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THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

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RAZUMKOV CENTRE HAS GONE UP IN THE RANKING OF WORLD'S LEADING THINK TANKS

In 2016, Razumkov Centre has improved its position in the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report annually presented by the Lauder Institute of the University of Pennsylvania (USA) since 2006. It is the only representative from Ukraine in nomination «Top Think Tanks Worldwide».

Razumkov Centre holds:

- 55th place among 175 top think tanks worldwide, including USA (2015 – 60th place out of 150);
- 36th place among 137 top think tanks excluding USA (2015 – 42nd);
- 5th place among the Top 90 Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe.

Razumkov Centre also ranked among the top think tanks in 7 other nominations, such as best managed think tank and think tanks with the most efficient use of budget.

The work on determining top think tanks for the Global Index Report included over 6,500 think tanks and over 7,500 experts worldwide, journalists, representatives of donor institutions. According to study

conditions, it was not allowed to define a think tank's own ranking.

[«Global Go To Think Tank Index Report» Presentation](#)

[View full 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report](#)

Domestic Policy

POLITICAL PREDICTIONS FOR 2017

It is highly probable that we will manage to avoid early parliamentary elections in 2017. They can happen only in case of extraordinary developments that would lead to a political crisis, create legal conditions for termination of Verkhovna Rada's powers and bring the President to make the decision to dissolve the Parliament. But these would have to be exceptional circumstances, as this process requires consent of all parties: the majority of MPs and the President. Thus, with the current political configuration, and on condition that political and socio-economic processes in the country will be developing more or less consistently, without sudden aggravations of the conflict in Donbas, there will be no elections this year.

At the same time, we must understand that the coalition, the Government, and the distribution of positions in it, – are the product of political compromise, which helped avoid early elections last year and somewhat stabilise the overall government system. And since no other coalition configurations are currently in sight, I do not think that there will be any drastic changes in the Government. Although replacements in some of the less sensitive ministerial positions are quite possible.

They can occur due to problems in implementation or negative consequences of implementation of

ambitious plans set by the Government.

However, there will be plenty of reasons for concern within the power structures. They will have to operate under limited finances. For instance, cooperation with IMF raises complicated issues of pension reform, introduction of the land market, reform of social security system, elimination of benefits for small and medium enterprises. Hryvnia's exchange rate stability, accusations against NBU head will remain a sensitive issue.

As for the format of the coalition itself, its problems are usually exacerbated in light of forthcoming elections. Coalition is government, and government needs to assume responsibility and bear the main blow of people's criticism. So before elections, all political forces, in varying degrees, wish to distance themselves from government, as in our country opposition enjoys better attitude. This is the natural logic. So tensions in the coalition are likely to rise. Nevertheless, the coalition will still exist in the form of situational engagement of additional votes, as done previously. The configuration of the current parliament will include the coalition and several opposition groups with different degrees of «oppositionism». Emerging of a united opposition is unlikely, due to presence of Opposition Bloc in the ranks of opposition, and competition between other opposition factions.

So 2017 will be challenging, and if the entire power system manages to go through it successfully, it will already be a positive outcome.

Full [text](#)



Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre
Yuriy YAKYMENKO



NATO MEMBERSHIP REFERENDUM DREAMS

President Poroshenko's words about the intention to hold a referendum on Ukraine's membership in NATO are surprising, as, if I remember correctly, the Alliance sent clear messages on numerous occasions that they are not welcoming us there right now.

But if the government indeed wants to hold this referendum and expects positive outcomes, it should first prepare appropriate legislative framework for the plebiscite. The current law on referendums is unconstitutional from all angles. Everyone knows what it is, and it is pending consideration in the Constitutional Court, which has still made no decision as to it. Holding a referendum on joining NATO according to this law would be utmost hypocrisy. Constitutional Court has to recognise this law as unconstitutional, after which we need to develop an adequate, democratic draft law on referendums. Also, I would like to draw the Constitutional Commission's attention to the fact that while we are at war, with the annexed Crimea, unclear situation in the East, over two million of internally displaced persons, and a certain percentage of potential participants of this referendum in the occupied territories

of Donbas, Russia will file hundreds and thousands of petitions to the European Court of Human Rights. Petitions that Ukrainian government violates human rights in Donbas in conducting the referendum, and that Ukraine must ensure these people's right to express their opinion as well.

