in the Peace Process

From the outset of the US presidential campaign, it became evident that *in the event of Donald Trump's victory, American policy towards Ukraine and the role of the United States in the Russia-Ukraine war would undergo fundamental change*. Meanwhile, Trump's views and broader American approach to the war in Ukraine have also been constantly changing.

In general terms, at least three stages can be distinguished in the evolution of the US President's foreign policy: the rejection of limited strategic partnership, positioning as an equidistant mediator, harsh criticism of Ukraine, and finally the articulation (albeit verbal) of ultimatum-style demands to Russia.

At the first stage (election campaign – late February 2025), Trump dismissed the policy of limited strategic partnership with Ukraine and announced the cessation of arms and military equipment supplies to Ukraine. He repeatedly declared that he would «resolve the conflict within 24 hours»,²⁵ that «this is not his war, but Biden's war», and that had he been president, the war would not have started. The US president stressed that his main goal was to achieve a ceasefire and initiate a peace process – peace through force – as tens of thousands of lives were being lost on both sides. This became his central narrative, which he sought to promote in contacts with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and the Russian dictator Putin.

At this stage, the tone of the US president's statements became increasingly favourable

to Russia. At the same time, Trump's assessments of Ukraine grew progressively more critical, with accusations directed against the Ukrainian leadership for its alleged unwillingness to establish peace. In particular, the US president raised demands regarding the repayment of \$300 billion for previous American arms supplies, insisted on the signing of a coercive agreement on rare earth metals, and accused President Zelenskyy of lacking the will to conclude a peace settlement.

Trump tried to play the role of a neutral mediator between Russia and Ukraine, repeatedly stressing that the war must be stopped and relevant deal reached. Towards the end of this stage his statements increasingly reflected both his personal favour towards the Russian dictator and his growing irritation with the actions of the Ukrainian president.

At the second stage (late February – July 2025), the United States appeared to position itself as Russia's temporary partner. On 28 February 2025, the infamous meeting between the presidents of the United States and Ukraine took place. A heated conflict erupted live in the White House reception room, leading to the interruption of the visit. The exchange of intelligence information and arms supplies to Ukraine were also temporarily suspended.²⁶

According to some expert assessments, the US not only ceased to be Ukraine's strategic partner, but, in effect, began «playing into Russia's hands» internationally. At this stage, the process of coordinating sanctions with the EU collapsed. The United States refused to support the 18th sanctions package adopted by the European Union. For the first time since the outbreak of the full-scale aggression, the Ramstein meeting on the coordination of military assistance to Ukraine on 4 June took place without US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth. Media reports suggested that the US was ready to recognise Crimea as Russian territory, lift sanctions against Russia and make other concessions unacceptable to Ukraine, all to the benefit of the Russian dictator.²⁷

²⁵ According to analysts, Trump repeated this statement 54 times.

²⁶ Arms supplies under contracts signed during Biden's presidency and the exchange of intelligence information resumed a few days later.

²⁷ Crimea to be officially recognised as Russian territory: the US is ready to take this step to achieve peace – Bloomberg – today.ua, – <https://today.ua/478434-prosochilisya-detali-mirnoyi-ugodi-yaku-gotuyut-ssha-krim-oficijno-bude-viznano-rosijskoyu-teritoriyeyu-bloomberg> (in Ukrainian).

Under pressure from the Trump administration, President Zelenskyy agreed to hold high-level russian-Ukrainian talks. The first round took place in Istanbul on 16 May, the second on 2 June, and the third and final round on 23 July 2025.²⁸ From the viewpoint of the peace process, these talks produced no substantive progress.

Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear that *the russian side was unwilling to make any compromises, particularly with respect to the US initiative for a ceasefire, instead insisting on the fulfilment of its own demands.*²⁹ Putin declared that he agreed in principle to the initiative for a ceasefire, but only if it would «lead to long-term peace and eliminate the root causes of this crisis».³⁰ In practice, russia's negotiation tactics boiled down to delaying the start of a real peace process. Its unacceptable ultimatum demands were accompanied by even more extensive and bloody missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities, which often followed immediately after Trump's telephone talks with putin.

