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# THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

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## ANTI-UKRAINIAN SENTIMENT AMONG RUSSIANS IS THE RESULT OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

The attitude of Russians to Ukraine is deteriorating for quite obvious reasons. First of all, there is an ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, and in one way or the other, the factual information on victims, clashes and everything happening in Donbas is reaching Russian citizens. Secondly, this is the result of the work of Russian propaganda, which is knowingly and deliberately creating the image of Ukraine, Ukrainians and the Ukrainian government as «Nazis», «fascists», «Banderists», «junta» and a lot of other things. Such deliberate shaping of the image of modern Ukraine surely affects the noncritically-minded Russian citizens, who in addition to other things have access to very limited information sources or simply do not want to know other types of information.

Russians believe the most hostile countries to Russia to be the United States of America and Ukraine, as according to the «Russian mythology» what is happening in Ukraine is the US war against Russia on the territory of Ukraine. For a very long

time Russia has been creating in the public mind an image of itself as the «besieged fortress» that has to stand up against everything and everyone. Besides, Russia keeps insisting on its civilizational «otherness» – Moscow as the new Rome, the concept of the «Russian world». This is fully in line with the modern ideology of the Russian government, which it is feeding to Russians whilst shaping the public opinion of Russian people. This is why to Russians, USA and Ukraine are their two main enemies.

Any further tendencies depend on the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, on how the issues of de-occupation of Crimea and Ukraine's eastern territories (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) will be resolved. If these processes keep developing

on the basis of further international pressure on Russia forcing it to proceed with de-occupation, the situation will certainly not be improving. Because Ukraine in the eyes of Russians will remain the enemy that seeks to deprive Russia of its supposedly rightful territory – Crimea. Essentially, the same goes for Donbas. Therefore, considering all these factors, I do not see any prospects for the improvement of Russians' attitude to Ukraine.

Full [text](#)

*Deputy Director, Director of Political  
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Yuriy YAKYMENKO*



## RETURN OF CRIMEA TO UKRAINE IS A COMPLEX ISSUE

In the nearest future, there will be no radical change in the situation in Donbas. Neither towards the resolution of this conflict, nor towards its aggravation.

At this moment, Russia is unlikely to begin full-scale military action due to international factors, expectations of the easing of sanctions. Intensification of fighting would only complicate the realisation

of this goal. However, this does not mean that Russia would not start military operations at a more convenient time. Experience shows that it is usually done, when there is a need to finish wringing certain concessions out of Ukraine. A particularly vulnerable period for this could be a period of instability within Ukraine itself. So in the next six months, most likely, we are to expect a standstill situation. And this period may possibly last much longer.

In the current situation, it is hard to talk about the return of Crimea to Ukraine. In order to return Crimea, changes have to happen both in Russia and in Ukraine, which has to become much more attractive to live in than Russia, and able to guarantee a higher standard of living for the citizens.

Another important factor is the line of the international community, which has to remain unchanged. Thus, non-recognition of Crimea as part of Russia will be a permanent stimulus for the return to happen after all.

Full text

*Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of  
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## CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES REGARDING JUSTICE AND DECENTRALISATION ARE TWO VERY DIFFERENT THINGS

Following the adoption of amendments to the Constitution regarding justice, leaders of some political parties started saying that this was a rehearsal of the adoption of decentralisation amendments to the Main Law. However, constitutional changes regarding justice and constitutional changes regarding decentralisation are two very different things. Draft amendments to the Constitution on decentralisation are still accompanied by a train of different political and social developments, along with quite adequate understanding of the essence of Minsk Agreements in the society.

Regarding the timeliness of adoption of constitutional amendments on justice and the new law on the judicial system and the status of judges, it should be said that in the state the court system was brought to, amendments to the Constitution were required, as there was a clear need to change the entire mechanism of formation of the judiciary, control of its activity, remove political influence on courts and judges, clearly define to which authorities these duties are assigned. We can say that formally, political influence on the judiciary will be brought down to a minimum: the President will not appoint judges for the first 5 years – there will be permanent appointment and not by the Verkhovna Rada as it is now. The President will appoint judges as proposed by the High Council of Justice, executing the so-called ceremonial function. Meaning that the President will be submitted candidates already selected through the competitions and qualifying

examinations: after ethics and integrity checks. There should not be a situation, where the President is «selecting» judges himself.

