

№9 (28 November 2014)

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THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY TAUGHT UKRAINIANS SELF-RELIANCE

The main achievement of the Revolution of Dignity is that Ukrainians learned to deal with everything on their own.

Unlike in 2004, Ukrainians no longer rely on the government, politicians, or officials. From the very beginning, these revolutions differed by the fact that in 2004, changes were expected from a particular person, and in 2014, people have understood that a lot depends on them. Ordinary people can easily influence all the areas of life. This also explains the extraordinary social engagement of Ukrainians for already a year.

This will help avoid disappointment and indifference of people when the war is over and the country gradually returns to normal life. In fact, Ukrainians learned to heat, dress, and provide the entire army with everything necessary, and stand to the end, even at the cost of their own lives. The naivety with which the society once expected changes from another politician is left in the past.

As to the residents of the East, there was a double division – a pro-Ukrainian and an anti-Ukrainian society. On one hand, many residents of the eastern regions decided on their nationality and identity. This is a powerful message to future generations.

On the other hand, there are people who do not want to live in Ukraine; we have split families, communities, and conflicts of yesterday's friends.

It is very subjective to talk about negative and positive things. Now we have achieved obvious progress but we also have very tragic events for the people of Ukraine.

Full <u>text</u>

Deputy Director of Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre Mykhailo MISCHENKO



UKRAINIANS THEMSELVES MAY PREVENT UKRAINE FROM REFORMING

From an interview on the course of talks on forming a parliamentary coalition and major challenges along the process of reforming Ukraine.

- Is the topic of forming a coalition important against the backdrop of war in Eastern Ukraine?

Yes, this topic is definitely important. It is written in the Constitution that in the new Verkhovna Rada, a majority should be formed, which appoints the government and takes responsibility for its activities. I would say that the formation of the coalition today is more transparent than it was last time.

- By an example of which country should Ukraine develop now?

We should follow the path of Ukraine we want to build. We have no other choice as no country in the world had such conditions and circumstances that we have today.

- Where should the newly appointed Government of Ukraine start?

With the implementation of a package of urgent reforms. Now one cannot name the exact laws that should be adopted but we can talk about the area that should be reformed, and it is virtually all the areas.

In the political sector, it is fundamentally changing the election law. This should be a proportional representation voting system based on the so-called



Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Viktor ZAMIATIN open lists. It is reported that, allegedly, participants of the negotiations agreed that mayoral election in big cities will be held in two rounds. This is definitely a step forward. It is done so that it would not turn out later that a newly elected mayor does not represent the interests of a local community. Local government should be completely reformed. There should be other areas of activities, responsibility, and powers.

Law enforcement agencies, and the judicial and fiscal systems should be completely reformed. Some steps in reforming the country have been done but there should be much more of them by the end of this year. They also should be more serious than they have been before. It should be a holistic, specific policy.

- What is the main threat to Ukraine on the way to its reforming?

Ukraine and Ukrainians. They may threaten reforms with active and passive resistance. Ukrainians, like many other peoples, want someone to come and do everything for them.

Full <u>text</u>

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CONFLICTS WITHIN THE COALITION SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT STARTS WORKING

The concept of political responsibility still remains hot air for many Ukrainian party leaders.

Given the degree of maturity of our political parties, unfortunately, the fact that, at first, politicians unite before the election to run for the parliament, and then, arguments and personal interests appear, can be regarded as quite natural. It is logical that when a political party runs in the election with a single list, all the issues concerning principles, differences, and ambitions should be dismissed until the election. Then comes political responsibility. If a political party makes it to the parliament and is able to form a faction, it should first implement its own election programme because voters voted for it, and then, if it joins the coalition, the coalition agreement. So this is a question of political responsibility and maturity of the politicians elected to the parliament.

Not enough time has passed for people to evaluate their choice. The parties that made it to the parliament

have not started working yet – the coalition is being formed. When the session is opened and deputies take the oath, we can say that there are factions, and they will take the responsibility. So far, all this is a trail of the election process. The critical point is the opening session of the new Parliament and the work of factions. Thus, this will have no negative impact so far in terms of the disappointment of people in the parties they voted for. However, if present conflicts are not settled, and they are transferred on parliamentary activities, this may already have consequences. We still have time to eliminate all the possible conflicts and contradictions.

