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OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES RESORT TO INTIMIDATION TACTICS AGAINST CRIMEAN TATARS, ATTEMPT TO DO AWAY WITH THEIR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

In their bid to have the Majlis outlawed in court, the occupation authorities of Crimea are mainly trying to intimidate Crimean Tatars by every means possible.

This is done to deter and discourage them from fighting for their rights and restoring Crimea's status as Ukrainian territory. The occupants also want them to give up on their long-time ambition of creating a national territorial autonomy of Crimean Tatars in Crimea without breaking off from Ukraine.

If the Crimean Tatar Majlis is declared an extremist organisation (which the self-proclaimed Crimean authorities are aiming for), this would pave the way for persecution of Crimean Tatars – whatever they do – simply for having anything to do with the Majlis. In doing so, the occupation authorities will attempt to alienate some Crimean Tatars from this organisation, thereby

reducing its role and influence with the Crimean Tatar population.

This would also accomplish another task of the "Crimean powers that be", that is to not just intimidate Crimean Tatars but also do away with their political leadership, organisation, and so

forth. It is quite likely that alternative organisations will be created and headed by Crimean Tatar activists who are more loyal to the incumbent authorities.

This situation calls for using all existing mechanisms of international law, particularly those of the UN, because what is happening in Crimea at the moment is blatant persecution of the indigenous population of the peninsula. Our Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Justice must use every opportunity to exert pressure on the so-called Crimean authorities from the perspective of international law.

Full [text](#)

*Yuriy YAKYMENKO,
Deputy Director General, Director
of Political and Legal Programs,
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AFTER MILITARY PULL-OUT FROM SYRIA, PUTIN WILL SEEK TO DESTABILISE THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE

After withdrawing his troops from Syria, Putin might well shift his focus back to Ukraine. Constant attempts at provoking instability and destabilising the political situation in Ukraine are to be expected.

This mainly applies to the occupied territories in the east but might also happen outside the Donbas as efforts are undertaken to destabilise the situation in other regions of Ukraine. This might be accomplished using techniques of the special services, by provoking conflicts or staging terrorist attacks. In other words, efforts might be made to create instability in Ukraine from within.

Putin's ultimate goal remains unchanged: Ukraine must not become a successful European

project but should instead turn into a zone of unending political instability. Ukraine should become a country torn by conflicts, unable to exist without external control. Essentially, this is meant to back up Putin's statement to the effect that the Ukrainian nation does not and cannot possibly exist because Ukrainians are unable to have their own statehood. Needless to say, Ukraine should not set an example of successful transformation of the internal political system for Russia. This is Putin's real objective.

Full [text](#)

*Yuriy YAKYMENKO,
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LUSTRATION WITHOUT CLEANSING

As soon as the *Law On Lustration of Power* was passed, I found it to be unacceptable on a number of points. It has been more than a year since the Venice Commission spoke about the need to amend it, which has not happened to this day.

The Lustration Law had to be a framework law because it had to be supplemented by the *Law On Restoring Public Trust in the Judiciary*. Together they had to provide systemic tools for cleansing the power and laying down the groundwork of government as a social society component created to work in the interests of the people. Alas, it turned out to lack sufficient implementation mechanisms.

Admittedly, those in power torpedoed an idea that – while potentially correct – was brought to life

with too much revolutionary enthusiasm instead of putting in place efficient mechanisms that would be founded in the law and legal principles.

All of this should be taken into account to introduce appropriate amendments and decide who should be subjected to lustration. Moreover, this mechanism will not work unless all authorities are subordinated to the binding force of these legal mechanisms.

Full [text](#)

Viktor MUSIYAKA,
Legal Research Consultant,
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INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULINGS MIGHT JEOPARDISE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

The interpretation of the constitutional use of the concept of the “following regular parliamentary session” recently announced by the Constitutional Court might jeopardise the fundamental integrity of the national legal system.

Effectively, the court’s ruling does not impose any obligations on the Ukrainian Parliament. It allows postponing a decision to introduce previously approved amendments to the Constitution to any subsequent regular parliamentary session. However, since the Constitution was first adopted the “following regular session” was interpreted only as a regular session that immediately follows the current session, meaning two successive sessions of the Ukrainian Parliament. In other words, amendments approved during one session must be introduced no later than the end of the following session.

