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# THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWSLETTER

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## PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT *UKRAINE'S PARTY SYSTEM BEFORE AND AFTER THE MAIDAN: CHANGES, TRENDS, AND PUBLIC DEMANDS AT THE ROUND TABLE ON 16 SEPTEMBER 2015*

The project *Ukraine's Party System Before and After the Maidan: Changes, Trends, and Public Demands* was caused by the need to understand dramatic changes in the party system which occurred over the last years, and, in fact, led to the Maidan and partly were a result of its victory.

The report analyses the last two stages of the evolution of the party system — 2010–2013 and from February 2014 to date.

### The main trends of the last stage are as follows:

- Substantial renewal of the party system, “new” parties coming into the political arena. For the first time, the parties created just before the election participated in the election and succeeded.



- The change of the balance of powers between the parties of the so-called pro-Western, pro-European, and pro-Russian attitude, due to significant changes in the political preferences of citizens (among the reasons were the Maidan, the collapse of Yanukovich's regime, and Russian aggression against Ukraine).

- In political parties: strengthening the role of the leadership factor, an increasing number of personalistic parties; a decreasing importance of ideologies, the unification of programmes; undeveloped local party structures and virtualisation of their activities; the strengthening of populist trends and parties; the intensification of the cooperation of parties with civic institutions.

Currently, the processes in the party system are influenced by the following factors:

**Changes in the legal framework** (in particular, the election law for local election, “decommunisation laws”, the prospect of introducing budget funding and strengthening control over reporting on party funds).

**Significant changes in the hierarchy of social divisions** (the change of the balance of powers along the dividing line on the sociocultural basis towards the pro-Western part in 2014–2015; increasing relevance of the socioeconomic division and decreasing relevance of the sociocultural one);

**The influence of the financial and industrial groups on the party system and politics in general:** after temporary weakening, its new wave can be observed now, which is reflected, in particular, in the creation of new parties and projects for local election;

**External influence**, which is reflected in the significant dependency of the situation in Ukraine and government policy on the positions of Ukraine's major foreign partners;

**Sociopolitical consequences of the armed conflict with Russia** (the change in public attitude, increasing patriotism as well as transferring the use of force into the political process);

**The local election factor**, especially given decentralisation processes as well as the prospects of holding early parliamentary election.

Compared to the previous stages of development of the party system, it has had **some, although so far minor, improvements** in the development of certain parties nationwide, strengthening the ties between the parties and the public, their accountability, weakening the influence of the financial and industrial groups on parties and increasing transparency of the finances of parties, and the development of internal party democracy.

However, the situation around the issues of the lack of a stable social basis, weakness (lack) of programme and ideological principles, and the exaggerated nature of the personal factor has not changed, or has worsened.

Now, theoretically, we can say that the party system of Ukraine retains the features of the system of moderate pluralism. However, current trends in the work of political parties may enhance the polarisation of the party system and cause a “multilateral opposition” to the ruling parties.

Full [text](#)

Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre  
Yuriy YAKYMENKO



## THE BILL ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE CONTAINS MANY CONTRADICTIONS

If the Minsk Agreements are not fulfilled before the vote on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, it will mean that this bill actually cannot be voted. In the context of adopting the bill, there is a lot of talking that it contains provisions that require certain adjustments but I have not heard anything about the willingness to amend the wording. Apparently, It is planned to put this bill to vote after the local election.

The constitutional process has been launched under difficult circumstances — after the annexation of Crimea, when the events in the East have started. Eventually, it could be completed with a proper final vote. However, the vote should not cause indignation among the public. Of course, certain political parties will deliberately stir up the situation and demonstrate discontent, whatever wording it is. However, there are things that can and should be put to public discussion, and, having received generally positive feedback, voted finally.

However, the public do not participate in these processes actively. Thus, the politicians should understand which provisions may cause certain unpleasant situations. The Verkhovna Rada together with the president should clearly identify what is needed for real decentralisation. It would not be such a bad idea to return to the provisions on the status of the so-called prefect, and see how the respective article will be worded, in particular in the part of the mechanism of the termination of powers. For the law does not provide how the status of the prefect is determined. If we go into detail, the concept of community in local government was removed from Article 140. I think that all this should be adjusted. However, in this case, the willingness to consider these issues at the session of the Verkhovna Rada and introduce appropriate amendments is necessary. Then, forward them to the Constitutional

Court, get feedback, adopt them, and finally adopt the bill.

