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THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER


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DEAR COLLEAGUES!

We are glad to inform you that the next issue of the National Security and Defence journal was printed – No. 3-4, 2016, prepared under the frame of the project «Building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens in the new environment: special aspects, prospects and challenges», implemented by the Razumkov Centre together with Matra European Partnership Programme and Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine.

Among other things, the journal presents the results of the national survey (10,000 respondents), which characterise the key indicators of Ukrainian citizens' identity today, including their dynamic through 2006-2016, aspects of identity of citizens in different regions and oblasts, aspects of identity in separate language and national groups, as well as those of citizens participating in fighting against Russia's aggression. The journal also presents opinions of participants of Expert discussion «Building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens: prospects and challenges» (Kyiv, 7 June 2016).



We hope that this study will be useful for everyone interested in the process of building the common national identity of Ukrainian society, Ukrainian political nation.

[The electronic PDF version of the journal is published at](#)

THE AIR WILL BE THICK WITH ANTICIPATION OF ELECTIONS ALL THE TIME

The start of political season shows that essentially the power dynamic remains the same, and no drastic changes are taking place so far in the balance between the composition of the coalition and non-coalition forces, no sharp fluctuations in the level of support of different political parties, etc.

The first days of political season were rather quiet, mainly because this is the period of getting into the swing of things after the Parliament's holidays. And the main suspense of the new season still lies ahead.

I think the coalition will keep its line-up, so we are hardly to expect any drastic changes. But the political players that are not part of the coalition today and are on the rise with their ratings, foremost «Batkivshchyna», we well as the new political projects, – will not allow to eliminate the topic of a snap election from the agenda. This topic will also be regularly raised by the «Opposition Bloc».

At the beginning of this session we can expect most attention to be paid to socio-economic issues, as the topics of tariffs, salaries, subsistence line were actively exploited and will be exploited by political players, who are not part of the coalition.

We are also expecting a challenging budget process. Already now, government representatives are talking about cutting budget payments or optimisation in certain areas.

Fulfilment of our obligations under the Association Agreement with the EU still remains on the agenda.

All of these issues still have to be dealt with. However, while previously there was a clear tendency to deal with administrative power policies, i.e. reforming public administration structures, overcoming corruption and so on, now we see attention turning to economic issues.

Analysing the whole picture of the current political situation, obviously, the defining factor is the conflict in Donbas and the war with Russia. The development of events there will determine the situation in Ukraine. Thus, the political events and processes taking place in other countries (first of all, election campaigns), will indirectly influence us through their impact on the relations between Russia and the West.

In regard to our domestic political processes, – competition in politics will remain severe, as the air will be thick with anticipation of elections all the time. Much of the public is dissatisfied with all government institutions; they are ready to go to the polling stations and, of course, politicians will use this in their rhetoric. These will mostly include politicians, who view elections as their chance to improve their standing or get into the next Parliament.

We will follow the new political projects that are now emerging. Interesting things are already happening around the anti-corruption radical pro-European wing created on the basis of Democratic Alliance and the party of Sakvarelidze and Chumak. It remains to be seen, what influence this will have on the balance of political powers, whether Petro Poroshenko Bloc will be able to retain its position, what will happen to the People's Front, whether it will regain its ground.

The season will be interesting. But I would hardly expect any significant changes in the power branches – either in the parliament, or in the government. I think that the next six months will be the period of more stability than before.

[Full text](#)

*Deputy Director General, Director
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of the Razumkov Centre
Yuriy YAKYMENKO*



NEW VERSION OF THE LAW “ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND STATUS OF JUDGES” CONTAINS ENOUGH PROVISIONS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

On September 30, together with amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine on administration of justice takes effect the new version of the Law «On the judicial system and status of judges», adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on June 2. It introduces significant changes to the judicial system – courts of almost all levels will be reorganised, the order of appointing judges will change, and their inviolability will be limited.

