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STATE-PUBLIC COOPERATION IN ENSURING SOCIAL RESILIENCE DURING THE WAR IN UKRAINE



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This analytical report was prepared by the Razumkov Centre as part
of a project funded by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Kyiv

KYIV 2024

«STATE-PUBLIC COOPERATION IN ENSURING SOCIAL RESILIENCE DURING THE WAR IN UKRAINE»

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The authors would like to express their gratitude to O. Markieieva and S. Kudinov for their help and valuable advice.

This publication was prepared by the Razumkov Centre based on the results of the research project «Best foreign practices and Ukraine’s experience in implementing state-public partnerships in civil defence», supported by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung in Ukraine. The publication analyses foreign experience in ensuring social resilience, civil preparedness and defence relevant to Ukraine; briefly assesses Ukraine’s achievements and challenges in this area; and presents general proposals and recommendations, as well as summarised results of in-depth interviews with commanders of volunteer units of territorial communities in five regions of Ukraine.

The publication will be useful for members of relevant authorities and local self-government bodies, academics, specialists in the field of security systems at the state and local levels, students, and others interested in the issue.

The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position of the grantor or endorsed by him.

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INTRODUCTION

States that take own security seriously, and especially those facing the threat of armed conflict, have developed or are developing practices of state-public cooperation in ensuring national security, resilience, protection of its people and industrial, energy and social infrastructure.

Ukraine's experience shows that existing security mechanisms do not always work or are insufficient amidst the dynamic hybrid warfare and its enormous and multidimensional consequences. The intensity of Russian attacks, the magnitude of consequences, and the limited capacity of the Ukrainian state make it imperative to engage the potential of entire society and the assistance of partners. Moreover, even after winning the war, Ukraine will hardly feel totally secure having a state that is a real and potential aggressor as its neighbour.

The lessons of initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine war (2014) and full-scale Russian invasion (2022) show that lack of completeness and integrity is one of major shortcomings of Ukraine's national security system. Starting at the level of theory, problems spread and intensify at the levels of planning, organisation and implementation. In particular, concepts such as «national security» and «national stability», «civil protection» and «civil defence», «public-private partnership» and «public-civic partnership» overlap and duplicate each other in many aspects. This leads to differences in opinions, approaches, and decisions that impede any rational system, including the national security system.

From this standpoint, it is increasingly important for Ukraine to review approaches to setting up a rational national security system, creating an effective civil defence system within it, introducing a clear division of powers and responsibilities of central and local authorities and the non-governmental sector to ensure the creation and functioning of such a system, and improving mechanisms of state-public partnership in security. In addition to general national security issues, this study focuses on ensuring community security in the context of war and decentralisation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

National security is a condition (range of conditions) of society, the state and their environment in which there are no threats to national values, their bearers (people, public institutions, businesses), strategic development goals and processes of their implementation, or a condition in which society and the state are reliably protected from existing and potential threats.

Threat is a factor (set of factors), the impact of which renders realisation of national interests totally or partially impossible. **Consequences of a threat** are negative changes in the parameters of the system's functioning or the absence of desired positive changes in a person, society, state or in the realisation of their interests.

Risk is the possibility of causing damage to an entity as a result of intentional or unintentional actions, either by the entity itself or by another entity. The risk is usually assessed as the priority of target (course of action) – the level of influence of negative factors. In different contexts, risk can be understood as a sense of danger, a premonition of a threat, a measure of the probability or extent of damage.

A challenge to national security is a problem in the realisation of vital national interests, to which the state or society lacks the means and resources to respond adequately. In this sense, **a problem** is understood as a complication in meeting strategic needs, in the transition of society and the state from the existing condition to the desired one. **A problematic (challenging) situation** is characterised by the lack of a solution adequate to the circumstances and may be associated with the shortage of prerequisites, methods, resources sufficient to achieve the required result or with the impossibility of implementing the existing method of achieving the required result.

System security is ensured by the presence of the following **properties**:

- ✓ ability to **predict** (predictability), **prevent** (preventability) and **avoid** (ability to avoid, to avert) the impact of threats;
- ✓ if the impact is unavoidable, the ability to **remain invulnerable** (invincibility) **to resist** (resistance), **to defend oneself** (protectability, defensibility) against such impact;
- ✓ if the defence is «breached» – resilience, i.e. the ability **to remain operational** (elasticity) within a certain range of destructive factors, their types and characteristics (for example, local or full-scale conflict, conventional or nuclear weapons attacks, etc.), without exceeding the permissible ranges of key parameters, and **return** to a steady state (springiness). The indication of the ranges of system parameters and characteristics of destructive factors is mandatory in the classical definition of the stability of dynamic systems;
- ✓ if, as a result of the impact of destructive factors, the key parameters of functionality went beyond the permissible ranges, the system may show survivability, or the ability to continue functioning in an «emergency mode» and restore stability at the expense of internal and external resources;
- ✓ the properties of **stability** and **survivability** are enhanced with the system's ability to **adapt** to the impact of destructive factors (adaptability), especially in the context



of non-linear hybrid threats; and vice versa, these properties are weakened if the system (the state) is **not flexible enough** (inflexible, rigidity), **weak and vulnerable** (fragile).

The above concepts may have specific definitions and applications depending on the scale (international, regional, national) and scope (military, economic, energy, information, cyber, etc.).

Social values are certain properties of society and / or its environment, the presence or absence of which is perceived by society as crucial for its life and development. A set of values (value foundations) defines in a generalised way the desired state of society for a certain perspective, meaning, guidelines and limits of social activity.

Interest is a need in relation to which an entity defines a goal and intention to achieve it. In some cases, a strategic goal may be equivalent to an interest as its subject (desired end result). Need is the desire of an entity to achieve a condition (range of conditions) most conducive for existence, functioning and development.

National interests are generally understood and legally defined vital needs of society and the state, in relation to which their subject matter (strategic goals as characteristics of the desired condition of society and the state) and intentions to achieve them are clearly formulated.

Method is a set of means of achieving a goal, organised in a particular way. It includes methodology – a theoretical idea of a set of techniques for obtaining the desired result; technology – a set of interrelated and ready-to-use techniques to obtain the desired result using certain means; organisational and executive system – a set of bodies administering the process of implementing a programme (plan) to obtain the desired result and entities implementing programme (plan) tasks; resource support – means, conditions (financial, administrative, logistical, personnel, information, etc.) that ensure practical realisation of the technology of obtaining the desired result.

Crisis is a peculiar condition of society, the state, international institutions, bilateral or multilateral relations caused by a set of internal and / or external problems, characterised by limited or no methods and capacities to de-escalate contradictions and solve problems. A crisis situation is characterised by a set of internal and/or external circumstances contributing to the emergence and escalation of contradictions, but opportunities to avoid conflict are still there.


Conflict is a form or condition of relations between parties (entities) amidst significant contradictions between them regarding interests, goals, and methods of their realisation that cannot be resolved without coercion by one of the parties or a third party. Characteristics of a conflict situation include the condition of conflicting parties, the degree of their mutual influence, the presence or absence of methods to settle and resolve contradictions, and the environment, including the conduct of third parties.

Civil protection is a function of the state (process of its implementation) aimed at protecting people, territories, environment and property from disasters by preventing such situations, eliminating their consequences and providing assistance to victims in peacetime and in a special period.

Civil defence is a function of the state (process of its implementation), which is realised through permanent implementation of a set of measures to prepare and carry out on the territory of the state the protection of the population, material and cultural values from the impact of destructive factors caused by armed conflict and its consequences, natural and man-made emergencies (unlike civil protection, the focus is on military threats).

The national security system (NSS) is an organised set of entities (state and non-state) united by the goals and objectives of protecting national interests and operating in this area in accordance with the functions, powers, norms and rules defined by law.

Organisation-wise, the NSS consists of the state and non-state sectors; purpose-wise, it includes subsystems of political leadership, defence, internal (public) security and strategic resource provision; function-wise (or by types of activity or focus on combating relevant threats), it is conditionally divided into foreign policy; state security; military and state border security; domestic policy; economic; scientific and technological; environmental; social and humanitarian; cybernetic; and information spheres.





Specialised entities of national security are state and non-state bodies, organisations and institutions defined by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, whose competences include certain tasks of ensuring national security.

National security entities of general competence are state and non-state bodies, organisations and institutions for which protection against threats is not the main function defined by law, but which may have relevant specialised units dealing with certain national security issues.

The public and private sectors include enterprises, organisations, institutions and individuals, which are distinguished by their ownership (state, municipal or private) and the degree of participation of state bodies in managing their activities.

The non-state sector is broader concept than the private sector. In addition to private entities, it includes non-profit, non-commercial public organisations and their associations (non-governmental entities).

Public-private partnership is a system of contractual relations between public (state) and private enterprises, organisations, and institutions for mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve certain results.

Public-civic partnership is a partnership between state and non-state entities for mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve certain results. Such a partnership can be formal (contractual) or informal, when non-state actors use key indicators (preferably clear, defined by law) that characterise the state policy. Such partnership builds on interaction of executive authorities, local governments, businesses and civil society institutions in achieving socially significant results based on mutual interest and responsibility, independence and democratic control.

The civil defence system is a form of public-civic partnership in ensuring national security, responsible for preparing and implementing protection of the population, material and cultural property on the territory of the state from destructive factors caused by armed conflict, its consequences, natural and man-made emergencies.

Militarisation (securitisation) of the state and society (of Ukraine) is the process of the state and society functioning, in which priorities of the government, businesses and the public are reoriented towards preparing and mobilising financial, economic, material, and human resources in peacetime and wartime to repel potential aggression, ensure readiness, security, resilience, and sustainability of state institutions, economy, energy, information space, communities, and society in general in the context of hybrid impact of negative factors. The militarisation of Ukrainian society is seen as a forced method to ensure national security in wartime and peacetime in the vicinity of the aggressor state, even after its defeat and possible collapse. One of the tools for this is an effective civil defence system organised with due regard to the needs, capabilities and specifics of Ukrainian society.



The proposed conceptual framework is somewhat different in terms of terminology used in legal documents** and by individual authors*** in Ukraine and abroad. This is mainly due to the differences between the process-oriented approach used in this publication and the object-oriented approach used elsewhere. The above system is neither complete nor perfect – it may require detailed explanations and may be subject to refinement, but even in its current form it is well-suited to give better understanding of the meaning and place of each component in the security system, as well as what exactly should be the focus of certain measures.

* National security system and the place of the non-governmental sector in it. Annex 2 to the report «Comparative analysis of the positions of the authorities and citizens of Ukraine on the issues of community security in the process of decentralisation of power and local government reform». Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, 2018 https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2018_poriv_analiz_pozycii_vlady.pdf.

** For example, the Law of Ukraine «On the National Security of Ukraine», <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19#Text>; Ukraine National Security Strategy, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3922020-35037>; European Security Union, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/european-security-union_en.

*** See, for example: O. Reznikova, «National Resilience in a Changing Security Environment», NISS, Kyiv, 2022, https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2023-01/National%20Resilience_EN.pdf; S. Pirozhkov et al., «National Resilience of Ukraine: a Strategy for Responding to Challenges and Preventing Hybrid Threats», Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2022, pp. 11-32, <https://files.nas.gov.ua/PublicMessages/Documents/0/2022/06/220624133824484-8851.pdf>; «Measuring Resilience: Benefits and Limitations of Resilience Indices», SKI Focus Report 8, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, March 2012, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Focal-Report_-8-Measuring_Resilience_2013.pdf; Schipper, L. and Langston, L. «A comparative overview of resilience measurement frameworks», Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, July 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285176222_A_comparative_overview_of_resilience_measurement_frameworks_analyzing_indicators_and_approaches.

