

**PUBLIC COUNCIL AT
THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF UKRAINE**



Razumkov
centre



**Hanns
Seidel
Stiftung**

UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT STATE, TRENDS, PROSPECTS

Expert opinions and positions

October 2024



UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT STATE, TRENDS, PROSPECTS

(Expert opinions and positions)

The expert survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre and the Public Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine with the support of the Hanns Seidel Stiftung focuses on the factors influencing Ukraine's foreign policy position, prospects and peculiarities of national diplomacy and its important component – European and Euro-Atlantic integration.¹

In the course of the survey, experts assessed the nature and impact of global trends, the level and effectiveness of foreign assistance, identifying the countries that are most helpful in countering Russian aggression. Respondents described the effectiveness of Ukraine promoting its interests and initiatives globally, as well as the state and problems of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Quite interesting are the expert opinions on the timeframe for Ukraine's EU and NATO accession.

The results of the expert survey give grounds for the following generalisations and conclusions.

FOREIGN POLICY PROCESSES AND TRENDS: CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO UKRAINE

Ukrainian diplomacy in war operates against the backdrop and under the influence of dynamic foreign events, fast-moving global and regional processes that pose challenges and threats to Ukraine. What external factors have the most negative impact on Ukraine? According to experts, first and foremost, it is **problems with supplying military aid** (4.5 points).² In the critical phase of a large-scale war, this is a top priority. The allied countries do provide crucial military support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), but they also limit Ukraine's defence potential and complicate the situation at the front because of a) metered and slow deliveries of weapons; b) unresolved issue of using their long-range weapons on the aggressor's territory; c) refusal to help destroy Russian missiles and drones on Ukraine's western borders; d) Hungary's continued blocking of EU military and financial support to Kyiv, etc.

Complicated pre-election situation in the United States and the uncertainty of Washington's future foreign course (4.2 points) is seen by experts as another unfavourable external factor. The dynamics of US internal processes pose a serious challenge, with the US presidential race being strategically important for both Ukraine and global politics in general. For Ukraine, it is crucial because Washington delivers a significant share of military and financial assistance, while serving an integrating centre of the international opposition to Russian aggression in Ukraine. In this regard, the contradictory position of presidential candidate Donald Trump on the ways and means of ending the Ukraine war cannot but cause concern. For Ukraine, it is vital that the official Washington continued its pro-Ukrainian course after the presidential election and maintained bipartisan support for Kyiv in repelling Russian aggression.

Then, experts note the **inability of global and regional security structures to prevent the escalation of conflicts globally, in particular,**

¹ The expert survey was carried out from 30 September through 10 October 2024 within the framework of the project «Expert and analytical support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in the context of developing public diplomacy and promoting the dialogue between government and society» with the support of the Hanns Seidel Stiftung Ukraine. 69 experts from different regions of Ukraine and Kyiv city, including MPs, representatives of ministries, regional authorities, governmental and non-governmental research institutions, university professors, independent experts, and scholars were surveyed.

² Experts were asked to assess the impact on a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where «1» means no impact, «5» means a very strong impact.

to stop russian aggression (3.9 points). The dangerous devaluation of global and regional security structures is becoming increasingly obvious, and the Ukraine war has proved their inability to adequately respond to russian aggression and stop the occupiers' crimes in Ukraine. The activities of the key security structure, the UN Security Council, regarding Ukraine have been effectively blocked by the aggressor, which has turned the UNSC into a «discussion platform», a tribune for spreading fakes, outright lies and absurd statements. The OSCE is also in crisis, and its efforts to stop the war on the continent failed to change Moscow's aggressive policy.

Experts also mention the negative factor of the **aggravation of political, social and economic situation in Europe coupled with the growing «fatigue» from the Ukraine war and the activation of right-wing forces (3.9 points).** These trends are caused by war-induced economic problems, social stratification, various internal political factors, and migration pressure, including the massive inflow of refugees from Ukraine. It is the socio-economic issues, such as gradual accumulation of «resource fatigue» in the EU economy and the migration factor that give rise to populism and political turbulence and catalyse complications and crises in the European community. For Ukraine, this factor is especially significant ahead of the start of the EU accession negotiations.

