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# THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

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## PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (Conceptual approaches and practical steps)

Since February, 2014, the Russian Federation has been waging a “hybrid” war against Ukraine. Tireless efforts of the international diplomacy, unfortunately, have produced no settlement or at least “freeze” of the situation in the east of Ukraine. Earlier Minsk agreements signed in September 2014 (the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum) were defeated – the Russian aggression in Donbas continued. On February 12, 2015, the Presidents of Ukraine, France, and the Russian Federation and the German Chancellor approved a new document – the Package of *Measures* for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, setting the goal of the conflict settlement by the end of 2015. However, implementation of those measures was postponed till 2016 and, given the course of events, is actually becoming an indefinite and hardly predictable process.

It should be noted that on one hand, the situation in the east of Ukraine has seen no serious changes for the better – hostilities go on, fundamental differences remain in the positions of the parties – Ukraine and the Russian Federation – regarding the conflict

conflict (that has both regional and global dimensions) acquires a long-standing character, with regular aggravations and unpredictable effects.

The Russian aggression – annexation of the Crimea and the war in the east of Ukraine – has led to deep changes in bilateral relations: a) the treaty-based framework of Kyiv and Moscow is ruined; b) institutional mechanisms of interstate relations are destroyed; c) top-level contacts were rendered impossible, politico-diplomatic relations became confrontational; d) Ukraine sustained unprecedented human, territorial and economic losses; e) in-depth estrangement arose between the peoples of Ukraine and Russia.

The previous official ideology of “strategic partnership”, “fraternal states”, “good-neighbourliness”, laid down in numerous joint agreements, became senseless. *A new political and ideological reality arose in the relations of Ukraine and Russia.*

Hence, reassessment and revision of the nature, ideology and the entire institutional system of relations with the Russian Federation in the key sectors (politics, security, economy, energy, the humanitarian sector, etc.) are needed, given that the current ruling regime of the Russian Federation is the main threat for the Ukrainian statehood.

It is also necessary to formulate a conceptually new model of coexistence with Putin’s Russia, reflecting the present-day realities and prospects of bilateral relations and taking into account the stand of the Western partner states and international organisations.

*Full [text](#)*

settlement. (In particular, implementation of the Minsk Agreements under the Russian scenario bears a threat of destabilisation of the domestic situation in Ukraine and ruination of its statehood). On the other hand, the international situation is changing rapidly: international terrorism is on the rise (terrorist attacks in Paris), the EU faces a “migration crisis”, Russia ventured military interference in Syria, a heated conflict of Moscow and Ankara spinned up. As a result, the events in Donbas kind of “receded into the background” for the West, tempting it to “freeze” the situation there at any cost, including at the expense of Ukraine’s interests.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation continues its military expansion in Donbas aiming to undermine the Ukrainian statehood, and for the time being, there are no grounds whatsoever to expect changes for the better in the Kremlin’s policy. Hence, the, Russian-Ukrainian



## Domestic policy

### FIGHT WITH CORRUPT PROCEEDS MAY TURN LEGAL FORCED TAKEOVER

On the International Anti-Corruption Day, December 9, 2015, Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko signed the Law “On the National Agency of Ukraine for Detection and Management of Assets Obtained through Corruption and Other Crimes”. The Agency will start operation within a three-month term.

The Constitution of Ukraine contains the list of executive bodies with a special status, but the above-mentioned National Agency is not on that list. This means that the Constitution must be amended urgently. Neither Parliament nor the President has the

authority to set up such an agency. It is to be set up by the relevant decision of the Cabinet of Ministers. All this is written in the Law on the Cabinet and central executive bodies.

At a Cabinet meeting in early December, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk revealed plans of creation of a special fund to accumulate the means confiscated from accounts of corrupt officials. According to the Prime Minister, in 2014 Ukraine’s law-enforcement bodies seized corrupt assets of former officials of President Viktor Yanukovich totalling USD 1.5 billion.

But at that time, there was no law to confiscate those funds; now, we have it. The new Agency might keep on its deposits the amounts being checked for corrupt origin. Another thing arouses doubts — respect for the constitutional norm of inviolability of ownership rights.

