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PEACE SUMMIT: GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT AND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

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PEACE SUMMIT: GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT AND STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

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The Peace Summit, scheduled to take place in Switzerland on 15-16 June 2024, is Kyiv's strategic initiative of regional and global scale and significance. After being presented in the autumn of 2022, the peace summit has become one of the main foreign policy priorities that Ukrainian diplomacy has been persistently promoting across the globe, at all levels and international platforms.

However, it should be borne in mind that the summit, albeit important, but only initial stage of a complex political and diplomatic process. Moreover, it is an integral part of ending the war in Ukraine. Therefore, the summit's success depends on many other factors, including the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ability to resist Russian intervention, international assistance, and the determination and unity of allied countries.

1. PROMOTING THE PEACE FORMULA: PECULIARITIES AND STAGES

Ukraine published and presented its Peace Formula in September-November 2022. The idea was first introduced by Ukrainian President on 22 September 2022 at the general debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly.¹ The initial version contained five points: punishment for aggression; protection of life; restoration of security and territorial integrity; security guarantees; and determination to defend oneself. An improved

and updated 10-point version was put forth by President Zelenskyy 15 November 2022 at the G20 summit in Indonesia. Since then, Ukraine launched a far-reaching political and diplomatic campaign to promote its initiative and convene a special conference called Global Peace Formula Summit to implement its Peace Formula.

The position paper «Ukraine's Peace Formula Philosophy»² outlined general approaches that are summarised in the table «General Principles of the Peace Formula» below:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PEACE FORMULA

- 1. Radiation and nuclear safety.** Any use of nuclear energy shall be safe. Russian troops shall be withdrawn from the territory of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and its territory shall be completely demilitarised. Any forms of nuclear blackmail must be stopped. Russia shall refrain from all forms of nuclear threats, clearly commit not to use nuclear weapons and not to jeopardise safety of nuclear objects.
- 2. Food security.** Matter of food security must be de-weaponised. Any actions that negatively affect production and supply of food create global risks. It is necessary to restore sovereign control of Ukraine over Ukrainian ports to ensure free, full and safe Ukrainian agricultural exports to different regions of the world.

¹ Speech by the President of Ukraine at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2022 – Official website of the President of Ukraine, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-77-yi-sesiyi-77905>.

² Ukraine's Peace Formula Philosophy, https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf

- 3. Energy security.** All efforts shall be applied to make it impossible for Russia to attack critical infrastructure objects and ensure constant protection and international monitoring of safety of Ukraine's energy facilities. Ukraine's energy infrastructure shall be restored by provision of appropriate assistance.
- 4. Release of prisoners and deported persons.** All of Ukrainian captives who are held in Russia and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea, must be released be complete exchange of prisoners of war, the release of all unlawfully detained persons, and the return of all internees and of civilians forcibly transferred and deported, including children. Meanwhile the rights of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians held by Russia shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
- 5. Restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.** The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine must be restored with respect to its entire territory within the internationally recognised borders, as of the declaration of independence of Ukraine in 1991, which includes all parts of the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation with no exceptions. States shall refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
- 6. Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities.** The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of UN Member States can be effectively upheld only when no foreign troops are illegally deployed on their territory, and the respective governments have full control over their internationally recognised borders. There is no possibility to restore Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity until Russia's troops remain on its territory. The Russian Federation shall immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and cease the hostilities.
- 7. Restoration of justice.** Accountability shall be ensured for the most serious crimes under international law committed on the territory of Ukraine through appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecutions at the national or international level. Justice shall be ensured for all victims and the prevention of future crimes. Russia must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine, including its aggression, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law. Russia must bear the legal consequences, including making reparation for the injury and damage, caused by such acts.
- 8. Ecological safety.** War against Ukraine caused large-scale environmental damage. International community shall support Ukraine in the following key directions to ensure environmental security: (1) environment damage assessment, including the impact on human health and biodiversity conservation; (2) prosecution for environmental damage; (3) recovery and reconstruction, including the green economy transition. A comprehensive system of environmental and economic recovery should include measures on Ukraine's environment renewal.
- 9. Preventing escalation and repetition of aggression.** The risk of an escalation of aggression against Ukraine will remain until its security is guaranteed by a legally binding international law, strengthened by reliable own defence capabilities and integrated into the new architecture of international security. Therefore, in order to prevent the new aggression against Ukraine, clear obligations and security commitments and arrangements should be provided to Ukraine.
- 10. Confirmation of the end of the war.** Achieving just and lasting peace is possible only if the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine is restored, along with the international legal formalisation of the end of the war. This step envisages the establishment of a clear framework for ending the war, providing security commitments and arrangements, setting conditions for post-war settlement. The end of the war would be confirmed at a peace conference to be held with participation of the widest possible range of states, taking part in the implementation of the Peace Formula. A comprehensive legally binding international agreement is to be signed by the parties with the participation of guarantor states.

This framework document obviously was only a «starting draft» outlining the structure and general approaches to the Peace Formula. It was during numerous non-public negotiations, consultations and discussions with foreign partners that a common vision of ways and mechanisms for achieving just peace for Ukraine was gradually shaped.

