



## CONTENTS

DOMESTIC POLICY.....	1
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE.....	3
ECONOMY.....	4
ENERGY.....	5
SOCIOLOGY.....	6
RAZUMKOV CENTRE NEWS.....	7



**ANATOLIY RACHOK,**  
Director General  
Razumkov Centre

Dear Colleagues!

You have received the first issue of the Razumkov Centre analytical Newsletter. This is the implementation of our aspiration to keep abreast of the times. A serious analytical centre should be able not only to respond quickly to the events of the fleeting world but also promptly present its position on the current events to its readers.

It is only natural that key topics of this issue are the first conclusions on the presidential election in Ukraine, the analysis of threats and challenges for Ukraine arising from the Russian aggression and the opportunities for development in this situation.

We hope that with each new issue, our readers will receive high-quality expert analysis of the current events and find out about public opinion polls that allow to see the picture of the development of our society better.

In our turn, we very much appreciate your advice, which will help us to implement better our mission – to assist Ukraine in becoming a democratic, social welfare European state with the rule of law, as well as developing the civil society, boosting the quality of life, improving international reputation of our country and upholding its national interests.

## Domestic Policy



### THE 2014 ELECTION FEATURES AND CONSEQUENCES

*The May 25, 2014 election was a unique event in the contemporary history of Ukraine.*

*It was the first election when the previous president shamefully fled the country under the pressure of massive continued protests of people. It was the first election when warfare between the terrorists supported by Russia and the Ukrainian military continued in Ukraine, and a part of the Ukrainian territory – Crimea – was annexed by a neighbouring country. For the first time, in this election, not the so-called “pro-western” and “pro-Russian” candidates fought for the victory but two pro-European politicians. Finally, for the first time since 1991, the winner of the election was identified already in the first round, and he won in every single region of Ukraine.*

In the history of independent Ukraine, only the presidential election of December 1, 1991 was of the importance roughly comparable to the importance of the election of May 25, 2014. When on 1 December 1991 it was about founding a new independent state of Ukraine, on 25 May 2014 it was about its preservation in this status and the chance for actual re-founding of the state on the new principles.

Since the escape of V. Yanukovich after the tragic events at Kyiv Maidan of February 18-20, 2014 and until the presidential election of 25 May, Ukraine had been in the situation of the incomplete process of forming a legitimate government.

National legislation does not provide for the possibility of the President “missing”. On 22 February, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by its Regulation decided that “President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich withdrew from the execution of his constitutional powers, and fails to perform his obligations”. Thus, the Parliament appointed a special election of the president of Ukraine on 25 May 2014. 328 people's deputies voted for this decision.

Before the election, an atypical for Ukraine balance of powers has developed. First, the society has accumulated a considerable potential of distrust in leaders of the parliamentary parties that were at the Maidan. On the contrary, during the protests, some politicians managed to increase significantly their support. Influenced by this fact, the previous front-runner of the election, the leader of the party UDAR V. Klychko refused to run for the position of president in favour of the self-nominated candidate P. Poroshenko.

Secondly, political forces in opposition to the new government failed to nominate a single candidate. 5 candidates came out from the Party of Regions (PR), and the party itself has split because of supporting M. Dobkin rather than S. Tihopko with higher rankings. Against the backdrop of the general decline of support of the PR because it was identified with Yanukovich's regime, its candidates could not claim success. As a result, the main competition was not between “pro-Russian” and “pro-European” candidates as usual but between representatives of the same side of the political spectrum – two pro-European politicians.

In total, the CEC registered 23 candidates, most of whom were leaders of the political parties (parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) and representatives of the Maidan. 21 candidates reached the day of the election, three of whom (including the Communist leader P. Symonenko) had announced refusal to run for the election too late.

The main backdrop of the campaign was the collapse of V. Yanukovych's regime, rapid Russian occupation of Crimea in February and March 2014, unwinding of armed unrest and total destabilisation in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (with unsuccessful attempts to destabilise the situation in Kharkiv and Odessa Oblasts). On the other hand – spreading public demand for preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, stabilisation of the situation and unification of the society, major renewal of the government, and systematic fight against corruption.

The campaign lasted a limited period of time and was significantly less expensive than most of the previous presidential campaigns – for the first time since 1994, there was no lobbying clout, large number of violations or fraud that could have affected the final result.