Note that the interpretation announced by the Constitutional Court directly contravenes the Constitutional Court ruling of 17 October 2002, which states with reference to Article 155 of the Constitution: “The issue of amending the Constitution of Ukraine must be discussed and decided at two successive regular sessions of the Ukrainian Parliament.” In the new ruling, the Constitutional Court also fails to explain the collision it has created.

This has resulted in an inadmissible situation where two mutually exclusive constitutional provisions are in effect.

When the Constitutional Court issued its infamous ruling in 2010, which effectively amounted to an anti-constitutional coup, the court also chose not to refer to its ruling issued in 2005, which made the 2010 ruling impossible. When ruling on the subject of cancelling the immunity of parliament members, the Constitutional Court cited seven of its former rulings that did not conflict with the new ruling while ignoring to mention the three rulings contravening it. The latest ruling follows the same pattern: the Court’s clarifications completely overlook the previous ruling that is in direct conflict with the new ruling.

This creates preconditions for the future Constitutional Court judges to declare some of the ruling of their predecessors to be unconstitutional. This inconsistency between Constitutional Court rulings might jeopardise the integrity of the national legal system.

Full [text](#)

Viktor MUSIYAKA,
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National Security and Defence

CURRENT SITUATION IN EASTERN UKRAINE AS A REFLECTION OF A WEAK WEST

The true objective of the Russian military involvement in the Syria campaign was not joining the fight but achieving certain political goals and results. Russia never wanted a reunited Syria and Assad back in power. Putin wanted to establish and entrench what Russians call a “Useful Syria” on the Mediterranean coast where Assad enjoys broad support from the population.

Even though many of these objectives were never achieved, the American security structure in the Middle East has been undermined. Jordan – a US ally – has suffered seriously as a result of what

has been happening. Persian Gulf states have lost trust in the USA. Meanwhile, Turkey – a NATO ally – failed to receive decisive support. One of Russia’s main objectives is isolating Turkey from its NATO allies and provoking Turkey to act irresponsibly, which will only deepen this isolation and the split within NATO. Russia has made progress in all of these directions.

The problem is that the West is so weakened by the new challenges and threats and so divided that it currently has much less collective resolve and confidence needed to confront Russia effectively.

In light of the risks of a Brexit, the migrant crisis, and the euro zone crisis, Ukraine has reasons to worry that support from the West will not be effective. Europe will continue to say the right things without backing them up with practical steps.

As to the Minsk Protocol, Russia has never honoured its obligations. And yet Russia insists that Ukraine fulfil its share of commitments that are much broader, to be honest. This is because the Minsk Protocol uses absolutely ambiguous wording. If the leaders of the self-proclaimed LNR and DNR keep on insisting that they interpret their special status as total autonomy – they do what they want; they have their own trade policy; they have their own people's police and security system; they decide

who should be entrusted with providing border security; and, last but not least, they will have the right to veto any foreign policy or security policy decisions in the Ukrainian Parliament – the parties will not reach any mutual understanding even 30 years down the road. The current problem is a reflection of a weak West.

[Full text](#)

*James SHERR,
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OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MINSK PROTOCOL

The international community, represented by the OSCE as well as Germany and France, is attempting to act as a go-between in the bilateral negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow within the framework of the so-called Normandy format.

In the summer of 2015, the Minsk Protocol – in combination with other factors such as the falling global energy prices and the growing impact of Western sanctions against Russia – resulted in a belated reduction in combat hostilities. However, this failed to produce either a complete ceasefire or any meaningful steps aimed at bringing back the occupied territories and the Russo-Ukrainian border in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of Kyiv.

As things stand now, even a banal freeze of the conflict – the way it happened in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – is not on the table. On the contrary, combat continues at a relatively low level of intensity. Ukrainian soldiers keep dying and getting wounded along the entire unstable line of demarcation between

the Ukrainian army and forces of Russia-backed separatists. The latter are mostly Kremlin-sponsored mercenaries, local criminals, pro-Moscow volunteer extremists, forcibly mobilised local population, and regular Russian forces. With each passing month, the territories of the so-called people's republics of Luhansk and Donetsk are plunged ever deeper into poverty and chaos.

Recent developments – along with the intensifying economic crisis in Russia and the Kremlin's struggle to have the Western sanctions eased – have resulted in a somewhat softer position of Moscow.