Of course, the international weight of the summit's decisions will strongly depend on the composition and geography of its participants. However, the involvement of diverse countries with varying views and positions necessitates mutual concessions and compromises. Therefore, as of May 2024, it is premature to discuss the structure and content of the final

document. Judging by the statements and comments of the Ukrainian leadership, the summit will prioritise three key topics: radiation and nuclear safety, food security, and the release of prisoners and deported persons. According to President Zelenskyy, «if we come out of the Summit with these three steps, with these positions agreed upon in most countries, it means that Russia will not block them any further, and we will develop a... very detailed plan for each of these points».³ German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also spoke about these three key topics in his comments to Stern magazine, emphasising that «nobody should have excessive expectations. We are not negotiating the end of the war. At best, it is the start of a process...».⁴

In general, the Ukrainian initiative builds on national interests and follows the spirit and letter of the UN Charter. This peace plan is universal in nature and will serve as a basis for integrating peace initiatives into a joint document. On the other hand, it is an incentive for further consolidation of countries from different continents in solidarity with Ukraine.

Official Kyiv has included the Peace Summit in its top foreign priorities. On 23 December 2022, at the Conference of Ambassadors of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy mentioned the Peace Formula implementation as one of the «very important areas of work in the coming year».⁵ In August 2023, during an emergency meeting of ambassadors, the President singled out the Peace Formula as the top five foreign policy priorities. He further outlined the Ukrainian Peace Formula as one of the most promising directions of Ukraine's foreign policy in a speech to representatives of the diplomatic service on 22 December 2023. On 12 April 2024, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, in a speech at an international conference in Kyiv, named a Peace Summit in

Switzerland as one of the main foreign policy directions.⁶

To advance this initiative, Ukraine used various diplomatic instruments and negotiation formats.

First, high- and higher-level negotiations.

As part of an intense political and diplomatic marathon, Ukraine has been actively engaging in bilateral dialogue at the presidential and ministerial levels to gather support for the Peace Formula and a global summit based on it. This topic was in the limelight of numerous talks between the President of Ukraine and leaders of European countries, as well as heads of state from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, etc.⁷

Second, consultations of security advisers.

This is the main political and diplomatic negotiations platform for the partner countries to coordinate their positions and elaborate the final document of the Peace Summit. Looking at the four main rounds of negotiations, one can easily track the growing dynamics of participation – from 15 countries and organisations in June 2023 to 81 in January 2024.

✓ **On 25 June 2023**, consultations on the key principles of peace were held in Copenhagen, Denmark, involving national security and political advisers from Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

✓ **On 5 August 2023**, the second round of the Peace Formula talks took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, attracting representatives from 42 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, and more. The number of countries significantly increased, in particular, due to

³ A Consolidation of countries from all the continents and the Global Peace Summit will show who really wants to end the war – the President of Ukraine in an interview for AFP, 18 May 2024 – Official website of the President of Ukraine, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ob'yednannya-krayin-z-usih-kontinentiv-na-globalnomu-samiti-m-90981>.

⁴ Scholz answers whether the peace summit will discuss ending the war in Ukraine – UNIAN, 14 May 2024, <https://www.unian.ua/politics/samit-miru-u-shveytariji-scholz-rozpoviv-pro-shcho-tam-budut-govoriti-12635715.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁵ Every day you should feel that people's lives and the situation in our country depend on your work – President's speech at the Conference of Ambassadors of Ukraine, 23 December 2022 – <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shodnya-vi-mayete-vidchuvati-sho-vid-vashoyi-roboti-zalezhit-80041>.

⁶ Kuleba names five priorities for diplomats, with Patriot systems being number one – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/3851581-kuleba-nazvav-pat-prioritetiv-dla-diplomativ-patriot-na-persomu-misci.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁷ Key events and stages of Ukraine's negotiations with partners, including those related to the Peace Formula, are outlined in the Razumkov Centre's monthly assessments. See: <https://razumkov.org.ua/en/edition/annual-analytical-results-and-forecasts>.

the arrival of delegations from China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and some others. It was decided to set up working groups on the key topics of the 10 points of the Ukrainian Peace Formula.

✓ **On 28 October 2023**, the third Peace Formula meeting took place in Malta, with 66 countries and international organisations participating. This event was considered a preparatory stage for the Peace Summit, which the Ukrainian side planned to hold at the end of the year.

✓ **On 14 January 2024**, the fourth meeting of national security and foreign policy advisers on the implementation of the Peace Formula took place in Davos, Switzerland. The meeting was attended by representatives of 81 countries and international organisations.⁸

In addition to this negotiation format, the Ukrainian leadership held regular consultations with foreign diplomats to discuss various aspects of the Ukrainian peace plan. For example, in December 2023, the 10th meeting with representatives from 83 countries and three international organisations was held at Boryspil Airport to discuss the implementation of Peace Formula's tenth point on confirmation of the end of the war.⁹

Third, promotion of the Peace Formula at international events and platforms. In 2023-2024, Ukraine effectively promoted and supported its peace initiative at various international events. Importantly, the universality of the Peace Formula made it possible to lobby for it at events of different thematic orientations.

In particular, Formula's security component correlated with the topics of the Munich Security Conference (February 2023-2024), the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore, June

2023), the 3rd Summit of the Crimea Platform (August 2023) and other similar events such as the Halifax Security Forum, the 3rd Paris Peace Forum, the 2023 Warsaw Security Forum.

Formula's political, legal and humanitarian component aligned with the conferences like «United for Justice: War Crimes against Ukrainian Children», the 3rd European Political Community Summit (Granada, October 2023), «Restoring Justice for Ukraine» (The Hague, April 2024), and others.

The economic aspects looked relevant at the World Economic Forum (Davos, January 2024), the Delphi Economic Forum (April 2024), the World Bank roundtable, etc.

Promoting Formula's environmental component, Ukraine made important initiatives at the COP28 Global Climate Change Conference (December 2023, Dubai).