Of course, illegally obtained means should be seized and transferred to the state, but the court alone may establish the corrupt origin of specific assets. Even the lawyers of the Main Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada believe that the procedure of disposal of such assets misprescribed in the Law may lead to legal forced takeover. Anything may be expected with our auction system. It is unclear who will deal with disposal of such assets, and how.

So far, it remains unknown how Ukrainian politicians and businessmen will respond to the emergence of the new structure. A great danger is posed by misinterpretation of the law on the new Agency concerning regimentation of the procedure of seizure of assets. For the National Agency to work really efficiently, the relevant law needs serious refinement. Lawyers have the time for that.

[Full text](#)

*Legal Research Consultant  
of the Razumkov Centre  
Viktor MUSIYAKA*



## National Security and Defence

### WHAT UKRAINIANS THINK ABOUT THE STATUS OF DONBAS

The Razumkov Centre's poll reveals that the opinions of the Ukrainians about the further fate of Donbas and conduct of the antiterrorist operation split: 34.4% of those polled stands for the ATO to be continued until Ukraine regains full control of the seized territories, 20.1% — for separation of the occupied lands, 22.7% — for a special status for them within Ukraine, 22.8% found it difficult to give an answer.

Answering the question "Why do you stand for separation of the occupied lands from Ukraine?", 62.4% of those polled opted to answer "I do not want the residents of those territories to influence the policy of Ukraine and to obtain funds from the Ukrainian budget". People who run business, take an active political stand, are afraid that their country will again be reversed. Given the experience of the government of Viktor Yanukovych, this seems reasonable. The people who take, let's call it, the stand of consumers do not want the return of the seized territories to Ukraine to affect their wellbeing.


In other words, there are different opinions in society, and this is normal. In fact, the main problem is that the authorities proper have no clear position in this respect.

This is true not only for Donbas and ATO but for all domains where the state is active. We speak about reforms, but no one in Ukraine knows what reforms are being implemented, and how. If even politicians cannot clearly formulate their stand and keep their word, how can one expect a common stand from the population? Consolidation is out of the question for the time being, there are simply no grounds for that.

A relevant strategy should be worked out at the state level, for instance, a strategy of stabilisation of the situation in the country. And after the situation is stabilised, one might think about a development strategy.

[Full text](#)

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### BLOCKADE OF THE CRIMEA REVEALED EXTREME VULNERABILITY AND WEAKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

This year, the formal timeframe for implementation of the Minsk agreements is coming to an end. I see this as one of the main reasons for escalation in Donbas in an attempt to provoke Ukraine to strike in retaliation and in this way shift accusations of disruption of the Minsk agreements to it.

In such situation OSCE is the only international organisation acting as an unbiased international mediator. However, the reports they release for Anglophone readers on a daily basis produce the impression that both parties are to blame. They report on the number of shots and sometimes their directions but not bound to timing. This gives no possibility to see the whole picture, who really initiates shooting, and who has to defend himself.

Furthermore, my sources reported that when documented information of violations by "DNR-LNR" is presented to OSCE, it is disregarded and not included in public reports.

So, the Russian Federation and militants demonstrate attempts to shift the blame for disruption of agreements on to Ukraine, and OSCE SMM — inefficiency of their mission. And since there are no tools to force the aggressor into a compromise, the pressure is exerted on the Ukrainian side that has often complied.

Our polls prove the suggestion that the Minsk agreements are inefficient. The words by Ukrainian

and Western politicians that there is no alternative only witness the complexity of the situation, lack of the political will to look for productive formats and of the desire to force Putin into taking a seat of a party to the conflict and the aggressor at the negotiation table.

Fight with the Islamic State, problems with migrants, terrorist attacks in Paris, confrontation of Turkey and Russia — all this is on one list with the situation in Ukraine, but the priority of those things is changing.

The West wants the conflict in Ukraine to stop and not to make daily headlines. They may be aware of but not too worried by the effects for Ukraine in one, two, or five years. But this is incomprehensible, if we speak about actions of the Ukrainian leadership.

