



№7 (4 November 2014)

THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

CONTENTS

DOMESTIC POLICY.....	1
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE.....	2
ECONOMY.....	5
ENERGY.....	6
SOCIOLOGY.....	7
NEWS OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE... ..	8

26 OCTOBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, FIRST CONCLUSIONS

On 26 October 2014, the third snap election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the history of independent Ukraine was held. This election has become the first to be held during military aggression against Ukraine and the central government having no control over the entire country.

This election was held to complete the process of renewal of the top government agencies, which started due to the victory of the Maidan, and bring the supreme state legislative body in compliance with major changes that had occurred in the political preferences and attitudes of the citizens of Ukraine since November 2013. According to public opinion polls, up to 70% of citizens supported the idea of a snap parliamentary election.

The election was held on the basis of the old mixed majoritarian and proportional voting system in the 50/50 ratio. Given the present circumstances, the election was neither held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea nor in the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts that are controlled by terrorists. However, the citizens who left these regions and moved to other oblasts of Ukraine were able to vote for party lists at the actual place of residence as of the moment of the election. In single-member districts, the election was held in 198 out of 225 districts; the lists contained approximately 30.5 million voters.

An important feature of the election was dual reformatting of the party and political field – for the first time, after the victory of the Maidan and the collapse of Yanukovich's regime; and for the second time, due to the results of the special presidential election. Based on these processes, among the five parties which had factions in the existing Verkhovna Rada (Party of Regions, Batkivshchyna, Udar, Svoboda, and Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)), only two started the new election campaign unchanged – KPU and Svoboda.

In general, the number of parties which participated in the party-list election was 29 (21 in the previous election). Among the main contenders to make it to the Parliament, the majority were the parties that supported Maidan or were created by politicians who actively participated in it – Petro Poroshenko Bloc, Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, Hromadianska Pozytsiya, Narodnyi Front, and Samopomich.

The former pro-government camp was represented by Sylina Ukraine and Opposition Bloc, which emerged due to the split in the Party of Regions, and their political satellite – KPU. An obvious front-runner at the beginning of the campaign was Petro Poroshenko Bloc – 40% of voters who intended to take part in the election were willing to vote for it.

In terms of content, the following themes were the core of the campaign – restoring peace/defending the country; maintaining the economic situation/fighting the economic crisis; implementing reforms/the European choice; renewal of the authorities (lustration)/fighting corruption. Accordingly, the main trend in forming electoral lists was the involvement of “new faces” – those taking part in the CTO, civic activists, volunteers, and journalists.

Due to its shortened period, the election campaign was conducted mostly in the form of advertising in digital media. The leading parties loosened the purse strings for outdoor advertising and printed materials. Somewhat less attention was paid to direct communication with voters – mass events, regional tours etc. The parties who head pro-government candidates at the top of their lists used this to create news hooks.

Preliminary party-list voting results (based on 98.53% of ballots processed) have brought some unexpected news. A major surprise were the results of the parties Narodnyi Front, Petro Poroshenko Bloc, and Samopomich. Having started from coming the fourth (5.7% of the voters who intended to vote as of September), Narodnyi Front has become the leader with 22% of support. Instead, Petro Poroshenko Bloc, which 38% of the respondents were willing to support in September, during the campaign lost almost half of its rating as of the start, and finished second. Samopomich managed to make a huge leap and, being an underdog (below 2%), ranked third (over 10% of votes).

Opposition Bloc (9.5%) finished fourth, which was because of the other parties that worked in the electoral field of Party of Regions and did not make it to the Parliament (in particular, Sylina Ukraine and KPU). Among the parties that made it to the Verkhovna Rada are O. Liashko's Radycal Party (significantly lowered the result at the finish) and Batkivshchyna. Among the parties that stood a chance to overcome the barrier but did not are Hromadianska Pozytsiya, Sylina Ukraine, and Svoboda.

The process of determining the winners in single-member districts is still under way. However, some preliminary conclusions as to the political structure and nature of the future Verkhovna Rada can already be drawn.

The parliamentary coalition will consist of pro-European political parties. The factions of Blok Petra Poroshenka (it will be the largest due to the number of FPTP candidates) and Narodnyi Front will become its basis. The size of the coalition will be sufficient for stable work and create a fundamental possibility for the formation of constitutional majority. However, given the leadership nature of the coalition member parties as well as due to the presence of a new generation of deputies in the factions who are not burdened with the experience of political agreements behind the scenes, the process of forming the coalition and the Government will not be smooth.