However, this algorithm is unlikely. Today it is only about whether this text will be voted finally.

There is a risk that unless the problematic provisions of this bill are amended, the possible positive things might not appear at all. For example, raion and oblast administrations are dismissed, and the councils will create their own executive bodies. This is a positive thing. There will be no local monster of executive power. However, there is another provision — in this bill, Article 118 provides that, locally, executive power shall be exercised by prefects. This is absolutely wrong because, in fact, the word “administrations” was replaced with “prefects”.

If the Constitution is amended, it will take at least two year for the provisions on decentralisation to come into force. New communities will appear when the VR adopts a respective decision, and then, on the basis of these communities, raions should be created, which would then get prefects. Before that, for two years, the function of prefects will be performed by heads of administration. When at the 2017 election, new heads of these communities, and raion and oblast councils are elected, all will be appointed according to the Constitution.

[Full text](#)

*Legal Research Consultant of  
the Razumkov Centre  
Viktor MUSIYAKA*



## FOR ORDINARY UKRAINIANS, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION ARE LESS IMPORTANT THAN RISING PRICES AND RATES

The events of 31 August 2015, when, during the vote on the amendments to the Constitution, blood was shed outside the Verkhovna Rada, were deliberately prepared.

When we recall the timeline of that fateful day, there was a specific political problem when certain political parties declared their disagreement with what was going on in the Parliament, and brought people to the streets.

For an average Ukrainian, the issue of amendments to the Constitution is much less important than, for example, prices and rates. In this case, public discontent with socioeconomic issues and respective work of the government to address them should not be confused with the current specific political topics that exist and are used primarily by radical political parties.

There were no tens of thousands of people dissatisfied with the authorities outside the Rada. These were people organised by a political party. This

indicates the radicalisation of certain political parties before the local election. Furthermore, this is due to uncontrolled spread of weapons within the country. Of course, this also indicates the level of tension but only for the part of the population connected with the events in Eastern Ukraine, and either belong to or are influenced by political parties.

What happened is not an indicator of the state of the society — it is an indicator of the state of part of the politics. This is a consequence of the military situation in which Ukraine is. This is a root cause. The fact that when in the parliament, amendments to the Constitution were discussed, blood was shed outside the parliament is by no means a coincidence or a sign from above. It is a deliberate act that was prepared for a specific event.

[Full text](#)

*Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of  
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## THE FATHERLAND LEAVING THE COALITION WILL NOT MEAN EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

Now the parliamentary coalition is going through difficult times. The number of its members has already decreased after the Radical Party had left. Furthermore, the intentions that representatives of the Fatherland talk about, and attitudes of the Self Reliance pose a risk to it. Obviously, the situation is significantly influenced by the factor of the local election — for political parties that will participate in the election, it will be difficult to take responsibility for

negative socioeconomic consequences for citizens, which led to the decision of the coalition and the government but were essential. This creates the conditions for such statements.

On the other hand, when speaking about reformatting the government, it is meant that the factions will seek more favourable positions for themselves in the new government and claim more than they have now in the current government.

Theoretically, the option of the Fatherland leaving the coalition can be considered but one should not rush into final conclusions until the processes in the government actually start including the process of discussion of how and which positions in the Cabinet of Ministers will change. It is not just the question of personalities and distribution of new responsibilities, i.e. quotas, but also the basic principles of work of the government, and, in particular, the action programme of the Cabinet of Minister, which is linked to the coalition agreement. So this is a deeper process. What is happening now, in my opinion, are tactical steps aimed at strengthening positions in the future negotiation process.

What will happen to the coalition if the Fatherland does leave it? From the official point of view, the

coalition will continue to exist. It will remain although reduced. It will be like that until the number of members of the coalition reaches a critical point — less than the majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Therefore, the Fatherland possibly leaving will have only political consequences as it will certainly mean political weakening of the coalition. However, it will not become a basis for any radical measures like reformatting of the coalition, or the termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada and calling for an early election.