The Crimea currently presents the most striking example. The blockade of the peninsula was prompted by the fact that people have exhausted all means to solve that problem by civilised, humane and political means and had to resort to radical steps. It is clear that the Ukrainian authorities do not fight for the Crimea. More than that, the Law on a free trade area and a contract of power supply to the "Crimean Federal District" are both clearly corrupt documents.

But the main thing, the blockade has shown that Russia is highly vulnerable. All talk of a "great power" and Putin is mere bluff. Destruction of just two poles



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and inability to sustain life on the peninsula within two weeks revealed the extreme weakness of the Russian Federation. And this is not the only bottleneck that should be used, if we want to defend Ukraine's independence.

*Full [text](#)*

## RUSSIA SEEKS EXEMPLARY REVENGE ON TURKEY FOR DOWNED BOMBER

During his recent address to the Federal Assembly, Putin made new accusations against Turkey. His rhetoric may witness that he is about to arrange exemplary revenge on Turkey. Expressions like "Allah deprived of sanity", "they will not be quit for tomatoes", etc. are a strong signal, first of all, of course, for the domestic audience, but Putin hardly expected that Erdogan would not hear those words. A declaration of intentions of further escalation with Turkey is rather an alarming signal, and it will affect the overall security situation.

I will not say that Russia will arrange terrorist attacks, using its special services. There are enough methods of encouraging such acts, tested yet in the Soviet times. It may be financial support for different organisations,

including opposition movements, now gaining strength in Turkey. That is, Russia will play different cards that can inflict damage on Turkey in one or another way.

Of course, publicly, Putin said that he would not resort to military means. However, deployment of sophisticated air defence systems and strengthening of forces in Syria evidence that this is done in order to organise a vendetta for Turkey there. And now, Russia will wait and produce a pretext to answer in kind.

*Full [text](#)*

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security  
Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK*

## STANDOFF BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA MAY TURN A NEW "ARMS RACE"

The NATO leadership decision to boost defence expenditures and name the main threats faced by the mankind now – the war in Syria and the Russian involvement in it, effects of the Arab Spring and the Russian aggression against Ukraine – may lead to a new "arms race".

The question of the need of adequate funding of defence arose long ago. According to the standards approved by NATO member states, such expenditures are to make not less than 2% of the GDP. In the past 10-15 years we observed a steady trend to reduction of defence expenditures. In different years the situation was different, but only four or five NATO countries met those standards. The other countries spend on defence much less than 2% of the GDP. In fact, there were reasons for that – Russia for a long time was seen as a partner, and the threat from it was out of sight. Nevertheless, such calls and demands to revise the amount of funding were continuously made by member states and the Alliance's leadership.

However, the situation has changed fundamentally, and the question of defence funding is high on

the agenda. In its previous strategy, NATO actually overlooked the possibility of an armed conflict with Russia – today, it looks more than real, and there is a need to boost investments in defence assets. While previously, there was a threat of proliferation of mass destruction weapons and a threat of terrorist activity, and they have not faded away, now, they are supplemented, if not overshadowed, by the military threat from Russia.

All this may lead, first of all, to a new "arms race". Secondly, disturbance of the balance of forces in favour of either adversary means not only a threat of an "arms race" but also a strong factor of deterrence. At a certain point, there may be escalation, but with time, it will lead to stabilisation of the situation, since the potential enemy will see and feel that further build-up of arms on its part will not give it a substantial advantage.

*Full [text](#)*

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# Economy

## IN 2016 HRYVNIA IS TO DEVALUE SLIGHTLY

The exchange rate of UAH24.1 for USD1 set in the draft budget of the Ministry of Finance for 2016 is apparently overly optimistic. It will be feasible, if Ukraine's economy grows next year, and additional resources for replenishment of foreign currency reserves appear.

However, given the weakness of the economy, I expect weak devaluation of hryvnia next year. I.e., there will be fluctuations with a slight trend towards devaluation. If devaluation is not shocking, it will not harm the business environment. Moreover, if it remains as expected, economic agents will rather quickly adapt to such dynamics. Weak devaluation may also somewhat support exporters and contribute to growth, so much needed for economic stability.