Concurrently, Kyiv's initiative received substantial support at permanent regional forums attended by Ukraine. In December 2023, the Nordic – Ukrainian Summit adopted a joint statement that emphasised the Nordic countries' strong support for the Ukrainian Peace Formula and confirmed their participation in the relevant summit.¹⁰ In February 2024, the Ukraine – South East Europe Summit adopted a joint declaration expressing readiness to participate in the Ukrainian Peace Formula implementation.

Fourth, support for the Peace Formula by international organisations. On 16 December 2022, in its conclusions, the European Council reiterated its readiness to support Ukraine's initiative for a just peace.¹¹ On 23 February 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution «Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive,

⁸ The number of participants increased by 15 compared to the previous event in Malta. 39 countries from Europe, 18 from Asia, 12 from Africa, 6 from South America, 3 from North America, and 2 from Oceania delegated their representatives to Davos. For more detail, see the Official website of the President of Ukraine – <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-davosi-rozpochalasya-chetverta-zustrich-radnikov-iz-pitan-88317>.

⁹ Andriy Yermak meets with foreign ambassadors at Boryspil Airport to discuss Peace Formula's tenth point on confirmation of the end of the war, 1 December 2023 – Official website of the President of Ukraine, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/v-aeroportu-borispil-vidbulasya-zustrich-andriya-yermaka-z-i-87413>.

¹⁰ Leaders of the Nordic countries reaffirm unwavering support for Ukraine at Oslo summit – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/3799824-lideri-krain-pivnicnoi-evropi-na-samiti-v-oslo-pidtvordili-nepohitnu-pidtrimku-ukraini.html> (in Ukrainian).

¹¹ EU leaders are ready to support Ukraine's peace initiatives – conclusions – Interfax-Ukraine, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/878682.html> (in Ukrainian).

just and lasting peace in Ukraine», which is fully in line with a number of Peace Formula provisions.¹² On 15 March 2023, at a meeting of the European Parliament, President of the European Council Charles Michel made a statement that the EU supports the fair Peace Formula proposed by Ukraine, and later declared support for Kyiv's peace initiative in the EU summit final document. On 17 May 2023, the 4th Council of Europe Summit emphasised political support for the Ukrainian Peace Formula.¹³ For their part, the G7 leaders supported the Ukrainian peace initiative at the summit in December 2023.¹⁴

The way to implementing the Peace Summit idea is long, complex, and controversial,

influenced by various objective and subjective factors, including domestic political trends in partner countries, opportunistic interests of individual states, regional and global processes, and the growing resistance of the aggressor and its satellites.

In assessing the process of developing the final document, it is worth noting that the above negotiation platforms have played a crucial role in summarising and processing proposals from partner countries, while numerous peace initiatives of different nature and focus have also emerged in the information space. The Table «*Selected peace plans and initiatives by individual countries*» below gives some idea of these peace-making efforts.

SELECTED PEACE PLANS AND INITIATIVES BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

Author	Content
Italy's phased peace plan¹⁵ (May 2022)	Italy has developed a plan for Ukraine, drawn up by the Foreign Ministry with the participation of the Italian government. The plan includes four stages: 1) a ceasefire and disengagement of the contact line under UN supervision; 2) Ukraine's accession to the EU in a short time and its neutral status without joining NATO; 3) a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the «disputed territories» of Donbas and Crimea to resolve the controversy over internationally recognised borders; 4) a new multilateral treaty on peace and security in Europe to ensure arms control and conflict prevention.
Mexico's proposals¹⁶ (September 2022)	Mexican President Andres Obrador announced his intention to submit a peace plan to the UN to end the war in Ukraine. The plan is to set up a mediation committee called High-Level Caucus for Dialogue and Peace, co-chaired by the Prime Minister of India, the UN Secretary General and the Pope. The mediators will immediately start negotiations with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine and reach a ceasefire in at least 5 years. Meanwhile, President Obrador spoke against anti-Russian sanctions and the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine.
The Chinese plan¹⁷ (February 2023)	In February 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published the «China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis», which consists of 12 points: 1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries; 2. Abandoning the Cold War mentality; 3. Ceasing hostilities; 4. Resuming peace talks; 5. Resolving the humanitarian crisis; 6. Protecting civilians and prisoners of war; 7. Keeping nuclear power plants safe; 8. Reducing strategic risks; 9. Facilitating grain exports; 10. Stopping unilateral sanctions; 11. Keeping industrial and supply chains stable; 12. Promoting post-conflict reconstruction.

¹² In this document, the General Assembly: a) reiterates its demand that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine... and calls for a cessation of hostilities; b) emphasises the need to ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law committed on the territory of Ukraine; c) reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders; and d) calls upon member states and international organisations to... achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

¹³ Council of Europe Summit Supports Zelenskyy's «Peace Formula», European Pravda, 17 May 2023 – <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/17/7161889/>.

¹⁴ G7 Leaders issued a statement following their virtual meeting on 6 December 2023. – <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-leaders-statement-6-december-2023>.

¹⁵ Italy presented a staged peace plan to the United Nations to end the conflict in Ukraine – UNIAN, <https://www.unian.ua/politics/italiya-peredala-on-poetapniy-mirniy-plan-po-ukrajini-novini-ukrajina-11833092.html> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁶ Mexico comes up with a peace plan for Ukraine, Podoliak calls it «playing along with Russia» – Focus, <https://focus.ua/uk/world/529735-v-meksike-pridumali-mirnyy-plan-dlya-ukrainy-podolyak-nazval-ego-podygryvaniem-rossii> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁷ China's Foreign Ministry has published a 12-point «position on settlement of the Ukrainian crisis» – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3674373-mzs-kitau-opublikovalo-poziciu-sodo-vreguluvanna-ukrainskoi-krizi-z-12-punktiv.html> (in Ukrainian).

