



Razumkov
centre

UKRAINE'S ROLE AND PLACE IN THE FUTURE EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SYSTEMS



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UKRAINE'S ROLE AND PLACE IN THE FUTURE EUROPEAN AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY SYSTEMS

Russia's all-out war against Ukraine has changed the picture of the world, substantially accelerating crisis trends in the system of international relations established after the Cold War. Russia's aggressive neo-imperialist policy caused tectonic shifts in the perceptions of security and inflicted incredible damage on the international system of security and stability, highlighted the inefficiency of the existing mechanisms of crisis prevention and settlement. The «normality», to which Russia – a permanent member of the UN Security Council – is trying to accustom the world has nothing in common with the norms of the international law.

To prevent recurrence of the horrors of war and ruination of the system of international law, the international community should seek reformation and strengthening of the security system at the global, regional and national levels. Further delay of implementation of the necessary changes in the security structures and mechanisms bears risks of total ruination of the system of international relations. The main responsibility for the prevention of this scenario rests with the national states, but an important role also belongs to civil society that can not only exert pressure

using public diplomacy, elections, protest actions, criticism in mass media, etc., but also offer intellectual support for reform processes.

In the context of bilateral relations, the war not only ruined the myth of fraternal nations but questioned the very possibility, in the short run, of peaceful coexistence with a country whose political elites and zombified population are hostile to Ukraine and democracy. The breakage of political, economic and cultural ties caused by the war, appreciation of a long-term nature of this security threat require relevant changes in the view on the future structure and organisation of Ukraine's political, economic and security sectors.

Ukraine's further movement towards the EU and NATO membership should be clearly and unequivocally stated both by Ukraine and by those institutes. Meanwhile, the substantive and temporal limits of this movement will largely depend on what the world, the international security environment (including the EU and NATO), Ukraine and Russia will look like after the war. Bearing this in mind, this paper focuses on the following issues:

THE FIRST SECTION analyses key trends in the international security environment against the background of the Russo-Ukrainian war and its main lessons;

THE SECOND SECTION reviews the scenarios of Russia's future and the war end;

THE THIRD SECTION dwells upon the key lines of development and important ongoing processes in the EU and NATO,

THE FOURTH SECTION analyses the lessons of this war for Ukraine, outlines the guidelines and recommendations of reformation of its defence sector;

ANNEXES include results of surveys of Ukrainian and foreign experts and Ukrainian citizens.

1.

DYNAMICS OF CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT DURING THE WAR IN UKRAINE

The war ensued from a larger process that commenced actually with the end of the Cold War – the rivalry of coalitions under the banners of democracy (of the West) led by the USA and, conventionally speaking, «non-West», first led by the USSR, and later by China, that gradually but steadily assumes the role of the second global pole. Both centres of power are trying to build coalitions of allies defending shared (or at least non-contradictory) values. The countries that appeared on the «borders» of those coalitions find themselves in the dangerous zone of rivalry accompanied with wars (Georgia, Ukraine) or conflicts on a smaller scale (not necessarily armed) – in some Balkan, Asian, African, Latin American countries hesitating between conventional neutrality and support for one of the centres of power.

In this respect, we can note the presence of two mutual processes: on the one hand, the results of the Russo-Ukrainian war exert influence on the leading actors seeking a vision of the renewed world order, on the other – the perception of the world order by these actors will determine the ultimate goals of the war, and therefore, the scope and pace of assistance to Ukraine, the power of pressure on Russia, influencing the dynamics of the war. Meanwhile, speaking about the war, it would be a mistake to disregard the factors of direct influence: the resolve, with which Ukraine defends its independence and territorial integrity, as well as the processes of erosion in the Russian top elites, economic degradation and currently spontaneous protests in Russia. The near future will show, which of these processes will be decisive.

IMPORTANT TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The war in Ukraine accelerated global processes, led to growth of uncertainty, unpredictability and, respectively, nervous behaviour of some actors. It greatly complicated forecasting, determination of strategic and tactical priorities, coordination of joint efforts of different countries to counter crisis phenomena.

Now we see the progressive process of strengthening and unification of the collective West. It was signified by Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO, changed approaches of the European states to collective and national security. This is

especially clearly exemplified by the intentions of Germany, Great Britain, Poland, other European countries to substantially strengthen their armed forces and their military and political role in Europe. The enhancement of political solidarity of the West was witnessed by the very rapid, by the usual bureaucratic standards, approval of unprecedented sanctions against Russia and programmes of assistance to Ukraine, concerted pressure on Russia in such reputable international organisations as the UN, G7, the Council of Europe.

Despite certain differences in such issues as, for instance, the «military» or «diplomatic» ways of the conflict settlement; the scope and forms of military and technical assistance to Ukraine; the attitude to Russia's future after the war end, – the collective West

found the balls to demonstrate and to maintain unity in its response to the Russian aggression for more than half a year now.

Meanwhile, the world witnesses growth in the number of actors claiming regional leadership and cautious, critical or even hostile to the West, its values and ways of their implementation. Noteworthy, many authoritarian regimes rose with assistance of the leading Western countries. However, the «green light» for economic cooperation with authoritarian states (China, Russia) disregarding the issues of human rights, morality, security, implementation of «purely commercial» projects involving companies from those countries facilitated their export of political corruption to the Western countries, economic and political dependence on their deliveries of energy resources, raw materials, consumer goods.

Specifically, attempts to establish constructive relations with Russia on the part of the USA (the «thaw» under George Bush Sr. and «reset» under George Bush Jr.), Germany («economic modernisation» under Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel), France (under Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac and early Nicolas Sarkozy), while neglecting the imperial essence of all the Kremlin regimes, as well as successful integration of Russia – not without the Western assistance – in the global economy contributed to its economic growth, resilience, strengthening of political influence on the international scene and on the global security situation, in particular, through intentional creation of problems and crises, while offering its offices for their «solution». It reached its climax during the war with Georgia (2008) and the beginning of the war with Ukraine (2014) that turned an overt aggression on February 24, 2022.

The rise of China, the regimes of Libya, Iraq, Iran, etc., later chanted by the West as the enemies, looked very much the same. On top of geopolitical factors, the key motives of such conduct by the West included prevalence of money over values, leading to its disregard of the factor of morality in politics.

The West is most of all concerned about the uncertain prospects of political development

of India, Turkey, other countries wanted by the West among its allies. This trend gained momentum during the «Arab spring», aggravation of crises and conflicts in Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, African countries, and was especially manifest during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, evident failures of the West, its inability to adequately respond to those crises also contributed to the enhancement of the instinct of self-preservation in the Western countries. A strong challenge of the Russian aggression against Ukraine gave impetus to the available threat response mechanisms, their practical verification and perfection. The ability of the West to overcome differences among states and find allies during this process will largely depend on successful solution of internal problems by the Western countries, their unity in confrontation with China and to a great extent – the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Confrontation of the West with China and Russia gains a global scale. Enhanced attention and rivalry focus on countries of South East and Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America. Competition for potential allies takes place against the background of attempts of certain countries – such as India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico – to become regional leaders, to have a decent place in the new world order and international division of labour. The success of this rivalry will depend on the attractiveness of the offered economic bonuses and models of socio-economic development, reliability of security guarantees. This rivalry will take place amidst mounting fundamental economic, political, social and environmental problems in both Western and «non-Western» countries. Against this background, China will make efforts to expand its global influence through the «Belt and Road» projects, consolidating its leading role in the SCO, while pursuing an assertive hegemonic policy in the Indo-Pacific region. One may expect from the USA large-scale regional and continental projects to attract countries of the global South, as well as involvement of more like-minded states in such structures as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, QUAD (Australia, India, Japan, the USA), AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain, the USA), I2-U2 (India, Israel, UAE, the USA), etc. Aggravation of confrontation of



the West led by the USA with China is witnessed by provisions of the new Strategic Concept of adopted in June 2022 (see section 3), the new US National Security Strategy released in October 2022,¹ more competitive relations of the EU with Beijing,² as well as the results of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China.³

The process of promotion of the Western values and pooling of a large group of European and «non-Western» countries under the umbrella of the collective West will be complicated by the following factors:

- ✓ preservation of differences among the «Anglo-Saxon», «continental European» and «Islamic» models of socio-economic development;
- ✓ policy differences in regions where interests of the leading Western countries meet;

- ✓ different abilities of European countries to compete with China and its allies, readiness of some of them for separate concessions for the sake of immediate economic gains;
- ✓ predisposition of developed democracies to rely on bureaucratic procedures to the detriment of flexibility and promptness of decision-making.

In other words, rivalry promises to be long and exhaustive. The degree of readiness of the West and «non-West» for economic and political compromises will depend on the future balance of forces in specific regions and sectors of economy. If Washington and Beijing fail to come to terms in the near future, one may expect aggravation of their relations around Taiwan, covert support for Russia by China as a means of testing and weakening the West. However, given the resolute stand of the US and its Western partners supporting Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian aggression, Beijing was advised of the possible consequences of a belligerent solution of the Taiwanese issue. One may hope that exactly the difficult situation in the global economy and the danger of mutually unacceptable losses spur Washington and Beijing into a compromise.

In this case the very possibility of competition between the USA and China will be conditioned by the absence of an atmosphere of military insecurity. For this reason, participation of Russia, as a source of conflict, in such competition becomes undesirable. Russia will most probably be assigned a role of a platform for competition, which will require its demilitarisation and fundamental rearrangement of the current state system.

¹ The National Security Strategy identifies the main rivals of the USA: PRC as the only state that potentially can change the international order, and Russia as a direct threat for the free and open international system. The document also suggests algorithms of dealing with both powers: outpacing China and containment of Russia. See: National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington, October 12, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.

² «Russia failed China: the EU attitude is changing». – *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 22 October 2022, <https://zn.ua/ukr/international/rosija-pidvela-kitaj-stavlennja-jes-zminjujetsja.html>

³ The 20th CPC Congress recognised the priority of the national security over economic growth. See: Stephen S.Roach, 'Xi's Conflict-Prone China', Oct 24, 2022, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/under-xi-chinese-security-takes-precedence-over-economic-growth-by-stephen-s-roach-2022-10>; «Xi's country: what reelection of the CPC Secretary General brings to China and the whole world». – *Livyi Bereh*, 24 October 2022, https://lb.ua/world/2022/10/24/533576_kraina_si_shcho_nese_kitayu_svitu.html

The key priorities of the present Western policy include utmost geopolitical, military, strategic and economic isolation of Russia. This presumes its gradual ousting from universal and regional multilateral organisations, curtailment of economic, scientific and technological ties, pressure on the countries that try to preserve relations with Russia in certain sectors and help it circumvent sanctions.

Slowly though, but the inertia of Russia's perception by other countries is being overcome: from a useful economic partner and an indispensable element of the international security system to a persistent and mean violator of the international law in all its aspects, a source of insecurity, an international terrorist, relations with which are toxic and threaten the reputation of others. Meanwhile, its possession of huge reserves of raw materials necessary for life and development, on the one hand, and of a power arsenal capable of destroying the whole creation (nuclear weapons), on the other makes the world actors to pursue a very restrained policy towards Russia.

If the West appears unable to oppose the nuclear blackmail of Putin's Russia and prevent its use of nuclear arms, this will amount to the recognition of uselessness of nuclear arsenals of the USA and its allies as a means of deterrence, prompt Russia to continue the policy of ultimatums and mean the collapse of the entire system of nuclear deterrence and control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, beginning of a poorly controlled process of many countries acquiring nuclear capabilities, which will question the very existence of the mankind.

The war has revealed serious bottlenecks in global and regional security systems:

✓ The practice of veto in the UN Security Council slows down, in the worst case – bars adoption of decisions for settlement of conflicts that directly or indirectly affect the interests of its permanent members. It is inadmissible that during the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia – a permanent member of the Security Council – as a recognised aggressor obstructs decisions aimed at resolution of this conflict. This runs contrary

to the common sense and requires immediate reformation of the United Nations Organisation.