At the same time, I have many doubts regarding a number of provisions of the draft. For example, I do not agree with the provision that basically leaves everything related to human rights protection at court at the mercy of the lawyers' community. The Constitution states that everyone has the right to choose the defender of their rights. So, these do not necessarily have to be lawyers. In the current situation, if all of those cases are handled only by lawyers, many people will just lose the opportunity to defend their rights, because they will not be able to afford lawyers' services. Essentially, this creates the monopoly of lawyers.

Of course, the reality may not quite meet (or may not meet at all!) the formal orders of the new constitutional provisions. Such cases can only be brought to a minimum through activity of civil society institutes and non-acceptance of violations of the Constitution by every thinking citizen that cares about the future.

[Full text](#)

*Legal Research Consultant of  
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## SCEPTICAL ATTITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT IS TYPICAL FOR UKRAINIANS

According to Razumkov Centre polls, over 70% of Ukrainian citizens think that the situation in Ukraine is developing in the wrong direction. Such low level of trust in government authorities is, so to speak, a historical tradition in our society. Unlike Russia, where the attitude to government has a certain degree of poetisation, Ukrainians have a typically sceptical attitude. So the government has to prove its efficiency all the times in order to be trusted.

Also, recently, we have been observing a trend, where people increasingly rely on themselves and not on the government. Therefore, although we see a low level of trust in government, we do not observe any significant manifestations of disappointment in the society on the overall. Since there were no high hopes specifically in relation to the government, there is no disappointment as well.

Speaking about protest potential, sociological research before the Revolution of Dignity in December 2013 allegedly showed no high level of readiness to participate in protests. In general, it is very difficult to

predict occurrence of such events with sociological research. Although the general feeling shows that the potential level of readiness for united actions is quite high in our society. That is why I believe that it is very dangerous for the government not to respond to the general mood of the society. And I think that the government actually understands it. Representatives of the political elite are trying to balance their own political and economic interests and the interests of society.

I do not believe that within government institutions there are any people, mechanisms or forces that are able to change by themselves. Changes are possible only under the pressure of society.

[Full text](#)

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## UKRAINIANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO MATCH GOVERNMENT AGAINST PEOPLE, THAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST OPPOSITION

According to a sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Centre, if presidential elections were to be held now, Petro Poroshenko would win. Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi would come second, with Yuliia Tymoshenko – in third place.


However, we have to understand that presidential or party rating is not just about positive or negative attitude, it is a choice from the preset list. In this case, we see that even the leaders have low ratings. There is a great demand for new people, new political forces, but so far there are none. Today's political forces are disappointing citizens. Despite the fact that they compete between themselves, for the majority of citizens, still, all political forces in the upper echelon are the government. So for citizens, the division into government and people is much

more meaningful, than the division into government and opposition.

Disappointment with the government can be explained by the lack of positive change in two years. While previously people believed: «yes, we understand, yes, everything is complicated, not everything will come at once», – in two years people obviously expected to see some positive changes.

[Full text](#)

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# National Security and Defence

## MAJOR ESCALATION OF THE DONBAS CONFLICT IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIAN TROOPS

During the month, in the military operations in Donbas, 28 Ukrainian soldiers died, more than a hundred were injured. Relatively quiet early May turned into aggravation of the conflict and the biggest losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the past year.

However, despite the increase in losses on both sides, we are not talking about a serious escalation of fighting in Donbas right now, rather, these are battles of local significance.

Large-scale escalation – is transition into the offensive. Right now, sides are gathering intelligence on each other's forces and defence capabilities, identifying weak areas.


Major escalation is possible only with participation of Russian troops. As the forces that are currently stationed

in the territory of «DNR/LNR» are not enough to break the defence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is not an offensive group. It can become an offensive one though, when it is joined by the Armed Forces of Russia with aviation, artillery, etc.

With this in mind, large-scale training Caucasus 2016 is planned, under the pretext of which a rather large group of armed forces can be brought close to Ukrainian borders.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Military Programmes of  
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## EVEN AFTER MODERNISING ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES RUSSIA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MATCH NATO

Russia's military capability, even after all possible modernisations, will still not be able to match that of NATO, or even the USA alone. This includes both military and resource comparison, taking into account the volume of the countries' GDP.