I. FOREIGN EXPERIENCE IN ENSURING SOCIAL RESILIENCE, CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND CIVIL DEFENCE

The outbreak of Russia's war against Ukraine in 2014 and especially its large-scale aggression in February 2022 put an end to Western countries' post-Cold War complacency. By this time, their systems of collective and national security had been significantly weakened; extraordinary approaches are needed to restore and strengthen them.¹

In the Euro-Atlantic community, there is a growing awareness of the need to rapidly enhance economic and defence capabilities and prepare societies for a possible armed conflict. The community's strength is its close cooperation, mutual assistance and joint actions, which still have room for improvement. Nevertheless, NATO and the EU alike are well aware of the need to increase social resilience and are developing a regulatory framework and making practical efforts in this area. Meanwhile, at the national level, each country must raise the readiness of its society for new security settings. With this in mind, the EU and NATO, as well as many individual member states, have launched security system reforms with a notable emphasis on threats from the «axis of evil»

¹ See, for example, «America is not ready for a major war, says a bipartisan commission», *The Economist*, 29 Jul. 2024, <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/07/29/america-is-not-ready-for-a-major-war-says-a-bipartisan-commission>; A. Zaremba, «Maginot Line 2.0: Why Europe is building defence lines near Russia», *Glavred*, 28 June 2024, <https://glavred.net/analytics/liniya-mazhino-2-0-zachem-evropa-sobralas-stroit-linii-oborony-vozle-rf-10576490.html> (in Ukrainian); «Europe must quickly ramp up its resilience against hybrid threats», *Helsinki Security Forum*, 22 Aug. 2024, <https://helsinkisecurityforum.fi/news/europe-must-quickly-ramp-up-its-resilience-against-hybrid-threats>.

states – Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – and the resilience of states and societies in the new security environment.²

It may be useful for Ukraine to look at the experience and updated approaches of NATO and the EU, the UK, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands³ to the development of methodological framework, organisational principles, and their implementation in the areas of national security, social resilience, and civil preparedness.



NATO

One of the key elements of the Alliance's ability to repel armed attack is collective defence, as enshrined in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴ In 2021, the Alliance clarified this principle: «national and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence (...) and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values».⁵

Since 2014, the need to achieve and maintain social resilience in NATO documents has covered an increasingly wide range of risks and threats and included an ever-increasing list of measures.⁶ In fact, an analysis of

² Alcaro, R. and Bargués, P. «Relational Power Europe. Conflict Management and the Future of EU Foreign and Security Policy», *JOINT*, Research Papers No. 26, May 2024, https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/joint_rp_26.pdf; Roepke, W.-D. and Thankey, H. 'Resilience: the first line of defence', *NATO Review*, 27 Feb. 2019, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line-of-defence/index.html>.

³ For the experience of Israel, Germany, France, and Poland, see: Civil-Military Co-operation in Protecting the Population during the Ukraine War, Analytical Report by Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, 2023, Section I, <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/02/2024-Sunhurovskiyi-CIVIL-WAR-I-F.pdf>.

⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 Apr. 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁵ Strengthened Resilience Commitment, 14 Jun. 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm?selectedLocale=uk.

⁶ Garriaud-Maylam, J. 'Enhancing The Resilience Of Allied SocieJes Through Civil Preparedness'. General Report, Committee On Democracy And Security, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 9 October 2021, <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-10/011%20CDS%2021%20E%20rev.%202%20fin%20-%20RESILIENCE%20THROUGH%20CIVIL%20PREPAREDNESS%20-%20GARRIAUD-MAYLAM.pdf>.



the relevant NATO documents⁷ shows that resilience encompasses the entire spectrum of properties that form the system security (see box «Conceptual framework» in the Introduction).

In particular, NATO's Allied Command Transformation has identified **four focus areas with potential to enhancing resilience**:⁸



- ✓ identifying key vulnerabilities and associated risks – this enables governments to develop adequate responses and mechanisms to manage consequences, both nationally and internationally;
- ✓ synchronising cross-governmental decision-making, taking into account the high dynamics of changes in the security environment;
- ✓ building military sustainability and civil preparedness;
- ✓ balancing the allocation of available resources – enhancing the links between the civil, private and military sector will enable cost-sharing and benefit resilience at the same time.

National and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and are therefore vital to NATO's efforts to safeguard its societies, populations and shared values. Resilience is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment. Military efforts to defend NATO territory and populations need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness to reduce potential vulnerabilities and the risk of attack in peacetime, crisis and conflict.

Civil preparedness has three core functions: continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to military operations. Military forces, especially those deployed during crises

⁷ H. Shelest, «NATO's Resilience Concept and Ukraine», *Ukrainian Prism*, 29 December 2021, p. 4-8, http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/NATO_resilience_.pdf.

⁸ Thiele, R.D. 'Building Resilience Readiness against Hybrid Threats – A Cooperative European Union / NATO Perspective', *ISPSW*, Sep. 2016, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISPSW-Building%20Resilience%20Readiness%20against%20Hybrid%20Threats.pdf>.



and conflict, depend heavily on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, energy and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions. Effective civil preparedness ensures that these sectors are ready to withstand attacks or disruptions and can continue supporting NATO's military forces at all times.⁹

These **seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness** were established during the Warsaw Summit in 2016, where Allied leaders committed to enhancing resilience, by striving to achieve the following:¹⁰

- 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services;
- 2) resilient energy supplies;
- 3) ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
- 4) resilient food and water resources;
- 5) ability to deal with mass casualties;
- 6) resilient civil communications systems;
- 7) resilient civil transportation systems.

In 2022, pursuant to the Strengthened Resilience Commitment adopted at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels,¹¹ NATO established the Resilience Committee, replacing the former Civil Emergency Planning Committee established in 1950. Reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council, the new Committee is responsible for strategic and policy planning and coordination of NATO's resilience activities. It is supported by six specialised planning groups in the following sectors:

⁹ 'Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3', 5 Sep. 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm; 'NATO's Resilience Concerns', Euro-Atlantic, Bucharest, 29 Feb.2024, <https://e-arc.ro/2024/02/29/natos-resilience-concerns/>.

¹⁰ Commitment to enhance resilience, Press Release, 8 Jul. 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?selectedLocale=en; Jamie Shea, «Resilience: a core element of collective defence», *NATO Review*, 30 March 2016, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html>.

¹¹ Strengthened Resilience Commitment, 14 Jun. 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm?selectedLocale=uk.



1. Civil communications – providing advice on building resilience in the communications sector;
2. Civil protection – addressing ways to ensure continuity of government as well as the ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movements of people;
3. Energy – ensuring oversight of resilient energy supplies;
4. Food and Agriculture – addressing resilience matters in the food and water sector;
5. Health – covering Allies’ ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises;
6. Transport (surface, maritime and aviation) – analysing and providing advice on resilient civil transport systems.



NATO has built a comprehensive system of civil preparedness and resilience focusing on higher effectiveness of military activities. However, its main drawbacks include irrational political decision-making system in conflicts and uneven allocation of resources

and efforts by Allies. Despite NATO’s requirements, activities in the above sectors are regulated by national and EU legislation.

That is why NATO summits consistently emphasise the need for closer partnership with the EU.¹² Joint NATO-EU efforts have achieved tangible

¹² «We will employ the necessary capabilities to detect, defend against, and respond to the full spectrum of malicious activities. We will also take concrete steps to deepen our cooperation with our partners engaged in similar efforts, in particular the European Union... The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels. Practical cooperation has been strengthened and expanded on space, cyber, climate and defence, as well as emerging and disruptive technologies». Washington Summit Declaration, 10 July 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.



results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, establishing cooperation on maritime security, military mobility, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, counter-terrorism, and capacity building. NATO and EU are set to further strengthen cooperation **to address in particular the growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructures, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference.**¹³



EUROPEAN UNION

NATO and EU have some differences in their approaches to understanding the resilience, as determined by the strategic goals of their formation. NATO initially perceived resilience in terms of implementing the principles of deterrence, defence and military cooperation. Today, in light of Russia's hybrid and wide-ranging aggressive actions across the globe, NATO seeks to increase the resilience of its member states in both the military and civilian spheres to ensure the effectiveness and combat capability of the bloc's military component.

In its turn, **the EU uses the concept of resilience in the context of nation-building, good governance, human rights and sustainable development.** For quite a while, the EU's activities in these areas were clearly tilted towards ensuring security at its borders and resilience of countries where instability may originate. Apart from developing common standards, internal resilience issues were mainly within the competence of national authorities. However, there have been recent attempts to develop the security component of the EU's activities, to broaden and deepen cooperation with NATO, and to step up coordination of national efforts to order to achieve the necessary preparedness and resilience both in individual member states and the EU as a whole.

¹³ Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 10 January 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_210549.htm?selectedLocale=en.



The EU's resilience policy has become more extensive, systematic and focused after Russia's seizure of Ukrainian Crimea and part of the Donbas. In April 2016, the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: a European Union Response¹⁴ was submitted to the EU governing bodies for consideration. The document referred to the need to build resilience as one of the EU's main goals and noted that resilience of the EU as a whole depends on the resilience of its members. Most of the 22 announced measures were aimed at enhancing resilience in energy and cybersecurity, countering radicalism and extremism, including through cooperation with external partners.

In June 2016, the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy «Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe»¹⁵ was presented. The document states that fostering the resilience of EU's democracies is one of the most important principles of the organisation. The list of strategic priorities includes ensuring the security of cyber infrastructure, energy security, strategic communications and components of the European digital space.

Adopted in 2022, a **Strategic Compass for Security and Defence**¹⁶ defines the EU's updated approaches that require to:

- ✓ act more quickly and decisively when facing crises;
- ✓ secure EU citizens against fast-changing threats;
- ✓ invest in the needed capabilities and technologies;
- ✓ partner with others to achieve common goals.



¹⁴ High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response, Brussels, 8 Apr. 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018>.

¹⁵ Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

¹⁶ A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf.

The Strategic Compass builds on a commonly agreed threat assessment among member states and adapts and expands the EU's security and defence programmes to today's more complex security environment, with its conflicts and great power rivalries. At the same time, the Strategic Compass emphasises the EU's intention to become a more autonomous and valuable partner for both NATO and the United States.

The main structural element of the EU's renewed preparedness and resilience policy is the **European Security Union**.¹⁷ Its main objectives are:

- ✓ ensure that EU security policy reflects the changing threats landscape;
- ✓ build long-term, sustainable resilience;
- ✓ engage the EU institutions and agencies, governments, the private sector and individuals in a whole-of-society approach;
- ✓ bring together the many policy areas with a direct impact on security.¹⁸

The EU Security Union Strategy¹⁹ covers the period from 2020 to 2025 and focuses on priority areas where the EU can help Member States in fostering security for all those living in Europe, while respecting our European values and principles. The Strategy's four strategic priorities – pillars – are as follows:

- ✓ fighting terrorism and organised crime, extremism and radicalisation by improving the existing and providing new tools for effective law enforcement;



¹⁷ Promoting our European way of life. Protecting our citizens and our values, Official web site of European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life_en.

¹⁸ European Security Union, Official website of European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/european-security-union_en.

¹⁹ Ibid.



- ✓ future-proof security environment, protection of social and critical infrastructure, both physical and digital;
- ✓ building a strong security ecosystem for better information exchange between national authorities and EU institutions; using security research and innovation to prevent current and future threats; and raising skills and awareness;
- ✓ tackling evolving threats, which entails equipping EU member states' law enforcement authorities with the right tools to detect and counter hybrid threats, cybercrime and illegal content online using innovative technologies.

