

# WAR AND CHURCH. CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN UKRAINE 2022

(Information Materials)

Religion and Church in Ukrainian Society: 2000-2022 (sociological study):

- Level and Nature of Religious Commitment of Ukrainian Society
- Religion, Church and Society
- The Church and the State
- Public Assessment of Inter-Religious, Inter-Confessional and Inter-Church Relations
- People's Forecasts of Changes in the Religious Situation after the War

War and Church. Church and Religion in Ukraine (results of focus group discussions)

The project is implemented with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine



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Information materials were developed for the permanent Roundtable «Religion and Power in Ukraine: Problems of Interrelations» with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine

Background: The Roundtable «Religion and Power in Ukraine: Problems of Interrelations», organised by the Razumkov Centre in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine, has been taking place since 1996, consistently bringing together the leaders and representatives of the largest Christian churches and religious organisations in Ukraine.

Invitees include representatives of government authorities, the public, the media and the expert community. Key issues discussed at the roundtable concern the improvement of state-confessional relations and the introduction of a partnership model in relations between State and Church in Ukraine. In particular, the Roundtable participants elaborated the draft Concept of State-Church Relations in Ukraine and presented it to the state and the public in 2004, receiving support of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations of Ukraine.

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# RELIGION AND CHURCH IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: 2000-2022

(sociological study)

Razumkov Centre permanently monitors the church and religious situation in Ukraine, including sociological monitoring of the state and trends of religious commitment in Ukrainian society, public confidence in the Church as a social institute, as well as the public opinion on the role of religion and the Church in civic life, relations between the state and churches, among different churches and confessions.

In 2000 the Centre performed the first in independent Ukraine large-scale survey of the level and features of religious commitment of Ukrainian citizens, their idea of the role of religion and the Church in the life of a man, society and the state. Since then, the Centre's Sociological Service regularly conducts general and thematic surveys of said problems.

The latest national-wide survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in November, 2022, with support from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Ukraine and comprised a poll of Ukrainian citizens with a sample representing the adult population of the Ukrainian territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (the poll was not held in temporarily occupied territories or the territories where hostilities were taking place),<sup>2</sup> as well as in online focus groups.<sup>3</sup>

During this latest survey, in addition to questions traditionally asked in course of monitoring, much attention was paid to public assessments of the Church response to the problems and challenges of the day (including its activity in the conditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine), citizens' ideas of the role and essence of the social mission of religious organisations, motives for commitment of religious rites.

The sociological survey results and their comparison with the data of similar surveys of the previous years are presented below.<sup>4</sup> The survey results are summed up in tables and diagrams. Comparative analysis of the survey results makes it possible to briefly outline the trends of religious commitment of Ukrainian society during the past 20 years and to draw the following conclusions.

- <sup>1</sup> For detailed survey results see, e.g.: for 2000: Dudar N., Shanghina L. Religion and faith in the life of Ukrainians. Razumkov Centre 2000, Kyiv, 2001, p.267-280; for 2010: Church and religious situation and state-confessional relations in Ukraine: outcomes of the decade, trends and problems. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report. National Security & Defence, 2011, No.1-2, p.2-77, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD119 2011 ukr.pdf
- <sup>2</sup> Face-to-face interviews were held on November 4-11, 2022, in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovs k, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and Kyiv city (in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv regions only in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian government and free of hostilities).

The poll was held with stratified multilevel sampling with random selection at the initial sampling stages and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected on the basis of sex and age quotas). The total sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories, where the poll was held, as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type).

- 2 018 respondents aged above 18 years were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. Meanwhile, additional systemic deviations of the sample may be caused by the effects of the Russian aggression, including forced evacuation of millions of citizens.
- <sup>3</sup> 5 online focus groups were held in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Lviv regions on November 5-17, 2022. In Kyiv region, the focus group included people who survived occupation in northern districts of the region. In Lviv region, 2 focus groups were held: one was made up of local residents, the other one of internally displaced persons. In Chernivtsi region one focus group made up of both local residents and internally displaced persons. In Kharkiv region one group of local residents. The focus groups included men and women in the age of 35 to 65 years, both believers and those not identifying themselves with any religion.
- <sup>4</sup> Comparing the results of the latest poll with the previous surveys, one should keep in mind that the polls of 2000 and 2010 were held throughout the territory of Ukraine, the poll of 2014 in all regions of Ukraine with the exception of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the polls of 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 in all regions of Ukraine, except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.



### 1. LEVEL AND NATURE OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

1. Over the entire period of monitoring, Ukrainian society has been demonstrating rather a high level of religious commitment. In particular, by the end of 2010, compared to 2000, the number of citizens calling themselves believers had increased from 58 to 71%.5 Later on, in 2010-2020, the share of believers among the adult population of Ukraine on the average made 70%. Meanwhile, the survey of 2014 recorded an increase in the number of believers from 67% to 76%. compared to the «pre-war» year of 2013 which is normal for a society that found itself in a stress situation. This figure remains the highest for all years of monitoring; later, it went down and at the end of 2021 made 68% of those polled. However, with the beginning of all-out Russian aggression it jumped to 74% (from 84% in the West of the country to 63% in the East and 61% in the South). The share of believers most of all increased, compared to the previous year, in the Central regions there, the share of believers among the adult population rose from 63.5% to 76% (diagrams «Irrespective of whether you go to church or not, how would you describe yourself?»).

2. Regional differences in all aspects of religious, confessional and church self-identification of Ukrainian citizens persist (the West of the country is traditionally distinguished for the highest level of religious commitment, the South and the East — the lowest). However, compared to 2000, the share of those who called themselves believers increased in the Centre, South and East and did not change in the West, compared to 2000. So, the difference among regions in the number of believers decreases. Regional differences in specific aspects of religious commitment, opinions and

assessments of respondents will be discussed below.<sup>6</sup>

## 3. The survey results show persistence of the dependence of religious commitment on the age, sex, and place of residence (city/village).

The level of religious commitment is traditionally higher in older age groups, compared to the younger ones (in 2022, least of all believers were recorded among the people of 18-24 years — 61%. However, in that age group their share increased most of all, compared to the previous year, when it made 48%). The share of believers, compared to the previous year, increased in all age groups, except for the oldest one, where it did not statistically change; the younger an age group is, the greater increase it demonstrated.

Among women, there are more believers, compared to men (81% and 66%, respectively). Last year they made 75% and 59%, respectively, so, the share of believers increased among men and women almost equally.7 Almost the same increase was recorded in the shares of believers among villagers (from 75% to 82%) and city residents (from 64% to 70%). Since the level of religious commitment increased among persons with higher (or incomplete higher) education (from 63% to 74%), and remained practically unchanged among respondents with secondary and secondary vocational education, now, the level of religious commitment in equal in all educational groups (74%), by contrast to the previous years.

26% of those polled reported that after the beginning of Russia's all-out war against Ukraine (after February 2022) they became more religious and pious than before, 4% — less religious and pious than before the war, 65% reported no changes in their attitude to religion and faith.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Hereinafter the terms «believers», «nonbelievers», «Orthodox», «believers of OCU (UGCC, UOC (MP), Protestant and Evangelic churches)», «just Christian», «just Orthodox», etc. mean the groups of those polled who identify themselves with those categories. The number of representatives of other confessions was insufficient for their statistical analysis as separate groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The regional division here is as follows: **the West**: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; **the Centre**: Kyiv city, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; **the South**: Mykolaiv, Odesa regions; **the East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv regions. «Regional affiliation» of respondents was determined by their place of residence before the beginning of the all-out Russian aggression (that is, before February 24, 2022). The only exception is that for the analysis of regional differences in answers to the question «*What are the relations among believers of different churches and religions in the region where you live?*», the place of residence of respondents at the time of polling was taken into account.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Higher religious commitment of women may be attributed to the fact that they generally live longer than men – among women, persons in the age of 60 more make 34%, among men – 23%.



The older the respondents are, the more of them became firmer in their faith: the share of such people increases from 18% among those under 30 years to 34% among those above 60. Their share is the highest in the West (31%, in other parts of the country – from 22% to 24%). They are especially numerous among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (46%), of UOC (MP) – 38%, of OCU and UGCC – 31%, much fewer – among «just Orthodox» (20%) and «just Christian» (18%, diagrams «After the beginning of the all-out war of Russia against Ukraine do you think you became...?»).

4. Respondents' declaration of affiliation with a religious organisation or church is not always associated with self-identification as a believer and may be caused by the sociocultural or ethnical identity.

For instance, 9% of OCU believers, 8% of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches, 5% of believers of UOC (MP), 2% of UGCC reported hesitation between belief and disbelief, and among the believers of some churches, a small share (not more than 1%) called themselves nonbelievers or atheists, and not more than 2% – indifferent to religion.

Among «just Orthodox», 73% called themselves believers, 19% hesitate between belief and disbelief, 2% are nonbelievers or atheists, 3% indifferent to religion. This makes us think that self-identification of some people as Orthodox is associated with the socio-cultural or ethnical rather than purely religious identity. This is especially true for the group of «just Christian» — among them, only 54% called themselves believers, while 26% hesitate between belief and disbelief, 6% are nonbelievers or atheists, 11% are indifferent to religion.

Meanwhile, among those who do not associate themselves with any religion, 11% called themselves believers, 15% hesitate between belief and disbelief, 31% nonbelievers, 15% atheists, 22.5% indifferent to religion.

Noteworthy, religious identity as such is far less important for the people than civic or regional identity. Answering the question: "With what social community do you identify

yourself, first of all?», 73.5% of respondents said «with Ukrainian citizens», 14% — «with the residents of my city (village)», 5.5% — «with the residents of my region», and only 3% — «with the people of the same faith», 1.5% — «with the people of the same church». The importance of association with co-believers or members of the same church is more noticeable in believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (24% first of all identify themselves with the people of the same faith or church), and for believers of UOC (MP) (11%), while among OCU and UGCC believers their share makes 4%.

Noteworthy, over the period of monitoring the majority of citizens expressed an opinion that a religious faith does not require affiliation with a certain confession. Now, 57% (in 2000 - 64%) of those polled suggests that «a man may be just a believer and not practice a specific religion».8 This opinion dominates in all regions, with the exception of the West, where the majority (55%) of those polled supported the opinion that «a believer must practice one or another religion». They make a majority among the believers of UGCC (61%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (61%) and UOC (MP) (54%). Representatives of the oldest age group (60 years and more) less than representatives of other age groups tend to believe that a man may «just believe» (49%, in other age groups – from 58% to 67%), (diagrams «With which of the following statements about a believer do you agree most of all?»).

5. Distribution of confessional preferences has not changed much since the beginning of monitoring: the majority of those polled identified themselves with Orthodoxy (in 2022 – 63%); quite many people called themselves Greek Catholics (10%) or «just Christian» (9%). Compared to 2021, the number of adherents of Protestant and Evangelic churches increased (from 1.5% to 4%).

Other confessions and religious trends (Roman Catholic, Islam, Judaism, etc.) have fewer followers. In 2021, Razumkov Centre recorded the highest in the history of surveys share of those who do not identify themselves with any confession, (19%), but this year, their share fell to 12%, which is close to the modal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This opinion was shared by the majority (from 56% to 64%) of respondents over the entire period of Razumkov Centre's polls on this subject (2000-2022).



indicator over the monitoring period: diagrams "With what religion do you identify yourself?").

Confessional self-identification bears evident regional specificity. The greatest number of the Orthodox was recorded in the Central regions (in 2022 – 75%, which is much higher than last year (67%), somewhat fewer – in the South (69%) and East (64.5%, those regions did not show a statistically significant increase, compared to the previous year). In the West of the country they make only 40%; roughly the same number of Westerners called themselves Greek Catholics (36%).

Along with the increase in the number of believers, the share of the Orthodox also goes up with age, from 51% among the young people in the age of 18-29 years to 67% among those in the age of 60 years and more (while the number of adherents of other confessions and religions in age groups does not statistically differ). The younger the respondents are, the more of them do not identify themselves with any confession (from 9% among those of 60 years and more to 18% among those under 30).

6. There is a serious difference between the declared religious commitment (74% of those polled called themselves believers, 63% — Orthodox) and their identification with a specific religious community.

Describing church and confessional selfidentification, researches usually note nominal self-identification with one or another Church, although churched people must belong to a certain religious community. Community membership was reported by only 26.5% of those polled (however, in the recent years their number has increased: in 2021 they made 21%, in 2020 - only 16%, diagrams *«Are you* a member of a specific religious community?»). Community members are more numerous in the West of the country (46%, in the Centre and the East 20%, in the South 15%). The older the respondents are, the more often they call themselves members of a religious community (from 18% in age group of 18-24 years to 33% among those in the age of 60 years and more). Villagers belong to a religious community more often than city residents (respectively, 37% and 21%), women – more often than men (respectively, 31% and 21%).

Affiliation with a specific Church does not simultaneously mean affiliation with a religious community: among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches, affiliation with a religious community was reported by 70%, among UGCC believers — 58.5%, among the believers of UOC (MP) — 41%, among OCU believers — 30%. 11% of «just Christian», 8% of «just Orthodox» also called themselves members of religious communities.

7. The attendance of church services by citizens did not change much. While in 2000 attendance of church services, mass was reported by 49% of those polled, and 51% did not attend them, later the attendance of service was reported by the majority of those polled (in 2022 - 54%). Residents of the country's West attend church services much more frequently (81%), of the other regions – from 37% to 47%. Attendance of church services increases from 42% among the young people in the age of 18-24 years to 59.5% in the oldest age group (60 years and more). Villagers attend church services more often than city residents (respectively, 63% and 50%), women - more often than men (respectively, 63% and 43%). Church services are the most often attended by the believers of UGCC (95%), among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches they make 80%, among the believers of UOC (MP) - 76.5%, among the believers of OCU - 64%, among «just Orthodox» - 42%, among «just Christian» -28%, among those who did not associate themselves with any confession -2% (diagrams «Do you attend church services, mass, liturgy?»).

Meanwhile, only 32% of those who reported attending church services and mass attend services regularly, at least once a week (which, however, is much higher than in 2021, when they made 20%). Now they make from 48% in the West to 20-23% in the other parts of the country. Service is the most frequently attended by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (85% at least once a week) and of UGCC (50%), much more rarely – by representatives of Orthodox churches: among the believers of UOC (MP) - 30%, among OCU believers -24% attends church services. Attendance of service at least once a week was more frequently reported by the people in the age of 60 years and more -40% of them gave such an answer, while in other age groups – from 28% to 30%.



A relative majority (43%) of those who attend church services, mass do that only on religious holidays. In the West they make only 29%, in the other three parts of the country from 47% to 62%. It was least of all reported by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (5%) and UGCC (26%), while among the believers of UOC (MP) they made 47%, among the believers of OCU — 50%, among «just Orthodox» — 60% (diagrams «How often do you attend church services, mass, liturgy?»).

Answering the question "Did you attend church services last Sunday (Saturday, Friday?", 24% gave an affirmative answer (46% in the West and 15% to 18% in the other regions), from 32% of those above 60 years to 15% in the age of 18 to 24 years: 72% of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches, 55% of UGCC, 36% — of UOC (MP), 23% — OCU, 14% "just Christian", 12% "just Orthodox".

The pandemic of COVID-19 somewhat contributed to worshiping in the Internet. According to the latest poll, 15% of those polled attended Internet services. Internet services are much more popular among residents of the Western part of the country (35%, in the other regions — from 6% to 9%) (diagrams "Did you worship in the Internet?").

52% of UGCC believers took part in Internet services, among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches — 32%, while, for instance, among the believers of UOC (MP) they make only 15%, among OCU believers — just 13%.

Proceeding from above, the quite expectedly, the use of advanced information technologies (social networks, «church in smartphone» app, etc.) by the Church is most of all welcomed by the believers of UGCC (73% welcomes it) and of Protestant and Evangelic churches (68%), followed by the believers of UOC (MP) (48%) and OCU (45%). In the Western part of the country it is welcomed by 57%, in the other regions – from 32% to 35% (the country average - 40%, diagrams «Now the Church actively uses advanced information technologies...?»).

8. Changes in the behaviour of believers in wartime. Answering the question, how the frequency of their visits to the church (house of prayer) changed after the beginning of the

war, 47% of respondents answered that they go to church, as before, 11% goes to church more frequently, 12.5% — more rarely (another 27% answered that they «didn't go there before and don't go now»). The latter are more numerous in the younger age groups (38% under 25 and 41% among the people in the age of 25 to 29 years). More frequent church visits with the beginning of the war were mainly reported by the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (31%), as well as residents of the Western part of the country (18%, in the other regions — 8-9%, diagram «Do you go to church (house of prayer)?»).

8% of those polled answered that after the beginning of the war they began to communicate with priests more often, 10% - more rarely, 41% - continued as before (another 38.5% answered that they «did not communicate with priests before and do not communicate now). The latter are in a majority in younger age groups (52% among those under 25 and 49% in the age from 25 to 29 years). More frequent communication with priests with the beginning of the war was reported by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (28%), as well as residents of the country's West (13%, in the other regions - 5-7%, diagram «Do you personally communicate with priests?»).

11% of those polled answered that after the beginning of the war they increasingly require communication with co-believers (members of their religious community), 6% - that they need such communication more rarely, 45% - that their needs did not change (another 30.5% answered that they do not belong to any confession or religious community). The greater need of communication with co-believers with the beginning of the war was more often reported by believers of the Protestant and Evangelic churches (38%) and believers of UGCC (22%), as well as residents of the Western part of the country (18%, in the other regions - from 5% to 9%, diagram «Do you need communication with co-believers (members of your religious community)?»).

9. In 2000-2020, the share of those who reported regular donations to the Church ranged from 9 to 11%. According to the latest poll, their share increased (15%). Compared to the beginning of 2000, there is a decline in the share of those who provided such

assistance «rarely» (from 38% in 2000 to 29% in 2022) and those who never did it (from 36% to 24%, respectively). In the past decade the share of those who make offerings on great holidays and pay for rites remained almost unchanged (29-34%, according to the latest poll — 31.5%), which is higher than in 2000 (16%) (diagrams: «Do you support the Church financially?»).

In 2022, 44% of religious community members regularly provided financial assistance to the Church, among those who do not belong to a community — only 3%, rarely do that, respectively, 34% and 26.5%; 18% and 37%, respectively, make donations on great holidays and pay for rites, 3% and 33%, respectively, never provide financial assistance.

Since there are more religious community members among residents of the Western part of the country, the share of those who regularly make donations is higher there (31.5%, in the other regions — from 8% to 9%. Among the believers of different churches, regular donations to the Church are more often made by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (59%) and UGCC (39.5%). Among the believers of UOC (MP), this figure equals 17%, among the believers of OCU — 15%.

The highest share of people who never make donations to the Church is observed in the Eastern (37%) and Southern (36%) regions, among young people (from 18 to 24 years – 38%, although last year such an answer was given in that age group much more often – 51%), and among those who did not associate themselves with any confession (76%).

In the Centre, a relative majority (41%) makes donations on great holidays and pays for rites. The same refers to «just Orthodox» (39%), «just Christian» (39%) and believers of UOC (MP) (44%).

10. Motives for attendance of church services. Speaking about the motives for attendance of church services, those who do that mainly mentioned communication with God (54%), participation in a prayer, religious rites (51%). Somewhat less frequently mentioned were the desire to listen to a sermon (35%), the fact that the attendance of church services calms them down, makes them forget about everyday troubles (35%), helps solve

moral problems that bother them (24%). 20% does that to be among like-minded persons, the people they like, 14% said that they did so all their life, and only 4% — because their religious community gives them some assistance, support (diagrams "What for do you attend church services, mass, liturgy?"). There were no substantial changes in the motives for attendance of church services, compared to the "pre-war" time.

As well as last year, residents of the South of the country stand out with their motivation, their main motive being that attendance of church services calms them down, makes them forget about everyday troubles (43%), while communication with God is far less important (30%) than for the residents of the other regions. For residents of the South and East, participation in a prayer, religious rites (respectively, 37% and 35%) is less important than for residents of the Western and Central regions (respectively, 57% and 54%), while residents of the East more rarely (24%) than residents of the other regions (from 33% to 41%) attend church services to listen to a sermon.

However, while last year representatives of younger age groups more rarely than representatives of older and medium age groups attended church services in search of comfort or solution of moral problems (for instance, in age group of 18-24 years such answers were given, respectively, by only 17% and 14% of those polled), now the importance of those factors in younger groups increased and equalled with medium age groups (for instance, in the age group of 18-24 years those figures increased to 30% and 26% of those polled, respectively).

Women more often than men reported such motives for attendance of church services as comfort (respectively, 38% and 29%) or solution of moral problems (respectively, 27% and 19%).

Those who do not attend church services mainly mentioned such reasons as to practice a religion, one needn't to attend church services, mass, liturgy (37%), the absence of such a need (36%), of lack of time (27%). Less frequent reasons included their being nonbelievers or atheists (14%), that none of their fiends attended church services, mass,



liturgy (7%). Only 2% each mentioned such reasons as the absence of any religious communities or communities of the Church or religion, to which they belong, in their place of residence, or participation in church services, mass, liturgy in the Internet, following TV or radio church services (diagrams "Why don't you attend church services, mass, liturgy?").

11. Does the Church require modernisation? The respondents who attend church services, answering the question if anything should be changes in the activity of the religious community, whose church services, mass, liturgy they attend, mainly said than nothing should be changed (54%).