The approved legislative changes contain enough provisions to create a most unfavourable situation for corruption. At the same time, the legislative norms alone are not enough, and everything depends on implementation of these provisions in real life.

Limiting the inviolability of judges is one more long-awaited aspect of the judicial reform. However, a complete removal of inviolability will only be in question in cases when a judge is caught in the act.

Now, a judge cannot be detained without Parliament's approval. After the Constitutional amendments come into effect, only the approval of the High Council of Justice will be necessary.

The High Council of Justice is a non-political body with continuous operation, as opposed to the Verkhovna Rada,

which works in sessions. A reminder: when it was necessary to remove judge Chaus' inviolability, the deputies were on holiday. Meaning that the High Council of Justice will be able to consider these matters much more efficiently.

Also, for the new judicial power to start its operation, the procedure code, the Constitutional Court law and other legislative acts must be harmonised with these changes. Obviously, this will take some time. Although the Presidential Judicial Reform Council is working hard, and several draft laws are practically ready. I think we can expect their quick adoption. However, the main thing is the implementation of these changes. The public has to control and react to everything happening in this sphere. So now we can only say that these amendments contain numerous provisions, which may have a positive impact and bring change and improvement in the operation of the judicial power.

Full [text](#)

*Legal Research Fellow
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National Security and Defence

WHY DID MILITANTS' LEADERS SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPRESS THEIR DESIRE TO DECLARE CEASEFIRE?

Leaders of the «LNR» and «DNR» groups have announced a full ceasefire starting September 15.

In their corresponding statements, separatist leaders Oleksandr Zakharchenko and Ihor Plotnytskyi have ordered the militants not to use any types of arms starting from midnight.

On the other hand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Marc Ayrault has insisted on adopting the laws on the «special status» and elections in Donbas. This being an attempt to make Ukraine abide by the political part of Minsk



*Co-director of Foreign Relations and
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agreements in their Russian interpretation can explain the sudden peaceable disposition of the militants.

It is important for Russia to bring the process to the political part of these agreements, as in this stage, Ukraine will be subject to the powerful pressure machine ensuring that elections are held in these territories, with no guarantees of their further return under Ukraine's control. Because as soon as Ukraine ensures that elections are held and the government is legitimised, the next plan will come in – creating an uncontrolled formation, which can be used regularly as the instrument of pressure, destabilisation, blocking not only domestic policy, but also foreign policy decisions of the central government.

Another strategic goal that Russia is trying to reach by making the militants agree to the full ceasefire, is making Europe drop its sanctions, or at least mitigate them.

Full [text](#)

PUTIN'S LAST LEVERAGE

It is hard to give an explicit assessment of the escalation in Donbas in early September this year, as our opponent has never acted explicitly.

These measures – I am talking not only about intensification of fighting, but also about accumulation of forces and funds to expand the aggression (by forces and funds, I mean Russia's regular armed forces, and not just them, the National Guard has started to draw closer) – are taken in order to consistently reach different goals.

If Putin can successfully pressure the West, as well as Ukraine, in the context of them abiding by his demands, he will be satisfied with it without launching a large-scale attack. If he fails, the possibility of escalation cannot be ignored. Moreover, this escalation could include not just the ground forces, but also the air fleet. This is the worst scenario, as it leads to mass casualties, which we would like to avoid.

The possibility of these scenarios was discussed in the middle of last year, and it was discussed in order to

avoid such events. Preparations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, efforts of international partners to pressure the aggressor – all of this has to goal of deterring Russia. Having the information – means being armed.

It is very likely that Putin will resort to such open aggression. Until now, Russia has definitively stated that it is not taking part in the fighting, but Putin has also not abandoned his goals. And his goal (in the context of Ukraine, not the broad spectrum of goals) is to prevent Ukraine from leaving the zone of Russian influence. So far, he has not been successful in reaching this goal, but he also has not abandoned it.

Full [text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes of
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Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*



DEBT BONDAGE: CAN WE DO WITHOUT ANOTHER IMF LOAN?

