



Razumkov
centre



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UKRAINE: FROM WAR TO PEACE AND RECOVERY

Analytical Assessments



I.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE: KEY DEVELOPMENTS, PROCESSES, TRENDS

Intense clashes in January 2023 in certain segments of the front did not change the overall situation as of late 2022. The main limiting factors of the warring parties' ability to conduct offensive operations also remained unchanged, namely the lack (or deliberate limitation) of human and material resources for the offensive and unfavourable weather conditions.

The signs of the parties' preparation for the next wave of large-scale escalation, which is expected in the coming months or even weeks, are becoming increasingly apparent. Favourable weather conditions for the use of heavy equipment are likely to trigger an offensive operation by either party.

In the meantime, the Russian leadership's statements and decisions suggest a shift to the «war of attrition» strategy, which is probably due to the awareness of the Russian army's insufficient ability to achieve a strategic turning point in the short term, on the one hand, and to the expectation that extending the conflict would be more beneficial for Russia than for Ukraine, on the other hand.

COMBAT ACTION

Russia's main efforts in January were aimed at:

- ✓ achieving at least minor tactical successes mainly to demonstrate progress in fulfilling the declared and repeatedly adapted goals of the so-called «special military operation»;
- ✓ reinforcing defences along the contact line and building a deeply echeloned defence not only in the territories occupied in 2022, but also on the Crimean Peninsula and in the border regions of Russia;

- ✓ undertaking periodic massive strikes on critical infrastructure using kamikaze drones, cruise and ballistic missiles;
- ✓ regrouping forces and building up reserves to prepare for a future offensive.

The Ukrainian Defence Forces carried out measures pursuing the following objectives:

- ✓ maintaining strategic initiative in the theatre of operations;
- ✓ creating conditions for further counter-offensive operations;
- ✓ countering the enemy's efforts to seize the tactical initiative in the most threatening areas.

In December-January, there was a relative stabilisation of both the contact line and the intensity of hostilities compared to September-November 2022. Weather conditions, as well as noticeable depletion of resources, ammunition and manpower forced the Russian military command to go on the defensive on much of the front line. This stabilisation of the front line was largely due to the set of mobilisation measures by the Kremlin as part of the shift from a «special operation» to a «long-term war of attrition». The urgent involvement of about half of the 300,000 newly mobilised fighters allowed the Russian side to replenish units on the front and ensure their combat capability to hold their positions.

The fight to control Bakhmut and adjacent areas remained at the epicentre of not only armed but also informational confrontation. After several months of gruelling fighting, Ukrainian forces left Soledar. According to the Ukrainian military, Russian losses in the fight for this town, which, along with Bakhmut, has no major strategic importance, reached

the level of two Chechen wars. The destruction caused by the enemy artillery has turned Soledar – like dozens of other captured settlements – into an uninhabitable place.

Announcing the «victory» in Soledar, the Kremlin praised the merits of the PMC Wagner and thus officially recognised its participation in the war against Ukraine for the first time. Prior to that, despite the obvious evidence, the Kremlin had long denied the very fact of its existence, and then rejected any relations between the PMC and the Russian state. It has also become known that Putin signed secret decrees, pledging pardons to imprisoned criminals recruited to participate in hostilities as part of the Wagner. According to media reports, since July 2022, Wagner's owner Evgeniy Prigozhin was able to recruit up to 40 thousand prison inmates, most of whom have already been killed, injured, captured, or deserted. It is noteworthy that such PMC activities are beyond Russian law but are still carried out with the knowledge of the state and with the support of formal law enforcement agencies.

Failure to capture Bakhmut by Prigozhin's mercenaries with the fire support from regular troops intensified mutual accusations between different factions of the Russian «war party». Prigozhin's excessive attempts to redirect public dissatisfaction with the

course of war and partial mobilisation to the Russian high command seem to have backfired on his own positions. New personnel changes in the top military leadership may indicate both Prigozhin's tactical defeat on the political front and Putin's understanding of limited effectiveness of parallel military formations in a high-intensity conflict.