15% sticks to the opinion that more attention should be paid to all kinds of assistance to the community members, their support, 14% to psychological support for the community members, 12% – to problems of the community members, 10% mentioned the need to deliver services and sermons in the mother language (last year this answer was given more rarely -5%), 9% - to streamline rites, reduce the duration of a liturgy, 8% – to pay more attention to familiarisation of the community members with the basics of the religious teaching (6.5%), 4.5% spoke about the need to hold mass or service at more convenient times (diagrams «Should anything be changed in the activity of the religious community?»).

Residents of the Central regions more often than in the other regions suggest that religious communities should pay more attention to psychological support to the community members (22%, in the other regions — from 8% to 13%) and to deliver services in the mother language (13%, in the other regions — from 5% to 9%). The need of service in the mother language was more often mentioned by Ukrainian-speaking respondents (11%), than Russian-speakers (5%).

Representatives of the youngest age group (18-24 years) more often mentioned the

need to streamline rites, reduce the duration of a liturgy (16%), deliver services and sermons in the mother language (16%), hold mass or service at more convenient times (12%).

Women more often than men suggest that religious communities should pay more attention to psychological support to the community members (respectively, 17% and 8%), and that more attention should be paid to all kinds of assistance to the community members, their support (respectively, 17% and 12.5%),

#### 2. RELIGION, CHURCH AND SOCIETY

- 1. The Church continues to maintain a leading position in the rating of public confidence among social and political institutes (alongside with the Armed Forces and volunteer organisations). Meanwhile, compared to 2010, when the level of public confidence in the Church reached its peak (72.5%), now, this indicator is lower 61% (diagrams «To what extent do you trust the Church?»). The Church is most of all trusted by residents of the Western part of the country (74% of respondents), in the other regions from 55% to 58%.
- 2. The recognised moral authority of the Church is lower than the confidence in it. In 2010-2020, this indicator was going down (from 56% to 44.5% in 2020, the share of those who did not see the Church as a moral authority in that period increased from 27% to 40%). However, the indicators of 2021 and 2022 appeared more optimistic: the Church was seen as a moral authority by 48% in 2021, by 49% in 2022, and was not by 31% and 33%, respectively (diagrams «Is the Church a moral authority for you today?»).

The citizens' opinions on this issue differ in different regions and depend on the confessional and church affiliation of respondents: the Church is a moral authority for 72% of residents in the West of the country and only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Data of the confidence in the Church build on the results of the public opinion poll held by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service jointly with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on August 5 – 12, 2022, with the grant support from the Bremen University and the International Renaissance Foundation. Face-to-face interviews were held in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv regions – only in the territories controlled by the Ukrainian government and free of any hostilities). The sampling structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the survey was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, sex, settlement type). 2024 respondents in the age of 18 and more were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.

39-43% in the other regions. Meanwhile, the moral authority of the Church on the national scale, compared to 2020, increased due to its increase in the Eastern and Southern regions. While in 2020 the absolute or relative majority of those polled in the East and South (67% and 42%, respectively) did not see the Church as a moral authority, now, the shares of those who see and don't see the Church as an authority in those regions do not statistically differ (in the South — respectively, 40% and 41%, in the East — respectively, 43% and 42%).

In terms of confessional and church affiliation, it is a moral authority for 84% of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches, for 82% of UGCC believers (the highest figures), lower — for the believers of UOC (MP) (66%) and OCU (59%), still lower — for «just Orthodox» (34%) and «just Christian» (31%), and among those who don't associate themselves with any religion — for only 3%.

The level of recognition of the Church as a moral authority is the highest in the oldest age group (60 years and more -58%), in the other age groups - from 38% to 49%).

3. Citizens rather critically assess the morality of priests. Only 23% of respondents reported confidence that "the majority of priests are highly moral and spiritual people" (in 2021 – 21%). The share of those who believe that the majority of priests are highly moral and spiritual people, compared to the previous year, increased in the Western regions (from 19% to 32%). In the Centre it, on the contrary, somewhat declined (from 23% to 17%), in the South and East, it did not statistically change.

This indicator is the highest among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (46%). Among the believers of UOC (MP) it makes 36%, among UGCC believers — 35%, OCU — 27%, among «just Orthodox» and «just Christian» — 15%, among those who do not belong to any confession — only 5.5%. Priests are more often seen as a moral authority by representatives of the oldest age group (27%).

Over the entire period of monitoring, the opinion that *«priests are the same as the majority of us, with all merits and sins»* dominates. This thought prevails in all confessional

groups (with the exception of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches).

**4.** Assessment of the role and functions of the Church in society. Over the entire period of monitoring, people rather highly praised the positive social role of the Church. However, with the beginning of hostilities in the East of the country, the share of those who noted a positive role of the Church (in 2014 – 52.5%) fell to 40% in 2020. In 2021, the share of those who noted a positive role of the Church increased to 49.5%, in 2022, after the beginning of the Russian all-out aggression, it increased even more – to 59%, being one of the highest indicators since 2000 (a similar figure – 56% – was recorded in 2010).

Compared to the previous year, their share statistically increased in all regions, except for the East (in the West — by 7%, in the Centre — by 8%, in the South — by 19% (diagrams «What role, do you think, the Church plays in present-day Ukrainian society?»). In the East, a positive role of the Church was noted by much fewer respondents than in the other regions (in the West — 78%, in the Centre — 54%, in the South — 60%, in the East — 41%).

The younger the respondents are, the more rarely they note a positive role of the Church (from 65% of those in the age of 60 years and more to 46% among those under 25 years).

A positive role of the Church was noted by the overwhelming majority of believers of the main confessions and churches in Ukraine: UGCC (90%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (82%), UOC (MP) (79%) and OCU (71%). Among «just Christian» — 45%, among «just Orthodox» — 44%, least of all — among those who do not associate themselves with any confession (11%).

26% of those polled stick to the opinion that the Church does not play any important role (in 2021, more people thought like that — 33%). Now, this opinion is the popular in the East (36.5%), least of all — in the Western part of the country (12%).

It should be particularly stressed that a negative role of the Church is out of the question: in the period of monitoring, the share of those who shared this opinion never exceeded 7% of those polled (now -2%).



5. Answering the question what main goals churches and religious organisations should set for themselves in Ukraine, respondents the most frequently mentioned spiritual support for the people who found themselves in a spiritual crisis (51%), worshipping God, common prayer (47%), moral recovery of society (29%), assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population (27.5%), defence of traditional values (24%, diagrams "What main goals should churches and religious organisations set for themselves in Ukraine?").

Residents of the Western part of the country more often than residents of the other regions mentioned worshipping God, common prayer (63%, in the other regions — from 31% to 46%). Representatives of the oldest age group mentioned this goal more often than representatives of other age groups (53%, in other age groups — from 40% to 48%).

Believers of UGCC (71%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (70%) mentioned it more often than believers of UOC (MP) (56%) and OCU (52.5%). Believers of UGCC more often than last year mentioned among the goals of the Church assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population (their share increased from 13.5% to 23%).

If we compare the answers to two questions: «What main goals should churches and religious organisations set for themselves in Ukraine?» and «What main goals does the church or religious organisation, to which you belong, pursue?», the answers to these two questions are similar, that is, respondents usually believe that the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, meets their expectations. Respondents mentioned the following key goals pursued by their church: worshipping God, common prayer (59% those who associate themselves with a specific church or religious organisation), spiritual support for the people who found themselves in a spiritual crisis (47%), moral recovery of society (27%), defence of traditional values (26%), assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population (21%, diagrams «What main goals does the Church or religious organisation, to which you belong, pursue?»). However, the share of those who believe that the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, helps socially unprotected groups of the population is lower (21%) than the share of those who believe that churches and religious organisations in Ukraine should set this goal for themselves (27.5%). That is, public demand for performance of this function by religious organisations is not sufficiently satisfied.

Residents of the Western part of the country more often than residents of the other regions mentioned worshipping God, common prayer as a goal implemented by their religious organisation (74%, in the other regions — from 33% to 55%). Implementation of this goal is more often mentioned by believers of UGCC (79%) and Protestant and Evangelic churches (74%), while among the believers of UOC (MP) 62%, OCU — 60%. It is also more often mentioned by representatives of the oldest age group (64%, in other age groups — from 54% to 59%).

Residents of the Western and Southern regions (respectively, 16% and 17%) more often than residents of the other regions said that their church implements the goal of bringing up youths. Residents of the Central regions more often than residents of the other regions mentioned spiritual support of their religious organisation for the people who found themselves in a spiritual crisis (55%). Residents of the Central and Southern regions (respectively, 26% and 28%) more often than residents of the other regions mentioned assistance of their religious organisation to socially unprotected groups of the population.

UGCC believers more often than believers of other churches reported that their church defends traditional values (42%); among the believers of OCU and UOC (MP) this answer was given, respectively, by 27% and 21%, least of all — by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (9%).

6. Ukrainian citizens believe that a social mission, assistance to the people, their support should occupy a leading place in the activity of the church or religious organisation.

32% of those polled responded that a social mission should occupy a leading place in the activity of the church, 37% that a social mission is important, but not primary in the church activity. Only 9% of those polled believes that a social mission is of little importance for the



church, and only 6% that the church (religious organisation) should not engage in social missions at all (diagrams "What place should a social mission occupy in the activity of a church, religious organisation?").

These opinions little differ from what was recorded last year, but compared to the previous year, the importance of the social mission of the church increased for the youngest age group: while in 2021, 54% of those under 25 suggested that a social mission should be the main or important line in the church activity, now, 68% in this group thinks so.

This opinion is shared by 81% of believers of UGCC, 78% of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches, 78% of OCU believers, 70% of UOC (MP) believers, 63% of «just Orthodox», 58% of «just Christian» and 41% of those who did not associate themselves with any confession.

Assessing which social missions of churches or religious organisations are the most important for society, respondents most of all mentioned psychological assistance (62%) and protection of vulnerable groups (victims of violence, homeless, displaced persons, etc. – 49%). Another 32% mentioned religious education, 29% – upbringing children, 25% welfare aid, 7% organisation of leisure, 6% occupational guidance and training. 3% of those polled said that none of the social missions of the church are important for society (diagrams «Which social missions of churches or religious organisations is, in your opinion, the most important for society?»).

In the perceptions of the main tasks and lines of the social mission of the church, the West stands out: Westerners more often than residents of the other regions mentioned among the main social missions of the church upbringing children (41%, in the other regions from 22% to 33%) and religious education (40%, in the other regions – from 20% to 34%), but more rarely than in the other regions - protection of vulnerable groups (40.5%, in the other regions - from 51% to55%). Residents of the Southern regions more often than residents of the other regions mentioned welfare aid (40%, in the other regions - from 20% to 25%). Believers of UGCC pay more attention to upbringing children than believers of other churches (48%).

Speaking about the social missions of the churches and religious organisations especially interesting for them personally, 39% of respondents mentioned psychological assistance, 23% religious education, 20% protection of vulnerable groups, 17% upbringing children, 16% welfare aid, 10% organisation of leisure, 6% occupational guidance and training. 22% reported that they are not interested in any social missions of the church (last year – 28%).

Residents of the country's Western more often than residents of the other regions mentioned religious education (35%), upbringing children (28%), occupational guidance and training (12%); residents of the Centre psychological assistance (44%); residents of the South and East – welfare aid (respectively 24.5% and 21%); residents of the West and South - organisation of leisure (respectively 17% and 14%); residents of the South protection of vulnerable groups (32%, this social mission of the church is least of all interesting for residents of the Western part of the country 14%, diagram «Which social missions of churches or religious organisations might be especially interesting for you?»).

Psychological assistance is more interesting for believers of UOC (MP) (57%) and OCU (49%), welfare aid – for believers of UOC (MP) (29%), and less – for believers of UGCC (8%). Upbringing children is especially interesting for believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (34%) and UGCC (26%), protection of vulnerable groups – for believers of UOC (MP) (28%). 55% of those who do not associate themselves with any religion are not interested in any social mission of the church.

Representatives of older age groups more often than younger people expressed interest in such social missions of the church as psychological assistance and welfare aid.

52.5% of those polled reported that they personally did not deal with any social missions of churches or religious organisations (last year - 58%). This answer was given more frequently by residents of the East



(60.5%) and South (59%), those who do not associate themselves with any religion (75%), and «just Orthodox» (64%). In younger and medium age groups this answer was given more often than in older ones.

This answer was given more rarely by residents of the Western part of the country (44%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (31%) and UOC (MP) (37%, diagrams "Which social missions of churches or religious organisations did you deal with personally?").

Among the social services of the church obtained by respondents, they usually mentioned psychological assistance (22%). 13% mentioned religious education, 9% — welfare aid (last year — only 4%), 7.5% assistance in upbringing children, 7% protection of vulnerable groups, 4% assistance in organisation of leisure, 4% assistance in occupational guidance and training.

Residents of the Western part of the country more often than residents of the other regions reported obtaining assistance in religious education (23.5%), upbringing children (16%), organisation of leisure (9%), occupational guidance and training (8%); residents of the South — welfare aid (15%), assistance as part of protection of vulnerable groups (14%).

Representatives of older age groups more often than younger respondents obtained from churches and religious organisations psychological assistance and welfare aid.

Such cases are more known to residents in the West of the country (29%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (36.5%) and UGCC (32%).

Social mission of religious organisations in wartime. Answering the question "What are the priority tasks for religious organisations in wartime?", respondents mainly mentioned psychological assistance (54%), assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (45.5%) and assistance in solution of social and living problems of citizens (39.5%). Another 28% mentioned raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine, 23% — assistance to internally displaced persons, 18% — mitigation

of the aftermaths of ruination of cities, villages, social and transport infrastructure, 4% — satisfaction of the needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad (diagram «What is your idea of the priority tasks for religious organisations in wartime?»).

Psychological assistance is mentioned as the most important social mission of the church in all regions, age groups and almost all church and confessional groups (with the exception of believers of UGCC, who consider assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine to be more important).

Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine is seen as the second most important mission in the West and Centre of Ukraine; in the East, it ranks 2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>, along with the assistance in solution of social and living problems of citizens and raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine. In the South, it ranks 3<sup>rd</sup> in terms of importance, after psychological assistance and assistance in solution of social and living problems of citizens.

48% of those polled answered that they knew cases, where religious communities (of any religion) after the beginning of the large-scale war of Russia against Ukraine provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Such instances are more known to residents of the Western part of the country (70%), believers of UGCC (82%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (77%, diagrams "Do you know about instances...?").

43.5% of those polled knows cases, where religious communities provided welfare aid to refugees (among internally displaced persons, 49% of those polled knows such cases). Such instances are more known to residents of the Western part of the country (56%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (74%) and UGCC (71%).

40% of those polled knows cases, where religious communities gave shelter to refugees (among internally displaced persons, 44% of those polled knows such cases). Such instances are more known to residents of the Western part of the country (53%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (68%) and UGCC (60%).



33% of respondents know cases, where religious communities brought or distributed humanitarian aid from abroad. This answer was the most frequently given by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (66%).

27% of those polled knows instances of arrangement of bomb shelters in churches (the most often – in the East (34%).

24% of those polled knows cases, where religious organisations provided assistance to medical and social institutions.

24% of respondents know cases, where religious organisations provided assistance to residents of liberated and frontline territories (among residents of formerly occupied and frontline territories — 31%). This answer was the most often given by residents of the country's East (31%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (53%).

21% knows cases, where religious organisations assisted with evacuation of residents from occupied territories and territories under artillery fire (among residents of formerly occupied territories — 34%, among residents of frontline territories and territories that were under artillery fire — 31%). This answer was the most often given by residents of the East of the country (29%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (40.5%).

At the same time, 6% of those polled said that they know cases, where religious communities after the beginning of the large-scale war of Russia against Ukraine expressed support for Russia's actions, especially among residents of the country's East - 10%, while among those who lived in the occupied territories, there are fewer such people - 2%).

4% of those polled knows cases, where religious organisations assisted the invaders (there are more such people among residents of the East of the country — 10%, although among those who lived in the occupied territories — only 2%).

4.5% of those polled said that they know cases, where religious communities took for themselves humanitarian assistance or used it for their benefit (the most often — in Western (7%) and Eastern (6%) regions).

20% of respondents said that they know instances of churches (religious organisations) building or maintaining medical and social institutions (hospitals, hospices, homes for the elderly, orphanages, etc.) (last year -29%), but the overwhelming majority (79%) never heard about it (last year -69%). The most often this was reported by residents of the Western part of the country (29%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (36.5%) and UGCC (32%, diagrams "Do you know instances of churches building or maintaining..?").

Answering the question *«Did religious* communities (of any church) after the beginning of the large-scale war of Russia against Ukraine) provide sufficient assistance to refugees, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, residents of liberated and frontline territories?», 18% of respondents reported that religious communities do their best to provide assistance to refugees, 33% – do a lot, 15.5% – do something, 3% - do nothing; regarding assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine respectively, 19%, 30%, 15% and 3.5%, regarding assistance to the residents of liberated and frontline territories - respectively, 14.5%, 21%, 15% and 6% (diagrams «Do you think that religious communities sufficiently...?»).

Regarding assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and refugees, religious communities are especially praised by residents of the Western part of the country, believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches and UGCC, regarding assistance to the residents of liberated and frontline territories — by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches.

53% of those polled knows about priests of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, providing humanitarian assistance and social support to internally displaced persons in Ukraine (diagrams "Do you know...?"). This answer was the most rarely given by residents of the East (38%, in the other regions — from 53% to 58%), the most often — by believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (80%).

47% of those polled knows about participation of priests of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, in the defence of Ukraine (chaplain service, service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial



defence — from 41% of residents in the country's South to 49% in the West). There were no statistically important differences in the answers to this question among the believers of the most numerous church and confessional groups.

36% of respondents said that the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, brought humanitarian assistance from abroad to help Ukrainian citizens who suffered from the war (this answer was the most often given by residents of the Centre (42%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (73.5%).

34% of those polled knows about statements of the leaders of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, drawing attention of the world leaders and the public to the situation in Ukraine and calling them to denounce the Kremlin's aggression. This answer was the most often given by residents of the West (41%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (46%) and UGCC (45%).

26% of those polled knows about instances, where priests of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, accompanied humanitarian cargoes or took part in the arrangement of humanitarian corridors, evacuation from the areas of hostilities and adjacent territories. This answer was the most often given by residents of the Western (32%) and Eastern (29%) regions, believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (48%).

22% of those polled knows about priests of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, providing humanitarian assistance and social support to Ukrainian refugees abroad. This answer was the most often given by residents of the Western part of the country (28%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (46%).

20% of those polled knows about priests of the church or religious organisation, to which they belong, satisfying the spiritual and religious needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad. This answer was the most often given by residents of the Western part of the country (26%), believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (53%).

26% of the respondents who in wartime stayed abroad witnessed the activity of representatives of some of the Ukrainian churches or Ukrainian

religious organisations abroad (diagram *«Did* you witness the activity of representatives of any of the Ukrainian churches or Ukrainian religious organisations abroad?»).

74% of religious community members reported that the religious community, to which they belong, from the beginning of the largescale war of Russia against Ukraine provided welfare aid to refugees, 74% - provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 59% – gave shelter to refugees, 41% – brought or distributed humanitarian assistance from abroad, 38% - provided assistance to medical and social institutions, 35% - provided assistance to residents of liberated and frontline territories, 28% - arranged a bomb shelter in the church, 27% - helped with evacuation of residents from occupied territories and territories under artillery fire. The most active role of their communities in provision of most types of assistance was noted by community members of Protestant and Evangelic churches (diagrams «Did the religious community to which you belong..?»).

54% of religious community members reported that in wartime they obtained from the religious community, to which they belong, moral support, 47% — psychological support, 22% — welfare aid. Among different kinds of assistance, the position of UGCC believers stands out, the majority of whom answered that they did not require psychological (67.5%), moral (58%) and welfare (86%) support from the religious community (diagrams «Did you obtain in wartime from your religious community..?»).

7. National character of the Church. In 2000 the majority (53%) of Ukraine's citizens was against the national character of the church in Ukraine (29% supported this stand). In 2010-2020 the share of those who opposed the national character of the Church ranged between 37-43%, while the share of its supporters between 31-34% (diagrams «Should the church, religion have a national character?»).

However, according to the poll of 2021, the share of supporters of the national character of the church increased to 39%, while its opponents made 44.5%. According to the poll of 2022, after the beginning of Russia's allout aggression, the share of those who support the national character of the church

increased even more — to 49%, while the share of its opponents fell to 32.5%. Apparently, the adherents of this stand impart to this notion the positive connotation of the «patriotic stand of the Church», while the opponents, on the contrary the negative connotation of the «national narrow-mindedness». It is also evident that the public demand for a patriotic position of the Church in wartime rose substantially.

In the Western and Central regions, supporters of the national character of the church make more than half (respectively, 63% and 51%) of those polled. In the Southern and Eastern regions, opponents of the national character of the Church are in a relative majority (respectively, 43.5% and 46%). However, the number of opponents of the national character of the Church in those regions substantially declined, compared to 2021 (then, they made 61% and 58% of the polled in those regions, respectively).