Full <u>text</u>

Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Yuriy YAKYMENKO



UKRAINIANS HAVE NOT FELT ANY POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS STARTED BY THE GOVERNMENT YET

The claim that A. Yatseniuk's Government does nothing in Ukraine is not true. I do not like using labels that there are no reforms. It is clear that Ukrainians would like better, more energetic, more effective reforms. The anti-corruption reform has already been launched, a package of anti-corruption laws was adopted. The lustration of authorities and public administration reform have been started. The number of civil servants and government spending have been reduced. The legislation on government procurement has been amended. The number of permits, licenses etc has been reduced.

However, I agree that people's lives have not improved. It has not become easier for businesses either.

Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Yuriy YAKYMENKO

Full <u>text</u>

National Security and Defence

A WEAKNESS IN NATIONAL DEFENCE

The regrouping of forces of the militants in Donbas may mean preparing for a massive attack. The issue of the most dangerous fronts arises. Thus, it is important to understand the logic of the Kremlin. The situation is likely to develop according to the following scenario:

•an attack should be expected simultaneously on several fronts – where the main forces are concentrated now: Luhansk, Debaltsevo, Donetsk;

•the most intensive combat operations should be expected on Luhansk, Debaltsevo, and Donetsk fronts – in order to expand the occupied territory (as much as possible), pull the Ukrainian forces into this region, and weaken the group near Mariupol;



•the main front is likely to be Crimea, where Russian regular forces are concentrated (possibly with aviation support);

•the goal of the attack will not be FORCED CREATION OF THE CORRIDOR to Crimea (this would be too straightforward and unlike the Kremlin's tactics) but rather expansion of the area controlled by the terrorists and forcing the Ukrainian leadership, under the threat of new major casualties, into "VOLUNTARY CONSENT" to introduce a transit corridor, controlled by Russia, for cargo delivery to the peninsula. Such corridor will not have to be defended (unlike the use of force) since this will be provided by the obligations of Ukraine.

In case of the development of the situation according to such a scenario, the biggest weakness in the Ukrainian defence may become not the army but military and political leadership – given its excessive commitment to peaceful means of conflict resolution. Under such circumstances, there may not even be any intensification of combat operations – if the frightened Presidential Administration will make concessions for the Kremlin without a fight. However, the possibility of the use of force should not be ruled out.

What to do:

 immediately assess and ensure the readiness of troops to active defence in all the operational depth – having realistic defence plans; being fully staffed and equipped; readiness of the intelligence service, communication, management, engineering support etc;

•support and assist public initiatives on introducing people's volunteer corps (vigilance committees, staff, training centres, volunteer corps) in adjacent areas (especially on dangerous fronts);

 develop contingency plans for protection and evacuation of people;

•support and create new centres of guerilla movement in the occupied territories, and strengthen sabotage and reconnaissance groups in these territories;

•approach the MFA of Russia for confirmation of the absence of Russian troops and equipment in Donbas – followed by attacks at terrorist groups;

 intensify appeals to Western countries for assistance with defence weapons; •approach the UN with the following requests – (a) to recognise Russia as a party to conflict (in order to deprive it of the right of veto, according to Article 27 of the UN Charter); (b) to introduce a controlled no-fly zone over the occupied territories (to prevent Russia from using combat and transport aviation to support the attack of terrorist groups).

From attempts to "prevent the third world war" (which is the task of the leading Western countries but not Ukraine), we should move to real active actions to protect our own independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

> Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI



RUSSIA WANTS TO CONTROL THE SOVEREIGNTY OF UKRAINE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Commenting on the Russian statement that Russia needs "one hundred percent guarantee" that Ukraine will not join NATO, I would like to note that, firstly, this is another demonstration of the fact that Russia is trying to control and limit the sovereignty of



Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiv MELNYK Ukraine in the choice of our foreign policy. Secondly, in Russia, they do not understand the level of their own ambitions – what the Kremlin can demand.