In February 2023, the European Commission adopted a communication and recommendations on common goals for strengthening Union's disaster resilience.²⁰ Therefore, strengthening disaster resilience in the area of civil protection should be:

- ✓ comprehensive: by covering the full disaster management cycle, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery;
- ✓ anticipatory: by reducing underlying disaster risks where possible and ensuring adequate preparedness to respond effectively and efficiently to disasters;
- ✓ cross-sectoral and transboundary: by promoting an approach that takes into consideration interdependencies between multiple risks, ensures coherence amongst relevant policy sectors and encourages cooperation between Member States sharing common risks;
- ✓ knowledge and evidence-based: by relying on a solid understanding of disaster risks, including on the economic, environmental and social impacts of disasters. For such purpose, research



²⁰ European Union Disaster Resilience Goals: Acting together to deal with future emergencies, COM(2023) 61, Brussels, 8 Feb. 2023, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A61%3AFIN&qid=1675958089171>; Commission Recommendation of 8 February 2023 on Union disaster resilience goals, Official Journal of the European Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0215%2801%29&qid=1676531610023>.



and innovation should be supported and knowledge sharing, including of good practice results from research, data-exchange, continuous evaluation and learning should be fostered;

- ✓ inclusive: to ensure no one is left behind by taking into account the specific needs and drivers of vulnerability of people such as gender, age, economic, educational and social background, disabilities; and geographic exposure to specific risks;
- ✓ sustainable: by taking into account nature-based solutions, the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on disaster risks and the prevention and mitigation of the environmental impact of disasters paying special attention to minimising the environmental impact of civil protection operations.

Strengthening disaster resilience in the area of civil protection calls for action in the following areas:

anticipate – improving risk assessment, anticipation and disaster risk management planning;

prepare – increasing risk awareness and preparedness of the population;

alert – enhancing early warning;

respond – enhancing the Union Mechanism response capacity;

secure – ensuring a robust Civil Protection System.

The European Commission continuously tracks the implementation of the EU Security Union Strategy and publishes monitoring results in annual Progress report. They show that the EU is able to adapt in a highly volatile and adverse security environment.

In general, both NATO and the EU have developed and applied a strong methodological framework in the field of civil preparedness and social resilience, which is implemented by their member states to the extent of their capabilities and national specifics. This reality should also be observed by Ukraine, which seeks membership in these organisations.



UNITED KINGDOM²¹

The UK national resilience system is organised into three levels – national, regional and local. General policies, rules and regulations are developed at the national level, where overall coordination and control of relevant activities in the country is ensured. The core processes of preparedness, response to threats and post-crisis recovery occur at the regional and local levels. In general, **the system's functioning covers the following processes:**

- ✓ risk identification and assessment (*anticipate, assess*),
- ✓ crisis prevention (prevent),
- ✓ readiness to respond (prepare),
- ✓ response to crisis (response),
- ✓ post-crisis recovery (recover).

The British system of local resilience builds on the principles of collegiality, subsidiarity, integration, continuity, focus, multi-level coordination and interaction, as well as collaboration with civil society and businesses. It pursues coordination and balance of interests and goals of authorities at all levels and local communities through integrated crisis management, distribution of powers and responsibilities, planning of crisis preparedness measures, capacity building and their rational use, flexible response to large-scale emergencies in the country, determination of the legal order and framework for the use of special powers in the course of emergency response.

Pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, local governments have the authority and responsibility for crisis management within defined territories, subject to maximum coordination of their actions by higher-level

²¹ For more detail, see O.Reznikova, K.Voytovsky, A.Lepinov, «Organisation of the national resilience system at the regional and local levels», Analytical report, Centre for Security Studies, Kyiv 2021, p.23-46, https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-09/analytrep_08_2021.pdf (in Ukrainian), <https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-04/ad-regional-resilience.pdf> (resume in English).



administrations and authorities, in compliance with the national legislation. Operational management and decision-making on local crisis response and recovery are carried out at the local level. To this end, emergency services (police, fire, ambulance, etc.), local authorities, healthcare providers, and government agencies should have emergency plans in place. These plans should include the involvement of other stakeholders, such as utility operators. The level of involvement of non-state actors (civil society and private sector) depends on the type of arrangements between them and local authorities. Volunteers are officially involved in preparation, response, relief and recovery activities. In extreme cases, armed forces may be involved. The task of counteracting military, terrorist and other national threats is entrusted to the government.

Building of the system of resilience of local communities in the UK is influenced by the complex structure of the country's administrative and political division based on the principle of decentralisation of power and its transfer to the subnational level.²² Within the administrative and political territories of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the city of London, a system of ensuring the resilience of local communities to crisis situations is functioning on the basis of partnership.

Local resilience forums (LRF) are a key institutional link. An integrated network of LRFs has been developed in England, Wales, Scotland and the city of London. The forums are a platform for interagency cooperation. They are interconnected by a common goal of building the resilience of local communities to emergencies and ensuring effective response to hazards. General expert support for the LRFs is provided by the relevant national agencies within the framework of the Natural Hazards Partnership.²³



²² Devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland>.

²³ Natural Hazards Partnership, <http://www.naturalhazardspartnership.org.uk>; Hemingway, R., Gunawan, O. 'The Natural Hazards Partnership: A public-sector collaboration across the UK for natural hazard disaster risk reduction', *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, Vol. 27, March 2018, p.p. 499-511, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420917303370>.



The main purpose of the LRFs is to ensure effective coordination and integration of interagency forces, means and capabilities of local communities (administrative, emergency and rescue, medical, police, volunteer, municipal, reserve, etc.), **as well as national bodies** (army, coast guard, national transport police, telecommunications agency, etc.) operating on their territory, in order

to achieve proper preparedness and response to emergencies and local crises of natural and man-made origin. Another important task of LRFs is to make sure that local communities organise and coordinate risk and threat assessment, planning, capacity building (organisational, material, engineering and technical, etc.), prevention, emergency response and recovery. Particular attention is on ensuring that local communities are comprehensively prepared to respond to crises and threats of various origins.

The practice of LRFs involves regular meetings in an interagency format with representatives of local authorities, civil society, media, etc. The forums do not have legal status but ensure the collective responsibility of all participants for planning and preparing for emergencies.

The territorial area of responsibility of LRFs is limited mainly to the areas /served by local police (district, several districts, county), with more than 10 communities and an extensive network of district operational response services (fire and rescue teams, emergency medical care stations, police, emergency utilities, etc.) Communities of large cities (at the level of districts and neighbourhoods) may also set up local resilience forums. Sectoral resilience forums may operate on certain territories (e.g., NHS Scotland Resilience Forum).²⁴ At the regional level, they may also establish permanent formats of interagency cooperation for resilience to ensure coordination between LRFs and higher-level authorities (autonomous regions, the City of London, and the state).

²⁴ NHS Scotland Resilience Forum. <https://www.readyscotland.org/ready-government/nhsscotland-resilience/nhs-scotland-resilience-forum>.



On 19 December 2022, the UK Government announced a new Resilience Framework until 2030.²⁵

The document was developed in accordance with the government's commitments set out in the report on the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy of 16 March 2021. It takes into account the increasing uncertainty trends in the global security environment.



The Framework complements existing strategic documents, in particular in the areas of energy and cybersecurity, climate change adaptation, clean energy transition, continuity of critical resources, etc. The document reveals improved approaches to risk assessment, division of duties and responsibilities, improved reporting, stronger partnerships, development of local resilience forums, protection of vulnerable groups, dissemination of necessary knowledge and skills, investment in resilience, etc.

The core of the Framework is built around three fundamental principles:

- ✓ a developed and shared understanding of the civil contingencies risks we face is fundamental;
- ✓ prevention rather than cure wherever possible: a greater emphasis on preparation and prevention;
- ✓ resilience is a «whole-of-society» endeavour, so we must be more transparent and empower everyone to make a contribution.

The purpose of the new Framework is to strengthen the UK's preparedness to respond to disaster risks in the current environment. It sets out new strategic approaches to risk management, planning, and organisation of activities aimed at improving preparedness to respond to a wide range of emergencies in an uncertain global security environment. The Framework

²⁵ The UK Government Resilience Framework, Policy paper, Cabinet Office, 19 Dec. 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63c9f056e90e071ba7b41d54/UKG_Resilience_Framework_FINAL_v2.pdf; «United Kingdom's new approaches to national resilience», NISS, 20 February 2020, <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/natsionalna-bezpeka/novi-pidkhody-velykoyi-brytaniyi-do-zabezpechennya-natsionalnoyi> (in Ukrainian).



sets out commitments across six themes: risk; responsibilities and accountabilities; partnerships; communities; skills; and investment.

The Framework contains specific measures to ensure national resilience:

- ✓ improve the organisational framework for resilience coordination and management: establishing a new sub-group of the National Security Council, the new Resilience Directorate, and appointing a new Head of Resilience to guide best practice, encourage adherence to standards, and set guidance that will increase transparency and accountability of government activities in this area;
- ✓ deliver a new UK Resilience Academy, built out from the Emergency Planning College;
- ✓ introduce an Annual Statement to Parliament on civil contingencies risk and the UK Government's performance on resilience;
- ✓ clarify roles and responsibilities in the UK Government for each NSRA (National Security Risk Assessment) risk, to drive activity across the risk lifecycle;
- ✓ refresh NSRA methodology;
- ✓ grow the UK Government's advisory groups made up of experts, academics and industry experts in order to inform the NSRA and plan relevant responses;
- ✓ develop governing bodies for resilience; revamp the network of situation centres (SitCens) based on high-tech innovations;
- ✓ strengthen the role of local resilience forums by improving the leadership, accountability, and integration activities in the field of resilience;
- ✓ improve the processes of formulating and making decisions by developing a tool for measuring social vulnerability as an indicator of socio-economic resilience;
- ✓ conduct an annual survey of public perceptions of risk, resilience and preparedness.



The Framework places considerable emphasis on better anticipating of crises and conflict situations. It is planned to extend the timeframe of risk analysis and data collection, as well as to attract new knowledge and ideas about the security environment development. Without diminishing attention to traditional UK hazards, priority is given to extremely dangerous risks and threats that are hard to predict and difficult or impossible to prevent (large-scale floods, terrorist attacks, etc.). Particular attention will be paid to factors that can cause, accelerate and protract crises (wars, pandemics, massive man-made disasters, etc.), and cascading effects. Peculiarities of crisis situations and their development, the interdependence of consequences, possible unforeseen circumstances, and vulnerabilities of the state and society are also analysed. On this basis, scenarios of dangerous situations and corresponding action plans will be developed to ensure adequate resilience.

It is planned to involve a wider range of experts, academics and businesses in the National Security Risk Assessment. Advisory groups under the Cabinet Office will be expanded to synergise interdisciplinary capacities to study resilience, including through the prism of cascading effects of emergencies, their consequences and increasing uncertainty, as well as to formulate recommendations. The



findings of studies of long-term prospects for the strategic security environment will be used in various documents, including the Resilience to long-term trends and transitions to 2050 report.²⁶ It is planned to expand the National Risk Register (NRR) format and to detail publicly available information on current risks and threats in order to make it more effective and practical for society.

In order to determine the impact of various risks on local communities and vulnerable populations, a special tool will be introduced for measuring social vulnerability as an indicator of socio-economic resilience. Other planned

²⁶ Resilience to long-term trends and transitions to 2050, Cabinet Office, 21 July 2022, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/resilience-to-long-term-trends-and-transitions-to-2050/resilience-to-long-term-trends-and-transitions-to-2050>.



activities include annual public opinion surveys on the impact of risks on the population, citizens' perception of resilience and emergency preparedness.

The roles, duties and responsibilities of ministries in relation to each risk identified within NSRA are subject to clarification. Annual reporting to the Parliament on risks, threats and measures to ensure national resilience is being introduced.

A sub-committee on national resilience will be established under the National Security Council. The Cabinet Office has launched its executive body for national resilience – the Resilience Directorate, tasked to ensure a strategic approach to systemic strengthening of national resilience. The Directorate will oversee inter-territorial, inter-industry and inter-sectoral resilience planning, monitoring of risk reduction, capacity building and emergency response preparedness. The Directorate will interact with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room and other structures. The Cabinet Office will also appoint a Head of Resilience as a chief executive officer responsible for implementing and coordinating best practices, developing and enforcing resilience standards, coordinating planning, developing recommendations, etc.

The methodological and technological renovation of the National Situation Centre (SitCen) under the Cabinet Office will continue by transforming it into a key element of a unified IT system for monitoring and analysing the security situation based on data from the public and private sectors. SitCen capacities will be enhanced by the private sector's information, telecommunications and analytical capabilities, the network of situation centres at all levels, and international partnerships.