Indonesia's peace initiatives ¹⁸ (June 2023)	Speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue defence meeting in June 2023, Indonesia's defence minister Prabowo Subianto proposed a peace plan with the following components: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ immediate ceasefire; ✓ withdrawal of troops by 15km from each party's forward position and establishment of a demilitarised zone; ✓ deployment of a peacekeeping force by the UN; ✓ holding UN referendums in the «disputed territories».
The African Union plan ¹⁹ (June 2023)	During his visit to Kyiv in June 2023, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa unveiled the African Union's position on the war in Ukraine: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peace through diplomatic negotiations; 2. De-escalation of the conflict; 3. Sovereignty of states and peoples in accordance with the UN Charter; 4. Security guarantees for all countries; 5. Free movement of grain and fertilizers ensured by both sides of the conflict; 6. Humanitarian support for victims of war; 7. Mandatory exchange of prisoners and return of children; 8. Post-war reconstruction (assistance to those affected by the war); 9. Intensification of dialogue and cooperation with African countries.
Vatican peacekeeping initiatives ²⁰ (April 2023)	In April 2023, the Pope announced the Vatican's intention to establish a «peacekeeping mission» to ease tensions between the two countries and end the war. Ukraine asked the Vatican to help with the release of prisoners. Subsequently, the Pope called for negotiations, noting that «the stronger will be the one who has the courage of the white flag».
Proposals by Brazil ²¹ (July 2023)	In July 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Silva outlined some ideas to end the war in Ukraine. In his view, Brazil, while remaining «neutral», could mediate in potential peace talks. A group of countries capable of talking to Ukraine and Russia should be created. Crimea will remain under the control of Russia, while the status of other annexed territories should be «reconsidered».
Turkey's new peace plan ²² (April 2024)	Turkey initiated and provided a negotiation platform for Ukraine-Russia talks in Istanbul in May 2022. Subsequently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put forward a number of peace initiatives. According to unofficial sources, the Turkish leader's latest peace plan provides for: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A mutual commitment by both the US and Russia not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances; 2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of another country in any way; 3. Freezing the war along the current front line; 4. A commitment to hold an all-Ukrainian referendum on the country's foreign policy in 2040, as well as referendums under international supervision in all annexed Ukrainian territories; 5. Guarantees that Ukraine remains non-aligned until 2040; 6. An exchange of all prisoners of war; 7. Russia not objecting to Ukraine joining the European Union.
Slovak proposals ²³ (May 2024)	In his speech on the occasion of the 79 th anniversary of the end of the WWII in Europe, Slovak President Peter Pellegrini called for peace talks with Russia, «to talk about a ceasefire, about peaceful scenarios». He suggested Bratislava as a venue for such talks, as it «has experience of such a summit».

Some of these peace initiatives looked like a «smokescreen» to get own dividends from the war in Ukraine, while other loud statements were mainly opportunistic, proposing the settlement of the situation by giving

Ukrainian territories to the aggressor, which is unacceptable to Kyiv (the latest Sino-Brazilian initiative of 24 May 2024 and its political peculiarities will be discussed below).

¹⁸ Peacekeepers and a referendum: Indonesia presents «peace plan» for Ukraine – UNIAN, <https://www.unian.ua/war/pripinennya-vognyu-vidvedennya-viysk-i-referendum-mirnyy-plan-indoneziji-dlya-ukrajini-12280233.html> (in Ukrainian).

¹⁹ South African President «10 components» of the African Union's position on the war in Ukraine – Radio Svoboda, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-afryka-par-myr/32462816.html> (in Ukrainian).

²⁰ Pope Francis on Russia's war against Ukraine. The one who has the courage of the white flag is stronger – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3837721-papa-rimskij-pro-vijnu-rf-proti-ukraini-silnisij-toj-v-kogo-e-muznist-pidnati-bilij-prapor.html> (in Ukrainian).

²¹ «Zelenskyy could not want everything»: Brazilian president suggests Ukraine give up Crimea – Focus, <https://focus.ua/uk/politics/559457-zelenskij-ne-mozhe-hotiti-vsogo-prezident-braziliyi-zaproponuvav-ukrajini-vidmovitsya-vid-krimu> (in Ukrainian).

²² Turkey reportedly has a new «peace plan» for Ukraine: what does the initiative envisage – TSN, <https://tsn.ua/svit/turechchina-maye-noviy-mirnyy-plan-dlya-ukrajini-scho-peredbachaye-iniciativa-zmi-2555521.html> (in Ukrainian).

²³ «Let's talk»: Slovak President «opened» a platform for «negotiations» with Russia – UNIAN, <https://www.unian.ua/world/davayte-pogovorimo-lider-slovachchini-zaproponuvav-ploshchadku-dlya-peregovoriv-z-rf-12630270.html> (in Ukrainian).

The timing of the summit has been repeatedly postponed due to the complex geopolitical situation and the ambiguous stance of some countries towards the Ukrainian initiative. Initially planned for July 2023 (500 days after the outbreak of the full-scale war), then the end of 2023, and then February 2024,²⁴ the process of promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula reached the home stretch on 15 January 2024, when an agreement was made during negotiations with the President of the Swiss Confederation Viola Amherd to hold a global peace summit in Switzerland. On 10 April 2024, the official announcement from Bern confirmed that the event would take place on 15-16 June in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock.