The majority of believers of UGCC (70%), OCU (60%) and a relative majority of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (50%), «just Orthodox» (38.5%) believe that the Church should have a national character. Opponents of the national character of the church are in a majority among those who do not associate themselves with any religion (51%), and make a relative majority of believers of UOC (MP) (49%) and «just Christian» (45%).

#### 3. THE CHURCH AND THE STATE

1. Attitude of citizens to the idea of an official state church. Over the period of monitoring, the number of its supporters declined from 20% in 2000 to 11% in 2020. In 2021 their share increased to 18%, in 2022 — to 28%, although they continue to stay in a minority. This idea is not supported by 47% (in 2021 — 58%). This opinion prevails in all regions and all confessional and church groups, with the exception of believers of OCU, among whom the number of supporters and opponents of this idea are roughly the same (respectively, 40% and 37%, diagram «Attitude to the idea of an official state church»).

The main arguments of the opponents of the idea of an official state church include its inconsistency with the right to the freedom of conscience and the multi-confessional character of Ukraine (respectively, 40% and 45%, diagrams *«If you disagree with the introduction of the institute of an official state church in Ukraine, why?»*).

2. Despite the rejection of the idea of an official state church by a relative majority of citizens, they tend to support wider involvement of the church in official events and ceremonies (blessing military servants and law-enforcement officers taking oath, state institutions, building of local self-government bodies, educational establishments)

It was praised by 51.5% of those polled (in 2021 – 42%), criticised by only 11% (last year – 17.5%). 38% and 41% remained indifferent or undecided (diagrams "What is your attitude to more active involvement of the church in official events and ceremonies?").

The share of those who praised the idea is higher than the share of its critics in all regions. The older the respondents are, the more they welcome this idea (from 42% among those under 25 years to 55% in the age of 60 years and more). This practice is welcomed by the majority of believers of UGCC (66.5%), OCU (64%), UOC (MP) (63%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (55%).

#### 4. PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF INTER-RELIGIOUS, INTER-CONFESSIONAL AND INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS

1. A relative majority (49%) of respondents noted comfortable relations between the believers of different churches and religions in the area, where they live. Another 12% called them friendly, 6% conflict-like, and 14% termed them as tense (diagrams «What are the relations like among the believers of different churches and religions in the area where you live?»). Compared to 2021, the share of those who believe that the relations are comfortable declined (from 58% to 49%), an increase from 3% to 6% was observed in the share of those who believe that they are conflictlike, and from 5% to 14% – that they are tense. Hence, one may note a deterioration of interreligious and inter-confessional relations, compared to the previous year.

Conflicts or tension in relations between believers of different churches is the most



often mentioned by residents of the Centre (28%, last year - 11%) and the West (21%, last year - 6%). In the Southern and Eastern regions, their share is much lower (respectively, 5% and 9%). Conflicts or tension in relations between believers of different churches were the most often mentioned by believers of OCU (28%, last year - 10%) and UOC (MP) (27%, last year - 10%), the most rarely - by believers of UGCC (8%, last year - 4%). These results show that the strongest tension is in the relations exactly between the believers of OCU and UOC (MP).

## 2. During the period of monitoring, the public opinion of the factors of conflicts that occur between believers of different churches changed.

Since 2000, the importance of the political factor has been growing steadily, and now it tops the ranking (43% of respondents called conflicts between churches purely political; in 2000, only 20% of those polled thought so). 32% of those polled said that «conflicts mainly concern property and buildings». The frequency of mention of this reason also increased, compared to 2000 (in 2000 - 22.5%), apparently, in connection with media reports of disputes and conflicts concerning the use of religious structures, mainly between the communities of OCU and UOC (MP) (diagram «Why do conflicts between believers of different Churches take place in Ukraine?»). Meanwhile, compared to 2021, the frequency of mention of this reason declined (last year, it was mentioned by 40% of those polled). Compared to the previous year, the share of those who see the source conflicts in «church hierarchs seeking power» fell from 34% to 25%, and the share of those who believe that «the essence of conflicts lies in the national question» rose from 15% to 20%. Statistically did not change the shares of those who believe that «mass media instigate religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts» (respectively, 16% and 17%), and that «the true Church must prove its superiority over others» (respectively, 10% and 11%).

The ideas of the political nature of interchurch conflicts are most of all spread in the Centre (50%) and South (46%) of Ukraine. The negative role of mass media provoking conflicts was the most often mentioned by residents of the country's South (30%). The political nature of inter-church conflicts is more often mentioned by the believers of UOC (MP) (51%), Protestant and Evangelic churches (50%), «just Christian» (50%), believers of OCU (45%) and «just Orthodox» (41.5%). Believers of UOC (MP) (26%) and «just Christian» (22%) more often complain that «mass media instigate religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts».

#### 5. PEOPLE'S FORECASTS OF CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION AFTER THE WAR

38% of those polled believes that after the war the role of religious organisations and churches in civic life in Ukraine will not change. Roughly as many (36%) believes that it will grow, and only 5.5% — that it will decline. A relative majority (47%) of residents of the Western regions expects a stronger role of religious organisations after the war, a relative majority of residents of the Central and Eastern regions (40% each) believes that it will not change, while in the South, the shares of the former and latter do not statistically differ (respectively, 36% and 39%, diagrams "Do you believe that after the war...?").

«Just Orthodox» (44%), «just Christian» (46%) and those who do not associate themselves with any religion (49%) more tend to believe that after the war the role of religious organisations in civic life in Ukraine will not change. The majority of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (62%) and of UGCC (53%), and a relative majority of OCU believers (43%) stick to the opinion that it will grow, while among UOC (MP) believers, the shares of the former and latter are equal (37%). Older respondents more often than young people believe that the role of religious organisations will grow, and more rarely — that it will not change.

37% of those polled believes that after the war the role of religious organisations, churches in solution of social problems of citizens will not change, 31% — that it will grow, and only 6.5%—that it will decline. In the Western, Central and Southern regions the shares of those who believe that the role of religious organisations in solution of social problems of citizens will not change and those who believe that it will



grow statistically do not differ, in the East a relative majority (41%) believes that it will not change.

Among representatives of different confessional and church groups, only among the believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (49%) and OCU (38%) a relative majority expects this role to grow. Older respondents more often than young people believe that the role of religious organisations in solution of social problems will grow, and less — that it will not change.

Regarding the intensity of conflicts in the relations between churches and religious organisations in Ukraine, 32% of those polled believes that it will remain unchanged, 21% believes that it will grow, and just so many — that it will decline. Among all confessional and church groups, a hope for mitigation of conflicts was more often reported by the believers of UGCC (41%).


A relative majority (46%) of respondents believes that after the war, religious

organisations and churches in Ukraine will adapt to the demand of time, 33.5% — that they will largely stick to traditions in their activity. The majority of those polled in the Centre (51%) and South (50.5%) of the country and arelative majority of residents in the West (46%) believe that religious organisations will change, while in the East, the shares of the former and latter do not statistically differ (respectively, 33% and 35%).


The majority of believers of OCU (52%), a relative majority of believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches (45%) and «just Orthodox» (42%) stick to the opinion that after the war religious organisations will adapt to the demand of time, while among the believers of UGCC, UOC (MP) and «just Christian» the shares of those who believe that religious organisations will modernise and those who believe that they will follow traditions do not statistically differ. The younger the respondents are, the more often they express hope that religious organisations will adapt to the demand of time.














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	2010	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2 2010	0 2018	18 2019		2020 20	202  2022		2010 20	2018 20	2019 20	2020 2	2021 20	2022   21	2010 2	2018 2	2019 2	2020	2021	2022 2	2010	2018   2	2019	2020	2021	2022	2010	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
	1.99	65.4	51.6	52.3	48.2	9.09	<b>5</b> 65.7	7 66.2	2 58.7	7 64.4	1.4 56.1	.1 65.1		67.7 73	73.0 68	68.9	64.0 6	67.1 7.	72.6 6	68.2 6	9 2.89	65.2 6	9.89	67.8	75.4	76.0	72.9 7	70.7	9.69	73.4	76.3	77.8	77.0	8.69	75.8	75.2	79.1
A person who wavers between faith and non-belief	10.2	11.5	16.9	17.1	19.1	19.4	≡	15.0	.0 12.4		11.3 15	15.2 13.7		16.2 11	=	11.6	14.5 14	14.3	12.9	15.0	14.9	11.0	16.0	15.2	11.9	8.3	10.3	9.3	11.7	9.01	12.0	89.	9.0	13.3	7.6	9.4	9.8
	11.8	8.3	6.7	4.5	9.0	9.8	10.1	1 5.3		9.0 3.	3.4 11	0.1	9.6	6.1 4	4.0 3	3.4	4.8	2.0 4	4.9	1.7	4.2	2.7	3.4	2.7	3.8	8.0	5.4	6.2	6.9	4.9	4.2	2.8	3.4	4.4	2.8	4.3	3.4
A convinced atheist	17	3.2	3.6	7.0	2.0	4.0	0 1.5	5 2.9		7.0 3.	3.4 5	.5 3	3.4	1.4	3.2 3	3.7	3.3	3.5	6:1	1.5	2.7	3.9	3.7	2.0	1.4	1.2	2.9	3.4	2.7	2.9	1.2	1.6	3.0	3.8	3.7	3.2	2.4
I don't care about these things	7.1	6.9	11.6	13.6	13.1	6.3	3 5.6	6 7.2		5.5 14.	14.7	.3 6	6.2 5	5.3 4	4.9 6	9.9	8.3	6.5	4.4	3.5	6.3	7.1	0.9	5.5	4.3	2.4	4.6	5.9	5.4	5.2	5.1	4.1	4.1	4.6	4.4	4.1	3.6
	3.5	4.6	9.8	5.5	5.5	=	1.6.1	1 3.4		7.5 2.	2.8 4	.9 2.	<b>2.1</b> 3	3.4 3	3.8 5	5.8	5.3	3.5	3.4	2.6	3.6	7.1	2.3	3.7	3.2	4.2	4.0	4.5	3.6	3.2	1.2	2.0	3.6	4.0	3.5	3.7	1.7
					뜅	GENDER	~											B	EDUCATION	NO NO					H		Н	П	П	≥	TYPE O	FSE	ETTLEM	핗			
			Male	0				Fen	Female			Inco	mple	te or ry edi	Incomplete or general secondary education	eral	0)	Secondary special education	ondary spe education	spec	<u>ia</u>	_	lighe high	r or in	Higher or incomplete higher education	on			Ö	City				>	Village		
	2010	2) 319	019 20	120 20	2010 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022	22 2010	0 2018	3 2019	2020	2018 2019 2020 2021 2022		2010 20	2018 2019	19 202	2020 2021 2022	2022	2010	2018 2	2019 20	2018 2019 2020 2021	21 2022	2 2010		2019	2018 2019 2020 2021 2022	021 20	22 2010	0 2018		2019 2020 2021		2022 2	2010 2	2018 20	2019 2020	2021	2022
	62.4 62.9 58.1	2.9 58		61.3 59.	59.1 <b>66.1</b> 78.7	1 78.7		78.9 72.4	73.6	73.6 75.1 80.7	30.7	- 7	71.3 68.4	4 69.7	7.11	74.0	ı	74.0 66.2	6.2 70	70.4 70.7	7 74.3	-	69.2	64.4	63.8 63	3.0 74	63.0 74.0 69.2	2 69.4	64.7	64.9	64.0 70.3		75.9 76	76.3 68.6	6 74.1	75.4	81.6
A person who wavers between faith and non-belief	13.8 14	14.1 14	14.0 14.	14.6 16.	16.8 14.4	9.6	6 9.3	10.7	11.6	9.9 1	10.4	6	9.3 12.1	1 12.5	5 11.5	14.6	I	11.7	11.4 12	12.2 11.9	9 11.5		12.7	13.0	14.2 14	14.9 11	11.9 11.3	3 12.2	12.9	15.0	13.7	14.2	11.9	9.9 10.9	9 8.9	11.6	8.3
	10.6	6.8	6.8 5.	5.3 7.	7.8 7.5	5.8	8 3.0	4.3	3.3	4.0	5.6	- 5	5.9 4.6	.6 4.5	5.0	4.2	ı	3.1	5.4 3	3.2 5.2	2 4.3	- 8	5.7	9.0	5.0	6.9	<b>5.9</b> 8.º	9 5.7	6.4	4.1	6.5	5.5	5.9	2.7 3.	3.3 4.5	4.1	3.7
A convinced atheist	1.9	4.7	5.5 5.	5.2 4.	4.4 3.1	1.0	0 1.6	2.8	2.6	2.6	1.4	- 2	2.8 2.9	.9 3.5	5 3.5	0.8	1	2.3	3.7 4	4.5 2.	2.6 2.6	- 9	3.9	2.0	3.1	4.2 2	2.3 1.8	3 3.7	4.1	5.1	4.0	2.2	8.0	1.5 3.	3.8 1.2	2.4	1.9
I don't care about these things	6.2	5 9.7	9.1 10.	10.2 7.	7.5 6.3	3 2.9	9 3.4	4.4	4.9	2.0	3.0	- 5	5.7 6.8	8.9	9 6.0	5.2	ı	5.2	9 6.9	6.2 5.	5.3 4.3	-	5.3	0.9	9.1	7.2 4	4.1 4.8	8. 6.0	9.9	7.7	7.2	5.3	3.6	4.1 6.2	2 6.7	3.9	3.2
	5.0	3.9	6.5 3.	5 4	4 2.5	5 1.9	9 3.8	5.3	4.0	3.4	1.9	- 5	5.1 5.3	3 3.1	3.0	1.3	1	3.7	6.4 3	3.4 4.3	3 2.9	- 6	3.1	9.6	4.7	3.8	<b>1.9</b> 3.0	9 3.0	5.2	3.3	4.6	5.6	2.0	5.6 7.1	1 4.6	2.6	1.3
															J	NOS	<b>CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTI</b>	ONA	구	IURC	⊒ E	EN	≥														
			OCU	$\supset$				n	UOC (MP)	MP)			S	yldmi	Simply Orthodox	орог	×			n	necc			Prot evan chu	Protestant and evangelical churches	s al	iS	mply	Simply Christian	stian			2 \$	do not belong to any religion	t belc religi	on on	
	2010	2018	2019	2020	2019 2020 2021 2022	2022	2010 2	2018 2	2019 2	2019 2020 2021	(4	022	2010 20	2018 2019	19 2020	20 2021	21 2022	2 2010	) 2018	2019	2020	2021 2022	2022		2022	8	2010 2018	8 2019	9 2020	0 2021	1 2022	2 2010	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
	1	ı	86.0 8	86.2	83.3	88.0	87.3 8	81.8	86.0 90.1		86.8	<b>92.4</b> 70	70.5 71.	1.5 67.3	.3 64.7	7 71.7	7 73.4	4 98.0	) 96.3	93.8	95.3	97.8	92.6	6	91.9	45.1	.1 50.0	0 53.1	67.6	54.4	54.3	\$ 21.3	6.9	5.8	4.6	14.8	10.6
A person who wavers between faith and non-belief	I	ı	7.5	9.0	11.4	9.0	8.7	11.2	7.0	8 6.9	8.2	5.3 18	18.0 14.	.0 17.6	22	.5 16.5	5 18.8	13	3 1.6	3.6	3.1	9.0	2.0		8.1	22	22.9 29.9	9 17.5	5 19.6	5 25.1	25.7	8.0	11.3	14.8	13.4	15.6	14.8
	1	ı	8.0	1.6	0.4	0.7	=	1.9	6.0	0.4	0.8	0.0	3.1 1.	1.9 5.	.5 3.3	3 1.3	3 2.3	3 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	9.0	0.0	Ū	0.0	12	12.5 6.	.5 3.8	3 2.2	5.3	3 4.6	43.3	29.0	23.0	17.4	24.8	31.4
A convinced atheist	1	1	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.8	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6 0.	0.4 1.	1.5 0.5	.5 0.3	3 0.0	0.0	0.0	1:0	0.0	9.0	1.0	J	0.0	0	0.7 1.3	3 1.9	0.0	0 1.8	3 1.7	1.9.1	23.1	19.1	23.0	16.9	14.8
I don't care about these things	ı	1	1.5	0.5	1.6	9.0	=	2.3	6.0	0.0	0.4	1.5 3	3.3 6.	6.4 3.	3.4 4.0	.0 4.8	8 2.6	<b>6</b> 0.7	, 0.5	0:0	0.0	0.0	0.5	Ŭ	0.0	6	9.0 8.4	4 18.8	8 6.7	6.6	10.9	15.2	23.5	26.5	35.4	20.1	22.5
	1	1	3.4	1.9	3.3	1.2	1.5	1.9	4.2	2.6 (	0.8	0.8 4	4.6 5.	5.7 4.	4.8 4.9		5.5 2.9	0.0 6	1.6	1.6	1.0	9.0	1.0		0.0	6	9.7 3.9	9 5.0	3.9	3.5	5 2.9	3.0	6.3	10.9	6.2	7.9	5.9



#### WHICH SOCIAL COMMUNITY DO YOU IDENTIFY YOURSELF WITH IN THE FIRST PLACE? % of respondent

		%	of respond	dent			
	l	UKRAINE			REGION (No	vember 2022)	
	2021	20	)22	West	Centre	South	East
With citizens of Ukraine	68.2	73	3.5	71.9	72.4	79.3	74.8
With residents of your city (village)	15.6	13	3.9	14.6	15.6	9.1	12.2
With residents of your region	8.1	5	5.5	5.5	4.9	3.8	7.3
With people of your profession	1.3	1	1.2	1.7	1.6	0.0	0.5
With people of the same faith	2.7	2	2.6	3.0	3.1	1.9	1.5
With people of the same Church to which you belong	1.0	1	1.5	1.8	1.3	2.9	1.0
Other	0.6	0	).6	0.6	0.3	1.0	1.2
Hard to say	2.5	1	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.9	1.5
			(Novembe				
	18-24 year	rs 25-29	years :	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
With citizens of Ukraine	79.0	76	5.4	74.3	73.4	74.5	69.6
With residents of your city (village)	10.8	11	1.5	11.4	14.4	14.4	16.8
With residents of your region	2.8	4	1.7	7.0	5.4	4.5	6.0
With people of your profession	0.6	1	1.4	1.9	2.2	1.5	0.2
With people of the same faith	1.7	2	2.0	2.4	1.1	2.4	4.5
With people of the same Church to which you belong	1.1	2	2.0	1.2	1.4	1.2	2.1
Other	1.7	0	0.0	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.7
Hard to say	2.3	2	2.0	1.0	1.6	1.2	0.2
	CONFES	SIONAL-CH	URCH IDEI	NTITY (Nover	mber 2022)		
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthod		Protestant a  C evangelica  churches	al Simply	I do not belong to any religion
With citizens of Ukraine	74.8	64.4	81.4	72.8	3 60.8	74.1	69.1
With residents of your city (village)	14.9	15.9	10.5	16.5	5 10.8	13.2	13.1
With residents of your region	4.5	6.1	2.9	6.3	3 2.7	8.6	10.6
With people of your profession	1.5	0.8	1.0	0.0	1.4	1.7	1.7
With people of the same faith	2.5	6.1	1.6	2.4	12.2	0.6	0.4
With people of the same Church to which you belong	1.2	4.5	0.0	1.5	5 12.2	1.1	0.4
Other	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.6	1.7
Hard to say	0.7	2.3	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0







#### WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DO YOU MOST AGREE WITH?

% of respondent

(continued)

						( /
			<b>AGE</b> (Nove	mber 2022)		
	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
A person can be just a believer and not profess any particular religion	60.9	67.1	60.6	58.6	58.3	48.6
A believer must profess one religion or another	27.0	28.8	33.3	32.7	34.5	44.2
Hard to say	12.1	4.1	6.1	8.6	7.2	7.2

		CONFE	SSIONAL-CH	URCH IDENT	ITY (Novembe	er 2022)	
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion
A person can be just a believer and not profess any particular religion	52.2	40.9	69.7	34.6	36.5	75.9	73.3
A believer must profess one religion or another	41.0	53.8	23.5	61.0	60.8	19.0	8.5
Hard to say	6.8	5.3	6.8	4.4	2.7	5.2	18.2


#### WHICH RELIGION DO YOU BELONG TO?

			% of	respondent					
	2000	2010	2013	2014	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Orthodoxy	66.0	68.1	70.6	70.2	67.3	64.9	62.3	60.0	62.7
Roman Catholicism	0.5	0.4	1.3	1.0	0.8	1.6	1.2	0.8	1.9
Greek Catholicism	7.6	7.6	5.7	7.8	9.4	9.5	9.6	8.8	10.2
Protestant and evangelical churches	2.0	1.9	0.8	1.0	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.5	3.7
Judaism	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Islam	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2
Buddhism	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2
Hinduism	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Paganism	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
I am simply Christian	6.9	7.2	8.6	6.3	7.7	8.0	8.9	8.5	8.7
Other	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
I do not belong to any religion	15.3	13.2	11.3	12.5	11.0	12.8	15.2	18.8	11.7
No answer	-	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.2