*Full [text](#)*

*Deputy Director, Director of  
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## National Security and Defence

### HYBRID WARFARE: THE LESSONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

*Short version of the speech by Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Mykola Sunhurovskyi at the discussion panel Modern World — Modern Threats: Responses to Hybrid Aggression during the Security Forum within the XXV Economic Forum in Krynica, Poland.*

Analysis of the lessons of the Russian–Ukrainian and other conflicts generated by the processes of “colour revolutions”, the Arab Spring etc — if we discard conspiracy scenarios — suggests that true explosion of violence and its consequences are caused, in particular, by unrestrained acceleration of globalisation. Modern global networks of political, trade, economic, and informational relations — under the conditions of liberalisation of economic relations, and interpenetration of economies and cultures — increasingly turn into an effective means of distribution of not only human heritage but also economic, political, and social disruptions, and crises and their consequences. This allows to assume the following:

A — The existing world order has reached the limit beyond which the Westphalian paradigm and the system of standards of international relations based on it turn out to be ineffective — neither in terms of development nor in terms of ensuring security. This is a real challenge for humanity, a crisis of the system of international relations, and requires coordinated effort of all progressive forces.

B — Claims for the leading role — if not in the new world order then at least in the process of building it — are the underlying reasons of the contradictions between major existing and emerging centres of power and coalitions being created around them. Under these conditions, the main sources of threats in the short term will be authoritarian regimes of powerful states and ambitious radical forces seizing power in fragile

states, and the potential conflicts zones will be the states and areas which are at the geographical and political borders of integration projects, experiencing the affect of both centripetal and centrifugal forces.

C — The fight for “border” states will be conducted using the whole arsenal of forces and means, turning the environment into a very unstable and poorly predictable one. It is a challenge to forecast and evaluate synergistic consequences of such fight both for individual states and regions, and the entire world order. However, existing regulations of the international law should be applied to the violators of the existing world order (in particular, to Russia). This is the uncertainty and difficulties in resolving modern conflicts (the old is already dying but the new has not been born yet), causing turbulence of the current transitional stage of the development of international relations.

D — The hybrid (synergetic) nature of modern conflicts, and not always tangible links between the elements of technology of their escalation and implementation, cause the need for thorough study, comprehensive justification, and making immediate changes in the structures and means of using the systems of national, regional, and global security.

*Full [text](#)*

*Director of Military Programmes of  
the Razumkov Centre  
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI*



### THE BLOCKADE OF CRIMEA SHOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF RETURNING THE PENINSULA TO UKRAINE

On 20 September, at the administrative border with Crimea, a perpetual campaign of blocking freight transport going to the peninsula started. Crimean Tatars — initiators of the blockade — note that Ukrainian companies should terminate trade relations with Crimea, which is occupied by the Russian Federation.

What is going on at the border with Crimea is not exactly a blockade. Organisers of the campaign did not set out to stop ordinary citizens who have to cross “the border” for personal reasons. The organisers of the campaign have repeatedly stated that the issue concerns the termination of the organised supply of goods to Crimea, which is absolute absurdity in this situation when there is an occupied area, and de

facto the state of war, and the Ukrainian state, which goes around the world begging and asking to impose sanctions, not only continues but increases trade volumes.

As to the timing of this campaign and its effectiveness, now there are polar points of view but the position of the opponents who claim the futility of such measure is not quite clear. I think what Ukrainian activists have done, especially the Mejlis leadership, is a very strong move which gives the message not only to the Russian occupants but also to the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian society about how to resist the aggressor.



From the first lines of the preamble of the law on the creation of the Crimea free economic zone, where the need to adopt such law is justified, the question arises — where the authors of this document were at the time



*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre*  
**Oleksiy MELNYK**

of writing it. It seems that in February and March 2014, nothing happened. I cannot say whether this law will be abolished but I am absolutely sure that this law should be abolished as soon as possible.

Now it is early to talk about reintegration of the peninsula into the Ukrainian legal, humanitarian, and social space. Today it is important at least to decide — to trade or to fight. So the task addressed by the activists is, above all, to revive the relevance of the issue of the return of Crimea.