Russia can somehow raise this issue to Ukraine but not to 28 NATO countries. Ukraine should realise that any Russia's requirement is always just the beginning of a list. Other requirements will follow, and this can continue for a very long time.

It is clear that politics is the art of compromise but trying to reassure Russia by satisfying its demands is a way to failure.

Full <u>text</u>

Economy

SUCCESSFUL REFORMS WILL ALLOW UKRAINE TO COUNT ON EXTERNAL DEBT RELIEF

Only if reforms are actively implemented, in a few years, Ukraine may raise a question of partial external debt relief.

There are two options when a country can apply for debt relief. The first option is when the country has global problems, and it is not possible to wait for the country to try to return or restructure the debt – for example, Latin American countries in 1980–1990s. Luckily, we do not have such a condition for our debt relief.

The other option of debt relief is used when the country is successfully implementing reforms. For

example, Poland was forgiven its debt, so to speak, for "good conduct". When Poland started to implement reforms, it became clear that partial debt relief would make it much easier for the country. Unfortunately, we do not have this yet either.

Full <u>text</u>

Director of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN



ONLY SANCTIONS AGAINST GAZPROM WILL SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Restrictive measures of the U.S. and the EU will become a real threat to the Russian economy only when sanctions against Gazprom are imposed.

The next stage of sanctions, if they are imposed, will be sectoral sanctions against the biggest Russian companies. I think in the end, it is Gazprom. When Gazprom gets on this list, then it will be real sanctions.

However, it is not about a complete cessation of Europe's cooperation with Russia in the oil and gas sector. This is the case when both parties are critically dependent on supply. So one can argue who will be more

affected in case of imposing sanctions against Gazprom but in any case, this will be a serious step.

The date of imposing new restrictions will depend on whether there are dramatic adverse changes in the situation in Donbas. "This may be some planned decisions of the Kremlin – for example, on another escalation of the conflict or Russian invasion, which already will be quite obvious. It is present now, but everyone is trying to pretend there are no Russian troops. Or it could be some tragic incident like the one with the Malaysian Boeing.

Full <u>text</u>

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK

THE INFLATION RATE AT 25% IS DANGEROUS FOR THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

Among economists, there is no single point of view on the inflation rate or its indicators but most think that a singledigit rate of inflation, i.e. that does not exceed 10%, is moderate, and such that even under certain circumstances may contribute to some structural changes. When inflation goes beyond 10%, although some believe it is over 20%, it is definitely considered a sign of disease. There is also such a concept as galloping inflation - i.e. inflation which already requires some stabilisation measures. Otherwise, it tends to turn into the processes of hyperinflation - when confidence in money is lost and the entire economic system collapses. In Ukraine, this problem has several reasons - it is associated with the escape from the hryvnia to foreign currencies which leads to the hryvnia depreciation and devaluation as the country depends on import. This leads to a significant increase in all the prices due to the import component. At the same time, due to financial constraints, the government waives certain subsidies, which also leads to rising prices.

As to opportunities to increase the purchasing power of people, there are such one-time things as waiving subsidies. They will take place, and this inflation factor will disappear. There are also those creating this vicious circle. We should fight this – fight by limiting the monetary base. Unless an appropriate anti-inflation policy is conducted, we will have the entire economic system ruined. Of course, the inflation rate at 25% is a dangerous indicator, and we should fight it, and have something to fight it with.

Full <u>text</u>

Senior research fellow of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr SIDENKO



INCREASED IMF AID WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN UKRAINE

The IMF "aid package", which was agreed in spring 2014 – when the circumstances were quite different, and there were no such intense hostilities in Donbas – should be revised.

One of the problems is that Ukraine has to pay the debt to Russia for the gas consumed in the previous period in the amount of approximately \$5.3 billion. Also, \$3.1 billion should be paid by the end of 2014. Furthermore, the situation with the national currency and dollar exchange rate are important since Ukrainian banks spent approximately \$3 billion on intervention. The gold reserves have currently fallen below the critical level, and do not meet any international standards. Furthermore, the bank suffers constant losses with regular refinancing of the banking system, and, therefore, capital increase is needed in the amount of approximately 66 billion hryvnias. In general, we can say that without increasing the IMF aid in the range of \$10–15 billion, there are no reasons to talk about minimal settlement of the economic situation in Ukraine.