											N N	WHICH RELIGION DO YOU BELONG TO?	ZEI IC	NO	DO	VOU	BFI	<b>DNC</b>	T02															
														% of r	% of respondent	nden	<u>_</u>		<u>.</u>													3)	(continued)	ed)
																RE	REGION																	
				West	st							O	Centre								South	ıth								East				
	5000	2013	2014	2018	5019	5050	2021	2022	5000	2010	2013	2014	2018	5019	5050	2021	2022	5000	2010	2013	2014	5018	5020	2021	2022	5000	2010	2013	2014	2018	5019	5050	2021	2022
Orthodoxy	52.3 45.9 60.2 54.0 45.6 46.6 46.3 45.0 39.9 69.0	.09 6.	2 54.	0 45.0	6 46.0	5 46.3	3 45.0	39.9	0.69	73.8	79.4	79.5	69.3 7	73.9 6	9 6.69	66.6 7	74.7 6	68.8 76	76.4 73	73.2 67	67.4 61.	61.6 69.3	3 64.9	9 61.3	8 68.9	1.69	71.8	299	71.6	61.6	62.9	64.7	61.4 6	64.5
Roman Catholicism	1.3	1.0 3.8	.8 1.0	.0 1.3	3 1.3	3 2.3	3 1.9	4.1	0.8	0.5	0.9	1.5	0.8	2.6	17 (	6.0	<b>1.4</b>	0.0	0.3	0.3 0	0.9 0.	0.0	8 0.4	4 1.2	2 0.5	0.0	0.2	0.8	9.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.4	1.0
Greek Catholicism	38.4 37.2		26.8 36.2	2 39.7	7 35.8	3 38.2	2 34.9	34.9 36.3	9.0	0.3	1.2	0.7	0.4	2.5	1.2	1.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.3 0	0.5 0.	0.0 0.4	4 0.0	0 0.4	4 0.0	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.2	9.0	0.7
Protestant and evangelical churches	0.8	3.8 0.5	.5 1.4	4 5.3	3 1.1	1.9	9 1.5	5.4	1 2.9	0.5	9.0	0.3	1.7	2.1	1.6	2.6	2.7	1.7 0	0.0	0.3 2	2.3 2.	2.9 1.7	7 2.1	1.2	2 1.9	1.9	3.2	1.2	0.9	2.9	2.1	0.8	Ξ	4.4
Judaism	0.5 0	0.0 0.5	.5 0.0	0.0 0.	0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.7 0	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0	0.08	3 0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0
Islam	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.	0.0 0.	0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	3.0 4	4.9 4	4.2 0	0.5 0.4	.4 0.8	8 0.8	8 1.2	2 1.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0
Buddhism	0.0	0.3 0.0	0.0 0.	0.0	0.0	0.0 C	0.0 C	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 0.4	4 0.0	0.0 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
Hinduism	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.	.0 0.2	2 0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3 0	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Paganism	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.	0.0	0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0	0.0 0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2
I am simply Christian	2.7 6	6.9 4.3	.3 4.1	1 4.9	9 7.8	8 6.7	7 7.3	5.2	7.8	7.7	5.5	10.3	4.1	7.7	10.01	10.0	9.3	4.0 7	7.2	6.5 6	6.5 14.5	.5 4.1	1 7.4	4 11.1	10.0	6.6	7.0	15.2	3.8	14.5	10.2	8.6	6.3	11.2
Other	0.0	0.8 0.0	.0 0.2	2 0.0	0.0	0.0 0	9.0 C	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 0.0	0 0.4	4 0.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	6.0	0.8	0.7
I do not belong to any religion	4.0 4	4.1 3.6	.6 3.1	1 3.2	2 3.6	5 4.6	5 8.7	7.2	18.2	17.0	10.8	7.1	22.4	10.6	13.9	18.0 10	<b>10.7</b> 20	20.9 10	10.2	14.1 18.1	11 20.2	.2 22.4	4 23.6	6 21.8	3 17.2	16.6	16.3	15.0	21.7	20.2	19.6	22.6	27.7	16.6
No answer	0.0	0.0 0.3	.3 0.0	0.0 0.0	0 3.8	9 0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.0	3.7 0.4	.4 0.0	0 0.4	4 0.8	9 0.0	0.0	0.5	9.0	9.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	6.0	0.2
								8-24	18-24 vears			25.	25-29 vears	arc			30-3	AGE 30-39 years	N N	ovem	IGE (November 2022)	022)	022) 40-49 years			75	50-59 vears	pars			909	60 + vears	۶	
1								7				1	7, 7	5			,	206.70	2				, ,					5				, , ,	2	
Orthodoxy								50.9	٥.				51.0					62.4				ó	64.4				64.3	~				7./9		
Roman Catholicism								m	3.4				1.4					1.7				. 7	2.4				1.8	~				1.4		
Greek Catholicism								9	10.9				12.9					10.9				ω	9.8				10.5	10				9.6		
Protestant and evangelical churches	ical chu	ırches						2	5.7				2.7					4.1				.,	3.2				3.9	~				3.3		
Judaism								0	0.0				0.0					0.0				J	0.0				0.0	0				0.3		
Islam								0	9.0				0.0					0.0				J	0.3				0.3	~				0.2		
Buddhism								0	9.0				0.7					0.0				J	0.3				0.3	~				0.0		
Hinduism								0	0.0				0.0					0.0				J	0.0				0.0	0				0.3		
Paganism								0	9.0				0.0					0.2				J	0.3				0.0	0				0.0		
I am simply Christian								80	9.8				13.6					7.8				J.	9.4				7.2	0.1				8.4		
Other								0	9.0				0.0					0.5				J	0.0				0.3	~				0.3		
I do not belong to any religion	eligion							18	18.3				17.7					12.4				10	10.8				#					9.8		
No answer								0	0.0				0.0					0.0					0.3				0.3	~				0.3		










<sup>\*</sup> There is no proportion of those who did not answer, because of their small numbers.



HOW	OFTEN					SERVICE rices, mee				VICES?		
	2000	0	2010	2013	3	2016	2019	)	2020	2021	I	2022
More than once a week	4.4		3.5	3.7		4.2	4.9		4.2	4.1		7.5
Once a week	15.9		15.7	14.9		17.7	19.1		22.4	15.9		24.8
Once a month	13.1		20.8	18.5		17.0	20.1		18.4	23.1		16.4
On religious holidays	52.0		50.4	53.0		51.7	48.8		47.2	44.2		42.9
Once a year	8.1		5.4	6.3		6.4	4.2		3.6	8.8		4.5
Less than once a year	3.0		2.2	1.7		1.9	1.3		2.0	2.8		2.2
Never, almost never	0.3		0.9	0.6		0.1	0.5		0.7	0.4		0.4
Other	2.9		0.6	0.1		0.2	0.4		0.5	0.3		0.0
Hard to say	0.0		0.0	1.1		0.0	0.7		1.0	0.4		1.4
		West			Cantra	REG	ION	South			Foot	
	2020	2021	2022	2020	Centre 2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	East 2021	2022
More than once a week	6.2	4.5	12.6	3.5	3.7	3.3	3.9	3.9	7.8	1.5	3.9	4.0
Once a week	40.1	26.6	35.0	10.3	10.9	19.0	10.4	10.5	15.6	15.3	7.7	16.0
Once a month	26.7	27.9	19.5	17.6	21.1	15.5	9.1	23.7	5.2	6.1	17.9	16.0
On religious holidays	24.3	33.0	29.3	57.5	49.9	52.4	67.5	48.7	62.3	65.8	53.1	46.9
Once a year	1.5	6.6	1.1	4.0	9.6	6.5	3.9	10.5	5.2	7.1	10.6	8.0
Less than once a year	0.5	1.1	1.4	4.0	3.5	1.3	2.6	1.3	1.3	0.5	4.8	6.9
Never, almost never	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.5	0.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1
Other	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0
Hard to say	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.5	2.0	1.3	1.3	2.6	3.1	0.5	1.1
	40.0		0.7.04			<b>GE</b> (Nove						
More than once a week		years		9 years .7		9 years 8.7		years 3		9 years .3		+ years
Once a week	17.		21		24		24		20			0.1
Once a month	23.		16		13		13		19			6.4
On religious holidays	41.		49		49		47		41			6.9
,	41.			.5		i.1		.7		.8		3.7
Once a year		.1 .7		.0		i.i i.2		.6		.6		1.4
Less than once a year	0.			.0		1.0						
Never, almost never								.0		.0		0.6
Other		.0		.0		0.0		.0		.0		0.0
Hard to say	0.	.0	3	.1	1	8.	2	.1	1	.0		0.9




НО	W O	FTEN							S SEF		•			•	) SEF	RVICE	ES?			اد مین
							CC	ONFF	10122	JΔI -C	HIIR	СН ІГ	FNTI	TV				(1	Contil	nued)
		0	CU			UOC	(MP)			nply C					CC			rotest gelica		nd rches
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022
More than once a week	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.2	2.6	4.2	6.5	5.0	2.7	2.5	0.6	3.7	8.7	5.3	3.6	10.3	-	-	-	40.7
Once a week	20.8	19.2	10.1	20.9	15.1	22.2	18.9	25.0	9.4	5.4	4.9	10.6	34.7	47.6	30.2	39.7	-	-	-	44.1
Once a month	20.8	18.5	23.8	13.0	26.3	22.8	25.4	17.0	15.4	11.3	17.1	14.9	27.7	29.1	31.4	23.7	-	-	-	8.5
On religious holidays	49.5	50.9	50.9	50.4	45.4	42.3	38.4	47.0	63.8	69.5	52.4	60.2	25.4	16.9	32.5	25.8	-	-	-	5.1
Once a year	3.1	3.6	8.8	6.8	2.6	4.2	8.6	4.0	6.4	4.9	18.3	6.2	2.9	0.5	2.4	0.5	-	-	-	1.7
Less than once a year	2.1	1.1	1.8	2.4	1.3	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.7	5.4	6.1	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	0.0
Never, almost never	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	2.6	1.6	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	0.0
Other	0.0	1.4	0.3	0.0	2.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	0.0
Hard to say	0.0	1.1	0.3	2.8	2.0	2.1	0.0	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.0	0.0	-	-	_	0.0






				DII	) YC	)U A	TTE	ND	ТНІ	E SE	RVI	CE I	LAS	ΓSU	ND	AY (	SAT	URI	)AY,	FR	DA'	Y)?						
											%	of re	espo	nde	nt											(00)	ntinu	ied)
										C	ONF	ESS	ION	AL-C	CHU	RCH	IDE	NTII	Υ									
		00	CU		l	JOC	(MF	')	(	Sim Orth	ply odo:	X		UG	CC		е	test vang chur	elic	al		Sim Chri	nply stiar	1			bel relig	
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022
Yes	31.7	26.7	25.1	22.9	30.8	23.8	38.5	35.9	10.6	4.2	9.3	11.7	44.3	55.2	42.5	55.1	-	-	-	71.6	8.1	3.4	17.4	14.3	1.6	0.3	1.1	0.8
No	67.9	73.1	74.3	76.8	68.2	76.2	60.7	62.6	87.6	95.0	90.5	87.8	52.1	44.8	57.5	44.9	-	-	-	28.4	91.3	95.0	82.6	85.7	96.1	99.0	98.7	98.7
No answer	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.0	0.8	1.5	1.8	0.7	0.3	0.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	0.0	0.6	1.7	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.7	0.3	0.4
												AG	E (N	love	mbe	er 202	22)											
		18-2	4 ye	ars		2	5-29	yea	rs		30	-39 y	ears	;		40-4	19 ye	ars		5	0-59	yea	rs		60	) + y	ears	
Yes		1	5.4				17	7.7				21.1				2	2.2				23	.7				31.9	)	
No		8	4.0				82	.3				78.4	ļ			7	77.5				75	.1				68.1		
No answer			0.6				0	.0				0.5	5				0.3				1	.2				0.0	)	





		DIE	YOU	U PAI	RTIC	IPATI	ED IN			US S		ICES	ON T	HEI	NTEI	RNET	?				
												ber 20	)22)						((	contir	nued)
	1	8-24 y	ears		25-2	29 yea	ars	3	0-39				19 yea	rs	5	0-59	years		60	+ yea	rs
Yes		16.	7			13.6			14.	8			15.4			18.	0			11.9	
No		57.	5			61.9			60.	8		ĺ	59.6			57.	7		į	58.6	
No, it is unacceptable for me		25.	3		Ź	24.5			24.	1		2	24.7			24.	0		;	29.0	
No answer		0.	6			0.0			0.	2			0.3			0.	3			0.5	
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2051 M) 2C	1P) Z022		Simpl rthod	у		UGC	C ZOZ	Prote		t and ical		Simpl Christi				elong igion 2022
Yes	14.4	12.2	12.9	8.0	4.5	15.2	5.5	2.8	2.9	55.7	39.9	52.4	-	-	32.4	5.6	9.3	10.3	0.3	1.3	0.4
No	68.8	58.1	66.8	69.3	52.5	61.4	65.0	53.6	59.0	39.2	51.7	41.7	_	-	54.1	74.9	41.9	52.9	58.0	48.0	58.7
No, it is unacceptable for me	16.8	29.5	19.9	22.6	42.6	23.5	29.5	43.1	37.6	5.2	8.4	5.8	_	-	13.5	19.0	47.7	36.8	41.6	50.1	40.0
No answer	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.0	0.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.9






### Currently, the Church actively using the latest information technologies (social media, «church in a smartphone», etc.). HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

% of respondent

(continued)

													(COI	itiliueu)
						AG	<b>E</b> (Nove	mber 20	)22)					
	18-2	4 years	2	5-29 yea	rs	30-39 y	/ears	40-4	19 years	50	)-59 yea	ırs	60 + y	ears
Positive	45	5.4		35.4		41.5		43	3.9		42.0		35.9	
Negative	4	.6		6.1		8.7		ç	9.2		11.1		14.1	
Indifferent	43	3.7		52.4		39.6		40	).9		41.7		40.2	
Hard to say	6	.3		6.1		10.2		6	5.0		5.1		9.8	
					CC	NFESSI	ONAL-0	CHURC	H IDENT	ITY				
	00	CU	UOC	(MP)		nply nodox	UG	CC	Protest evang chur			nply stian	I do not to any	t belong religion
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Positive	49.2	45.1	34.9	48.1	32.6	30.3	65.7	72.8	-	67.6	36.6	25.7	17.4	9.4
Negative	11.2	10.1	18.3	14.5	17.6	12.8	1.7	3.4	-	9.5	25.0	16.6	15.0	5.1
Indifferent	33.9	36.4	35.7	30.5	41.0	48.8	19.9	17.0	-	14.9	34.3	48.0	55.4	79.6
Hard to say	5.7	8.4	11.2	6.9	8.9	8.1	12.7	6.8	_	8.1	4.1	9.7	12.1	6.0



<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.




#### FOR WHAT PURPOSE DO YOU ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS, AND SERVICES?\*

%	of those v				ces and me		,,,,		<b>-</b>	(continued)		
					REC	GION						
		West	Centre					East				
Communication with God	60.0	)	50.9			30.3			54.6			
Participation in prayers, religious rites	56.8	3		54.0		36.8		3		35.1		
Religious service helps me to calm down and forget about everyday worries	41.1		33.4			37.7			24.1			
Willingness to listen to a sermon	36.3	3		42.9	7		25.9					
Service helps to address burdensome moral issues	27.4	1	22.2			22.4			21.8			
Staying among like-minded people and those who they like	20.8			27.3			20.7					
I have done so all my life	9.4	1		13.5		18.2	2		22.9			
Religious community gives me some help or support	5.3			2.0			6.5			5.7		
Other	0.2			0.2		0.0		0.6				
Hard to say	0.0	)	405	0.2		1.3	3		1.7			
	10 24	(OOKS	AGE	rc 20	20,4225	40.40	10075	EO EO	ore	60 1 2222		
Communication with Cod	18-24 y		25-29 yea	15 30	)-39 years	40-49 y		50-59 ye	ars	60 + years		
Communication with God Participation in prayers, religious rites	52 46		45.3 48.4		50.5 45.0	49.		50.8		62.0 53.5		
Religious service helps me to calm	40	.0	48.4		45.0	52.1		54.7		55.5		
down and forget about everyday worries	37.0		21.5 31.2		32.5		35.8		41.2			
Willingness to listen to a sermon	30.1		32.3		36.2	32.8		32.6		37.8		
Service helps to address burdensome moral issues	26.0		24.6		23.3	3.3 26.8		24.4		23.1		
Staying among like-minded people and those who they like	19.2		10.8		17.0			18.2		23.6		
I have done so all my life	15	.1	16.9		11.9	14.4		12.4		14.1		
Religious community gives me some help or support	8.		1.5		4.1	3.1		3.6		4.9		
Other	0.		1.5		0.5	0.5		0.0		0.0		
Hard to say	0.		0.0		1.4	0.0		0.5		0.3		
_	<u> </u>	NFE22IC	ONAL-CH	URCHI	DENTITY							
	0	CU	UOC	(MP)		nply nodox		UGCC		Protestant and evangelical churches		
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	202	21 2022	2	2022		
Communication with God	49.8	53.4	62.7	54.5	32.9	37.9	49.4			81.4		
Participation in prayers, religious rites	49.2	50.5	53.8	54.5	42.1	38.5	56.5	63.6		50.8		
Religious service helps me to calm down and forget about everyday worries	33.1 <b>32.7</b>		36.6	36.6	18.9	23.1	36.3	38.1		62.7		
Willingness to listen to a sermon	28.7 <b>33.1</b>		35.7	41.6	22.6	31.7	31.5	41.8		30.5		
Service helps to address burdensome moral issues	25.2 <b>23.1</b>		31.2	31.7	14.7	<b>22.5</b> 32.1		29.4		17.2		
Staying among like-minded people and those who they like	14.9 <b>18.4</b>		24.3	14.9	9.1	17.4	18.5	12.9		33.9		
I have done so all my life	14.3	12.6	14.1	17.8	23.2	18.8	14.3	13.9		1.7		
Religious community gives me some help or support	2.4	2.8	3.2	5.9	0.0	3.7	3.6	2.6		5.1		
Other	2.7	0.0	3.2	0.0	3.7	<b>0.0</b> 1.2				0.0		
Hard to say	0.9	1.0	2.2	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.

November 2022







			D	o you	SUPP			HURCH	FINAI	NCIAL	LY?					
% of respondent (continued													ntinued)			
	REGION (November 2022)															
			est			Centre		South					East			
	2020	) 20	021	2022	2020	) 2	021	2022	2020		021	2022	2020	) 20	021	2022
Yes, regularly	31.3		7.6	31.5	4.7		11.2	9.2	7.5		5.3	7.7	5.1		5.7	9.0
Yes, rarely	39.0		3.2	35.4	27.2		2.3	27.3	18.7		2.9	26.4	15.4		3.8	26.4
Never	12.1	1!	5.4	<b>12.7</b> 30		3	2.2	22.6	37.8 25.8		5.8	35.6	36.5	40.5		36.7
I make donations on the days of major holidays and pay for the performance of rituals (rites)	17.3	2.	3.9	20.3	37.1 34		4.2	40.7	35.3 35.0		5.0	30.3	42.9	29	9.5	27.6
No answer	-	(	0.0	0.0	-	(	0.1	0.2	-		0.0	0.0	-	(	0.6	0.2
								SE (Nove	mber 2	022)						
	18-	24 yeaı	'S	25-29	years		30-39	years	40-49 years			50-59	years		60 + years	
Yes, regularly		11.4			2.3		13		14.6				6.2		17.3	
Yes, rarely		30.3		2:	2.6		29	.9		27.3		2	9.7		31.0	
Never		37.7		3	2.2		23	.1		22.4		2	1.0		21.4	
I make donations on the days of major holidays and pay for the performance of rituals (rites)		20.6	32		2.2		33	3.1		35.7		33.0			30.0	
No answer		0.0		0.7 0.0 0.0					(	0.0		0.	.3			
		CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY														
	OCU				UOC (MP)			Simply Ortho			dox	UC	UGCC			
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022
Yes, regularly	18.0	15.7	12.6	14.7	10.8	12.5	19.3	17.4	4.2	3.3	4.0	4.4	27.7	43.5	39.9	39.5
Yes, rarely	37.1	36.8	31.1	37.3	35.2	31.1	30.7	28.8	29.4	21.1	26.6	26.9	45.0	38.9	44.4	42.4
Never	13.5	13.3	15.9	12.7	14.6	7.0	11.1	8.3	30.0	34.7	32.7	29.2	6.8	3.6	3.9	2.0
I make donations on the days of major holidays and pay for the performance of rituals (rites)	29.2	33.9	40.4	35.3	38.5	49.1	38.9	43.9	36.3	40.7	36.2	39.4	19.9	14.0	11.8	16.1
No answer	_	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.0	1.5	-	-	0.5	0.0	-	-	0.0	0.0
		Protestant and evangelical churches Simply Christian I do not						not belong to any religion								
	2019		2020	2021	2022		2019	2020	2021		7077	2019	2020		707	2022
Yes, regularly	-	<u> </u>	_	-	58.9	)	4.4	2.2	6.4	. !	5.2	0.4	0.3		1.8	0.4
Yes, rarely	-		-	-	19.2	1	6.3	24.7	25.1	1	9.0	5.8	3.9	(	9.0	6.4
Never	_		-	-	9.6	4	3.8	27.5	31.6 <b>36.8</b>		6.8	81.7	81.5			76.3
I make donations on the days of major holidays and pay for the performance of rituals (rites)	-		-	-	11.0	) 3	3.8	45.5	36.8	3	9.1	11.7	13.6	1!	5.0	16.9
No answer	_		-	_	1.4		-	_	0.0		0.0	_	_	(	0.3	0.0



#### WHY DO YOU NOT ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS, SERVICES?\*


% of those who do not attend religious services and meetings

	Ukra	aine	West		Centre		South		East	
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
I do not feel any need to do so	36.6	35.8	35.3	24.0	40.1	35.4	34.0	50.4	34.0	33.8
I believe that it is not necessary to attend religious services or meetings in order to practice a particular religion	32.3	37.4	20.6	27.9	34.2	41.3	38.0	37.7	30.8	33.8
I don't have time for that	26.7	26.9	35.3	28.8	35.7	31.9	23.5	23.1	14.6	18.4
I am a non-believer, an atheist	17.0	14.1	17.6	21.2	15.3	11.4	18.5	19.1	18.1	13.2
None of my acquaintances attend religious services and meetings	8.0	6.7	5.9	7.7	7.9	7.0	12.3	7.7	6.5	5.1
There are no religious communities of the church or religion to which I belong	1.7	2.3	7.8	3.8	0.5	3.1	1.2	1.5	1.6	0.9
There are no religious communities where I live	2.0	1.9	6.9	3.8	0.8	2.6	3.1	0.8	1.6	0.4
I participate in online religious services and meetings, listen / watch services on the radio or TV	1.4	1.8	4.9	4.8	1.3	1.7	1.2	0.0	0.9	1.7
Other	3.6	4.0	6.9	2.9	2.0	3.7	6.8	3.1	2.8	5.6
Hard to say	2.1	3.1	1.0	3.8	2.0	2.6	3.1	3.8	1.9	3.4

AGE (November 2022)											
	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years					
I do not feel any need to do so	34.3	40.2	41.5	41.7	33.3	33.6					
I believe that it is not necessary to attend religious services or meetings in order to practice a particular religion	28.7	32.9	35.9	38.3	40.0	35.7					
I don't have time for that	28.4	25.6	29.2	37.5	27.9	16.2					
I am a non-believer, an atheist	23.5	17.1	12.5	8.6	15.7	13.2					
None of my acquaintances attend religious services and meetings	11.8	11.0	6.8	6.3	5.7	4.3					
There are no religious communities of the church or religion to which I belong	2.9	2.4	0.5	4.0	3.6	1.7					
There are no religious communities where I live	2.0	2.4	2.1	1.1	2.1	2.6					
I participate in online religious services and meetings, listen / watch services on the radio or TV	2.9	1.2	1.6	0.6	3.6	1.7					
Other	0.0	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.7	13.6					
Hard to say	1.0	3.6	3.6	4.6	2.1	3.0					

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.