In general, Ukrainian diplomacy has been effective in promoting the Peace Summit initiative through a variety of coordinated political and diplomatic formats and tools, creative approaches and lobbying efforts. The scope of the dialogue has expanded, with the use of parliamentary and public diplomacy channels, as well as assistance from allied countries.²⁵

2. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UKRAINIAN PEACE PLAN

The process of achieving a just and lasting peace for Ukraine has a number of peculiarities: a) it is affected by many global and regional factors; b) it includes many components (military, political, economic, etc.); c) it involves, directly or indirectly, many players with diverse approaches and visions of peaceful world.

In general terms, the Peace Summit is essentially the beginning (or preamble) of a difficult and obviously long journey to end the war. Notably, the aggressor country will not participate. Russia's absence was clearly explained by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba: «...it makes no sense to have Russia at the negotiating table if you cannot

guarantee that it will act in good faith. There are only two ways to bring Russia to a situation where it will act in good faith. The first is success on the battlefield, and the second is the presence of a coalition of countries that share the same principles and the same approaches».²⁶

Given the above circumstances and peculiarities, and appreciating the inaugural nature of the Peace Summit, one can identify several tactical and strategic objectives of this event.

Therefore, **the overall objective of the Peace Summit is to ensure broad representation of world leaders and adopt a joint document (communiqué, declaration, joint statement) that will serve as a roadmap to end the war in Ukraine and establish a just and lasting peace.** As President Zelenskyy put it in an interview on 17 May 2024, «having a serious number of countries and a relevant communiqué will give us a diplomatic advantage».²⁷

While the decisions made at the summit will be mainly political, the support of reputable international institutions (EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE PA, G7) and world leaders will provide legitimacy and geopolitical weight to the Ukrainian initiative. On the other hand, the final document's conceptual approaches and specific measures will not only contribute to the formation of a new security architecture in Europe but also have broader geopolitical context, such as improving the means of addressing / minimising various crisis situations around the globe.

As part of the Ukrainian peace scenario, this event is to accumulate the approaches and proposals of the states that are genuinely interested in a peaceful settlement and to form a common negotiation platform. However, the process of elaborating and clarifying the final text will probably continue after the summit. According to President Zelenskyy, «After that (after the summit – ed.),

²⁴ Ukrainian President's Office considers holding Peace Formula summit in 2024 – Ukrainska Pravda, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/9/7428091/>.

²⁵ For more detail see the Razumkov Centre's analytical report «Ukraine's foreign policy in the context of geopolitical processes» (February 2024), <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/04/12/2024-PAKT-5.pdf>.

²⁶ Kuleba explained when peace negotiations with Russia are possible – Deutsche Welle, <https://www.dw.com/uk/kuleba-poasniv-koli-mozli-vi-mirni-peregovori-z-rosie-u/a-68979206> (in Ukrainian).

²⁷ Zelenskyy: The Peace Summit should result in a communiqué of leaders – Interfax, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/987368.html> (in Ukrainian).

we can arrange platforms in different countries where each of these points will be technically elaborated. And then this plan will be given to the representatives of Russia».²⁸

The summit's strategic goal is to consolidate and expand the alliance of countries that support Kyiv's peace plan and are ready to join in its implementation. This is a challenging task given the countries' diverse positions on the war in Ukraine. In this regard, the global community can be conventionally divided²⁹ into Ukraine's *allies* providing direct military and financial support to Ukraine and defending its interests on the world stage. This is an alliance of more than 50 nations with the core formed by the countries of the collective West that participate in the Ramstein group, join anti-Russian sanctions, support the creation of an international tribunal, etc. There are *countries in political solidarity with Ukraine*, which, together with Kyiv's allies, make up a group of more than 100 states that support pro-Ukrainian resolutions in the UN General Assembly. There are also *«neutral» states* that avoid clear determination regarding the Ukraine war and try to maintain contacts with Ukraine and the aggressor alike, calling for a «peaceful settlement of the conflict». These are China, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, as well as several countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. **The group of aggressor's allies** includes North Korea, Iran, Belarus, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Syria, and some others.

Ukraine's leadership has repeatedly stressed the importance of bringing as many countries as possible to the summit, sending more than 160 invitations to world leaders. While European leaders have predictably shown their support for the event, the participation of the Global South has been the subject of an intense covert struggle between the collective West and the aggressor country, and more broadly, between the democratic world and the camp of authoritarian states. In this

regard, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement on his country's participation in the summit should be considered a positive signal.

According to the Ukrainian President, as of the beginning of June 2024, as many as 107 states and international organisations have confirmed their participation in the summit,³⁰ suggesting that the event will indeed be global and able to unite the majority of countries. The involvement of leaders of international organisations that support Ukraine and advocate for peace on Ukrainian terms is also seen as a crucial factor.

In political and ideological terms, the summit is important for defining the collective West's common strategic positions on Ukraine. Unfortunately, political elites experience shortage, or rather absence of vision of tactics and strategies for countering Russian military and hybrid expansion in Europe and globally. The absence of the collective action plan for the West on Ukraine is a major concern for Kyiv. This creates problems with military and financial support for Ukraine, with the introduction of sanctions against the aggressor and its isolation in the world, etc.

Furthermore, Ukraine's allies have differing positions on key issues. The Ukrainian President highlighted this in his interview to AFP on 18 May 2024, stating that «We are in an absurd situation where the West is afraid that Russia will lose the war. And it does not want Ukraine to lose it..., everyone wants to find some kind of model to end the war quickly».³¹

Such differences concern not only the ending of the war (point 10 of the Peace Formula), but also to the forms and means of holding Russia accountable for its aggression. The debate is currently underway on the status of an international tribunal for the aggressor country (point 7 of the Peace

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ For more detail, see the Razumkov Centre's publication «Strategic partners of Ukraine» in the National Security and Defence journal, No. 3-4, 2023, p. 24-25, https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2023/10/04/NSD193-194_2022_eng.pdf (summary in English).