According to my forecasts, by the end of the next year the national currency will cost not 24.1 but 28-29 UAH/USD.

Meanwhile, GDP growth by 2%, envisaged by the Ministry of Finance in the draft budget does not go beyond the limits of an error. Such growth of the economy that collapsed in the past three years will mean nothing more than survival. The Ministry of Finance may be understood: budget should rest on conservative assumptions that may be achieved, as economic agents will try to recover

little-by-little. Of course, Ukraine should grow by 7-8% a year, but let us assume that 2016 will be the year of post-crisis recovery, for which, 2% growth is an acceptable figure.

Furthermore, in the draft budget the Government provided growth of minimal social standards by approximately 12%. According to the Prime Minister, the incomes of the Ukrainians will hence "keep up" with the inflation rate. However, this will happen only if the inflation does not exceed said 12%.

Still, I doubt if it will be contained at such a level. After all, rates, foodstuff prices, etc. will change. We predict inflation at a rate of 14-16%. Meanwhile, this year the Government raised social standards earlier than planned – not in December but in September. So, I cannot rule out that the dynamic of growth of social standards in 2016 will be somewhat better than it is now.

*Full [text](#)*

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre  
Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*





## TAX REFORM SHOULD REST ON RESTRUCTURING OF ECONOMY, REVENUES AND EXPENSES

The draft budget will rest on the tax basis that is under discussion now. It is very hard to predict how this discussion will end, as there are two concepts – of the Ministry of Finance, and of the Verkhovna Rada Committee. Now they say that a compromise is possible, but it is not quite clear what it may involve for the time being.

In the proposals of the Verkhovna Rada the gap between incomes and expenditures is greater than of the Ministry of Finance. At some point this may cause additional complications. For instance, the IMF does not care much about absolute or relative indicators, where expenses go and where revenues come from. The main question for the Fund is about the balance of the budget. That is, the concern is about the level of the budget deficit and the sources of its coverage. If the sources of funding are rational and reasonable, clear and transparent, the IMF will quietly agree to any novelties. Meanwhile, the stand of the IMF

is highly important for us, because if Ukraine gets loans from it, funding will also come from the World Bank, EBRD, EU, the US credit will be more affordable.

I might hail liberalisation of the tax legislation, but so far, I do not see how that process could help the budget. Within a short period of time, changes in taxation will hardly produce sufficient resources to cover pensions, funding of social programmes, education, culture, etc.

The tax reform should rest on restructuring of the economy, revenues and expenses. And of course, one should begin with understanding what to do with expenses. Furthermore, there should be clear understanding how the business environment will change if we really leave more budget resources locally.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

## IMF IS NOT TO SUSPEND COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE

Ukraine has to simultaneously solve tasks of macroeconomic stabilisation and transformation. That is why so far, I tend to believe that the IMF utmost supports Ukraine and does not intend to give up such a policy.

Revision of the IMF crediting policy is not associated solely with Ukraine. The IMF from time to time reviews its credit policy. Greece is also heavily problem-plagued. So, one cannot say that the revision takes place because of Ukraine.

One should understand that without the IMF, Ukraine may face very serious problems. Foreign capital markets are now closed for Ukraine, private lenders are unlikely to come to Ukraine now. Resources of the IMF and other financial institutions are currently the only source for Ukraine to replenish its reserves and meet its debt obligations.

[Full text](#)

*Director of Economic Programmes  
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## UKRAINE SAW GREEN LIGHT – PREFERENCES FOR SUPPLY OF GOODS TO EUROPE, BUT THE RESULT REMAINS POOR

Over nine months of this year, our enterprises sold to the European Union products worth a bit more than USD 9 billion. Export volumes were 32.9% lower than in January-September, 2014. A serious decrease, compared to last year, is observed in next to all commodity groups. For instance, export of vegetable products decreased by over 30%. Foreign sales of grain fell by 36%. Exports of fat and oil decreased by 30-35%, mineral products – by more than 50%, products of the food processing industry – by 20%. However, export of live stock, meat and dairy products, as well as fish, tea and coffee somewhat increased.