There are many questions on whether the IMF requirements can really facilitate the country's transformation. So far, most measures are directed at pressuring, restricting and reducing, but it remains to be seen, whether new areas with development potential will be created.

If cooperation with IMF continues as it is – mostly reducing and destroying – it raises a question: why do we need such cooperation at all?

Our exports structure remains as archaic as before, same as the underdeveloped industrial system.

Social and human capital are factors of economic growth. If the IMF imposes restrictions in this area with its policies, we are facing sad prospects. We can cut down

the entire sector of education and medicine, and then say that we achieved fiscal balance.

On the other hand, experts believe that if Ukraine is denied the tranche, this will lead to its inability to pay off other debts that must be returned this year, which will result in more pressure on hryvnia, its devaluation, and a number of other negative consequences.

[Full text](#)

*Economic Research Fellow
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WHY DOES UKRAINE REALLY NEED THE NEW IMF LOAN TRANCHE?

Let us not overestimate the significance of the sum of IMF loan tranche. This is the minimum stability loan. This loan will not solve our problems, but it can help improve the attitude to Ukraine first of all of private investors, who so far are very cautious.

I would view this loan tranche foremost as the symbol of cooperation between Ukraine and the IMF, other international financial institutions, and major developed countries. This is demonstration of support by the USA, EU, UK, Canada. Demonstration of support of Ukraine's efforts. Although all of these countries admit that,

unfortunately, the efficiency of reforms in Ukraine has significantly dropped this year compared to what has been discussed at the end of last year.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes
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Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



UKRAINIAN COMPANIES ARE STARTING TO RISE FROM THE CHASM THEY HAVE BEEN IN FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS

Data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine show that the percentage of loss-making companies has dropped from 42.3 to 34.6% compared to the same period last year. The smallest number of such businesses (7.3% of the total number) was registered in agriculture, forestry and fishing industry, the largest – in entertainment (73.9%).

However, last year was a crisis year for Ukraine to be making parallel comparisons. So far, we have to look at

the situation with very cautious optimism. The Cabinet of Ministers hopes for a 1% growth of the GDP by the year-end. Such growth is more symbolic, as we can hardly speak about full economic recovery at this point. Both, our economy and companies are starting to rise from the chasm they have been in for the last two years.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

NATIONAL CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE IS NOW A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

The National Bank does not have to respond immediately to various hryvnia fluctuations. It must actively react only if there are shock threats or dramatic national currency depreciation. So far, this is not the case. At the end of August - beginning of September hryvnia is traditionally weaker, so I would not treat

today's fluctuations as something extraordinary. NBU's interference here is uncalled for.

Although current exchange rate fluctuations are within the norm, the National Bank's stand is extremely unarticulated. This can become an additional risk factor. It is highly likely, that in the nearest future we will be observing exchange rate fluctuations within one hryvnia range either towards strengthening or towards weakening of the national currency.

Above all, the National Bank should not absolve itself of responsibility for exchange rate fluctuations completely. National currency exchange rate is now a national security issue. Ukrainian economy is very sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Ignoring sharp fluctuations or shocks will cause the economy and people to lose their baseline.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes of the Razumkov Centre
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



ENERGY SECURITY OF UKRAINE: A LOOK THROUGH THE LENS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

In the recent decades, the world has been paying more and more attention to the issue of energy security, which is an integral part of national security and a defining factor in economic independence of each state.

For Ukraine, the issue of energy security arose rather seriously in 2014, caused by the annexation of Crimea, as well as Russia's military interference on our country's territory. Due to the annexation of Crimea, we lost gas fields in the Black Sea shelf, assets of the DTEK «Krymenergo» company (25% belonged to the state), generating companies, State Enterprise «Feodosia Oil Product Supply Company», also all hydrocarbon production projects were «frozen». Military action involving Russia in the East of our country caused the destruction of oil and gas infrastructure.

