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THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

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ON THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT

Recently, the Parliament has adopted the Law on the Anti-Corruption Court. This court will consider criminal cases involving corrupt officials. In the US, for instance, all courts are anti-corruption. In order to bring the so-called VIP corrupt officials to justice there is no need to create special courts, which is by the way prohibited by the Constitution of Ukraine – it prohibits the creation of separate special courts. My idea is to create district anti-corruption courts at each NABU administration in Kharkiv, Odesa, Lviv and Kyiv. In Kyiv, besides the district court, a court of appeal has to be created, and an Anti-Corruption Division in the Supreme Court.

Full [text](#)

Razumkov Centre Scientific Consultant on Legal Issues
Viktor MUSIIAKA



PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED, NOT LIFTED

There are three Constitutional Court decisions that clearly state that parliamentary immunity is not a deputy's personal privilege, but a protection mechanism. And now this mechanism is about to be removed. Even the Venice Commission has already expressed its opinion that Ukraine cannot completely destroy parliamentary immunity. It should just be brought to the right state.

Lifting deputies' immunity will lead to the situation, where many issues will be solved "through setting corresponding tasks for the parliament".

It should be clearly defined that a deputy must be detained at the crime scene, without a doubt. But there should be parliamentary approval to bring him to justice. Law enforcement authorities must have the right to detain MPs at the crime scene or right after the crime has been committed.

Full [text](#)

Razumkov Centre Scientific Consultant on Legal Issues
Viktor MUSIIAKA

NEW RISKS OF WAR

Until its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has never dared to wage such an open, unwarranted aggression in over 25 years of its strategic – geopolitical and civilisational – confrontation with the West. Over time, NATO and EU expansion, "humanitarian interventions", "colour revolutions", and regime change have led to the development of a single, approved, comprehensive assessment of threats, and since 2014, this assessment is no longer ambiguous.

The new reality in relations between Russia and the West is best described by the term "antagonism" or, using a more precise term – "rivalry". Same as in the days of USSR and the Cold War, the threat coming from Russia has a systemic character. But, unlike the well-structured "system of two worlds" that clearly defined the opposing sides during the Cold War, the current system has lost its clear boundaries and its former cohesion, and is characterised by a high level of interdependence and adaptability. Relations between these systems became more unpredictable, there emerged lies and mutual distrust

(thanks to the Kremlin chromosome, which includes not just the violent, but also the criminal component). Now, there are less rules and "regimes" (including the arms control regime), which kept the Cold War confrontation within acceptable boundaries. At least after the removal of Khrushchev from power, the USSR honestly followed the agreements on nuclear weapons, and did not allow itself to openly threaten with their use. It would not have allowed its allies like Assad's Syria to use chemical weapons, to say nothing of facilitating such use. And even if the USSR had decided to destroy each of its opponents (which it had all the possibilities for), it would not have done it in secret.

Full [text](#)

*External International Security
Scientific Consultant of the Razumkov Centre*
James SHERR



UKRAINE AND RUSSIA – THE END OF BROTHERHOOD

As shown by results of the survey conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre together with Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2017, public opinion tends to lean towards the idea that Ukrainians and Russians have little in common. Respondents were asked to choose from three statements – "Ukrainians and

Russians have always been and remain fraternal nations", "Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations before, but they are not now" and "Ukrainian and Russians have never been fraternal nations".

Only about a quarter (27%) of respondents agreed with the first statement. Over three thirds (66%) of

respondents disagree with the statement about the two nations' fraternal relations – it is those, who believe that Ukrainians and Russians used to be fraternal nations before, but they are not now (50%), and those, who think that Ukrainian and Russians have never been fraternal nations (16%).

In the West and Centre, supporters of the idea that Ukrainians and Russians remain fraternal nations are a minority (11% and 17%, respectively). As for the South and East, here the percentages of those, who support the fraternal relations idea and those, who do not share it, have no statistically significant differences; in the South – 45% and 45%, in the East – 48% and 47%, respectively.

The percentage of those, who support the fraternal relations idea goes down with the age of respondents (from 37% percent among 60 y.o. and older respondents, and up to 19% among respondent younger than 30 y.o.). Among ethnic Ukrainians, 26% believe that Ukrainians and Russians are fraternal

nations, and 68% do not agree with this statement, among ethnic Russians – respectively 44% and 48% (i.e. in the latter case, these two percentages had no significant differences). And, judging by the fact that among those Russian citizens of Ukraine, who do not believe that Russia-Ukraine relations are that of a brotherhood, two thirds (67%) associate Russia with aggression, it is clear that abandoning the “Russia-Ukraine brotherhood” idea, they are distancing themselves not from Ukrainians, but from those Russians on the other side of the border, who support Putin's policy.