Respondents believe that **polarisation of the international community with deepening global confrontation between the democratic world and the camp of authoritarian states** (3.8 points) also has a significant negative impact. It is no coincidence that experts noted this dangerous trend. Recently, there has been notable ideological, political, and economic divide between the Western democracies (the US, EU, and NATO) and the camp of countries with authoritarian/totalitarian drift, the cult of personality, and disregard for human rights (Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, Iran, and Syria). Military-political cooperation and coordination between the latter has intensified. There are apparent attempts to transform BRICS from «non-Western» into «anti-Western» union. This polarisation of the world community is gaining momentum and is turning into a

leading geopolitical trend that will determine the peculiarities and dynamics of global developments in the near future.

In the list of factors, experts also note the unfavourable trend of **initiating plans to end the Ukraine war that do not meet Ukraine's interests (3.6 points).** This is not accidental, given that pseudo-peacekeeping populist rhetoric has recently intensified in the global discourse, and various plans and initiatives have been articulated calling for a freeze in hostilities in favour of the aggressor at the expense of Ukraine's interests. In particular, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in September, China and Brazil initiated the so-called Friends of Peace platform. This «6-point consensus» is essentially an attempt to create an alternative plan to the Ukrainian Peace Formula that is favourable to the aggressor, thus torpedoing the second Peace Summit. At the same time, mediation peacekeeping services are offered by India, the UAE, Austria, and some other countries, making further promotion of the Ukrainian peace plan even more urgent.

Experts are somewhat more reserved in assessing the impact of factors related to the war in the Middle East (3.2 points), the threat of a conflict over Taiwan (3.2 points), and the unfriendly policy of the Hungarian leadership (3.2 points). However, it is clear that these factors directly or indirectly affect the ability of allied countries to provide military and financial assistance to Ukraine.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE

Since the outbreak of the large-scale war, the Ukrainian diplomacy's main priority has been to attract external support and accumulate the necessary military, financial, logistical resources to resist Russia's armed intervention. At the same time, ensuring political and diplomatic solidarity from the international community, strengthening the sanctions front against the aggressor, providing assistance to Ukrainian refugees, and the like are also of major importance. How effective is foreign aid to Ukraine during the war? In general, expert assessments are mostly restrained. It should be noted that findings of the present expert survey are generally in line with the

data from previous Razumkov Centre studies.³ This means that the problems identified by experts have become sustainable.

Experts are the most positive about **assistance to Ukrainian refugees (4.2 points)**.⁴ In this regard, it is worth recalling that back in March 2022, the EU Council enacted the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainian citizens in the EU territory. This mechanism provides for access to the labour market, housing, social security, healthcare and education for Ukrainians temporarily residing in EU countries. On 25 June 2024, the EU Council decided to extend the temporary protection regime for Ukrainian refugees until 4 March 2026. Currently, more than 4 million Ukrainian citizens are staying in the EU.

Experts are also generally positive about **external financial assistance, including macro-financial tranches, loans (4 points)**. Unfortunately, the war has turned Ukraine into a major recipient of donor assistance; therefore, financial tranches from partner countries currently cover about one-third of Ukraine's budget expenditures, the lion's share of which is defence spending. Since February 2022, budgetary assistance from the EU has totalled €32 billion, plus \$23 billion from the US. This external support is literally vital as it helps maintain social and economic stability and provide the necessary funding for the social sector. The total amount of aid from Brussels now stands at €118 billion.⁵ Significant share of external support also comes from the United States. The Ukraine Facility plan for 2024-2027 worth €50 billion also deserves special mention, but the issue of confiscating the aggressor's frozen assets worth about €300 billion remains open.

Humanitarian aid scored 3.9 points. This is a very important area given Ukraine's enormous financial and economic losses, with more than 30% of the national economy destroyed, 3.5 million jobs lost, and more

than 20% of the territory occupied. According to the World Bank, about 29% of Ukraine's population is living in poverty due to the war.⁶ Consequently, humanitarian aid is provided as supplies from partners, through international organisations and foundations. In this context, it is worth mentioning the allies' significant assistance in restoring Ukraine's energy infrastructure and helping to prepare for the winter. In particular, since February 2022, the European Commission has allocated €843 million for humanitarian aid programmes in Ukraine.

Experts give **3.8 points to political solidarity and support for Ukraine on international platforms**. Since the onset of Russian intervention in February 2014, the countries of the collective West and international institutions have proclaimed and implemented a policy of condemning Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine. In 2014-2024, the EU, NATO, G7, UNGA, PACE, and OSCE bodies adopted various resolutions demanding to stop the Russian intervention, withdraw the occupation forces, and ensure the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The partner countries: a) support Ukraine's position on international platforms in solidarity; b) promote Ukrainian initiatives on the global stage; c) undertake efforts to politically isolate the aggressor, etc.