In the last days of January, there was a local escalation around Vuhledar – the Donbas town of major operational importance for both sides. After several days of intense fighting, Russian elite marines and paratroopers made minor advances, but failed to break through the Ukrainian defences. The attempted assault on Vuhledar is probably a sign of preparation for a Russian offensive to capture Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, or at least an attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from an important foothold for a possible offensive to the «Crimean corridor».

The likelihood of a ground invasion scenario from Belarus is considered low. According to intelligence reports and expert assessments, the level of presence and movement of personnel and military equipment throughout Belarus bears no signs of preparation of the strike force. At the same time, Belarus continues to play the role of Russia's important ally, providing comprehensive support to Russian aggression, including the use of its



military infrastructure for air and missile strikes, repair and transfer of heavy weapons and ammunition from Belarusian arsenals. Also, current low probability of an invasion from Belarus does not rule out possible aggravation of the threat of using the Belarusian bridgehead to make distracting or accompanying strikes simultaneously with the advances of Russian troops on a chosen main direction of the offensive.

UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR

The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the Law «On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and Other Legislative Acts of Ukraine on the Specifics of Military Service under Martial Law or in Combat Circumstances» passed by the Verkhovna Rada, which provides for stricter punishment for military violations. Notably, both the president and the legislators ignored the concerns of human rights defenders about possible violations of the basic rights of servicemen, as well as the warnings of opponents of a repressive approach to solving problems with military discipline.

In January 2023, a series of corruption scandals hit the defence ministry. According to a journalistic investigation, the MoD has been procuring food services «several times higher than in Kyiv supermarkets». After an unsuccessful attempt to refute the accusations against him and even to accuse the journalists of destructive intentions, the Minister of Defence was forced to dismiss his deputy, recognise the problem, and admit the need to resolve it. One of the reasons for corruption in defence procurement was the rejection of transparent procedures under the pretext of «military necessity». This case has once again demonstrated the relevance of the threat of bribery in times of war, when public confidence in the government and support from foreign partners may be jeopardised.

FOREIGN EVENTS (EXTERNAL FACTORS)

January decisions and statements of Ukraine's international partners confirm readiness of the anti-war coalition for comprehensive and long-term support of Ukraine and gradual abandonment of the policy of artificially limiting capabilities in the transfer of heavy weapons. As a result of the Ramstein-8 meeting, Ukraine should receive an unprecedented aid package from the allies in terms of the range and quantity of weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Successful resolution of the milestone issue of supplying tanks may be evidence of the dominant position of those partners who support the idea of ending the conflict by providing Ukraine with opportunities for a convincing military victory and, accordingly, Russia's defeat on the battlefield.

In January, there were no events, political statements, or decisions that could be seen as having a dramatic impact on the further course and prospects for ending the war or on existing trends. So, as of the end of January 2023:

- ✓ The maximalist goals of the Kremlin's armed aggression against Ukraine remain unchanged, namely the destruction of Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, the process of adapting intermediate intentions and methods of achieving them is underway.
- ✓ Russia is taking active measures to prepare forces and means for a decisive revenge, aiming to seize the initiative in the theatre of operations in the coming months, while preparing to shift to the «war of attrition» strategy.
- ✓ Awareness by Ukraine's partners of the dangers of possible prolongation of the war seems to have prompted them to change their approaches to decision-making regarding the range, quantity, and pace of military assistance to Ukraine.

II. ECONOMY

DECISIONS

Ukraine remains in the spotlight of the global community and international financial institutions, which provide significant economic and financial assistance to our country.

Since the beginning of 2023, democratic countries have continued assisting and supporting Ukraine. Specifically, on 16 January, Ukraine and the EU signed a Memorandum and Loan Agreement on macro-financial assistance worth €18 billion. The next day, Ukraine received the first tranche of €3 billion. According to Ukrainian officials, this support will allow Ukraine to cover its most urgent needs with a stable flow of funds throughout the year.

However, the situation is much more complicated. The EU has stated that the next tranches will be disbursed only if reforms are implemented. The war is no longer a valid ground for slowing down changes in Ukraine.

The entire text of the Memorandum has not yet been made public, but according to media reports, the document contains 20 conditions for reforms with specific deadlines.