Full [text](#)

*Deputy Director of
the Sociological Service
Mykhailo MISHCHENKO*



National Security and Defence

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF JAVELINS

Javelins should not be considered a magical weapon or a cure-all. Rather, their effect is political. The most important thing is that the decision on supplying these weapons to Ukraine has finally been approved. There was also non-public work on technical aspects. Prior to submitting its proposals on the political decision, Americans have conducted significant preparations in Ukraine in order to provide proper conditions for supplying Javelins.

They assessed not only the ability of the Ukrainian military to efficiently use the weapons, a lot of aspects were also connected with its physical preservation, intellectual property protection, export control. The Americans had to be sure that this technologically new weapon would not be lost, stolen, and that it would not be illegally transferred to the other side.



*Co-director of Foreign Policy and
International Security Programmes
Oleksii MELNYK*

And I am stressing this aspect, because through it Ukraine received a certificate of reliability and loyalty from the US. And this opens up the path for future ambitious supplies. Because, once the process has been a success, any procurements or free shipments that follow, will take much less time.

As for the escalation that Javelin shipments could have caused, this was rather about potential threats from Russia. For such arguments have a clear refutation – Javelins are defensive, not offensive weapons. So, given both the nature of these weapons and their quantity – they could not have stimulated Ukraine to go on the offensive.

Yes, Javelins do have a clear effect of deterrence. And I think that if it comes to their practical use, this should be a carefully planned operation: not just one shot at one tank, but a more or less large-scale use.

And as soon as the other side sees that a certain number of their tanks that have reached the shooting distance are instantly destroyed with a 100% probability (or close to that), – it will indeed have a significant psychological and tactical effect on the enemy.

Full [text](#)

THE WORLD HAS REACHED A DANGEROUS LINE

After the last chemical attack in Syria and as a result of US and allies' air strikes at the sites controlled by Bashar Assad, Vladimir Putin and the West have reached a dangerous line. Kremlin has just one more serious bargaining chip – nuclear weapons – which puts the world on the brink of a major war.


Syria was one more instance of the red line being crossed regarding the use of chemical weapons. Many experts agree that keeping Bashar Assad in power is not the main goal of Russia's policy. The main goal is to demonstrate that Russia “is rising from its knees”, that everyone should be afraid of it and agree to everything at its first demand.

If Russia loses in the situation with Syria, it will mean its defeat by the Western coalition. Which will be followed by an offensive in all areas: economy, finance, information, etc. Russia will be pressured to return to the boundaries that it has originally crossed. This can lead to two situations: either Russia agrees

to a compromise in Donbas and Crimea, or Putin gets even angrier and goes on the offensive. Starting an offensive with the so-called “DNR-LNR” units currently existing in Donbas will not be particularly effective. Ukraine's Armed Forces now exceed the Donbas militants by their capacity. And if Russia uses its artillery, missile troops and army aviation – it will mark its open involvement in the conflict, which will lead to Russia being recognised as a party to the conflict, and the loss of its veto power at the UN Security Council. Putin is unlikely to go for it, as he is able to think strategically.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*



AZOV SEA THREAT

In connection with the detaining of Ukrainian ships in the Sea of Azov, we should understand that the threat is coming from both the Azov Sea and the Black Sea. And our army is preparing for it. It is considering the possibility of a strike from different directions and is preparing appropriate forces and infrastructure to react in case of the slightest danger. The other issue is that these forces are not enough. So, they are using everything there is. The coastline is armed with artillery and mines.

Thus, there is no doubt that the army sees the danger and is preparing for it, yet as of today, it does not have enough border or naval forces in either

the Black or the Azov Sea to prevent Russia from detaining Ukrainian vessels. There are problems with the numbers and the technical level. Our naval forces do not have vessels that could effectively confront the threat. At the moment, the shipment of two US motorboats for Ukraine's border service is being discussed. Also, there is talk of building a certain number of such vessels in Ukrainian industrial facilities. But as of now, this is not enough.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*

ALLIED FORCES OPERATION: HOW IS THE NEW FORMAT DIFFERENT FROM ATO?