[Full text](#)

## IS THE TRANSITION TO A PROFESSIONAL ARMY POSSIBLE IN UKRAINE?

The possibilities and prospects of the transition to an army on a contractual basis are being actively discussed in Ukraine now. Let me just note that the idea is not new. Furthermore, it had previously been implemented in stages.

The programme of transition to a professional army has existed since 2003. 10 years ago, in 2005, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were very close to completing the implementation of this idea. Among almost fifty points planned, almost all were implemented. Only the most demanding points of the programme remained unfulfilled, such as housing.

However, legal framework was created, the percentage of contractors in the army was gradually increasing, and the total number of soldiers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine was declining. When Yanukovych was in power, the call-up for military service was actually suspended so, de facto, there was the transition to a professional army. In Ukraine, only a small number of conscripts remained, who served in internal troops.

However, the events of the last year and a half pushed the government to resort to various methods of staffing the army. Mobilisation is, in fact, the very same call-up. People were called up to serve in the army in completely non-peaceful conditions. Problems arose very quickly. The last wave of mobilisation showed significant difficulties with staffing — especially because the main emphasis is put on duty and enforcement.

However, a technical increase in the number of military officers does not lead to a direct increase in the

defence capability of the army. For those involved in this issue consistently, the need to form a professional army has been obvious for a long time.

Ukraine is not the first one to come to this conclusion. Most European countries use this approach. However, one should not argue that a conscript army has no right to exist. There are countries where the call-up remains. However, in this case, this can be explained by certain national traditions in some countries.

For example, in Austria, or in Sweden until recently, this was due to a great passion of young people to defend their country. One of the strongest armies in the world — Israeli — is formed with a call-up for all citizens (both male and female). However, the UK and the U.S. had to give up conscription, which did not prevent these countries from creating the most capable armies in the world.

All these are national characteristics. As to Ukraine, there definitely should be the backbone of the conscript army but, at the same time, we should work on the reserve. It is difficult to make somebody serve with the law or the fear of punishment. However, there are a lot of people willing to join the army voluntarily. The state, in turn, should make good use of the potential of citizens as much as possible rather than try to force everyone.

[Full text](#)

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre*  
**Oleksiy MELNYK**

## HOW TO MAKE THE KREMLIN SURRENDER

Except reducing the intensity of fire, the ceasefire in Donbas has not brought any significant results yet. The parties have stuck to their interests, and nobody wants to concede.

This once again proves that the approach to reformatting of the Minsk talks and their agenda, i.e. the combination of issues of the conflict and the internal policy of Ukraine was a mistake, and has led to the fact that none of the parties compromises.

Obviously, the process of the conflict settlement should have been divided into two formats: in the first format, the Ukrainian government negotiate with representatives of the unrecognised republics — in the way that any country negotiates with terrorists (on the end of hostilities, the exchange of military prisoners, the withdrawal of weapons and humanitarian aid, etc); and in the other format involving Ukraine, Russia, and representatives of the West, it is about the surrender of Moscow in this war, i.e. about forcing the aggressor state to give up its goals (stop supporting separatists as well as regaining control over the border, the withdrawal of Russian troops etc).

With such an approach, it could have ended with something. However, in the mixed agenda, I see no possibility for any compromise.

Putin will go all the way — he needs control over Ukraine to keep it in orbit of the Kremlin. Meanwhile,

Ukraine cannot make any amendments to the Constitution in relation to the unrecognised republics because it poses a threat of not only a loss but also internal destabilisation of the country. People who fought will definitely ask the authorities what all that was for, and will consider such decision treason.

Therefore, sooner or later, the idea of reformatting the negotiation should come to mind to politicians.

What happens next? In this question, there are a lot of components that do not allow to make a clear prediction. However, I see no options how this conflict can end by the end of the year. We already can hear from Russia and the separatists that the implementation of the Minsk Agreements should be postponed to the following year. This is delaying the conflict, due to which Ukraine will incur economic, demographic, and moral losses.

This scenario is unfavourable for Ukraine. It hampers reform in all the other areas of state activities and creates the basis for destabilisation of the situation in other regions of the country. The future depends on many factors, including what happens in Ukraine and how successful the reforms will be, and whether the government will learn not only to listen but also to hear — not the voters but the people.