On the one hand, this will certainly make it more difficult for Ukraine to receive full funding. On the other hand, if we want the recovery to begin immediately, the EU's approach will be able to accelerate reforms and thus the construction of a renewed country.

Similarly, one should also expect increased cooperation and improved transparency with the United States. For example, the offices of inspectors general of the Pentagon, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have released a FY2023 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Ukraine Response.

As of 6 January 2023, U.S. government oversight agencies have published 14 reports since the start of full-scale war, which outline recommendations for improving internal controls, reducing costs, and increasing efficiency.

At the same time, increased controls do not mean increased restrictions. Quite the contrary, there is a growing position in the US that «...the United States and allies urgently provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs».

It is likely that the expansion of America's economic and military assistance to Ukraine, backed by proper controls, will become the basis of cooperation policy in 2023.

At the end of January, a significant decision of Ukraine's partners began to materialise with the launch of multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform to support Ukraine's repair, recovery, and reconstruction within the framework of the so-called «financial Ramstein».

The first meeting of the Donor Coordination Platform was held via videoconference and attended by high-ranking officials from Ukraine, the EU, the G7 countries, and financial institutions such as the EIB, the EBRD, the IMF, and the World Bank. If such a platform operates on a regular basis, it can significantly speed up and increase the effectiveness of partner assistance to Ukraine.

The government and the National Bank of Ukraine also work towards ensuring economic stabilisation and balance. Thus, the NBU Board decided to keep the discount rate at 25% per annum and to continue raising the mandatory reserve requirements for banks. This will help to further increase the attractiveness of hryvnia assets, maintain

exchange rate stability, and gradually decrease inflation, which has been happening over the past months.

De-occupation of the territories, expansion of food supply, as well as weaker consumer demand amid Russia's energy terror helped stabilise inflationary pressure. Inflation was also restrained by stable utility tariffs, a fixed hryvnia exchange rate, and improved logistics.

On 12 January 2023, the Verkhovna Rada somewhat unexpectedly adopted as a basis several bills introducing certain tax incentives for industry. Key innovations include the exemption from VAT and customs duties of imports of equipment and components (when equipment is imported exclusively for own production), as well as equipment for vocational and professional higher education that train personnel for enterprises.

If adopted in general, these innovations will reduce state budget revenues, but they can play a positive role in stimulating modern industrial production.

Meanwhile, further consideration of the draft laws is unclear, as the IMF usually opposes additional benefits unless clear sources of compensation for the reduction in revenues are identified.

However, one can also observe «reverse» intentions. For example, on 27 January, the Cabinet approved a draft law abolishing, starting 1 July, the preferential taxation system for small businesses, which now allows them paying only 2% of income. If this draft law is adopted in the specified wording, small businesses will lose tax benefits from 1 July 2023, even if the war does not end and martial law is not lifted by that date.

Another «feature» of the draft law is that it proposes to lift the moratorium on conducting documentary checks of businesses.

Unfortunately, an increase in fiscal pressure seems quite likely this year.

The government continues to build European integration institutions. Thus, the

Cabinet of Ministers approved a decree establishing a delegation for negotiations regarding the Single Market Agreement between Ukraine and the EU (2021-2027) and its signing.

The EU's Single Market programme is a seven-year financial support initiative. It is designed to facilitate access to markets, create a favourable business environment, help develop and grow businesses, and ensure the competitiveness and sustainability of companies and entire sectors of the economy, which is extremely important for Ukraine as a candidate for EU accession.

In early January, the government set up a new structure – the State Agency for Restoration and Development – on the basis of the State Agency for Infrastructure Projects and the State Agency of Motor Roads (Ukravtodor). The key tasks assigned to the Agency include practical implementation of priority reconstruction projects, development of donor interaction mechanism, and coordination of national and regional projects.

An institution of this kind can have a truly positive impact on the effectiveness of recovery. However, so far, the experience of domestic agencies rather points to increased risks of bureaucratisation and corruption. Therefore, it seems expedient to give international sponsors the right to closely monitor the financing and implementation of recovery projects.