Assessing the transformation of the ATO into the Allied Forces Operation, it is worth noting that the change of format will allow to improve the management of the troops and the field forces in general. The difference is that all the forces are now subordinated to the Joint Headquarters. This removes the uncertainty that was previously there, when the Anti-Terrorism Centre seemed to be in charge, main tasks were the responsibility of the General Headquarters, and as a result, it was unclear who was subordinated to whom, and what the order process

was, who commanded whom. The new format will allow for proper regulation of forces and means involved in the current situation. Thus, management will become more efficient. Therefore, in the event of any unforeseen actions on the part of the enemy, response time is significantly reduced. Besides, logistical support will become much more efficient as well. Everything will be managed by one entity.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*

MINE CLEARANCE OF DONBAS WILL TAKE MANY YEARS

According to the Ministry of Defence, there are about 7 thousand sq.km of terrain with unexploded ordnance in Donetsk and Luhansk oblast areas under Ukrainian government control. As of today, only 25 hectares of agricultural land was cleared. According to the UN calculations, a year of war equals ten years of mine clearance. Which means that even if the war stops now, Ukraine still has 40 years of work on eastern lands ahead of it to make them fertile again. However, everything depends on the frequency of shellings and mining, type of terrain and the mines

used. According to some estimates, it will take 10-15 years to clear Donbas lands and billions in funding. Ukraine will not be able to tackle this task alone, it will need international assistance.

Full [text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Policy and
International Security Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Mykhailo PASHKOV*



Economy

ELECTIONS AND SUMMER SEASON: WHAT WILL HAPPEN WITH EXCHANGE RATE?

In the near future, dollar will strengthen a little. One of the key contributing factors will possibly be the gradual rising up to speed of Donald Trump's initiatives to reduce tax pressure on infrastructure projects. Summer is usually the time, when hryvnia strengthens. Yet this is more a seasonal factor than a macroeconomic one, because this year, the main risks are associated with the elections. The election factor will start taking effect in the fall, which will not affect the exchange rate at once. Often, elections mean the inflow of foreign investment. We can even see hryvnia strengthen a little in September-October due to the

start of pre-election financing. However, all of this will not strongly affect the exchange rate. Fluctuations will be small – within the range of 26 UAH per dollar give or take one hryvnia.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



THERE ARE REASONS TO EXPECT A POSITIVE EXPORT DYNAMIC

There are reasons to talk about an expansion of Ukrainian products' export to the EU and also expect further positive export dynamic.

The first reason is that we have lost a significant volume of export supplies in the previous 2-3 years, so, in part, it can be the restoration of the previous volume, but more importantly, at the moment Ukrainian and global economies are on a slight rise.

Thus, there is a tendency for a gradual increase in exports, especially if we can engage in more active negotiations on free trade areas with Turkey, Israel, Southeast Asia countries.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

NEW INCREASE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE: WHAT IS THE RISK AND HOW WILL THIS ACCELERATE INFLATION?

Recently, the Minister of Social Policy Andrii Reva stated that there are grounds for raising the minimum wage already today.

In this situation, it is important to raise not only the minimum wage, but also all social standards – the subsistence minimum, pensions, so that everything is synchronised. As the minimum wage was increased to 3,200 UAH, on the one hand, this was a good thing, but on the other – a part of workers started working part-time, a part – working in the shadows, meanwhile, the subsistence minimum remained the same.

Today, wages are not the main factor of inflation, it is influenced much more by administration of different markets, particularly, that of communal services. Another factor is currency shocks. Even if the minimum wage is increased in several months, inflation expectations will hardly be too high.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

Energy Sector

NORD STREAM 2 CAN MEAN A MAJOR REDUCTION OF GAS TRANSIT THROUGH UKRAINE

As a result of Nord Stream 2 launch, Ukraine could lose about 50 bln. cu. m of its current volume of gas transit (90 bln. cu. m). In addition, the TurkStream that is being built will also take away a certain volume of transit gas, so the situation for Ukraine can become much more complicated.

Germany and German companies' interest is to diversify their gas supplies and have several transportation routes. Both, economic interests and politics are intertwined here. And while on the part of Germany, it is probably mostly business, Russia is largely interested in the political aspect.

At the same time, neither party is taking into account Ukraine's position in this situation, so currently

Ukraine is in a weak position. The powerful players are acting in their own interest, letting Ukraine know about the done deal at the most. Today, Ukrainian authorities are incapable of formulating a clear energy policy and standing strong defending Ukraine's interests.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Energy Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre
Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*



Foreign Policy

THE WEST WILL BE PUSHING THE DONBAS ISSUE TO THE BACK FOR A WHILE

Donbas issues and the prospects of peacekeeping force introduction are important and topical for the West in general. But at the moment, clearly, western leaders are preoccupied with problems in other regions: America's withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, followed by the meeting between US and DPRK leaders. Which means that for the time being, Donbas issues will be pushed to the background. But this does not mean that they lost their importance and are being postponed for a long time.