*Co-director of Foreign Relations and  
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Therefore, in the case of a direct face-off without the use of nuclear weapons, for example, between Russia and the United States, Russia has a very small chance of winning this war. But we should not be excited about this, because this is the scenario that everybody is trying to avoid at any cost.

At the same time, availability of military capability is only one of components. Equally important, and perhaps even most important in case of Russia is its willingness to use this capability and take risks. This is precisely Russia's main advantage.

[Full text](#)

## FOR RUSSIA THE COST OF A LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE IN UKRAINE IS MUCH HIGHER TODAY THAN TWO YEARS AGO

The threat of full-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine has never disappeared. It was present from the very beginning of the war, even during the times of truce. This is confirmed by the facts presented by the representatives of the Main Intelligence Agency and the National Security and Defence Council: concentration of troops near the Russian-Ukrainian border, supplying of ammunition, fuel and oil, equipment on the occupied territories, etc. All this gives grounds to consider such threat possible.

Exactly how likely is the threat of large-scale battles? It is necessary to analyse not only the facts that confirm

preparations for aggression, but also the motives and objectives that Russia can achieve by escalating the conflict. First of all, let us look at Minsk Agreements. In the current situation, it is both Russia's and Ukraine's responsibility equally to comply with provisions of the agreement; and in case of any aggression on the part of Russia, the failure of the Minsk Agreements will be entirely on Russia.

But we also have to understand, who we are dealing with. The entire two-year history of the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates that for Russia the more effective tool was always that of force. This happened before Minsk-1, this happened before Minsk-2: use of force, intimidating Ukraine and its Western partners, forcing them to make concessions and sign agreements, and if someone does not agree to Russia's conditions, it begins to «speak» with guns.

I think that starting a large-scale offensive now would be impractical for Russia, as the situation is radically different from the one back in August 2014. Even then, the cost of the offensive was extremely high for Russia. Now this cost, taking into account possible losses and probable achievements of this military operation, is much higher than two years ago. Based on common sense, Russia should probably not resort to the use of force and large-scale battles.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes  
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## MOSCOW WILL RESORT TO NEW PROVOCATIONS IN RESPONSE TO STRENGTHENING OF NATO

Judging by the statements of NATO leaders and heads of some of its members, a number of important decisions on strengthening eastern borders of the block are expected at the next NATO summit in Warsaw. It is not just about placing small units of troops in different countries on a rotational basis, but also placement of NATO bases (including heavy equipment) on its eastern flank.

This is a really radical decision. Even two years ago it was difficult to imagine such developments. Five years ago, NATO did not even have operational defence plans for the Baltic States and its eastern members.

These measures are the result of Russia's policy from at least 2008 (since the time of Russia-Georgia war). Now NATO's eastern members can feel safer. The Alliance is abandoning its previous strategy of relations with Russia aimed at developing cooperation, and is moving towards the format of containment. Previous approaches have not proved effective, in particular because Russian leadership has not taken them as they should have. The current strategy, in my opinion, is more

productive. The arguments of power demonstrated by NATO today are more convincing for Russia. There is hope that after a certain period of escalation that has not ended yet, there will come a period of stabilisation (although some people are already starting to call it the new cold war).

Moscow will of course respond to the strengthening of NATO's eastern borders. We are bound to see new provocations, and political, economic and energy countermeasures – both declarative and real. In the military sector – more active demonstrations of power, dangerous manoeuvres of Russian aircraft, attempts to breach air and sea space of NATO members. Nevertheless, if the parties manage to avoid an unplanned incident (which could trigger a large-scale conflict), it is likely that Russia will eventually have to stop. The «red line» will be drawn for Russia, the one that it cannot overstep.

Full [text](#)

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## BEFORE JOINING NATO, UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME ITS EQUAL PARTNER

Ukraine should focus on raising the standards of its Armed Forces, which would allow the country to become an equal partner of the Alliance.

According to realistic estimations, practical realisation of the programme of Ukraine's accession to NATO is hardly possible in the next five years. Therefore, in this period, Ukraine could follow Sweden's model of cooperation with NATO. We can also remember Finland's model. In short, they entail development of partnership to the level of practical NATO membership without its formalisation. For Ukraine it is important first to reach the level of standards of NATO partners.