Full <u>text</u>

Senior research fellow of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr SIDENKO

THE COALITION AGREEMENT INDICATES THAT ECONOMIC REFORMS WILL CONTINUE

In early March 2014, the country was almost in the state of collapse. However, the economy was sustained – an agreement was reached with international financial institutions which have started funding Ukraine. Despite all the problems and obstacles, defence has been organised. We estimated the possible economic losses at the level of 2009, i.e. the global crisis. However, now the fall is much less, and it is mostly due to Donbas – in Western and Central Ukraine, there are a number of oblasts where a positive trend is observed.

One of the main shortcomings is the collapse of the hryvnia. S. Kubiv has indeed become the Kamikaze who took the heat of devaluation, whose inevitability nobody doubted because experts had been telling "the predecessors" that the hryvnia should have been released gradually. However, what has been happening to the hryvnia in summer and in autumn can rather be explained by the lack of understanding and consistent policy of the NBU.

I am somewhat optimistic about the coalition agreement. Of course, anyone can open the document on any page and criticise almost every provision. However, the fact that five rather different political parties have formed and agreed this single document is an achievement. Previously, such documents were written behind closed doors, and their wording used to be more vague. Furthermore, the authors of the agreement at least have an understanding of the need for reforms – the adoption of a new fiscal ideology aimed not only at withdrawal but also at the simplification of the regulations and the reduction of the government intervention in the economy.

> Director of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN

Full <u>text</u>

Energy

MONOPOLISATION OF THE MARKET OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SIGNIFICANTLY DISTORTS THE GASOLINE PRICE IN UKRAINE

We can say that in Ukraine, the pricing of petroleum products, in addition to a purely pricing factor, which operates in the international oil markets, is affected by two more powerful factors. First of all, I mean the hryvnia devaluation. The other factor is the monopolisation of the market and its lack of transparency. These factors are the hindering element that does not allow to reflect the cost of gasoline at Ukrainian filling stations according to changes in the international markets.

The Antimonopoly Committee and law enforcement agencies should fight the shadow oil market. For Ukrainians to be able to buy gasoline at the real price, according to fluctuations in the global oil market, public institutions should work. If hryvnia exchange rate becomes stable, and there is competition in the market, fluctuations in prices on petroleum products in Ukraine will fully reflect fluctuations in oil prices in the international markets.

For a lion's share of cost in the price of petroleum products is oil, and Ukraine currently imports over 80% of petroleum products.



Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO

REDUCTION IN OIL PRODUCTION POSES A THREAT TO RUSSIA OF LOSING EUROPEAN MARKETS

Russia will not benefit from reduced oil production - this has never been the country's strategy, and it has always tried to sell as much raw material as possible.

Therefore, Russia will not reduce oil production, otherwise it may lose a number of markets. It mainly supplies oil to European countries via pipeline, and if Russia stops the supply of raw material abroad, it will lose its influence on European countries. Other countries - oil

DIFFICULT ENERGY SITUATION MAKES UKRAINE BUY COAL IN RUSSIA

From an interview on Ukraine buying coal abroad and private thermal power plants.

Major coal mining unions are located in the occupied territories of Donbas. Thus, Ukraine has to compensate for the lack of coal with procurement abroad. Ukrainian energy system is 48% provided by nuclear plants and 40% by thermal plants. However, when nuclear plants are base-load, thermal plants can manoeuvre so, today, Ukrainian energy system cannot work without thermal generation. Coal is a critical component for operation of the energy system of Ukraine. A lion's share is the amount of coal consumed by power plants.

Ukraine will buy coal from South Africa and Russia, and will also continue to use coal from Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Why these sources?