So, if we are to speak about Ukraine joining NATO even hypothetically, this has to happen on a well-planned basis: proper referendum legislation, legitimate CEC, as well as clear understanding of the scope of the plebiscite, – who will take part in it, and how to ensure the right to participate in the referendum for all citizens of Ukraine.

Full [text](#)

*Research fellow on Legal Issues
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Viktor MUSIYAKA*



COMPROMISE WOULD IMPERIL UKRAINE

In December 2016, one of Ukraine's most influential figures, Viktor Pinchuk, declared (in his article for The Wall Street Journal) that pre-emptive and 'painful' compromises would be needed to forestall a US-Russian bargain 'over the heads of more than 40 million Ukrainians'. The path of compromise is hardly new for Pinchuk, son-in-law of Ukraine's second president, Leonid Kuchma, a prominent philanthropist and one of the richest people in Ukraine, with long-standing business ties to Russia.

Unlike some other prominent figures, it is rare to find Pinchuk accused of being a front man for Russia's interests. Nevertheless, he has been a consistent proponent of a conciliatory course: a policy hospitable towards the West, respectful of Russian red lines and critical of those who believe that Ukraine must choose between one side and the other. Yet in this text with the proposal to settle for a compromise with Russia, Pinchuk contradicts himself. Despite his laudable goals – preserving 'Ukraine's right to choose its own way, safeguard its territorial integrity and build a successful country' – his solutions effectively abandon them. They call for 'temporarily' renouncing the goal

of EU membership, pursuing 'for now' an 'alternative security arrangement' with NATO and perhaps most controversially, holding local elections in occupied areas before 'conditions for fair elections exist'. Such compromises would mean Ukraine's succumbing to Russia without any obligations or safeguards. Once agreed, such temporary arrangements create a new reality and destroy the existing EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine relations. They also create a new dynamic which Russia can be expected to use in order to secure Ukraine's subordination, first de facto and then de jure. There is no reason to think that any unilateral concession offered will deflect Russia from these ends, which it pursued doggedly even when Ukraine was a 'non-bloc' (i.e. non-aligned) state.

Full [text](#)

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James SHERR*



Energy Sector

EFFICIENT WORK OF THE ENERGY UNION WILL ENSURE CONSISTENT AND COMPREHENSIVE, INSTEAD OF SELECTIVE, COMPLIANCE

Over the last three years, the national energy market has been undergoing profound transformations. The reform covers key energy sectors: natural gas and electricity. Adoption of the Law «On Natural Gas Market» in 2015 was an important event that advanced the development of natural gas market. The law established the need to separate regional gas companies by isolating regional gas network operator functions from natural gas supplier functions. This process had to be completed within 2016. As for the electricity market, in September 2016, Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Law «On National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities», and a draft law «On Electricity Market in Ukraine» in the first reading.

Preservation and development of Ukrainian gas transportation system is currently under threat, owing

to the creation of alternatives to avoid Ukrainian natural gas transportation routes from Russia to the EU. In this context, on 28 October 2016, the European Commission (EC) has made an unexpected decision on increasing capacity of OPAL gas pipeline, which is the extension of the onshore section of Nord Stream gas pipeline, thereby strengthening Russia's gas monopoly in the European gas market.

According to government representatives and international experts in energy sector, this decision will allow Gazprom to start an active campaign on completion of Nord Stream 2 project. As a result of Opal gas pipeline decision, NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy can lose up to €380 million in revenues annually.

An important argument against the decision of the European Commission is the need to respect the main

goals and objectives set at the time of establishing the Energy Community. These goals include creating an integrated natural gas market, improving the reliability of resource supplies, and the development of competition in the gas market. Members of the Energy Community are to refrain from any action that could jeopardise the goal.