Against this backdrop, in recent weeks Kyiv has returned to a previously discussed mechanism for restoring peace in the occupied territories of Eastern Ukraine. Kyiv believes that a full-scale peacekeeping operation in the Donbas can be a realistic solution at least for this territorial conflict with Russia in mainland Ukraine.

[Full text](#)

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DISCUSSIONS OF DONBAS ELECTIONS PREMATURE AS ARMED HOSTILITIES CONTINUE

The eleventh meeting of the Normandy Four this March in Paris has yet again illustrated the protracted impasse in negotiations. They discussed the initiative put forward by Germany's Foreign Minister Frank Steinmeier to hold elections in the Donbas in the first half of 2016. The meeting came to naught: against the background of active combat in Eastern Ukraine, any discussions of the "modality" of elections seem premature, to put it mildly. Before they can happen, at least the first "peacekeeping" clauses of the Minsk Protocol have to be implemented. They precede the fourth, "political" clause dealing with the "dialog about the modality of holding local elections."

Elections in the occupied territories would require solving countless problems that are not even discussed: demilitarisation and withdrawal of foreign troops; jurisdiction of the Ukrainian authorities and presence of

the mass media; a register of voters updated to reflect changes over the past two years (including 1.7 internally displaced persons); border control at least by the OSCE mission; adoption of the relevant electoral law; presence of international observers; liquidation of illegal armed groups, and the question of amnesty. This is only the most general and incomplete list of problems. Presently there are no solutions for any single of those issues. Before elections can be discussed, weapons have to be laid down.

Steinmeier's initiative is perfectly understandable. Berlin needs progress in Ukraine considering that:

(a) the EU – grappling with its own internal problems and conflicts – has been showing fatigue over the war in the Donbas and is eager to somehow resolve the "Ukrainian issue" as soon as possible;

(b) Germany needs a breakthrough and success especially during its OSCE chairmanship, considering the foreign and domestic factors. At whose expense this success will be achieved is a question of secondary importance.

We are facing a contradictory situation: negotiations in the Normandy format are essentially “frozen” because diplomats can obviously keep on meeting to no avail for a very long time, whereas the situation in the Donbas has entered a “hot phase”, with active combat,

another escalation reported by the OSCE, and arrivals of Russian military detachments and transports with ammo reported by the Ukrainian intelligence forces.

[Full text](#)

*Mykhaylo PASHKOV,
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TWO SCENARIOS FOR UKRAINE FOLLOWING PUTIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA

Putin has yet again caught everybody by surprise. His decision to pull out of Syria was completely unexpected primarily to the Russian public at home, as evidenced by an avalanche of comments appearing in the Russian press yesterday and today.

Putin will have a very hard time selling the withdrawal from Syria as a major victory to Russians. Over the past two years, Russian society has cultivated a heavy demand for militarist rhetoric, sabre rattling, and a constant streak of “victories”. In the case of Syria, this approach worked for just a couple of weeks and was not as pleasing to the public as the fight against putative Ukrainian “fascists”.

It is therefore only logical to expect an attempt to switch the attention of the Russian TV audience back to “bad news from Ukraine”.

With this in mind, serious thought should be given to two possible scenarios that the situation can evolve into.

The first scenario can be considered provisionally positive. Putin might attempt a certain reconciliation in the Ukrainian conflict by keeping the escalation on the down low or making some concessions. In

exchange, he will ask for what the Kremlin would prefer to get without resorting to force. This mainly concerns the Western pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to conduct (recognize) elections in the parts of the Donbas outside Kyiv's control, amend the Constitution, and declare an amnesty. In other words, Russia will push for the implementation of that part of the Minsk Protocol that mainly Ukraine has to honour.

Bear in mind, however, that in doing so Putin will not aim to defuse the conflict, but to achieve his original objectives: to create an enclave through which he will be able to control the central authorities in Kyiv and their domestic and foreign policy decisions.

The other scenario that must not be ruled out may involve the need to feed another helping of military victories to the Russian public. In this case, the first scenario will be preceded by yet another major escalation, possibly involving the “liberation” of certain key locations.

[Full text](#)

*Oleksiy MELNYK, Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International
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ECONOMIC CRISIS HELPS TO BUILD A PROFESSIONAL ARMY

The economic hardships currently experienced by Ukraine have created an environment favouring recruitment for a professional army. This also holds true for other countries that have switched to contract-based armies. When the national economy struggles, more people consider careers in the Armed Forces. However, while it is important to

motivate young people to join the Army, retaining them is just as important.