The opposition will have up to 70 deputies, and most of them will join the faction of Opposition Bloc. However, regional distribution of support of the political parties in the context of “pro-government”–“oppositional” suggests a loss of the monopoly to represent the interests of voters of Eastern and Southern Ukraine by the political heirs of Party of Regions.

In the future Parliament, the representation of extreme political parties will decrease since neither KPU, which represents the left wing, nor Svoboda or Pravyi Sektor will have their own factions.

Representation of the main financial industrial groups in the Parliament will remain but we can expect substantial reduction of their impact on the activities of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, due to changes in its political structure and members of the Parliament.

*Deputy Director,
Director of Political and Legal Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre Yuriy YAKYMENKO*



National Security and Defence

THE NOVOROSIYA PROJECT IMPLEMENTED BY THE KREMLIN FAILED

Since 5 September, when the ceasefire was announced, there has been the number of victims both among Ukrainian military officers and among civilians. I cannot keep a record of the militants killed – it falls into the category of a war or a large-scale armed conflict, according to the classification of the respectable Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI.

SIPRI provides the definition of war as a conflict in which more than a thousand people died during one year. So, if this “ceasefire” lasts a year, it will fall into the category of a large-scale armed conflict. By no means this can be called a ceasefire. This is rather a certain de-escalation of the conflict but by no means a ceasefire.

From the very beginning, it was clear that none of the leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) intended to comply with the ceasefire. The reason for this is that in case of a real ceasefire, rather sad prospects await these people. Now they are on everyone’s lips, people talk to them and even sign some agreements with them but as soon as there is ceasefire, they perfectly understand that they will be held responsible for what they have done. Therefore, they are not interested in the ceasefire at all.

In fact, when somebody says that it is impossible to manage the separatists, I both agree and disagree with it at the same time.

I agree in a sense that they do not follow direct orders from Moscow. However, there is “reflexive governance”. That is, they can be managed by stopping the support from Russia. This is what will make them give up ambitious plans, and may be the key to resolving the conflict.

We have to admit that the key to solving the problem is still in the Kremlin, and in the hands of one person – Putin – who (this should also be admitted) now is not

that independent in his decisions. For it is probably needless to repeat once again that he brought himself to a standstill with his own actions.

As to the Novorosiya, DPR, and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) projects which were carried out under the direction of the Kremlin by the FSS and MID, they are left to their fate.



How long it will last is unknown. Will Russia give it up completely, or will the Kremlin try to take control again? Now there is chaos, and it is hard to say how it will evolve.

There are also rather interesting, significant changes in the public mood. Especially in Eastern Ukraine. For example, now the majority of citizens (76%) feel threatened by Russia. In 2013, which was a year ago, there were less than a quarter. So the society is beginning to understand who is actually an enemy and who is a friend of Ukraine.

In 2012, for example, most people considered Russia a strategic partner. Now it is only one in ten. Instead, Poland, the EU, and the U.S. are ranked first among the strategic partners. Even in the eastern regions, when we ask about the causes of this conflict, approximately a quarter of the population there blames the Russian authorities for this.

Full text



*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre
Oleksiy MELNYK*

REFORMING THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

– What do you think are the main problems in the security sector that we have seen in the last six months – first in Crimea, and then in Eastern Ukraine?

– The main problem is that the events which have occurred and continue to occur in the East showed the inadequacy of estimates made at the state level as to strategic challenges and threats that the national security of Ukraine is facing. It is at the state level because at the expert level it was actually forecasted, in particular by experts of the Razumkov Centre. The only thing that was not properly taken into account is the scale of the existing threats but as to Crimea, attention was always drawn to it as a “hot spot” in Ukraine, and, in particular, the grounds for this were indicated – the Russian Black Sea Fleet which played a destabilising role there, and Russia’s information warfare as well.

However, again, at the state level, everyone kept saying, and it was recorded in the documents, that the threat of Russia’s large-scale aggression was considered





unlikely. However, even if it was recorded in the documents, the situation Putin used still would not allow to give a normal response to the actions of Russia.

– For a very long time, Ukraine was focused on the enemy behind the western border, was it due to the fact that we inherited such an “enemy” from the USSR? Has it left a mark on the defence capability and combat readiness of our army?