The main difference between full NATO membership and partnership is in the fifth article of the Washington Treaty – protection of borders of the member state. Formalisation is important, but equally important is reaching the standards of the partnership level. Such cooperation with NATO would be much more meaningful for Ukraine than all the loud promises of membership.

Full [text](#)

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# Economy

## IF IN SUMMER THE IMF DOES NOT GIVE UKRAINE MONEY, THE ENTIRE CREDIT PROGRAMME WILL BE OVER

IMF mission came to Ukraine with a regular check of how the government executes the terms of the loan. Last time the representatives of the Fund were not satisfied with homework results and postponed the financing until better days. This review of cooperation in the framework of the Extended Fund Facility programme (EFF) resulted in the statement by the Head of Mission Ron van Rooden that an agreement had been reached at the expert level.

There is some progress, but whether it is enough for a positive decision is unclear. There are a number of institutional issues related to the level of corruption in Ukraine and to the efficiency of use of the international funds.

Since February, there have been indicators of GDP growth, but they are certainly not at the level sufficient to start talking about Ukraine rising from the bottom of the crisis pit. So far, the economy is still in the state of depression.

The IMF sees the existing pension system as a major destabilising factor and may require the adoption of

reforms in the form that the current pensioners would hardly like. It is not easy to say, whether a compromise between the demands of the Fund and the desires of elderly Ukrainians is possible.

Ukraine will most probably get the loan, because the management of the Fund is unlikely to be willing to assume the responsibility for disrupting the financing programme, which has been frozen for quite a while now. But we have to understand: if the money is not allocated in summer, the programme will simply be over.

Full [text](#)

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## WHY UKRAINIANS DO NOT TRUST HONTAREVA

According to a recent survey by the Razumkov Centre, the current level of distrust of the population towards the NBU is 80%.

The central bank has to pursue transparent and comprehensible policy. There is, of course, commercially sensitive information, but when refinancing is allocated in a non-transparent way, it causes distrust.

Businesses that kept money in the failed banks lost tens and hundreds of billions of hryvnia (population – less so, because at least the Individual Deposit Guarantee Fund returns them their money). And, unfortunately, some of these losses are connected with

the fact that the failure of the banks was unclear. Not all the banks that were declared bankrupt had negative balances, and the bankruptcy of others – was clearly political.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes  
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Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



## IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO RESTORE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE IN BANKS THAN TO GET A NEW TRANCHE FROM THE IMF

The current macroeconomic situation in Ukraine gives the impression that the economy is finally on the rise from the bottom. So we can trust government forecasts of 1.5-2% growth. But we must understand that this is purely symbolic growth, which cannot satisfy us in any case.

Along with this, if we look at some formal indicators, they look slightly better: inflation decreased, level of debt reduced, budget deficit is under control. So a whole number of indicators, which, incidentally, are taken into consideration in making the decision on granting Ukraine the IMF tranche, are improving.

Another thing is that all these changes are very mild. So I think, now it is much more important to

begin normalising our domestic situation. Indeed, we can receive the \$1.7 billion tranche, but experts and government officials say that the population now holds several dozen billion on hand. It is extremely important to increase the reliability of the banking system and its credibility. If we managed to return back into the system at least a part of funds currently on hand of the population, it would have a much more significant positive effect than receiving another IMF tranche.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes  
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## Energy

### CONNECTING UKRAINE'S ENERGY SYSTEM TO ENTSO-E WILL TAKE AT LEAST 3-4 YEARS

Ukraine can increase its electricity export through integration of the Ukrainian system into the European electricity transmission system ENTSO-E. The pilot project – construction of the energy bridge in western Ukraine – has already been presented at the relevant ministry. Moreover, project implementation requires no budget money, as private investors are ready to cover the expenses.

The data on complete integration into ENTSO-E is not yet fully revealed, but according to preliminary information

that I have, it can take 3-4 years, on condition that Ukraine talks to Brussels and ENTSO-E in a single voice.