At the third stage (early July – August 2025), Donald Trump attempts (at least verbally) to compel russia to make peace, while relations between the United States and russia grew increasingly strained. Mounting frustration with putin and his tactics of imitating peace talks led US President to announce a 50-day ultimatum to russia at a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 14 July 2025. On 28 July, Trump set a new deadline for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine of 10-12 days,³¹ stressing that «very tough tariffs» could be imposed, affecting all goods and services of russian origin. However,

these statements, along with the symbolic order for two US nuclear-armed submarines to move closer to russian shores, had no effect on the kremlin's position. Trump's peace efforts and ultimatums towards russia were not backed by practical action, in particular, the long-discussed «secondary sanctions» against buyers of russian oil were never applied.³²

On 15 August, Trump met with putin in Alaska. The meeting delivered clear dividends for russia: a) the political isolation of the russian dictator was weakened; b) sanctions against the russian federation were once again postponed; c) putin succeeded in persuading the US president of his logic for ending the war: peace talks without stopping the fighting.

This renewed shift in the American position in favour of the aggressor prompted European leaders to actively forge and promote a common approach towards Washington and consolidate support for Ukraine.³³ On 18 August 2025, Trump met with Zelenskyy, joined by the leaders of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Finland, as well as the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO. The leaders of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe agreed to develop security guarantees for Ukraine akin to those provided under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The working group tasked to develop such guarantees was headed by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Discussions also addressed the sale of US weapons to Ukraine in the amount of \$100 billion, to be financed by European partners. At the same time, sensitive territorial issues were postponed to the next round of talks.

²⁸ These negotiations only produced an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners and the return of the bodies of the dead.

²⁹ Such as demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine, its non-aligned (neutral) status, «protection of the rights» of russian speakers, and official recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts as russian territories.

³⁰ Putin began to set conditions for a ceasefire – Deutsche Welle, 13 March 2025 – <https://www.dw.com/uk/putin-pocav-visuvati-umovi-dla-pripinenna-vognu/a-71915632> (in Ukrainian).

³¹ Putin outlined his demands for ending the war in Ukraine. What about Trump's ultimatum? – BBC News Ukraine, 1 August 2025 – <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c8jp9z2klv8o> (in Ukrainian).

³² Except for India, but according to experts, «secondary sanctions» against this country were primarily due to Trump's personal confrontation with Indian PM Narendra Modi.

³³ Statement by President Macron, Prime Minister Meloni, Chancellor Merz, Prime Minister Starmer, President Stubb, Prime Minister Tusk, President Costa, President von der Leyen – Official website of the EU, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/16/statement-by-president-macron-prime-minister-meloni-chancellor-merz-prime-minister-starmer-president-stubb-prime-minister-tusk-president-costa-president-von-der-leyen/>.

By early September 2025, the issue of security guarantees was discussed at various levels and in multiple formats. These included proposals for establishing a system of legally binding multilateral partnership guarantees at the level of state leaders, strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine and its defence capabilities, and deploying in Ukraine's rear a multinational contingent of several thousand European troops supported by the United States (it should be borne in mind that this refers to peacekeeping measures in the post-war period).

These high-level meetings gave some momentum to the negotiation process, which remains at a bifurcation point, as the main vector – towards peace or continued war – depends on Russia's position. Unfortunately, current statements by Russian officials³⁴ indicate that Moscow remains intent on delaying and obstructing the negotiation process, putting forward a priori unacceptable ultimatum demands, escalating hostilities at the front, and intensifying terror against Ukraine's civilian population.

Overall, it must be stated that the US-initiated peace negotiation process to end the war in Ukraine, launched in February 2025, has thus far produced no positive results. Russia, while imitating peace initiatives, has used the negotiations as a smokescreen to escalate its aggression, with no intention of halting hostilities. Numerous attempts by the United States to appease the aggressor have had the opposite effect. Russia has intensified its terror against Ukraine's civilian population. In particular, on 28 August, the aggressor launched yet another massive strike against Kyiv, employing 629 air-attack assets, which killed 25 and injured 53.