DEVELOPMENTS, PROCESSES, TRENDS

The Ministry of Economy preliminary estimates indicate that Ukraine's GDP fell by 30.4% in 2022, which, given the ongoing aggression and massive missile attacks on the domestic critical infrastructure in November-December, is a slightly better indicator than previously estimated (33-40%).

International partner assistance allows Ukraine to maintain its macroeconomic balance. Thus, as of 1 January 2023, Ukraine's gross international reserves amounted to \$28.5 billion (up 1.9% in December). This increase was driven by foreign currency receipts from international partners, which exceeded

the NBU's interventions to sell foreign currency aiming to maintain the official (fixed) exchange rate.

Moreover, net international reserves reached \$18.3 billion — the highest level of the year, excluding January. Gross reserves play an important role in foreign economic balancing (financing the trade deficit, paying off debt, and making interventions). Net reserves are a significant monetary component in the formation of money supply. The above volumes help ensure macroeconomic balances.

Note that the growth of reserves thanks to partner assistance occurred despite the continued significant excess of demand over supply in the FX interbank market. Thus, since the beginning of 2023 and as of 27 January, the NBU bought only \$25 million on the interbank market and sold \$2.73 billion, meaning that the negative balance of interventions exceeds \$2.7 billion.

In 2022, Ukraine received an unprecedented global financial support of about \$32.1 billion. The largest financial assistance came from the United States (\$12 billion), the EU (\$8 billion), the IMF (\$2.7 billion), and Canada (\$1.9 billion). At the same time, the country raised about \$3.1 billion through the placement of foreign currency bonds. Together, this allowed the country to offset a significant part of the NBU's net interventions in selling foreign currency (\$25 billion) and the country's payments for servicing and repaying its foreign currency debt (\$9.1 billion).

Replenishment of reserves is crucial for the country's economic security, and so far,

there are reasons to hope that international partners will continue providing adequate financial support to Ukraine, making any collapse scenarios impossible.

At the NBU initiative, all systemically important banks have joined forces to create a common banking network — POWER BANKING. This is a network of various bank branches throughout Ukraine that will continue operating and providing banking services to customers even in critical blackout situations. Today, the POWER BANKING unites all 14 systemically important banks, whose branches have become the basis of this network, and involves other banking market participants. In January, the joint network capable of providing banking services in the event of a possible blackout increased by more than 1.5 times to 40% of the total.

In the event of a blackout, a specific list of essential banking services, including cash withdrawals, payments, money transfers, etc. will be available to all customers in POWER BANKING branches.

On 17 January 2023, the State Property Fund of Ukraine (SPFU) sold the Ust-Dunaisk Commercial Sea Port for UAH 201 million — three times of its starting price of UAH 60 million. This was the first ever sale of a seaport in the history of independent Ukraine.

Although there was strong opposition to the port's privatisation, the SPFU and the Ministry of Infrastructure insist that this enterprise requires large-scale investments that can only be made by private business. This can indeed accelerate the development of the region and transport, and thus should be welcomed.

III.

ENERGY SECTOR

Ukraine's energy system suffered a total of 12 missile attacks and 14 UAV strikes on power facilities. A massive Russian attack on 14 January 2023 caused significant damage to several power units of thermal power plants. In addition, more than 10 GW of the main installed capacities are currently unavailable to the Ukrainian energy system and are under the control of Russia: Zaporizhya NPP, Zaporizhya TPP, Luhansk TPP, Vuhlehirsk TPP, Kakhovka HPP.

ELECTRICITY MARKET

In January, the shortage of generating capacities across the country exceeded 20%, and in some energy-intensive regions (such as Kyiv oblast) – close to 40%. There was a decrease in electricity consumption thanks to warm weather, but a significant power shortage remained due to damaged power lines and generation. At the same time, Ukrenergo managed to restore one of the 330 kV lines in the southeast of the country.

The problems with electricity supply were partially addressed by importing it from the EU. According to the European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E), as of 28 January 2023, electricity supply from Slovakia increased to 9,296 MWh, which is the highest since the beginning of cooperation (15 January 2023).