✓ The UN security system failed to demonstrate the political will or efficiency of the mechanisms of coercion to ultimate solution of conflicts, observance of international norms and assumed commitments. Operations of coercion to peace envisaged by the UN Charter have actually disappeared from the Security Council agenda, due to the lack of the political will, financial, military and technical resources, vetoes on such decisions. Instead, softer means are used: peace-building and peacekeeping operations (so-called operations under Chapters VI⁺ or VII⁻). Attempts of the UN and other security organisations to avoid complex problems lead to their deepening, rather than solution. Prioritisation of ceasefire during political settlement of armed conflicts leads to their freezing and subsequent escalation. It was exemplified by the frozen conflict in Donbas in 2014, which expectedly evolved into an all-out aggression against Ukraine.

the West as a whole, its security institutes, national security systems of the vast majority of the Western states appeared unprepared for the full scale Russian aggression that put the world on the brink of World War III. On the other hand, the whole world was surprised that a powerful aggressor such as Russia might face not just resistance but a defeat in confrontation with a country, whose people and government are united in defence of freedom and territorial integrity. More than that, the West might not recover or at least suffer a serious loss of face after such insolent and aggressive stake-raising by the Kremlin, if Ukraine failed to disrupt the Russian *Blitzkrieg*. The initial phase of the Russian war against Ukraine, its ultimatums to NATO, subsequent nuclear blackmail of the USA and European countries have proven the need for collective and national security systems to have the means for timely risk identification, threat prevention, adequate efficient response not only to aggression as such but also to a threat of it. This raises topicality of not only the presence of forces, means and resources but also of efficient and tested mechanisms of their employment, readiness to use them and to extend assistance to allies and partners.

✓ Hybridity of international conflicts and crises is growing, with emergence of non-traditional weapons: energy resources, political corruption, aggressive propaganda, cyber weapons, recently supplemented with food supply. Application of such weapons by the aggressor state characterises it as a base, treacherous, cruel actor. The main lines and manifestations of use of those weapons by Russia include:

- pressure on the West by attempts to defame it, appealing to memories of the Asian and African countries about their colonial past, rejection of inequality between the global North and South, spreading fakes about the origins of COVID-19 and unfair distribution of vaccines;
- undermining the European unity through aggravation of the energy crisis and grievances of population in the European countries before and during the winter period;
- hopes for overburdening, undermining of the resilience of the EU countries, their diversion from the war in Ukraine by forced response to migration caused by shortage of grain, while its deliveries from Ukrainian ports were obstructed by Russia proper;
- consolidation of its position on the international scene by opposing Russia to the «wicked» West; mitigation of the effects of sanctions due to the failure of some countries to join them, promotion of «grey» schemes and smuggling of some goods and technologies needed by the Russian defence industry; weakening of Ukraine's economic potential and disruption of the Western assistance.

✓ The war revealed problems with the efficiency of the existing economic and

security alliances. The key problems here apparently include mistakes in risk assessment, inability to prevent crises, late response to them, irresponsible attitude of some allies to resource needs. Against this background, apocalyptic conclusions are heard about the end of globalisation and the era of big unions and emergence of networked structures presented by autonomous regional and subregional unions, alliances, coalitions. In reality, signs of such processes do exist; they are aimed at the search of the ways to secure internal solidarity and resilience of alliances and coalitions. The examples include:

- the Northern European Defense Union, the Visegrad Four, the Lublin Triangle, the Three Seas project, already existing in Europe;
- Boris Johnson's initiative of creation of a new military-political and economic union involving Ukraine, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Turkey under the British auspices beyond the EU;
- Emmanuel Macron's idea, which has already begun to materialise, to create a «European political community» of some EU members and all the countries of Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova;
- interstate coalitions focused on assistance to Ukraine fighting the Russian aggression (so-called Ramstein and Copenhagen processes).⁴

However, in absence of convincing evidence of the efficiency and resilience of the new entities, the process will probably go along several parallel paths: reforming existing economic and security institutions; formation of more stable subregional structures and flexible situational coalitions within them; development of interregional and global partnerships.

⁴ «Ramstein gathering: representatives of over 40 countries discuss military aid to Ukraine», Radio Liberty, 26 April 2022, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/ramshtayn-zibrannya-40-krayini-dopomoha/31821991.html>; «Meeting in Copenhagen will expand the Ramstein format – German MOD», Ukrinform, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3545977-zustric-u-kopengageni-stane-rozsirennam-formatu-ramstajn-minoboroni-nimeccini.html>; «#CopenhagenUkraine. More arms and \$1.5 billion of aid: what was agreed by Ukraine's allies», Liga, 11 August 2022, <https://www.liga.net/ua/politics/articles/copenhagenukraine-bolshe-orujiya-i-15-mlrd-pomoschi-o-chem-dogovorilis-soyuzniki-ukrainy>

This conclusion is proven with the results of the expert poll held by Razumkov Centre (Annex 1), where one of the questions was:

**WHAT DO YOU THINK THE MAIN SCENARIOS OF FORMATION
OF THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM WILL BE?**

% of experts

Scenarios	In the world		In Europe		Euro-Atlantic	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Breakup of existing and creation of new regional and subregional alliances, situational coalitions	35.3	64.7	27.5	72.5	19.6	80.4
Strengthening of subregional (sectoral) unions, alliances and rearrangement of existing institutes on the basis of agreements among the new entities	76.5	21.6	76.5	21.6	66.7	31.4
Preservation of existing security institutes with their substantial reformation and enhancement of the role of subregional entities	74.5	25.5	74.5	25.5	84.3	15.7

35% of experts believes that globally (within the UN system), security structures will face breakup of existing and creation of new inter- and subregional alliances, situational coalitions. 28% of experts believes that such processes may take place in the EU, OSCE, and 20% – in NATO. However, the majority of experts (65-80%) considers such changes to be unlikely.

3/4 of experts believes in the probability of global and European processes associated with the strengthening of subregional (sectoral) unions, alliances and rearrangement of existing institutes on the basis of agreements among the new entities. 2/3 of those polled believes in such process in NATO; a third denies such a probability.

The majority of experts (75%) sees the most probable trend of changes in security structures at the global and regional levels (especially in NATO – 85%) in preservation of existing security institutes with their substantial reformation and enhancement of the role of subregional entities within them.

Shifts in this direction have already started in the camps of both democratic and authoritarian countries, for which reason, the rivalry between them will intensify and acquire new features.

Therefore, the dynamic of the global developments witnesses the movement towards a bipolar world, with the USA and China as its poles, each supported by a coalition of like-minded states. Great many countries hesitating between joining one of the poles and conventional neutrality will face the hard times of competition for their sympathy (or loyalty) – apparently, using both «soft» and «hard» power.

We may expect fateful changes in the field of reformation of global and regional security structures. These processes may bring the growing role of more compact and internally more coherent subregional or sectoral alliances of countries, maybe even with rearrangement of the existing structures, to which they belong.

Russia's role in the emerging world order will be substantially diminished. Its adherence to provocations, blackmail, ultimatums increasingly dissatisfies and irritates the leading powers on both poles. Under the new world order, Russia deserves the role of a gas station for developed economies. Minimisation of its aggressive imperial essence requires its demilitarisation and fundamental rearrangement of the present state system.

Ukraine should make use of these processes in the international security environment to reaffirm its role of an independent actor, enhance and promote its positive image, join European and Euro-Atlantic collective security systems.

2.

THE WAR END AND RUSSIA'S FUTURE

Collective resistance to Russia has become a symbol of the new Western unity. It immediately influences the strategy of victory over Russia (in this respect, the camp of the democratic countries has reached a consensus formulated in the documents of the EU, G7 and NATO summits), as well as the duration of the war and the vision of the Ukrainian and Russian future. Such a strategy may look as follows:

- ✓ on the condition of prompt supply of all necessary weapons by the West, Ukraine wins a *total* victory over Russia; in the best case, the war may be over before the end of 2022 – an option desired for all; in case of piecemeal arms deliveries, it may last for years – an undesirable option;
- ✓ continuation of the sanctions pressure to deprive Russia of a possibility to restore its offensive potential and threaten anyone with aggression;
- ✓ transformation of Ukraine into a fortress defending the south-eastern flank of the EU and NATO, their bulwark in the Black Sea region – recovery (reconstruction) of Ukraine with participation of the interested partners, strengthening of its security sector to the level that will ensure its defence and resilience, being one of the main security guarantees.

Internal processes in Russia, caused by the military defeat and effects of sanctions, may lead to its partial or complete reformatting, which will fundamentally change the attitude to it in the world¹. Today, the attitude to Russia is controversial. Even in the anti-Russian camp one may hear appeals to avoid Russia's collapse – maybe prompted by the hopes for preferences during the post-war conquest of the destroyed Russian market, or by the lack of fantasy to imagine the world without the nuclear blackmailer and the terrorist state.² Fears of uncontrolled looting of Russia's nuclear potential may hardly be called reasonable, because this problem can be resolved through joint efforts, as witnessed by the experience of the USSR breakup.³

The two diametrically opposite options of Russia's future may include:

1. «*Avoidance of the collapse of Russia*» – meaning preservation of the present regime with some cosmetic changes in the political system of the state. Natural death, physical liquidation or dethroning of Putin may have a symbolic meaning but will not guarantee Russia's repudiation of imperial ambitions, since zombified Russian elites and society (with few exceptions) are heavily (on a brink of a psychological trauma) poisoned with hatred to «fascist» Ukraine and the «wicked» West.⁴ Under such circumstances, the probability of a progressive political force

¹ «Russia's break-up: what the West thinks about it», *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 1 August 2022, <https://zn.ua/ukr/international/rozpad-rosiji-shcho-pro-tse-dumajut-na-zakhodi.html>; «Russia and post-Russia: is break-up feasible?», *Idel.Realii*, 7 October 2022, <https://www.idelreal.org/a/32068054.html>

² Hromenko S. «Why is the West afraid of Russia's defeat», *Livyi Bereh*, 13 July 2022, https://lb.ua/world/2022/07/13/522910_chomu_zahid_boitsya_porazki_rosii.html

³ «We may witness the fall of Putin's regime and break-up of the Russian Federation, – US General», *Focus*, 14 September 2022, <https://focus.ua/uk/politics/529306-my-mozhem-stat-svidetelyami-padeniya-rezhima-putina-i-raspada-rf-general-ssha>

⁴ See, e.g., the progress and results of the 30th Assembly of the Russian Foreign and Defence Policy Council on May 14-15, 2022. This organisation provides a platform for discussion of foreign and security policy issues by representatives of the best Russian and international think tanks. At the Assembly, representatives of the camps of both the opponents of the existing regime (as far as it was allowed) and ardent adherents of the imperial course shared their views. In the issues of Russian foreign policy priorities and its policy towards Ukraine, representatives of both camps were almost equally aggressive. See: After the special operation: Russia at a new stage of development, 6 June 2022, http://svop.ru/proekty/assambleja_svoj/42184/#more-42184

ready to promote the values of democracy and market economy coming to power in Russia in the near future is close to zero. The «soft» option of deterrence of the Russian aggressiveness under this scenario may include its coercion (under the threat of sanctions) to rejoin the Adapted Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which it quit in 2007, before attacking Georgia. Under the Treaty, Russia had to withdraw the concerned heavy weapons beyond the Urals and to observe flank limitations on manpower and equipment. The «tough» option presumes coercion of Russia (with sanctions pressure and defeat in the war in Ukraine) to denuclearisation and partial demilitarisation.

2. *Rearrangement of the Russian political and administrative system* (decolonisation) with division of its military potential among the new entities and controlled elimination of nuclear weapons. This scenario is very dangerous, since it will be accompanied with collision of interests of separate groups claiming an independent role. Weakening or loss of centralised control over uniformed services and their subordination to regional and political leaders, taking place even now due to the lack of funds to maintain personnel, may lead to armed conflicts, economic collapse of whole regions, numerous victims, flows of refugees. However, the «imperial disease» in the phase of aggressive wars waged by present-day Russia can hardly be cured without «surgical» interference. Still, the aggressor (both the rulers and the people supporting them) deserves this, while the scope of damage sustained by its victims (Georgia and Ukraine) calls for an adequate punishment. Moreover that in view of the threat of a nuclear Doomsday, approached by the world through Russian efforts, the price paid will be justified.

Ukraine may hope for a decent place in the new world order, global and regional economic and security systems only in case of its *total* victory over Russia — if the conflict is frozen, it will be seen as a victimised country rather than a fully-fledged actor. After the victory, many will be willing to join the winning camp (and there will indeed be many winners, without whom, the victory would have been

impossible). Instead, in case of a «near miss», all responsibility will rest with Ukraine, because a ceasefire halfway to victory will be its decision, not forced by anyone.

The answer to the question about the firmness of the Western unity will depend on the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The victory of the West and disappearance of Russia from the radars of existential threats will make the basis for preservation and strengthening of the Western unity for a long time ahead, an impetus and a guideline for reformation and adaptation of multilateral institutes coordinating the foreign and defence policy of the Western countries in the new conditions.