– The threat from the East was not ignored – it had been discussed. This also concerned Crimea. However, both in the strategic plans of the General Staff and other state institutions, the view dominated that war with Russia was impossible. This is due in no small part to that fact that most general officers grew up in the Soviet Union, and the fifth column has remained very powerful in Ukraine. Especially for the last four years, when there was a very active infiltration of the agents of the Federal Security Service into Ukraine; such a combination was implemented that Ukrainian officials were mostly afraid to provoke or cause discontent of Russia even with secret documents. The first attempt to revise approaches to national security was made when Hrytsenko was Minister of Defence but then it returned to the way it was again. In Ukraine, the East was practically denuded, and about three more or less normal military units remained there, and the rest were focused on the West, as before. So it was inadequate deployment of troops.

– Do you think that today the Ukrainian army is more capable than it was six months or a year ago?

– It is an absolute truth that it is more capable than it was in late February 2014. If we compare the present state with the state as of late February – which was basically zero level of combat readiness, contrary to the estimates that we have constantly heard starting from that the army was fully ready and ending with a more realistic one that it was ready to a limited extent – when in reality, it turned out that by the end of his rule, Yanukovich left the Armed Forces completely destroyed, the progress is certainly enormous.

What the former Acting Minister of Defence Teniukh said about 6,000 capable soldiers with 120,000 on the list was a “cold shower” for many. However, the level of combat readiness of those 6,000 was also a big question. Also, we can say that the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other structures, despite significant

limitations, have fulfilled their task, showed relatively high efficiency in the fight against pro-Russia mercenaries – the so-called separatists or terrorists. However, when Russia has used its regular troops in Ukraine, it turned out that forces are not that even.

– As to people actively supporting the army, could it somehow help create an unusual army, or is it the state that should fully deal with it?

– The state should welcome any public initiatives but one should also understand that the society cannot and should not replace the state. Only the state has monopoly on the use of force, and we can talk about private armies only in terms of what is called “commercial security structures” but they should not replace the army. They have their own function, and they should be controlled by the state. Of course, existing public initiatives, especially related to military logistics, have the right to exist but it can be an additional mechanism for supporting the army – for many reasons, it cannot replace the logistics, which should operate explicitly within the state.

– Can the Ukrainian army adapt to such challenges, and can they be prevented?

– The key word here is “prevent”. It is much easier and cheaper to prevent a conflict than wage war or settle the conflict.

Of course, all these lessons should be learned and taken into account when forming the future Armed Forces of Ukraine. Here, it is important that it would be a process rather than decisions at the level of leadership, who now certainly have extensive experience and think that they are so well-informed that the powers entitle them to determine and make decisions in the area of security, either alone or in private – this is an absolutely wrong approach.

Here is one such example – for a long time we kept saying that we need a mobile army, that it should be professional but now, during the CTO, which actually is a general military operation, there is an urgent need of a large number of tanks and heavy artillery. On this basis, some may conclude that we really need more tanks and heavy artillery. I am not sure about that for if there were efficient proactive actions in advance to prevent such a conflict, it would not reach the stage when tanks were needed. So, once again, I would like to warn against rushing to voluntarist decisions on the ways of reforming the army.

We need a serious review of the defence sector which would assess all the threats, available resources, and help reach the optimal form of the Armed Forces. By a comprehensive review of the defence sector, I mean the process which had been already carried out twice in Ukraine. This is a generally accepted international practice of solving such problems. All government agencies are involved in this comprehensive review; the challenges and threats that the state national security is facing are analysed. We are talking about a full range of military and non-military threats, from the least likely to the most likely, and their likelihood and degree of threat to national security are assessed.



Then, based on this analysis, when the list is formed, priorities which are vital for Ukraine are determined. Then, a certain set of capabilities is formed for specific threats. Not only of military capabilities but also capabilities of all the government agencies – from the State Emergency Service up to, for example, the Ministry of Healthcare.

Then, financial calculations are carried out for it. During the first calculations, a budget is formed which is several times higher than the one possible – not just

the military one but of the whole country. Then, various options for countering these threats are considered – diplomatic, economic, political, and in, particular, military. Only during this process, an optimal decision can be achieved.

This is a complex process but in Ukraine, there are experts, and there is a possibility to involve international experts, in particular from NATO – this work is somewhat routine but it should be done if we finally want to create a new army rather than keep simulating reform.