[Full text](#)

*Oleksiy MELNYK, Co-Director of Foreign Relations
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RUSSIA CAN RESUME ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA AT THE DROP OF A HAT

In addition to its military dimension, the conflict in Syria also has a political dimension. Putin's order to withdraw Russian troops belongs in the political dimension.

This is primarily a gesture signalling Russia's willingness to help achieve a ceasefire to be soon instituted on a UN mandate, and do so as a dominant and influential player.

Secondly, with this order Putin has demonstrated the limited nature of Russia's involvement in the Syria conflict while at the same time signalling to the West that he will not go down the path of a major escalation of Russian involvement. Of course, this is not because Putin is a peace dove, but because this threatened to escalate into Russia's involvement in a ground operation – something the Kremlin wishes to avoid due to the lack of both military and financial resources.

On the other hand, this is merely a symbolic gesture. The order calls for the withdrawal of aviation while Russian military bases in Syria are there to stay in full

force, much like the S-400 missile systems. That is why Putin can easily resume the military campaign in Syria at any time.

In reality, the Russian operation in Syria was intended more for viewers back home. This has been the first military operation attempted by the Kremlin outside Russia and the post-Soviet space. The war far away from the Russian border flattered the Russians' ego and, most importantly, helped to maintain the political image of Putin, who is allegedly helping Russia rise from its knees and turning it into a global player and a great power.

[Full text](#)

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Economy

STRUCTURAL FLAWS OF THE ECONOMY PRECLUDE UKRAINE FROM BENEFITING FROM ACCESS TO EU MARKET

The EU granted Ukraine simplified access to its markets in late May 2014. Since then virtually all European duties on Ukrainian products have been lifted. Tariff quotas apply to agricultural produce only. This means that we can sell a certain quantity without any duties, which apply fully only when the quota has been used up. Ukraine uses up quotas for some agricultural products rather quickly. We have already used up more than one half of the annual quota for grain exports. This is our major commodity. And yet 2015 quotas were not used up for the majority of products. For our part, we have still not granted full access to European companies. Ukraine is lifting customs duties according to a schedule stretching for years.

The European Commission predicted that with duties out of the way Ukraine would be able to

increase exports by 500 million euros each year. We recorded growth in the first half of 2014 only to see it come to naught by the end of the year. This happened because Ukrainian goods are present in a narrow segment in the EU market. Ukrainian producers are selling either raw materials or semi-finished products such as metals. These are low added-value goods. Ukraine is selling few products that require highly-skilled workers to make. This is the reason for our limited presence in the EU market.

Full [text](#)

*Volodymyr SIDENKO,
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HRVYNIA EXCHANGE RATE TO FLUCTUATE IN UAH 0.50 RANGE THIS SPRING

Ukraine has many factors contributing to high risks, both political and economic, which is naturally reflected in such a highly sensitive indicator as the foreign exchange rate.

Until mid-April, the foreign exchange market situation will be more or less the same it is now: periods of slight strengthening will alternate with periods of slight weakening of the hryvnia. Foreign exchange rate fluctuations of 30-40 kopecks will become customary.

I do not see any factors that would contribute to a significant strengthening of the hryvnia in the short term

in light of political and economic instability. Likewise, there are no factors that would provoke a shock devaluation of the hryvnia. These fluctuations are our "new normal".

Full [text](#)

*Vasyl YURCHYSHYN,
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STRENGTHENING US ECONOMY WILL HELP STAVE OFF A NEW GLOBAL CRISIS

Despite the mounting risks for the global economy, a replay of the 2007-2008 crisis scenario is not on the table because there are currently much fewer imbalances than there were back then.

We are primarily talking about the balance of payments: the foreign trade deficit of the USA is much lower now, and the UK is showing positive trends. The economic growth slowdown in China has been fairly predictable, since the Chinese economy is currently twice the size it was a decade ago. A large economy cannot keep on growing at a very fast pace.

The US has the largest economy that has been demonstrating very good performance in terms of employment, consumer prices, capital influx, and the economic development index. All of this may well stave off another global crisis.