Effectiveness of military assistance, including supply of weapons, military equipment and machinery for the AFU scored 3.5 points. As noted above, the problem of regular and timely supply of weapons in the required quantity and nomenclature remains highly relevant and prioritised. In the President of Ukraine's Victory Plan, military and technical support from the West is the key, and so is the effective and unrestricted use of the full range of Western weapons provided to Ukraine. Modernisation and development of the Ukrainian military industrial complex and its effective integration into the EU defence industry is another priority.

³ Strategic partners of Ukraine (realities and priorities in war). National Security & Defence, No. 3-4 2023, p. 92-110 – https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/10/11/NSD193-194_2023_ukr_all.pdf (in Ukrainian).

⁴ The assistance was assessed on a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where «1» means that the assistance is completely ineffective, «5» – very effective.

⁵ EU has already provided EUR 118 bn in aid to Ukraine – EC Vice-President. Interfax, 17 September 2024 – <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/1014293.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁶ Almost one-third of Ukraine's population lives in poverty – World Bank. European Pravda, 31 May 2024 – <https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2024/05/31/714505/> (in Ukrainian).

Experts are quite reserved in assessing other areas of support, such as **assistance in implementing reforms in Ukraine (3.5 points), assistance in rebuilding destroyed facilities in Ukraine (3 points), and imposing sanctions against the aggressor (2.5 points)**. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that the collective West and various international institutions have imposed different sanctions since 2014, which have been updated and expanded over time. Today, Russia is the most sanctioned country in the world, with roughly 17,000 individual and sectoral sanctions imposed against the aggressor.⁷ According to various estimates, the Russian economy has lost \$400 billion, but unfortunately, the sanctions are quite limited, and the entire sanctions coalition only includes about 40 countries. In the meantime, Moscow has arranged work-arounds for the supply of dual-use products from China and other Asian countries. So, in a general sense, the current international sanctions policy towards Russia has not caused economic problems large enough to force the Kremlin to stop its aggression in Ukraine.

Respondents are mostly sceptical about **international organisations' assistance to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression**. Some exceptions include the EU (4.1 points), the IMF (3.6), NATO (3.4) and the Council of Europe (3). It should be recalled that Russia was expelled from the PACE back in March 2023, but this had no effect on the aggressor. Nonetheless, these bodies and their member states have demonstrated consistent solidarity and support for Ukraine – military, financial, political and diplomatic, etc.

Other international institutions have been disappointing and ineffective in helping Ukraine. The surveyed experts were quite negative about the International Committee of the Red Cross (2 points) and the IAEA (2.1 points), but their biggest criticism is towards specialised security structures. The experts gave 1.9 points to the assistance provided by the OSCE and the UN. Such low scores are explained by the failure of these organisations to respond

adequately to Russian aggression. As mentioned above, the UNSC and the OSCE activities regarding Ukraine were effectively blocked by the aggressor's veto power. The UN and ICRC humanitarian missions have no access to the occupied territories. Moreover, Red Cross officials assume an attitude that is unacceptable to Ukraine regarding the aggressor and its crimes.⁸ In its turn, the IAEA has de facto no control over the situation surrounding the Zaporizhzhia NPP seized by Russian troops. Also, due to objective circumstances and geo-political factors, the influence and assistance to Ukraine from such regional entities as the BSEC is unsatisfactory.

It is rather interesting to assess assistance of individual countries to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. Out of suggested list of 36 countries, experts identify the following range of countries that, in their opinion, are most helpful to Ukraine.

The experts first of all note **the United States (94.2%), the United Kingdom (87%), Germany (79.7%), Lithuania (62.3%), the Netherlands (56.5%), Poland (55.1%), Estonia (55.1%), Denmark (46.4%), Czechia (40.6%), Latvia (39.1%), France (39.1%), Canada (29%), Sweden (23.2%), Romania (17.4%), and Japan (15.9%)**.

Such expert assessments are apparently influenced by information on the transfer of regular military and financial assistance packages to Kyiv. In this context, it is worth mentioning the September statement by the US President about a record-breaking aid package to Ukraine worth \$8 billion, as well as reports of recent military aid from Berlin and London, the delivery of the first F-16s from the Netherlands, active assistance from the Baltic states to name a few.