The victory of Russia and capitulation of Ukraine will lead to aggravation of the old and emergence of new differences in the West, search of those guilty of the defeat, destructive processes within separate countries and among them. Even a «half-victory» of the West, giving Russia a chance to «get up off its knees», meaning recurrence of its aggressiveness some time later, will mean a great foreign policy defeat for the West; it will change the balance of political forces in the Western democracies, encourage the opponents of the West led by China to step up pressure on the leading Western countries and the whole system of the Western values.

Comprehension of such effects is seen in the growing Western aid to Ukraine, in creation of an even broader coalition of countries resolved to firmly support Ukraine with arms, finance, humanitarian assistance, along with expansion and introduction of even tougher sanctions against Russia. Meanwhile, separate countries sometimes hesitate whether to provide Ukraine with large batches of weapons (especially heavy weapons). The reasons may include their lack of confidence in Ukraine's victory over more powerful Russia, uncertainty of the status of post-war Russia «to deal with after the war ends», as well as fears of the price to be paid for the victory (effects of the crises in the economy, energy sector, food security, migration waves, etc.).

Given all this, there are three main options of the war end, being in the focus of heated debate.

1. Beginning of negotiations about a ceasefire with the frontline as of the beginning of the talks (actually, on Russian terms); freezing of the conflict (until Russia restores its offensive potential with the Russian troops very close to the Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea). De-occupation of Donbas and Crimea becomes a matter of a compromise; sanctions against Russia remain in place, but efforts will be made to ease or lift them; military and technical assistance to Ukraine will be limited, officially or unofficially.

For Ukraine, this will mean a capitulation; for the West – the loss of its face with far-reaching consequences, mentioned above.

This option meets the interests of Russia, by all means trying to force Ukraine to it, including by hoping for pressure on it on the part of its Western partners and the international community. For this purpose, the Kremlin resorts, on the one hand, to overt terror, using artillery and missile strikes, attacks of kamikaze drones on populated localities, critical infrastructure facilities, peaceful population of Ukraine, on the other – to flagrant lies about the genocide of the «people of Donbas» allegedly organised by Ukraine, Ukrainian shelling of the occupied Zaporizhia NPP, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' plans to blow up the dam of the Kakhovka HPP, the use of the «dirty» bomb, etc. It spreads such narratives in the Western media, in the diplomatic circles, within the Western political community, in international organisations,

such as the UN. Unfortunately, sometimes they do find support (not too strong) among individual politicians, businessmen, «Putin's friends».⁵

2. Ousting of the Russian troops to the dividing line as of February 23, 2022; negotiations about security guarantees for Ukraine; negotiations about the fate of occupied Donbas and Crimea.

This option will suit neither Ukraine (due to the loss of territories) nor Russia (especially after the occupied territories were proclaimed Russian). However, it finds support in certain political circles of the Western countries: Germany, France, Italy, marginal political forces in the USA, trying to justify their position by their concern about the war victims, losses of the global economy caused by the war and deterioration of the socio-economic situation in their countries.

Through negotiations one may be able to get temporary concessions of Russia in some issues not critical for it in exchange for easing or lifting of some sanctions, but in fact, it will mean freezing of the conflict, because in Russia this result will be presented as a capitulation of the West and will encourage Russia to replenish its forces and resources in order to resume aggression, using the occupied territories as a bridgehead for the offensive.

Regarding negotiations about security guarantees for Ukraine, at the initial phase of the war they were viewed as a necessary step to its end. As AFU acquired the necessary capabilities, with the assistance from the Western partners, and seized the strategic

⁵ «Putin wants to offer Ukraine a pause to get ready for a new attack – Mass media», *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 14 October 2022p., <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/10/14/7371976/>; «Russia uses statements by Western politicians to force Ukraine to talks», *Interfax-Ukraine*, 3 August 2022, <https://mind.ua/news/20245236-rosiya-vikorisovue-zayavi-zahidnih-politikiv-shchob-zmusiti-ukrayinu-jti-na-peregovori>; «Macron called upon the Pope to call up Biden, dictator Putin and ROC head Cyril», *NV*, 25 October 2022, <https://nv.ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/makron-zaklikav-papu-rimskogo-zatelefonuvati-putinu-golovi-rpc-kirilu-ta-baydenu-ostanni-novini-50279148.html>; «Peaceful plan» by Elon Musk. Why Musk plays along Putin», <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=64itPzx6kHg>; «Hungary's Foreign Minister condemned the EU strategy for Ukraine», *Voice of America*, 25 October 2022, <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/criticizes-eu-ukraine-strategy/6804263.html>

initiative on the battlefields, negotiations about security guarantees began to be seen as an extra safeguard of Ukraine's security, until it joins NATO. But despite the assurances of representatives of the President of Ukraine Office that the leading Western countries were ready to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, in reality they were only ready to discuss those issues, clearly avoiding military guarantees, except arms supplies.

The real security guarantee, at least for Ukraine and East European countries, will be presented by the ultimate deprivation of the Kremlin regime (both current and future) of any capabilities for aggression, or, better, termination of the Russian Empire as such.

3. Full restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and capitulation of Russia, presuming:

- ✓ a successful counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine using Western

military and technical assistance and reestablishment of the 1991 borders;

- ✓ Russian reparations for damages inflicted on Ukraine;
- ✓ conclusion of the relevant legally binding document specifying the conditions of demarcation of the border, associated Russian obligations, mechanisms of verification of their observance and responsibility for violation.

The option of a total defeat of Russia and its deprivation of any possibilities to unleash aggression against its neighbours reflects the views of the political circles that determine the policy of the majority of the Western countries (such as the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Poland, the Baltic states, etc.), and meets the sentiments of the patriotically-minded majority of Ukrainian society.

OPTIONS OF THE WAR END, AS SEEN BY EXPERTS AND CITIZENS

PLEASE ASSESS THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS OF THE WAR END,

% of experts

Scenarios	Probability		
	Low	Medium	High
Commencement of negotiations about a ceasefire on the frontline as of the beginning of talks (actually, freezing of the conflict on Russian terms)	78.4	17.6	3.9
Withdrawal (ousting) of Russian troops to the frontline as of 23.02.2022 and beginning of peace talks	21.6	52.9	25.5
Ousting of Russian troops to the 1991 border; legalisation of the result	51.0	31.4	17.6

* For convenience, the proposed answers were shortened.

The probability of the first scenario was expectedly assessed as low by the overwhelming majority of experts (78.4%); 17.8% called it medium, 3.9% – high.

The second scenario met a mixed reaction: its probability was termed high by a quarter of those polled, a bit more than half called it medium, every fifth polled – low.


More than half of experts assessed the probability of the third scenario as low; a third – as medium, and 17.6% – as high.



This opinion about the terms of the war end and talks with Russia, according to the public opinion poll (Annex 2), is shared by the Ukrainian citizens, as witnessed by the answers to the following questions.

WHAT WILL YOU PERSONALLY SEE AS THE VICTORY IN THE WAR?

% of respondents



There are different opinions about talks with Russia. WITH WHICH OF THESE STATEMENTS DO YOU TEND TO AGREE MORE?

% of respondents



They disagreed with experts, answering to the following question:

FOR HOW LONG DO YOU THINK UKRAINE MAY OBTAIN A «TIMEOUT» IN CASE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS OF THE WAR END?

% of experts

Scenarios	Period			
	up to 1 year	1-5 years	5-10 years	over 10 years
Commencement of negotiations about a ceasefire on the frontline as of the beginning of talks (actually, freezing of the conflict on Russian terms)	47.1	41.2	9.8	2.0
Withdrawal (ousting) of Russian troops to the frontline as of 23.02.2022 and beginning of peace talks	15.7	56.9	25.5	2.0
Ousting of Russian troops to the 1991 border; legalisation of the result	11.8	11.8	23.5	52.9

* For convenience, the proposed answers were shortened.

More than half of experts believes that Ukraine may obtain a «timeout» of not more than 10 years in case of the least probable, in their opinion, third scenario. Nearly 24% believes that in this case, the «timeout» will last 5-10 years; 12% each – up to 1 year or 1-5 years. Clear thing, the third scenario implies not only Putin's removal but also destruction of Russia as a powerful state. In the other cases Russia will be given a chance to recover and begin a new aggression.

Under the second scenario, the majority of those polled (57%) believes that the timeout will last 1-5 years, almost 16% – that Russia will attempt a new aggression in less than a year. A quarter of those polled suggests that this period will last 5-10 years.

According to experts, implementation of the first scenario will allow a timeout of not more than 5 years (47% – up to 1 year, and 41% – 1-5 years). Only 10% believes that Russia will calm down for 5-10 years.

Therefore, the first and second scenarios will mean a «near miss» or only a short timeout for Ukraine. For these reasons, they cannot be deemed acceptable for Ukraine.

Importantly, the poll was conducted before the victorious offensive of AFU in Kharkiv region and the South of Ukraine and the conference of the Yalta European Strategy, where the Ukrainian leadership presented its views of the war end and the possibility of negotiations with Russia*.

Source:

* «Yalta is close, negotiations with Russia will not». How Zelensky responded to the US at a secret YES forum», Eupravda, 10 October 2022, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/09/10/7146539>.

These options of the war end may be adjusted as a result of scenarios, strategies of the parties to the conflict, dependent on the situation on the front, the balance of forces and developments on the international scene. In particular, the option of Russia's breakup may affect the interests of some Western and non-Western countries. With this in mind, the formula of a «total defeat» for Russia may be adjusted, dependent on changes in the global balance of forces. This may substantially influence the final result of the Russo-Ukrainian war. On the one hand, China can somewhat influence the Russian behaviour and its stand regarding the terms of the war end. On the other, given Ukraine's total dependence on the Western assistance, the USA and some countries

of Old Europe can, with piecemeal arms deliveries and easing of the sanctions imposed on Russia, influence Ukraine's ability to win a «total victory», in this way avoiding Russia's breakup.

Currently, the Kremlin is trying to force Ukraine and the West to agree to the first option of the war end, desirable for it. However, the course of the war and the growing unity of Ukraine's Western partners are leading to a total defeat for Russia.

Russia's defeat will reduce the degree of tension in the European region and the world, opens a window of opportunities for Ukraine's accelerated accession to the NATO and the EU.

3.

KEY TRENDS OF NATO AND EU TRANSFORMATION

The EU and NATO undergo continuous transformation, but the essence, speed and depth of the current changes will surely substantially differ from the previous ones¹. This period is distinguished for the so-called Russian factor influencing the processes of internal transformations and, respectively, immediate effects of those processes for Ukraine as a distinctive partner of NATO and a candidate for the EU membership.

The year of 2022 saw revision of the strategic EU² and NATO³ documents. Drafts prepared for months in accordance with bureaucratic procedures apparently underwent substantial revision after February 24, 2022⁴. Despite the ongoing dynamic changes in the security environment greatly catalysed by the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict, strategic documents of the EU and NATO shape the policy framework for the key international actors in the Euro-Atlantic space at least in the middle run.

NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The updated NATO strategy reiterates the provisions of the three core tasks of the Alliance (collective security, crisis management, cooperative security), standard for the previous documents, but with particular emphasis on the first element. Elaboration of the lines of implementation of those tasks in Strategy 2022 gives them a new practical sense, reflecting present, more dangerous strategic realities, and, respectively, should be implemented through further practical steps for adaptation of approaches to the fulfilment of the mentioned key tasks.

«... NATO's key purpose is to ensure our collective defence, based on a 360-degree approach. It defines the Alliance's three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. We underscore the need to significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence as the backbone of our Article 5 commitment to defend each other.

The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO's goal is

¹ «We will now accelerate NATO's transformation for a more dangerous strategic reality, including through the adoption of the next Strategic Concept in Madrid.» Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government, Brussels 24 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.

² A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved on March 21, 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/>.

³ NATO Strategic Concept approved by the heads of states and governments at the Madrid NATO summit on June 29, 2022, <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>.

⁴ Soborny K., A new security model in Europe: how the «compass» strategy will help Ukraine. *Apostrof*, March 23, 2022, <https://apostrophe.ua/ua/article/politics/foreign-policy/2022-03-23/novaya-strategiya-bezopasnosti-evropyi-chem-pomojet-kompas-ukraine/44981>.

a safer world for all; we seek to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons.

... ensuring our national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values».

The analysis of the strategic environment in 2022, proving the topicality of security threats, is supplemented with a detailed description of the new threats and challenges originating from the Russian Federation and China.