[Full text](#)

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## Foreign Policy

### STEINMEIER'S NEW PLAN LOOKS CYNICAL ON THE BACKGROUND OF ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS

On 30 May, in Berlin, during the German-Russian Forum/Potsdam Encounters, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and OSCE Chairperson Frank-Walter Steinmeier came forward with a proposal for settlement of the conflict in Donbas. He proposed that «an incentive factor for both sides (i.e. Russia and Ukraine) should be built into the mechanism. In case of substantial progress, lifting sanctions gradually should become possible». While previously, on 25 May, German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel also spoke about «gradual lifting of sanctions» at the German-Russian forum in Rostov. And German Foreign Ministry has confirmed this possibility with the words of Martin Schaefer.

These statements are surprising, to say the least, as on 26 May in the declaration released at the end of the G7 summit it was stated that sanctions are clearly linked to Russia's complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. Moreover, the Group of Seven threatened to approve further restrictive measures, depending on Russia's actions.

Steinmeier's new plan looks especially cynical on the background of apparent conflict escalation, also noted by the OSCE mission. The shelling of lines of ATO forces is increasing, Ukrainian soldiers are dying, the flow of Russian arms, ammunition, equipment, fuel and money to the occupied territories does not decrease.

Clearly, in this situation, holding its solidarity on sanctions is as important for the West, as strengthening NATO's eastern flank in Europe. However, it is also clear that the «gradual stimuli» for Russia in the form of easing the sanctions can cause the opposite effect, which Western politicians are apprehensive of and which they are trying to avoid.

[Full text](#)

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## DONBAS ELECTIONS: LANDMINE FOR EUROPE

The West continues its official and behind-the-scenes pressure, pushing Kyiv to promptly hold elections in Donbas. Today, «express elections» in the occupied territories are essentially a giant delayed-action landmine, controls of which are in the main office in the Kremlin. «Accession» to Ukraine of terrorist military formations with pseudostate metastases controlled by the Kremlin threatens to turn the entire country into a crisis area in the middle of Europe, into a «migration volcano».

It is unacceptable to hold elections in this situation. For the West it is safer, cheaper and more beneficial to «freeze» the situation in Donbas and «unfreeze» the Norman process expecting difficult and prolonged negotiations on political settlement. This also means that the four unrecognised republics in the post-Soviet space could be joined by another two (for the time being).

Ukraine should abandon the illusion of prompt and painless «return» of occupied Donbas territories to Ukraine. Two years of war is more than convincing evidence that the conflict in Donbas is serious and

long-lasting, and that it cannot be solved in the framework of Minsk Agreements. As a warning, let us remember the conflicts in the post-Soviet space that have been frozen for a quarter of the century, the unrecognised republics – the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic (1990), Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (1991), the Republic of South Ossetia (1992), the Republic of Abkhazia (1993). Meanwhile, the remote control of these conflicts that regulates their temperature and activity is in Kremlin office No. 1.

Let us also remember that in 2008 Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia, and signed agreements on «friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance» with them. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Tuvalu quickly joined in the process of «recognition of independence». We should not discard a similar negative scenario.

Full [text](#)

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## Sociology

A national survey of the population of Ukraine was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre on 11-16 May 2016. There were 2016 respondents aged from 18 y.o. in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Theoretical sampling error – 2.3%.

### If the election took place next Sunday, for which political party would you vote?

	% of respondents, who would vote in the election
1. Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Batkivshchyna» (Y. Tymoshenko)	12,0
2. Party «Self Help Union» (A. Sadovyi)	10,6
3. Party «Petro Poroshenko Bloc «Solidarity» (Y. Lutsenko, V. Klitschko)	9,9
4. Party «Opposition Bloc» (Y. Boiko)	9,1
5. Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	8,4
6. Party «Civic Position» (A. Hrytsenko)	6,0
7. Party «All-Ukrainian Union «Svoboda» (O. Tiahnybok)	3,6
8. Party «Movement for Cleaning» (M. Saakashvili)	2,7
9. Party «Strong Ukraine» (S. Tihipko)	1,9
10. Party «National Movement of Dmytro Yarosh»	1,8
11. Party «Our Land» (co-heads: O. Mazurchak, O. Feldman, A. Kisse, S. Kaltsev, Y. Hranaturov)	1,6
12. Party UKROP (D. Borysenko, B. Filatov)	1,5
13. Party «People's Front» (A. Yatseniuk)	1,3
14. Party of Simple People of Serhii Kaplin	1,1
15. Party «New State» (P. Symonenko)	1,0
16. Party «Revival» (V. Bondar)	0,9
17. Party «People's Control» (D. Dobrodomov)	0,9
18. Agrarian Party of Ukraine (V. Skotsyk)	0,7
19. Party «Right Sector» (A. Tarasenko)	0,7
20. Party «People's Movement of Ukraine»	0,5
21. Party «Power of People» (O. Solontai)	0,5
22. Party «Democratic Alliance» (V. Hatsko)	0,4
23. Other party	5,5
24. WOULD CROSS OUT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE BALLOT/SPOIL THE BALLOT	4,7
25. Hard to say	12,8