Full [text](#)

*Vasyl YURCHYSHYN,
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Energy Sector

UKRAINIAN ENERGY SECTOR ROUNDUP: 2015

Much of Ukraine's domestic energy sector had been dependent for many long years on purchases of natural gas, petroleum products, and fuel for power plants (both thermal and nuclear) from Russia. This reliance on imports turned natural gas, oil, nuclear fuel, and, eventually, coal, into trump cards that Russia could use to put pressure on Ukraine. Additional factors that have severely undermined the nation's energy security include the

loss of fuel and energy sector facilities and hydrocarbon development prospects following the annexation of Crimea and armed hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, not to mention the destruction of the oil and gas infrastructure in the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The year 2015 was challenging for the Ukrainian energy industry and related sectors of the economy.

The problems include: shortages of anthracite coal for thermal power plants and delivery problems; a failed privatisation programme in the energy sector; an imbalanced fiscal policy in the gas production industry (which resulted in a reduction (although insignificant) in natural gas production); a drastic increase in utility rates; a substantial share of counterfeit and low-quality motor fuel that remains outside control.

Despite the many problems, 2015 was a milestone year for Ukraine, with the country making certain achievements in the energy sector. The noteworthy



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accomplishments include: diversification of natural gas supplies, resulting in an unprecedented reduction in natural gas imports from Russia; a reduction in total natural gas consumption and growth in the volume of gas transit through Ukraine; diversification of nuclear fuel supplies to further reduce dependence on Russia; adoption and implementation of progressive laws dealing with various aspects of the energy sector, which are compliant with EU standards; continuation of the energy efficiency and energy saving programme.

[Read the entire report](#)



*Kateryna MARKEVYCH,
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NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS NOW ACCOUNT FOR 57% OF ENERGY OUTPUT IN UKRAINE

The share of nuclear power plants in domestic power generation has been on the rise recently, currently standing at 57%. While this may be good news, we should remember that 12 out of 15 nuclear power units operating in Ukraine went into operation as far back as the Soviet era. Their design service life of

30 years has either run out or is about to. It has been extended by 10 years for three power units.

Full [text](#)

*Volodymyr OMELCHENKO,
Energy Programmes Director, Razumkov Centre*

NAFTOGAZ SHOULD BECOME A HOLDING COMPANY WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN TRADING

Naftogaz and the Ministry of Energy and the Coal Industry has each presented a vision of the reform of the national monopoly in gas production, transit, and trading.

Both models are aligned with the European Union's Third Energy Package. However, the antagonism between Naftogaz and the Ministry reflects not so much a search for a better mechanism for managing assets as political struggle between different groups of influence.

There is a compromise between the current proposals of the Ministry and the monopoly. Naftogaz can be turned into a holding company in which system operators would be separated from the parent company at the level of operational management.

Naftogaz would still retain the corporate rights.

Naftogaz should be a holding company. It could have a staff of 15 to 20 employees who would convene shareholder meetings, oversee implementation of resolutions, and would not be directly involved in commerce.

Yet the political influence in this situation is extremely dangerous. As long as the shadow structures continue to exert their influence, none of the models will bring the much-needed changes.

Full [text](#)

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Foreign Policy

RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KYIV AND ANKARA APPEARS QUITE LOGICAL

The current rapprochement between Kyiv and Ankara looks quite logical against the backdrop of drastic changes in the Black Sea region after Russian occupation of Crimea and the escalating conflict between Russia and Turkey.

It is primarily extremely important for Ukraine to preserve and expand the front of international solidarity and support as the country struggles with the Russian threat. Turkey can be a big help in this regard.



Secondly, Kyiv is unconditionally interested in a long-term allied partnership with Turkey – an influential regional leader in the political, trade, economic, energy, and humanitarian spheres.

Note that Turkey – being at the forefront of a large-scale migrant crisis and engaged in complex negotiations with Brussels – is gaining particular importance and weight for Europe that will from now on listen more closely to whatever Ankara has to

say. Ukraine should keep that in mind. Still, it is too soon to say how strategic or situational the Ukraine-Turkey partnership will turn out.

Full [text](#)

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INEVITABLE ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

The Russian aggression created an unprecedented political and ideological reality in relations between Kyiv and Moscow. It is reflected in a large body of laws and regulations (petitions and decrees of the Ukrainian Parliament on the Russian aggression, the relevant Presidential Orders, and decisions of the National Defence and Security Council; a new National Security Strategy and a new Military Doctrine). In the most general terms, the current “ideological matrix” of Ukrainian politics in relations with Russia can be phrased as follows: Russia is an aggressor and a military enemy; the Kremlin aims to destroy the Ukrainian statehood; the aggression will be protracted; a return to normal relations is conditional


on the surrender of occupied territories, compensation for the losses caused by the act of aggression, and non-involvement in the domestic affairs of Ukraine.