The new pilot seeks to reform the activities of England's local resilience forums, in particular, to bolster their role, powers, responsibilities and accountability, integrate their capabilities across England, develop volunteering and cooperation between the forums, improve their funding from government, public and private funds, strengthen civil-military cooperation, etc.

It is also planned to expand resilience standards to the public and private sectors (where they are not yet implemented) to improve risk management

and planning. Standards for safe operation of critical infrastructure and high-risk facilities will be updated to improve their resilience. In addition, the UK Government is to enhance outreach to the private sector on resilience building.



SWEDEN

Though Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has expedited total defence reconstruction, with a particular emphasis on fast-tracking the civilian side, the process had already begun in 2015 in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas. The relevant Defence Bill for the period of 2016–2020 envisaged, inter alia, the development of the «total defence» concept consisting of military and civilian components within the framework of the «whole society» approach to national security.²⁷

The reform's main purpose of the reform is to unite military and civil defence into a national defence system («Total Defence») by improving the armed forces and the defence system in general, involving the whole society, ensuring the country's full participation in the formation and implementation of the EU and NATO defence policy, and deepening security cooperation with other states.



Sweden's seriousness in this regard is evidenced by the increasing government spending on Total Defence. The country's military budget has roughly doubled since 2020 to around SEK 120 billion (\$11 billion) in 2024. At the same time, Sweden has significantly increased annual spending on

²⁷ Adamson, E. and Moyer, J. 'In from the cold: rebuilding Sweden's civil defence for the NATO era', War on the Rocks, 9 Apr. 2024, <https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/in-from-the-cold-rebuilding-swedens-civil-defense-for-the-nato-era>.



civil defence: in 2024, it will amount to about SEK 5.5 billion (\$510 million), almost three times more than in 2021.²⁸

Sweden was arguably one of the most militarised states in Western Europe during the Cold War and had a systematic and well-developed Total Defence concept encompassing all of society. **Today, a number of challenges prompt focusing more effort on the concept's civilian component, also complicating its reform:**

- ✓ According to Swedish Defence Commission's December 2023 report,²⁹ Sweden's crisis preparedness and civil defence is «not designed to handle an armed attack and the extreme stresses of war». There is a lack of planning, training, and expertise, and too few institutions and agencies have integrated civil defence planning into their routines. The ability to transition from peace to a wartime footing is lacklustre.
- ✓ Over the last few decades, Sweden has become highly dependent on a «just-in-time» service provision. This makes the economy, society, and the service sector extremely vulnerable to conditions of the armed conflict, including damage to infrastructure, deterioration of transport (sea, rail, air, road), disruptions in the financial system, electricity, water, utilities, essential goods, food, and information.
- ✓ Systems for electronic communications are not designed to operate in war-like conditions and cyberattacks pose a real threat. The transfer of public services from the government to the private sector requires additional coordination and motivation of business activities to ensure their continuity and sufficiency in times of war.³⁰

²⁸ «Sweden should hike military budget to 2.6% of GDP, defence committee says», Reuters, 26 Apr. 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-should-hike-military-budget-26-gdp-defence-committee-says-2024-04-26>, «Investments in civil defence and crisis preparedness in the autumn budget», Ministry of Defence, 22 Sept. 2023, <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/09/investments-in-civil-defence-and-crisis-preparedness-in-the-autumn-budget>.

²⁹ Swedish Defence Commission submits total defence report, Swedish Government Offices, 19 Dec. 2023, <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/12/swedish-defence-commission-submits-total-defence-report>.

³⁰ Björn von Sydow, Resilience: Planning for Sweden's «Total Defence», *NATO Review*, 4 Apr. 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/04/04/resilience-planning-for-swedens-total-defence/index.html>.

Swedish law defines Total Defence as the planning and measures required to prepare the country for war.

The Total Defence concept entails that when the government orders the highest state of alert, all functions of society are engaged in the defence effort, both military and civilian. Accordingly, the parliament, the government, government authorities, municipalities, private enterprises, voluntary defence organisations as well as individuals are all part of the Swedish Total Defence.³¹



The key conditions for effective Total Defence, in particular its civilian component, include advance planning, readiness of the state and society to respond to crisis and conflict situations, and the ability to ensure normal functioning in these settings. The key reform areas and efforts of the Swedish civil preparedness and defence system are as follows:³²

1. Introducing a sound functional and administrative-territorial structure:
 - ✓ Socially important functions expanded to 56 based on the principles of necessity to meet the basic needs of society, protect national values and ensure security and continuity, including in peacetime crisis situations, high alert and war.
 - ✓ Ten sectoral preparedness sectors defined, namely health, care and social assistance; food and water supply; law enforcement and public safety; protection and rescue of civilian population; transport and transport infrastructure; financial security; financial services; telecommunications, electronic and postal communications; energy supply; functioning of state electronic databases and information protection. These sectors unite 41 state institutions responsible for

³¹ Ibid.

³² O.Reznikova, A.Lepikhov, «Reform of the Swedish civil preparedness system», NISS, 30 May 2023, https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2023-05/az_30052023_reforma-systemy-tsyvilnoi-gotvnosti-shvetsii.pdf (in Ukrainian).



emergency response and civil preparedness. Each sector appoints a responsible government agency to ensure coordination before and during peacetime crises and high alert situations, as well as to support civil preparedness bodies and organise interaction with other actors that can contribute to the sectoral preparedness sector. In parallel with the work in the identified preparedness sectors, preparedness may be carried out within other important public functions that are not currently included in any of the above sectors.

- ✓ Six regional civil preparedness districts determined, aligning with the Swedish military districts. Each district encompasses two to seven councils of Sweden's administrative units. One council is made responsible for all other territorial units. The head of this council is appointed



as the chairperson of the regional civil preparedness district, responsible for organising civil preparedness in the district, including coordination and supervision, inter-district and inter-regional planning, capacity building, emergency response (including in cooperation with other districts, sectors, defence forces), and communication with the Government. A similar organisation of civil preparedness activities is planned at the local level. To this end, responsible coordination councils will be established, and civil preparedness supervisors will be appointed. One of the tasks of the regional civil preparedness districts is to enhance cooperation with the armed forces, industry sectors, and other administrative units of Sweden.

- ✓ Information exchange established in the sectors and regional civil preparedness districts; measures are taken to protect existing and create backup nodes and lines of operational communication, and unified information exchange protocols are introduced.
2. Outlining the functions, tasks, duties, powers and responsibilities of government authorities in planning and resolving crisis situations.



- ✓ The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) is an executive coordinator for civil preparedness before, during and after an emergency, war or threat of war. The Agency's main functions include protecting the population from emergencies, coordinating authorised bodies amidst crises or increased level of danger, as well as ensuring preparedness for crisis situations. Additional tasks include arranging work in the field of civil defence, supporting relevant stakeholders in planning activities in this area, and ensuring coordination with defence planning.
 - ✓ 60 government bodies (civil preparedness bodies) have additional tasks in the field of emergency response and civil preparedness. These bodies are responsible for one or several important public functions, and their activities are of particular importance for ensuring the society's preparedness for crisis situations and total defence. They must have sufficient capabilities to counter threats and risks, eliminate vulnerabilities, organise effective responses to crises in peacetime and perform their tasks in a state of high alert.
3. Defining the process and method of planning for emergencies of any origin for the authorities responsible for a particular administrative-territorial unit (municipalities, district councils) and for the civil preparedness sectors in the new structure, both in terms of planning and management. Resumption of the Total Defence planning was an important part of the 2015 Defence Bill, as much of it had been suspended since the end of the Cold War.
- ✓ In January 2017, the Swedish Government formed the Defence Commission and approved its reports «Resilience: The Total Defence Concept and the Development of Civil Defence 2021-2025» and «Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of Military Defence 2021-2025».³³
 - ✓ Based on these reports, the Swedish Government developed and approved the National Security Strategy³⁴ and, in particular, three internal

³³ The Swedish Defence Commission's white book on Sweden's Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025, The Swedish Defence Commission secretariat (unofficial summary), <https://www.government.se/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/forsvarsberedningen/slutrapport-14-maj/defence-commissions-white-book-english-summary.pdf>.

³⁴ Nationell säkerhetsstrategi [National security strategy], Swedish Government Offices, Stockholm, 2017, <https://www.regeringen.se/48db21/globalassets/regeringen/block/aktualitetsblock/statsradsberedningen/nationell-sakerhetsstrategi.pdf>.



security strategies: a crime prevention strategy, a national strategy against organised crime, and a strategy against violent extremism and terrorism.³⁵ Their main principles are to prevent, avert, protect and manage.³⁶

✓ In order to improve the methodology of joint planning in the field of civil preparedness, as well as to enhance coordination in planning, a new Planning Guideline has been developed.³⁷

4. Implementing unified approaches to cooperation and crisis management to ensure efficient use of resources.

5. Building up the existing capacity and strengthening inter-sectoral work to overcome crisis phenomena in the social sphere.



6. Ensuring readiness to attract civilian and military assistance from other countries and organisations in the event of a large-scale crisis or war.

7. Strengthening public-private partnerships to ensure readiness to supply goods and services in crisis.

✓ The National Strategy for security of supply of critical goods and services in crises is being updated.³⁸

✓ It is planned to introduce stricter requirements for businesses regarding their participation in civil preparedness, in particular, their ability to

³⁵ Barriers to crime – a crime prevention strategy, Resistance and action; Sweden’s national strategy against organised crime, Strategy against violent extremism and terrorism, <https://government.se/government-policy/efforts-to-strengthen-swedens-security>.

³⁶ Prevent, avert, protect and manage: new national strategy against violent extremism and terrorism, Press release of Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Justice, 17 Jan. 2024, <https://government.se/press-releases/2024/01/prevent-avert-protect-and-manage-new-national-strategy-against-violent-extremism-and-terrorism>.

³⁷ Planering för civil beredskap, MSB, Feb. 2023, <https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/30295.pdf>.

³⁸ Strategi för försörjningsberedskap, MSB, June 2021, <https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/29643.pdf>.



assess risks and vulnerabilities in their activities and adapt to the war technologically, logistically, and personnel-wise; ensure diversification, security and continuity of supply of critical goods and services for at least 90 days; accumulate and store reserves; quickly restore supplies in case of interruptions; act in unforeseen circumstances; carry out crisis and defence planning together with the authorities; develop joint capabilities, participate in training; ensure information security and cybersecurity, etc.

8. Developing education and training for the new civil preparedness system. 2022 marked a record-high membership in voluntary defence organisations, ranging from attending educational workshops to serving in the Volunteer Aviation Corps. One of the main tasks is **to make civil preparedness and defence an integral part of the Swedish security culture.**



FINLAND

Finland borrowed a lot from the Swedish civil defence model of the Cold War era, but after the war ended, it, unlike Sweden and most European nations, resisted the temptation of using «peace dividend» and continued to build up and improve its preparedness to respond to emergencies, including military ones. **Currently, the Finnish civil defence system is considered one of the most reliable in Europe.³⁹ In this regard, the Finnish Government sees one of its main tasks in investing in the strength of own society.**

This means increasing society's crisis tolerance and resilience, ensuring the readiness and ability to act of the political and administrative leadership of the country, updating legislation, and investing in defence and intelligence. The Finnish tradition of comprehensive «societal security» offers an excellent basis for national cooperation on hybrid influence between various actors: government, local governments, civil society, and business actors.⁴⁰

³⁹ Press statement by President von der Leyen with former Finnish President Niinistö, European Commission, 20 Mar. 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_1602.

⁴⁰ K.Pynnöniemi, S.Caapi, «Hybrid influence – lessons from Finland», *NATO Review*, 28 June 2017, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2017/06/28/hybrid-influence-lessons-from-finland/index.html>.



Ensuring security in case of war builds on the «Total Defence». This requires a combination of military and civilian defence and means that all ministries and agencies have plans for emergencies or armed conflicts. Each organisation is given certain powers for both peacetime and wartime. Emergency plans are put into effect by a special law introduced by the President and approved by Parliament.