At present, the question of Washington's further course of action remains open. But it is clear that there is no alternative to coercing the aggressor into peace by force. The path to ending the war lies in strengthening sanctions pressure on Russia, expanding and intensifying military-political, financial and economic support for Ukraine, and ensuring reliable security guarantees for Kyiv.

III. UKRAINE'S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION: CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS

2025 became a milestone in the development of relations between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). After more than three years of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the Alliance moved from ad hoc assistance to institutionalised, systematic support. At the same time, however, NATO's current political documents still lack a clear formula for Ukraine's membership, fuelling debates about what lies at the end of the integration tunnel and what the «ceiling» of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration might be.

Following his meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Kyiv on 22 August 2025, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine spoke about security guarantees for Ukraine: «Much of this is based on our cooperation with partners, on our cooperation with NATO, which has already been implemented. The Ukrainian army is highly integrated into the Alliance system. We will certainly continue all practical levels of our cooperation with NATO».³⁵

Some outcomes of the June NATO summit. The NATO summit in The Hague on 24–25 June 2025 was the key event of the year. Despite its shortened format, the Ukrainian issue was ranked high on the agenda. Meaningful meetings were held with NATO and EU leadership, with leaders of EU member states, and the US president. The NATO-Ukraine Council also convened with the participation of the Alliance's foreign ministers.

The Ukrainian delegation expected a clearer signal on membership, but in the final documents, the Alliance focused on practical commitments rather than on political declarations. Under US pressure, the member states' leaders agreed on an ambitious goal: to ensure by 2035 a defence and security expenditure level of 5% of GDP. This means allies are preparing to invest not only in their armed forces, but also in the resilience of their societies, innovation and infrastructure.

³⁴ Russian foreign minister claims Putin is ready to meet Zelenskyy «if all issues are worked out». *Ukrainska Pravda*, 21 August 2025 – <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/08/21/7527188/>.

³⁵ Security guarantees, defence support and diplomatic effort to achieve peace: summary of the meeting between the President of Ukraine and NATO Secretary General. Official website of the President of Ukraine, 22 August 2025 – <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/garantiyi-bezpeki-oboronna-pidtrimka-ta-diplomatichna-robota-99677>.

Moreover, spending on support for Ukraine may be credited towards this quota. Still, the final communiqué contained no direct reference to Ukraine's future membership. Yet it does not signify a halt to Kyiv's Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, *de jure*, the decision of the previous NATO summit in Washington on the irreversibility of Ukraine's accession remains in force.

So, what did Ukraine gain as a practical outcome of the NATO summit in The Hague? The Alliance adopted a historic decision to increase defence spending to 5% of each country's GDP on national defence and security, dividing this figure as follows:

- ✓ 3.5% – direct defence activities (military, weapons, ammunition);
- ✓ 1.5% – defence / security-related sectors (cybersecurity, infrastructure, roads, communication, dual-use facilities).

The main outcome for Kyiv is that assistance to Ukraine can be credited towards these indicators. This strengthens NATO's financial capabilities and creates additional resources to help Ukraine. Despite differing views, the Alliance reaffirmed its unconditional support for Ukraine and the principle of collective defence – Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This provided Kyiv with confidence in the long-term solidarity of its allies. At the summit, it was stated that support for Ukraine remained «ironclad».

Defence-related expenditures for Ukraine, as part of NATO member states' commitments, creates an incentive for further expansion of aid packages. After all, in The Hague, the emphasis was placed on defence industrial cooperation both within NATO and in partnership with Ukraine. NATO stressed the need to remove trade barriers, stimulate innovation and strengthen defence production.

This will enable Ukraine to engage in larger-scale projects for the production of equipment, ammunition, materials and armaments together with European and American industries in line with NATO standards. Overall, the results of the NATO summit in The Hague indicate financial stability, the setting of strategic priorities, political consolidation, and industrial prospects, including increased production and reduced administrative barriers.

New NATO military assistance mechanism for Ukraine. As noted, in 2025, a new NATO collective mechanism, PURL (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) was introduced to systematise and coordinate military assistance to Ukraine.

The essence of PURL is a list of the priority needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, developed in close cooperation between Kyiv and NATO headquarters (NSATU – NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine in Wiesbaden, Germany). It records Ukraine's most urgent requests: air defence systems (Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T), missiles, ammunition, drones, electronic warfare equipment, as well as repair and logistics needs. Allies have access to this list and «cover» specific items through their contributions or through joint financing.