Obviously, the immediate future will not bring any positive changes in the Kremlin’s policy on Ukraine or domestic political changes in Russia, with yet another presidential term for Putin the most likely scenario. This raises the question: How and based on what model should we coexist with the Putin-led Russia? How and on what basis should we pursue our relations in the political, diplomatic, security, economic, energy, communications, and humanitarian spheres? What mid-term strategy should Ukraine adopt in relations with Russia?

Needless to say, we are talking about forming a conceptually new model of relations not with some far-away or insignificant country but with a neighbouring nation with which Ukraine shares a 2,000 km national border and countless interpersonal, sociocultural, and historical ties. Over 7.5 million people crossed the border between Ukraine and Russia in 2015 alone.

Full [text](#)

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EU RETURN TO BUSINESS-AS-USUAL PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA IMPOSSIBLE

On March 14, foreign ministers of EU member states gathered at a special meeting to discuss the prospects of future relations with Moscow. This brainstorming session resulted in the adoption of a package of certain basic principles of the policy to be pursued by Brussels in relations with Russia.

The meeting of the ministers has demonstrated that:

(a) a return to a business-as-usual partnership with Russia will not happen but all sorts of compromises are quite possible;

(b) EU member states are not unanimous on the principles and rules for building relations with Russia much like on the sanctions (with Hungary, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus least supportive of the sanctions against Russia);

(c) the H-hour for prolonging the sanctions has been pushed closer to the summer because on March 10 the EU prolonged individual sanctions (against 146 individuals and 37 Russian companies) until September 15. The most painful sectoral sanctions are in effect

until July 31. While the prolongation of the “Crimean” sanctions is practically a given, bargaining over the other two sanction packages is quite possible. Brussels may be prompted to engage in such bargaining by certain “peacekeeping” steps taken by Russia, such as the sudden decision to pull out the Russian military from Syria.

The EU does not have a clear-cut mid-term strategy for dealing with Russia, which would be approved and supported by all member states. Nor does the EU show an understanding of the nature and objectives of the existing Putin regime. Brussels is scared and reluctant to engage in a long-term and full-scale confrontation with the Kremlin. Hence the short-term nature of sanctions tied to the Minsk Protocol and the possibility of an “exchange of services” with the Russian Federation.

Full [text](#)

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The Razumkov Centre sociological service conducted a public opinion poll on 19-24 February 2016. A total of 2,021 respondents aged 18 or older were surveyed in all regions of Ukraine excluding Crimea and occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The theoretical sample error (corrected for

the design effect) does not exceed 2.3% with a confidence level of 95%.

The theoretical sample error does not exceed 2.3% with a confidence level of 95%. For more details on the results of opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre, go to our website at <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>.

If the Ukrainian parliamentary election were to be held next Sunday, which of the following parties would you vote for?

	% of respondents	% of respondents who intend to vote
Opposition Bloc Party	8.4	11.3
Samopomich Alliance Party	7.9	11.2
Petro Poroshenko Bloc – Solidarity Party	7.8	11.1
Batkivshchyna All-Ukraine Alliance Party	6.7	9.1
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	4.8	6.6
For the Cleansing of Ukraine Bloc of Mikheil Saakashvili	4.3	5.8
Svoboda All-Ukraine Alliance Party	2.9	3.7
Ukrainian Union of Patriots (UKROP) Party	2.2	2.7
Party of ATO Fighters	2.0	2.3
Civic Stance Party	1.9	2.9
Our Land Party	1.5	2.0
People's Front Party	1.4	2.0
Right Sector Party	1.3	1.6
Renaissance Party	1.2	1.6
Left Opposition Party (Communist Party of Ukraine and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine)	1.1	1.4
People's Control Popular Movement Party	1.0	1.5
National Movement of Dmytro Yarosh	0.7	1.1
Serhiy Tihipko's Party Strong Ukraine	0.6	0.8
Republican Platform Party	0.2	0.1
Other party	4.5	5.2
I would choose not to vote	17.9	–
Hard to say/Refused to answer	19.6	16.3

If the Ukrainian presidential election were to be held next Sunday, who would you vote for?