From own experience, Finland is aware that neighbouring a potentially hostile terrorist state it must be constantly ready for «unpleasant surprises». After joining NATO, as an outpost on the Alliance's northern flank, Finland must become an insurmountable barrier to the Kremlin's imperial ambitions, be able to protect its own population and critical infrastructure from threats of any origin and demonstrate the will and readiness to defend state sovereignty.

In Finland, they consider the following as the main components of the country's readiness for war:⁴¹

- ✓ Supplies: at least six months of all major fuels and grains sit in strategic stockpiles, while pharmaceutical companies are obliged to have 3-10 months' worth of all imported drugs on hand; total amount of the available crisis fund is 2.5 billion.
- ✓ Civilian defences: all buildings above a certain size have to have their own bomb shelters, and the rest of the population can use underground car parks, ice rinks and swimming pools which stand ready to be converted into evacuation centres.
- ✓ Trained fighters: almost a third of the adult population is a reservist, meaning Finland can draw on one of the biggest militaries relative to its size in Europe. In total, 10,000 people have been trained in national defence courses over the past six decades; a further 60,000 have attended regional defence courses.
- ✓ «Comprehensive security» strategy: rigorous, society-wide system to protect itself ahead of time – planning not just for a potential invasion, but also for natural disasters or cyberattacks or a pandemic.

⁴¹ Milne R. «War with Russia? Finland has a plan for that», *Financial Times*, 28 Mar. 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/c5e376f9-7351-40d3-b058-1873b2ef1924?fbclid=IwAR3_-iAUuuZN-nJ9H7AMJKAqavt72cQoOv3ItOXWDWUamfbDQ5Pffu6TX6k.



- ✓ Informal networks between the elites of the political, business and NGO worlds that are ready to work together, adjust the current defence plan, and create as much resilience in the system as possible before a crisis occurs.

Finland has a rich experience of public-private partnerships in the areas of social resilience, civil preparedness, mobilisation reserve training, and voluntary national defence.⁴² Voluntary national defence and the coordination of activities in this area is done by the Ministry of Defence. Founded in 1955, the Finnish Reservists' Association (FRA) unites 326 local organisations with a total of 37,000 members. The main purpose of FRA is to support the military skills and morale of reservists. 90% of the FRA's members are those who have already completed military service, but the organisation is open to people who have not served in the army. The only requirements are to be over 18 years of age and have Finnish citizenship. The FRA cooperates with the Finnish Reserve Officers' Federation, the Defence Guilds' Federation of Finland and other voluntary defence NGOs in the country. The FRA is a member of the National Defence Training Association of Finland, which trains and educates citizens to be prepared for and to survive dangerous situations.

The National Defence Training Association of Finland is a non-governmental organisation with regional and local offices, approximately 60 permanent staff and about 2,000 volunteer instructors. Its responsibilities are as follows:⁴³

- ✓ organise basic military training and training that contributes to defence capabilities within voluntary national defence, as well as to carry out public information, promotion and awareness work related to voluntary national defence;
- ✓ improve opportunities for women to participate in voluntary national defence and arrange their military training;
- ✓ monitor, support and coordinate national defence training conducted by its member organisations.

⁴² Szymański, P. «Z Rosją za miedzą/ Polityka bezpieczeństwa Finlandii», Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/z_rosja-za-miedza2_net.pdf.

⁴³ «Szymański: Finns impress with their willingness to defend themselves (interview)», Techmash 19 June 2024, <https://metalloobrobotka.org.ua/article/shimanskij-fini-vrazhayut-svo%D1%94yu-gotovnisty-zahishhatisya-intervyu/> (in Ukrainian).



The Association works closely with the armed forces and coordinates volunteer activities in the field of national defence. It organises additional exercises and training for reservists, conducts educational activities on national defence, and follows exercises orga-

nised by 15 other voluntary defence organisations. The Association also provides training for civilians and instructors. Its training courses cover survival skills (orienteering, food search, shelter construction), self-defence, firefighting, tactical medicine, search and rescue, shooting, handling explosives, driving civilian and military vehicles, road safety, maritime navigation, and the use of radio equipment. The Association also organises specialised courses for the authorities in evacuation, sheltering, and providing essential services to a large number of civilians. Every year, about 50,000 people take part in these courses.

The Finnish government actively supports the activities of voluntary defence organisations. Finland's defence budget has a separate expenditure item «Financing of organisations that provide reserves training (outside the Armed Forces) and support for military-patriotic structures». This item is funded on the basis of the Voluntary National Defence Act and provides for expenditures on military training and military honours in case of death or loss of life of servicemen.



THE NETHERLANDS⁴⁴

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has an effective mechanism of cooperation between state and local authorities, non-governmental organisations and businesses on national security and social resilience, implemented

⁴⁴ O.Reznikova, K.Voytovsky, A.Lepinov, «Organisation of the national resilience system at the regional and local levels», Analytical report, Centre for Security Studies, Kyiv 2021, p. 11-22, https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-09/analytrep_08_2021.pdf (in Ukrainian), <https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-04/ad-regional-resilience.pdf> (resume in English).




through the institution of safety regions. Its primary goal is to develop the resilience of local communities to emergencies and crises.

The Netherlands is administratively divided into 12 provinces, which in turn are divided into 352 municipalities. In order to integrate capacities of local communities to effectively respond to emergencies and crises, a network of 25 safety regions has been formed within the 12 provinces. From one to four safety regions may operate in one province on a decentralised basis. Each region encompasses 6 (Flevoland) to 24 (Utrecht) municipalities. Local communities (municipalities) are grouped into safety regions based on their specific risks and threats, as well as the security environment in a particular area of the country, its borders with neighbours – Germany and Belgium. The Law on Safety Regions,⁴⁵ which regulates relations in the area of national resilience, is in line with international agreements on border relations with neighbouring countries and EU legislation.

Safety region is a special format of public administration in the field of regional security and resilience, which combines the capabilities of several territorial communities, creating a joint governing body and legal regulation to ensure effective coordination and enhanced cooperation.

The main function of safety regions is to make sure that united territorial communities respond effectively to local emergencies. This is done by introducing a unified system of security and social resilience, integrating resources and capabilities and their rational use, and ensuring a high level of preparedness. In this regard,



it is important to establish adequate interaction between municipalities and local communities, first responders (fire, rescue, medical, environmental, epidemiological, flood control, police, emergency services, etc.), anti-crisis management, logistics, information, consulting support of districts, private

⁴⁵ Wet veiligheidsregio's, Geredigeerde 1 Jan. 2019, <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0027466/2019-01-01>.



enterprises and volunteer organisations, local units of state bodies (primarily, security forces: army and navy, coast guard, special services, government agencies), and local authorities.

The main tasks of safety regions are as follows:

- ✓ analysing and assessing risks and disaster management capacities;
- ✓ planning in the field of security and social resilience of united territorial communities;
- ✓ advising the safety region entities on disaster risks;
- ✓ ensuring the development of resilience of communities and critical infrastructure to socially significant hazards, increasing their preparedness for crises, as well as introducing an appropriate system of training of the population and emergency response services to act in emergency situations;
- ✓ coordinating and ensuring the development of emergency response services, emergency medical care units, operational and technical support, supply of necessary technical means, etc.;
- ✓ organising prevention and response to emergencies, ensuring the development of engineering infrastructure for protection in the safety region;
- ✓ ensuring proper information exchange between the safety region entities (as well as with neighbouring regions, the Ministry of Security and Justice, the army, etc.), development of security information centres, uninterrupted operation of cyber systems, and establishment of sustainable communications with the population;
- ✓ ensuring the development of the civil defence system in the safety region within the framework of civil-military cooperation and volunteer activities;
- ✓ fostering cross-border cooperation (in the border regions) in joint response to threats, emergencies and crises with neighbouring territorial communities of Belgium and Germany.



The general management of safety regions is carried out by councils made of the mayors of the municipalities that make up these regions.

The heads of safety region councils are appointed by royal decree upon the recommendation of the board of mayors after being heard by the royal commissioner. Separate sectoral councils are established and operate, headed by the directors of the relevant departments. The chief provincial prosecutor (or his/her deputy), the head of the water department, and the royal commissioner, who acts as an intermediary between the safety region and the Government, are required to attend the meetings of safety region councils. The heads of councils appoint municipal coordinators. In times of crisis, additional operations managers are appointed to oversee the overall management of the safety region's response services

Each safety region has a policy group (consisting of municipal leaders and the prosecutor) responsible for crisis management and security policy development.

In the event of emergency, a regional operational group (consisting of directors of



municipal emergency services) is assembled to organise disaster management. The group is headed by the head of regional operations.

At the municipal level, the same principle is used for setting up a system of collegial advisory bodies and working groups. The activities of municipal operational services are coordinated by a single operational control centre, which operates at the office of the board of a particular safety region. Local businesses and NGOs are involved in disaster prevention and response. The governing bodies of the safety regions annually conclude cooperation and social responsibility agreements with them.

A unified system of monitoring and dispatch services has been established at the national, regional and municipal levels to ensure operational control over the security situation. To ensure proper information provision, security information centres have been established in safety regions, and a unified communication system for information sharing was put in place to ensure effective interaction between safety regions. The country has



well-developed systems of communication with the population and its notification. Each safety region runs its own website.

The network of safety regions is a key element of the country's crisis management system, linking the development and implementation of national security and social resilience policy of the Netherlands at the central and local levels. Government agencies do not interfere in the development and implementation of relevant policies of safety regions. At the same time, safety regions are required to follow the provisions of the law and generally accepted approaches to the development of such a policy, consider national risks and threats specific to their territories, the country's capabilities, as well as the goals and objectives of the state, the implementation of which is mandatory for administrative territories in accordance with the National Risk Profile.⁴⁶



In the event of local emergencies, central authorities do not interfere with the actions of safety districts, which have to offset the consequences of natural disasters or other hazards on their own but may expect reimbursement from the state. In case of nation-wide emergency and other crisis situations, the central authorities, such as the

Ministry of Justice and Security and the National Coordinator for Security and Counter-Terrorism, have the right to intervene in the process of localisation and elimination of the consequences.

At the national level, the Security Council under the Ministry of Justice and Security is an important coordinating, collegial and advisory body for safety regions.⁴⁷ Its main function is to set priorities for safety regions and to monitor the realization of security and resilience policies in local communities. The Council consists of 25 representatives of safety regions elected at sessions of relevant safety region councils. The functions of the Security

⁴⁶ National Risk Profile, 2016, https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/Dutch%20National%20Risk%20Profile%202016_english.pdf.

⁴⁷ Over het Veiligheidsberaad, <https://www.veiligheidsberaad.nl/over-het-veiligheidsberaad>.

Council include discussing a variety of urgent issues faced by safety regions; setting security and resilience priorities for local communities based on the analysis of current and projected development of the security environment; making important joint decisions in the area of security and resilience of united territorial communities; and promoting interaction and coherence of safety regions.

An important area safety regions' activity is planning measures to ensure the security and resilience of united territorial communities. This involves the development of a number of publicly available documents:

- ✓ Regional risk profile⁴⁸ and digital map of risks (for the public);⁴⁹
- ✓ Security policy implementation plan for the safety region describing scenarios for the operational activities of security and police services and organisations in the region, as well as actions of municipalities during disaster relief and crisis management; information exchange between safety region entities, as well as with neighbouring regions and their first responders; planned measures within the policy of ensuring security and resilience of local communities; the procedure for consultations, dissemination of necessary knowledge and skills among interested competent response agencies, forces and means available in the safety region and its municipalities; guidelines for emergency response services and private organisations in the safety region in case of emergency; time standards for emergency response for the relevant services of the region.
- ✓ Safety region crisis response plan of similar content,⁵⁰ its annex – the Disaster response plan (for private partners involved in emergency response in the region), and the Coordinated regional incident response procedure.⁵¹ The municipalities in the safety region can make proposals for the inclusion of



⁴⁸ Regionaal Risicoprofiel 2023-2027, https://www.vrmwb.nl/media/qnmkutwa/regionaal-risicoprofiel-2023_2027.pdf.