For the first time since 1991, the election was held in one round with its winner P. Poroshenko getting almost 55% of the votes. It was largely a result of the public aspiration for the fastest stabilisation of the situation in Ukraine as the society widely believed that Russia in every possible way would hinder the election of a legitimate Ukrainian president. Moreover, before he was elected the threat of armed invasion remained high. The call for the public to choose a winner already in the first round for the sake of saving time and resources has also probably played its role.

Second place of Y. Tymoshenko was an expected result. We can assume that upon return to active politics, the leader of Batkivshchyna failed to grasp the changes in the public mood, and chose wrong behaviour and strategy of the election campaign.

The biggest surprise of the election was O. Liashko's good result. Apparently, the topics and style of his campaign were well understood by some voters inclined to "simple decisions and decisive actions". Both O. Liashko and the next candidate by the results A. Hrytsenko focused their campaigns on the topic of combating the aggression against Ukraine and protection of its territorial integrity. This had a positive impact on the support of voters.

As mentioned above, representatives of the former government could not expect to succeed. Even in their electoral regions, including the relatively "quiet" ones, S. Tihipko and M. Dobkin lost to P. Poroshenko and other candidates since they competed actually not with them but with each other. The presidential election participant of many years – the leader of the CPU P. Symonenko, whose electoral rhetoric almost entirely coincided with the statements of the Russian leaders, got 1.5% of the votes, thus he can hardly be regarded as a serious politician in the future.

The defeat of the representatives of Svoboda and Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor), who together got less than 2% of the votes, clearly proved how groundless are the myths that Ukraine is becoming "fascist and radical", spread by the Russian propaganda and picked up by some Western media. These results may indicate that now in Ukraine there is public demand for peace and stability rather than fighting, which is associated with the leaders of these parties.

One of the main consequences of the 2014 presidential election will be major reformatting of the political scene. The basis of this trend is notable public disappointment in politicians of the previous era. The election led to expressing no confidence to those who could be associated with the previous government (S. Tihipko, M. Dobkin, P. Symonenko) as well as Y. Tymoshenko; and the need to create a new stable parliamentary majority that will be able to hold the constitutional reform and implement a range of unpopular but necessary steps.

Much will depend on how well the newly elected President P. Poroshenko will use public trust given to him. As the experience of his predecessors V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovych showed, he has no more than six months for this.

*Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Yuriy YAKYMENKO,  
Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Viktor ZAMIATIN*

## **RUSSIA WILL NOT LEAVE UKRAINE ALONE AND WILL PROVOKE CONFLICT**

*Source material: conversation with readers of the website Hlavred*

### **On the situation in the East of Ukraine**

It is possible to defeat the terrorists but they need to be deprived of external support. The government is doing what it can in nowadays circumstances, with powers and resources it has. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) are terrorist groups, and this will define their future. Hardly anyone except similar structures will dare to recognise their independence.

I think that any actions of Akhmetov against the terrorists who operate there will have a positive impact on the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and reflect the position of the silent, intimidated majority of citizens. Of course, such actions could have been taken much earlier. Apparently, Mr Akhmetov waited too long, and moved on to a more active manifestation of his position only when the situation has become a real threat to his interests. During this period, his abilities have significantly weakened, and without efforts of the central government, he can't deal with the terrorist groups operating in Donbas on his own.

The greatest responsibility for the current situation lies on two entities – the previous government and Russia. The previous government is responsible for social and economic degradation of the country and deliberate destruction of those institutes that were to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, deliberate encouragement of the society to split. Moreover, it continued systematic suppression of the rights and freedoms of citizens, which led to social explosion.

Russia is responsible for resorting to an open war of aggression and further support of the terrorist groups in Ukraine in order to transform our country into a zone of instability and conflict. However, some responsibility lies on the current government which through certain impulsive actions, in the early days of its formation, contributed to increased tension and anxious expectations among the residents of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.

### **On Crimea**

For a long time, Crimea will remain a problematic territory in all aspects – both in terms of its political and legal status, social and economic prospects of the peninsula. Crimea is the territory of Ukraine. However, in order to restore status quo in this matter, we need much time – at least five years. The main factors here will be, above all, international legal arrangements and the situation in Russia.

### **On the parliamentary election**

Early parliamentary election is necessary. It will complete the process of reformatting the authorities. However, before that, the Verkhovna Rada should adopt certain necessary decisions, particularly in the part of amendments to the Constitution. If the Verkhovna Rada can implement these task in two consecutive sessions, the early parliamentary election can be held in November or December 2014. Now it is possible but there is also opposition to holding an early election. Therefore, the matter of the timing of this election will depend on the position of the newly elected president, the balance of powers in the Verkhovna Rada and the extent of public pressure on politicians to hold the election.

*Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Yuriy YAKYMENKO*

*Full text in original language*



# National Security and Defence



## GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCE OF POWERS AND ITS CHANGES AT THE BACKDROP OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

The dominant background of the formation of modern security environment are global processes of regional disintegration, reintegration and globalisation that are becoming more and more intense and significantly influence the creation of a new system of international relations.

Modern world has not become – and in the mid-term will not – more stable or secure. Most of the existing threats are of global (pollution, climate change, resource depletion) or network (terrorism, cybercrime, drug and arms trafficking etc.) nature. The emergence of new threats and changes in their nature and scope go faster

than governments and international institutions gain the ability to counter them effectively. All this requires adequate common approaches to combat threats and ensure security.

Enhancing interdependence and awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence is the basis for countries to form future development strategies and foreign policy principles. However, there are factors that can lead to reformatting of the existing international balance of interests and powers, and cause destabilisation of the situation and its development under unwanted scenarios, including spreading violence with the use of armed force.

Many theories that explain the world order through competition and dialogue of civilisations, appearance and disappearance of the centres of power, their fight for resources, leadership, and the right to influence others are likely to be “partially right”. Furthermore, they are complementary – the world is a much more complex mosaic of all these puzzles, an organism where the centres of power, instead of performing the functions of interdependent and interrelated organs, compete each other.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a sign and a certain milestone for changes in the world order and security environment. It highlighted the factors and potential negative effects of the emergence of imbalance of powers in the world.

*Director of Military Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI  
Full text in [Ukrainian](#) / [Russian](#)*

## WEAPONS FROM RUSSIA STILL CAN EASILY COME TO UKRAINE

Neither the Security Service of Ukraine nor the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes generalised figures on participation of the Russian military in the conflict in Ukraine. In addition to groups of intelligence agencies, private defence organisations are involved as well as Cossacks and other military organisations from Russia. That is why it is rather difficult to clearly distinguish which of them are citizens of Russia, which are “fresh Russians” from Crimea, and which are local militants or criminals

According to rough estimates, in total, there are up to five thousand armed separatists participating in combat operations in Donbas. Locals who act as crowd and support also should be added.

Russian weapon arsenals were imported to Ukraine in advance. Supply is most likely to continue now. The weapons that separatists have, are the latest AK-47 in particular, which are in service of the Russian army only; the Ukrainian army does not have them.

The opportunities for illegal supply of weapons to Ukraine are huge. In particular, through Crimea and the Azov Sea coast, using small vessels and boats, both people and cargo are transported with little or no barriers. Although border control has been strengthened, it is almost impossible to block 2,000km.

*Co-director of Foreign Relations and International Security  
Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Oleksiy MELNYK  
Full text in original language*

## RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN DONBAS DEPENDS BOTH ON SECURITY FORCES AND POLITICIANS

The events in Donbas are caused by the fact that the Ukrainian government has lost the initiative, and is forced to respond to the situation rather than act one step ahead. Since independence, the Ukrainian security sector had been too much under the Russian influence. Major purges were performed there, and professionals were supposed to replace those dismissed. But political appointees have come instead. Furthermore, insufficient training of people sent to Donbas begins to be visible. Not only they have to be professionals – their work has to be coordinated. It takes years to develop this coordination, and it could not appear easily.

Another reason of casualties among Ukrainian security forces is the lack of coordination between the security and political blocs.

The main goal of the counter terrorist operation is not killing terrorists or separatists. The final goal should be to stabilise the situation, and it depends not only on security forces. Their responsibility is to isolate terrorists, and then work with them. The political bloc should take care of people in these areas. This is where there are mistakes – the failure to act within the political bloc.

There is hope that the presidential election will have a positive impact on stability in eastern Ukraine.

*Director of Military Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI  
Full text in original language*

## **ECONOMY OF CRIMEA WILL SUFFER FROM RUSSIAN RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF PRODUCTS FROM THE PENINSULA**

The shift of trade flows to Odessa is a positive natural process, and the ban on the export of products will primarily hit Crimea itself.

In fact, even in such areas as recreation and tourism, Odessa and Kherson Oblast will be able to compete with the traditional flows of holidaymakers who used to come to Crimea. We need to bear in mind now, even if we do not accept it, that Crimea is an occupied territory, separated from Ukraine. Unfortunately, for the nearest future, tools to restore economic cooperation have not been defined. In addition, one should understand that businesses will not run from pillar to post. If entrepreneurs focus on Odessa Oblast now, then even in case of changes, they will not rush back to an old spot, so to say. Therefore, things like confidence and stability are very important for business. So even if there are any changes, those businesses that shifted to Odessa and other southern oblasts of Ukraine will not return anywhere.