How PURL works:

1. Ukraine submits its needs (for example, Patriot systems + missiles for them).
2. NSATU verifies and agrees on priorities.
3. NATO member states commit to covering specific items.
4. Procurement can be made either directly or through special funds (for example, NATO trust funds or bilateral agreements).

Features of PURL:

- ✓ **Collective approach.** This is not a set of separate initiatives by individual countries, but a single «basket» of needs.
- ✓ **Transparency.** Allies see exactly what Ukraine needs and can make prompt decisions.
- ✓ **Accelerated deliveries.** Thanks to PURL, a mechanism of regular «large assistance packages» was launched in August 2025.
- ✓ **Flexibility.** The programme allows allied funds to be used for the purchase of American weapons.

For Kyiv, the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List is the first ever instrument that has provided standardised form and regularity to

external military assistance. With PURL, this assistance has become part of NATO's official budgetary commitments. In effect, it is a «bridge» to Ukraine's full integration into the Alliance's defence planning.

The practical dimension of cooperation was reinforced by the launch and deployment of the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) in Wiesbaden, Germany. This coordination centre has become the main hub for aligning Ukraine's military requests with the capabilities of its allies.

In 2025, it was through NSATU that «large assistance packages» – substantial consignments of weapons and ammunition – began to be delivered. For example, in August 2025, NATO announced the delivery of American equipment financed by the Netherlands, as well as a joint Scandinavian package worth \$500 million, with a focus on air defence, ammunition and spare parts. This is no longer a one-off action, but a systematic mechanism of support.

Air defence remains a key area. Following devastating Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, NATO and individual allies decided to transfer additional Patriot systems to Ukraine. Allies coordinated among themselves who could transfer systems and under what terms, as well as how to replenish missile stocks. Part of the battery was deployed in Poland to protect supply routes into Ukraine.

Joint NATO-Ukraine structures. The first joint NATO-Ukraine structure – JATEC – was launched recently to analyse combat experience from the war, provide training and education, and develop recommendations in the fields of strategy, policy, tactics and operations. JATEC is a Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre located in Bydgoszcz, Poland.

JATEC's initial operational capability was achieved in January 2025, with full capability expected by the end of 2025. The Centre's staff includes representatives of both NATO and Ukraine. The purpose of JATEC is to

collect and systematise experience from the war with Russia, deepen interoperability, and provide analytical, educational and training support covering both military and civilian aspects. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, «This is a symbol of solidarity between NATO and Ukraine... JATEC will help improve the interoperability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the Alliance».³⁶

In 2025, the transfer of modern aircraft to Ukraine continued. The Netherlands delivered a new batch of F-16s, and France provided Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Formally, these are bilateral initiatives, but coordination took place in the broader context of NATO support.

The Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) remains an important instrument. By the summer of 2025, contributions to its trust fund exceeded €1 billion. Through this mechanism, Ukraine received not only non-lethal assistance – fuel, medical supplies, spare parts – but also resources for rebuilding critical infrastructure. Despite major achievements, the cooperation faced challenges, such as uncertainty over the fund's participants, shortages of ammunition and air defence systems, and other deficits.

Paths and prospects for NATO-Ukraine partnership. In the current conditions, it is crucial to maintain a balance between reality and expectations. Efforts should focus on several key areas to make cooperation even more effective: making maximum use of NSATU mechanisms, developing domestic repair and production hubs, synchronising standards and criteria with NATO, and engaging more actively with public opinion within the Alliance.

Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in 2025 has been dual in nature. On the one hand, Kyiv is receiving an unprecedented level of practical support, ranging from air defence systems to billion-dollar financial packages. On the other hand, the political prospect of membership remains uncertain. For Ukraine, this means the need to prove its ability not only be a recipient of assistance but also an

³⁶ Ukraine and NATO outline JATEC priorities for 2026. Website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 9 July 2025 – <https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/ukraine-and-nato-outline-jatec-priorities-for-2026>.

active participant and contributor to collective security.