This hierarchy of allied countries assisting Ukraine is noteworthy, but the following important circumstances should be borne in mind. *First*, it is clearly not an exhaustive list, because other EU countries and European

⁷ Website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Prime Minister: Ukraine, together with partners, seeks to develop a unified legal framework for the confiscation of Russian assets, 27 February 2024 – <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/premier-ministr-ukraina-razom-iz-partneramy-prahne-napratsiuvaty-iedynu-iurydychnu-ramku-dlia-konfiskatsii-rosiiskyykh-aktyviv> (in Ukrainian)

⁸ International Red Cross has turned into advocate for Russia – Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner. *Ukrainska Pravda*, 27 April 2024 – <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/27/7453305/>

states, as well as South Korea, Australia, Argentina and many others should be added to the group. 50 countries that are members of the Ramstein Group speaks volumes. So, experts basically define the hierarchy of countries that help Ukraine most in the military, financial and economic spheres, but it is obvious that political and diplomatic solidarity and support on international platforms are also vital for Ukraine.

Second, the geopolitical situation around the Ukraine war is changing dynamically, and so is the coalition of allied countries. Yet one should remember that **in the context of the war that threatens national statehood and sovereignty, the nature and level of support for Ukraine by a particular nation is the main criterion for the state of bilateral relations and partnership outlooks.**

Nowadays, different countries have different positions and attitudes towards the war in Ukraine and, accordingly, different behaviours – from unconditional comprehensive support and assistance to distancing and disengagement from events in Ukraine.⁹

UKRAINIAN INITIATIVES: DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS

Among the variety of Ukrainian initiatives promoted globally, experts focused on two key areas – concluding bilateral security cooperation agreements with different countries and promoting the Peace Formula with a view to holding the second Peace Summit tentatively at the end of 2024. So, it is about expanding military and technical partnership with allied countries and building cooperation in the security sector, and about forcing the aggressor to peace using political and diplomatic instruments.

As of October 2024, Ukraine has signed 27 bilateral security cooperation agreements – 7 with the G7 countries, 19 with the states that once joined the Vilnius Declaration, and one with the EU.¹⁰ Among the most recent signings

is the agreement with Greece signed on 17 October 2024. Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and other countries have also joined the declaration.

In general, these agreements provide for developing partnership in various security areas, including support for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO; assistance in building modern, NATO-compatible defence forces; modernisation of Ukraine's defence industry; intelligence sharing; cooperation in cyber security; strengthening macroeconomic stability; economic recovery of Ukraine and assistance in continuing reforms; sanctions against Russia, etc. It should also be added that, in a general sense, these documents reinforce and expand the legal framework of relations with partner countries.

Will these bilateral security cooperation agreements help Ukraine to counter Russian aggression? Most respondents (69.5%) believe that these agreements will help Ukraine one way or another, while 18.8% are cautious about the practical results of Ukraine concluding such bilateral agreements. When analysing expert assessments, several important circumstances should be borne in mind.

First, the very title of most agreements suggests that they are not about security guarantees, but rather about security cooperation and long-term support for Ukraine. The formalisation of partners' commitments is intended to reduce the risk of «political storms» in these countries, given the protracted nature of the war, the rise of right-wing forces in Europe, and the experience of 6-months wait for an aid package from the US.

Second, these agreements are not ratified by the parliaments of the signatory states. And, as known, it is difficult to guarantee the implementation of political agreements in the long term. So, it is an open question whether these agreements will be enough to support Ukraine until it joins NATO. For Ukraine, the signing of such bilateral documents means

⁹ For more detail, see Ukraine's Foreign Policy in the Context of Geopolitical Processes, Razumkov Centre, February 2024 – <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/04/12/2024-PAKT-5.pdf>.

¹⁰ At the NATO Summit in Vilnius on 12 July 2023, the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries agreed on a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. The text of this declaration was supported by the G7 – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as the leaders of the European Council and the European Commission.

political, material and moral support with long-term results. Therefore, Kyiv's key task is to build its own security capabilities.

Most experts (62.3%) are positive or rather positive about the Ukrainian leadership's plans to hold the second Peace Summit at the end of 2024. However, 26.1% of respondents are sceptical about such plans. In this context, it is worth recalling that after the first Peace Summit (15-16 June, Switzerland), 94 countries and organisations did sign a joint communiqué, which, however, addressed only 3 of the 10 points of the Ukrainian Peace Formula – nuclear and food security and the release of Ukrainian prisoners and deportees, including children.