In our opinion, efficient operation of the Energy Union will ensure consistent and comprehensive, not selective, compliance with legal requirements, along with rules and principles of EU directives and regulations, as well as the Third Energy Package. In this regard, Ukraine urges the EU and the Energy Community to take into

account Ukraine's interests in making decisions related to the development of energy supply routes, along with ensuring their security and the appropriate level of competition across the integrated European energy market.

[Full text](#)

*Director General
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Anatolii RACHOK*



IS IT POSSIBLE NOT TO BUY COAL FROM LNR/DNR?

Activists' blocking of railway sections on the border with non-Kyiv-controlled territories drew attention to economic relations with the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR, in particular, to the issue of coal supply from the temporarily occupied territories.

Activists started blocking railroad tracks in late January, calling on Ukrainian authorities to stop the trade with the «illegal armed formations».

It is necessary to recognise that dependence on the coal from the uncontrolled territories is critical. I believe that if all four railroad tracks are blocked, we shall have severe energy supply problems. First of all, this will affect areas adjacent to the front-line. Next, it will affect Dnipro.

In spring 2016, National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities adopted a controversial decision to include the price of coal in Rotterdam port plus shipping to Ukraine in the electricity tariff.

Responding to many critics of this decision, its proponents said: it will allow Ukrainian energy companies to make timely purchases of sufficient amounts of coal for their TPPs, which would not have to import the difficult-to-obtain anthracite.

Meanwhile, the cost of electricity for consumers due to the 'Rotterdam+' formula increased by 15-20%. However, this formula did not have any effect on easing of imports and diversification of anthracite supplies. And it remains unclear, why the government has done nothing during the two heating seasons to withdraw from dependence on coal supply from the uncontrolled territories. So this objective should be clearly defined now. We need to stop the trade of all commodities, except coal, with the occupied territories. At the same time, we need to set the goal to minimise dependence on anthracite from these regions already this year, – use more gas coal, purchase imported coal, and make more use of nuclear power capacities.

[Full text](#)

*Volodymyr OMELCHENKO,
Director of Energy Programmes
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Foreign Policy

FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: TRENDS AND PERSONALITIES

Current trends in Europe, which became especially prominent after Brexit and Donald Trump's victory in the US Presidential election, can be described as the gradual decline of traditional mainstream right- and left-wing political parties. Both right and left shifted to the centre, moving away from their traditional slogans, for which they were initially elected. As a result, frustrated voters have to seek an alternative, which is likely to present itself in the form of marginal radical parties. 2017 will see a wave of elections in Europe: Netherlands, Bulgaria, France and Germany, the results of which will determine tomorrow's political landscape on the continent. Two rounds of France's 2017 presidential elections will take place on April 23 and May 7. Results of these elections can have a significant impact on French policy towards the EU, and towards Ukraine. Main favourites are: leader of the far-right National Front Marine Le Pen and an independent

candidate Emmanuel Macron, who offer radically different views on the European order: Macron – evolutionary and constructive, Le Pen – revolutionary and destructive. These elections are very important for Ukraine, because they will also define the diplomatic landscape in the Normandy format, which will affect its efficiency, prospects for extension of sanctions after 31 July 2017, and the overall policy of France towards Ukraine.

[Full text](#)

*Expert of Foreign Policy and International
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UKRAINE'S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION IS UNACCEPTABLE TO RUSSIA

If Ukraine holds a referendum on NATO membership, it will be a powerful signal of its complete liberation from the Russian influence.

First of all, Ukraine should set clear priorities in overcoming obstacles to joining the Alliance.

If through this referendum we want to show that Ukrainians choose the Euro-Atlantic course and hope for

certain security guarantees from NATO, Kyiv will reach its goal. But if we hope that NATO will open its doors for us after the referendum, it is extremely unlikely. The issue of Ukraine's membership is not currently on NATO's agenda.

We just need to have a realistic assessment of the performance coefficient. Cooperation with NATO

is essential for Ukraine. Foremost, in the framework of Annual National Programmes and Comprehensive Assistance Package.