## DO YOU THINK THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE CHANGED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WHOSE RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS, AND SERVICES YOU ATTEND?\*

% of those who attend religious services and meetings

(continued)

		AGE (November 2022)							
	18-24 ye	ears	25-29 years	30-39	years	40-49 years	50-5	9 years	60 + years
No changes are needed	45.2		56.9	50.	0	57.7	50	).5	56.8
More attention to various types of assistance to community members, their support	19.2		9.4	17.	9	11.9	1	7.6	14.7
More attention to psychological support of community members	15.1		6.2	14.	2	12.9	14	1.5	14.7
Greater focus on the problems of community members	11.0		10.8	8.	3	13.4	14	1.6	12.1
Performing services and sermons done in my nativelanguage	16.4		7.7	11.	0	9.3	10	0.4	8.1
Simpler rituals and reduced duration of the service	9.6		6.2	8.	3	7.2	6	5.7	9.8
Greater focus on religious teaching of community members	16.4		3.1	11.	4	8.8	8	3.9	6.6
Performing meetings and services at a more convenient time	12.3		4.6	3.	2	5.1	3	3.1	4.3
Other	2.7		1.5	0.	0	0.5		1.0	0.9
Hard to say	6.8		15.4	7.	8	8.2	6	5.8	8.4
			СО	NFESSIC	NAL-C	<b>HURCH IDE</b>	NTITY		
	00	CU	UOC	(MP)	Simply	y Orthodox	UG	GCC	Protestant and evangelical churches
	2021	202	2 2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2022
No changes are needed	58.4	53.0	69.7	62.4	55.5	43.1	58.9	58.2	65.5
More attention to various types of assistance to community members, their support	13.1	14.7	7 13.0	11.9	12.8	16.9	8.9	19.1	10.3
More attention to psychological support of community members	10.9	17.3	7 10.3	13.9	8.6	11.3	6.5	7.2	3.4
Greater focus on the problems of community members	9.1	12.8	<b>3</b> 11.9	10.9	6.7	11.3	10.7	8.7	10.2
Performing services and sermons done in my nativelanguage	6.1	11.6	1.6	10.9	3.0	11.9	3.6	3.1	6.8
Simpler rituals and reduced duration of the service	17.9	6.2	3.8	5.0	6.7	13.1	10.7	14.4	1.7
Greater focus on religious teaching of community members	5.2	6.8	6.5	10.9	4.9	6.8	8.9	8.8	11.9

Performing meetings and services at

a more convenient time

Other

Hard to say

5.2

0.3

6.7

2.8

0.9

8.8

4.9

0.5

5.4

4.0

0.0

5.9

2.4

1.2

15.9

3.7

0.0

13.0

3.0

0.0

6.5

4.6

1.0

5.7


6.8

0.0

5.1


<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.






 <sup>\*</sup> The sum of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».
 \*\* The sum of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».








		ı	S THE	CHUR	CH A N	-		THORIT ondent	Y FOR	YOU	TODA	Y?			loon	tinued)
								E (Nove	mber 2	022)					(COII	unuea)
	18-	24 year	S	25-29	25-29 years 30-39 years 40-49 years 50-59 years										60 + ye	ears
Yes		42.5		3	8.1		44.	2		46.1		4	9.2		57.	6
No		41.4		4	5.6		37.	4		35.5		3	2.7		23.	8
Hard to say		16.1		1	16.3 18.4 18.4 18.0									18.	5	
						100	NFESSI	ONAL-	CHURC	H IDEN	ITITY					
		0	CU		UOC (MP) Simply Orthodox UGCC											
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022	2019	2020	2021	2022
Yes	57.0	57.3	63.6	58.7	55.9	64.1	69.3	65.6	35.4	30.8	36.6	33.7	79.2	86.5	78.8	82.0
No	24.9	24.5	18.3	23.8	23.9	25.3	16.8	13.7	44.1	51.2	35.6	44.1	12.5	4.7	7.8	6.8
Hard to say	18.1	18.2	18.1	17.4	20.2	10.6	13.9	20.6	20.5	18.0	27.8	22.2	8.3	8.8	13.4	11.2
			otestar gelical	nt and churche	es			Simply	Christia	n		l do n	ot belo	ong to a	ıny reli	gion
	2019	0	0707	2021	2022		2019	2020	2021		2022	2019	2020	3	2021	2022
Yes	_	Ì.		-	83.8	28	3.1	32.6	39.8	30	).9	5.1	4.2	ć	5.3	3.0
No	_	-		-	10.8	55	5.6	48.3	28.1	46	5.3	80.9	78.8	70	).4	81.3
Hard to say	_	-		_	5.4	16	5.3	19.1	32.2	22	2.9	14.0	17.0	23	3.2	15.7





WHISH	STATEN	TATEMENT BELOW WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THE MOST? % of respondent										ntinued)
					DECI	<b>ON</b> (No	vomb	er 2022)			(00)	itiliueu)
		West			Centre	ON (NO	venio	South			East	
The clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins		44.7			50.7			40.9			42.6	
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people		31.8			17.4			26.4			23.0	
The majority of the clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things		13.9			22.8			22.6			18.4	
Hard to say		9.6			9.1			10.1			15.9	
	18-2/	19 24 years 25 20 y		) voars		E (Nove		2022) 49 years	50-50	years	60 +	years
The clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins		18-24 years 25-29 ye 48.9 45.3				7.1	40	43.4		1.2		4.7
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	20	20.1 17.6		7.6	22	2.3		23.3	22	2.2	2	27.2
The majority of the clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	2	21.8 25.7		5.7	5.7 20.1		21.1		15	5.9	1	8.0
Hard to say		9.2	1	1.5	.5 10.4		12.2		10	0.8	1	0.1
		OCU		CONFESSIONAL-C UOC (MP)			1				UGCC	
	_							mply Orth				
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
The clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins	50.1	49.5	47.8	49.1	45.3	47.7	50.6	50.4	49.1	61.1	60.7	44.2
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	28.5	24.8	26.7	33.0	35.4	35.6	13.0	18.3	14.9	26.4	25.8	35.4
The majority of the clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	15.2	20.2	16.7	13.6	14.8	12.9	26.6	23.3	23.0	7.8	9.6	12.6
Hard to say	6.1	5.5	8.8	4.4	4.5	3.8	9.7	8.0	13.1	4.7	3.9	7.8
	ev		ant and al church	nes		Simply	Christian			I do not to any	t belong religion	
	2020		2021	2022	2020		2022	2022	2020	0	707	2022
The clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins	-	-	-	36.5	44.4	54	4.7	52.9	35.9	38	3.5	41.3
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	-	-	-	45.9	10.6	1:	2.2 14.9		4.2	(	5.9	5.5
The majority of the clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	-	-	-	10.8	30.0 26		6.2 <b>23.0</b>		47.1	40	).4	31.5
Hard to say	-	-	-	6.8	15.0		7.0	9.2	12.7	14	4.2	21.7








WHAT ROL	E DOES	S THE C		H PLAY of respo		DERN (	JKRA	INIAN SC	CIETY	?	(cor	ntinued)	
					REGI	<b>ON</b> (No	vemb	er 2022)			(30.		
		West			Centre			South			East		
Positive role		78.2			54.4			59.6			41.4		
Insignificant role		11.6			29.5			28.8			36.5		
Negative role	2.8				2.2			1.9		7.1			
Other		1.7			1.5			2.4			0.5		
Hard to say		5.7			12.4			7.2			14.5		
						E (Nove	ember	2022)					
	18-24 years 25-29 y			9 years	30-39	years	40-	49 years	50-59	years	60 -	+ years	
Positive role	4!	45.7 53.4		3.4	54	1.7		58.9	6	1.6	6	5.1	
Insignificant role	3:	3.7	2	7.4	28	3.0		25.9	23	3.4	2	23.7	
Negative role	4	4.6 6.8		6.8	;	3.2		2.4	4	1.2		2.2	
Other	(	0.6 2.7		2.7		1.7		1.6		1.2		1.2	
Hard to say	1!	5.4		9.6 12.4		11.1		Ç	9.6		7.7		
		0.011						CH IDENT			11000		
		OCU			JOC (MI			mply Orth			UGCC		
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	
Positive role	59.5	65.9	70.6	47.4	68.0	78.6	24.0	35.0	44.0	82.9	88.8	89.8	
Insignificant role	30.7	24.2	20.3	28.5	20.5	16.8	51.5	46.0	33.2	13.5	5.1	8.3	
Negative role	1.1	1.8	2.0	4.7	1.6	0.0	4.8	3 2.3	3.1	0.0	0.6	0.5	
Other	2.7	1.2	0.3	2.9	2.0	0.8	3.1	2.5	2.1	1.0	0.0	0.5	
Hard to say	6.1	6.9	6.8	16.4	7.8	3.8	16.7	14.3	17.5	2.6	5.6	1.0	
	ev	Protest angelica	ant and			Simply	Christi	an		I do not to any			
	2020	0	707	2022	2020		2021	2022	2020		707	2022	
Positive role	-	-	-	82.4	28.5	28.5 40		45.1	5.2	10	0.8	11.1	
Insignificant role	-	-	-		48.0	3	6.8	36.6	42.5	5	3.9	51.7	
Negative role	-	-	-	1.4	1.1		2.9	2.3	17.3	1:	2.6	13.2	
Other	-	-	-	1.4	3.4		2.3	4.0	7.8		5.5	3.8	
Hard to say	-	-	-	4.1	19.0	1	7.5	12.0	27.1		7.1	20.1	





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



### WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS THAT CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN UKRAINE SHOULD PURSUE?\* % of respondent

(continued)

7	6 of responde	nt					(	(continued)
					ION			
	West		(	Centre	South			East
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	49.2			54.8	49.5			47.7
Worshiping God, praying together	63.2			46.2	31.3			35.8
Promoting moral recovery of society	29.4			33.6	27.9			20.1
Helping vulnerable populations	23.1			29.2	33.7			26.7
Protecting traditional values	27.5			22.9	28.8			17.6
Educating youth	17.5			10.8	23.6			10.0
Promoting peace and tolerance	7.7			14.1	12.9			15.0
Spreading its influence in society	5.7			10.0	3.4			6.6
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	4.8			7.7	10.6			4.4
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	6.3			3.4	7.2			1.7
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	3.0			2.7	4.8			8.3
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	4.3			3.7	3.8			2.0
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.5			2.2	4.8			2.2
Helping to master professions	1.1			1.5	3.4			1.2
Other	0.0			0.1	0.0			0.2
Hard to say	3.5			3.5	6.3			12.2
	18-24 years	25-2 yea		30-39 years	40-49 years	50-5 year		60 + years
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	46.3	46.	.9	51.3	51.8	53.5	5	52.3
Worshiping God, praying together	42.9	40.	.1	44.0	47.6	45.9	)	52.7
Promoting moral recovery of society	25.7	28.	.6	30.2	30.9	28.0	)	29.1
Helping vulnerable populations	25.7	25.	.2	27.5	28.9	27.3	3	27.8
Protecting traditional values	25.7	19.	.0	23.8	23.6	26.8	3	22.5
Educating youth	13.1	17.	.0	14.8	14.3	14.1		12.0
Promoting peace and tolerance	12.6	17.	.7	11.9	13.0	11.4	1	11.8
Spreading its influence in society	9.7	8.	.8	5.3	8.9	7.2	2	7.2
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	7.4	6.	.8	7.8	6.0	6.3	3	5.7
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	5.1	4.	.1	4.1	2.7	3.3	3	5.5
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	4.6	8.	.2	2.9	2.4	5.1		4.5
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	2.9	3.	4	4.6	4.3	3.6	5	2.2
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	1.7	2.	.7	2.7	3.3	3.3	3	2.7
Helping to master professions	1.7	2.	.0	1.5	1.1	1.8	}	1.2
Other	0.0	0.	0	0.0	0.3	0.0	)	0.2
Hard to say	5.7	6.	1	5.8	6.5	5.1		4.6

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



## WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS THAT CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN UKRAINE SHOULD PURSUE?\*

% of respondent

(continued)

						(continued)
			FESSIONAL-			
		CU		C (MP)		Orthodox
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	51.8	56.9	54.9	60.6	51.1	51.2
Worshiping God. praying together	50.4	52.5	57.0	55.7	46.1	38.6
Promoting moral recovery of society	30.1	33.8	26.2	35.1	27.5	26.8
Helping vulnerable populations	33.0	30.8	32.8	25.2	32.8	27.4
Protecting traditional values	18.9	22.2	26.6	30.5	16.8	28.5
Educating youth	15.4	12.8	13.5	14.5	12.5	14.9
Promoting peace and tolerance	18.5	11.4	11.9	13.6	16.3	14.1
Spreading its influence in society	7.9	8.0	7.4	6.9	6.5	3.4
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	8.5	5.3	11.5	3.8	7.5	7.6
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	4.5	3.5	1.2	3.1	2.3	4.2
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	2.9	2.7	2.0	6.1	3.0	3.1
Shaping state policy. both domestic and foreign	3.0	4.2	1.6	0.8	1.0	2.9
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.3	1.4	2.9	0.8	2.5	3.1
Helping to master professions	0.8	1.4	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.8
Other	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.0
Hard to say	1.8	1.8	2.0	0.8	4.0	6.8
		UGCC	evan	tant and gelical rches	Simply Ch	nristian
	2021	2022	20	022	2021	2022
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	52.2	55.8	52	2.7	48.3	49.1
Worshiping God, praying together	75.3	71.4		0.3	43.3	40.6
Promoting moral recovery of society	26.8	30.7		9.7	26.9	24.6
Helping vulnerable populations	13.5	23.4	_	7.0	34.5	33.7
Protecting traditional values	19.1	32.2		).8	25.6	17.2
Educating youth	23.0	23.9		3.5	13.4	10.3
Promoting peace and tolerance Spreading its influence in society	9.6 E.1	6.8		5.8	12.3 12.9	17.7
spreading its initidence in society	5.1	3.4	14	2.2	12.9	16.1

12.8

7.3

1.1

0.0

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

5.8

6.3

1.5

0.5

2.4

1.0

0.0

0.0

Involving as many believers in the church

Organising religious education and teaching

Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)

Competing with other churches to influence

Shaping state policy, both domestic and

Helping to master professions

(religious association) as possible

of basics of religion

foreign

Other

the believers

Hard to say

**7.4** November 2022

4.6

3.4

4.6

5.2

3.4

1.1

0.0

17.6

5.4

2.7

4.1

9.5

2.7

0.0

0.0

8.8

2.3

4.7

3.5

7.6


1.8

1.2

4.1

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



## WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION THAT YOU BELONG TO?\*

% of those who associate themselves with a particular church or religious association

(continued)

% of those who associate themselve	es with a part	icular c		s association SION		(continued)
	West		Centre	South		East
Worshiping God, praying together	73.8		54.6	33.1		51.6
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	41.1		55.0	47.6		39.5
Protecting traditional values	32.6		22.8	27.4		17.3
Promoting moral recovery of society	28.6		27.1	28.2		23.1
Helping vulnerable populations	16.7		26.4	28.2		11.3
Educating youth	16.1		7.9	16.9		6.5
Promoting peace and tolerance	7.4		9.2	13.7		9.3
Spreading its influence in society	6.3		7.9	11.2		5.7
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	2.7		5.2	2.4		2.8
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	4.0		3.0	2.4		2.0
Organising religious education and teaching basics of religion	5.3		2.4	8.9		2.8
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	3.0		3.4	3.2		1.6
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	2.5		4.5	0.0		2.0
Helping to master professions	1.7		1.7	0.8		0.8
Other	0.0		0.0	0.8		0.4
Hard to say	2.5		5.2	8.0		19.0
	10.04	25.2		GE 40, 40	EO EO	40.
	18-24 years	25-2 year		40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
Worshiping God, praying together	55.4	53.9	56.0	58.5	55.1	64.2
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	43.8	42.7	44.9	47.6	45.1	49.9
Protecting traditional values	27.7	25.6	26.4	24.6	27.8	24.1
Promoting moral recovery of society	25.0	26.7	22.3	26.5	31.2	28.7
Helping vulnerable populations	14.3	25.8	24.2	17.9	21.5	20.1
Educating youth	17.9	11.1	12.8	11.9	8.6	9.8
Promoting peace and tolerance	7.1	6.7	10.2	11.5	12.0	6.1
Spreading its influence in society	3.6	10.0	8.7	4.0	7.3	8.6
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	2.7	3.3	3.4	4.0	3.0	4.7
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.6	2.2	4.2	2.8	2.6	2.8
Organising religious education and teaching basics of religion	7.1	5.6	5.3	4.7	2.1	2.6
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	4.5	0.0	4.9	1.2	3.9	2.3
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	6.3	1.1	4.5	2.0	1.7	2.8
Helping to master professions	0.9	2.2	1.9	2.4	0.4	1.2
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2
Hard to say	7.1	11.2	4.5	8.7	5.6	7.3

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



## WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION THAT YOU BELONG TO?\*

% of those who associate themselves with a particular church or religious association

(continued)

	OCU CONFESSION		FESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY				
	00	CU	UOC	(MP)	Simpl	y Orthodox	
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	
Worshiping God, praying together	60.6	59.7	62.2	62.1	46.4	45.1	
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	43.3	53.5	46.7	44.8	39.7	37.0	
Protecting traditional values	29.5	27.2	31.0	21.4	24.1	19.5	
Promoting moral recovery of society	26.4	26.0	28.3	29.3	15.6	23.7	
Helping vulnerable populations	21.2	24.2	25.8	23.1	19.3	11.1	
Educating youth	14.3	10.0	9.7	13.8	4.9	8.9	
Promoting peace and tolerance	15.4	7.5	9.3	14.5	10.3	8.9	
Spreading its influence in society	8.5	7.7	9.3	3.4	5.4	8.1	
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	4.4	3.7	4.4	0.9	2.2	1.3	
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.6	2.5	1.8	0.0	2.2	2.5	
Organising religious education and teaching basics of religion	1.9	3.2	2.2	3.4	1.3	3.4	
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	1.1	2.5	3.1	4.3	5.8	1.7	
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	2.8	3.8	1.8	0.9	1.3	1.3	
Helping to master professions	1.1	1.0	0.4	1.7	0.9	1.3	
Other	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	
Hard to say	2.5	3.8	4.9	6.0	8.0	19.1	
	l	JGCC	Protest evang chur	gelical	Simply C	hristian	
	2021	2022	20	22	2021	2022	
Worshiping God, praying together	77.6	78.8	73	.9	41.5	36.3	
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	43.8	43.8	53	.6	35.5	31.9	
Protecting traditional values	21.8	42.1	8	.7	33.3	17.6	
Promoting moral recovery of society	31.2	31.5	31	.9	23.7	20.9	
Helping vulnerable populations	9.5	15.3	24	.6	24.7	23.1	
Educating youth	28.4	17.2	14	.5	6.5	7.7	
Promoting peace and tolerance	12.4	9.4		.4	6.5	13.2	
Spreading its influence in society	4.7	5.4	4	.3	10.8	12.1	
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	4.7	4.0	8	.7	14.0	9.9	
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	0.0	2.5	1	.4	15.1	9.9	
Organising religious education and teaching basics of religion	7.1	6.4	7	<b>7.2</b>	3.2	3.3	

Other

Hard to say

Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)

Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign

Helping to master professions

0.0

0.6

0.6

0.0

1.8

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.0

1.0

2.9

0.0

1.4

0.0

1.4

9.6

4.3

3.2

0.0

7.5

9.9

7.7


2.2

1.1

14.3

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.