In 2010, such analysis of the security situation started with the assertion that «the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low». In 2022, the statement of the fact of the absence of peace in the Euro-Atlantic space is followed by the reasons that led to such striking deterioration: «The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order». Respectively, a conclusion is made of «the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity». The threat originating from the Kremlin's policy is examined in a broader context of strategic rivalry, involving China and resulting in destabilisation and regular shocks of a global scale.

Further elaboration of the nature of this threat determines the lines and, accordingly, the vision of the architecture, within which, the future Euro-Atlantic security policy should be implemented:

«Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes

and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance.»

By contrast to the absence of any mentions of China in the 2010 threat analysis, the detailed list of challenges of the present Chinese policy in the Strategic Concept 2022 is worth notice – in addition to the summary description of the threats originating from authoritarian regimes.

«The People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.»

The main five elements of the NATO Strategic Concept mentioned in the speech by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at a meeting of the foreign

ministers of the Alliance member states in Riga on November 30, 2021, include⁵:

- ✓ defence of values: democracy, freedom, rule of law, – from oppression by both the authoritarian regimes and the political forces the disrespect democracy;
- ✓ military and technological superiority;
- ✓ a strong society, resilience of society, state structures and the infrastructure;
- ✓ transformation of NATO into a global Alliance, enhancement of partnership with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan;
- ✓ strengthening institutional fundamentals of the Alliance.

The new NATO Strategic Concept set out the basic requirements to the deterrence and defence capabilities based on a 360-degree approach – coverage of the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains, as well as the entire range of threats and challenges. These capabilities rest on the combination of capabilities of nuclear and conventional forces and means, forces and means of missile defence, supplemented with space and cyber forces and means.

The NATO Strategy identifies the main lines of strengthening defence capabilities as follows⁶:

1. Enhancement of the resilience of society by strengthening its ability to prepare for, respond to, recover from and adapt to the full range of threats and hazards, address vulnerabilities that can otherwise be used as leverage or be targeted by adversaries. Enhancement of the resilience requires close civil-military partnership, as it impacts NATO's ability to conduct its missions and maintain the mobility of troops and equipment, as well as support for national forces under NATO command, civilian resources and infrastructure.

2. Bolstering NATO's readiness, responsiveness and reinforcement. The NATO Readiness Action Plan passed several stages of evolution. Launched at the Wales Summit in 2014, it included assurance measures for NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe to reassure their populations, deter potential aggression and reinforce their defence. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, a strengthened deterrence and defence posture was approved, with a broad range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise to protect territory, populations, airspace and sea lines of communication. Starting from 2017, four multinational battle-groups were deployed in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia; to strengthen security of the south-eastern flank, adapted forward presence was provided in that direction; to secure the northern direction, special exercises were held, advance planning measures were implemented; to enhance NATO awareness about the situation, a relevant Regional Hub was set up in Naples, Italy. At the 2018 summit in Brussels, the NATO Readiness Initiative was launched, providing 30 manoeuvre battalions, 30 kinetic air squadrons and 30 major naval combatants at 30 days' readiness or less for NATO. These forces are being organised and trained as larger combat formations. In 2018, the Cyberspace Operations Centre with member states' support groups was set up in Belgium, and the 2021 summit endorsed the new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy. At a meeting of the leaders of the member states in London in December, 2019, the Alliance declared space as a fifth operational domain. In 2020, the Space Centre for coordination of activity and sharing information was created in Germany. At the Brussels summit in 2021, the Alliance recognised that attacks to, from or within space present a clear challenge to security and could lead to the invocation of Article 5. At the Brussels summit on March 24, 2022 in response to the Russian aggression it was decided to deploy four multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in addition to those already deployed in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia. At the Madrid summit in June, 2022, the leaders of the member

⁵ «Russia and China: what will the new NATO Concept focus on», DW, 30 November 2021, <https://www.dw.com/ru>.

⁶ «Deterrence and Defence», NATO web site, 10 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/topics_133127.htm?selectedLocale=uk.

states committed to deploying additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on NATO's eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battalion-sized battlegroups to brigades.

3. Maintaining military and technological edge. The Alliance must be ready for the increasingly unpredictable security situation. To this end, the Brussels summit in 2021 approved full implementation of the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, making the basis for a more proactive approach to military adaptation to the changes in the nature of the war, caused by innovations in artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems, big data and biotech. Implementing this approach, the Alliance approved the strategy for emerging and disruptive technologies, set up a Defence Innovation Accelerator and a multinational Innovation Fund.

4. Investing in defence. In addition to the member states' commitment to allocate not less than 2% of the GDP to defence in course of 10 years, they agreed to raise expenses on new equipment to at least 20% of their defence expenditures within the same period. Thanks to more fair distribution of the economic burden and greater contribution of the European countries and Canada to the NATO budget, the additional contributions in 2014-2022 will total \$350 billion. The member states also undertook to ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet the NATO guidelines, in particular, in terms of their deployability, sustainability and interoperability.

By and large, the 2022 Madrid NATO summit that adopted the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance demonstrated its ability to more adequately assess the existing threats and more seriously address the future challenges, readiness to promptly adapt to changes in the international security environment, steadily observe security guarantees for the member states, expand its influence to other regions, ensure international security.

STRATEGIC COMPASS IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR (THE EU)

As we noted above, the approved document required prompt revision due to the

all-out Russian aggression, especially in assessments. Meanwhile, the plans and ambitions of the EU as a global actor in the security sector seem not to be adjusted properly (at the time of release of the Strategic Compass). On the one hand, it may seem disappointing, but on the other, the good news is the absence of intentions to implement the ambitions of creating an alternative to NATO.

Instead, it expressly admits NATO's leadership in the Euro-Atlantic security system and declares readiness for all-round cooperation and coordination. The statement of the importance of «a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence» as a contributor to global and trans-Atlantic security is accompanied with a remark of an auxiliary role of the EU for «NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members». The goal of creating a Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops before 2023 is another proof of the absence of a serious intention to create an autonomous «European Army».

The Strategic Compass of the EU admits the role of the USA as the staunchest and most important strategic partner and contributor to security on the European continent. Meanwhile, relying on the leadership and military capabilities of NATO and the USA, the EU insists on the autonomy of decision-making as one of the principles, on which trans-Atlantic partnership and cooperation between the EU and NATO should be based.

Decision-making processes are a bottleneck in the Common Security and Defence Policy, threatening the principles of political and financial solidarity of the Union. The Strategic Compass offers rather a promising approach to the solution of this problem, presuming formation of «groups of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct a mission or operation within the EU framework and under the political oversight of the Council».

NATO and the EU are expanding cooperation in the fields of civil defence, readiness and countering hybrid threats, aimed at creation of complementary and interoperable potentials in order to avoid duplication of efforts and promote mutually acceptable sharing of the economic burden.

PROCESSES WITHIN NATO AND THE EU AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

The responses of NATO and the EU to the Russian aggression against Ukraine were absolutely clear but somewhat differed in terms of their resolve. The EU responded with resolute extension and toughening of sanctions against Russia introduced before the war in an attempt to contain the aggressive policy of the Kremlin, provision of huge financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, prompt granting the status of a candidate for joining the Union. The response of the Alliance, possessing nuclear weapons and responsible for avoidance of an open conflict with Russia, was more restrained and at the beginning of the war reduced to a call upon its member states to grant assistance to Ukraine on a bilateral basis. Further on, the position of NATO and its separate member states changed, due to the AFU successes and the resolute stand of the USA providing extensive military and technical assistance to Ukraine.

Against the background of the events in Ukraine and the international security environment in general, the EU increasingly realises the necessity of reforms, including of the Common Security and Defence Policy, intended to ensure an adequate response to the new challenges. The main aspects of the reforms should include: recognition and due regard of mistakes; regard of Ukraine's military experience, expansion of assistance; strengthening of their capabilities, development of EU Rapid Deployment Capacity; self-reliance; particular focus on hybrid threats and wars in the media space; additional investments in the necessary

strategic systems and advanced weapons.

«There are taboo-breaking decisions. We break taboos on the Ukrainian war, using the European Peace Facility to buy arms – something that at the beginning «oh, that is impossible, we have never done it... Maybe we have to start doing things that we have never done in the past»⁷.

NATO and the EU, their member states provide substantial assistance to Ukraine in equipment of AFU with the required weapons, as well as large-scale financial and humanitarian assistance. By and large, assistance to Ukraine in one or another form was provided by more than 50 countries of the world, humanitarian and financial – by over 30 foreign companies and a number of international organisations⁸. Substantial assistance is provided to Ukraine in the AFU personnel training. All this contributes to the enhancement of the AFU efficiency, resilience of Ukrainian society, and the defeat of Russia.

Numerous official statements by top executives prove the invariability of the NATO policy in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict: «We cannot allow President Putin to win. That would be a disaster, a tragedy for Ukrainians, but it would also make us, NATO Allies, more vulnerable. Because then the lesson learned from Ukraine for President Putin is that he can achieve his goals by using military force. And that will be a lesson learned not only for him, but also for other authoritarian leaders around the world»⁹. This position is fully in line with the provisions of the NATO Strategic Concept 2022.

⁷ EU Ambassadors Annual Conference 2022: Opening speech by High Representative Josep Borrell, 10 Oct. 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell_en; «Speech by High Representative of the EU Josep Borrell at the event «Europe in danger: what next for EU security and defence?»», 25 January 2022, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas>; «European lend-lease for Ukraine: What military assistance of the EU may look like», Yevropeiska Pravda, 19 October 2022, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/10/19/7148890/>

⁸ List of international assistance Ukraine (з 2014), 1 September 2022, [https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Список_international_assistance_Ukraine_\(з_2014\)_2014](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Список_international_assistance_Ukraine_(з_2014)_2014).

⁹ Joint Statement for the press by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucr, 26 October 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_208592.htm.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE AFU PERSONNEL TRAINING

The US assistance packages provide funds for education and training of the AFU servicemen. The US Department of Defence plans to set up a new command for coordination of armament and training of the Ukrainian servicemen. The newly-established command structure is expected to optimise the system of training and assistance, created right after the Russian invasion of Ukraine*.

Great Britain launched the *INTERFLEX* programme of primary training for 10 thousand Ukrainian servicemen on its soil. Instructors for the programme are provided by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden. In early October, this programme was supplemented with a course of the AFU NCO corps training**.

More than four thousand AFU servicemen underwent training on foreign weapon systems and military

equipment in 14 partner countries, including over two thousand gunners, 500 experts in operation of multiple launch rocket systems and 500 in air defence weapons, almost 200 experts in operation and technical maintenance of antitank systems, nearly 100 experts in operation and technical maintenance of radar equipment***.

On the 17th of October, the EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg took a decision to set up a military assistance mission in support for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). The mission is to start operation in mid-November. It will work on the territory of the European Union member states with headquarters in Brussels for overall strategic coordination. The Mission's mandate will last two years. Expenditures on it will total EUR 106.7 million. Up to 15 thousand Ukrainian servicemen are expected to undergo training over that period****.

Sources:

*Pentagon Plans to Set Up a New Command to Arm Ukraine, Officials Say" Sept. 29, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/29/us/politics/pentagon-command-ukraine.html>.

**Announcement of the AFU General Staff / 5 October 2022, <https://www.facebook.com/100069092624537/posts/pfbid0CLUJ9Mu3AmepEjjRAdPdFWirfdxnjnm66YdpuZ1erjzSsDixTGAY5WKGb7PYJjDI/>.

***«More than 4 thousand Ukrainian servicemen passed training in 14 partner countries – Hromov», Radio Liberty, 1 September 2022, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-navchannia-za-kordon-zsu/32014421.html>.

****«European lend-lease for Ukraine: What military assistance of the EU may look like», Yevropeiska Pravda, 19 October 2022, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/10/19/7148890/>.

SUBREGIONAL STEPS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF FORMAL STRUCTURES

Comprehension of the evident and persistent inability of the existing international structures to promptly take and efficiently implement decisions for crisis prevention and management prompted the international community to set up new provisional coalitions. Such an approach was used even earlier to solve similar tasks (in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan) and is also reflected in the new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass, providing for expansion of global partnerships and promotion of «groups of willing and able Member States». The best known examples of such newly established alliances in support for the defence of Ukraine include the Ukraine Defence Contact

Group (in the Ramstein format), and the Copenhagen format.