³⁰ Nikiforov: 107 countries and international organisations confirmed participation in the Peace Summit – Radio Svoboda, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/nykyforov-samit-myr-uchasnyky/32977041.html>.

³¹ Ukraine and allies often have different views on ending war – Zelenskyy, Interfax-Ukraine, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/987619.html>.

Formula). To this end, the international conference «Restoring Justice for Ukraine» (The Hague, 2 April 2024) adopted a declaration in which 44 nations confirmed their intention to work on establishing such a tribunal.³² Meanwhile, the issue of confiscating frozen Russian assets remains unresolved.

To summarise, the overall objective of the Peace Summit is to establish a sufficiently broad, stable and consolidated coalition of countries for promoting and implementing a single negotiation platform based on the Ukrainian peace plan to end the war in Ukraine.

3. GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PEACE SUMMIT

In the summer of 2024, Ukraine will be at the centre of several important international events, in addition to the Peace Summit. On 13-15 June, the leaders of the G7 countries will gather for a regular summit chaired by Italy. On 9-11 July, Washington will host the 75th anniversary NATO summit. Already on 18 July, about 50 European leaders will attend the 4th European Political Community Summit. On the one hand, all these events hold great significance for Ukraine, its national interests and needs in the ongoing war. On the other hand, they highlight the global multidirectional transformations occurring within the international community.

The Peace Summit itself embodies and reflects many complex geopolitical processes and trends. **First**, the event has a clear European dimension. It is vital for European countries and EU institutions that actively assist Ukraine to engage in a large-scale political and diplomatic dialogue on ending the war on the continent. The war has transformed the EU's foreign policy (primarily in the security sphere) and spurred the evolution of positions and outlooks of the European community as a whole.

Second, the Peace Summit should be viewed in the context of the ongoing conflict between the collective West and Russia. It was in response to Russian aggression that a

coalition of Ukraine's allies was formed, including the EU, US, Canada, UK, Japan, Australia, and others. The Ukrainian peace initiative aims to establish a major negotiation platform in the future, mainly focused on a de facto dialogue between the West and Russia, but also involving other international players. At the same time, the summit, along with other international events, will contribute to strengthening solidarity and the military, political, and economic unity of the collective West.

Third, Kyiv's peacekeeping initiative is of particular significance due to the fact that the Ukraine war has become a catalyst for the polarisation of the international community. It has led to a dangerous global divide – political, economic, ideological – between the democratic world (the United States, the EU, and NATO), and the camp of countries dominated by authoritarian/totalitarian tendencies, the cult of personality, and disregard for human rights (Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, Syria, Iran, etc.). These opposing centres of power are competing for influence in different regions of the world.

The struggle between the West and Russia and their allies over the participation of the Global South in the Peace Summit is driven by the growing confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism on a geopolitical scale. This struggle for the votes of countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region globalises the weight and significance of the Ukrainian peace initiative.

Ukraine recognises the importance of gaining support from non-Western countries and has recently adopted strategies to engage with countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In preparation for the summit, meetings, negotiations, and high-level consultations were held with the leaders of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Guatemala, the Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and various African countries. On the side-lines of the G7 summit (May 20, 2023), consultations have also taken place with the Presidents of Indonesia

³² 44 states in The Hague support creation of special tribunal and use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine – Ukrainska Pravda, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/3/7449398/>

and Korea and the Prime Ministers of India, Vietnam, and Australia. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has undertaken a series of «African tours» to engage with the African Union, and the Peace Formula was also promoted at the Summit of the Association of Caribbean States (25 countries). The idea of the Peace Summit was also mentioned by the Ukrainian President in addresses to the Organisation of American States and the Arab League, as well as in press conferences with representatives from Latin America and Africa.

Therefore, the ultimate goal of the summit is to reinforce and expand the coalition of nations committed to protecting freedom, universal values, international norms of coexistence, and the like.

The Chinese factor. In simple terms, Beijing's position on the war in Ukraine involves declaring a strategic partnership with Russia and not condemning Russian aggression, but at the same time avoiding conflict with the West by proclaiming abstract peace initiatives with a set of general slogans. While supporting the aggressor in the UN General Assembly, China still does not recognise the occupied territories. While not directly supplying weapons to Russia (one of main propaganda arguments), China is increasing the supply of dual-use goods, thus strengthening Russia's military-industrial complex.

This dual policy is due to the fact that China is one of the main recipients of economic super-profits from the war in the form of cheap Russian raw materials, energy resources, and monopoly presence in Russian markets under Western sanctions.³³ So, the current situation is beneficial to Beijing – the deeper Russia becomes involved in the war in Ukraine, the more it becomes dependant on China as a raw materials supplier, which gives Beijing additional trade and economic preferences. Therefore, the hope that China could pressure

Putin to end the war in Ukraine is increasingly unlikely.