However, any of Ukraine's moves towards Europe or NATO will cause a reaction from Russia. This has to be accepted as a given. Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration is unacceptable to Russia. And the further Ukraine

integrates into the EU and NATO, the stronger will Kremlin's pressure be.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Policy and
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Mykhailo PASHKOV*



Economy

“YANUKOVYCH'S DEBT”: LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

Analysing proceedings on «Yanukovich's debt» repayment in the London court, it turns out that because the credit came from the public resources of the Russian fund, the court may recognise the debt as sovereign.

Ukraine's position is based on the fact that the debt resulted from placement of securities on a regular private market. This is our argument, but it all depends on how the mechanism of debt placement is construed. If the court finds that it was placed not on a competitive basis, but was designed for a specific borrowing entity, the debt can be recognised as sovereign.

The UK court is unlikely to consider political motives, and will refer solely to legal aspects.

[Full text](#)

*Senior research fellow
on Economic Issues
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Volodymyr SIDENKO*



NOT A REITERATION OF THE MARSHALL PLAN STATEMENT, BUT REAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Speaking at a conference in Brussels, Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman reminded that in 2014 the EU and donors proposed a «Marshall Plan» for Ukraine and planned to hold a donor conference in February 2015. Prime Minister believes that it is time to come back to this issue.

It is good to have goals. But it is one thing to set specific targets and introduce specific tools to achieve these goals, and quite another – to expect that declarations alone will immediately solve all the issues. So reiterating the statement on the Marshall Plan today

sounds rather bizarre. The fact is that we ourselves have to formulate the targets, for which the West could provide resources..

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



THERE IS NO DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF HOLIDAYS AND THE STATE OF ECONOMY

Experts are discussing the idea that if Ukrainians worked more, the country would become more affluent.

However, in Ukraine we should rather be talking about work efficiency and the quality of public administration.

Regretfully, the quality of public administration does not directly depend on the number of days we work or rest. Today some countries are even debating the possibility of shortening the workweek or extending vacation period, and this is not considered a risk for economic activity. So I would focus on the public administration system, which in either event has to ensure the efficient use of manpower and working time, primarily through «adequate» laws, through proper execution of its duties, reducing corruption, etc.

Similar is the situation with salaries. Salary is a portion of value added created in a particular country. If we have

low-technology production, low investment level, which do not allow to ensure high performance, the level of salaries can hardly increase.

Looking at 2016, – government aims to achieve economic growth of 2%, and the minimum salary is increased twofold. This is hardly an effective mechanism.

Yes, we do need to raise salaries. But such huge «scissors» are unlikely to result in a real growth of income. There are a lot of risks here – the risk of inflation, unemployment, underemployment, etc. In the end, in a quarter or two, we are bound to see how this experiment of ours of raising the minimum salary develops.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

UKRAINE SHOULD NOT EXPECT A MAJOR INCREASE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 2017

Investment attractiveness of Ukraine and the volume of direct foreign investment in 2017 will remain approximately the same as in 2016.

Extremely low economic growth is insufficient to increase the attractiveness of the country. So I do not expect an increase of the level of investment attractiveness

in the next year compared to the previous one; I would not expect a direct expansion of both domestic investment, and, unfortunately, the inflow of foreign direct investment as well.

According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, total foreign direct investment for the 9 months of 2016

increased by \$2.62 billion, or by 6.2% and amounted to over \$45 billion. I.e. only \$1000 per capita, which is among the worst indicators in Europe.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

National Security and Defence

THE WAR OF REFLECTIONS VS. REFLEX POLICY

Today's phenomenon that has been named «hybrid war» is defined not only by the use of a combination of regular and irregular military formations, groups, «hard» and «soft» power, but also a complex web of truth and lies, law and lawlessness, «military action theatres» in physical, informational and energy (in terms of energy, not energy resources) dimensions, in the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic spaces, conflicting interpretations of the nature and chronology of historical and current events, etc. All of this causes a high degree of «hybridity» and, consequently, uncertainty, complexity in understanding the processes that are taking place. In this situation, this war can be justly called the war of reflections – levels of understanding of the things happening and things that can happen.


A relevant question is: what is a hybrid? Leaving out complicated theoretical explanations, hybrids are

strategy, policy, tactics of a conflict party (parties). The party that has them, has more chances of winning (other conditions being equal). Accordingly, the party that is insufficiently conscious of what is going on and reacts to the enemy's actions reflexively, is doomed to failure.