Ramstein format

The first meeting in the Ramstein format on April 26, 2022, was attended by representatives of over 40 countries, including NATO and the EU members, as well as representatives of African, Middle Eastern, Asian and Pacific states. As of October, 2022, six meetings have been held,¹⁰ with more than 10 states joining the gathering. Meanwhile, the gathering remains not institutionalised (without a formal accord or charter), which does not rule out but maybe on the contrary, guarantees promptness and efficiency of the alliance. Other factors of the Ramstein format efficiency may include the US leadership, engagement of NATO

¹⁰ For more detail about the format results see: Ramstein and NATO will expand support to Ukraine. 17 October 2022 <https://www.facebook.com/reznikovoleksii/posts/pfbid0ymAxihdMWh9PG4iJYf55oSmaFUZorniKXvQ2S2UWGVAYXvjX74oKKIqFnnBPcVal>.

and the EU, and common security interests of all the participants.

Copenhagen format

A conference of the Western partners of Ukraine in Copenhagen kind of supplemented and continued the Ramstein format. Its main task is to provide continuous long-term funding of Ukraine's defence needs.¹¹ The efficiency of Copenhagen is apparently based on the same factors – leadership (Denmark and Great Britain) and common security interests of the participants.

The meeting in Copenhagen on August 11, 2022, discussed short- and long-term programmes of demining, personnel training, steady supply of arms and equipment, expansion of production capacities in the donor countries manufacturing land weapon systems.¹²

European Political Community

According to the mastermind of the European Political Community, French President Emmanuel Macron, the new format is designed to give «a signal of unity» and «a platform for political coordination» for both the EU member states and those beyond the EU.¹³ The first summit attended by over 40 European states (27 member states of the EU and 17 countries with the candidate or partner status, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) was dedicated to discussion of mainly but not only the problems of the Russo-Ukrainian war; however, it was the Russian invasion that actualised the need to «think over and reform the broader European agenda, except the EU and NATO work». ¹⁴ Now, that forum does not have clearly defined goals and objectives, but with time it may evolve into a conference supplementing the existing unions, or become an alternative to OSCE as a platform for discussion of the European security problems among like-minded stakeholders. Ukraine, joining this

format, should use the chance to find political understanding, support from European partners for subsequent conversion into their readiness to grant it the status of a fully-fledged EU member.

The updated strategic documents of the EU and NATO reflect the community of assessments of the security situation, as well as in determination of approaches to countering present and future risks and threats. They recognise the erosion (ruination) of the international architecture of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, which affects the strategic stability.

Both unions declare their adherence to the idea of the EU-NATO partnership based on shared values, complementarity and mutual strengthening, as well as the intention to improve coordination with other international structures, such as the UN, OSCE, the African Union (AU), G7 – first of all, in implementation of the tasks of crisis prevention and management.

The heads of the NATO member states and their governments have recognised that the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is a fundamental challenge to the values and norms that contributed to security and wellbeing on the European continent, and officially declared their intention to oppose the Russian aggression, to assist the government and people of Ukraine and to defend the security of the allies¹⁵. Therefore, the Russian aggression poses a direct threat for the Alliance's security, and assistance to Ukraine is an integral element of countering this threat.

The EU also views support Ukraine fighting the Russian military aggression as a key task of strengthening the European security, witnessing the community of the security interests of Ukraine and the EU both now and in a distant future.

¹¹ International military assistance: 26 countries gathered €1.5 billion for Ukraine in Copenhagen. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 11 August, 2022, <https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/mizhnarodna-vijskova-dopomoha-26-krajini-zibrali-u-kopenhaheni-1-5-mlrd-dlja-ukrajini.html>.

¹² «Reznikov explained the difference of formats in Ramstein and Copenhagen», *Korespondent*, 12 August 2022, <https://korespondent.net/ukraine/4505140-reznykov-obiasnyl-raznytsu-formatov-v-ramshtaine-y-kopenhahene>.

¹³ Prague hosts a summit of the leaders of over 40 European states mainly dedicated to the problem of the Russo-Ukrainian war. *Ukrayinskyi Tyzhden*, 6 October 2022, <https://tyzhden.ua/News/255816>.

¹⁴ (EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell). Ibid.

¹⁵ Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government, Brussels 24 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.

4.

SECURITY PROSPECTS OF A POST-WAR UKRAINE

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

One of the main lessons of the war for Ukraine is that the problem of its security lies not in NATO's unpreparedness to provide the necessary assistance to it. The thing is that simultaneously with a call upon the member states to provide assistance to Ukraine (which is not a NATO member), the Alliance tried to maintain the image of a peaceful union doing its best to avoid a direct conflict with a nuclear power. The real problem for Ukraine is that it appeared outside of the Alliance and with the beginning of the war actually suspended the attempts to join it. Instead, the President's Office opted to prepare a utopian agreement of security guarantees as an alternative to NATO,¹ while focusing on Ukraine's bid for the status of a candidate for the EU membership. However, for arms deliveries from European countries, Ukraine should have appealed exactly to the EU, since this process is governed by its legislation, not the stand of the NATO leadership.² The shift in the Ukrainian authorities' attitude to NATO and application for soonest accession to the EU witnessed not Ukraine's readiness for this step (support for accession to NATO has not disappeared since 2014 and was only growing) but rather the opportunism of the President's Office officials and its excessive influence on the legislative and executive branches in Ukraine.

Furthermore, the EU membership is very important for Ukraine's development but cannot guarantee its security.³ That is why

European countries, especially those on or near Russian borders – such as Finland and Sweden – opted to join NATO. One of the probable reasons is that the EU security capabilities are concentrated in the field of civil security, while in terms of military capabilities, the EU relies on NATO.

The process of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and the EU that took over 30 years has seen difficult evolution, from their recognition of independent Ukraine in 1991, signing of the Charter of Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO and the Ukraine-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 to the conclusion of the Agreement of Association with the EU in 2014, the status of NATO's Enhanced Opportunity Partner in 2020 and of a candidate for the EU membership in 2022. This process involved many controversies in Ukraine: disputes about partnership with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), its non-allied status, etc. But now, integration with NATO and the EU are the priority lines of the state policy, provided for in the Ukrainian Constitution.

The reasons for such duration of this process – with very important intermediary, but unconvincing and uncertain end results – are to be found both in NATO and the EU (a huge economic burden caused by the admission of Ukraine, unwillingness to complicate relations with Russia, erosion of

¹ «We won't be a country that asks for something, standing on its knees»: Zelenskyy said that he had long brushed off the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO, TSN, 8 March 2022, <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/ne-budemokratynoyu-yaka-viproshuye-navkolishki-zelenskiy-zayaviv-scho-davno-oholov-do-pitannya-vstupu-ukrayini-do-nato-2002909.html>; «Arakhmia: Ukraine wants to create its own NATO», UNIAN, 2 April 2022, <https://www.unian.ua/politics/arakhmiya-ukrajina-hoche-stvoriti-vlasne-nato-viyna-z-rosiyeyu-2022-novini-ukrajina-11770609.html>.

² In particular, the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CSDP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment defines the criteria, by which the member states should be guided during arms delivery and in which some of them found a reason to refuse such deliveries to Ukraine. It is about arbitrary interpretation of the criteria quoted in Article 2 of the Common Position, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_001-08#Text.

³ For more details on the EU cooperation with Ukraine in the security sector see: Ukraine-EU partnership in the security sector: present state and prospects. Razumkov Centre Analytical Report, Kyiv 2021, Razumkov Centre Library, <https://razumkov.org.ua/vydannia/vydannia-serii-biblioteka-tsentru-razumkova>

political solidarity of the member states), and in Ukraine proper (unstable state policy and public support for over 30 years, lack of a common political will, lack of noticeable results in reformation of the human rights sector, in fighting corruption, etc.).

The war has substantially adjusted the process of the European integration. Ideas of the Western countries of the reasons of troubles in the present-day world and approaches to introduction of the principles of a new world order, the role and place of NATO, the EU, Ukraine in it have changed. The internal situation in Ukraine also changed. The Euro-Atlantic thrust of its foreign policy has been reaffirmed, motivation of its support in society grew significantly. Unprecedented

assistance to Ukraine from the Western partners allows it to promptly adopt NATO and EU standards. Successful meeting of the requirements going with the status of a candidate for the EU membership⁴ by Ukraine will help it implement Section 1 of the standard NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁵ Given all this, Ukraine's claims for soonest accession to those organisations look not ungrounded.


Furthermore, Ukraine – in terms of security – is moving towards NATO and the EU membership not empty-handed. The defence capabilities and experience of fighting with a much stronger adversary acquired by it may be successfully used by NATO and the EU to improve their standards and strengthen their security capabilities.

PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, ITS MAIN PROVIDERS, SECURITY GUARANTEES BY EXPERTS AND UKRAINIAN CITIZENS (ANNEXES 1, 2)

Proceeding from their experience and the available information, Ukrainian citizens mainly adequately assess the level of assistance provided by foreign partners in the war with Russia (Annex 2). Respondents termed as sufficient humanitarian

assistance (56.5%) and sheltering refugees (63.2%), which proves that moral values are no stranger to Western societies. Experts noted insufficiency of political (44.6%) and military and technical assistance (67.7%).

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA? % respondents




⁴ The EU requirements to Ukraine associated with accession to the EU: to introduce the legislation on the procedure of selection of judges for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine; to complete the integrity check of candidates for the Higher Council of Justice by the Ethics Council and selection of candidates before the establishment of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine; to step up fighting corruption, including top-level; to appoint the new head of the Specialised Anticorruption Prosecution Office and the new director of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine; to ensure compliance of the legislation on money laundering with the FATF standards; to adopt a comprehensive strategic plan of reformation of the entire law-enforcement sector as an element of Ukraine's security environment; to implement an anti-oligarchic law in line with the Venice Commission conclusions; to overcome the influence of selfish interests through harmonisation of the relevant legislation of Ukraine and the EU; to complete the reform of the legislation on national minorities in line with the Venice Commission recommendations. See: «European Commission officially offered Ukraine the status of a candidate for the EU membership», *Yevropeiska Pravda*, 17 June 2022, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2022/06/17/7141476>.

⁵ Section 1 of MAP lists political and economic issues, solution of which may help the applicant country join NATO. See: Membership Action Plan (MAP), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en.

Experts view the USA as the key partner of Ukraine in all security domains, restoration and reformation of the security sector (Annex 1). Experts see the importance of NATO in cooperation in the defence sector, of the EU – in the field of


financial and humanitarian assistance and the civil security sector reform. Noteworthy, compared to the last year's poll, assessments of the importance of the Western assistance for Ukraine went up.



* The five-point scale from 1 to 5: 1 – minimum importance, 5 – maximum importance.

According to experts, the security capabilities of NATO exceed those of the EU in all respects, making NATO a more attractive provider of security guarantees to Ukraine, and its membership in the Alliance – more

preferable. The main bottlenecks of NATO, according to experts, include promptness of decision-making, promptness and efficiency of response (3.5 on a 5-point scale), mobility of resources (3.7).




* The five-point scale from 1 to 5; «1» – minimum capabilities, «5» – maximum capabilities.

Experts positively assess Ukraine's potential security contribution to the EU and NATO capabilities. What strikes the eye, compared to the last year's poll, is the prevalence of assessments «yes, fully» over «yes, partially» in domains immediately relating to the dynamics of combat operations

in Ukraine: defence of the EU and NATO eastern flank from Russian aggressive actions; practical experience of countering the Russian aggression for personnel training; exchange of experience in cyber security; participation in joint antiterrorist activities.

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES UKRAINE MAY OFFER TO THE EU AND NATO IN THE SECURITY SECTOR?

% experts



Given Ukraine's role in the defeat of Russia, the strength and scope of the Western assistance, the absolute majority of experts (80-96%) sees the sufficient conditions of guaranteed security in the combination of strong national defence capabilities, minimisation of the Russian threat (ruling out its aggression), and accession to NATO, – since the first scenario of Russia's future, «*Avoidance of the collapse of Russia*», is not ruled out (see section 2). Accession to the EU was termed as such condition by 55% of experts, probably, due to the EU sanctions and post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. Interestingly, 86% of international experts believes that the EU membership gives Ukraine greater security guarantees than NATO.


Meanwhile, over 84% of experts does not see a sufficient security guarantee in conclusion of an agreement of guarantees, especially without a military component, as its incorporation in the agreement rules out the very signing of such a document. More than that, the existence of bilateral agreements of Ukraine (with the USA, Canada, Turkey, European countries, as well as arrangements in the Ramstein and Copenhagen formats) make conclusion of an additional agreement a purely bureaucratic procedure, which may cause harm to those formats. Meanwhile, the need of conclusion of an agreement of security guarantees is evident to 64% of international experts*.