Ukraine got preferences for export of goods to the EU, and this was supposed to boost its sales, but they go down. There are a few reasons for that. First, we are subject to export quotas. Cost-effectiveness is the second one. Unfortunately, it is such that our products cannot compete on the EU markets. Another problem is that instead of investing in new technologies and supplying products with high added value, we continue to sell abroad mainly semi-finished goods and raw materials. Their prices at the world markets have dropped substantially, so, our exports decreased accordingly.

As regards industrial products, including machine building, the EU does not need them because it is rather energy-intensive. The price of our mechanical and electrical machines includes the high cost of the energy resources used. Furthermore, after the loss of

the Russian market our exporters did not bother about new standards and product quality, redirecting instead their sales to China, Turkey and African countries. Our greatest problem is that of competitiveness of our products, since we have failed to clearly and correctly adapt our legislation to the European. I mean phytosanitary, sanitary and technical regulation.

In addition, our producers suffer from very weak ties in the EU countries. When they try to promote their goods, they rarely meet the demand. Our chambers of commerce and industry could help, but now their work is of little effect. Ukrainian producers also lack command of foreign languages, particularly English. But the main thing is that we should modernise our fixed assets, introduce new technologies, innovations, not drain capital offshore but invest directly in production, only then will our products be more competitive on the European markets.

[Full text](#)

*Expert of economic programmes  
of Razumkov Centre  
Kateryna MARKEVYCH*



## SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SOME ASPECTS OF COMPARISON WITH UKRAINE

The interest to comparative analysis of Ukraine and RSA is prompted by the fact that both countries share some “similar” features. In particular, both countries since early 1990s have been transforming their political and economic systems (moving from “communist” and “apartheid” to democratic regimes, building competitive economies to replace oligarchic, law-material based, creation of new labour markets and fair distribution of

incomes, etc). Noteworthy, in many cases the results and efficiency of reformation in RSA far exceed Ukrainian achievements.

[Full text](#)

*O.Pishchulina as a lead expert of social and gender programmes, M.Sgulha – trainee of economic programmes. Project manager – Vasyl Yurchyshyn, director of economic programmes.*

## CORRUPT SCHEMES POSE THE GREATEST THREAT FOR UKRAINE'S ENERGY SECURITY

Ukraine has enough power plants using the gas group of coal, and they are underutilised, although we have enough of such coal. I see this as a result of a corrupt collusion intended to bind Ukraine to the interests of "LNR", "DNR" and the Russian Federation. The main reason is not that the problem of energy security and provision of power plants

with domestic fuel cannot be resolved, but the problem of total corruption, without the solution of which, the problems of energy security cannot be resolved.

[Full text](#)

*Director of energy programmes of Razumkov Centre  
Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

## IN THE NEAR FUTURE RUSSIA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE CRIMEA WITH ELECTRICITY EVEN 15%

The underwater cable will not cover even 15% of the Crimean demand. To achieve that goal, additional power engineering infrastructure should be built: transformer substations, additional power lines, etc. This is not an easy thing to do. So, the project implemented now can only partially solve the problem of power supply to Kerch and its outskirts, nothing more.

2-3 years will be needed to ensure self-sustainability of the Crimean energy system. First of all, combined cycle gas turbine units (CCGT) for gas-powered thermal power plants must be built, extra powerful cables must be laid, distribution infrastructure in the Crimea must be created.

However, Russia can put an end to critical dependence on the Ukrainian energy as soon as the end of the next year. It will be able to meet critical demand if it invests heavily in self-sufficiency of the Crimean power engineering, lays

additional cables, brings in diesel generator sets. They will still have great problems, rolling blackouts will take place, but not on the current scale. That is, they will get over the critical phase.

Presently, electricity is supplied to the peninsula from the Rostov Nuclear Power Plant. Rostov oblast indeed experiences a deficit of electricity and is reliant on cross-flows from the central districts of the Russian Federation. Some areas may be short of power there, but the cross-flow of power to the Crimea is really miserable, 100 MW are not critical at all for the south of Russia. Furthermore, they plan to complete construction of another unit at that NPP later this or early next year and in this way cover part of the Crimean demand.