Imported electricity is 2-3 times more expensive than Ukraine-produced electricity. The base-load futures price for February 2023 in Romania and Slovakia is about 170 €/MWh (or 6,681 UAH/MWh at the official NBU exchange rate). Foreign suppliers are already offering electricity for February with guaranteed delivery at 12 UAH/kWh, VAT included.

Imports are carried out by enterprises with a share of electricity of about 5-10% in the

prime cost of a product or service, as well as those that cannot stop the production process for 3-4 hours according to the shutdown schedules.

The Cabinet of Ministers approved the Regulation on the peculiarities of electricity imports during the autumn-winter period of 2022-2023, according to which consumers receiving resources from foreign countries are protected from scheduled shutdowns.

Despite the small volumes, electricity imports from the EU allow Ukrainian businesses to maintain production processes and balance the energy system of Ukraine. The average daily electricity consumption in Ukraine is 12 thousand MW, while the demand is 16-17 thousand MW.

NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

To date, eight nuclear power units in the government-controlled areas are operating at maximum capacity and account for about 55% of total electricity consumption in Ukraine. The largest volumes are generated by the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP.

The permanent monitoring mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) started its work at the Khmelnytskyi NPP on 23 January 2023. According to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), similar missions have started working at the Pivdennoukrainsk NPP, Rivne NPP, as well as at the Chornobyl NPP, which is being decommissioned, and at the Zaporizhya NPP (the latter since September 2022).

Ukraine is willing to increase nuclear power generation: by 2030, it plans to add another 2 GW. Energoatom has started implementing a project to build Units 5 and 6 at the Khmelnytskyi NPP, which is scheduled to be completed by 2029.

On 20 January 2023, the government approved a directive to start developing a feasibility study for the construction of units based on the AR1000 technology as part of the agreement between Energoatom and Westinghouse on the construction of nine new power units based on the AR1000 technology in Ukraine.

NATURAL GAS MARKET

Gas reserves in Ukraine's underground storage facilities have dropped to about 11 bcm, compared to 14.7 bcm in early November 2022. The Cabinet of Ministers has approved a directive that will allow Naftogaz Ukraine to attract a grant from the EBRD worth almost €189 million to import additional gas volumes.

During 2022, the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine LLC (GTSOU) and ROSEN Europe B.V. carried out intra-pipe diagnostics (IPD) of more than 2 thousand km of the main gas pipelines DN 1400 (1,176.75 km), DN 1200 (71.91 km), and DN 1000 (789.86 km). IPD of one of the main gas pipelines on the section from the state border with Moldova to the GTSOU compressor station deserves special attention, as this section enables gas transportation in reverse mode. IPD will increase the reliability of the national gas transmission system.

LAW ON IMPROVEMENT OF SUBSOIL USE

The adoption of Ukraine's European integration law on subsoil use (No.2805-IX, to enter into force on 28 March 2023) provides for a large-scale reform of the subsoil use sector in Ukraine. Key provisions of the law include the following:

- ✓ introduction of a unified state electronic geo-information system for the use of subsoil and its components, in particular, access to data of the state register of special permits for subsoil use;
- ✓ use of international standards and classifications in the course of expert examinations, assessments of resources and mineral reserves;

- ✓ free circulation of special permits that will facilitate the development of the Ukrainian subsoil use market and increase its attractiveness for investors;
- ✓ introduction of a mechanism for addressing the issue of «dormant» licenses, which establishes a fee for license renewal if less than 5% of the approved reserves have been extracted (excluding unproductive oil and gas wells) and a ban if production is less than 1%, which will improve the situation on the mineral market;
- ✓ introduction of a new rule on the priority right of the owner of a land plot of no more than 25 hectares to obtain a special permit for subsoil use without holding an auction (electronic bidding);
- ✓ replacement of concept of «geological exploration» with a comprehensive (end-to-end) special permit for a period of 3 to 20 years on land (and up to 30 years on the continental shelf and within the exclusive (maritime) economic zone of Ukraine), which allows combining exploration of mineral resources with their industrial development;
- ✓ creation of an economic passport that will allow Ukrainians to receive part of income from the rent for subsoil use.