* Source: Khomenko S., Holubeva A., Ivshyna O. «Militarisation and heading to NATO. Is it real to have security guarantees for Ukraine?», BBC News Ukraine, 15 September 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-62912958>.



PLEASE CHOOSE THE SUFFICIENT (MINIMUM REQUIRED) COMBINATION OF COMPONENTS OF SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR UKRAINE IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS,


% experts



These views are shared by the Ukrainian citizens (Annex 2).

PLEASE ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR PROVISION OF SECURITY GUARANTEES TO UKRAINE,

Average score*



* The five-point scale from 1 to 5: «1» – condition is not important, «5» – condition is extremely important.

According to the public opinion poll, the absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens supports accession to NATO.

**IF A REFERENDUM ON ACCESSION TO NATO WERE HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE,
WOULD YOU TAKE PART IN THE VOTING?**


% respondents



**HOW WOULD YOU VOTE, SHOULD YOU TAKE PART IN A REFERENDUM
ON ACCESSION TO NATO?**

% of all

% of those who would take part in the referendum



Changes in expert assessments of the terms of Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO are demonstrative (Annex 1). While last year, none of the experts considered Ukraine's accession to the EU in the next 5 years feasible, now, those who believe in it make 35.3% (to NATO – 45.3%). More experts

gave Ukraine up to 10 years to join the EU (their share rose from 40% to 57%). The percentage of those who believe that Ukraine may join the EU in a more distant future declined substantially – from 40% to 8% (to NATO – 12%).


WHAT IS YOUR IDEA OF THE PROBABLE TERMS OF UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE EU AND NATO?

% experts/assessments by international experts (last year's assessments)

Terms	EU	NATO
Up to 5 years	35.3/18.0 (0.0)	43.1/18.0
Up to 10 years	56.9/64.0 (28.0)	39.2/36.0
In a more distant future	7.8/18.0 (40.0)	11.8/48.0
Never	0.0/0.0(6.0)	0.0/0.0
Hard to say	0.0/0.0(26.0)	5.9/0.0

Noteworthy, in expert opinions, the importance of the factor of the Russian reaction declined, compared to last year's poll – from 3.6 to 3.0 in respect to accession to the EU and to 3.3 – to NATO, on a 5-point scale. The opinion that keeping Ukraine outside of NATO may prevent a conflict with Russia

is wrong. The initiative of aggravation of relations belongs not to NATO but to Russia, and if Putin wants a conflict, he will invent a pretext for it. Noteworthy, the Russian aggression in 2014 was prompted not by Ukraine's desire to join NATO but by signing of the Agreement of Association with the EU.



The fact is that since the early days of its independence, Ukraine has been in the state of a conflict with Russia – political, economic, energy and cultural «wars»,⁶ now – in the state of an open all-out armed conflict. If the imperial Russian regime is not terminated, Ukraine is doomed to stay in such a state for a long period of time. That is why the one and only line of its security policy is to have the NATO «umbrella» – it will not only reduce insecurity but also ease the economic burden on Ukraine (as well as on each separate member of the Alliance) thanks to the advantages of collective defence.

If Ukraine is admitted to NATO and the EU, it is not going to be a net consumer of

the benefits provided by these organisations, especially in the security sector. Ukraine may offer a decent «added value» in the form of defence of the eastern flank of the EU and NATO from Russian aggressive actions; practical experience of countering the Russian aggression for personnel training; exchange of experience in cyber security; participation in joint antiterrorist activities and peace operations, etc.

The course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, victorious actions of Ukraine fighting a stronger enemy, the terrible consequences of the conflict felt not only in Ukraine but also beyond its borders largely shape the international agenda, especially in the Euro-Atlantic region. We may hope that realistic

⁶ Economic, energy, cultural, information aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian war require elaborate studies and stay beyond the scope of this paper.

assessment by Western societies, the entire international peace-loving community, on the one hand, of the essence of the authoritarian Kremlin regime and the Russian society (brazen contempt for the international law, disposition towards undisguised terrorism, genocide of the Ukrainian nation), on the other – invincibility of Ukrainian society fighting for freedom, territorial integrity, human rights, as well as the invaluable assistance of democracies in this fight will surely be translated into the victory of virtue over evil, contribute to the assanation of international relations, return morality into politics.

MAIN LESSONS OF THE WAR

1. Despite the common opinion that authoritarian regimes have an advantage over democratic in promptness of decision-making, stockpiling and use of resources, society motivation to fight the enemy, the experience of the war in Ukraine proved that the Kremlin regime loses exactly in those domains. Meanwhile, **Ukraine managed to translate democracy and self-organisation of society into a strong and coherent force that can oppose the aggressor, despite its huge advantage in quantitative parameters.** More than that, democracies all over the world demonstrated their ability to join efforts for assistance to Ukraine in its confrontation with imperial Russia. It was also facilitated by the more liberal media of the democratic countries, thanks to which, the war was closely monitored by their societies in a real-time mode, in all its manifestations, mobilising the public to oppose aggression and exert pressure on politicians for greater assistance to Ukraine.

2. The Ukrainian political elite should draw some conclusions about the principles of formulation of the foreign policy (any policy) of the state:

- ✓ **one vector** is the principle of a long-term strategy of the foreign policy: it is physically impossible to move in a few different directions or to attain divergent national interests;
- ✓ in its turn, the current foreign policy should rest on the principle of **many vectors**: one may and should cooperate with anyone, *provided that the results (vectors) of such cooperation do not run contrary to the strategic vector.* Furthermore, an important factor is presented by the partners' perception of such multi-vectored policy and every its problematic manifestation;⁷
- ✓ **substantiation of the goals** (both strategic and tactical) that shape the policy vectors: wrong or distorted goals pose the main hidden threat for any strategy, policy; wrong goal-setting may result from actions of both external forces (enemies, rivals) and unprofessional conduct of domestic authorities, politicians, civic activists; wrong goals may divert a state from progressive development for a long time with irreparable consequences;
- ✓ **a policy of sharp and short steps without a «roadmap» (strategy) is a road to nowhere**: the probability that such a policy will provide the required results is no higher than of a jackpot; without a «roadmap», one cannot assess correspondence of intermediate results to the set ultimate (strategic) goals or the required resources; such a policy may only be justified by availability of huge resources for correction of mistakes, while the resources used for attainment of erroneous goals may be considered lost.

Therefore, attempts of many political and economic actors in Ukraine to justify reckless cooperation with Russia, China, other authoritarian regimes, observed before the beginning of the war, in particular, by immediate economic gains look unconvincing, to put it softly, and in many cases – as betrayal of the national interests. **Hasty implementation of certain initiatives, their insufficient substantiation, absence of expert and public analysis, search of simple decisions normally result in lost time, resources, intellectual potential and trust**

⁷ Recall US reaction to Ukraine's sale of *Motor Sich* shares to China. See: «Conflict around Ukrainian aircraft works: what USA and PRC want», DW, 8 February 2021, <https://www.dw.com/ru/konflikt-vokrug-ukrainskogo-aviazavoda-chego-hotjat-ssha-i-kitaj/a-56499961>.

in specific ideas, their authors, and the authorities in general.

3. The defence policy of the state should rest on a realistic assessment of the national capabilities and the partners' readiness to provide assistance. Insufficient supply, support, maintenance and logistics of AFU before the war (artillery, ammunitions, operational and tactical missile systems, the Navy fleet, anti-ship weapons, aircraft, air defence systems), limited capabilities of the domestic defence industry, shutdown of many active defence industry enterprises with the beginning of the war resulted in Ukraine's total dependence on the partners' assistance. Their abilities to provide such assistance are different and depend on many internal and external factors: their national interests, availability and size of stocks of the required weapons, the current social, political and economic situation in their respective countries, the balance of political forces, political readiness to provide military and technical assistance, overcoming bureaucratic obstacles (or disguised unwillingness), agreements and mutual commitments with other partners and allies, etc. Each of these factors can influence the scope and terms of assistance to Ukraine, and therefore, the results of combat operations and losses, including among civilians. **So, due regard of these factors both in defence planning and during the post-war reconstruction is highly important.** On the other hand, the Ukrainian case prompted the progressive international community to more responsibly assess the national and international security, relations with potential originators of crises and conflicts, and to appreciate the ability to join efforts for the sake of common goals, when facing insecurity. **The task of the Ukrainian diplomacy (including popular) is to preserve this feeling of unity with Ukraine in the Western political and public circles.**

4. Before February 24, 2022, the intelligence, military, political, expert circles (including Ukrainian) made numerous assessments of the probability of the Russian attack on Ukraine, along with assumptions of

Russia's unreadiness for all-out aggression. To support them, they referred to such things as the insufficient strength of the Russian task forces, absence of any proof of deployment of command and control systems, logistics, maintenance, medical support, etc. — nevertheless, they attacked. Indeed, the Kremlin made many mistakes in its assessments of Ukraine's readiness to put up the fight and the Western readiness to help it. **But the main mistake of those who denied the very possibility of Russia attacking Ukraine was that they did not make «an allowance for a nuts» — the logic of this process is determined not by its understanding by the defending party but by the paradigm that was formed and evolved in the head of the Kremlin dictator,** starting at least from his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.⁸ This requires from Ukraine's national security system, including its defence sector, military-political leadership, **permanent maintenance of high alert, development and introduction of an efficient system of forecasting and risk assessment, study and introduction of best practices of defence forces training and employment, equipment of AFU with advanced hi-tech weapon systems, allocation of reserves of manpower and materiel in required quantities and of the required quality, adoption of NATO standards in all these aspects.**

5. Insufficient readiness of Ukraine for the all-out Russian aggression was seen in faulty approaches to budget priorities: the state budget items dealing with security, despite their increase since 2014, proved clearly inadequate, in view of the degree of danger and the real state of AFU — their structure, stocks of weapons, reserves.⁹ Other reasons for the lack of resources to maintain the required level of readiness included poor management in the conditions of resource limitations, corruption, and activity of the Russian agents within state bodies. This requires **adoption of Western standards of strategic management, ultimate parting with the Soviet (Russian) experience and practices not only in AFU but in all the**

⁸ «Putin flexed his muscles before the West», DW, 12 February 2007, <https://www.dw.com/ru>.

⁹ See: Yearly analytical summaries and forecasts 2014-2021, Razumkov Centre, <https://razumkov.org.ua/vydannia/shchorichni-analitychni-pidsumky-i-prohnozy>.

system of state governance. Fighting the Russian propaganda and spy network requires diligent efforts of special and intelligence agencies in close interaction with civic activists.

6. The Black Sea appeared one of the most threatening for Ukraine lines of the Russian aggression. Isolating Ukraine from its Black Sea ports, Russia is still trying to undermine its export/import and economic potential as a whole, to obtain a bridgehead for further destabilisation of Ukraine. At the beginning of the war Ukraine actually stood face to face with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, until deliveries of anti-ship weapons by Western partners somewhat corrected the situation. **Such a state of affairs highlighted one of the deficiencies of NATO and the EU – the absence of a clear-cut Black Sea strategy.** This explains the high price, which Ukraine has to pay in terms of the human toll and destruction of the civilian infrastructure caused by missile attacks from the Black Sea.

7. Russia's superiority in the numerical strength of its troops and quantity of weapons is offset by the quality of AFU training, strong motivation of the Ukrainian military and entire society, technological edge of the Western arms supplied to Ukraine, more efficient military command and control at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The higher quality of combat operations of the Ukrainian troops came through infantry weapons, artillery, air defence, communications, reconnaissance and detection systems, among other things. AFU even managed to create elements of a networked war, efficiently uniting in one network different artillery, reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare units and command posts. Ukraine opposed the strictly centralised command system of the Russian Armed Forces with a smart combination of the unity of command at the strategic and operational levels with decentralisation and creative initiative at the tactical level. This ultimately led to the exhaustion of the enemy and creation of conditions for seizing the strategic initiative.