These comments help understand the nature of confrontation in «hybrid wars» in general, and in the Russia-Ukraine conflict in particular.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes
of the Razumkov Centre
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*



IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA, UKRAINE WOULD BE ALLIANCE'S VALUABLE ASSET

Ukraine's main obstacle on the way to NATO is the military conflict on its territory, however if Russia decided to start a military conflict with the Alliance itself, this flaw of Ukraine would have turned into a major advantage in the eyes of the Alliance, as currently no one doubts Ukraine's combat readiness.

NATO's foundation is the USA. If the incumbent US President says that NATO is obsolete, this is yet another item on the very long list of things, where Trump demonstrates his incompetence in the matters

of international politics, including international security issues.

The main purpose of NATO and the collective security and defence system has not lost its relevance today. We know that NATO's strategic concept is revised approximately every ten years. And I believe that what Trump meant was that NATO is in need of major transformations. And above all, he emphasised the fact that Europeans should invest more in their own security. Here, it is hard to disagree with him.

Currently, the topic of Ukraine's NATO membership is rather theoretical. It is important to note that the public opinion of Ukrainians regarding possible accession to NATO has radically changed. While 3 years ago there were only 20% of those who were ready to support this idea, now sociologists register at least 50%.

[Full text](#)



*Co-director of Foreign Relations
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Oleksiy MELNYK*

SBU REFORM IS RESISTED FROM WITHIN

Two years ago, Ukraine announced its plans to reform the security sector, which was followed by a comprehensive review of the security and defence sector. Ukraine turned to European partners, to Western partners, including NATO, asking to provide expert advice in the course of the reform. And after the work that had been done during these several years, we came to a stage when the concept was ready; and then it got stuck in our bureaucratic corridors – months of finalisation, revisions, approvals. And now NATO says: if you want us to provide this assistance, then, please, at least approve the action plan for the reform.

At this point, I do not know the specific names of those, who slow down the adoption of the concept of SBU reform. But it is quite clear that there is resistance among officials responsible for decision-making. Clearly, there is

some resistance inside the Security Service, resistance of the old machine that feels quite comfortable within the unreformed structure.

Talking about necessary changes, SBU has to transform from a classical to a European-style security service. I.e., SBU must not carry out functions of law enforcement agencies, they should not have divisions working with economic crimes. There is also the issue of demilitarisation of the service. It is important to understand that NATO and our Western partners are not imposing any models, they are simply offering some of the best practices, international experience, but the choice is ours.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International
Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK*

EVERYONE SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, BUT HOW DO WE ACHIEVE IT AND AT WHAT PRICE?

Second anniversary of Minsk agreements has come, but the consensus has still not been reached. There are three different positions: those, who do not know, what to do with Donbas; those, who think that we must take back the occupied territories at any cost and as early as possible, agreeing to all compromises (special status, full amnesty, elections); and those, who think that we must acknowledge 'de jure' the current 'de facto' situation, i.e. the occupation of territories that we are unable to regain control of at this moment. The problem is that the current government does not clearly announce its intentions, does not explain its strategy. Everyone supports the idea of territorial integrity, but how do we achieve it and at what price?

Various sources claimed that Putin could blackmail Ukraine (in February 2015), as well as Germany, by threatening to severely and systematically shell not only the East, but other parts of the country as well. Former German Foreign Minister Steinmeier later acknowledged that Minsk Agreements were the only possible compromise. Yet, Western representatives understood

from the very beginning that these agreements would not lead to conflict resolution.

Kyiv did not dare implement the 'roadmap' drafted by Western countries and Moscow. 40 thousand militants from the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR republics, who receive money, weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation, whose headquarters are in Russia, and whose battalion commanders are Russian army officers or Russian private military contractors, who have 500 tanks and over 1000 artillery systems, will soon become «people's police». They will continue to perform the same tasks and report to the same structure, but will be financed from the Ukrainian budget. Later, if it is declared that the conflict is over and that Minsk agreements have been fulfilled by the separatists, we will have to destroy the contact lines, checkpoints, withdraw Ukrainian soldiers. Then, the separatist influence, as metastases, will be able to spread westward.