Ukrainian diplomats are currently working at various levels to organise the second Peace Summit. Various consultations and talks are underway to formalise the Peace Formula components. In particular, on 4 September 2024, an online conference was held on the Food Security clause, bringing together 75 partner countries and international organisations from all over the world. Ukraine seeks to elaborate a joint plan for implementing all the points of the Peace Formula shortly and hold the second Peace Summit in one of the Global South countries at the end of 2024. This is because this region is currently the scene of a sharp confrontation between the alliance of democratic countries and the camp of authoritarian states.

However, it is clear that organising a second summit now will be a real challenge due to a number of factors such as complicated pre-election situation in the United States and the uncertainty of Washington's position after elections, and the growing demand in the global discourse for an early end to the war along with the emergence of the pseudo-peacekeeping initiatives mentioned above. At the same time, it is also clear that these factors are forcing Ukraine and its partners to step up the promotion of the Ukrainian model of achieving sustainable peace among the international community.

In simple terms, Kyiv's position is that its Peace Formula should be the basis for a just peace, and the recently presented Victory Plan addressed to the allies should create conditions for forcing Russia to negotiate.

SOME ASPECTS OF UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

Ukraine's foreign policy has the EU and NATO integration as one of its strategic priorities. The overwhelming majority of **experts (82.6%) positively assess the Ukrainian government's European integration policy**. The reasons for such assessment include the country's persistent pro-European reform efforts in various areas, deepening sectoral cooperation with Brussels and implementation of the Association Agreement provisions despite the large-scale war. After receiving the candidate status and a package of recommendations from the European Commission in June 2022, Ukraine literally activated the «turbo mode» of its pro-European transformations. Over the past two years, the country adopted packages of basic laws to adapt national legislation to European norms in various areas; renewed and rebooted the highest judicial bodies and anti-corruption institutions; and ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Roadmaps for public administration and rule of law reform are currently being prepared.

Expert opinions and assessments generally indicate that the current government has succeeded in consolidating the efforts of the state and civil society towards Ukraine's accession to the EU. Meanwhile, Russian aggression has de facto accelerated Ukraine's European integration processes and contributed to the nation's pro-European unification. The war has entrenched in Ukrainian society the idea that there is no alternative and no reversibility in the country's movement towards the EU.

Currently, an active preparatory period is underway to put the membership talks into practice. A series of inter-ministerial meetings have been held to implement the European Commission's recommendations. In September, Brussels hosted the EU-Ukraine screening sessions on Economic Criteria, Financial Control, Public Administration Reform, and Functioning of Democratic Institutions, dedicated to the key negotiation cluster of the EU Accession Process. There are grounds to believe that concrete negotiations on Ukraine's accession will begin in early 2025 during Poland's EU presidency.

Yet it is clear that this final stage of the country's EU accession process will be neither easy nor smooth. The progress towards the European community is slowed down by various factors, among which **77% of the surveyed experts primarily point to internal problems** (insufficient pace of reforms, inadequate fight against corruption, etc.) In this regard, there have been some positive developments in the fight against corruption in recent years, including updating and rebooting of the system of anti-corruption institutions, as well as approving the new state anti-corruption programme. From 2013 to 2023, Ukraine slowly improved its position in the Corruption Perceptions Index by 11 points, and now ranks 104th out of 180 countries.¹¹ However, the problem of curbing corruption remains high on the agenda. It has become particularly acute in war and requires the government and society to focus their efforts.

It is quite logical that **65% of experts name Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine**, the occupation of parts of its territories, and massive socio-economic and human losses as external factors that hinder European integration. Russian expansion is obviously the most dangerous external factor. *First*, Kyiv has to channel enormous political, diplomatic, financial, economic, and human resources on countering Russian intervention. These resources could be effectively deployed on the European integration front. *Second*, the war slowed down the pace of reforms within the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. *Third*, the war has reduced the interest of European business partners in developing contacts with the warring country given the obvious risks and dangers to prospective investments and business. *Fourth*, the war has turned Ukraine into a major recipient of international donor aid. In the context of long war of attrition and limited domestic resources, European integration is implemented on a reduced scale.¹²

In turn, **60.9% of experts mention the obstruction of Ukraine's European integration by certain EU countries** as a negative factor. This clearly refers to official Budapest that

pursues an openly unfriendly policy towards Ukraine and its European movement and hinders EU military and financial assistance to Kyiv in every possible way, abusing the veto power and the consensus principle in EU decision-making. Hungary never mentioned the Ukraine war as a priority of its current EU presidency. Meanwhile, when talking about negotiating prospects, Ukraine will not only have to deal with the «Hungarian factor» but also face complex issues and demands from other EU members, particularly its Eastern European neighbours.