	% of respondents	% of respondents who intend to vote
Petro Poroshenko	10.7	14.7
Yulia Tymoshenko	7.4	9.5
Andriy Sadovyi	6.5	8.9
Yuriy Boyko	4.8	6.5
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	4.5	6.3
Oleh Lyashko	3.9	5.2
Dmytro Yarosh	2.1	2.6
Serhiy Tihipko	1.8	2.3
Oleh Tyahnybok	1.3	1.8
Petro Symonenko	1.0	1.5
Vitaliy Klychko	0.9	1.2
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	0.2	0.3
Other politician	12.9	14.8
I would choose not to vote	16.9	–
Hard to say	25.2	24.4

Razumkov Centre Events

SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

A wide range of security problems faced by Ukraine dominated the **Second International Conference Security Sector Governance: The Role of Democratic Institutions & International Best Practices**, held in Kyiv on 16-17 March 2016 by the Razumkov Centre and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of The Netherlands.

After two days of breakout sessions and work group discussions, conference participants analysed the major challenges in Ukraine's security sector, successes and problematic aspects of sector reforms. Particular attention was devoted to issues of establishing cooperation and coordination between governmental, nongovernmental, national and international participants of reform processes in Ukraine. Discussions touched on subjects of democratic (especially parliamentary) control, observance of human rights, gender equality in the operation of the security sector and its reforms, opportunities and obstacles for implementing best international practices.

The conference drew representatives of the authorities, civil society organisations, volunteer movements, independent Ukrainian and international experts, employees of international organisations, students and journalists.



PARTICIPATION IN EVENTS OF THE UKRAINE WEEK IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The Razumkov Centre participated in events of the Ukraine Week in the European Parliament, hosted by Brussels from February 29 to March 2, 2016.

Yuriy Yakymenko, Deputy Director General, Director of Political and Legal Programs at Razumkov Centre, travelled to Brussels as part of a delegation of Ukrainian think tanks and NGOs to take part in events of the Ukraine Week in the European Parliament.

On February 29, the Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in Brussels hosted the *Ukrainian Laboratory – Fair of Project Ideas for Reforms in Ukraine*.



Ukrainian civil society representatives also participated in the Ukraine Week opening ceremony at the European Parliament.

As part of the programme, the Razumkov Centre presented its vision of the future Ukraine scenarios, projects, and future plans to European experts and politicians.

PARTICIPATION IN THE 4TH YOUTH KYIV SECURITY FORUM

Oleksiy Melnyk, Co-director, Foreign relations and international security programmes at Razumkov Centre, participated in expert and jury member capacity in the 4th Youth Kyiv Security Forum *Ukraine – World: Building Relationship Strategies*, organised by the Open Ukraine Foundation of Arseniy Yatsenyuk in collaboration with the NATO Office of Information and Press in Ukraine and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

On behalf of the Razumkov Centre, Mr Melnyk presented copies of the *SIPRI Yearbook 2014* to the group of winners. The best four training participants chosen by a jury decision received invitations to attend the international conference *Security and Defence Governance: Role of Democratic Institutions and Best International Practices* conducted by the Razumkov Centre on March 16-17 in Kyiv.



PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD BANK WORKSHOP IN KYIV

On 25 February 2016, Volodymyr Sidenko, Razumkov Centre Senior research fellow, participated in a World Bank workshop, *Conflict in Ukraine and the Road Ahead: Impact on Livelihoods and Development Prospects*, hosted by the World Bank office in Kyiv, and gave a presentation at a breakout session titled *Managing Localised Socio-Economic Impacts of the Conflict*.

Workshop participants who joined the discussion include: for international organisations – Qimiao Fan, World Bank Country Director for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; Neal Walker, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine; Jan Thomas Hiemstra, UNDP Country Director For Ukraine; Paul Quinn Judge, Crisis Group's Senior Europe and Central Asia Program Adviser; and Olena Voloshyna, IFC Country Manager for Ukraine; for Ukraine – Hryhoriy Nemyria, Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights; Natalia Yaresko, Minister of Finance; Vadym Chernyshyn, Head of the State Agency of Ukraine for Rebuilding of the Donbas; Pavlo Zhebrivskyi, Head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration; Heorhiy Tuka, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration; Veronika Movchan, Director of Research at the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting.

UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC
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