20th-anniversary EU-Ukraine summit is scheduled for the summer. Certain success has definitely been achieved in the four years of our Eurointegration:

visa-free travel, full-fledged operation of the EU Association Agreement, and a number of other steps that our partners have noted and positively assessed, including, in European Commission resolutions and documents. Overall, it is unclear, what baggage Ukraine takes to the summit and what resolution will be adopted there, as in the previous summit, no final document was adopted due to the contradictions between Ukraine and certain EU countries.

Full [text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Policy and International Security
Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykhailo PASHKOV*

BATTLE FOR SYRIA

Clearly, any dictatorship has a goal of keeping the territory that is under its control. But the division of Syria can be seen as an inevitable consequence of the current situation in the Middle East.

It is necessary to understand that there are several parties at once interested in the division of Syria. First of all, Turkey is interested to have no separatist Kurdish regions on its borders. So, Ankara is trying to secure its southern border.

Besides, Iran itself is striving to become the region's leader. Here, it sees its probably last ally that would ensure its regional influence. On Syrian territory, Iran can gain regions that are, first, loyal to Iran's regime, and second, can present a united front

in its fight against Israel. Iran's main opponents in the region are Saudi Arabia and Israel.

It is through Iran that all logistical support for Hamas (that stands against Israel) is ensured. Russia is also interested in its share of this pie. Foremost, in the regions with bases, for instance, Tartus. Then, also in the territories with potential gas pipelines. However, the US and the EU that has its own economic interests are not at all keen on this idea.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes of
the Razumkov Centre
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*

The national survey of Ukrainian population was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre from 19 to 25 May 2018 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Number of respondents – 2019, age – from 18 y.o. Theoretical error of the sample does not exceed 2.3%.

For more details on the results of opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre, go to our website at <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>.

**At the moment, it is difficult to say, who will be taking part in the presidential election.
Who would you vote for from the candidate list below?**
% of respondents


	<i>For all respondents</i>	<i>For those, who plan to vote</i>
Yulia Tymoshenko	10.1	13.3
Anatolii Hrytsenko	7.3	9.4
Yurii Boiko	6.6	8.4
Petro Poroshenko	5.4	7.6
Oleh Liashko	5.8	7.4
Sviatoslav Vakarchuk	4.7	5.6
Vadym Rabinovych	4.2	5.5
Volodymyr Zelenskyi	3.9	5.0
Andrii Sadovyi	2.5	3.5
Oleh Tiahnybok	2.2	3.0
Volodymyr Groysman	1.7	2.2
Dmytro Yarosh	1.2	1.4
Nadiia Savchenko	0.8	0.9
Petro Symonenko	0.8	0.9
Arseniy Yatseniuk	0.7	0.9
Vitaliy Klitschko	0.5	0.6
Viktor Chumak	0.3	0.3
Other politician	8.4	9.7
Would not vote	14.7	–
Hard to say	18.3	14.6

If elections to the verkhovna rada were to take part next sunday, which political party would you vote for?
% of respondents

	<i>For all respondents</i>	<i>For those, who plan to vote</i>
"All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Y. Tymoshenko)	10.0	12.6
"Civic Position" party (A. Hrytsenko)	8.1	10.7
"Opposition Bloc" party (Y. Boiko)	6.3	8.5
Political party "For Life" (V. Rabinovych, Ye. Muraiev)	6.0	8.1
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	5.7	7.9
"Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"	5.6	7.8
"Self Help Union" (A. Sadovyi)	3.7	5.1
"Servant of the People" political party (I. Bakanov, V. Zelenskyi)	4.1	5.0
"All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (O. Tiahnybok)	2.4	3.3
"Left Opposition" (Communist party of Ukraine and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine) (P. Symonenko, N. Vitrenko)	1.2	1.3
"Civic Movement "People's Control" party (D. Dobrodomov)	0.9	1.2
"Governmental Initiative of Yarosh" party (D. Yarosh)	1.1	1.2
"Civic Platform of Nadia Savchenko" party (N. Savchenko)	0.9	1.1
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (V. Skotsyk)	0.7	0.9
"People's Front" party (A. Yatseniuk)	0.7	0.8
"Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP" (D. Borysenko, B. Filatov)	0.8	0.8
"National Corps" party (A. Biletskyi)	0.5	0.6
"Movement of New Forces" party (M. Saakashvili)	0.4	0.6
"Right Sector" party (A. Tarasenko)	0.3	0.5
Social Democratic Party (S. Kaplin)	0.3	0.5
Political party "Civic Movement "Hvylia" (V. Chumak, V. Kasko, N. Novak)	0.4	0.4
People's Movement of Ukraine (V. Kryvenko)	0.2	0.2
"Revival" party (V. Bondar)	0.2	0.2
"Our Land" party (Yu. Hranaturov)	0.2	0.2
Political party "Syla Lyudey" (Yu. Bova)	0.2	0.2
People's Party (V. Lytvyn)	0.1	0.2
Political party "Democratic Alliance" (V. Hatsko, V. Ptashnik)	0.1	0.2
"Strong Ukraine" party (S. Tihipko)	0.1	0.1
Other party	5.4	6.3
Would not vote	15.5	–
Hard to say/Refused to respond	18.1	13.3