Other problems pose lesser threat to Ukraine's European integration. In particular, only 27.5% of respondents noted the negative impact of the aggravation of the internal socio-economic situation in the EU; 23.2% noted negative geopolitical and geo-economic trends in the world; and 20.3% noted the weakness of the Ukrainian government's European integration policy.

Quite interesting are the expert opinions on the timeframe for Ukraine's EU accession. Thus, 2.9% of experts are quite optimistic, believing that Ukraine will join the EU within 1-3 years. On the other hand, 13% mention a longer-term perspective of 3-5 years. Still, the majority of respondents (59.4%) are convinced that Ukraine will join the EU in 5-10 years. Additional 14.5% believe that joining the EU is realistic in 10-20 years. A statistically insignificant share of respondents (1.4%) think that this will never happen.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that other countries' experiences of the EU accession negotiations are quite specific and diverse and should hardly be used to estimate the duration of Ukraine's accession process. On the other hand, European integration in the settings of a large-scale war is unprecedented in the history of the European Union. At the same time, it is already clear that the following will have a major impact on the duration of membership talks: Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine; resolution of internal problems, including the fight against corruption, and progress on the path of European reforms; the parties'

¹¹ Corruption Perceptions Index 23. Ukrinform, 20 April 2024 – <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3854442-indeks-sprijnatta-korupcii-2023.html> (in Ukrainian).

¹² For more detail, see: European Integration in Times of War: Challenges and Prospects. Razumkov Centre, December 2022 – <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2022/12/28/2022-MATRA-IV-KVARTAL-7.pdf>.

ability to compromise in various areas during the negotiations; internal political, social and economic trends in the EU.

Meanwhile, experts are somewhat less optimistic about the timing of Ukraine's accession to NATO. The overall picture of forecasts regarding Euro-Atlantic integration is as follows: 8.7% of respondents believe that Ukraine will join the Alliance within 1-3 years, while 14.5% are convinced that it will happen in 3-5 years. The largest share of experts (36.2%) is focused on a 5-10-year period. But in total, almost 60% of the surveyed experts are convinced that NATO accession will happen within the next 10 years. It is also worth noting that as many as 21.7% of respondents refrained from answering the question about the likely timing of Ukraine's NATO membership.

It is clear that Ukraine's accession to the Alliance depends on the cessation of Russian aggression, because NATO countries will hardly support Ukraine's membership during the active phase of the war. On the other hand, deepening partnership and intensifying Euro-Atlantic integration is a key factor in countering Russian aggression. It is precisely Ukraine's approximation to the Alliance, including the invitation to join, that is a key component of the Victory Plan promoted by the Ukrainian side among its allies. Current problems and difficulties on the path to the Alliance are not insurmountable, but it is also clear that there is no alternative to Ukraine's NATO membership.

SUMMARY: SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS¹³

The survey findings reflect some important features of the current foreign policy situation. *First*, among the unfavourable external trends and events, experts highlight the chronic problems with the supply of military aid to Ukraine. *Second*, experts are quite cautious in assessing the assistance from international institutions, especially from specialised security bodies. *Third*, official Kyiv's initiatives to promote the Peace Formula and conclude

long-term security cooperation agreements with partner countries are generally welcomed by experts. And *fourth*, the expert community is largely optimistic about Ukraine's progress on the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

It is clear that this expert survey cannot cover all foreign policy areas, but its results provide grounds for some conclusions and recommendations. Given the Russian aggression, as well as global and regional challenges and threats, Ukrainian diplomacy should focus on the following strategic directions.

The priority task is to maximise the unity and solidarity of the collective West in countering threats at different levels, including Russian intervention in Ukraine and the Kremlin's hybrid expansion in Europe; military and political convergence of aggressive authoritarian regimes that provoke instability in different regions of the world; centrifugal processes in the EU and NATO, etc.