Also, the next events will depend on the determination of our Western partners to extend the

sanctions, and whether it will be possible to reach Russia's pain threshold so that they understand the harmfulness of the chosen path.

This, by the way, is unlikely. It is the matter of very complex balancing. For the three principles, on the basis of which one can interact with Russia, are the following — do not believe, do not fear, do not ask.

Things are coming to freezing the conflict. I do not see a possibility to find a way out that would suit all the parties while being in the current format of the negotiation.

Grouping of the Russian troops at the borders of Ukraine neither reduces nor weakens — on the contrary,

the forces continue to build up. This indicates that among Russia's possible future plans, the option of the renewal of large-scale battles should not be ruled out. Maybe it is not the main one but no one excluded it from the list. It is not only about the battles in the former territories but also the possibility of the violations of Ukraine's borders in other regions. We should be ready for this as well.

*Full text*

*Director of Military Programmes of the Razumkov Centre  
Mykola SUNHUROVSKYY*

## Economy

### THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY CAN DEVELOP AT THE EXPENSE OF RICH FOREIGN MARKETS

Recently it became known that the Private Creditors' Committee agreed to write off 20% of Ukraine's debt as well as postpone the remaining payment for 4 years.

Of course, it is good that Ukraine demonstrated that we were a civilized player because such negotiations are always very difficult. So Ukraine demonstrated that one can work with us.

Furthermore, restructuring will positively influence the hryvnia. In the nearest future, we will keep the reserve, which will certainly help strengthen the rate. This positive outcome of the talks may provide the basis for other investors so they will not be afraid of our country.

Speaking of the impact of the trends of global crisis on Ukraine, above all, against the backdrop of global oil price reduction, gas price reduction can be expected, which may positively affect the Ukrainian economy.

However, there are global trends that when oil price goes down, the price on other commodities goes down as well, such as grains or metals. That is on Ukraine's main exports.

Ukraine is a small open economy. It can develop and receive additional benefits not only from domestic markets (they are poor) but from rich foreign markets. The Asian Tigers developed like that, former socialist countries developed like that, and even Japan and Sweden in the postwar years developed like that.

*Full [text](#)*

*Director of Economic Programmes  
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Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*



### LOW PURCHASING POWER OF UKRAINIANS WILL RESTRAIN RISING PRICES

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed amendments to the 2015 budget (bill No.3060), related to increasing the living wage, and minimum wages and pensions. In particular, from 1 September, the minimum wage will be raised by 160 UAH (from 1,218 to 1,378 UAH), and the living wage will be raised by 154 hryvnias (from 1,176 to 1,330 UAH). As a result, the minimum pension, stipend, and other social benefits will be raised.

Next year, the minimum social standards can be raised in April or May. Then, after the first quarter, it will already be clear whether the economy is going to

develop sustainably, and whether there are appropriate resources.

In Ukraine, rising prices significantly depend on the national currency rate so the more stable the hryvnia will be, the less inflation should be expected. However, low purchasing power will also be a serious hindering factor for rising prices in the next few years.

*Full [text](#)*

*Director of Economic Programmes of  
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### DESPITE DEEP ECONOMIC CRISIS, UKRAINE AVOIDED TOTAL COLLAPSE



Ukraine is in a very difficult situation — at war, which Europe has not experienced for a long time, and, of course, this led to huge losses. A 15–20% GDP drop is a real loss for the country. However, Ukraine managed to avoid total collapse and complete disaster. Last year, there were many scenarios that Ukraine would collapse, would not survive the winter, and about terrible rolling blackouts. All these fears turned out to be somewhat exaggerated. Now we can already say that this summer we hit the bottom of the fall and crisis. Hope has appeared that we will once again rise.

*Full [text](#)*

*Director of Economic Programmes of  
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# Energy

## RUSSIA CANNOT GIVE UP UKRAINIAN GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM TO TRANSPORT GAS TO THE EU IN THE MID TERM

In the mid term, the fuel market of Europe may change — Russia is trying to create more and more gas pipelines bypassing Ukraine. On the morning of 4 September, Russian Gazprom and Western companies signed a shareholders' agreement to create the gas pipeline system North Stream 2, intended to increase the supply of Russian natural gas to the European Union bypassing the Ukrainian gas pipeline system (GPS).