DEAR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN!

Razumkov Centre presents a new issue of the National Security and Defence journal No.3-4, 2017, "Political Culture and Parliamentarism in Ukraine: Current State and Main Problems".



The journal contains information and analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre, expert articles and interviews, as well as participant opinions from the Expert Discussion "Political Culture in Ukrainian Society and the State of Parliamentarism at the Present Stage: Problems and Development Trends, Ways of Improvement" (Kyiv, 14 December 2017).

Information and analytical materials are grouped into two sections and recommendations. Section one presents results of the national sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Centre, which outline the current state of citizens' political culture, their level of knowledge about the political system and its institutes, attitude to them, political values and orientations, level of civic and political participation, as well as analytical summaries on the basis of this data. Section two talks about topical issues in the development of parliamentarism in Ukraine. It formulates recommendations for government agencies and civil society institutes aimed at developing political culture and raising the level of efficiency of parliamentarism in Ukraine.

Results of Ukrainian MPs' survey may be of particular interest to the reader.

For the electronic version of the journal, go to:

http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD171-172_2017_eng.pdf

PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 2018 (BERLIN)

On 28-29 May 2018, the Global Solutions Summit took place in Berlin, which was a Think 20 dialogue event aimed at providing analytical support for the G20 Buenos Aires (Argentina) summit in November 2018. Berlin Global Solutions forum, which became an intermediate step in preparation for the September 2018 global T20 summit in Argentina, was attended by over 1,100 participants from all the continents. There were representatives of world's leading research centres and universities, top business structures, civil society organisations, international organisations involved in global regulation, as well as prominent politicians. Ukraine's Razumkov Centre Scientific Consultant on Economic Issues Volodymyr Sidenko participated in the event.

Global Solutions Summit 2018 organised by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and Global Solutions Initiative in close cooperation with organisers of the G20 summit in Argentina received extraordinary support from the German government. This was demonstrated by the fact that Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and Federal Minister of Finance and Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke at the summit, as well as the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas and Federal Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Minister Svenja Schulze.

Significance of the forum was also stressed by the presence and speeches by Nobel Prize laureates in Economics George Akerlof, Edmund Phelps, James Heckman, Professor at Columbia University (USA) and United Nations Secretary-General's Special Adviser Jeffrey Sachs, and others.

For more information, go to:

<http://razumkov.org.ua/novyny-tsentru/uchast-u-forumi-hlobalni-rishennia-2018-berlin>

RAZUMKOV CENTRE EXPERT DISCUSSION "GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS: WORLD ECONOMY AND UKRAINE"

On June 7, Razumkov Centre held an expert discussion titled "Global Trends and Prospects: World Economy and Ukraine".

The discussion was conducted as part of Razumkov Centre project with support of Hanns Seidel Foundation Office in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Among the participants, there were representatives of legislative and executive authorities, banking and financial sectors, researchers, government and independent experts from Ukraine, as well as representatives of foreign embassies and international organisations.

An analytical publication was presented and the following issues were discussed:

- global trends and factors, risks and components of today's economic environment and the new "normal";
- the influence of global processes and structural changes in Ukraine's economy, the task of macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary balancing;
- institutional support for strengthening of innovation, investment and infrastructure directions of economic policy for accelerated development of the country.

RAZUMKOV CENTRE PANEL DISCUSSION "THREE COMPONENTS OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY SECURITY: REFORMS, INVESTMENT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION"

On 30 May 2018, Razumkov Centre held a panel discussion titled: "Three Components of Ukraine's Energy Security: Reforms, Investment, European Integration".