The peculiarity of Beijing-Moscow relations is best illustrated by Putin's visit to China on 16–17 May 2024. Amidst lavish ceremonies, loud declarations of strategic partnership and the signing of a series of interagency agreements, the Kremlin's main goal was to gain international legitimacy for its dictator after the controversial elections, and to win political support from China.³⁴ This visit can also be seen as part of Moscow's plan to block the Peace Summit (more on this below). It is no coincidence that Putin expressed his support for the Chinese peace plan, and on the same day (17 May), it was announced that the presidents of Brazil and South Africa, who are Russia and China's BRICS allies, would not participate in the Peace Summit.³⁵

Unfortunately, the recent actions and statements of the Chinese leadership suggest that **Beijing may attempt to become an alternative peacekeeping centre, moderating a peace conference according to its own scenario, which generally aligns with the aggressor country.**

On May 24, 2024, China's top diplomat Wang Yi and Brazil's chief foreign policy advisor Celso Amorim signed a joint communiqué in support of a separate peace conference to resolve the «crisis in Ukraine» with the participation of Ukraine and Russia. This new plan includes 6 points:³⁶ a) adherence to de-escalation principles; b) dialogue and negotiations are the only way to resolve the «Ukrainian crisis»; c) a comprehensive ceasefire; d) increased humanitarian aid to «relevant regions»; e) inadmissibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction and attacks on nuclear power plants; f) opposition to «dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups». In essence, this is a new interpretation of China's abstract plan, which is supported by Moscow.

³³ See Y. Yakymenko, V. Yurchyshyn, «Rapprochement intentions or readiness for disengagement?», the Razumkov Centre's analytical report (May 2024), p. 8–13, <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/05/14/2024-PAKT-8-ENGL-2.pdf>.

³⁴ Behind the scenes of the visit. Can the Sino-Russian partnership survive Xi and Putin – Radio Svoboda, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/kytay-ta-rosiya-budyut%CA%B9-vidnosyny-na-bahato-popolin%CA%B9-vpered/32959052.html> (in Ukrainian).

³⁵ Presidents of Brazil, RSA won't attend Peace Summit in Switzerland – media – Interfax, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/987503.html>.

³⁶ China and Brazil support conference on peace in Ukraine only with Russia's participation – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/3867271-kitaj-i-brazilia-pidtrimuut-konferenciu-sodo-miru-v-ukraini-lise-za-ucasti-rf-komunike.html> (in Ukrainian).

In general, one can expect that China, in its typical fashion, will not fully ignore or support the Peace Summit, but rather attend the event as a low-ranking, detached observer.

The Russian factor. Moscow has categorically rejected Ukraine's initiative for ending the war and is promoting its own vision, which includes absurd «demilitarisation» and «denazification» of Ukraine, a ban on NATO membership, and recognition of Russia's sovereignty over the occupied territories. No one really expects that Russia will agree with the proposals of the Peace Summit and abandon its own positions. However, the summit does pose a challenge and a threat to the Putin regime, which is why Moscow has used all possible tools and means of hybrid aggression to block and disrupt this event. According to President Zelenskyy, «We have accurate information from intelligence – precise data – that Russia not only wants to disrupt the Peace Summit, but also has a concrete plan to do so...».³⁷

One can distinguish the following components of Russia's plan to disrupt the Peace Summit.

Subversive and sabotage activities (primarily in Europe) are aimed at destabilising the socio-political situation, generating crises, and inciting distrust to the governments of countries supporting the Peace Summit. NATO's statement of 2 May 2024 specifically mentions Russia's intensified activities in the form of «sabotage, acts of violence, cyber and electronic interference, disinformation campaigns and other hybrid operations». Russia has carried out hybrid attacks in the Czechia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, the United Kingdom, etc.³⁸ Explosions at military and critical infrastructure facilities in Germany and Norway were prevented. Russian Portal

Kombat websites was exposed in France. Belgium is investigating allegations of Russian financing of MEPs. European politicians and intelligence officials are highlighting the dangers posed by these subversive acts. According to the head of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Thomas Haldenwang, the risk of sabotage and state terrorism has increased significantly.³⁹

Massive information operations are aimed at discrediting Ukraine, proving the worthlessness of its peace initiatives, and promoting Russian narratives and plans to end the war. For example, a massive campaign has been launched recently regarding the «illegitimacy» of President Zelenskyy and the legal questionability of him concluding any peace agreements. Such operations are carried out through networks of political and public organisations loyal to Russia, as well as pro-Russian media. Targeted intelligence work is being carried out among «compatriots» to organize mass public actions in support of Russia.

Interference in domestic political processes, support for right-wing and extremist movements. The EU leadership and leaders of many European countries, including the President of the European Commission and the Prime Ministers of Poland and Belgium, have raised concerns about massive Russian interference in the upcoming European Parliament elections (June 6-9).⁴⁰ This interference is about undermining trust in democratic institutions and procedures on the one hand, and supporting far-right, nationalist, separatist movements that produce Eurosceptic, anti-NATO and anti-American sentiments in Europe, on the other hand. ECFR experts predict a significant increase in the right-wing representation in the new European Parliament.⁴¹ Moscow hybrid aggression's

³⁷ Zelenskyy: Russia plans to disrupt the peace summit – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3856348-rosia-planue-zirvati-samit-miru-zelenskij.html> (in Ukrainian).

³⁸ NATO accuses Russia of hostile actions in Allied territory and promises to respond – European Pravda, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/05/2/7185145/>.

³⁹ German special services warn of increased threat of terrorist attacks – Ukrainska Pravda, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2024/04/23/7184415/> (in Ukrainian).

⁴⁰ Belgium investigates Russia's alleged interference in EU elections – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3851679-belgia-rozsliduvati-me-jmovirne-vtrucanna-rosii-u-vibori-v-es.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁴¹ A sharp right turn: A forecast for the 2014 European Parliament elections – Euronews, <https://uk.euronews.com/politics/european-parliament-2/2024/01/25/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/>.

tactical objective is to exert pressure of right-wing forces on the leadership of European countries ahead of the Peace Summit, and the strategic objective is to create an influential pro-Russian lobby within EU political establishment, ultimately seeking to disintegrate the European community.