Gazprom wants to use the practices of the first North Stream. The new stream will depend on the development of the gas pipeline systems of the European Union. Germany does not need so much gas. Everything will depend on demand but the less will be transported, the more difficult it will be to make the North Stream 2 profitable.


The Russians are trying to implement the Turkish Stream instead of the South Stream. At least, they will be building a single-strand pipe to meet the demand of Turkey. The thing is that Russia has already lost approximately 6 billion USD on piping and building compressor stations in their country for the Southern Stream, and not to lose all the money, they can build the Turkish Stream.

Russia is stuck with a number of projects in the East, in particular towards China. Gazprom does not have that much money to implement these projects. They want to take up many projects but are actually spreading the resources too thin.

In the next few years, Russia has no choice but to cooperate with Ukraine in the area of gas transit to the EU. In the mid term, in 4–5 years, there will be no changes. Everything depends on how the sanctions will work. All this will be built with credit funds, and, because of the sanctions, they will be hard to find. Apart from this, Gazprom also has other projects that need funding. The current project may cost Gazprom approximately 10 billion USD. It is unlikely that in the nearest 5 years they will give up the Ukrainian GPS.

Full [text](#)

Leading Expert of  
Energy Programmes of  
the Razumkov Centre Viktor Lohatskyi



## THE LACK OF COAL IN STORAGE IS CAUSED BY INEFFECTIVE POLICY OF THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY

To have a proper heating season, at least 3–3.5 million tons of coal should be accumulated in the Ukrainian storages. Currently, there is twice less fuel than it should be so the situation is rather difficult. The main reason of the crisis is the situation in Donbas. The Ministry of Energy is trying to solve this problem but they have taken up this issue much later than they should have. This issue should have been addressed back in April. Also, there is a problem of inconsistency in the coal price within the country, and this is also why everything is delayed. So I see serious problems in the coal sector although there are active government efforts to solve them. The key source of coal procurement today are the areas of Donbas controlled by Ukraine as well as Russia and South Africa.

The danger of the shortage of coal has been realised; the means to solve the problem are being developed. Furthermore, the volume of natural

gas supply has increased — the amount of fuel in underground storages already exceeds 14 billion cubic metres.

However, the problem of procurement is not in the lack of funding, as consumers pay for electricity and energy, but in the lack of well-trained and skilled managers in the research unit of the Ministry of Energy and the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities (NCSREPU).

Full [text](#)

Director of Energy Programmes of  
the Razumkov Centre  
Volodymyr OMELCHENKO



# Social Policy

## DUE TO EMIGRATION OF TALENTED RESEARCHERS, UKRAINE IS LOSING ENTIRE SCIENTIFIC SCHOOLS



Researchers of the emigration process state that due to emigration, Ukraine has been gradually losing talented professionals for a long time so the quality of human resources is declining. We are losing entire scientific schools. It will take decades to recover them in the future.

Another equally important problem related to emigration is the loss of state resources that Ukraine puts into upbringing and education of its citizens. In Ukraine, secondary and partly higher education is free. In case of young professionals leaving, the state gets nothing in return from them.

Full [text](#)

Director of Social Programmes  
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Liudmyla SHANHINA






# Sociology

The studies were conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 29 April to 5 May 2015 in all the regions of Ukraine except Crimea and the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts; from 21 to 26 November 2014 in all the regions of Ukraine except Crimea and the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk


Oblasts. Sampling error (without design effect) is less than 2.3% with a probability of 0.95.

More information on findings of the public opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre is available on the Razumkov Centre website <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>.


## Are political parties necessary or not for the normal development of Ukraine as a state? % of respondents




## Does Ukraine need a multi-party system? % of respondents



## Approximately how many parties should exist in Ukraine? % of respondents



## Regions (May 2015)



## INTERNATIONAL ROUND TABLE *THE PARTY SYSTEM OF UKRAINE AT THE PRESENT STAGE: CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, AND PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS*



On 16 September 2015, the Razumkov Centre jointly with the representative office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine held the international round table *The Party System of Ukraine at the Present Stage: Challenges, Problems, and Public Expectations*.