Because currently, there are no other sources where we can buy coal. Moreover, you cannot find coal of such scarce types as A and T in every country. Only in South Africa, Australia, the U.S., and some other countries. It seems that in Ukraine, there are certain lobby groups who do their best to limit the diversification of coal supply to our country and make Ukraine dependant on supply from the so-called Luhansk People's Republic and Donetsk People's Republic as well as Russia. In other words, they are trying to make Ukraine not only dependent on gas but also on coal. This issue needs thorough work of our intelligence agencies who have to find these people. This is not a matter of money but of maintaining sovereignty and security of Ukraine.

Coal can be bought in the foreign exchange market, depending on prices and quality. We should not worry about where it comes from to the foreign exchange market because the main thing is that all the parameters should suit Ukraine. In this option, there are no problems, except finance and logistics. No shortage of coal is currently observed in the international markets.

suppliers - will come to these markets, and Russia will have to make every effort in order to become an exporter of oil to Europe again, and it does not mean it will succeed. Full text

Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO

Also, coal price, converted into calorific value, is fully competitive with gas and other energy sources. Over the last 3–4 years, the coal price has fallen by 30–40% in the international markets, and that is why coal fuel is cost-efficient now. However, it creates certain economic problems given that the equipment of our thermal power plants is outdated, and there are no filters or purification systems so it is quite a serious pressure on the environment. However, in the difficult situation that Ukraine is now, environmental issues fade into insignificance.

- The media reported that Ukraine is negotiating with Russia on power procurement. What do you think about it?

Yes, there was a corresponding Decree of President P. Poroshenko. It has recently been published. This Order provides for coal procurement both in the occupied territories and Russia. Basically, if they sell the product without any political conditions, it can be bought but we should forget about diversification of the supply sources, not to become totally dependent. Ukraine exports electricity to Moldova, Belarus, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland in the amount of 6–7 billion kilowatts annually. Until 2014, there was surplus but we are coming back to the issue of coal - there is no coal, there is no sufficient capacity to generate electricity. It is impossible to sell power required for operation of the energy system without energy sources. However, we should understand that in Russia, there is no business separated from the government, especially business engaged in trade with Ukraine. Thus, we should be under no illusion that energy sources will be sold to our country with no political implications.

Full text

Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO

<u>'oreign Policy</u>

PUTIN'S ESCAPE FROM THE G20 SUMMIT ONCE AGAIN PROVES THAT THE WORLD SUPPORTS UKRAINE

The President of Russia V. Putin did not leave the G20 Summit because of a "busy schedule" - he ran away because he was uncomfortable among the world leaders who have clearly expressed their condemnation of the Russian policy in Donbas.

U.S. President B. Obama who spoke of the possible extension of sanctions, UK Prime Minister D. Cameron, and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel spoke rather harshly. In fact, Russian policy towards Ukraine received strong and clear condemnation. Here, we should also add the initiative of the three countries - the U.S., Japan, and Australia - on joint actions to further promote sanctions against Russia.

At the summit, a kind of an international core of opposition to the Russian policy was formed. The G20 summit showed unity of the international community in supporting Ukraine and condemning the Russian policy.

However, there will be no radical changes in the Russian policy in the nearest future. Russia will continue to conduct aggressive policy towards Ukraine and support the militants in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. Russia is interested in a kind of a disintegrating enclave in Ukraine, a zone of tension

that would undermine the Ukrainian economy, threaten its statehood, and undermine Ukraine's course towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

It should be noted that the history of the Russian aggression against Ukraine has begun long before the military conflict. At first, being "gently forced" to join the Eurasian Union, and then – economic and energy pressure. In the future, the relations with Russia should be built not even from scratch but from a negative point, as the Ukrainian society has got a tremendous traumatic experience.

However, now the main threat for Ukraine is not a fullscale invasion but the possibility of freezing the conflict in Donbas. The key problem here is the lack of control over the Russian border, through which the so-called "humanitarian convoys" are coming.

Full <u>text</u>

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykhailo PASHKOV



Sociology

This issue of the newsletter presents some of the findings of the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 10 to 14 October 2014 in all the regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2,004 respondents aged 18 and over were interviewed. Sampling error – 2.3%.

The survey was conducted as a part of the permanent project of the Razumkov Centre The Party System of Ukraine: Development Features, Problems of Functioning and Prospects for Development. More information on findings of the public opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre is available on the Razumkov Centre website http://www.razumkov.org.ua.