Since the defence budget of the country should not undermine the prospects for socio-economic development, the best is the figure of 2% of the GDP on defence. This, by the way, is a standard for NATO members. It provides an appropriate level of defence capability and allows a country to spend money on other social needs – healthcare and education. Although short-term budget increase is allowed – for example, for rearmament programmes – but not more than 4% because if for several years in a row, spending exceeds 4%, it leads to the emergence of much bigger socio-economic threats to security than potential military threats.

Full text

*Co-director of Foreign Relations
and International Security Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK*

CURRENTLY THERE ARE ALMOST NO COUNTRIES THAT WOULD JOIN RUSSIA'S BLOC AGAINST UKRAINE

Despite the pro-Russian mood of the citizens of Serbia, this country and the rest of the world do not support Russian aggression against Ukraine, and will hardly ever support it.

Currently, no serious, mass or disturbing for Ukraine support of the Russian aggression globally is observed. There are some signs at the international level – for example, in Serbia – but these are local signs that do not affect the big picture at all.

Now Ukraine is getting very serious global support from the international community, starting from the decisions of the European Union and the U.S., which contain a certain round of sanctions against the Russian

Federation. In this case, this is mainly about supporting Ukraine's position towards Russia. On the other hand, we see that even the partners of Russia in the Customs Union and the new Eurasian Economic Union have taken a rather low-key position. It is worth mentioning Lukashenko's recent interview and Mr Nazarbayev's view – in this case, it is not about unconditional support of the Russian aggression by Russia's closest partners.

Currently, there are almost no countries that would join Russia's bloc against Ukraine, and I would not say that Serbia is Russia's ally. This is spontaneous and situational support since Serbia still seeks the EU integration.

China clearly understands what it needs today. As a result, it holds a rather low-key position on the matter. China does not ruin the relations with the Russian Federation – let us just mention the energy project in Siberia – but also maintains relations with Ukraine, the U.S., and the EU, which have imposed sanctions against Russia. So China holds a peculiar position – not a position of neutrality but of a multi-vector policy both towards Russia and the West

Full text



*Co-director, Foreign Relations and
International Security Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Mikhail PASHKOV*



INCENTIVE MONETARY POLICY IS REQUIRED TO SAVE UKRAINE'S ECONOMY

We need to move from a restrictive monetary policy to an incentive one. The privatisation of enterprises will help stimulate the economy. 17 billion UAH were even planned for this year to cover the budget deficit. However, no tender was held or even announced. This is when a list of enterprises that are not subject to privatisation was shortened back in June.

There should be a clear transition from restrictive policies that provide for withdrawal from business and people to stimuli. Moreover, it is better to do this

not at the expense of the budget or unclear loans for refinancing but through reducing the tax burden, measures promoting business, deregulation, tenders etc.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre* **VASYL YURCHYSHYN**



UNTIL 2014 FULL-FLEDGED ECONOMIC GROWTH IS UNLIKELY

Given the fact that the raions of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts that are not controlled by the Ukrainian government used to provide roughly up to 15% of the GDP, suspension of the majority of industrial production in Donbas may cause GDP to fall by up to 8% in 2014.



The process of recovery should be approached differentially – a lot of production in Donbas is outdated; it makes no sense to restore it on the old technological and structural basis. It would be better to renew what is more or less modern, and as to the rest, programmes for disposal, reorientation of workforce, disabling outdated facilities, including mines, should be adopted, and instead, new productions in new areas that can be competitive and develop dynamically should be created.

They may include the service industry and IT services. If this concerns young people, they can undergo appropriate training. This may also be the creation of companies producing energy-saving appliances, which will be in high demand. This may be companies that are creating a cluster with the agro-food sector, as it is likely to develop rapidly. Maybe we should

develop new energy areas associated with, for example, solar and wind energy. That is something that changes the whole profile of Ukrainian economy, that will become its future.

We can discard certain enterprises which actually focus only on Russia – they are not competitive outside the Russian market, and it will be very problematic to maintain them. For example, we have huge capacity in the production of railway rolling stock, aimed at the Russian market. I do not think that they are needed in such amount, given the fact that even before the outbreak of hostilities, Russia has begun to reduce the amount of orders. I think we should try to convert these facilities to be used for production of public transport. However, this requires appropriate investment.

As to the GDP forecast for next year, it is unlikely that we will overcome this crisis. The scope of tasks relating to reforms is too big. The task for next year is to stop deterioration, maintain the situation at the current level, and conduct the necessary reforms to attract private investment.

In case of intensive reforms, from 2016 we may feel a slight increase, up to 2% of the GDP. Fully – from 2017, and only in about 4 years, we will be able to reach the figures of 7–8%.