Speakers at the event included: Edward Chow, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.), Torsten Woellert, European Commission Team Leader for Energy and Environment of the Support Group for Ukraine, and Volodymyr Omelchenko, Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre.

During the discussion, the following issues were considered:

- the reform of natural gas and electricity markets: restraining factors and possible ways to accelerate the implementation of secondary legislation;
- attracting foreign investors into the process of privatisation and renovation of Ukraine's energy infrastructure;
- attracting investment for RES development: modernisation of legislation with the purpose of harmonising investors' and consumers' interests;
- synchronisation of the Ukrainian power system with ENTSO-E: prospects and outcomes;
- Ukrainian GTS and Nord Stream-2: common interests of Ukraine and Europe

RAZUMKOV CENTRE CO-ORGANISED A CONFERENCE IN LONDON – “REFORMS IN UKRAINE: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN 2018”

On 24 April 2018, Razumkov Centre held a joint conference with Chatham House, Eurasia Center and Atlantic Council: “Reforms in Ukraine: Progress and Challenges in 2018”.

What is the state of reforms in Ukraine? How will the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections affect Ukraine's reforms and development prospects? What are the next steps for resolving the most relevant issues of socio-economic development and capacity-building in Ukraine's security sector?

These and other important issues were discussed during the event. Participants included:

Pavlo Pynzenyk, Chairman, Razumkov Centre Board; First Deputy Chairman, Verkhovna Rada Committee on Rules of Parliamentary Procedure and Support to Work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; US Ambassador to Ukraine (2003 -2006)

Viktor Galasiuk, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship

Janet Gunn, Independent Analyst

Yuriy Yakymenko, Director, Political and Legal Programmes, Razumkov Centre

Vasyl Yurchyshyn, Director, Economic Programmes, Razumkov Centre

Orysia Lutsevych, Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House

Oleksiy Melnyk, Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Razumkov Centre

Craig Oliphant, Senior Advisor, Foreign Policy Centre

James Nixey, Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

RAZUMKOV CENTRE HELD A ROUND TABLE ON “PECULIARITIES OF RELIGIOUS AND CHURCH SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: 2010-2018 TRENDS”.

On 26 April 2018, Razumkov Centre together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine, supported by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations and the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Culture and Spirituality, conducted a regular meeting of the ongoing Round Table “Religion and Government in Ukraine: Interaction

Issues”. The following topic was proposed for discussion: “Peculiarities of Religious and Church Self-Identification of Ukrainian Citizens: 2010-2018 Trends”.

The following issues were discussed:

- Religious and church self-identification of Ukrainian citizens: causes for changes in recent years.
- Do social and civic positions of churches and religious organisations of Ukraine match the current needs of society?
- Development prospects for the church-religion situation, inter-denominational and state-church relations in Ukraine.

Razumkov Centre has prepared [information and analytical materials](#) for the meeting. In particular, these materials contained results of a sociological study of the current state and trends of religious commitment within Ukrainian society (the study was conducted on 23-28 March 2018).

PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE AWARDED THE STATE PRIZE IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE SCIENTIFIC CONSULTANT OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE

The President of Ukraine awarded the State Prize in science and technology to the scientific consultant of the Razumkov Centre Sidenko Volodymyr Romanovych and the team of authors for their work “Institutional Transformation of Ukraine's Financial and Economic System in the Context of Globalisation”.

Razumkov Centre sincerely congratulates Volodymyr Romanovych with national appreciation of his work.

PARTICIPATION OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE IN PRESENTATION OF “SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN KHARKIV OBLAST” STUDY

On May 14, the sociological study of the “Socio-Political Situation in Kharkiv Oblast” was presented. Research was conducted in April-May 2018, initiated by the Global Strategy Institute together with the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research named after O. Yaremenko, Razumkov Centre and “Social Monitoring” Centre.

Presentation participants included: Political Studies Expert, Director of Global Strategy Institute Vadym Karasov; Head of the Board of the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research named after O. Yaremenko Olha Balakireva, Director of “Social Monitoring” Centre Dmytro Dmytruk, Deputy Director of the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre Mykhailo Mishchenko.

Sociological Study Materials

PARTICIPATION OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE IN THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

On 9 June 2018, Co-Director of the Foreign Policy and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre M. Pashkov took part in the Second Interparliamentary Conference “Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: Strengthening the Interparliamentary Component of Regional and Security Cooperation, While Developing Interaction with the EU and NATO”.

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