[Full text](#)

*Director of energy programmes of Razumkov Centre  
Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

## LOSS OF CRIMEAN ENERGY MARKET WILL NOT CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO UKRAINE

In response to the Crimean "blackout", the Russian authorities announced that within the next two years the peninsula would become entirely independent from Ukrainian energy resources. According to the Russian plans, in 2016, an energy bridge from Krasnodar Krai across the Kerch strait to the Crimea will daily supply nearly 800 MW of electricity.

The Russian project may take nearly two years. If the measures promised by the Russian authorities are implemented promptly, indeed, electricity from Ukraine will be less needed with every month or year. It will not be a very serious loss for Ukraine, because the Crimea accounted for nearly 5-7% in the power consumption

balance of entire Ukraine. Power consumption in the Crimea used to increase only in summertime, along with the number of holiday-makers. This somewhat offset energy consumption in Ukraine as a whole.

[Full text](#)

*Lead expert of energy programmes  
of Razumkov Centre  
Viktor LOHATSKYI*



## EFFICIENT ENERGY CONSUMPTION IS THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY SECURITY

The demand for energy resources now and in the future will be conditioned, firstly, by the growth of population, especially in emerging economies (India, China); secondly, by coping with climate change, with the goal of decarbonisation as the catalyst; thirdly, by the development of the production sector and rise in living standards, creating a steady demand for energy resources; fourthly – by pricing of energy resources, in particular, oil and natural gas.

As regards energy resources proper, as before, extractable fuels will cover the bulk of the world demand. Now, natural gas enjoys the highest demand, since that resource is the most environment-friendly, compared to coal and oil, causes minimal discharge of CO<sub>2</sub> and meets decarbonisation goals.

Beyond doubt, extraction of unconventional hydrocarbons, already toughening competition at traditional fuel markets will grow every year. Renewable sources of energy (RSE), the prime cost of which is rapidly coming close to that of conventional ones, will be particularly important.

Toughening competition at energy markets offers opportunities for choice of the resources. However, the quantity of such resources goes down from year to year, while their quality (due to difficulty of extraction) is deteriorating. This may lead to the so-called global hunt for energy resources among countries of the world. However, today, a new trend is observed – the efficiency of energy consumption will be the most important "fuel": the quantity of energy spared by raising the efficiency of its use will be greater than the quantity of energy produced by any other separate source.

Most European countries solve the problem of consumption of energy resources by improving technologies, decreasing energy intensity of production, raising the level of energy conservation in industry, the public sector and households, and also raising the share of renewable sources of energy in power generation.

What steps should Ukraine make? First of all, there should be a state policy of energy conservation, aimed at development of and state support for innovative projects in the field of development and introduction of energy-saving technologies. The legislators should approve the draft National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency through 2020, public awareness about energy efficiency should be built by informing consumers of energy resources about their benefits from energy conservation, energy consumption should be further reduced in households and industries (especially chemical and metallurgical), additional measures should be taken to cut energy consumption in centralised heating systems. Energy conservation proper is to take place along the process chain: energy generation – transportation – distribution – consumption.

[Full text](#)

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# Sociology


The latest survey devoted to Ukraine-Russian relations was held by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on November 6-12, 2015. 2008 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the Crimea and occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with a sample representing the adult

population of the country by the key socio-demographic indicators. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3% with the probability of 0.95.

More information on the findings of the public opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre is available on <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>


## How would you describe current relations between Ukraine and Russia?

% of respondents




## How have relations between the people of Ukraine and Russia changed within the last year?

% of respondents



## What is your attitude to...?

% of respondents





## INTERNATIONAL ROUND-TABLE "UKRAINE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: PRESENT STATE AND PROSPECTS"

On December 16, 2015, Razumkov Centre jointly with the Kennan Institute Kyiv Office and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ukraine Office organised the Roundtable "Ukraine-Russian relations: present state and prospects"

It was attended by Ukrainian national deputies, representatives of the concerned ministries, governmental and non-governmental think tanks, officials of foreign embassies in Ukraine, Russian experts, journalists.