[Full text](#)

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK

RUSSIA IS NOT READY TO LEAVE DONBAS WITHOUT REACHING ITS GOAL

Despite the oncoming changes in the Normandy format of negotiations on Donbas, there is no direct connection between them and the US elections or the oncoming elections in France and Germany.

Most likely, Minsk agreements will be extended through 2017 as well. This does not mean that they are impeccable, or that they will start being effective all of a sudden. It is just that there is essentially no alternative. Also, there are no conditions for preparing a real political settlement process, which, above all, should be manifested in some statements or initiatives from the interested parties and only then be recorded on paper in the form of treaties or any other types of international legal acts. The conflict is in the active stage, and neither side is ready to surrender; meanwhile, the other party, Russia, which is currently stronger, even though Ukraine has certain military capabilities, – is not interested in either launching a massive escalation or leaving Donbas without reaching the goals defined and recorded in the political part of Minsk agreements.

We should not be having unnecessary concerns regarding France and Germany elections. Let us see how it all ends. This will be the indicator of the West's ability to act. If they learnt the lessons that Russia taught them recently, including the intervention not only in domestic policy, but also in the very electoral process, I am confident that the remaining time is enough to minimise this Russian influence. But we also cannot blame everything on Russia, as Europe itself is in a serious political crisis.

Also, regardless of the prospects of nominally pro-Russian candidates winning in the EU elections, we cannot write off the possibility of a post-election change in rhetoric that is currently observed in the United States. When the candidate who was saying one thing literally up until the last day of elections and, mechanically, for some time after the elections, is now obliged to take into account or attempt to take into account things that the major political forces in the country want to hear from him.

[Full text](#)

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK

NORTH KOREA: THE UNPREDICTABLE ATOM

Presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea is rather unpleasant as it is. And the fact that it also has carriers for these weapons turns the country into a direct source of nuclear threat.

The goal of DPRK's regime is to demonstrate that they are an entity to be reckoned with. This is especially true of relations with the United States.



It all depends on the range of North Korean missiles. Up until now they have had successful tests of medium-range missiles, while their tests of intercontinental ones failed. They also attempted to launch satellites into orbit. Missiles designed for satellite launch can also be used as nuclear weapons carriers.

In the latest case, the missile reportedly flew about 500 kilometres. This however does not indicate its maximum range. If it was put into the geostationary orbit, it is already an intercontinental missile. So all of those within this range may be concerned. The unpredictability of the North Korean regime makes its nuclear weapons as unpredictable.

[Full text](#)


Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI

Sociology


The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 18 to 23 November 2016. 2,018 respondents aged over 18 in all the regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, were interviewed. Sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.

For more details on the results of opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre, go to our website at <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>.

Which approach to language policy do you think is correct? % of respondents



Do you agree with the following statements? % of respondents



Do you agree with the following statements? % of respondents

The Ukrainian language, which was suppressed for many years, requires support from the state for its development and spread, regardless of how this affects the position of other languages												
	REGIONS					AGE					LANGUAGE	
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas	18-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years	60 years or more	Ukrainian	Russian
Yes	86.8	63.8	42.3	36.1	46.8	58.7	61.8	57.7	61.4	54.8	72.3	40.6
No	4.7	13.2	20.5	39.1	24.4	15.5	18.3	23.3	16.8	19.9	10.1	29.8
Hard to say	8.5	23.0	37.2	24.8	28.8	25.7	19.9	19.0	21.7	25.2	17.6	29.6
	NATIONALITY		EDUCATION				FINANCIAL STANDING					
	Ukrainians	Russians	Incomplete secondary	General secondary	Vocational secondary	Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary	We hardly make ends meet; we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off but remain unable to make certain purchases		
Yes	63.3	26.6	53.0	53.2	60.1	60.6	47.2	60.9	63.9	66.2		
No	15.7	39.2	22.7	17.3	18.8	18.9	25.1	17.2	17.2	9.9		
Hard to say	21.0	34.2	24.2	29.5	21.1	20.4	27.7	21.8	18.9	23.9		

PRESENTATION OF SIPRI YEARBOOK 2015: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

On 2 February 2017, Ukrainian translation of SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security was launched.