The next summit in Turkey (Ankara, 7–8 July 2026) will be an important milestone in Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. The country can expect the deepening of financial and security agreements with NATO and its member states on a bilateral basis. Since the Hague summit laid the groundwork for increased defence budgets, Ankara is likely to become the venue for the first major progress report on defence spending, and for the announcement of new aid packages and coalition initiatives, particularly in air and missile defences and other defence domains.

Consolidation of defence initiatives must be translated into concrete results. Issues of joint production, logistical problems and repair and training infrastructure development are expected to come to the forefront – areas where Ukraine will present its own initiatives and programmes. While the question of Ukraine's NATO membership remains open, the Ankara summit may launch a more concrete discussion on standards and criteria that Ukraine must meet, along with a timetable for further integration steps.

As noted, Ukraine, the leaders of European states, the United States and Canada are discussing formalised security guarantees for Ukraine, modelled on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but without full integration into the Alliance. While attending Kyiv in August 2025, NATO Secretary General noted that consultations are underway on the format of such guarantees. In the context of possible peace initiatives, President Zelenskyy emphasised that Russia cannot be part of discussions on security guarantees, since it is an aggressor.³⁷

Ukraine expects the swiftest possible formalisation of such guarantees. The Hague summit provided financial, military-political and industrial support. In turn, Ankara may become a platform for consolidating this support and clarifying the Alliance's vision for Ukraine's future NATO membership.

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the wake of a full-scale war, Ukraine's domestic situation, its foreign policy position and its standing on the international stage are largely shaped by the state and prospects of its partnership with the EU, the US and NATO. These vectors of national diplomacy carry priority status, strategic significance and geopolitical weight. Yet, in light of current realities, it is necessary to acknowledge certain disturbing trends and processes. In particular, from a formal standpoint, the June summits of the EU and NATO reflected a phase of «integration uncertainty» along both the European and Euro-Atlantic tracks. Furthermore, Kyiv's relations with Washington have been fundamentally reshaped by new US policy.

In view of this, the priority tasks of Ukrainian diplomacy include deepening military-political, economic and socio-cultural partnership with the EU; eliminating delays in the implementation of planned European integration reforms; focusing joint efforts with partners on advancing the EU accession negotiations; and neutralising the negative impact of the «Hungarian factor». Intensifying pragmatic dialogue with Washington and taking full advantage of certain positive trends in US policy towards Ukraine is also on the agenda. It is equally important to advance military-technical cooperation with the United States, implement joint economic initiatives, and coordinate efforts within the peace negotiation process. In turn, practical integration into the North Atlantic Alliance and further consolidation of international military assistance, including in light of the NATO Hague summit decisions to increase member states' military spending, are of particular importance. Key tasks include the effective implementation of the new NATO arms procurement mechanism for Ukraine and logistical support for deliveries.

Some specific measures and steps for building partnerships in the above areas are outlined below.

³⁷ Zelenskyy on security guarantees for Russia: I don't know who is threatening them. Ukrinform, 22 August 2025 – <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/4028454-zelenskij-pro-garantii-bezpeki-dla-rosii-ne-znau-hto-im-zagrozue.html> (in Ukrainian).

European integration. The following should be highlighted among the priorities of Ukraine's partnership with the EU.

First. Ensuring the accelerated integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the European one. In particular, this includes: a) stepping up Ukraine's practical participation in EU defence programmes and projects – the long-term Rearm Europe Plan, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the Security Action for Europe programme, the European Defence Fund for strengthening defence capabilities, and others; b) giving concrete substance to a range of agreements, arrangements and memoranda adopted within the framework of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forums, including cooperation with the European Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association, and the launch of a new joint EU-Ukraine initiative – BraveTech EU – for the development of new security technologies and systems; c) implementing projects for the supply of weapons and joint production by the Ukrainian defence industry and leading European defence industry corporations. This specifically includes executing a three-year joint plan with Germany (IRIS-T systems), agreements with Norway's company Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace (production of NASAMS systems), and Spain's Escribano Mechanical and Engineering. It also involves establishing production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark under the Build with Ukraine initiative, along with similar projects with defence companies in France, Czechia, Sweden and other EU countries.