⁴⁹ Risicokaart.nl geeft inzicht in veiligheid, <https://www.risicokaart.nl>.

⁵⁰ Regionaal crisisplan, https://www.vrhm.nl/sites/default/files/2023-11/regionaal_crisisplan_deel_1_0.pdf.

⁵¹ GRIP en de flexibele toepassing ervan, <https://nipv.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/20170523-IFV-GRIP-en-de-flexibele-toepassing.pdf>.



their specific risks and countermeasures in the planning documents. These documents are approved by the relevant safety region council. Based on these plans, they develop or update emergency response protocols and procedures for interaction, rules, instructions, and guidelines for the safety region's entities (primarily first responders).

CONCLUSIONS

In NATO, the EU, and its member states, **the resilience system is a part of collective and national security systems. This makes the relevant policies and measures targeted, interdependent and complementary. In general, such measures are as follows:**

- ✓ comprehensive forecasting, analysis and assessment of risks and threats, their sources, methods of realisation and dynamics of development; modelling of crisis and conflict situations; identifying own vulnerabilities and determining the needs for forces and means;
- ✓ planning and implementing measures to ensure collective (national) security, social resilience, formation of necessary forces and means; ensuring readiness of military and civilian components; identifying and addressing the needs for regulatory, organisational, personnel, information and resource support for their functioning and processes in general;
- ✓ responding to risks and threats, preventing their escalation into crisis and conflict situations; managing and resolving crises and conflicts; ensuring coordination of actions of all stakeholders, involving internal and external partners on mutually beneficial terms;
- ✓ ensuring ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the collective (national) security policy, crisis and conflict management processes, and adjusting relevant policies and plans.

Setting up specialised sectoral (functional), regionally dispersed mechanisms interconnected by a single main goal, awareness of resource constraints and the need for complementarity, and the coordinating role of the central government is a useful practice typical for NATO, the EU and their member states. Organisation of their activities on the principles



of subsidiarity, multi-level decentralisation, horizontal interaction and vertical coordination, accountability and responsibility ensure successful implementation of relevant strategies, plans and programmes.

The political leadership of NATO, the EU, and their member states pays considerable attention to enhancing the role of non-state actors in ensuring collective and national security, resilience, and preparedness. In particular, non-governmental think tanks are actively involved in forecasting and assessing risks and threats, organising cyber defence and information hygiene measures. Specialised NGOs make a significant contribution to the training of the population and military reserves. In turn, the role of the state is to set goals, regulate, coordinate and provide resources for the activities of non-state actors.

A separate activity area of the state and non-state actors in European countries **is to raise awareness in society that national security, resilience and preparedness is «everyone's matter», and to make citizens feel their ownership and responsibility for this matter and for its success.** This requires effective communication channels of the state with society and businesses, sharing relevant content, and protecting these channels from the influence of political forces that preach populism, radicalism and extremism, or reducing such an influence.

The implementation of these approaches contributes to the formation of relevant security culture in government agencies and society, raises the level of self-organisation of the public and its trust in the authorities, reduces anxiety, confusion, nervousness and vulnerability to direct and indirect consequences of threats, crises and conflict situations, and thus enhances social resilience.⁵²

⁵² O.Reznikova, K.Voytovsky, A.Lepinov, «Organisation of the national resilience system at the regional and local levels», Analytical report, Centre for Security Studies, Kyiv 2021, p.211, https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-09/analytrep_08_2021.pdf (in Ukrainian), <https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-04/ad-regional-resilience.pdf> (resume in English).

II. STATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY IN UKRAINE: IN SEARCH FOR RATIONAL APPROACHES

The concepts of resilience and preparedness have emerged, consolidated and gained significance in Ukraine's security discourse following similar developments in NATO, the EU, and their member states. There are several reasons for this. First, undermining the state and society's resilience and preparedness to respond to crises, including interference by another country, is one of the main goals of hybrid influences practiced by Russia in relation to the European agenda and Europe's ability to defend itself against hybrid threats. Second, resilience and preparedness have proven to be weak points of European nations and collective security systems in the face of growing (and externally driven) political turbulence, declining solidarity and the «sudden» challenges posed by Russia's war against Ukraine.

However, unlike European countries, Ukraine has many more weaknesses and, accordingly, areas of attention to ensure necessary levels of security and development. That is why, in an effort to meet European standards, the concept of resilience in the Ukrainian context has acquired many additional features not inherent in its classical definition.¹ It would be nothing wrong if this was limited to the theory and accompanied by discussion of reasonable and useful comments from both supporters and opponents of this approach. However,

¹ National Resilience of Ukraine: Hybrid Threats Challenge Response and Prevention Strategy: National Report / ed. by S.PyrozHKov et al. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, p. 11-32, <https://files.nas.gov.ua/PublicMessages/Documents/0/2022/06/220624133824484-8851.pdf> (in Ukrainian); O.Reznikova, «National Resilience in a Changing Security Environment», NISS, https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2023-01/National%20Resilience_EN.pdf. In particular, this refers to the lack of necessary pre-conditions for creating a national resilience system in Ukraine: a coherent conceptual and methodological framework, regulatory base, organisational foundations, trained personnel, etc.



when controversial proposals fall into the hands of interested politicians and politically motivated managers, they, even at times of war, often turn into initiatives for structural changes, new positions, questionable personnel changes, revision of the existing division of powers and, ultimately, unnecessary duplication and confusion in the functioning of the national security system (NSS).² From the cost/efficiency viewpoint, it would be more appropriate to focus on substantial improvement of the existing NSS, including its important component of ensuring resilience.

THE BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE


Taking into account the definition of concepts (box on p.XX), each NSS element with particular capabilities and its interaction with other elements implement the system's respective properties as a whole and ensure the fulfilment of its ultimate function – achieving a condition (range of conditions) of society, the state and their environment in which there are no threats to national values, their bearers (people, public institutions, businesses), strategic development goals and processes of their implementation, or a condition in which society and the state are reliably protected from existing and potential threats.

If NSS is ineffective, the reason for this is not only the wrongly chosen concept – «security» or «resilience» – but also largely unsystematic approaches to organising, supporting and managing the development and operation of the system (both NSS and sustainable socio-economic development) and lack of attention to the balanced implementation of the following properties (abilities) of the state and society:

1. **Strategic vision.** Wider range of anticipated risks and threats, more detailed analysis of these risks, more thoroughly elaborated plans for the NSS development and functioning and better resource provision narrow the space for uncertainty and surprises, thus increasing the opportunities for ensuring **preparedness** to respond and **adapt** to destructive impacts. This is achieved by the following sequence of measures³:

² The Concept of Ensuring the National Resilience System, approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 479 of 27 September 2021, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4792021-40181>.

³ For more information on the methodological framework of building a rational national security system, see: Defence Policy: The Need for Reforms of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A collection of materials based on the results of public consultations. – Kyiv: Zapovit, 2011.



- ✓ identification and assessment of threats and defence against them (national values, interests, their bearers, processes of achieving strategic goals), taking into account the geographical, economic, social and other peculiarities of Ukraine;
- ✓ assessment of the security environment; identification of risks and threats; analysis of categories of threats (natural and man-made accidents and disasters, climate change, terrorism, armed attacks, etc.) along



with their connections, origins, methods of implementation, forces and means involved, development dynamics (from the emergence of contradictions to crisis and conflict situations) – of each risk and threat; creation of the risk register;

- ✓ preliminary definition of the desired outcomes of protecting national interests and political priorities in countering risks and threats;
 - ✓ possible scenarios of hazardous situations; identification of weaknesses and strengths of the threat protection system; assessment of existing and identification of necessary capacities to counter threats and achieve desired outcomes; identification of forces and means, reserves, and methods of their use for implementing these capacities; development of a catalogue of *strategic* and *operational* capacities;
 - ✓ preliminary planning of building the necessary capacities, development of response plans for hazardous situations (from natural disasters, man-made accidents and catastrophes to armed conflict), defining and working out the procedure and rules for interaction and coordination;
 - ✓ assessment of available and necessary resource capabilities, identification of their sources (internal and, if necessary, external), planning of resource provision;
 - ✓ elaboration of conceptual, strategic and planning documents;
 - ✓ arrangements for the implementation of planned tasks, their resource provision, monitoring, reporting, and timely adjustments to plans.
2. The ability to **prevent** threats and **avoid** their impact. This should be achieved through a set of the following measures:
- ✓ membership in NATO and the EU, along with their umbrella of collective defence and joint security and development actions;
 - ✓ creation of Ukraine's own deterrence potential (missile «shield and sword», powerful armed forces, strong territorial defence, effective civil defence, powerful defence industry, unified society) sufficient to force a potential enemy to abandon aggressive plans;



- ✓ improvements in foreign policy and creation of Ukraine's international image as a desirable and reliable partner, addressing contradictions with other countries at the earliest possible stage of their emergence using the methods of state and public diplomacy;
 - ✓ participation in international mechanisms of influence (diplomacy, sanctions, information campaigns, etc.) on states that pose threats to peace and world order.
3. The ability to **resist, defend** oneself, and **remain unaffected** by destructive factors:
- ✓ ability of central and local authorities, political, economic and social actors, all law enforcement agencies, the civil defence system, transport and energy systems, service providers, and the population as a whole to move from a state of preparedness to a threat protection mode in full or in part (depending on the nature and scale of the crisis) as soon as possible;
 - ✓ country-wide introduction of a reliable system of uninterrupted public information and warning;
 - ✓ installation of the most reliable echeloned systems of radio intelligence, electronic warfare, air and missile defence, and naval defence to protect troops, critical infrastructure, and settlements from air and sea attacks;
 - ✓ establishment of an extensive network of shelters and protective structures for the population and critical infrastructure, taking into account regional peculiarities;
 - ✓ constant improvement of means and methods of protection against cyberattacks, hostile propaganda and disinformation, along with ensuring «information hygiene».
4. **Resilience**, that is, the ability of state and societal institutions to consistently maintain functionality in the face of crises (political, economic, security) within acceptable efficiency ranges and ensure the return to equilibrium (nominal efficiency). This is achieved, in particular, by:

- ✓ professionalism of the state apparatus and local self-government bodies, their ability to navigate difficult situations, make quick but informed decisions and, ultimately, public trust in the authorities;
- ✓ stability on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptability of management procedures at the levels of the state, society, and business, on the other hand;
- ✓ presence of a «safety margin» at all levels (state, regional, individual): *operational* material and financial reserves, backup mechanisms (energy, water, food, transport) to maintain normal functioning in crisis;
- ✓ involvement of the widest possible range of state and non-state actors in timely preparation, training, exercises to develop methods and procedures for functioning in crisis situations; formation of skills in the public to keep calm and behave rationally in crisis situations, avoiding panic;
- ✓ support and promotion of self-organisation of society, mechanisms for ensuring national cohesion, self-defence, civil protection of communities, volunteer movement, business initiatives that can compensate for the functional insufficiency of state institutions at critical moments;
- ✓ commitment of Ukrainian society to traditional national values, which, in turn, requires a significant improvement in the state information and education policy with greater focus on patriotic education, as well as a review of government approaches to communication with the public and businesses;
- ✓ ability of the state and communities to find and implement mechanisms for compensation for the damage caused;
- ✓ ability to create attractive conditions for the return of refugees, which will have a significant impact on Ukraine's demographic situation in the short and long term.





5. **Survivability** is the ability of state and public institutions to continue performing their intended functions in extremely unfavourable crisis and conflict situations, even with a significant deterioration in efficiency, and to restore resilience through internal resources and external involvement. Important elements of ensuring survivability are:

- ✓ territorial dispersal of troops, military and economic infrastructure, and the establishment of reliable transport and communication networks;
- ✓ creation of a geographically dispersed energy supply system with diversified energy sources, integrated within the country and through cross-border cooperation;
- ✓ localisation of natural, man-made and military crises, elimination of their consequences, and restoration of the capacity of affected critical industrial and social infrastructure;
- ✓ availability of *strategic* financial and material reserves at the state and regional levels sufficient to meet the vital needs of the population, support the functioning of central and local governments, military and civil defence systems, and economic activity of state and non-state enterprises, services and service providers;
- ✓ timely and adequate military, financial and humanitarian assistance from foreign partners.