Occupation also leads to the fact that the international community or international trading institutions cannot

recognise much of the business there. This means that opportunities for business development are far from those under normal conditions. Therefore, on the contrary, it would be appropriate to find mechanisms, which would help and promote those businesses – including tourism – willing to develop in southern oblasts of Ukraine and stand on their own feet soon, join the infrastructure, and get positive results. The shift of trade flows or services should be welcomed

The ban on the export of products from Crimea will significantly affect the Crimean economy. The Russian market can hardly seize the flows that used to go to Ukraine, due to the complexity of delivery, much more complex procedures, and, furthermore, competition that companies willing to enter the Russian markets will face. This is more difficult and requires funds. Such restrictions are introduced allegedly to keep the products of Crimea for the local people but actually, it will only worsen the situation. Markets and the level of demand and supply mean rather complex procedure, related to infrastructure, logistics, and connections with suppliers, and that is why Crimean producers are most likely to lose more.

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

*Full text in original language*

## **WHEN ECONOMY FAILS, MILITARY TENSION GROWS**

*Source material: Interview for the website From-UA*

**– What kind of pricing strategy is pursued in Ukraine now by the new Government? What does it depend on?**

First of all, now it is about IMF loans. Therefore, it is their use, which is connected with the need to strengthen the banking system, fill foreign exchange reserves, and ensure solvency of the country. Also, speaking about the IMF loans, they are mainly intended for the National Bank of Ukraine, not the Government that takes care of the pricing strategy, the matter of the budget, or social justice, which affects pricing one way or another.

Therefore, at the first stage, until what is called macroeconomic stabilisation occurs, which is certainly related to political and military tension, it is too early to speak about the funds of the IMF or the World Bank aimed at the implementation of any pricing strategy. In the nearest future, we can hardly expect to see any government interventions.

Another thing is that it should be very important that exchange stabilisation finally happens, hryvnia exchange rate calms down to a certain extent, and there are grounds to believe that it will even drop. It will certainly be a factor for reassurance on the consumer markets because now a significant number of import prices depend on the exchange rate. In this exchange rate, market risks are considered. As soon as foreign exchange is stable, one can speak about pricing dynamics calming down. Another point here is the administrative principle for the rates of public utilities but this is rather moved to autumn.

**– What is your forecast regarding the future of domestic producers in case of signing the economic section of the Association Agreement with the EU?**

The EU has already abolished – or nearly abolished – taxes for the majority of Ukrainian goods. The free trade zone is most likely to be open until autumn. For now, Ukrainian

markets remain protected, at least partially. This allows to say that Ukrainian business is given extra temporary space for adaptation.

Today we can state that those companies that are already exporting their goods to Europe will be able to expand. Those companies that are preparing for this but for whatever reason were unable to enter the European markets will be able to enter these markets. For those who have not entered and did not mean to do this, there may be problems because for those companies fully focused on Russia (Russia currently has a very serious embargo policy for certain goods) the situation may worsen.

As you can see, there is no general recipe. For those whose business was focused on Europe, opportunities are expanding; for those preparing for this step – opportunities are emerging; and for those tied up in Russia, the situation is rather complicated but not hopeless. It should be just the opposite - there should be coordination of business and public administration that will use control mechanisms. For example, by incorporating Ukrainian business into the system and network of the European business. It gives chances.

**– Given the events in eastern Ukraine, should we expect a price increase for food supplies and consumer goods across the country?**

Of course, the situation in the East affects pricing. There is a very clear triangle: currency – politics (including military) – economy. That is why political situation adversely affects economic expectations and does not allow working normally. Similarly, when economy fails, the military tension grows because confrontation is partially related to weak economic dynamics, which leads to economic troubles, social security problems, payment of wages etc.

The same is with the foreign exchange rate, which either calms people down or makes them nervous. So, of course, the situation in the East adversely affects the expectations of people as well as foreign exchange and pricing strategies.

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

*Full text in original language*





### UKRAINE WILL USE THE IMF FUNDS FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION

By definition, the IMF funds should help macroeconomic stabilisation, and are usually credited to accounts of the National Bank of Ukraine. These funds are usually used for macroeconomic stabilisation and support of the balance of payment. That is to ensure critical import, support of the national currency and repayment of external debts.