# Razumkov Centre News

## EXPERT DISCUSSION «BUILDING A COMMON IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES»



On 7 June 2016, Razumkov Centre together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine and Matra European Partnership Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands conducted expert discussion «Building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens: prospects and challenges».

During the expert discussion were presented results of a sociological survey by the Razumkov Centre (10,000 respondents) that characterise the current state of identity of Ukrainian citizens and certain society groups.

Participants included representatives of legislative and executive authorities, scientists, government and independent researchers and experts, as well as representatives of foreign embassies and international organisations.

During the discussion, the following issues came in focus:

1. How did the events that had taken place in Ukraine in 2013-2015 (Maidan, annexation of Crimea, Russia-Ukraine conflict, etc.) influence the different aspects of identity of Ukrainian citizens?

2. What trends are characteristic for the current stage of the process of national identity formation? What is the ratio of their positive (consolidating) and negative (conflict) potential?

3. On what basis could a joint/nationwide identity of Ukrainian citizens form, given the current conditions and challenges?

*Read materials and analytical content on «Building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens: prospects and challenges»*

## REGULAR MEETING OF THE ROUND TABLE «RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE: RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS»

On 26 May 2016, Razumkov Centre together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine with support of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations conducted a regular meeting of the ongoing Round table «Religion and government in Ukraine: relationship problems».

Information and analytical materials were presented that contained results of the sociological study of the state and trends in religious commitment within Ukrainian society (the study was conducted on 25-30 March 2016), as well as interviews of church leaders and religious organisations – participants of the ongoing Round table.

The following topic was proposed for discussion: «Religion, church, society and state: two years after Maidan». In the framework of this discussion such issues were raised:

1. Religious commitment within Ukrainian society: dynamics and direction of change (2014-2016).

2. Church-state relations: achievements and problems.

*Read information on «Religion, church, society and state: two years after Maidan»*

## THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE «GOVERNANCE AND REFORM OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: BEST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES»

Razumkov Centre together with Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Interfactual Association of deputies «Ukraine – Euro-Atlantic space!», NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine and with financial support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, organised international conference «Governance and reform of national security and intelligence services». Its undeniable success was that for the first time one round table gathered all actors: international and domestic experts, representatives of the Security Service of



Ukraine, National Security and Defence Council, foreign intelligence, Ministry of Defence, Parliament, civil society, journalists, etc.

*More on the [event](#)*

## EXPERT DISCUSSION «INTEGRATION OF UKRAINE'S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM WITH ENTSO-E AS ENERGY SECURITY FACTOR FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES»

On 20 May 2016, Razumkov Centre with support of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety, conducted expert discussion «Integration of Ukraine's electricity system with ENTSO-E as energy security factor for Central and Eastern European countries».

Discussion participants included people's deputies of Ukraine, representatives of the relevant ministry, representatives of European energy companies and energy community, Euro-MPs, experts.

During the discussion, publications of the Razumkov Centre were presented: «[Results of 2015: Ukraine's energy sector](#)» and «[Price formation in energy markets: experience of EU countries and Ukraine](#)».

During the discussion, the following issues were considered:

1. The role of Ukrainian electric power industry for energy security in Central Europe.

2. Issues of synchronising the amount of energy consumption in Ukraine with ENTSO-E and identifying priority infrastructure projects for Ukraine regarding its integration with EU networks.

3. Reforming Ukrainian energy markets on the basis of the Third EU Energy Package and export potential of Ukrainian electric power industry.

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