HEATING SEASON

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine's energy system is working, and repairs are underway.

The country has already passed half of the heating season with no catastrophic problems in the field of heat supply. This was due to prompt delivery of modern Western air defence systems, which destroyed most of the missiles and drones targeting Ukraine's critical infrastructure; provision of a significant amount of equipment for repair work by partner countries; support of boiler houses with generators in the face of frequent power outages by generators. Also, relatively warm winter helped Ukraine to achieve significant economy in gas in underground storage facilities and in coal (1.2 mln tons in storage).

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT


Partners continue to help Ukraine's energy sector.

- ✓ Establishment of the Ukraine Energy Market Observatory by the Energy Community Secretariat, which will monitor all events related to the energy market and corporate governance of Ukraine. The assessments made on a confidential basis will be shared with domestic and international stakeholders with the aim of integrating the Ukrainian energy sector with the European one and ensuring transparent governance.
- ✓ G7 statement confirming their commitment to continue close coordination in providing equipment and humanitarian assistance, procuring necessary equipment and supporting
- ✓ Ukraine's long-term vision of modernisation and decarbonisation of its energy system and integrating with the European system (G7 meeting with partners on 25 January 2022).
- ✓ An initiative to launch the EU-Ukraine strategic partnership in the field of renewable gases as part of Ukraine's announced plans to increase the share of electricity production from carbon-free sources to 90% by 2050 and, in particular, to increase the share of renewables to 30% by 2030 (meeting of the President of Ukraine with the Executive Vice President of the European Commission for the European Green Deal on 9 January 2023).
- ✓ A project to provide backup electricity to cities in case of damage to generation and networks, implemented in cooperation with the government, city administrations, and donors. Use of technological energy solutions to ensure generation reserves for large cities and protect critical infrastructure (primarily heating and water supply) during power outages.



IV.

CITIZENS' OPINIONS ABOUT CURRENT ISSUES¹



HOW HAS THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS COMPARED TO THE BEGINNING OF 2022?
% of respondents

	Improved	Worsened	Did not change	Hard to say
Ukraine's international image	74.8	8.2	10.1	6.9
Ukraine's defence capability	74.7	9.9	8.7	6.7
Interethnic relations in Ukraine	45.5	14.6	28.5	11.3
Citizens' attitude towards the government	24.8	24.6	38.1	12.4
Government's attitude towards citizens	17.4	24.5	45.0	13.1
Freedom of speech	16.5	25.4	47.6	10.6
Situation with civil rights and freedoms	16.5	22.8	45.0	15.8


¹ Results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service in cooperation with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 13-21 December 2022.


The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey in Zaporizhzhya, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions was only carried out in government-controlled areas not subject to hostilities).

The survey was based on a stratified multi-stage sampling method with random selection at the earlier stages of sampling and a quota method of selecting respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected according to gender and age quotas). The sample structure reflects the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

A total of 2,018 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.


HOW HAS THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS COMPARED TO THE BEGINNING OF 2022?				
	% of respondents			(continued)
	Improved	Worsened	Did not change	Hard to say
Level of democracy	14.7	24.5	49.4	11.4
Crime	12.5	33.0	38.5	16.0
Observance of the law by civil servants	11.9	24.9	44.5	18.7
Social protection (social benefits, allowances, subsidies, etc.)	10.0	36.8	41.9	11.3
People's confidence in the future	9.1	66.6	14.7	9.7
Health care	8.0	44.8	39.8	7.4
Situation of ethnic and religious minorities	5.6	20.7	49.2	24.5
Pensions	5.5	33.9	46.9	13.6
Education	4.4	58.9	27.1	9.6
Overall stability	3.9	76.0	13.4	6.8
Wages	3.1	62.6	25.2	9.1
Economic situation in the country	2.7	83.0	10.1	4.2
My family's well-being	2.7	71.9	21.9	3.4
Prices and tariffs	2.2	86.8	8.0	3.0
Overall situation in the country	4.7	75.4	13.0	6.9





* A total of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».

** A total of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».



* A total of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».

** A total of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».

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