The Razumkov Centre News

PARTICIPATION IN THE ROUNDTABLE "SECURITY CHALLENGES: UKRAINE, EUROPE, THE WORLD"

On 6 November 2014, at the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Ukraine, the roundtable "Security Challenges: Ukraine, Europe, the World" was held. The event was attended by prominent representatives of the diplomatic corps, the expert community, and a large student audience of the Academy.

The Razumkov Centre was represented by Director of Military Programmes M. Sunhurovskyi, who presented a report "Overall Structure of the Process of Threat Analysis Within Building a Rational National Security System". In the speech, a tool was proposed which allows to simplify the analysis of threats in the conditions of informational uncertainty and incorporate it into the overall process of justification of the rational system of protecting Ukraine's national interests. According to assessments of the organisers of the roundtable, the proposed tool will be useful for students and other beginners in studying the threats and systematising the information received.

EXPERT DISCUSSION "MIDDLE CLASS IN UKRAINE: SOCIOLOGICAL PORTRAIT"

On 20 November 2014, the Razumkov Centre, with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, within the project "Middle Class in Ukraine: Life Values, Readiness to the Association, and Promoting Democratic Standards", held an expert discussion "Middle Class in Ukraine: A Sociological Portrait". The discussion was attended by representatives of non-governmental, research, and sociological organisations as well as higher education institutions, in particular M. Mischenko, V. Panioto, V. Kostrytsia, L. Cherenko, T. Stetskiv, I. Bekeshkina, Y. Holovakha, V. Sariohlo and others.

The following issues were discussed – social and sociodemographic characteristics of the middle class; values and civic engagement of the middle class; social well-being, confidence in public institutions and social environment etc. The participants of the event analysed the issue of formations and prospects for development of the middle class as an important component of functioning of a stable society, and also expressed their opinions on additional criteria for identification of the middle class which would help to form the portrait of a middle class representative and determine a share of the middle class in Ukraine more clearly.

Read the publication Ukrainian Middle Class Through the Eyes of Its Representatives: Discussions in Focus Groups

<u>Read in English Middle Class in Ukraine: Identification Criteria.</u> <u>Expert Assessments, Citizens Perceptions, and Self-Identification</u>

EXPERT MEETING "UKRAINE-NATO PARTNERSHIP: STATE AND PROSPECTS"

On 20 November 2014, the Razumkov Centre hosted an expert meeting, held jointly with NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine – Ukraine – NATO Partnership: State and Prospects.

The participants discussed the state and opportunities for development of Ukraine's relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, critical issues and strategic prospects for national security, and the role of civil society in shaping the agenda and promoting Ukraine–NATO partnership.

The discussion was attended by representatives of the government agencies and NGOs, and staff of NATO Headquarters and missions in Ukraine.

PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR "MEDIA IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT: A MEANS OF CONTROL OR A PROPAGANDA TOOL"?

On 24 November 2014, Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes Oleksiy Melnyk presented the report "The Role of Propaganda in the Ukrainian Conflict" to the participants of the international seminar "Media in a Political Context: A Means of Control or a Propaganda Tool?" The event was held by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Department of Journalism of Stockholm University.

THE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO UKRAINE

On 24 November 2014, the meeting of the representatives of the Razumkov Centre with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt was held. The U.S. Embassy was also represented by Counsellor for Public Affairs, Education and Culture Mr Conrad Turner.

At the meeting, the Razumkov Centre was represented by Director General Anatoliy Rachok, Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes Y. Yakymenko, Research Consultants V. Musiyaka and V. Sidenko, Director of Energy Programmes V. Omelchenko, and Director of Military Programmes M. Sunhurovskyi.

During the discussion, the participants of the meeting shared their opinions on political, economic, and security situation in Ukraine, and prospects for the implementation of reforms by the newly elected Parliament and the new Government.

Particular attention in the discussion was given to the situation and problems of non-governmental think tanks in Ukraine, and their cooperation with the government. The parties expressed mutual interest in establishing systematic cooperation between Ukrainian and American think tanks and demonstrated their readiness to actions in this direction.

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