## WHAT PLACE SHOULD SOCIAL SERVICE OCCUPY IN THE CHURCH, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES, NAMELY HELPING AND SUPPORTING PEOPLE (E.G., FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, HELP WITH LEARNING, ORGANISATION OF LEISURE TIME, ETC.)?

% of respondent (continued)

	CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY													
	00	OCU		UOC (MP)		Simply Orthodox		UGCC		estant nd gelical ches	Simply Christian		belo	not ng to eligion
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Social service should play a leading role in the church (religious association) activities	37.7	34.2	33.1	33.3	33.3	30.5	28.7	33.0	-	43.2	27.5	24.1	23.5	25.0
Social service is an important but not the primary activity of the church (religious association)	47.0	43.9	43.3	36.4	30.0	32.6	60.1	48.1	-	35.1	31.0	33.9	25.6	15.7
Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)	6.1	7.1	4.9	9.1	8.5	8.1	4.5	12.1	-	6.8	9.9	16.7	9.8	10.2
The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all	3.7	2.9	8.2	9.1	7.8	5.7	1.7	1.5	-	2.7	11.7	6.3	11.6	19.5
Hard to say	5.5	12.0	10.6	12.1	20.5	23.0	5.1	5.3	-	12.2	19.9	19.0	29.6	29.7



<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




## IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR SOCIETY?\* % of respondent

	% (				spond	ent	(continued)								
		\M/+				REGIC	<b>N</b> (No	vembe	r 2022)						
		West			(	Centre			Sout	h			East		
Psychological assistance		59.1				66.2			60.6	5			58.1		
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)		40.5				50.6			54.8	3			51.8		
Religious education		40.1				34.1			26.9	)		20.1			
Child rearing		40.7			22.1				33.2	2		24.7			
Financial assistance		19.6				24.8			40.4	1			24.8		
Organisation of leisure time		9.0	5			6.6			9.1				3.7		
Vocational guidance and training		8.3	3			5.9			3.8	3			4.6		
Other		0.2	2			0.0			0.0	)			0.2		
None		2.0	)			2.0			2.4	1			7.6		
Hard to say		7.2	2			6.9			9.1				12.5		
						AGE	(Nove	mber 2	022.)						
		4 years	25	5-29 yea	ars	30-39			9 years	50	)-59 y∈	ears	60 + y		
Psychological assistance	!	59.8		66.0		59.	9	6	2.6		61.9		63.	1	
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)		51.7		53.1		51.	0	4	8.1		45.0		47.	0	
Religious education	2	29.9		30.1		29.	2	3	4.4		30.7		34.	5	
Child rearing		27.4		28.6		27.	3	2	29.8		30.6		28.6		
Financial assistance	Ź	24.6		22.4	4 22.9			2	24.1		25.3		27.6		
Organisation of leisure time		7.5		6.8	8 7.8				7.6		7.8		5.8		
Vocational guidance and training		6.3		2.7	2.7 6.6			6.2			8.4		5.		
Other		0.0		0.0		0.	5		0.0		0.0	0.0		0	
None		6.9		4.1		4.	4		1.9		2.4	.4 2.4		4	
Hard to say		6.3		7.5		9.	7		8.1		9.0		8.	1	
					CON	FESSIC	NAL-	CHURC	HIDE	NTITY					
	0	CU	UOC	(MP)		nply nodox	UG	GCC .	ar	elical	Sir Chr	nply istian	belo	not ng to eligion	
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	
Psychological assistance	67.8	70.1	63.5	68.2	60.5	57.4	46.6	62.6	-	58.1	59.3	61.1	40.6	40.4	
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	48.7	48.4	49.6	43.5	55.4	51.2	41.9	53.4	-	36.5	41.5	57.1	38.5	43.2	
Religious education	44.1	37.2	36.1	40.9	23.6	25.1	52.5	39.3	-	47.3	23.8	27.4	14.5	16.6	
Child rearing	27.7	30.3	32.0	31.3	19.0	26.9	54.5	47.6	_	35.1	26.3	23.0	11.6	8.1	
Financial assistance	23.8	3.8 <b>22.8</b> 26.6 <b>32.1</b>		32.1	23.3	24.8	13.4	26.7	_	25.7	21.1	27.4	23.2	26.8	
Organisation of leisure time	8.3	8.3 <b>8.4</b> 5.7 <b>6.8</b>		6.8	3.8	5.0	2.8	10.2	-	12.2	8.2	2.9	9.0	4.2	
Vocational guidance and training	4.9	6.3	6.6	3.0	3.3	3.4	12.3	9.2	-	4.1	11.6	10.9	6.3	4.3	
Other	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.5	_	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	
None	1.8	1.5	5.7	0.0	5.3	3.4	0.6	0.5	-	2.7	5.3	1.1	15.3	14.8	
Hard to say	2.6	4.2	4.5	1.5	8.3	14.1	7.3	0.5	_	10.8	11.6	12.0	15.6	21.2	

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.



# WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS WOULD BE INTERESTING FOR YOU PERSONALLY?\* % of respondent


						( /
			<b>AGE</b> (Nove	mber 2022)		
	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
Psychological assistance	33.3	33.3	35.4	37.0	42.9	44.1
Religious education	22.3	21.8	26.3	19.2	23.8	23.0
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	21.7	21.1	18.0	18.9	21.4	20.1
Child rearing	13.7	17.1	20.2	18.9	17.8	14.7
Organisation of leisure time	12.6	8.9	10.7	10.8	9.6	7.2
Financial assistance	9.1	12.2	13.6	14.1	16.9	21.8
Vocational guidance and training	8.6	6.8	5.8	7.6	6.0	5.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3
None	28.7	29.3	25.3	22.8	18.3	17.5
Hard to say	12.0	10.2	11.7	13.8	14.7	12.9
		CO	MEECCIONAL -	CHIIDCH IDENI	TITV	

	OCU		UOC	(MP)	Simply (	Orthodox	UG	CC
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Psychological assistance	67.8	49.0	63.5	56.8	60.5	34.7	46.6	32.5
Religious education	44.1	20.3	36.1	28.2	23.6	21.1	52.5	16.6
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	48.7	29.2	49.6	33.6	55.4	15.4	41.9	28.3
Child rearing	27.7	19.5	32.0	14.4	19.0	12.5	54.5	26.3
Organisation of leisure time	8.3	11.4	5.7	8.4	3.8	7.3	2.8	15.5
Financial assistance	23.8	17.6	26.6	28.8	23.3	16.7	13.4	7.8
Vocational guidance and training	4.9	6.8	6.6	2.3	3.3	3.4	12.3	6.8
Other	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.0	1.0
None	1.8	14.7	5.7	6.9	5.3	26.9	0.6	15.0
Hard to say	2.6	9.9	4.5	4.5	8.3	16.2	7.3	16.0

		ant and al churches	Simply (	Christian	l do not belong to any religion		
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	
Psychological assistance	-	37.8	59.3	34.5	40.6	12.8	
Religious education	-	21.6	23.8	22.3	14.5	13.1	
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	-	31.1	41.5	16.1	38.5	4.7	
Child rearing	-	16.2	8.2	6.9	9.0	3.0	
Organisation of leisure time	-	33.8	26.3	17.1	11.6	2.6	
Financial assistance	-	14.9	21.1	16.0	23.2	11.5	
Vocational guidance and training	-	8.1	11.6	12.0	6.3	3.8	
Other	-	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	
None	-	5.4	5.3	28.6	15.3	55.3	
Hard to say	-	8.1	11.6	16.0	15.6	19.1	

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.




# WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED PERSONALLY? (FOR EXAMPLE, YOU RECEIVED SOME KIND OF ASSISTANCE)?\* % of respondent

				ACE /NI	I 2022\			( ///////////////////////////////////
	18-24 years	25-29	vears	AGE (Nove 30-39 years	mber 2022) 40-49 year	s 50-50	9 years	60 + years
Psychological assistance	13.1		l.4	18.0	22.0		5.8	28.0
Religious education	9.7	13	3.6	14.1	13.0	1:	3.5	12.0
Financial assistance	6.9	4	l.1	7.0	7.6		9.0	12.0
Child rearing	6.9	6	8.0	8.5	9.2		7.2	6.2
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	9.2	3	3.4	6.8	5.7		9.9	7.4
Organisation of leisure time	3.4	2	2.7	5.1	5.4		4.5	3.4
Vocational guidance and training	3.4	2	2.7	3.4	5.1	!	5.1	2.6
Other	0.0	C	).7	0.5	0.0	(	0.6	0.3
None	58.3	59	9.9	55.0	54.6	4	6.5	49.1
Hard to say	8.0	11	1.6	9.7	8.9	1	1.7	8.6
			CON	FESSIONAL-C	CHURCH IDE	NTITY		
	OCU			UOC (MP)			Simply Ort	thodox
	2021	20	22	2021	2022	20	021	2022
Psychological assistance	22.2	28	.6	29.5	35.6	12	2.3	12.0
Religious education	10.8	16	.1	16.4	17.6	2	4.8	7.0
Financial assistance	4.3	10	.9	8.6	16.0		3.0	4.7
Child rearing	5.9	8	.8	6.6	3.8		1.5	4.2
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	5.3	6	.8	14.3	13.0	3	3.8	6.5
Organisation of leisure time	3.1	5	.4	5.7	3.1	(	).5	1.8
Vocational guidance and training	1.8	4	.6	2.5	0.8	(	8.0	0.5
Other	0.4	0	.0	1.6	0.8	(	).5	0.5
None	56.6	46	.3	38.9	37.4	7	1.5	64.2
Hard to say	4.7	8	.9	7.0	6.1	3	3.3	11.0
	UGCO			estant and lical churches	Simply Cl	nristian		ot belong y religion
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Psychological assistance	19.1	19.9	_	37.8	19.9	20.6	4.5	3.8


	UG	CC		Protestant and evangelical churches		Simply Christian		belong religion
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Psychological assistance	19.1	19.9	-	37.8	19.9	20.6	4.5	3.8
Religious education	28.1	19.9	-	27.0	11.6	5.2	3.2	0.4
Financial assistance	3.4	4.4	-	20.3	3.5	10.3	1.3	2.6
Child rearing	10.7	11.2	-	12.2	9.9	5.1	2.1	0.9
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	5.1	4.4	_	13.5	4.1	8.0	3.4	4.7
Organisation of leisure time	6.7	7.8	-	6.8	8.7	4.0	0.5	0.9
Vocational guidance and training	0.0	5.9	_	2.7	5.2	7.4	1.3	1.3
Other	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.6	1.1	0.0	0.4
None	38.5	47.1	-	31.1	53.8	56.9	78.1	75.4
Hard to say	10.1	8.8	-	4.1	11.1	13.2	10.3	13.1

 $<sup>\</sup>ensuremath{^{\star}}$  Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.













#### IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE CHURCH IN UKRAINE, WHY SO?

% of those who consider it inappropriate to establish the institution of the state church in Ukraine


Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations




This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches



Other



Hard to say



■ 2000☑ 2010

■ 2013 □ 2018 ■ 2019

■ 2020■ 2021

**2**022




#### IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE CHURCH IN UKRAINE, WHY SO?

% of those who consider it inappropriate to establish the institution of the state church in Ukraine (continued)

		<b>REGION</b> (No	vember 2022)	
	West	Centre	South	East
Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations.	42.0	47.7	59.4	39.6
This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches	42.7	42.7	18.8	43.5
Other	5.9	5.4	7.9	6.1
Hard to say	9.4	4.2	13.9	10.9


		CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY (November 2022)								
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion			
Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations.	50.0	37.7	48.4	48.3	25.8	45.1	37.6			
This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches	38.9	44.3	38.6	35.0	67.7	41.2	40.6			
Other	4.4	4.9	4.9	8.3	3.2	9.8	7.5			
Hard to say	6.7	13.1	8.2	8.3	3.2	3.9	14.3			






# HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHURCH IN STATE OR PUBLIC RITUALS, SUCH AS BLESSING DURING THE OATH OF THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, CONSECRATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. ETC.?

	LOCA	L GOV	ERNM	ENT BU	IILDIN	GS, EDU	JCATIO	NAL II	<b>NSTITU</b>	TIONS,	ETC.?			
					% o	f respon	dent						(con	tinued)
						REG	<b>ION</b> (No	vember	2022)					
		Wes	t		(	Centre			Sout	h			East	
Positive		59.9				49.8			51.9				43.8	
Negative		10.9		10.2				11.1				11.5		
Indifferent		18.3	}	27.2				28.4	ļ			35.5		
Hard to say		10.9				12.7			8.7				9.3	
		AGE (November 2022)				)22)								
	18-2	4 years	2	5-29 yea	ars	30-39	years	40-4	19 years	50	)-59 yea	ars	60 + y	ears
Positive		42.0		44.5		49	.9		54.3		52.3		55.	.0
Negative		10.9		12.3		11	.4		11.6		9.9		10.	.0
Indifferent		35.1		33.6		28	.0		24.3		27.0		22.	.5
Hard to say		12.1		9.6		10	.7		9.7		10.8		12.	.5
					СО	NFESSI	ONAL-	CHURC	H IDEN	ΓΙΤΥ				
	0	CU	UOC	(MP)		nply nodox	UG	CC	evang	ant and gelical ches		nply stian	belong	not to any gion
	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Positive	59.1	63.7	54.3	62.6	34.6	41.4	67.4	66.5	-	54.7	27.3	38.5	11.9	18.3
Negative	11.4	6.4	13.1	11.5	21.1	11.3	5.6	11.2	_	18.7	25.0	11.5	25.6	18.7
Indifferent	20.5	19.9	18.0	16.0	34.6	32.2	19.1	15.0	_	16.0	32.0	36.8	48.8	51.9
Hard to sav	8.9	10.1	14.7	9.9	9.8	15.2	7.9	7.3	_	10.7	15.7	13.2	13.7	11.1



<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.

<sup>\*\*</sup> In questionnaires for years 2000, 2010, 2013 this option was not offered.




#### WHY ARE THERE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE FAITHFUL OF DIFFERENT CHURCHES IN UKRAINE?\*


% of respondent

											(00)	ntinued)
		West			REG Centre	ION (No	vember 	2022) South			East	
Conflicts between churches are		37.8			50.3			46.2			31.3	
purely political  Conflicts are mainly around property												
and buildings		31.2			33.0		30.8			32.8		
Church hierarchs seeks power		26.8			28.7			23.6			17.4	
National question is the essence of the conflicts		24.7			16.2			18.3			24.5	
The media incites religious intolerance and interchurch conflicts		19.4			14.9			29.8			10.5	
The true Church must prove its superiority over others		11.1			10.2			13.4			11.2	
Other		1.7			0.7			1.0			0.5	
Hard to say		10.7			12.7			20.7			29.4	
				1				H IDEN				
		OCU		l	JOC (MI	P)	Sim	ply Orth	odox		UGCC	•
	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022	2020	2021	2022
Conflicts between churches are purely political	28.7	40.2	45.2	33.9	36.5	50.8	36.1	39.6	41.5	39.9	38.5	34.5
Conflicts are mainly around property and buildings	38.0	40.2	31.2	48.4	46.7	32.1	43.1	40.6	35.0	38.9	38.8	32.7
Church hierarchs seeks power	24.3	32.1	25.3	27.7	33.6	16.8	31.0	34.3	20.6	22.8	31.5	30.6
National question is the essence of the conflicts	14.4	12.4	19.8	26.3	16.8	16.8	21.8	17.5	21.7	21.8	12.3	26.2
The media incites religious intolerance and interchurch conflicts	23.7	18.3	15.4	15.7	18.9	26.0	17.4	15.5	14.9	25.9	6.7	16.5
The true Church must prove its superiority over others	9.9	10.8	11.3	9.1	10.2	8.3	7.5	7.8	9.7	8.3	15.6	8.3
Other	1.1	0.2	1.0	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.0	1.3	8.0	8.3	0.0	2.4
Hard to say	13.3	10.4	14.7	7.3	9.0	17.4	9.9	10.5	18.3	5.7	11.2	11.2
	ev	Protest angelica	ant and al churc			Simply	Christia	n		I do not to any		
	2020	6	707	2022	2020		2021	2022	2020		7021	2022
Conflicts between churches are purely political	-	-	-	50.0	33.0	) 4	6.5	50.3	39.9		11.2	34.7
Conflicts are mainly around property and buildings	_		-	17.6	36.9	) 2	11.3	37.7	37.3	3	8.0	34.0
Church hierarchs seeks power	-	-	-	29.7	26.3	3 4	0.7	25.7	36.6	3	7.4	33.1
National question is the essence of the conflicts	_	-	_	16.2	19.6	5 3	4.5	21.8	17.3	3 1	3.4	18.7
The media incites religious intolerance and interchurch conflicts	_		-	6.8	20.1	1	5.1	22.3	16.3	1	3.4	14.5
The true Church must prove its superiority over others	_		-	23.0	5.0	) 1	4.0	13.2	6.5	5	6.1	8.9
Other	_		-	0.0	1.1		0.6	0.6	0.7		2.1	0.4
Hard to say	-	-	-	14.9	10.1		6.4	16.7	17.0	) 1	4.7	24.7










	(	CONFESSION	AL-CHURCH I	DENTITY			
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion
More religious and pious than before	31.2	38.2	20.4	31.2	45.9	17.7	3.4
Less religious and pious than before	4.2	4.6	4.7	2.4	2.7	2.9	3.4
My attitude to religion and faith did not change	61.3	50.4	67.4	65.4	48.6	73.1	86.4
Hard to say	3.3	6.9	7.6	1.0	2.7	6.3	6.8






			AGI	Ε		
	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
More often	11.4	8.2	9.2	11.1	10.2	12.7
More rarely	10.9	9.5	10.9	12.7	11.4	15.1
As before	38.3	38.8	48.2	50.0	52.7	46.7
Didn't go there before and don't go now	38.3	40.8	28.2	24.6	22.3	22.7
Hard to say	1.1	2.7	3.4	1.6	3.3	2.7

		CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY									
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion				
More often	11.9	14.4	7.3	16.2	31.1	5.2	0.4				
More rarely	13.9	17.4	13.1	15.2	13.5	13.8	2.6				
As before	56.1	56.1	47.0	65.2	44.6	32.2	13.2				
Didn't go there before and don't go now	15.7	9.8	30.3	2.5	9.5	46.0	78.3				
Hard to say	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.0	1.4	2.9	5.5				

**RAZUMKOV CENTRE** 








## AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24, 2022), COMPARED TO THE "PRE-WAR" TIME, YOU...?

% of respondent




		REG	ION	
	West	Centre	South	East
More often	18.1	9.3	5.2	7.8
More rarely	3.7	9.0	3.8	5.4
As before	57.9	42.0	32.4	39.7
Didn't go there before and don't go now	13.1	34.2	47.1	37.0
Hard to say	7.2	5.6	11.4	10.0

			В	IK		
	18-24 years	25-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 + years
More often	6.3	8.2	9.7	12.2	10.2	13.6
More rarely	3.4	4.1	5.1	6.5	6.0	8.4
As before	43.1	40.4	44.7	44.2	47.7	45.3
Didn't go there before and don't go now	37.4	39.7	34.2	30.1	29.4	24.4
Hard to say	9.8	7.5	6.3	7.0	6.6	8.4

	CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY						
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion
More often	13.3	10.8	3.7	21.7	37.8	6.3	0.0
More rarely	9.4	6.9	5.0	2.9	4.1	7.5	1.3
As before	55.0	60.8	39.9	65.7	45.9	24.7	9.3
Didn't go there before and don't go now	15.9	14.6	41.5	3.9	6.8	54.0	82.2
Hard to say	6.4	6.9	9.9	5.8	5.4	7.5	7.2





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



#### WHAT IS YOUR IDEA OF THE PRIORITY TASKS FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS IN WARTIME?\*

% of respondent

(continued)

							(continued)
	CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY						
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evan- gelical churches	Simply Christian	l do not belong to any religion
Provision of psychological assistance	62.0	55.7	48.3	58.7	70.3	50.9	32.8
Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine	48.2	47.3	41.5	63.9	48.6	44.6	29.8
Assistance in solution of social and living problems of citizens	42.4	42.4	39.7	36.4	40.5	37.1	29.8
Raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine	28.7	16.7	27.7	36.6	29.7	34.9	26.0
Assistance to internally displaced persons	21.4	32.6	20.6	29.8	27.0	29.1	15.7
Mitigation of the aftermaths of ruination of cities, villages, social and transport infrastructure	20.4	16.8	17.5	11.2	21.6	20.6	16.6
Satisfaction of the needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad	3.0	3.0	3.9	4.9	1.4	2.9	4.3
None of the above	2.0	3.1	4.2	_	4.1	2.9	15.3
Hard to say	4.6	6.1	10.4	1.0	1.4	7.5	20.9

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.