8. Fighting a stronger adversary such as Russia, in resource terms, Ukraine, as we mentioned above, appeared **fully dependent**

on the Western military and technical assistance. Providing such assistance, the West is still hesitating between the desire of the Russian defeat, on the one hand, and to avoid evolution of this conflict into an all-out nuclear war, on the other. Such piecemeal assistance certainly affects the plans and pace of the AFU advance, and the main thing – results in the growing number of civilian victims and economic damage sustained by Ukraine. **This situation requires: first of all, stepping up diplomatic efforts by the Ukrainian President, Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry for the increase in the volumes and pace of assistance, extension of its list (long-range missiles, tanks, aircraft, air/missile defence systems, etc.); second, perfection of methods of efficient employment of foreign arms; third, recovery and development of the domestic defence industry, including with the assistance of foreign partners.**

9. The war has highlighted the problem of insufficient attention of the state to the development of the domestic defence industry and its role in AFU armament. For the majority of Ukrainian defence industry enterprises, the state defence order may be the only source of funds. However, over the entire period of Ukraine's independence, the priorities and volumes of budget expenditures on arms procurement were inadequate to the real threats and even the minimum needs of AFU and other uniformed agencies. Allocations of ready money for defence industry enterprises were irregular. The inefficient pricing policy of the state defence orders barred their accumulation of liquid funds, effectively ruled out research and developments, substantially complicated innovation. All these deficiencies require urgent rectification. **That said, for post-war recovery, one should take into account that during the war the AFU list of equipment was supplemented with numerous foreign weapon systems, which will have a negative effect on orders from the domestic defence industry in the near to medium future.** The results of current measures at relocation and re-commissioning of a number of defence industry enterprises, initiatives of joint ventures with Western partners and production of arms on their territory, etc. should also be taken into account. To this end,

it is important to use the assistance of NATO, whose member states are working out a 10-year plan of recovery of the Ukrainian defence industry.¹⁰

10. In addition to military and technical assistance, Ukraine obtains substantial support from the Western countries in AFU personnel training (see the Box in Section 3). That said, since the success of combat depends not only on the skills of individual servicemen and crews but also on the teamwork of military units, there is a need to synchronise the arrival of arms and personnel trained in Western countries. By and large, **Ukraine helped by the Western partners is quickly and successfully adopting NATO standards of technical equipment and personnel training, being a factor of its soonest accession to the Alliance.**

11. The system of creation, maintenance and training of mobilisation reserves needs to be improved. Before 2014, no regular mobilisation measures were taken. **Since the beginning of the war and up until now, such measures have been taken either randomly (formation of the AFU reserves, when the reserve structure was changing all the time), or late (formation of the Territorial Defence Forces and the resistance movement).** This flaw became especially evident, when territorial defence units that did not have enough time to train began to take part in hostilities. As a result, those units sustained unreasonable losses. In addition, deficiencies in preparation of the reserves gave rise to another serious problem: military registration and enlistment offices saw crowds of volunteers who were not registered, had no (or poor) military training without firm practical skills, which showed up in losses and the efficiency of employment of units manned with such

personnel, especially at the initial stage of the war. Measures at rectification of those deficiencies were taken too late – right before the all-out aggression.¹¹

12. A great contribution to Ukraine's victory in the war with Russia is being made by the volunteer movement that arose in early 2014 and has reached an unprecedented scale.¹² The need of the volunteer movement was initially caused by the lack of resources for the army (uniform, individual protection means, medicines, foodstuffs), absence of a modern system for distribution of those resources, poor logistics, lack of equipment, poor domestic industrial base, insufficient state support for refugees. Many of these deficiencies were largely rectified before the beginning of the full-scale aggression, but not all. The best news in this domain since the beginning of the aggression was presented by the changed attitude of the state to the volunteer movement (with a few sad exceptions, hopefully, caused by personal reasons) and of volunteers to the state, as witnessed by improved coordination of actions at logistic support and maintenance of defence forces and assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. On top of the immediate effect on the logistic support and maintenance of defence forces and provision of assistance to the state authorities at the national and local levels, **the volunteer movement presents a strong factor of civil society development in Ukraine, thanks to its mass character.** In 2022, 86% of Ukrainian citizens took part in charitable activities. This is 19% more than in 2021, and 26% more than in 2016.¹³

13. The war has revealed poor efficiency of the pre-war civil defence system, deficiencies in protection of the population

¹⁰ «NATO works out a plan of restoration of Ukraine's defence industry – how to use the historic chance», *Oboronno-Promyslovyi Kyryer*, 13 October 2022, <https://opk.com.ua/>.

¹¹ E.g., the Law of Ukraine «On Fundamentals of National Resistance» was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 16 July 2021, effective from 1 January 2022. Decree No.36 «On Priority Measures at Strengthening the Defence Capabilities of the State, Enhancement of Attractiveness of Military Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Gradual Shift to the Principles of a Professional Army» was signed by the President on 1 February 2022.

¹² Funds collected by volunteers amount to billions of dollars, troops get a lot of materiel, from foodstuffs, medical supplies, accouterments and modern gear for servicemen to software for command and control systems, motor vehicles, drones and other weapon systems. In an exotic development, the Charitable Fund of Serhiy Prytula acquired an ICEYE satellite along with the access to the photo image database. See, e.g.: «Prytula's Fund bought a «popular satellite» with funds collected for Bayraktars, – Prytula», *Livyi Bereh*, 18 August 2022, https://lb.ua/society/2022/08/18/526649_fond_prituli_pridbav_zibrani.html.

¹³ Zherelnikova Z. ««All for the front»: charity and volunteering of Ukrainians since the beginning of the all-out of the war», *VoxUkraine*, 30 August 2022, <https://voxukraine.org/vse-dlya-frontu-blagodijnist-ta-volonterstvo-ukrayintsiv-z-pochatku-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijny/>.

and critical facilities from missile, air strikes and artillery fire. The bottlenecks of the state policy in this domain have military (air and missile defence), infrastructural (erection of protective structures, equipment of facilities and provision of the population with protective means), organisational (alert, evacuation of the population, production assets, other critical facilities, provision of humanitarian assistance in populated localities that suffered from strikes, etc.) aspects and require an adequate response.¹⁴ Study and consideration of best international practices may be helpful here (see the Box below).

The global situation evolves so that true peace is too far away. In such conditions, the USA, Europe and Ukraine alike should use the jointly acquired skills of fighting a powerful aggressor and build a strong barrier separating democratic

Europe from authoritarian Russia. In this connection, Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, creation of a powerful collective defence system using its territory and experience, incorporation of Ukraine into the NATO air and missile defence belt look absolutely logical.

The known bottlenecks of Ukraine include the absence of the means for deterrence of aggression and resources for its rapid and efficient repulsion, commensurate with the Russian capabilities. In such conditions Ukraine has to rely on the good will of the partners, providing assistance to it: from deterrence of Russia's use of nuclear weapons to huge military, technical, financial, humanitarian assistance. However, it would be better to rely not only on the good will of the partners but on the commitments of the allies provided by

USEFUL EXPERIENCE OF FINLAND'S WAR PREPARATIONS

For defence in case of a military conflict, Finland regularly tests mechanisms of all-round mobilisation of all public resources.

The exercises involve not only military servants and reservists but also representatives of private businesses and local authorities – they practice in cooperation and learn about the tasks to be accomplished in case of a war at least once a year.

There are many emergency stocks of uniform, equipment and foodstuffs in Finland. Part of those stocks – such as masks, gloves and medicines – came in handy during the first stage of dealing with the coronavirus pandemic in 2020.

Every building in Finland with an area of over 1200 m² has a bomb shelter (some of them are equipped with air filtering systems in case of a nuclear strike).

In most cities there are large structures built in rock. They are normally used as sports arenas but in case

of a war may provide an excellent shelter for peaceful residents or a base for the military.

In Finland, it is obligatory to equip every bridge, overpass and tunnel with special niches for explosives. In peacetime those niches are empty, but in case of a danger charges will be put there to blow up the roads for the advancing enemy forces.

The first stage of «total defence» must be activated as soon as Finland's military intelligence detects substantial build-up of adversary troops near its borders.

In this case, the necessary machines and equipment will be moved from the storage sites to mobilisation centres, reservists will be called to the assembly points.

Development companies will arrange minefields, erect protective structures and put explosives in supports of bridges and tunnels together with military engineers.

Source: Ivshyna O. «Lessons of the war with Moscow and total defence. How the Finnish Army is trained». BBC. 23 May 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-61554112>.

¹⁴ In particular, on 23 August 2022, Ukraine's President V. Zelenskyi signed a law on obligatory availability of a shelter in every new building. It provides for urgent arrangement of a network of shelters in Ukraine, including in all new buildings. Urban planning documentation is to include information about engineering and technical measures of civil defence. The law also contains provisions of obligatory availability of engineered features for evacuation of persons with limited mobility in buildings with more than 50 permanent residents and structures that can temporarily accommodate over 100 persons. See: Law of Ukraine «On Introduction of Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Meeting Civil Defence Requirements During Territorial Planning and Development» effective from 24 October 2022, LIGANET., <https://ips.ligazakon.net/document/view/J1074521?an=1>. In December, 2021, the Law of Ukraine «On Critical Infrastructure» was adopted (<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1882-20#Text>).

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For this, Ukraine should become a NATO member.

The experience acquired by Ukraine in this war (since 2014) means that the Ukrainian military is already using the same operational doctrine as the armies of the EU and NATO countries. The system of personnel training, logistics and major weapon systems of AFU will also meet NATO standards in the near future. Therefore, in military terms, Ukraine has *de facto* adapted to the European and Euro-Atlantic security systems, being an important factor of soonest accession to the EU and NATO.

The lessons of this war should make the basis for building a strong and sustainable national security system in Ukraine, resting on capabilities that will rule out armed aggression against Ukraine, on the ability of society and the state to rapidly adapt to changes in the security environment and to operate sustainably, to minimise external and internal vulnerabilities, as well as on the development of mutually advantageous relations with the key foreign partners, first of all, the EU and NATO, their member states, on pragmatic cooperation with other states and international organisations – while respecting the international law and the national interests Ukraine.¹⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS¹⁶

1. Creation in Ukraine of a strong and sustainable system of national security, first of all, its defence sector, should be the main priority of the state and budget policy. The heading to NATO and the EU should be seen as the main mechanism of fulfilment of this task.

2. The change of approaches to good governance based on the principles of strategic management should guarantee

successful reformation of all sectors of activity of society and the state.¹⁷ To this end, the state, resting on civil society institutes, should:

- ✓ develop the vision of the country's future, the strategy («roadmap») of achievement of the desired state of society as a totality of strategic goals (end results) and the sequence of the main intermediate results (milestones);
- ✓ work out, together with all potential actors in the relevant domains, plans, programmes, projects of the strategy implementation, specifying the detailed algorithm of actions – *a schedule of practical measures and intermediate results leading to the end goal*;
- ✓ realistically assess the available resources (financial, material, political, human, technological, intellectual) and, if necessary, potential achievable and minimally burdensome sources of foreign assistance;
- ✓ thoroughly analyse the risks that may hinder implementation of the plans, and the means required for their removal or minimisation.

Such content and sequence of those steps matter not because the NATO standards require so but because this meets the physical essence of any target-minded process. **Such an approach will characterise Ukraine as a target-minded actor ready to work hard but deserving respect (or at least attention) of partners, rivals and enemies alike.**

3. Adoption of NATO standards in the field of strategic defence management requires, in particular, a new approach to state governance the field of security and defence: **it should manage not the Armed Forces or other uniformed agencies but**

¹⁵ See: Strategy of National Security of Ukraine, approved by the President of Ukraine Decree No.392 dated 14 September 2020, <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3922020-35037>.

¹⁶ Recommendations on the defence sector proper (force structure, strategy and tactics of their engagement, armament priorities, requirements to the manning system and mobilisation readiness, etc.) should be worked out after the war.

¹⁷ Information on the web site «Recovery of Ukraine» (<https://recovery.gov.ua/>) does not meet the requirements to strategic planning, is not integral and cannot be viewed as an efficient strategy of Ukraine's development.

the processes of their attainment of the set goals. Hence, the development of the regulatory-legal framework, allocation of the required budget resources should take place on the basis of obligatory detailed description of those processes in doctrinal, conceptual, planning documents (see the previous item).

4. It is desired – but very difficult, given the real capabilities of the current Ukrainian authorities – to **incorporate a conventional «Marshall Plan» in the national development strategy, not vice versa. Ideally, this «Plan» should be a tool of financial support for the national strategy and programmes of its implementation strictly monitored by the Western donor partners.** A limiting factor may be presented by the fact that the state desperately lacks funds, which may affect its role in drafting the plan of assistance to Ukraine. This limitation may be (at least partially) offset by a strong political will, good diplomacy, maintenance of solidarity in society, concentration and skilled coordination of civil society efforts and its desire of a better future, as a motivator of diligent work. As was noted in Item 1, **the national strategy and plan of assistance to Ukraine should prioritise creation and development of a strong and sustainable system of national security.**

5. The same refers to cooperation with NATO countries,¹⁸ other foreign partners during the recovery of the domestic defence industry that should become the engine of development of the Ukrainian economy after the war. In this connection, it is important to get rid of populism, when deciding on the required list and quantities of weapons for AFU and allocation of budget funds, to involve representatives of defence industry enterprises, independent experts for discussion of the strategy and specific plans of recovery. Development of the strategy, plans and the relevant regulatory-legal framework in this sector requires due account of such factors as: adoption of NATO standards, harmonisation of the Ukrainian legislation with that

of the EU, long-term plans of military and technical assistance from Western partners, as well as erosion of the notion of what is called the «defence industry complex» in Ukraine during the introduction of new standards and development of cooperation with foreign partners.