Second. Accumulating EU budgetary and financial support. In particular, it is imperative to ensure the fulfilment of the indicators of the Ukraine Facility Plan to secure quarterly financial tranches from the EU (total funding in 2025 amounts to €12.5 billion). Key agenda items include the election of judges to the High Anti-Corruption Court, adoption of laws on decentralisation, digitisation of enforcement proceedings, revision of judges' integrity declarations, and other related measures.

Third. Focusing joint efforts with European partners on opening EU membership negotiations in 2025, during Denmark's EU presidency. On the one hand, this involves the effective implementation of a set of pre-accession pro-European reforms (including

the European Commission's recommendations in the 2024 EU Enlargement Package) and incorporation of the results of screening sessions evaluating Ukraine legislation's compliance with EU law into the national legal framework. Priority steps must be taken in the most sensitive areas – enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption bodies and the law enforcement system as a whole (including amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to ensure efficient investigation of corruption cases). Judicial reform is also critical, including proper participation of external experts in competitive procedures, filling vacancies in the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Justice, urgently rebooting the Supreme Court, and setting up specialised administrative courts. Equally important is implementing government-approved road-maps to strengthen the rule of law, support democratic institutions and reform public administration.

On the other hand, working with European partners to overcome the negative impact of the «Hungarian factor» and to open negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU under the «Fundamentals» cluster is critical.

Therefore, given the current foreign policy realities, the main vector of Ukrainian diplomacy is to strengthen military-political, financial and economic partnership with the EU, while achieving productive integration into the European community.

US-Ukraine cooperation. In the short-term, relations Kyiv and Washington are likely to take the form of a limited strategic partnership, characterised by a certain degree of volatility and instability. In this context, Ukraine's diplomatic priorities in the American track are as follows.

First. Ensuring pragmatic dialogue with the US president, taking into account his psychological traits and interests. An important element here is expanding communication with the White House administration at various levels, conveying objective information to Trump's entourage, and communicating Kyiv's position regarding the achievement of a lasting and just peace for Ukraine.

Second. Promoting approaches shared with European partners and a unified, consolidated

European position aimed at ensuring fair conditions for ending the war and providing Ukraine with reliable and effective security guarantees.

Third. Prioritising a stable supply of American weapons and equipment funded by European partners (under the PURL initiative), expanding these supplies in terms of quantity and quality. On the other hand, it is essential to create conditions for obtaining American weapons paid for with Ukrainian funds and lifting restrictions on their use on the territory of the aggressor. This objective will be facilitated by US-Ukraine agreements on the delivery of modern Ukrainian weapons, particularly drones, to the United States, and by the introduction of exchanges of combat experience from the Russia-Ukraine war, cyber defence, intelligence data, etc. Equally relevant is attracting US investment in Ukraine's advanced defence companies, gaining access to cutting-edge American technologies and reserves of essential components for modern weapons production. In turn, Americans will gain access to Ukrainian start-ups and have the opportunity to test them in battlefield conditions.

Fourth. Fully promoting economic cooperation within the framework of the Agreement on the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund. The Fund's activities can be used both for joint investments and as a mechanism for settlements relating to the supply of modern American weapons. It is

necessary to expedite the conclusion and implementation of joint projects in the field of mineral extraction, and to ensure effective implementation of decisions adopted by the Board of the US-Ukraine Fund.

Euro-Atlantic integration. Amid the full-scale war, it is crucial to make effective use of the NATO-led collective procurement mechanism for Ukraine (PURL), in order to meet the most urgent needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — namely air defence systems (Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T), missiles, ammunition, drones, electronic warfare equipment, repair and logistics.

Active use of NATO-Ukraine Council mechanisms to coordinate actions on the international stage, identify directions and priorities for domestic reforms in Ukraine, and jointly monitor the effectiveness of their implementation, including within the framework of the adapted Annual National Programme for 2025, is also on the agenda.

It is equally important to make sure that bilateral intergovernmental agreements on long-term cooperation in the field of security with the Alliance countries have meaningful content — specific projects and practical agreements for the development of military-technical partnership. It is necessary to accelerate the creation of proper conditions for expanding cooperation between the Ukrainian defence industry and those of NATO countries.