Even before the 2014 events Ukraine depended on Russia for much of its energy, procuring natural gas, nuclear fuel, petroleum products, and later, coal. History shows that at one point our country has made the critical error of maintaining close industrial and energy cooperation with Russia. For many years we have had to purchase Russian gas in the amount of over 50 billion cubic metres. The reason – inefficient national economy, which from the very beginning was being built on the basis of access to cheap energy resources of the Soviet Union

and corruption of officials. Ukraine's attempts to switch to alternative procurements of fuel from Turkmenistan failed, as Russian leadership did not agree to grant the right to transport Turkmen gas through its territory.

The abovementioned events forced Ukraine to take measures to enhance its level of energy security and to begin implementing the necessary reforms in the energy sector. Thus, despite the fact that years 2014-2015 were complicated for the national energy sector, Ukraine managed to achieve considerable success and go on with this trend into 2016. First of all, this refers to diversification of natural gas supply: the share of Russian gas in the overall procurement of hydrocarbons in 2015 dropped to 37.6 %, and from 25 November 2015 our country cut gas imports from Russia completely. Thus, Gazprom lost Ukraine's gas market, which exceeds its total annual exports to Italy, France, the Netherlands and the UK.

[Full text](#)

*Expert of economic programmes
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Kateryna MARKEVYCH*



START OF THE HEATING SEASON IN UKRAINE

Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Ihor Nasalyk is convinced that Ukraine will prepare for the heating season in time. The long process of repairing five nuclear power plant units, increased consumption of electricity during the hot summer period, – placed substantial load on Ukrainian TPPs. Thermal power generation sector had to increase the volume of coal combustion to sustain the balance in the energy system. Thus, in the midst of preparations for the heating season fuel stocks in the warehouses of heat generating companies dropped to one million tonnes. This is almost 80% less coal than they had last year and one half as much as the country needs.

The current situation in the energy sector is really not very bright. We had to start stockpiling coal earlier, as

the fighting in the East of the country regularly disrupts the timely supplies of anthracite. Officials need to solve the problem of the lack of coordination between various departments in preparation for the heating season, and also leave political and business interests in the energy sector out while making important decisions for the country.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Energy Programmes
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Foreign Policy

DOES POROSHENKO NEED TO MEET PUTIN ONE-ON-ONE?

Recently, former President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk suggested that the presidents of Ukraine and Russia meet one-on-one, without intermediaries.

Here it would be also appropriate to recall how in early August Russia has «engineered» an event (an «attempted» terrorist attack in Crimea), after which Putin refused to meet in the Normandy format at the G-20 summit in China, hoping to hold a tripartite meeting there behind Ukraine's back. At that time Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande have upheld the Normandy format. This made Putin back down.

A meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian presidents in the current situation, taking into account the mediation efforts of France and Germany, will send an extremely negative signal to Paris and Berlin. Moreover, a one-on-one meeting would be a strong argument for the pro-Russian forces in Europe – let Poroshenko and Putin deal with Donbas and Crimea on their own, – Europe is tired of this conflict, it has enough of its own problems, and it needs to restore relations with Russia.

Ukraine has received unprecedented traumatic experience from the «brotherly» Russia: 10 thousand dead, 22 thousand injured, 1.8 million internally displaced persons, 44 thousand sq m of occupied territory, 20% of industrial potential destroyed! In this situation, chances of successful negotiations in the Kyiv-Moscow format are extremely unlikely.

Therefore, the focus should be more on expanding the format of negotiations (involving the USA), on bringing the process of resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the international level as much as possible. After all, Ukraine certainly benefits from the multilateral format, which strengthens its negotiating position many-fold.

[Full text](#)

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DONBAS: THREE POINTS FOR “FREEZING” THE CONFLICT

The best option in the current situation is to «freeze» the conflict in Donbas. This means placing emphasis on the first three points of Minsk Agreements (ceasefire, disengagement of military forces and effective monitoring of these actions). Maybe it makes sense to single out these three points into a separate peace treaty (memorandum) and approve it in the Normandy format. Without prior political demands and conditions. The goal being to stop the fighting, disengage the parties, create a 400-kilometre buffer zone along the former front line, with mandatory international control.