If one analyses each of the above points, its content and technological saturation (in terms of participants and their interaction), it is possible to conclude that interaction with state and non-state actors – state, regional and local authorities, local self-governments, NGOs, aca-

demics, experts, practitioners, and civic activists at the state, regional and local levels – is not only desirable but mandatory. The lessons learned from



the past 2.5 years of war further emphasise the need for such collaboration, including the role of volunteer units in the initial stages of Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022, the contribution of volunteer movement and donations from ordinary citizens to strengthening the Armed Forces' capabilities, the participation of independent experts, NGOs and activists, and the media in enhancing the country's preparedness and resilience.

These lessons also reveal serious systemic flaws in Ukraine's rigidly centralised NSS and – together with the experience of European countries discussed above – the possibility of mitigating, if not eliminating them by engaging non-state actors and broadly implementing the principles of **collegiality, subsidiarity, integration, continuity, focus, multi-level decentralisation of management, horizontal interaction and vertical coordination, accountability and proportional responsibility**.

THE NEED FOR MILITARISATION OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY, TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL DEFENCE SYSTEM

The word «militarisation» usually evokes a negative image of something necessarily associated with war, aggressiveness, total and rigid subordination of society to the state apparatus, and people having to give up their rights and freedoms.

In fact, the definition of militarisation is quite conditional and depends on the type and form of state system (authoritarian or democratic), the direction and goals of state policy (aggression or deterrence of aggression), the conditions in which it takes place (wartime or peacetime), and the degree of coverage of public life (total or partial). Examples from history include Nazi Germany and the USSR during WWII, Israel throughout its history, and modern Russia and Ukraine – all these provide insight into such differences.

In the case of Ukraine, militarisation is viewed as a necessary, forced measure to ensure the readiness of the state and society to defend against aggression from a neighbouring state, even in times of peace and after the aggressor's potential defeat and collapse.

The militarisation (securitisation) of the state and society refers to a shift in priorities, views and motivations of the state authorities, business and society towards preparing and mobilising financial, economic, material, and



human resources in peacetime and wartime to deter potential aggression, preserve the stability and resilience of state institutions, the economy, energy, information space, communities, and society in general in the face of hybrid influence of negative factors.

In particular, an opinion poll conducted in March 2024 by the Razumkov Centre found that 67% of Ukrainian citizens are positive about changing long-term budget priorities at the state level in favour of strengthening the security and defence sector. Additionally, 64% support this at the community level, and about 50% are willing to accept such changes, even if they negatively affect their personal/family budgets.⁴

One aspect of militarisation – a tool for promoting national preparedness, security, resilience and sustainability – is the creation of an effective civil defence system that caters to the needs, capabilities and specifics of Ukrainian society.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The concept of civil defence was consolidated at the interstate level with the adoption of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention IV of 1949 in 1977.^{*} This protocol defined civil defence as the performance of humanitarian tasks aimed at protecting the civilian population from danger and assisting in eliminating the immediate consequences of hostilities or disasters, as well as creating conditions necessary for their survival.

The next stage in civil defence development worldwide was linked to the end of the nuclear arms race, and necessitated adaptation to the new foreign economic environment. The Declaration on Civil Defence, signed at the 10th World Conference on Civil Defence in 1994, marked a shift towards a broader concept, encompassing more than just civil defence. This shift influenced the transformation of Ukraine's civil defence system, which was originally based on the post-Soviet system, into a civil protection system.^{**}

Indeed, civil defence and civil protection have overlapping areas of application, but civil protection has a broader scope and tasks, particularly in terms of international humanitarian assistance. This primarily affects the activities of the relevant UN

⁴ «Is the militarisation of Ukrainian society necessary: citizens' attitudes». The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service from 21 to 27 March 2024 as part of the ENGAGE activity, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact in Ukraine. <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/chy-potribna-militaryzatsiia-ukrainskogo-suspilstva-stavlennia-gromadian-berezen-2024r>.



agencies, which are more accustomed to (and more comfortable and profitable with) addressing crisis situations without the use of force. However, war-related disasters have similar consequences to natural and man-made emergencies, and often have a greater impact.

Since the end of the Cold War, the benefits have diminished, strategic nuclear arms reduction negotiations have stalled, authoritarian regimes have become more aggressive, and references to hybrid threats have become more common. Full-scale wars, previously deemed impossible, have now become a reality. Accidents and catastrophes caused by the war and human casualties have never been higher in the history of independent Ukraine, and the list is increasing daily. This necessitates a reconsideration of the nature and content of measures to ensure international security in general and civil defence in particular.

* Additional Protocol I, Part IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV of 12 August 1949), Section I, para. 62-63 – International Committee of the Red Cross, https://blogs.icrc.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/98/2023/11/0365_154-ebook.pdf.

** Civil Protection Code of Ukraine, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5403-17#Tex>.

The revision of the civil protection concept in favour of civil defence has nothing to do with a return to the post-Soviet, highly centralised, paramilitary system. In fact, it is about using the achievements of the Unified State System of Civil Protection in Ukraine, recognising its shortcomings and those of its predecessor (the civil defence system), and incorporating the standards and relevant experience of NATO, the EU and their member states.

In Ukraine, the national security functions are performed by the following specialised NSS subsystems:⁵ the unified state civil protection system; the unified state system for preventing, responding to and suppressing terrorist acts and minimising their consequences; the emergency health care system; the national cybersecurity system; the national system for protecting critical infrastructure; and the defence system (including the territorial defence system). They consist of state bodies, professional forces, voluntary organisations and formations operating at the central, regional and local levels. The synergistic effect of their activities should be achieved through interagency cooperation and state-public partnership mechanisms.

⁵ O.Reznikova, «National Resilience in a Changing Security Environment», NISS, p. 443-447, https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2023-01/National%20Resilience_EN.pdf.



The need for such mechanisms is stipulated in relevant legislation, but it is not clearly defined and poorly elaborated. Scenario modelling for various emergencies (especially in the context of hybrid threats) is not sufficiently developed and used across agencies. As a result, the mechanisms of interaction and coordination are not clearly defined in the NSS programme and planning documents. The bodies responsible for coordinating certain forces at the national, regional and local levels, ensuring inter-agency collaboration, and coordinating state and non-state actors, are either absent or have a poor understanding of their tasks. As a result, the emergence of unforeseen circumstances in the development and functioning of relevant systems leads to «manual» management, which negatively affects efficiency.



The incomplete decentralisation reforms at the regional and local levels are hindering the implementation of civil defence and the effectiveness of government interaction with society and business. This creates additional risks for the provision of public services and complicates the process of strengthening the in-

stitutional capacity of territorial communities, including their security and resilience. The main issue lies in the distribution of functions and powers, territorial responsibilities, and lack of resources at the local level.⁶

One area in which there is weak coordination between NSS subsystems is the preparation of the population for crisis situations caused by military operations. The civil defence subsystem should focus on this area and

⁶ S.Kovalivska et al. «On the Risks to the Proper Provision of Public Services Due to Changes in the Administrative and Territorial Structure of Ukraine». – NISS, <https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2020-10/publicni-poslugy-1.pdf> (in Ukrainian).



partially take over functions of other subsystems or duplicate them to improve the overall functioning of the civil defence system.⁷ Its main functions should be as follows:

- ✓ forecasting (participation in forecasting) of military risks and threats at the national, regional and local levels; developing registers and data-bases of risks and threats at the regional and local levels;
- ✓ defining and planning the tasks of civil defence forces and means at the state, regional and local levels in the event of military threats, including hybrid;
- ✓ preparing civil defence forces and means for operation in peacetime, during a special period and under martial law;
- ✓ creating and maintaining alert systems in an efficient state;
- ✓ creating and maintaining a network of facilities to protect the population against military threats;
- ✓ providing psychological, medical and other types of assistance to victims in crisis situations;
- ✓ deploying and maintaining a network of NGOs offering training courses to prepare the population, government authorities and local governments, institutions, enterprises, organisations and communities to respond to military threats and actions in a special period and martial law, and providing assistance to educational institutions on these issues;
- ✓ training the population in the proper handling of weapons;
- ✓ creating a network of volunteer formations of local communities to promote defence, planning, organising and providing comprehensive support for their activities;
- ✓ planning evacuation measures and coordinating them with the SES and local authorities;

⁷ Duplication of functions of individual system elements (single or multiple) is one way to increase the reliability of the system as a whole.



- ✓ engaging in planning state material and financial reserves;
- ✓ establishing and maintaining reliable channels of communication between government agencies, the public and businesses;
- ✓ promoting international cooperation on civil defence and protection of the population.

The main purpose of militarisation, the key to ensuring national security, and a prerequisite for successful operation of the civil defence system is the widest possible involvement of citizens in patriotic education, military training, and participation in the above activities.


DEVELOPMENT OF STATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN PROTECTING THE POPULATION AT THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

Civil defence is one of the areas of the state and society's activity where state-public partnership (SPP) can and should provide tangible «added value». The main SPP actors at the regional and local levels are local state (military) administrations, territorial divisions of state agencies, local self-government bodies, enterprises, institutions, organisations, regional networks of public analytical, educational and other organisations, public activists, and citizens.

In order to ensure effectiveness of the SPP, its various forms and platforms should be used, and the useful experience of other countries should be taken into account. Such forms and platforms may include, in particular:

- ✓ The practice of **regional, local and site commissions on technogenic and environmental safety and emergencies** (similar to local resilience forums in the UK, civil preparedness district councils in Sweden, safety region councils in the Netherlands) with the expansion of their agenda to include the following issues: hearing of representatives of territorial divisions of state executive bodies, local executive authorities, local self-government bodies on civil defence; mobilisation measures in the broad sense; planning of measures to respond to military threats; assistance to state owned and private enterprises involved in the execution of the defence order; financial and material support of civil society organisations involved in civil defence; assistance in conducting exercises, trainings on civil defence; supporting volunteer movement, etc.

- ✓ **Volunteer formations of territorial communities** (Ukrainian: dobrovolchi formuvannia terytorialnykh gromad – DFTGs) are a relatively new form of civil-military cooperation, which, with the onset of Russia's «covert» aggression in the Donbas, was used proactively and with no legal basis in many regions of Ukraine, in the form of organisations and staff to promote territorial defence. The Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of National Resistance», which entered into force on 1 January 2022, provided the legal basis for DFTG establishment and functioning.⁸ Today, in addition to performing direct tasks, they have become a resource, a training base for Ukrainian Armed Forces' recruits and for civilians to prepare them for national resistance. This is carried out with the local authorities' support, the involvement of active community members, and the support from volunteer organisations. In Ukrainian society, a DFTG member is increasingly viewed as a «volunteer with a gun». Improving the activities of DFTGs, realising their strengths and eliminating their problems requires new approaches,⁹ fundamental changes in legislative acts and bylaws, which, however, are denied by the current government.¹⁰
- ✓ **Community safety centres** can be used as a base (or separately) for hosting and operations of DFTGs, voluntary units of emergency and fire services, and municipal police. The creation of such centres has become commonplace in all regions of Ukraine, bringing together civil society activists, local governments, and territorial units of the SES and



⁸ The Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of National Resistance», <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-20#Text>.

⁹ See, in particular, Civil-Military Cooperation in Protection of Civilians during the Ukraine War. Analytical report. – Razumkov Centre, p. 53-59, <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/02/2024-Sunhurovskyi-CIVIL-WAR-ENGL-F.pdf>.