November 2022

# WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGION) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING...?\*

% of respondent

% of respondent									
	Ukraine	West	Centre	South	East				
	Gave shelter to refugees								
Yes	40.2	52.7	35.8	26.9	39.7				
No	59.5	46.6	64.1	73.1	59.8				
No answer	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.5				
	Arranged bomb shelters in churches								
Yes	26.7	25.5	24.4	25.0	34.1				
No	73.1	73.8	75.5	75.0	65.9				
No answer	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0				
Provided assistance to medical and social institutions									
Yes	24.1	30.1	22.1	13.5	26.0				
No	75.4	68.8	77.8	86.1	73.8				
No answer	0.5	1.1	0.1	0.5	0.2				

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



# WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGION) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING...?\*

% of respondent

		(continued)						
	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East			
Assis	Assisted with evacuation of residents from occupied territories and territories under artillery fire							
Yes	20.9	21.8	18.6	11.1	29.3			
No	78.9	77.6	81.3	88.9	70.4			
No answer	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.2			
		Provided welf	are aid to refugees					
Yes	43.5	56.4	42.6	36.1	32.4			
No	56.1	43.3	56.9	63.9	67.6			
No answer	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0			
Provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine								
Yes	47.7	69.9	42.4	33.2	36.8			
No	51.6	29.0	57.0	65.9	63.2			
No answer	0.7	1.1	0.6	1.0	0.0			
	Brought	or distributed hum	anitarian assistance	from abroad				
Yes	33.3	30.8	36.2	26.9	34.1			
No	66.1	68.6	63.3	73.1	65.4			
No answer	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.5			
	Provided ass	sistance to residents	of liberated and fro	ntline territories				
Yes	24.2	25.5	21.0	21.5	30.6			
No	75.4	73.9	78.6	78.0	69.2			
No answer	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2			
Took for themselves humanitarian assistance or used it for their benefit								
Yes	4.5	6.6	3.0	1.4	6.4			
No	95.2	92.8	96.7	98.6	93.6			
No answer	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.0			
Expressed support for Russia's actions								
Yes	6.0	4.1	6.7	0.5	10.0			
No	93.7	95.2	93.1	99.5	89.7			
No answer	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.2			
Helped the invaders								
Yes	4.2	4.1	2.8	0.5	9.6			
No	95.6	95.4	97.1	99.5	90.4			
No answer	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0			

 $<sup>\</sup>ensuremath{^{\star}}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



# WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGION) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING...?\*

% of respondent

(continued)

			76 OTTESP				(continued)
			CONFESSI	ONAL-CHURCI	HIDENTITY		
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion
			Gave shelter	to refugees			
Yes	42.7	48.1	29.8	60.0	67.6	36.8	15.3
No	57.0	51.9	69.5	40.0	32.4	62.6	84.3
No answer	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.4
		Arra	nged bomb sh	elters in churc	hes		
Yes	29.8	32.1	22.5	24.8	37.8	27.4	13.1
No	70.0	67.2	77.0	74.8	62.2	72.6	86.9
No answer	0.1	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Provided assi	stance to med	lical and socia	linstitutions		
Yes	27.5	29.5	12.5	31.6	41.9	27.4	8.9
No	72.2	68.9	86.7	68.0	58.1	72.0	91.1
No answer	0.3	1.5	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.0
Assist	ed with evacua	ation of resider	nts from occup	ied territories	and territories	under artiller	y fire
Yes	22.8	22.7	12.8	25.2	40.5	26.9	8.1
No	77.0	76.5	86.7	74.8	59.5	73.1	91.9
No answer	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Pro	ovided welfare	aid to refuge	es		
Yes	47.3	48.5	31.1	71.2	74.3	35.1	17.9
No	52.0	50.8	68.7	28.8	25.7	64.9	82.1
No answer	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Provided ass	sistance to the	Armed Forces	of Ukraine		
Yes	52.0	55.7	29.5	82.0	77.0	43.7	19.1
No	47.3	43.5	69.2	18.0	21.6	56.3	80.9
No answer	0.7	0.8	1.3	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0
	Provid	ed assistance	to residents of	liberated and	frontline territ	ories	
Yes	27.9	35.9	13.3	27.3	52.7	26.3	7.2
No	71.7	63.4	85.9	72.7	47.3	73.1	92.8
No answer	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.

November 2022



# WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGION) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING...?\*


% of respondent

(continued)

(continued							(continued)		
			CONFESSI	ONAL-CHURCH	HIDENTITY				
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion		
	Brought or distributed humanitarian assistance from abroad								
Yes	35.0	36.6	24.3	41.7	66.2	35.6	17.0		
No	64.6	61.8	75.2	58.3	33.8	63.8	83.0		
No answer	0.4	1.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0		
	Took for	themselves h	umanitarian as	ssistance or us	ed it for their b	enefit			
Yes	3.4	3.8	2.1	6.3	6.8	6.9	4.7		
No	96.5	95.4	97.1	93.7	93.2	93.1	95.3		
No answer	0.1	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
		Expre	ssed support	for Russia's act	tions				
Yes	6.5	3.1	4.7	2.4	5.4	10.3	7.6		
No	93.1	96.2	94.8	97.6	94.6	89.7	92.4		
No answer	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
			Helped the	invaders					
Yes	4.8	2.3	3.1	2.4	1.4	6.9	5.5		
No	95.1	96.9	96.3	97.6	98.6	93.1	94.5		
No answer	0.1	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.

November 2022





# DO YOU THINK THAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY CHURCH) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) SUFFICIENTLY DO THE FOLLOWING?

% of respondent

#### Help refugees



#### **Help the Armed Forces of Ukraine**



#### Help residents of liberated and frontline territories

14.5	21.3	14.6	5.9	43.7

 $\square$  They do their best  $\square$  They do a lot  $\blacksquare$  They do little

■ They do nothing ■ Hard to say

November 2022

		REGION					
	West	Centre	South	East			
		Help refugees					
They do their best	26.4	16.3	13.9	14.2			
They do a lot	41.4	30.7	38.9	25.5			
They do little	9.4	19.1	22.1	13.0			
They do nothing	0.9	3.0	2.9	6.6			
Hard to say	21.8	30.9	22.1	40.7			
	Help th	e Armed Forces of Ukr	aine				
They do their best	29.8	15.7	20.6	12.0			
They do a lot	40.3	28.5	26.8	21.8			
They do little	8.9	19.1	17.7	14.2			
They do nothing	1.5	3.3	3.3	6.8			
Hard to say	19.6	33.5	31.6	45.2			
	Help resident	s of liberated and fron	tline territories				
They do their best	17.9	13.8	13.5	11.8			
They do a lot	24.5	20.8	25.0	16.2			
They do little	10.9	16.0	18.3	14.7			
They do nothing	6.6	4.9	2.9	8.6			
Hard to say	40.0	44.4	40.4	48.8			



## DO YOU THINK THAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY CHURCH) AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) SUFFICIENTLY DO THE FOLLOWING?

% опитаних

(continued)

(continued)								
			CONFESSIO	DNAL-CHURC	H IDENTITY			
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangeli- cal churches	Simply Christian	I do not belong to any religion	
Help refugees								
They do their best	21.8	19.7	13.9	22.8	44.6	15.4	4.3	
They do a lot	35.9	40.9	25.9	53.9	36.5	26.3	14.5	
They do little	14.7	9.8	21.7	6.8	6.8	23.4	19.6	
They do nothing	1.6	2.3	3.9	0.0	2.7	4.0	9.4	
Hard to say	26.0	27.3	34.6	16.5	9.5	30.9	52.3	
		Help the A	rmed Forces	of Ukraine				
They do their best	20.5	27.5	12.5	30.2	47.3	15.5	5.5	
They do a lot	34.7	29.8	23.0	47.3	31.1	24.7	12.8	
They do little	14.4	10.7	21.1	9.8	4.1	22.4	17.4	
They do nothing	1.9	3.1	2.9	0.0	4.1	6.3	10.6	
Hard to say	28.4	29.0	40.5	12.7	13.5	31.0	53.6	
	Help r	esidents of li	berated and f	frontline teri	ritories			
They do their best	18.3	20.6	10.7	11.7	30.1	10.9	3.0	
They do a lot	24.8	26.7	14.6	27.8	38.4	17.7	9.8	
They do little	14.4	11.5	18.0	9.8	6.8	20.0	17.9	
They do nothing	3.7	3.1	6.0	9.3	5.5	8.0	9.8	
Hard to say	38.8	38.2	50.7	41.5	19.2	43.4	59.6	



% of those who belong to a church or religious organisation




November 2022

		REGION						
	West		Centre		South		East	
Yes it did	34.3			42.3	20.	)		35.4
I know nothing about it	59.8			48.9	70.	)		56.0
Hard to say	5.9			8.7 10.0		)	8.6	
		CONFESSIONAL-			CHURCH IDENTITY			
	OCU	UOC	(MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	evan	ant and gelical rches	Simply Christian
Yes it did	35.6	25.	.6	28.6	34.0	73	3.5	36.6
I know nothing about it	57.2	61.	.5	62.4	61.0	20	0.6	53.5
Hard to say	7.2	12.	.8	9.0	5.0	5	5.9	9.9



#### WHERE PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION, TO WHICH YOU BELONG, ACCOMPANIED HUMANITARIAN CARGOES OR TOOK PART IN THE ARRANGEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS, EVACUATION FROM THE AREAS OF HOSTILITIES AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES?

% of those who belong to a church or religious organisation




November 2022

		REGION						
	West	Centre	South	East				
Yes, I know	32.0	20.7	16.8	29.3				
I know nothing about it	58.0	68.2	73.1	60.7				
Hard to say	10.0	11.1	10.1	9.9				

		CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY						
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian		
Yes, I know	22.0	26.1	18.0	29.6	47.8	33.3		
I know nothing about it	68.1	60.0	68.2	63.3	43.3	62.8		
Hard to say	9.8	13.9	13.7	7.0	9.0	3.8		

#### DO YOU KNOW ABOUT PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION, TO WHICH YOU BELONG, SATISFYING THE SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS NEEDS OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES ABROAD?

?, % of those who belong to a church or religious organisation





November 2022

	REGION						
	West	Centre	South	East			
Yes, I know	26.0	16.2	12.6	19.6			
I know nothing about it	63.8	72.0	80.7	72.3			
Hard to say	10.3	11.8	6.7	8.1			


		CONFESSIONAL-CHURCH IDENTITY						
	OCU	UOC (MP)	Simply Orthodox	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches	Simply Christian		
Yes, I know	16.2	16.8	9.4	24.4	52.9	19.7		
I know nothing about it	73.3	72.6	78.4	68.2	38.2	75.8		
Hard to say	10.5	10.6	12.2	7.5	8.8	4.5		






















# DID THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY TO WHICH YOU BELONG AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE LARGE-SCALE WAR OF RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE (February 24) DO ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING? % of those who belong to a religious community (parish) (continue)


(continued)

	% or those who belong to a religious community (parish) (continued					
		CONFESSIONAL-0	CHURCH IDENTITY			
	OCU	UOC (MP)	UGCC	Protestant and evangelical churches		
	Provided	welfare aid to refuge	es			
Yes	72.5	70.4	71.7	90.4		
No	10.4	13.0	13.3	5.8		
No idea/hard to say	17.1	16.7	15.0	3.8		
	Provided assistance	e to the Armed Forces	s of Ukraine			
Yes	67.9	75.9	89.2	82.7		
No	8.1	5.6	3.3	9.6		
No idea/hard to say	24.0	18.5	7.5	7.7		
	Gave	shelter to refugees				
Yes	53.8	64.8	58.3	72.5		
No	19.0	18.5	32.5	11.8		
No idea/hard to say	27.1	16.7	9.2	15.7		
В	rought or distributed	humanitarian assistar	ice from abroad			
Yes	37.1	35.8	30.8	76.9		
No	26.2	22.6	28.3	13.5		
No idea/hard to say	36.7	41.5	40.8	9.6		
	Provided assistance	to medical and socia	linstitutions			
Yes	38.5	40.7	33.9	43.1		
No	24.9	20.4	33.1	29.4		
No idea/hard to say	36.7	38.9	33.1	27.5		
Provi	ded assistance to resic	lents of liberated and	frontline territories			
Yes	35.3	37.0	24.2	58.8		
No	23.5	14.8	38.3	15.7		
No idea/hard to say	41.2	48.1	37.5	25.5		
	Arranged b	omb shelters in churc	hes			
Yes	31.1	40.0	16.5	27.5		
No	45.5	30.9	73.6	51.0		
No idea/hard to say	23.4	29.1	9.9	21.6		
Assisted with evacu	ation of residents fror					
Yes	26.6	21.8	22.3	43.1		
No	32.4	34.5	49.6	23.5		
No idea/hard to say	41.0	43.6	28.1	33.3		
























# WAR AND CHURCH. CHURCH AND RELIGION IN UKRAINE

(results of focus group discussions)

Application of qualitative survey methods, including focus groups, makes it possible not only to record the opinions of citizens on topical social issues and problems but better than quantitative survey methods reveals people's reasoning of their positions, views, motives and actions. Meanwhile, application of qualitative survey methods rules out extrapolation of its results to the whole population.

**Survey method:** online focus group (FG) discussions via the Zoom platform.

**Sample:** 5 FGs, total number of participants – 42, in that, 24 women and 18 men.

**Timeframe**: 5 FGs held between November 5-17, 2022.

#### **Target audience:**

√ women and men of 35-65 years,¹

- ✓ believers associating themselves with different confessions and churches, non-churched or nonbelievers, atheists (based on self-identification of FG participants)
- √ nlive in different regions of Ukraine, local residents of those regions and IDPs (internally displaced persons).

PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS AND DESCRIPTION OF FOCUS GROUPS							
	Lviv region		Chernivtsi region	Kyiv region (towns of Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel)	Kharkiv region		
	Local residents	Displaced persons	Local residents and displaced persons	Local residents	Local residents		
OCU	2	3	5	2	2		
UOC (MP)	-	1	2	3	2		
UGCC	2	-	-	-	-		
Protestants	1	1	-	1	1		
Nonbelievers	2	2	1	-	-		
Agnostics	1	-	-	-	-		
Atheists	-	-	-	1	3		
Non-churched	-	1	1	1	-		
Buddhists	-	-	-	-	1		
Total	8 respondents (5w/3m)	8 respondents (5w/3m)	9 respondents (5w/4m)	8 respondents (4w/4m)	9 respondents (5w/4m)		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Plural nouns (FG participants, displaced persons, parishioners, etc.) shall be deemed to include both men and women.



#### **RELIGION AND CHURCH IN CIVIC LIFE**

#### Perception of and attitude to the Church

The perception of the Church, as a spiritual entity uniting believers and the clergy, produces the following associative array, present in all FGs and mainly associated with the church, as a temple:

- ✓ A Temple (Church), a place or structure where people gather to pray and turn to God,
- ✓ The specific atmosphere of a temple, facilitating communication with God, application to God for assistance, protection, and special feelings of being in a temple relief, renovation, purification, comfort, harmony of mind and soul.
- ✓ A community of people united by the faith in God, like-minded persons, friends. It was more frequently reported by churched FG participants.
- ✓ Spiritual and moral values, Love and Virtue, the God's commandments.
- ✓ More rarely a place traditionally visited not only by believers but also by atheists, where solemn events and religious holidays take place.
- ✓ Nonbelievers, atheists tend to see the church as an architectural monument, a museum or just as a religious organisation that does not play any role whatsoever in the present-day life. Noteworthy, such FG participants included those who do not refuse to help religious organisations, especially during or after the occupation. Some associated it with a sect or a profit-making entity.
- ✓ In the conditions of a large-scale war, the Church may present a hybrid weapon, a tool of influence, a channel of propaganda targeting a significant part of the population.

The majority of the above associations with the notion of the Church was related exactly with the temple, the feeling of being in a temple. Discussing the perception of the Church, some believers stressed the Church's role in their life, in particular, the need to go to church regularly, others — not only atheists, nonbelievers, but also some believers, do not

see it necessary to take part or show interest in the Church activity, to go to church regularly. Some totally reject the need of such organisation, as an unnecessary, in their opinion, mediator in communication of man with God.

#### Moral authority of the Church

Some participants left the issue of moral authority of the Church unanswered: mainly, nonbelievers, agnostics and some believers. It seems that for some participants, consideration of the issue of moral authority of the Church was an abstraction or something uncertain.

Noteworthy, reflecting on the moral authority of the Church, FG participants rarely mentioned metropolitans and patriarchs of their church and other churches, prominent religious leaders. They cited some examples, both good and bad.

Some believers said that the Church plays an important role in their lives and enjoys some authority, while some found it difficult to explain, where it is found, while the rest cited the following reasons and instances:

- √ the Church enjoys respect and authority for its moral and welfare support to vulnerable groups of the population, refugees, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc.
- √ the Church, church-going, communication with a religious community is an inherent need, it contributes to spiritual development, gives the feeling of cohesion, mutual support, joint activity, satisfies, inspires, adds power, helps, being an integral element of everyday life.
- ✓ the Church is a bearer of moral and spiritual values.

Some believers of different FGs noted that moral authority originates from the faith in God, not from the Church proper and its ministers.

According to some FG participants, the authority of the Church is strongly related with the authority of its ministers, priests, who offer the liturgy and immediately communicate with the believers.



## Factors undermining the authority of the Church

Noteworthy, when discussing the moral authority of the Church, some participants of different FGs spontaneously started discussing the factors that, on the contrary, undermine the Church authority:

- ✓ Politicisation of the Church, its use by certain political forces.
- ✓ An obsessive or even categorical, aggressive position of hierarchs, priests, the Church leadership with respect to certain public or political events, other confessions, some social groups of the population, etc. Attempts of manipulating the public opinion, thoughts of parishioners.
- ✓ The anti-Ukrainian position of priests, hierarchs of some Churches, assistance to invaders in the occupied territories of Ukraine (mainly meaning UOC (MP)).
- ✓ Non-transparency of the financial activity of the Church, intolerable luxury in decoration of churches and the way of life of hierarchs and priests of some churches, parishes.
- ✓ Unacceptable behaviour of priests, hierarchs may seriously undermine the authority of a whole church.

#### Formation of the attitude to the Church

Proceeding from the answers of many FG participants, formation of the attitude to the Church is influenced by the following factors:

✓ Perception of the Church through the prism of family and cultural traditions. In many believers among FG participants, the choice of a specific church and the attitude to it was partially formed yet in childhood or during the teen years; religion, the faith in God was an element of education; church-going, at least on big holidays, was and remains a family tradition.

Meanwhile, some FG participants, mainly nonbelievers, criticised such perception of the Church. They consider such an approach to be superficial, unconscious and, maybe, far from the real faith in God, from religion. They are convinced that a true religion should not rest on habits and rituals, without practical

observance of the God's commandments and Christian values.

- ✓ A temple, its atmosphere and personal feelings of a man in a temple.
- ✓ The person of the hierarch, priest, his religious commitment and spirituality, way of life beyond the church walls, the content of his sermon, the manner of talking to parishioners, the attitude to other confessions, churches, etc.
- ✓ Timely and meaningful assistance, support of the Church representatives to a man in a difficult life situation, facing serious challenges, a disease. A meeting with believers who help the man to come to God caused religious feelings.

Some participants of different groups stressed that the faith in God, internal convictions and values of a man are decisive for shaping the attitude to the Church.

Noteworthy, quite many FG participants rather often assess the Church, their attitude to it, their affiliation with a specific church through the prism of perception of the activity of a specific church where, for instance, they were baptised, which they used to visit, whose atmosphere and charisma of priests they like.

Some focus group participants have little idea of what is going on in Ukraine's church life. Some still confuse UOC (MP) with OCU.

## Influence of priests on the attitude to the Church

FG participants repeatedly mentioned priests in the context of discussion of their attitude to the Church, its activity, position with respect to important social events, etc.

They believe that ideally, in everyday life a priest must lead believers by his example; be a bearer of the principles of faith, behaviour, attitude to religion, observance of church rules.

However, during the discussion, one could also hear such words as «priests also walk like men», «disregard the person of the priest, we go to Church to communicate with God», «for communication with God mediators are not needed», «a priest may express his personal views, not the position of the whole



Church». Apparently, priests not always meet expectations and ideas of how a spiritual person, an official representative of the Church should behave.

According to FG participants, they used to meet different priests: the high spirituality and charisma of some of them led them to faith and strengthened their willingness to go to church, while the unacceptable conduct of others, on the contrary, might turn them away from religion and the Church. Although the latter were met more rarely, people were more willing to cite examples of unacceptable behaviour of priests.

#### **Church-going**

Many believers among FG participants reported their need to go to church. However, the majority goes to church from time to time, first of all, on big religious holidays, while some (mainly FG participants from Lviv and Chernivtsi regions) go to church almost every week.

The most common motives of church-going include the need to find comfort, to restore their psycho-emotional or energy balance, to feel unity with God, to reflect on life and to get answers to pressing questions, more rarely — to talk to other believers, to find fellow believers, to listen to the sermon, to communicate with the priest,

Almost all believers — FG participants have an opportunity to visit a church of their confession. Dependent on circumstances, they can visit temples of different Orthodox churches or even different Christian confessions, or just pray at home. Some use an opportunity to watch liturgy or listen to sermon via the Internet.