The round-table participants were welcomed by the Head of the Centre's Board Mykola Martynenko, Head of the Kennan Institute Kyiv Office Kateryna Smahlii, Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Office Gabriele Baumann.

Co-director of foreign relations and international security programmes Mykhailo Pashkov introduced a special issue of Razumkov Centre's [National Security & Defence](#) journal No. 8-9, 2015. The journal carries Razumkov Centre's analytical study "Prospects of Ukraine-Russian relations (conceptual approaches and practical steps)", a remote roundtable of Ukrainian and Russian experts, interviews with Western diplomats and experts, results of nation-wide and expert polls, articles by Ukrainian and international authors.

The event also featured presentation of a special issue of Kennan Institute's *Agora* journal.

During the first session the participants discussed the state and problems of bilateral relations with a focus of the sources, reasons and prospects of the Russia-Ukrainian conflict. Experts also noted the international dimension of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, assessing its global and regional aspects.



The second session was devoted to discussion of the ways, mechanisms and prospects of settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In this context, they spoke about shaping a new model of relations between Kyiv and Moscow, discussed conceptual approaches and practical steps at policy-making.

## RAZUMKOV CENTRE TOOK PART IN GENERATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GLOBAL AND EUROPE THINK TANK SUMMITS

The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania released reports and recommendations generated following the Global and Europe Think Tank Summits in Milan on October 3, 2015. The Summits were organised by TTCSP jointly with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and attended by representatives of over 90 lead think tanks from more than 50 countries of the world.

The recommendations were produced by the world leading think tanks – the summit participants, including Razumkov Centre. The proposals were summed up by the TTCSP team led by Professor James McGann.

The generated recommendations take regard of the challenges and problems faced by think tanks in the modern world and carry basic approaches to their solution. The recommendations are intended to enhance the adequacy of think tanks to the transient situation,



the demand of the key target groups – politicians and society – for their intellectual products.

[Full text](#)

## PARTICIPATION IN PARLIAMENTARY SEMINAR

On December 15, 2015, academic adviser to Razumkov Centre Viktor Musiyaka was the main speaker at a seminar for exchange of experience among experts and parliament members concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) and protection of civilian population, held in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine under the chairmanship of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman Volodymyr Hroisman in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee for Legal Policy and Justice and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee for European Integration and Foreign Affairs.

The event was organised jointly with Razumkov Centre and Human Rights Agenda.

This high-level networking seminar provided a platform to discuss Ukraine's future steps on its road to ratification of the Rome Statute with MPs from Austria, Sweden and Great Britain, as well as high-ranking representatives of Estonia, the Netherlands, the EU, OSCE and ICC, experts in judiciary, scholars, representatives of public organisations, for identification, comprehension and removal of existing fears and potential obstacles for ratification and effective implementation of the Rome Statute.

## PARTICIPATION IN TRAINING "UNITY FOR SECURITY. NATO FACTOR"

On December 12, 2015, co-director of foreign relations and international security programmes of Razumkov Centre Oleksiy Melnyk took part in the training "Unity for security. NATO factor".

The event was attended by embassy officials, NATO representatives in Ukraine, Ukrainian MPs, representatives of expert and academic circles.

The participants discussed global transformations and the role of defence alliances, the challenges faced by the North Atlantic Alliance today, and views of the future of NATO, Ukraine, and its place in the trans-Atlantic security system.

## MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY

On December 10, 2015, co-director of foreign relations and international security programmes of Razumkov Centre Oleksiy Melnyk and academic adviser to Razumkov Centre Viktor Musiyaka met representatives of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Alain Guidetti and Alexandra Tokareva.

At the meeting, they discussed the development of a concept of arrangement of different events by the Geneva Centre aiming to promote decentralisation reforms with account of the relevant experience of some European countries.

## IMPROVEMENT OF METHODS OF SETTING ROYALTY RATES FOR NATURAL GAS EXTRACTION IN UKRAINE

Proposals for improvement of the methods of setting royalty rates for natural gas extraction in the context of introduction of amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine.

[Read all recommendations by Razumkov Centre experts](#)