In some cases, the IMF makes exceptions and decides to use part of the funds for budget deficit. As to the specific case of Ukraine, the notice said that a part of the funds of the International Monetary Fund may be used by the Government of Ukraine to cover budget deficit. This is likely to happen.

Generally, one should expect that the funds provided by the IMF should ensure the solvency of Ukraine primarily for the external debt – either to ensure critical import or meet debt obligations of Ukraine.

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

Full [text](#) in original language

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WILL ALLOW UKRAINE TO AFFECT THE WORLD ECONOMY

Countries that produce food supplies can take the place of those countries that can greatly affect global economic flows.

It is a known fact that in the nearest future, the food problem will escalate and become more critical. Moreover, it will be not just about amounts but also the quality of food. At the same time, Ukraine traditionally comes as the breadbasket of Europe but Ukrainian adaptability to manufacture in the agricultural sector is still much inferior to similar sectors in many other countries.

Due to improvement of technical support, in the coming decade Ukraine can take its rightful place in the world. We already have 3 billion people working in the agricultural sector. This shows that even given difficult conditions in which this industry has been for the last 5-10 years, it was giving results.

Therefore, Ukraine's transformation into the agricultural centre in Europe is a complex issue that should be addressed in terms of amounts, quality, ecology, and resource preservation. Also, all this should be connected with advanced technology.

The development of any sector always stimulates development of related sectors; it will promote expansion and development of domestic production. We can hope that the locomotive of the agricultural sector will be able to boost both the process industries and mechanical engineering, which can positively affect the rural social sector and contribute to the outflow of labour from rural areas. One can expect that access to humanitarian and social sectors will improve.

*Director of Economic Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Vasyl YURCHYSHYN*

Full [text](#) in original language

## Energy

### IF GAZPROM CUTS OFF GAS TO UKRAINE, IT WILL VIOLATE ITS OBLIGATIONS TO EUROPE

Ukraine should not succumb to any political and economic attacks of Gazprom, which promises to cut off the supply of gas, and should publicly seek price reduction for Russian fuel.

By no means one should negotiate behind the scenes, as it used to be. When decisions are made behind the scenes, Ukraine always loses. Intermediaries win, Russian politics wins. It used to be like that during Yushchenko's presidency as well as Kuchma's.

The Government of Ukraine should continue legal proceedings with Gazprom and take them to Stockholm Arbitration since trilateral talks with the participation of the European Commission do not bring the expected results.

Trilateral talks have little chance to bring at least some results because Gazprom is not used to balancing interests but pushing its own interests. One should not cherish any illusions; Ukraine should be prepared for gas to be really cut off. Here we must clearly understand the situation – this is a classical position of Gazprom. The government should have its own way, and should not panic. There is enough gas for the population; the industry should think of itself – in many cases, reduce gas consumption. Gazprom has no technical capacity to cut off gas supply to Ukraine while leaving untouched supplies to Europe. If Gazprom cuts off the supply of gas to Ukraine, it will mean recurrence of 2006 and 2009, and then Gazprom will not fulfil its obligations to European partners. This will lead to a devastating defeat of Gazprom in Europe – a total loss of its reputation.

*Director of Energy Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

Full [text](#) in original language



### SOUTH STREAM POSES THE BIGGEST THREAT TO THE ENERGY SECURITY OF UKRAINE

The South Stream construction project will certainly affect the profits of Ukraine from gas transit but this is not the main problem of the plan.

The South Stream construction project still affects Ukraine in terms of lower income from the transit although this loss is approximately \$1 billion annually. The main problem is that now the transit and supply of natural gas to Ukraine are linked, they are not separate. Thus, Russia cannot block energy supply to Ukraine without cutting off gas supply to the European Union. But when South Stream is built, Russia will be able to cut off gas supply to Ukraine completely. This may cause very serious consequences not only for Ukraine but also destabilise the economic and political situation in other countries. Therefore, Ukraine should consider South Stream as the biggest energy threat today.

*Director of Energy Programmes  
of the Razumkov Centre Volodymyr OMELCHENKO*

Full [text](#) in original language

# Sociology

In this issue of the Newsletter we present some findings (summarised in tables and diagrams) of the survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on April 25-29, 2014. 2,012 respondents aged over 18 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea were interviewed. Sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.


The following regional division was applied: **West** – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi Oblasts; **Centre** – Kyiv; Vinnytsia,

Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv Oblasts; **South** – Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson Oblasts; **East** – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kharkiv Oblasts.