The Yearbook is produced by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) since 1969, and is recognised today as one of the most authoritative sources of information in the area of international security, translated from English into Chinese, Arabic, Russian, Japanese and Ukrainian.

Publication of SIPRI Yearbooks in Ukrainian since 2000:

- has allowed to largely compensate for the lack of aggregate information on contemporary processes in the area of international security in Ukraine, foremost for those, who do not have a sufficient working command of the English language;
- facilitates the introduction of international terminology, assessments and standards used in science, education, political discourse, expert and public discussions, government documents in Ukraine;
- provides source materials for formulating the country's practical politics;
- makes a significant contribution to ensuring transparency in the areas virtually closed for public until recently.

[Download SIPRI 2015](#)

[more about the event](#)

PARTICIPATION OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE IN EUROPE-UKRAINE FORUM

Razumkov Centre took active part in the work of the 10th Europe-Ukraine Forum held on 27-28 January 2017 in Rzeszów (Poland). Traditionally, at the beginning of the Forum, Razumkov Centre presented its analytical report «Ukraine 2016-2017: Signs of Progress and Symptoms of Disappointment» (report was presented by the Lead Expert of Political and Legal Programmes of the Centre V. Zamiatin). Director of Economic Programmes of the Centre V. Yurchyshyn spoke at the panel discussion «Economic Policy Dilemmas: Between Globalisation and Protectionism». Participants of the anniversary Forum,



organised by the Institute for Eastern Studies, included over 1000 guests from Ukraine, Poland, Germany and other European countries.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE: DEFENCE PRODUCTION, SALES AND ACQUISITIONS»

On 1-2 January 2017, took place International Conference «Security Sector Governance: Defence Production, Sales and Acquisitions», organised by the Razumkov Centre together with Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Ukrainian Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CACDS) with financial support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Conference participants heard reports of domestic and foreign experts, representatives of governmental and non-governmental organisations on the state and directions of reforms in the management of development, production, procurement and export of arms.

There was a fruitful working group discussion of alternative approaches to the reform of governance in defence industry, systems of logistic and technical support of the Armed Forces, improving the efficiency of government-private partnerships in management, production, acquisition of arms, participation of Parliament, NGOs and media in monitoring the development and implementation of Ukraine's military-technical policy.

Constructive discussions in the working groups resulted in the development of proposals package on the structure and powers of defence industry governance system, increasing the role of government-private partnerships, areas of activity and reforms of industry enterprises, ways to increase efficiency of Parliamentary, NGO and media control.

[conference materials](#)

[more about the conference](#)

ROUND TABLE: «WHY ARE THINK TANKS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN EVER? UKRAINIAN CONTEXT»

On 27 January 2017, the Razumkov Centre held Round Table: «Why Are Think Tanks More Important Now Than Ever? Ukrainian Context».

During the event, the 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report published by Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program of the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, was presented.

Issues discussed included:

- What areas of research should be a priority for Ukrainian think tanks considering internal and external challenges Ukraine is currently facing?
- What think tank activities and products will be in high demand in the near future?

[«Global Go To Think Tank Index Report» Presentation](#)

[more about the event](#)

PARTICIPATION OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE IN THE OPERATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF UKRAINIAN ARMY OFFICER CORPS

On 21 February 2014, operational assembly of the officer corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine took place at the National Defence University of Ukraine. Among participants were representatives of the DoD Strategic High-Ranking Advisors Committee, representatives of Armed Forces of the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, Lithuania.

Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykola Sunhurovskyi presented a lecture on «Consideration of the Russia-Ukraine conflict experience in developing Ukraine's modern defence sector». Some issues raised in the lecture that attracted interest and questions from the audience were: reasons of Russia's aggressive behaviour and aggression against Ukraine; nature of «hybrid» wars as synergetic wars and the wars of reflections; special aspects of Russia's aggression that create certain requirements for the defence sector of Ukraine; specific areas of Ukraine's defence sector that need reforms based on the lessons learnt from the aggression and future developments forecasts.

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