This does not mean suspending negotiations in other areas (mainly, on the release of hostages), but execution of a separate agreement on cessation of hostilities must be the basic condition and the main negotiating formula in the Normandy format, as well as the priority theme of trilateral meetings in Minsk.

The main thing is to stop the conveyor of daily deaths on both sides. And this point is more important than all the other provisions of Minsk Agreements.

The West as well, guided at least by the instinct of self-preservation, must be interested in safely «freezing» the conflict in Donbas and eliminating the threat of its escalation. This is more efficient, safe and cheap than recklessly pushing Kyiv to hold elections in the occupied territories.

By the way, international peace-making experience proves that the only possible crisis resolution algorithm is: cessation of hostilities – humanitarian issues – political dialogue.

It would also be wise to expand the Normandy format involving signatories of the Budapest Memorandum (foremost, the USA). Such an attempt to expand the negotiation format was made at the NATO summit in Warsaw during the G5+Ukraine meeting.

The key task today is to involve more international partners into the process of resolving the situation in Donbas – i.e. use all available international mechanisms and platforms, involve different international players in the peace-making process. Expand the presence of different missions in Donbas – the UN, OSCE, PACE, EU, Red Cross, Reporters Without Borders, international human rights and humanitarian agencies. Along with this, pursuing the decision of the OSCE Permanent Council on OSCE police contingent in Donbas.

Clearly, «freezing» the conflict is not the solution, but this is the least of evils compared to today's smoldering conflict or the threat of its escalation. This is one of the conditions for implementation of the new Concept of state target program «Restoration and development of peace in the Eastern regions of Ukraine». However, its execution will depend on three factors – effectiveness of internal reforms in Ukraine, international situation and Russia's policy in regard to Ukraine. We should not cherish any illusions as to the latter.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security
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UKRAINE'S PROSPECTS ON THE VISA-FREE REGIME

Postponing the vote on scrapping visas for Georgian citizens, which was originally scheduled for September 14, is not an alarm signal for Ukraine.

Our process is slightly different. Currently, the EU committee is submitting all documents and materials to the Parliament, which will consider this issue. The parliamentary session on the visa-free regime for Ukraine is scheduled for October, so I do not foresee any special sudden force majeure events, which could undermine} the progress. It is going according to plan.

Previously, European politicians had certain reservations, but back then they arose in the context of EU's migration problem. However now, when this process is in the homestretch, everything is calm. Of course, a lot can change, as nowadays the situation in the EU and in the world on the whole is very tense. But as of today, I do not see any reasons to panic. Cautious optimistic expectations are present.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security
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IN THE WEST, RUSSIA IS OPENLY RECOGNISED AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT, RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IS OPENLY DISCUSSED

The language used by Western leaders has significantly changed in the past six months. Russia is openly recognised as a party to the conflict, Russian aggression is openly discussed, and this is considering that Russia is not mentioned in Minsk Agreements, apart from certain editorial amendments listing heavy weapons to be withdrawn. There is one volley fire system there,



which only the Russian army has in its inventory, or the text mentions the withdrawal of foreign troops and everyone knows that the only foreign troops there are the Russian ones.

So despite the fact that Russia is not mentioned in the agreements, the issue of its involvement in the conflict is still on the table. I would also like to mention the events that are about to take place and influence the decision on escalation or de-escalation of the conflict in Donbas: in late September we are expecting to hear the findings of the MH17 disaster investigation and there are serious reasons to believe that they will prove Russia's guilt in the crash or that of the Russian leadership. The judicial system of the Netherlands is very independent and the politicians have to listen to the public opinion to such extent that even if they wanted to make some corrections to the reports, they would be unlikely to be able to do so.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes
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Sociology

Study was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre from 16 to 21 June 2016 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Number of respondents – 2016, age – from 18 y.o. Theoretical sampling error – 2.3%.


For more details on the results of opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre, go to our website at <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>. <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>.