Persuasion and coercion of the leaders of different countries, mainly African and Latin American, not to participate in the Peace Summit. In attempts to block the participation of as many countries of the Global South as possible, the Kremlin is using various means of hybrid influence, including: a) active political pressure thanks to its fairly strong diplomatic presence in Africa and Latin America; b) financial, economic, energy pressure and blackmail, coupled with corruption and the use of criminal webs; c) special operations by Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service (FSB), Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU), military contingents; d) information and propaganda work the population of targeted countries (RT and Sputnik).

Introduction of alternative «peace» plans and conferences. The aforesaid China and Brazil initiative to hold a separate event involving Moscow and Kyiv to resolve the «crisis in Ukraine» should be seen as the first «trial balloon» aimed at diverting international attention from the Peace Summit. It is predicted that Russia and China will work together to promote an alternative «peace forum» (possibly based on the Chinese plan) that mainly serves the interests of the aggressor country and opposes the Ukrainian initiative.

Russia is likely to try to involve its partners in the BRICS – Brazil, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE – into this pseudo-peacekeeping alliance. The second group of participants may include Moscow’s «dependents» in the SCO, CIS, and CSTO – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Some countries in the Middle

East, Africa, and Latin America that are aligned with Russia, such as Syria, North Korea, Nicaragua, Cuba, Eritrea, and others, may also agree to participate.

To summarise, the Peace Summit has a continental dimension, with European countries and institutions having the strongest interest in ending the war. Alternatively, the summit will highlight the further division between the democratic and authoritarian worlds. In the geopolitical context, it is about a clash of two approaches – the Ukrainian Formula for ending the war and establishing a just and lasting peace, and the Russian aggressive plans. It is no exaggeration to say that further development of the global community will largely depend on the choice between the two.

4. THE PATH TO ENDING THE WAR: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE

The overall Peace Summit situation is surrounded by multidirectional trends and processes that present both challenges and opportunities for Ukraine. First, the global political establishment, particularly in Europe, is increasingly hopeful for an end to the Ukraine war due to political, socioeconomic, and humanitarian factors. There is a strong demand for peaceful initiatives and solutions in Europe. The ongoing militarisation, war rhetoric, and the threat of terrorist attacks and sabotage fuel fear among the population of Western countries. This fear is «pressuring elites to articulate peaceful cases».⁴² Moreover, the European community’s perception of the war in Ukraine consists of many «puzzle pieces», such as awareness of the threat posed by the Russian regime, concerns about nuclear blackmail by the Kremlin, and fatigue from the long conflict in the centre of Europe, and so on.

Recognising such sentiments, Russia has recently been signalling about its readiness for peaceful dialogue and an end to the war on

⁴² On the eve of the Peace Summit: what should be noticed in statements on ending the war – Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-politics/3865720-naperedodni-samitu-miru-so-treba-pocuti-v-zaavah-pro-pripinenna-vijni.html> (in Ukrainian).

⁴³ Kuleba: Putin’s entourage sending false signals about supposed readiness for ceasefire to disrupt Peace Summit – Interfax, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/989040.html>.

the current front line. But Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba believes that these signals are false and intended to disrupt the upcoming Peace Summit, which the Kremlin fears.⁴³ The experience of a decade-long war shows that Russia initiating any peace talks has only served one purpose – to buy time and mobilise forces for the next aggression. However, against the backdrop of peaceful expectations, Russia's speculation on peace, coupled with the initiation of alternative peace plans and conferences with partners, poses a threat to genuine peace process.

Furthermore, Ukraine faces internal and external factors that weaken its position. Internal challenges include the difficult situation at the frontline, limited mobilisation potential, and general fatigue from the war, while external challenges are linked to the slowdown of military and financial assistance. Possible increase in the influence of right-wing radical and nationalist forces in EU institutions following the European Parliament elections, the uncertainty of Washington's position after the US presidential race, and the likelihood of pro-Russian revenge in countries like Moldova and Georgia further contribute to Ukraine's challenges.

On the other hand, the summit will boost Ukraine's authority and influence globally, increase the consolidation of Ukraine's allies, expand the geography of productive partnerships across the world, and open up strategic prospects for Kyiv for a peaceful settlement on a pro-Ukrainian platform supported by the international community.

However, it is important to recognise that the Peace Summit is just the beginning of a long and complex process. Figuratively speaking, this June 2024 event opens the «second front» of political and diplomatic fight against the aggressor. And Ukraine's position in this fight will be strengthened by: 1) steady political solidarity and support of the allies, both bilateral and on international platforms; 2) expanded scale and consistency of foreign military, financial and humanitarian aid; 3) supported modernisation of the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration into the system of military-industrial complexes in Europe and the world; 4) Ukraine's accelerated integration into the EU and NATO (such as the opening of the EU membership talks in June 2024); 5) productive realisation of Ukraine reconstruction programme based on new practices and technologies; 6) continued and expanded process of concluding security partnership agreements with countries around the world; 7) improved and strengthened joint sanctions policy against the aggressor.

Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list of ways to strengthen Ukraine's position and create favourable settings for negotiations. However, it is clear that the efficiency of subsequent political and diplomatic processes and the coercion of the aggressor to peace will directly depend on the «power support» for peace initiatives. In this context, the unity of the democratic world, its unwavering solidarity and comprehensive support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian intervention will be vital.