More information on the findings of this and other studies conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre is available on the Razumkov Centre website <http://www.razumkov.org.ua>

## PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AND PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS FOR ITS ACTIONS

**Speaking about your general impression about the new government, how would you rate it compared to the previous government?**  
% of those polled




**Would you like V. Yanukovych to regain the position of president?**  
% of those polled




## PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN UKRAINE

**Has your attitude to Russia changed since the accession of Crimea to Russia?**  
% of those polled




## FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE CITIZENS OF UKRAINE


**Which direction of foreign policy should be a priority for Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



**Shall Ukraine join the European Union?**  
% of those polled



**Do you agree that there is a war between Ukraine and Russia now?**  
% of those polled



# The Razumkov Centre News

## Participation in the International Conference in Poland

On April 29-30, 2014 Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre V. Zamiatin participated in the international conference "10 – 10. The European Union. Self-government. Citizens". V. Zamiatin spoke about the internal development of Ukraine and presented the project of the Razumkov Centre "Ukraine 2014: New Prospects and New Threats."

Also, during his stay in Poznan, V. Zamiatin had a meeting with students and professors of the Institute of Eastern Studies of Poznan University. V. Zamiatin made a brief presentation on the current situation in Ukraine, presented the project "Ukraine 2014. New Prospects and New Threats", and answered numerous questions of the audience.

## The Visit of the Razumkov Centre Researchers to China, 5-8 May 2014

On May 5-8, 2014, **Director of Sociological Service A. Bychenko** and **Director of Economic Programmes V. Yurchyshyn**, as part of the delegation of Ukrainian think tanks, visited China. The visit was organised by China Public Diplomacy Association. During the visit, Ukrainian experts had several meetings with the officials of the People's Republic of China and representatives of think tanks of China, and also participated in a series of roundtables devoted to the current situation in Ukraine and the prospects of development of Ukraine-China relations.

In particular, Ukrainian representatives had meetings with:

- Zhou Li, Deputy Minister, International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ,
- Sun Zhenming, Vice President of China Public Diplomacy Association,
- Zhang Hanhua, Head of the Eurasian Department of the MFA of China,
- the authorities of Suzhou and the economic department of the mayor's office of Suzhou.

### Public events:

- Roundtable Current Situation in Ukraine at China Public Diplomacy Association,
- Presentations at Shanghai Institute for International Studies

All the events were well organised; meetings and discussions were meaningful and fruitful. The representatives of China have repeatedly **emphasised and stressed on their interest in the development of partnerships** with Ukrainian government agencies and NGOs.

## Roundtable Religion and Authorities in Ukraine: Problems of Relations.

15 May 2014 The Razumkov Centre jointly with the representative office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine, supported by the National Council of Churches, held a regular session of the roundtable Religion and Authorities in Ukraine: Problems of Relations. The following discussion topic was proposed – **What can the Church do in the current social and political situation in Ukraine?**



The following questions were proposed for the discussion:

1. Is the Church a civic institution in Ukraine today?
2. What impact does the Church have today on the Ukrainian society, the government, and law enforcement?
3. Can the Church fulfil the mission of a mediator in resolving social and political conflict in Ukraine?

During the roundtable session, the Razumkov Centre presented information materials "Ukraine 2014: Social and Political Conflict and the Church". They contain findings of the sociological study, in particular on the attitude of the citizens of Ukraine to the Church as a civic institution, as well as texts of certain appeals and documents of the National Council of Churches and Religious Organisations of 2013-2014.

## Meeting with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federative Republic of Brazil Antonio Fernando Cruz de Mello

On May 21, 2014, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federative Republic of Brazil Antonio Fernando Cruz de Mello visited the Razumkov Centre. Brazil was also represented by Consular, Third Secretary of the Embassy of Brazil in Ukraine Lucas Shalella das Neves

The Razumkov Centre was represented by Director General A. Rachok and Deputy Director, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre Y. Yakymenko.

At the meeting, prospects of developing cooperation between Ukraine and Brazil in various areas, the features of transformation processes in both countries, the current situation in Ukraine and expectations for the presidential election, possible solutions to the crisis of international security institutions caused by the actions of Russia were discussed.

Possible areas of cooperation of the Centre with leading think tanks in Brazil and prospects of using the Brazilian experience in reforms were also discussed.

UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES  
NAMED AFTER OLEXANDER RAZUMKOV

Address: 01015, Ukraine, Kyiv, 16 Lavrska St  
Telephone (044) 201 11 98, Fax (044) 201 11 99  
E-mail newsletter@razumkov.org.ua