[Full text](#)

*Senior research fellow of
the Razumkov Centre* **Volodymyr SIDENKO**



IN 2014 THERE WILL BE NO DEFAULT SINCE DEBTS HAVE BEEN RESRTICTED UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR

Ukraine will not declare default this year since until the beginning of 2015, no large external debt repayments have been planned. Currently, the external debt situation is relatively calm. There was a tense situation over whether Ukraine would be able to pay the debts of the National Joint-Stock Company Naftohas. By the end of the year, we will have only regular payments, no large ones are expected. There is also hope that IMF will continue funding. Although there was a lot of criticism, IMF has no plans to discontinue the tranches yet.

Cooperation of Ukraine with the EU and the World Bank is possible. This will create a good incentive which will give hope that private investors will begin to feel better about Ukraine. Next spring, investment may start coming back. We now have a huge investment gap, and when it is not closed, it is difficult to expect economic development. It is good that Ukraine will have no large payments until spring 2015 so I would not talk about default.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre* **VASYL YURCHYSHYN**

FALLING OIL PRICE HAS LIMITED IMPACT ON RUSSIAN ECONOMY

We cannot argue that the falling oil price will cause the collapse of Russia. In a month or two, Russian economy will not fall apart. Even at \$80 a barrel, Russian economy is more or less able to function normally at least for a year.

In long-term contracts, the gas price is tied to oil prices. Also, if oil is getting cheaper, gas prices should also go down. This is exactly the kind of contract between Ukraine and Russia. However, one can expect any unpredictable actions from Russia, especially when the formula by which they calculate the gas price for Ukraine can be interpreted in different ways. We should not expect an adequate gas policy from Russia. The oil price is also more than 60% of the gasoline price. Of course, in Ukraine, the effect of a decrease in the raw

material price are somewhat diminished by problems in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, gasoline prices are falling not as fast as we would like.

The decline in gasoline prices is held back by the problems of buying foreign currency that importers now have as well as by the fact that our petroleum products market is monopolised.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Energy Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*



THERE MAY BE NOT ENOUGH GAS FOR EVERYONE

We cannot say that the energy sector of Ukraine is 100% ready for the heating season, it is ready only partially. We currently have a serious shortage of both gas and coal, and these problems have not disappeared anywhere. Yet the situation is not critical. Of course, cuts are possible; in some regions, the reduction of gas supply pressure both for the households and the industry are possible. During certain periods of autumn and winter seasons, such disruptions in both power and gas supply are very likely.

However, there is every possibility for these cuts not to be that regular as they were in the 90s. However, the shortage of fuel encourages the government to work more quickly on the issue of procurement of scarce resources, which are primarily coal and gas from the European Union countries. The government managed to provide reverse supply although now it is reducing under the pressure from Russia, which is now putting pressure on Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

The issue of coal procurement should be addressed, this is a key problem. The next thing that needs to be done is to decide on the list of enterprises that are not-critical for the Ukrainian economy. For these enterprises, at critical times of energy supply, it should

be either reduced or even temporary cut off. For there can be situations when there are not enough energy sources for everyone.

First of all, consumption at critical times should be reduced for the industry when for the population such measures are a last resort.

Speaking of energy independence of Ukraine not only from Russia but also from Europe, it is absolutely possible. It is necessary to create conditions that would stimulate gas production. Also, the licensing system and economic leverage for gas production should be revised, which would create comfortable conditions for investors.

Energy conservation should also be taken into account. If appropriate measures are taken, Ukraine will be able to become fully energy independent in the next 5–7 years. Reverse gas supplies not only through Slovakia and Hungary should be also considered – now it is possible to implement a project of building a new bridge in Poland to increase the possibilities of the re-export of gas. In this way, we can fully get rid of dependence on gas supply from Russia.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Energy Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

THE EU COULD HAVE ALREADY GIVEN UP RUSSIAN GAS BUT IS ATTRACTED BY LOW PRICE

Europeans are currently reconsidering cooperation with Gazprom, and will slowly move away from Russian gas but it will not happen immediately. Now it is obvious that Europe is responding very slowly to the actions of Russia towards Ukraine so we should not expect any hard line towards Russia.

In general consumption, the European Union depends on Russian gas by 25%. This is not a critical amount, and Europe could give up this gas fairly easily. They have powerful enough terminals. However, this is a matter of price. For today for most European

countries, the matters of business rather than of geopolitical risks, which not everyone has realised yet, rank first.