Important activity areas include preserving and strengthening consolidated military and financial support of the allied countries; promoting higher technological level of weapons provided to Ukraine and obtaining permission to target objectives in the aggressor's territory; developing the national defence industry with the help of partners and increasing the resilience of the economy as a whole. In general, it is about strengthening military-technical and economic cooperation with the countries of the collective West and other friendly countries such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and many others.

The current vector of Ukraine's foreign policy is to create conditions for holding the second Peace Summit, tentatively at the end of 2024. The current operational agenda includes conducting thematic conferences in November to elaborate and agree on the Peace Formula points and create a common negotiation platform for achieving a just peace for Ukraine. A thematic conference on the fourth point of the Peace Formula – release of prisoners and deportees – scheduled for

¹³ This subsection uses some of the proposals contained in previous Razumkov Centre materials that remain relevant today.

late October 2024 in Canada, should be an important step in this direction. The implementation of the Peace Formula depends on the effective use of existing political and diplomatic potential of Ukraine and its allies, public diplomacy tools for organising the second Peace Summit and promoting its components in problematic areas such as Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific.

The «power component» of Ukraine's peace plan is the Victory Plan, which Kyiv is actively promoting bilaterally and on international platforms. Implementation of this plan's five points is currently a priority for national diplomacy, ministries and agencies, parliament, civil society institutions, etc. The Victory Plan seeks to establish a new quality of partnership with NATO, strengthen Ukraine's defence, develop its economic potential and enhance its role in the European security system. The plan combines tactical and strategic components that require both operational decisions and forward-looking actions.

The key challenge in the American track is to maintain pro-Ukrainian policy and support from official Washington. In the face of ongoing Russian aggression, it is vital for Ukraine to maintain bipartisan support in Congress and the American establishment as a whole. The Ukrainian side should do the best to resist any attempts to involve Kyiv in US domestic political processes but continue regular dialogue with representatives of both parties. However, the dynamics of the US election process and the uncertainty of the Washington's future foreign policy necessitate the development of political, security, and economic measures in case of unfavourable post-election transformations in US policy.

Ukrainian diplomacy's strategic direction is integration into the EU and NATO. In relations with the EU, the obvious priority now is to prepare for productive accession negotiations, such as opening several negotiation clusters, e.g. Cluster 1 «Fundamentals of the EU Accession Process». To this end, it is necessary to:

- ✓ agree on roadmaps for the rule of law and public administration reforms;

ensure effective implementation of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law;

- ✓ accelerate reforms in the most «sensitive» areas for the EU – improving the work of anti-corruption bodies, reforming the judiciary, ensuring functioning of democratic institutions, promoting fundamental rights and freedoms, etc;
- ✓ further build institutional and human resources of governmental agencies responsible for European integration; step up cooperation between state institutions and specialised non-governmental think tanks dealing with European integration issues, that is, engage the public in the negotiation process more broadly;
- ✓ ensure maximum transparency and publicity of the negotiation process, including the publication of regular interim government reports;
- ✓ implement the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement provisions in the most problematic areas – transport, financial cooperation and anti-fraud, consumer protection, etc;
- ✓ introduce a targeted and flexible regional policy to minimise and address existing and possible problems in relations mostly with Eastern European neighbours (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria), including during the accession negotiations;
- ✓ take action together with the EU allies and institutions to minimise the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Hungarian leadership aimed at blocking Ukraine's movement towards the EU.

As for Euro-Atlantic integration, political and diplomatic activity will focus on the following areas. *First*, the Victory Plan components need to be discussed with the allies, especially in terms of deepening and formalising partnership with NATO. These discussions should certainly be public and at various levels, including parliamentary, and

with the involvement of civil society. Meanwhile, specific content has to be added to framework security cooperation agreements that Ukraine has just concluded with partner countries and NATO members. This means developing and implementing packages of intergovernmental and interagency agreements, contracts and joint programmes on military-technical cooperation as part of the allies' long-term commitments.

Second, effective realisation of the action plan for implementing sections of the adapted Annual National Programme for 2024, as well as Ukraine's commitments to reform the defence sector contained in the above-mentioned security cooperation agreements are of paramount importance. It is about strengthening democratic civilian control over the security sector, increasing the efficiency and transparency of defence institutions and industry, improving the development of the armed forces.

Third, it is important to use the mechanisms of the NATO-Ukraine Council productively to coordinate actions globally, identify directions and priorities for internal reforms in Ukraine and jointly monitor the effectiveness of their implementation.