In the current situation, what should be the main priority of the country's leadership? % of respondents


Increasing salaries and pensions	55.8
Industrial development and creating jobs	48.3
Protecting Ukraine from Russia's aggression	41.3
Overcoming corruption	39.1
Reducing state debt	20.2
Enhancing the country's energy independence	19.8
Infrastructure development (schools, hospitals, roads)	16.6
Strengthening Ukraine's credibility in the world	9.3
Fighting the operation of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine	7.8
Punishing politicians and officials from the former circle of Viktor Yanukovych	6.3
Protecting people from street crime	6.1
Other	1.6
Hard to say	1.5

* Respondents were asked to indicate no more than three applicable answers.

In your opinion, what should be the priority in the situation of limited budget funds in Ukraine? % of respondents



In view of the problems the state is facing today, who should become the main centre of making important state decisions? % опитаних



Razumkov Centre Events

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY SECTOR IN THE LIGHT OF VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES EXPERIENCE»



On 15 September 2016, Razumkov Centre together with International Centre for Democratic Transition (Hungary) and with support of International Visegrad Fund held International conference «Institutional Reform of Ukraine's Energy Sector in the Light of Visegrad Group Countries Experience».

During the conference, Razumkov Centre presented its published previous report on the International Visegrad Fund project «Institutional Reform of Ukraine's Energy Sector in the Context of Its Integration into the EU Market».

PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ON ENERGY SYSTEMS



From 28 August to 2 September 2016, Expert of Economic Programmes K. Markevych was taking part in the International School of Energy Systems organised by the Institute of Energy and Climate Research – Systems Analysis and Technology Evaluation (IEK-STE) at Forchungszentrum Julich near Munich (Germany). The seminar was attended by researchers, representatives of non-governmental organisations and business.

The event covered the topics of energy security and energy policy, energy technologies and energy efficiency, climate change and environment, assessment of energy technologies. Particular attention was paid to the aspects of energy systems and their further development.

K. Markevych had the opportunity to make a presentation on the issues of global energy development, energy security and ways to enhance it, as well as Ukraine's place on the map of Europe in the context of energy security.

EXPERT FORUM «METHODS, SCENARIOS AND PROSPECTS OF SETTLEMENT OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT»

On 21-24 August 2016 in Cadenabbia (Italy), Konrad Adenauer Foundation held a trilateral Ukrainian-German-Russian expert forum «Methods, Scenarios and Prospects of Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict». This is already the fourth meeting in this format organised by the German foundation in order to establish regular expert dialogue and search for methods and mechanisms of conflict settlement together.



The forum was attended by Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre M. Pashkov. Representative of the Centre has given opening and closing speeches.

In the meeting, participants discussed the international context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, current situation and prospects of execution of Minsk Agreements (including the possible future introduction of a police mission in Donbas), analysed tendencies in the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its different areas (economy, energy, humanitarian area, etc.) A separate session was devoted to determining possible scenarios of future developments, searching for methods and mechanisms of settling the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

MEETING WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TRANS EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES ASSOCIATION

On 16 September 2016, Razumkov Centre hosted a meeting with the Deputy Director of the Institute for European Politics (Berlin), Dr. Katrin Böttger, who also represented the Trans European Relations Studies Association (TEPSA).

From the Razumkov Centre, the meeting was attended by Director General A. Rachok, Deputy Director General Y. Yakymenko, Co-director of Foreign Policy and International Security Programmes O. Melnyk.

In the meeting, participants discussed the issues of establishing cooperation between the Razumkov Centre and the German Institute for European Politics in different areas, prospects of holding events together and joint participation in international projects.

As a TEPSA representative, Dr. Böttger offered the Razumkov Centre membership in the Association, which unites 37 organisations, think tanks and universities from 32 countries (EU members and candidates for EU membership).

Representatives of the Razumkov Centre noted that Razumkov Centre priorities – conducting fundamental research in the sector of politics – are consistent with TEPSA approaches, so membership prospects are quite realistic.

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