¹⁰ This relates to granting the DFTGs the status of a legal entity, restricting the right to keep and use small arms, equipping the DFTGs with weapons and vehicles, etc. See, in particular: «Draft. Expert opinions to the draft laws of Ukraine on amendments...», https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/bills_documents/document-3790361.pdf.



the National Police. Stronger cooperation between the community safety centres and Administrative Service Centres, which were established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is considered quite promising area, as their interaction will not only improve the provision of all types of services to communities, but will also encourage the social activity of citizens, facilitate their search for areas to apply their efforts for the welfare and security of the community, cohesion and resilience.



✓ Since 2014, the **military training movement** has become very popular in Ukraine. Its participants are entities of both the state¹¹ and the non-governmental sector¹² throughout the country. Qualified instructors, including members of the Armed Forces, the State Emergency Service, the National Police,

and veterans with extensive military experience, are involved in conducting military training drills for civilians and preparing the public for emergency situations. The courses cover a wide range of issues, including rules for handling weapons; marksmanship; mine and explosive safety; basics of aerial reconnaissance using UAVs; preparation for mobilisation; first aid; psychological support in warfare; preparedness for blackouts, etc. The 2-4-week courses are designed for 30-100 trainees. The main hindrance is that organisations are lacking resources and facing bureaucratic procedures in obtaining them.

¹¹ See, for example, «A seven-week course on military affairs for civilians started for the first time in Kyiv region» – Kyiv Regional State Administration, <https://koda.gov.ua/v-kyivskij-oblasti-vpersherozpochavsya-semytyzhnevij-kurs-z-vijskovoyi-spravy-dlya-czyvilnyh> (in Ukrainian).

¹² The most powerful civil society organisations in Ukraine for training civilians for military and emergency situations include, in particular: Ukrainian Legion, <https://ukraine-legion.org.ua>; Civil Awareness Centre, ran by Serhiy Prytula's Charity, <https://prytulafoundation.org/help-army/direction/czent-gotovnosti-czivilnih?city=kyiv>; Training Centre for Special Military Training of the NGO Patriot Group. <https://grupa-patriot.org.ua>; ASKOLD Special Training Centre, https://prometheus.org.ua/course/course-v1:Prometheus+GMT101+2022_T3; Arsenal Military Training School, <https://arsenal-training.com>.

- ✓ The history of a full-size **volunteer movement** in Ukraine dates back to 2014, when society mobilised all the way up from the grassroots to save the nation. With the outbreak of russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the volunteer movement to support the Ukrainian army spread spontaneously. Volunteers formed groups, and groups formed organisations. In just four months since the start of invasion, more than four thousand civil society organisations have been created and registered in Ukraine.¹³ The structure, professionalisation, and the quality of volunteering are gradually improving.¹⁴ In the meantime, the state, lacking human, financial and material resources, is forced to rely on the volunteer movement on the one hand, but tries not to lose its monopoly on force and support of society. Therefore, it slowly brings volunteering into the country's legal framework, taking it under its control, and where it sees a threat to its monopoly, restricting or creating difficult conditions for volunteering.¹⁵ In fact, **volunteer assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, other security agencies, and various categories of citizens has turned out to be a mechanism for society to compensate for the state's inadequate capacity to perform the relevant functions.**

- ✓ **Public-private partnerships** (PPPs) could become an effective form of the state's interaction with businesses and the public across many areas, from services in planning, creation, reform and development of security structures to logistics, security services, participation in law enforcement,



¹³ 4,365 NGOs and charitable organisations established in Ukraine during the full-scale war – Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, <https://cedem.org.ua/en/news/4365-gromadskyh-ta-blagodijnyh/>.

¹⁴ T.Melezhyk, «Ukrainian volunteers and foundations that help the country the most during the war» – *TSN Ukraine*, <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/top-volonteriv-ta-fondiv-yaki-zaluchili-naybilshhe-groshey-dlya-shvidshoyi-peremogi-ukrayini-2181787.html> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁵ N.Povtar, What's wrong with the government aid to volunteers during the war – Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, <https://cedem.org.ua/analytics/volontery-dopomoga-strahuvannya>.



etc.¹⁶ The private sector has a number of advantages, such as the ability to freely attract funds and resources; more efficient and unregulated management; efficiency; technical and professional potential. PPPs in the security sector are the most developed but require significant improvements in the emergency management and defence. In particular, the goal of PPPs in the emergency management is not to maximise joint profits, but to minimise costs by limiting budgetary expenditures by the state and the profits of the private enterprise involved in the crisis management.¹⁷

In Ukraine's defence industry, the share of the state has been decreasing notably in favour of the private sector: while the share of private producers in 2015 was only 23% of the total weapons and military equipment order, in 2023 private companies already owned 4/5 of the defence market.¹⁸ During the war, the production of drones and other military equipment was almost entirely on the shoulders of the private sector. Yet the state has failed to set up effective PPP instruments, build a system for selecting results in priority areas of research, basic and critical technologies, and create a system to improve the efficiency of intellectual property rights management in the field of defence technologies. At the same time, artificial criminalisation of economic, financial and other civil law relations has become widespread in Ukraine, aimed not at prosecuting crimes, but solely at putting pressure on businesses. Under such conditions, businesses are more likely to care not so much about the security of the state as about own security from the state. This essentially negates the possibility of establishing and developing a relationship of trust between the state and business, which is the central for PPPs.¹⁹

¹⁶ For more information on the PPP legal framework, forms, and practical experience, see: O.Markeeva, B.Rozvadovskyi, et al. «The State and the Private Sector Defending the National Security: From Cooperation to Partnership. Analytical Report.» – NISS, https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-12/block_markeeva_n.pdf; S.Kudinov, «Public-Private Partnership in the Field of National Security – a Modern Dimension for Ukraine» – South Ukrainian Law Journal, pp. 108-114, <http://www.sulj.oduvs.od.ua/archive/2023/4/20.pdf>.

¹⁷ O.Markeeva (reference 16), p. 11.

¹⁸ Performance Results of the Ministry of Strategic Industries and Ukroboronprom for 2023 – Ministry of Strategic Industries, <https://mspu.gov.ua/news/rezultaty-dialnosti-minstratsepromu-ta-ukroboronpromu-za-2023-rik>.

¹⁹ O.Markeeva (reference 16), p. 36.

The militarisation of the state and society in peacetime is a reality and a significant challenge for Ukraine. One area of militarisation and one mechanism for its implementation is the introduction of a civil defence system, which should be fundamentally different from the post-Soviet model.

Collegiality, subsidiarity, integration, continuity, focus, multi-level decentralisation, horizontal interaction and vertical coordination, accountability and proportional responsibility should be the main principles of organising and functioning of the civil defence system.

One way to improve the NSS effectiveness is to introduce a large-scale state-public partnership. Today, the main restricting factor to its development is the unwillingness of the state to establish and maintain equal relations with non-state partners.



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The concept of resilience has become trendy in Ukrainian security discourse. Ensuring resilience has become a separate area of the country's security policy. One explanation for this is the need to comply with EU and NATO standards, where preparedness and resilience are indeed among the main components of security policy. This happened mainly and largely as a result of the realisation by Western collective security institutions of the lessons of Russia's «covert» aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and its transformation into a full-scale war in 2022, as well as the consequences of the Kremlin's subversive activities in Western countries. These lessons show that, first, the resilience and preparedness of the West are the main targets of Russia's hybrid influences, and second, the resilience and preparedness have proven to be the main weaknesses of European nations and their collective security systems against the growing political turbulence, declining solidarity, and growing economic challenges caused by the Russia-Ukraine war.

For Ukraine, which has many more weaknesses and, accordingly, areas for improving its security and development, it would be more appropriate to focus not on introducing a new and unsupported area – national resilience – but on significantly enhancing the existing national security system, including resilience as one of its components.

2. Setting up specialised sectoral (functional), regionally dispersed mechanisms interconnected by a single main goal, awareness of resource constraints and the need for complementarity, and the coordinating role of the central government is a good practice typical for NATO, the EU and their member states.

A separate activity area of the state and non-state actors in European countries is to raise awareness in society that national security, resilience and preparedness is «everyone's matter», and to make citizens feel their ownership and responsibility for this matter and for its success. This requires effective communication channels of the state with society

and businesses, sharing relevant content, and protecting these channels from the influence of political forces that preach populism, radicalism and extremism, or reducing such an influence.

Due consideration of the positive experience of NATO, the EU and its member states will contribute to the formation of relevant security culture in government agencies and society, raise the level of self-organisation of the public and its trust in the authorities, reduce anxiety, confusion, nervousness and vulnerability to direct and indirect consequences of threats, crises and conflict situations, and thus enhance social resilience.

3. The need for **militarisation of the state and society** is becoming a very relevant for Ukraine – **as a forced measure to ensure the nation's readiness in peacetime and wartime to defend itself against aggression from a neighbouring state**. The militarisation (securitisation) of the state and society refers to a shift in priorities, views and motivations of the state authorities, business and society towards preparing and mobilising financial, economic, material, and human resources in peacetime and wartime to deter potential aggression, preserve the stability and resilience of state institutions, the economy, energy, information space, communities, and society in general in the face of hybrid influence of negative factors. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians agree with the need to revise budget priorities in favour of strengthening the security sector.

4. One aspect of militarisation – a tool for promoting national preparedness, security, resilience and sustainability – is the creation of an effective civil defence system. Its main goal and a prerequisite for successful operation is the **widest possible involvement of citizens (ideally, the entire society) in patriotic education, military training, and participation in the following activities:**

- ✓ forecasting (participation in forecasting) of military risks and threats at the national, regional and local levels; developing registers and databases of risks and threats at the regional and local levels;



- ✓ defining and planning the tasks of civil defence forces and means at the state, regional and local levels in the event of military threats, including hybrid;
- ✓ preparing civil defence forces and means for operation in peacetime, during a special period and under martial law;
- ✓ creating and maintaining alert systems in an efficient state;
- ✓ creating and maintaining a network of facilities to protect the population against military threats;
- ✓ providing psychological, medical and other types of assistance to victims in crisis situations;
- ✓ deploying and maintaining a network of NGOs offering training courses to prepare the population, government authorities and local governments, institutions, enterprises, organisations and communities to respond to military threats and actions in a special period and martial law, and providing assistance to educational institutions on these issues;
- ✓ training the population in the proper handling of weapons;
- ✓ creating a network of volunteer formations of local communities to promote defence, planning, organising and providing comprehensive support for their activities;
- ✓ planning evacuation measures and coordinating them with the SES and local authorities;
- ✓ participation in planning the creation of material and financial reserves at the state, regional and local levels;
- ✓ establishing and maintaining reliable channels of communication between government agencies, the public and businesses;
- ✓ promoting international cooperation on civil defence and protection of the population.



5. Volunteer formations of territorial communities (DFTGs) are one of the tools of civil defence and a form of state-public security partnership at the local level is the. They proved themselves well during russia's covert» aggression in 2014 and the full-scale war in 2022. Improving their activities, especially by changing the state's attitude to their regulatory and resource support, is relevant both at during the war and in peacetime.

A separate area of the DFTGs' activity is their collaboration with voluntary units of emergency, rescue and fire services and municipal police. Currently, this interaction is mostly *ad hoc*, in the event of hazards. In peacetime, it would be expedient to bring them together under the aegis of community safety centres, introduce joint planning and, if necessary, joint implementation of relevant activities. As for the special period and martial law, transitional procedures should be envisaged for the transfer of these formations and services under the control of the relevant state agencies and military administrations as soon as possible.

An important area of **enhancing** the national security system is **the improvement of state-public partnerships by searching for and implementing new approaches, forms, and mechanisms of interaction between the state and the non-state sector.** Today, the main initiators are the public and businesses. In turn, the state, while lacking human, financial and material resources, is forced to rely on civil society's initiatives, but on the other hand, it tries not to lose its monopoly on force, management of resource-intensive processes and at least the perceived support of society. Therefore, it is very slow to meet them, and sometimes even limits or creates unfavourable conditions for the activities of non-state actors.

In general, state-public partnership in its many forms during the war in Ukraine has proved to be a mechanism for society to compensate for the state's inadequate capacity to perform the relevant functions.