6. Ukraine should step by step confirm its independent role in foreign policy. Now, this may and should be done by putting forward the initiative of demilitarisation of the Black Sea region. Its implementation may become an important factor of security not only for Ukraine and littoral Black Sea countries but also for the countries of South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. This idea may be announced at the Crimean Platform and later promoted in the EU, NATO, OSCE, G7, G20, UN.

7. Given the need of post-war reformation of Ukraine's security sector and enhancement of the Verkhovna Rada supervisory functions with respect to special services, as well as the existence of only a loose team of freelance consultants with limited capabilities and powers at the Security, Defence and Intelligence Committee, it makes sense **to set up a specialised public expert board on intelligence that might include experienced civil society representatives.** According to the Geneva Centre for the Security Sector Governance expert Dr. Teodora Fuior: «In addition to parliamentary committees, an increasing number of states are establishing expert intelligence oversight bodies, external to parliament. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Croatia, North Macedonia, Switzerland, Portugal and Finland provide some examples».¹⁹

8. The capabilities of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council to predict and analyse the threats may be improved through integration (adaptation) of the *Delta* application developed by the Centre for Innovation and Defence

¹⁸ «NATO works out a plan of restoration of Ukraine's defence industry – how to use the historic chance», *Oboronno-Promyslovyi Kyryer*, 13 October 2022, <https://opk.com.ua/>

¹⁹ T.Fuior, Parliamentary Oversight of Military Intelligence, 'Chapter 2. Parliamentary Oversight of Military Intelligence', 23 February 2021, p.17-39, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ParliamentaryOversightMilitaryIntelligence_jan2021.pdf

Technology Development of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine²⁰ in the software at the NSDC Main Situation Centre. The *Delta* system of situational awareness is designed for collection, processing and display of information about enemy forces, coordination of defence forces, as well as for informing about the situation in line with the NATO standards. It is used for operation and mission planning, coordination with other units, exchange of encrypted information about the location of enemy forces, etc. **When this system is supplemented with a component for active detection and assessment of risks and threats,²¹ this will substantially enhance the completeness of forecasting and analysis of the security situation and reduce the time required.**

The processes of adoption of the NATO standards by AFU, thanks to the arrival and successful use of the Western assistance in terms of equipment, personnel training, cooperation in defence planning and defence industry development, parallel processes of meeting the requirements

going with Ukraine's status of a candidate for the EU membership, as well as diminution of the «Russian factor» create favourable conditions for accelerated reforms and accession of Ukraine to the EU and NATO.

These reforms are called to give Ukraine the features that will characterise it as a decent actor of international relations, a welcomed participant of economic cooperation and collective security systems, a reliable partner, contributor of «added value» and give it the right to hope for relevant economic and security benefits. At the stage of post-war reconstruction, it is important for Ukraine not to lose the potential of attractiveness among the partners, which it acquired during selfless resistance to aggression, and to use the chance that cost it huge losses.

That said, militarisation of all sectors of life is a reality and a necessity, which Ukraine faced and with which it will have to live at least in the near future.



²⁰ In particular, *Delta* integrates chat bots developed by the Ministry of Digital Transformation – «eEnemy», and SSU – «STOP Russian War». See: «Ukraine presented a domestic system of situational awareness Delta», Ukrainian Military Centre, 27 October 2022, <https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/ukrayina-predstavyla-vlasnu-systemu-sytuatsijnoyi-obiznanosti-delta/>.

²¹ The concept of active detection and assessment of risks and threats was developed by Razumkov Centre as an element of the general methodology of substantiation of a rational system of national security.

UKRAINE'S SECURITY PROSPECTS IN EXPERT ASSESSMENTS

On August 24-31, Razumkov Centre held an anonymous expert poll within the framework of the project «Role and place of Ukraine in the future European and Euro-Atlantic security systems», carried out with support of Hanns Seidel Stiftung. It polled 44 leading Ukrainian and 10 international experts.

The poll was held in order to find out the opinion of Ukrainian and international experts regarding the prospects of Ukraine's integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic

security structures. The answers to these questions are rather complex and non-linear, since they depend on many external and internal factors, such as the outcome of the war, Russia's future, changes in the global and regional security environment, security guarantees that may satisfy Ukraine, the main partners of Ukraine, Ukraine's contribution to the regional security, what the EU and NATO may offer to Ukraine, and on the contrary – what Ukraine may offer to the EU and NATO.

PLEASE, RATE THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS FOR THE END OF THE WAR, % experts			
Scenarios	Probability		
	Low	Average	High
Transition to negotiations on a cease-fire with the fixation of the contact line as of the beginning of the negotiations (practically, on Russian terms); freezing the conflict (for the time when Russia restores its offensive potential with the maximum approach of the grouping of Russian troops to the Black Sea ports of Ukraine); the issue of de-occupation of Donbass and Crimea belongs to the sphere of finding compromises; sanctions against Russia remain, but efforts are being made to soften or cancel them; restrictions on military-technical assistance to Ukraine are officially or unofficially introduced	21.6	52.9	25.5
Withdrawal (expulsion) of Russian troops to the border as of February 24, 2022 and the transition to peace negotiations, including the issues of Donbass and Crimea as a compromise (freezing the conflict at the level of February 24, 2022, similar to Minsk 2); conclusion of an agreement on providing Ukraine with security guarantees (political support for Ukraine and providing it with military-technical assistance in case of aggression); initiation of the process of lifting sanctions against Russia; reduction of military and technical assistance to Ukraine	51.0	31.4	17.6
Pushing Russian troops to the borders as of 1991; renegotiation of the agreement on the demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian border; reparations from Russia for the damage caused; forcing Russia to resume participation in the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (with mutual flank restrictions, withdrawal of Russian heavy weapons beyond the Urals, resumption of relevant verification measures); cancellation of sanctions against Russia to the extent of its fulfilment of contractual obligations; reorientation of aid to Ukraine to create a strong security sector	78.4	17.6	3.9

FOR HOW LONG, IN YOUR OPINION, UKRAINE CAN GET A «BREAK» IN THE EVENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORRESPONDING SCENARIOS FOR THE END OF THE WAR?

% experts

Scenarios	Period			
	up to 1 year	1-5 years	5-10 years	more than 10 years
Transition to negotiations on a cease-fire with the fixation of the contact line as of the beginning of the negotiations (practically, on Russian terms); freezing the conflict (for the time when Russia restores its offensive potential with the maximum approach of the grouping of Russian troops to the Black Sea ports of Ukraine); the issue of de-occupation of Donbass and Crimea belongs to the sphere of finding compromises; sanctions against Russia remain, but efforts are being made to soften or cancel them; restrictions on military-technical assistance to Ukraine are officially or unofficially introduced	47.1	41.2	9.8	2.0
Withdrawal (expulsion) of Russian troops to the border as of February 24, 2022 and the transition to peace negotiations, including the issues of Donbass and Crimea as a compromise (freezing the conflict at the level of February 24, 2022, similar to Minsk 2); conclusion of an agreement on providing Ukraine with security guarantees (political support for Ukraine and providing it with military-technical assistance in case of aggression); initiation of the process of lifting sanctions against Russia; reduction of military and technical assistance to Ukraine	15.7	56.9	25.5	2.0
Pushing Russian troops to the borders as of 1991; renegotiation of the agreement on the demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian border; reparations from Russia for the damage caused; forcing Russia to resume participation in the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (with mutual flank restrictions, withdrawal of Russian heavy weapons beyond the Urals, resumption of relevant verification measures); cancellation of sanctions against Russia to the extent of its fulfilment of contractual obligations; reorientation of aid to Ukraine to create a strong security sector	11.8	11.8	23.5	52.9

WHAT, IN YOUR OPINION, WILL BE THE MAIN SCENARIOS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE FUTURE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?

% experts

Disintegration of existing and formation of new pan- and sub-regional alliances, situational coalitions

In the world	35.3	64.7	0.0
Europe	27.5	72.5	0.0
Euro-Atlantic	19.6	80.4	0.0

Strengthening of sub-regional (sectoral) unions, alliances and reformatting of existing institutions based on agreements between new entities

In the world	76.5	21.6	2.0
Europe	76.5	21.6	2.0
Євроатлантика	66.7	31.4	2.0


Preservation of the existing security institutions with their substantial reformation and increasing the role of sub-regional entities

In the world	74.5	25.5	0.0
Europe	74.5	25.5	0.0
Euro-Atlantic	84.3	15.7	0.0

□ Yes ■ No ■ Undecided

PLEASE, CHOOSE A SUFFICIENT (MINIMALLY REQUIRED) SET OF COMPONENTS OF THE RELIABLE SECURITY OF UKRAINE UNDER THE EXISTING CONDITIONS?


% experts




PLEASE ESTIMATE THE «WEIGHT» FOR UKRAINE OF THE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU, NATO AND THE USA IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS,
grade point average (last year assessments)*

	EU	NATO	USA
External security guarantees	2.6(2.4)	4.1(3.52)	4.3(4.12)
Ukraine's victory in the war with Russia	3.6(2.72)	4.4(3.060)	4.7(3.76)
Strengthening and reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine	3.4(2.38)	4.5(3.98)	4.7(4.18)
Reforming law enforcement agencies	4.0(3.42)	3.2(2.98)	4.0(3.22)
Reforming special and intelligence agencies	3.4(2.64)	4.2(3.56)	4.7(3.8)
Military and technical assistance	3.6(2.26)	4.2(3.26)	4.8(4.32)
Financial and humanitarian aid	4.2	3.0	4.6
Sanctions and their compliance	4.2	3.2	4.4
Reforming the justice system	4.1(3.54)	3.0(2.56)	4.0(3.38)
Fight against corruption	4.1(3.52)	3.2(2.98)	4.1(3.8)
Development of the defense industry	3.8(2.34)	4.3(3.22)	4.5(3.48)

* The five-point scale from 1 to 5; «1» – min, «5» – max.



* The five-point scale from 1 to 5; «1» – minimum capabilities, «5» – maximum capabilities.




* The five-point scale from 1 to 5; «1» – not important factor, «5» – the most important factor.



. WHICH OF THE LISTED CAPACITIES CAN UKRAINE OFFER TO THE EU AND NATO IN THE SECURITY SPHERE?

% experts



HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE LIKELY TERMS OF UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE EU AND NATO?


% experts/international experts' assessments (last year assessments)

Term	EU	NATO
Up to 5 years	35.3 / 18.0 (0.0)	43.1 / 18.0
Up to 10 years	56.9 / 64.0 (28.0)	39.2 / 36.0
In a more distant perspective	7.8 / 18.0 (40.0)	11.8 / 48.0
Never	0.0 / 0.0 (6.0)	0.0 / 0.0
Difficult to answer	0.0 / 0.0 (26.0)	5.9 / 0.0

THE ROAD TO THE VICTORY, AS SEEN BY THE CITIZENS

On September 22 – October 1, 2022, Razumkov Centre held a public opinion poll «Political and Ideological Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens in the Conditions of the Russian Aggression». It covered security questions, cited in this Annex. The poll was held in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Transcarpathian, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil,

Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv (in Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv and Kharkiv regions – only on the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine and free from hostilities). 2 021 respondents in the age of 18 years and above were polled in 112 populated localities (57 cities and 55 villages). The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.





**There are different opinions about talks with Russia.
WITH WHICH OF THESE STATEMENTS DO YOU TEND TO AGREE MORE?**

% respondents

Talks with Russia should be waged only after its troops are ousted (withdrawn)
to the borders of 1991



Talks with Russia should be waged only after its troops are ousted
to the frontline as of February 23, 2022



It is an efficient way to achieve peace that should be used now




☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Hard to say

HOW DO YOU ASSESS INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE IN ITS WAR WITH RUSSIA?

% respondents

Sheltering refugees



Humanitarian




Political



Military and technical



☐ Sufficient ☒ Insufficient ☐ Hard to say



* The five-point scale from 1 to 5: «1» – condition is not important, «5» – condition is extremely important.