As to Germany, it will not be too much trouble for them to give up Russian gas but it will cost a few extra billion dollars a year because, for example, gas from Qatar or Northern Africa will be slightly more expensive.

Full [text](#)


*Director of Energy Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

Sociology

This issue of the Newsletter presents data of the National Exit Poll on the results of the election in Ukraine on 26 October 2014. It was held by the Consortium which consists of The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation,


Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Oleksandr Razumkov. Official data of the CEC (as of 4pm, 28 October 2014) is also presented for comparison.

National exit poll*. % of respondents



* Exit-poll was conducted in those constituencies of Ukraine, where the voting was organized

Snap election of the people's deputies of Ukraine on 26 October 2014 % of processed protocols in Ukraine (99.93%)



News of the Razumkov Centre

THE MEETING OF EXPERTS OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE WITH AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF ITALY TO UKRAINE



On 10 October, the meeting of the representatives of the Razumkov Centre with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Italy to Ukraine Mr Fabrizio Romano was held. The Razumkov Centre was represented by Director of Economic Programmes V. Yurchyshyn and Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programmes of the Centre V. Zamiatin. During the meeting, the following topics were discussed – the course of the campaign of the special election to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and the issues of compliance with the Minsk Protocol, and the prospects for economic recovery in Ukraine.

PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSION THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DURING THE GERMAN WEEKS IN UKRAINE

During the German Weeks in Ukraine, on 10 October 2014, a podium discussion *The Price of Freedom* was held in the National Parliamentary Library, which was attended by Legal Research Consultant of the Razumkov Centre V. Musiyaka. The event was held against the backdrop of the recent transformation processes in Ukraine, and internal and external threats that the country is facing. Among the participants were Director of Munich Institute for Contemporary History Professor Andreas Wirsching, Ukrainian scholar, historian, and publicist Volodymyr Vyatrovych, and writer and journalist Andriy Liubka. Ambassador of Germany to Ukraine Christoph Weil welcomed everyone.

At the discussion, the participants analysed what price the countries of the former Eastern Bloc had to pay for democratic change and their political, social, and economic freedom; the role played by the European identity and shared cultural memory on the way to democratisation; and what conclusions Ukraine should draw from revolutions and transformation processes in Central and South-Eastern Europe. The participants of the event discussed the most necessary reforms for Ukraine today and shared their views on the specific assistance needed from the European Union for the development of the rule-of-law state.

ATTENDANCE OF THE OSCE CONFERENCE

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes O. Melnyk attended the OSCE conference (OSCE FOCUS 2014) Ukraine and European Security: Future Prospects, held in Geneva on 10–11 October 2014. The conference was held by the MFA of Switzerland, given its presidency in OSCE, and Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

The conference was attended by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier, representatives of the UN and the EU, ambassadors of the leading countries to OSCE, including ambassador of Russia and deputy permanent representative of Ukraine in OSCE.

The main topic of the discussion was the role of OSCE in settling the Ukrainian-Russian crisis.

THE MEETING OF EXPERTS OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE WITH THE CANADIAN ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

On 13 October 2014, a meeting with the delegation of the Canadian Election Observation Mission (CANEOM), headed by Mission Director Jamie Tronnes, was held in the Razumkov Centre. The Razumkov Centre was represented by Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programmes V. Zamiatin and Expert of Political and Legal Programmes A. Stetskiv. During the meeting, the experts of the Centre were familiarised with the Mission's activities and discussed the pressing issues of holding the special election of people's deputies of Ukraine on 26 October 2014. The possibility of further cooperation was also discussed.

THE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF SLOVAKIA TO UKRAINE

On 15 October, the meeting of the representatives of the Razumkov Centre with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Slovakia to Ukraine Juraj Sivachek was held.

The Razumkov Centre was represented by Director General A. Rachok and Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Y. Yakymenko.

The following topics were discussed – current socio-political situation in Ukraine, the intensification of international cooperation between Ukraine and the countries of the Visegrad Group, using practical experience of Slovakia in the process of the European integration of Ukraine, and the prospects of cooperation between the Razumkov Centre and the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Ukraine in facilitating these processes.

UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES
NAMED AFTER OLEKSANDR RAZUMKOV

Address: 01015, Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Telephone (044) 201 11 98, fax (044) 201 11 99
Feedback: newsletter@razumkov.org.ua