Some FG participants — OCU believers stressed that if there is no Orthodox church nearby, they may visit a Roman Catholic church but will never go to «a church of the Moscow Patriarchate» (UOC (MP)). In their turn, some UOC (MP) parishioners stressed their willingness to go exactly to a UOC (MP) temple.

It was stressed more than once that a habit of going to church for the sake of comfort does not testify a deep faith in God. They believe that one should study the Bible, learn more about the religion, follow the Commandments, develop spiritually, do good deeds, be honest, etc.

Nonbelievers are rare guests in church, viewing it as a tourist site, like a museum or an architectural monument.

## Influence of the war on religious commitment

According to almost all the participants of the survey (both believers and atheists), the beginning of the large-scale war did not change their attitude to religion, to God, that was shaped before the war.

Although the results of further group discussion make us think that changes in the religious commitment did take place, it is rather difficult to measure them correctly during focus group discussions.

For instance, rather many participants repeatedly stressed that extreme circumstances, risk or danger for the life, like staying under fire or participation in a combat, may strengthen religious feelings, the faith in God.

Some confessed sincerely that due to the war, they felt a greater need to pray, began to pray more actively, turn to God, the higher forces.

Some FG participants in wartime felt greater interest in religion, a desire to find answers to their theological and philosophical questions; they began reading theological literature, turned to biblical texts.

According to the observations of some of those polled, belief in God, religious feelings weaken in safe, peaceful times, when people simply enjoy their lives. Instead, in a critical, stressful situation, when nothing depends on them, their life is endangered, and there is no one to help, the belief in wonders, in God, religious commitment get much stronger.

Few people reported more frequent attendance of the church.

Quite many believers — FG participants do net see it necessary to communicate with the priest more often than before the war, or to attend the religious community, the mass, the divine service more frequently.



Some, mainly from the Kharhiv FG, began to go to church even more rarely because of the danger for their lives, air alerts, shelling, ruination of the churches or departure of the priests.

Some of those polled, in particular, those who stayed in the occupation, demonstrate kind of exhaustion and disappointment in priests, the Church in general, weakening of the need to go to church even in safe conditions. They came to the conclusion that one should not rely on priests, who are ordinary people and can make mistakes, give poor advice or flee the war like others, abandoning their flock. One should more rely on his intuition and intelligence during decision-making, on one's own powers, and it is not necessary to go to church in order to pray and to turn to God.

#### Gathering of a religious community

By and large, the majority of believers did not introduce the notion of a «religious community» on their own, although when discussing direct questions about the religious community, some reported communication with their religious community and participation in joint events. They usually meant a group of like-minded persons, friends among parishioners. Such FG participants were few, on the average, 1 per group, as a rule, churched.

Noteworthy, some Orthodox believers among FG participants did not fully understand what the expression "gathering of a religious community" actually means. They assumed that the term "mass" is not typical for Orthodox believers, as it is more widely used by Protestants and may mean a sermon, or interpretation or discussion of prayers or religious texts. The Orthodox call it "liturgy".

According to some Orthodox believers, the Orthodox have neither the tradition nor the regular basis for the "gathering of a religious community"; it may be held in the churches that have a "backbone" (community) of active believers; usually, it may be held in church premises after the Sunday service, when the priest may on his initiative invite parishioners, treat them with tea, talk, answer their questions, make requests or give assignments.

## RELIGIOUS ASPECT IN PERCEPTION OF UKRAINE'S WAR WITH RUSSIA

The majority does not tend to view the war of Ukraine with Russia through the prism of religion, the fight of the God and the Devil, punishment of the people for their sins or ordeals sent by God for spiritual purification or strengthening their spirit.

Proceeding from the verbal and non-verbal reactions, many participants never analysed the events in such a context before these discussions.

A small share of FG participants more or less agreed that «a fight between the God and the Devil takes place in the world», and that Ukraine's war with Russia is a war between virtue and evil.

According to other polled, the war, as an example of the fight between the good and the bad, is a test of moral qualities of an individual person. Moral qualities are not necessarily shaped by religion, but by many temporal factors, first of all — upbringing by parents, society or the environment.

By and large, the survey participants do no believe that the war in Ukraine ensues from the sins of Ukraine and its residents, or that God in this way punishes the people for their sins. The majority does not see a religious background in the hostilities and human tragedies.

Neither did they support the assertion that by sending ordeals to the people, God shows them a way to spiritual recovery and development.

None of the believers said that the beginning of the war in Ukraine undermined their faith in God, because God should not allow the evil to dominate and should punish those who stand against him.

## RELATIONS AMONG CHURCHES AND CONFESSIONS

The general attitude to different churches and confessions is tolerant, respectful, with an emphasis on the real freedom of choice of faith and religion in Ukraine, absence of limitations



on the activity of different confessions and churches.

The majority noted the generally friendly relations among churches and confessions.

According to FG participants, conflicts and contradictions mainly take place between OCU and UOC (MP).

Some of them believe that they may be provoked by separate politicians, political forces, including agents of influence of the aggressor country and mass media financed by them in order to split parishioners of different churches and groups of the population.

According to some participants, conflicts between UOC (MP) and OCU mainly take place in small towns and villages. They mentioned the following possible reasons:

- √ the desire of a community to join another confession, mainly in the regions where most temples belong to UOC (MP).
- ✓ reluctance of the local authorities to allot land or to give permission for construction of a temple of another church, mainly — OCU, that has fewer temples, parishes and priests.
- ✓ Dissatisfaction with their priest, his behaviour, no or slow reaction to political events, demands or initiatives of believers. For instance, parishioners may be unable to help refugees or soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the same time, quite many participants expressed concern about the very existence of UOC (MP) in Ukraine, more often called the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. FG participants know that UOC (MP) announced its independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, but nevertheless, it is still considered subordinated to Moscow, not demonstrating a pro-Ukrainian stand, or «pro-Russian». They cited examples allegedly proving the pro-Russian position of UOC (MP).

Some are indignant that the money earned by the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine allegedly goes to Moscow and returns to Ukraine in the form of missiles, weapons, killing Ukrainians.

Some FG participants suggested calling spades spades and renaming UOC (MP) into

ROC, which, in their opinion, more corresponds to the concept of that church, so that the believers are aware, to what church they go to pray.

Among the survey participants, residents of Lviv region were especially categorical with respect to UOC (MP) and termed the existence of that church in Ukraine fully unacceptable. But at least two participants in each FG were clearly more insistent and consistent in their desire to ban UOC (MP) in Ukraine.

Some FG participants suggested that conflicts arise not among parishioners but among the church leaders or priests.

On the other hand, many stick to the opposite opinion, that namely the priests provoke a negative attitude of their parishioners to other churches or confessions. In such cases a question arises, which FG participants could not answer: do priests express their personal views, or the position of the whole Church?

#### Joint events

Many participants are unaware of joint events of different churches and confessions, few examples were cited.

Some people said that the local authorities from time to time organise events, inviting representatives of different churches and confessions. They welcome such events.

They could nor recall joint events initiated by the churches themselves.

Meanwhile, the majority sees organisation of joint social events or liturgy by representatives of different churches and confessions as a good idea. Although some FG participants — UOC (MP) parishioners are rather categorical: they welcome joint social activity of UOC (MP) and OCU but consider a common liturgy unacceptable, suggesting that their Church is canonic, while OCU is not.

Still, rather many FG participants neither think about nor understand inter-confessional canonical differences, see no obstacles whatsoever for joint services by priests of different confessions, churches and support this idea.

At the same time, some FG participants spoke against joint prayer, liturgy, religious



or social events involving UOC (MP). They believe that UOC (MP), starting from 2014, and after the beginning of the large-scale war, supported the aggression against Ukraine and therefore is responsible for the deaths and woes of Ukrainians.

## Attitude to communities shifting from one shurch to another

Few FG participants heard about communities shifting from one church to another, mainly from their friends or news reports. No one heard about such cases in their place of residence. Generally, people were not against it, suggesting that a community may choose the church.

Some FG participants noted that such instances are more common in village communities, less numerous and more united, while the possibility of a community shifting from one church to another in a big city seems unlikely. According to some FG participants, the change of subordination of a parish is a long process, rather a complex legal issue that requires approval of the highest levels of the church hierarchy, and a community actually does not have sufficient powers and tools of influence.

Nevertheless, they repeatedly stressed that a community has the right and possibility to choose the church and the temple, and some FG participants, mainly from the liberated territories or displaced persons, have already left or are going to leave UOC (MP) and join OCU.

## Celebration of Christmas on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December

For many FG participants, the decision of the OCU Synod regarding the celebration of Christmas on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December, if the parishioners want so, is not on the agenda and not relevant now.

The key trends in the discussion of this issue in different FGs may be described as follows:

✓ Almost all FG participants celebrate Christmas on the 7<sup>th</sup> of January. Some of them doubt that they will change their habits and deeply rooted family traditions related with Christmas in the near future, and will continue to celebrate Christmas on the usual dates — the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> of January.

- ✓ Meanwhile, the majority is not against celebrating Christmas on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December.
- ✓ Some FG participants already celebrate both Christmas dates.
- $\checkmark$  Few people are against Christmas celebrations to be moved from the 7<sup>th</sup> of January to the 25<sup>th</sup> of December.
- ✓ Few people are going to celebrate Christmas only on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December, willing to do that together with the bulk of the world.
- ✓ Some noted that such a decision will draw them closer to the European culture of Christmas celebration and at the same time put an end to the joint tradition with Russia, celebrating Christmas on the 7<sup>th</sup> of January. They see such a decision as political, and the desire of the Ukrainians to distance themselves from anything that may be associated with Russia.

Some FG participants noted that the decision of the OCU Synod regarding the celebration of Christmas on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December, if the parishioners want so, was just a declaration of intentions, since all other church holidays and dates, to which the believers got used, need to be moved as well; these changes will take long enough, which may cause discontent or resistance in many believers. Some stressed, and this opinion was supported during the discussion, that such changes are either irrelevant or untimely now, and may be launched after the believers and confessions unite in one National Orthodox Church.

Some people see the plans to change the dates of church holidays as political designs irrelevant to faith and religion. They noted that there would be no unity and cohesion in Ukrainian society on this issue, it would lead to disputes, confusion, split the nation that, on the contrary, should be utmost united now.

#### **ROLE OF THE CHURCH IN WARTIME**

Discussing the issue of the desired role and activity of the Church in wartime, almost all the participants were united, irrespective of the region, faith, church affiliation, age, etc.

✓ First of all, they expect from the Church moral and psychological support, especially needed in wartime.



- ✓ the main priorities in the Church activity are also deemed to include volunteering, humanitarian, welfare, information assistance, charity.
- ✓ the Church should stand sentinel over the country's statehood and integrity, take a patriotic stand, unite Ukrainians. All this is especially important in wartime.
- ✓ In some FGs, debates arose regarding the assistance and support of the Church to the military. Many participants are sure that the Church should pray for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and help them. In their sermons and appeals priests should call for, and believers provide support and assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

However, some FG participants believe that the Church should take a neutral stand dissociated from political events and concentrate on the issues of faith, religion; not support war but call for peace.

#### Instances of the church activity in wartime

By and large, according to many FG participants, churches meet the key perceptions of what religious organisations should do in wartime.

#### Kinds of assistance

According to the majority of FG participants, churches and church communities provided varied assistance to refugees, displaced persons, local residents from the very beginning of the large-scale war. They cited many instances of such assistance, which they learned from their friends or from personal experience:

- ✓ Assistance in evacuation; search of housing, resettlement of refugees, use of their premises for settlement of displaced persons.
- ✓ Welfare or humanitarian assistance, such as hot meals, food sets, hygienic means, clothes, occasionally financial assistance.
  - ✓ Psychological assistance and support.
- $\checkmark$  Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Residents of the liberated territories of Kyiv region stressed that religious organisations

and volunteers helped and continue to help them even more than the local authorities.

FG participants from the liberated cities of Bucha, Hostomel and Irpin in Kyiv region the most often mentioned various assistance obtained exactly from Protestant religious communities, while being believers of Orthodox churches or atheists.

Displaced persons from other regions also stressed that they got assistance from Greek Catholic, Catholic and especially Protestant religious communities, in particular in Lviv region.

#### Motives to provide assistance

Many FG participants (believers and atheists) with the beginning of the large-scale war helped displaced people with housing, various items, food, but were reluctant to speak about it, not viewing this as something extraordinary. They often did that by their own volition, without any request from their religious community.

Many joined volunteer projects initiated by active parishioners of their church and its priests, or in cooperation of the parish with different public and volunteer organisations and groups.

Assistance from a church community, according to FG participants, is more flexible and efficient: the team is quite strong, cohesive, they all know and trust each other; believers got used to work as a team.

Among factors that motivate religious communities and groups of parishioners to help others, they mentioned:

- ✓ sympathy, a gentle heart, mercy, natural human feelings, coinciding with the principles laid down by the Christian religion: to love your neighbour, to do good deeds, to help those in need, who suffer, flee from the war, hunger, violence;
- √ national solidarity, cohesion,
- ✓ patriotism, desire to do all they can to defend their land, save lives and health of citizens, the will to win.

Some FG participants suggested that through help, a religious community also



seeks to recruit people for their curch, to get more parishioners. Some FG participants, in particular, displaced persons, confirmed that local residents, believers invited them to go to their church but were not intrusive or overly insistent.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN LOCAL RESIDENTS AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Almost all the survey participants (both local and displaced) stressed that different religious or church affiliation in no way affected the relations between displaced persons and local residents and assistance to displaced persons.

Just a few displaced persons cited examples when they, as they claimed, received no support due to differing religious views.

Some displaced FG participants noted that demonstration of interest in their church, the desire to visit the temple, to attend liturgy facilitates communication with local believers, accelerates adaptation, makes relations friendlier.

## AN IDEAL CHURCH IN THE EYES OF FOCUS GROUPS PARTICIPANTS

The desired changes, wanted in the Church after Ukraine's victory, may include the following:

✓ Many people express a strong desire to unite the Church, but have little idea how to do this. They mainly thought of uniting Orthodox Churches, creating a united national church in Ukraine, not banning however other confessions, that are not Orthodox or Christian.

- ✓ At the same time, some participants noted the absence of a prominent figure, a leader among the clergy who could lead the United National Church.
- ✓ They stressed that the Church should be autonomous and independent from other Churches, especially from the Moscow Church, ROC.
- ✓ They wished the Church to steadily gain moral authority and win popularity in society, to have more believers, to be more modern, living, open, close to the people, to change with the whole world, to flexibly respond to new trends in the world and in society.
- ✓ As examples of an «open, living Church, close to the people», some mentioned social activity, different social projects focused on people's needs, education by Protestant religious communities.
- ✓ To promote one of the inherent functions of the Church study of the Bible, propagation of Christian values, imparting high morality and spirituality to the population.
- ✓ To enhance the creative enlightening, philosophic and educational function of the Church. To make the Church a generator of progressive ideas and social projects.
- ✓ To reduce the Church's influence on law-making, to delimit secular and church life.
- $\checkmark$  They also repeatedly stressed that the Church should not be politicised.
- ✓ To make the financial aspect of the Church activity more transparent, to set affordable and uniform prices of church rites and services



## CONCLUSIONS

Proceeding from the above, the following conclusions can be made.

The Church continues to retain a leading position in terms of public confidence among the social and political institutes. The recognised level of moral authority of the Church is lower than the level of confidence in it, and the assessment of the moral authority of the Church was declining in the previous years. However, compared to the previous years, its moral authority has increased recently (first of all, in the Southern and Eastern regions).

Compared to the previous years, the number of those who noted a positive role of the Church in society increased substantially (by 19%, compared to 2020). However, the attitude of citizens to the morality of priests is rather critical. Less than a quarter of respondents expressed confidence that the majority of priests are highly moral, spiritual persons.

After the beginning of the all-out Russian aggression against Ukraine the share of citizens who described themselves as believers increased. Nearly a quarter of those polled reported that after the beginning of the all-out war of Russia against Ukraine they became more religious and faithful, according to their self-assessment.

The regional nature of all aspects of religious and confessional self-identification of Ukrainian citizens persists. However, compared to the early 2000s, the difference among regions in the shares of the people who called themselves believers decreased. The dependence of religious commitment on the age, sex, and settlement type persists as well.

The level of religious commitment is traditionally higher in older age groups, compared to the younger ones. However, the younger an age group is, the greater was the increase in the number of

believers in that group, compared to the previous year.

The declared affiliation of respondents with a certain religious organisation or church is not always related with their self-identification as believers and may be conditioned, e.g., by the socio-cultural or ethnic identity. The religious identity proper is far less important for citizens than civic or local.

There is a substantial difference between the claimed religious commitment (74% of those polled called themselves believers, 63% — Orthodox) and their affiliation with a specific religious community: community membership was reported by only 26.5% of those polled. However, in the recent years their number increased — by approximately 10% in course of two years.

Only 17% of citizens regularly (at least once a week) visit church services and mass, but their share increased, compared to the previous year, when they made only 10%.

Believers of Protestant and Evangelic churches and residents of the Western part of the country the most often reported that with the beginning of the war they more often go to church and communicate with priests.

Lower attendance of church services during the pandemic of COVID-19 was accompanied with more active monitoring of religious events in the Internet. This is more inherent in residents of the country's West, believers of UGCC, Protestant and Evangelic churches.

Those who do not attend church services rarely attributed this to the lack of religious communities of the church or religion, to which they belong in the area where they live; rather, they do not feel the need to do this or believe that to follow a religion, one needn't attend church services. So, in order to encourage people to go



to church, there should be not only more churches but more interest and incentives for the people to go there.

Answering the question if anything should be changed in the activity of the religious community, whose services, mass, liturgy they attend, more than half of religious community members said that nothing should be changed, while those who want changes more often speak about the need to pay more attention so assistance to community members, their support (including psychological), as well as the need to hold service and preach in the mother language.

Representatives of the youngest age group more often than others spoke about the need to streamline rites, reduce the duration of liturgy, hold service and preach in the mother language, hold mass, service at more convenient times.

A relative majority (46%) of respondents believes that after the war religious organisations, churches in Ukraine will adapt to the demand of time, 33.5% — that they will mainly stick to traditions in their activity. The younger the respondents are, the more often they express hope that religious organisations will adapt to the demand of time.

Answering the question, what main goals churches and religious organisations should set for themselves in Ukraine, respondents the most often mentioned spiritual support for the people who found themselves in a spiritual crisis, worshipping God, common prayer, moral recovery of society, assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population, defence of traditional values.

If we compare the answers to two questions: «What main goals should churches and religious organisations set for themselves in Ukraine?» and «What main goals does the church or religious organisation, to which you belong, pursue?», the answers to these two questions are similar, that is, people mainly believe that the church or religious organisation to which they belong meets their expectations. However, the share of those who believe that the church to which they belong provides assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population is lower

than the share of those who believe that churches in Ukraine should set this goal for themselves. It may therefore be concluded that religious organisations insufficiently meet the public demand for the performance of this function.

Ukrainian citizens believe that a social mission, assistance to the people should occupy a key place in the activity of the church or a religious organisation. Reflecting on which social missions of churches or religious organisations, in their opinion, are the most important for society, and in which social services of the church they are personally interested, respondents more often mentioned psychological assistance, protection of vulnerable groups, religious education.

More than half of those polled noted that they personally did not deal with any social mission of churches or religious organisations (although their number was a bit lower than last year). Among the social services provided by the church and obtained by respondents, they more often mentioned psychological assistance.

Answering the question «What are the priority tasks for religious organisations in wartime?», respondents the most often mentioned psychological assistance, assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and assistance in solution of social and living problems of citizens.

Many (40% and more) Ukrainian citizens know that religious communities provide assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, welfare aid and shelter to refugees.

The majority of religious community members reported that their religious community since the beginning of the large-scale war of Russia against Ukraine had provided welfare aid and gave shelter to refugees, and also helped the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

54% of religious community members reported obtaining moral support from their religious community in wartime, 47% – psychological support, 22% – welfare support.

In wartime the public demand for a patriotic stand of the Church has grown



significantly: for the first time over the entire period of monitoring, the share of those who supports the national orientation of the Church exceeded the share of its opponents.

The majority of respondents called the relations between believers of different churches and religions in the place where they leave comfortable or friendly, but 20% — tense or conflict-like (12% more than last year). So, one may note some deterioration of inter-religious and inter-confessional relations compared to the previous year. From the representative public opinion poll and focus group discussions it may be concluded that tense relations are observed between the believers of OCU and UOC (MP).

During the period of monitoring, the public opinion on the factors of conflicts arising

between believers of different Churches changed. Starting from 2000, the importance of the political factor has been growing steadily, and now, it tops the ranking.

Inter-religious, inter-confessional and inter-church conflicts are limited, because the religious and church identity is of little importance for Ukrainian citizens (only 4% of citizens in the first place identify themselves with the people of the same faith or church).

Since the religious identity proper matters for citizens much less than civic or regional identity, we assume that emergence of purely religious conflicts in Ukraine is unlikely, but it is not ruled out that in case of other conflicts (first of all, political or interstate), their participants may speculate on religious problems or use the influence of one or another church on society.