The round table was held within the project *Ukraine's Party System Before and After the Maidan: Changes, Trends, and Public Demands*.

Representatives of legislative and executive authorities, political parties, scholars, government and independent Ukrainian experts as well as representatives of foreign embassies and international organisations were invited to participate in the discussion.

During the round table, [research findings of the Razumkov Centre](#) were presented, and the following issues were discussed:

- The development of Ukraine's party system against the backdrop of modern European trends
- The current state and trends of the development of political parties in Ukraine



## ATTENDING THE ECONOMIC FORUM IN KRYNICA-ZDRÓJ

Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr Omelchenko attended the XXV Economic Forum in Krynica-Zdrój (Poland), held 8–10 September 2015. The forum was opened by President of Poland A. Duda, in the presence of President of Macedonia G. Ivanov and President of Croatia K. Kitarović.

The Economic Forum in Krynica-Zdrój is one of the largest annual conferences in Central and Eastern Europe, where politicians, businessmen, artists, and civic activists meet. The motto of this year's Forum is "How to build a strong Europe. Strategies for the Future". Over 3,000 guests of the Forum attended more than 100 thematic panels. Among the main topics of discussion were the issues of European security, political and economy cooperation, the migrant crisis, and the situation in Eastern Ukraine.

Mr Omelchenko was a speaker at the panel *Iran — A New Beginning?*, where due to the expected lifting of sanctions on Iran, Iran's influence on the global oil and gas markets, attracting international investment to the development of Iran's infrastructure, and stabilisation of the political situation in the Persian Gulf region were discussed.

## ATTENDING THE SECURITY FORUM *THE ROLE OF NATO AND THE EU IN THE BLACK SEA REGION*

Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy Melnyk attended the Security Forum *The Role of NATO and the EU in the Black Sea Region*, held on 9–10 September 2015 in Sofia. The expert presented the report [The Role of International Organisations in Ukraine](#). Also, during his stay in Sofia, Mr Melnyk gave a long interview to the Bulgarian TV channel BulgariaOn Air, which can be viewed [here](#).

## ATTENDING THE XIII INTERNATIONAL FORUM *THE ENERGY INDUSTRY OF UKRAINE: PRESENT AND FUTURE*

Within the programme of the XIII International Forum *The Energy Industry of Ukraine: Present and Future*, Director of Energy Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr Omelchenko, together with Minister of Energy and Coal Industry Volodymyr Demchyshyn, people's deputies of Ukraine, and representatives of the diplomatic corps, attended the panel discussion *Energy Diplomacy: Ukrainian Context*, held on 22 September 2015 in Kyiv.

## ATTENDING THE EXPERT MEETING *THE EU–UKRAINE–RUSSIA RELATIONS AT THE BACKDROP OF A LONG-TERM CONFLICT*

On 20–23 August 2015, in Cadenabbia (Italy), the expert forum *The EU–Ukraine–Russia Relations at the Backdrop of a Long-Term Conflict* was held by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. On behalf of the organisers, participants of the forum were welcomed by heads of the representative offices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine and in Russia — G. Baumann and C. Crawford.

The discussion was attended by leading German, Ukrainian, and Russian experts. The Razumkov Centre was represented by the speeches of Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes M. Pashkov and Economic Research Consultant V. Sidenko.

## PRESENTATION OF THE PROJECT OF THE RAZUMKOV CENTRE IN ITALY

On 20 August 2015, at the international expert forum held by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Cadenabbia (Italy), another publication of the Razumkov Centre *The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: State, Consequences, and Prospects* was presented. (English version). It is published within the joint project of the Razumkov Centre and the representative office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine *Prospects for Ukraine–Russia Relations: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Steps*.

The publication contains analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre, dedicated to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, and speeches of the experts from Ukraine, Russia, Germany, the UK, and foreign diplomats. Also, the publication presents some of the findings of the social research of the Razumkov Centre conducted during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict — from April 2014 to May 2015. Public opinion on the state of relations between Kyiv and Moscow, the consequences of the conflict, and the prospects of the relations between the two countries are presented.