Another critical area concerns the development of a comprehensive state policy on the «new Ukrainian diaspora» – Ukrainian refugees, primarily in the EU. Given the scale and significance of the problem for Ukraine, it is advisable to set up a separate state agency, as stated by the President of Ukraine. At the same time, the MFA should develop a targeted programme to coordinate actions of Ukraine's diplomatic missions and diaspora organisations (Ukrainian World Congress), while working systematically with Ukrainian refugees.

To sum up, the main tasks of Ukrainian diplomacy include consolidating and uniting the democratic world; enhancing long-term political, military and financial assistance and support from the allied states and international institutions; effectively implementing the strategically important initiatives, namely the Second Peace summit and the Victory Plan. At the same time, in the settings of lasting war, the factor of building internal resilience and unity of the Ukrainian nation, developing the country's defence capabilities, ensuring active involvement of the society's potential, and implementing successful reforms is becoming increasingly important.

HOW MUCH DO THE FOLLOWING EXTERNAL EVENTS AND PROCESSES HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON UKRAINE?		
Average score*		
	Average score	Hard to say,%
Problems with supplying military aid to Ukraine, unresolved issue of the use of Western weapons in russia	4.5	7.2
Complicated pre-election situation in the United States and the uncertainty of Washington's future foreign course	4.2	1.4
Aggravation of political, social and economic situation in Europe coupled with the growing «fatigue» from the Ukraine war and the activation of right-wing forces	3.9	0.0
Inability of global and regional security structures to prevent the escalation of conflicts globally, in particular, to stop russian aggression	3.9	5.8
Polarisation of the international community with deepening global confrontation between the democratic world and the camp of authoritarian states (strengthening of the russia, China, Iran and North Korea partnership)	3.8	1.4
Initiation of plans in the global discourse to end the Ukraine war that do not meet Ukraine's interests	3.6	0.0
The Middle East war – the Gaza Strip crisis, Israel's military actions against Hamas and Hezbollah, the Western operation against the Houthis	3.2	1.4
The ongoing US-China confrontation, which is becoming a systemic crisis. The threat of a conflict over Taiwan	3.2	0.0
Hungary's unfriendly policy, official Budapest's blocking of EU assistance to Ukraine and its European integration process	3.2	0.0
Russia's growing hybrid influence in Moldova and Georgia ahead of elections	2.8	0.0

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where «1» means no impact, and «5» means very strong impact.

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE IN COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION?		
Average score*		
	Average score	Hard to say,%
Assistance to Ukrainian refugees	4.2	0.0
Financial assistance, including macro-financial tranches, loans	4.0	1.4
Humanitarian aid	3.9	0.0
Political solidarity and support for Ukraine on international platforms	3.8	1.4
Military assistance, including supply of weapons, military equipment and machinery for the AFU	3.5	0.0
Assistance in implementing reforms in Ukraine	3.5	1.4
Assistance in rebuilding destroyed facilities in Ukraine	3.0	4.3
Sanctions against the aggressor	2.5	1.4

* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where «1» means that the assistance is completely ineffective, and «5» – very effective.

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE ASSISTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS TO UKRAINE IN COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION?


Average score*

	Average score	Hard to say, %
EU	4.1	0.0
IMF	3.6	8.7
NATO	3.4	0.0
Council of Europe	3.0	1.4
IAEA	2.1	4.3
ICRC	2.0	4.3
UN	1.9	1.4
OSCE	1.9	2.9
BSECO	1.5	20.2


* On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where «1» means that the assistance is completely ineffective, and «5» – very effective.

WHICH COUNTRIES HELP UKRAINE THE MOST IN COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION?*




% of the experts



* Respondents could choose no more than eight countries from the list below.



* Respondents could choose no more than eight countries from the list below.



WHAT ARE THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES TO UKRAINE'S INTEGRATION INTO THE EU?*	
% опитаних респондентів	
Internal problems in Ukraine (insufficient pace of reforms, inadequate fight against corruption, etc.)	76.8
Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, the occupation of parts of its territories, and massive socio-economic and human losses	65.2
Obstruction of Ukraine's European integration by certain EU countries	60.9
Aggravation of the internal socio-economic situation in the EU	27.5
Negative geopolitical and geo-economic trends in the world	23.2
Weakness of the Ukrainian government's European integration policy	20.3
Other	1.4
Hard to say	0.0

* Respondents could choose no more than three options.

