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POLITICAL CULTURE AND PARLIAMENTARISM IN UKRAINE: CURRENT STATE AND MAIN PROBLEMS

(*Informational and Analytical Materials by the Razumkov Centre*)

The Revolution of Dignity, countering Russia's aggression and the controversial, at times painful for society, process of reform implementation in different sectors have significantly aggravated the problem of efficiency of people's interests representation mechanisms operated by government bodies, as well as the issue of people exercising their constitutional right to participate in the management of public affairs.

The evolving relationship between government and society attests, on yet another occasion in the modern history of Ukraine, to the exact same phenomenon: the period of society's enthusiasm, active, even sacrificial participation in political processes, and high public expectations change to disappointment, despair and apathy threatening to turn into aggression.

Electing candidates, who in the moment of elections seemed to match public expectations for government representatives, changes to negative, even hostile attitude with time. The level of trust in elected higher government institutions in such periods drops from highest possible to minimal levels, as it happened in 2005-2009 and 2014-2017. Today, the growing activism of civil society and manifestations of its major creative potential after the second Maidan are combined with the risks and dangers that this energy might become destructive for democracy.

This problem has two components: special aspects of people's political culture, on the one hand, and the efficiency of mechanisms for implementing their political will, representative institutions – on the other. Without understanding these aspects, their mutual influence and correlation, the process of improving democracy institution in Ukraine will keep going on according to the "trial and error" scenario, while political system operation remains doomed to regular crises, which might turn into more "revolutions" at extreme points. Democratic system stability today is impossible without further constructive (not just protesting) participation of citizens equipped with knowledge of political institutions and skills to participate in them.

The main goal of the Razumkov Centre's Project "Political Culture and Parliamentarism in Ukraine: Ways to Improve Representative Democracy" is to use the study of the current state and special aspects of Ukrainian citizens' political culture, in particular, their attitude to interest representation institutions, and analysis of the most topical problems influencing the efficiency of operation of the highest representative and the only legislative body in Ukraine – the Verkhovna Rada, in order to create recommendations for the development of an adequate policy for citizens' political culture formation and optimisation of political institutions with the purpose of raising the quality of democratic representation.

This journal consists of three chapters.

Chapter one presents sociological research data that provides insight into the current state of political culture of citizens, and an analytical summary based thereon.

Chapter two looks at modern problems of parliamentarism development in Ukraine, presents data from surveys of Ukrainian MPs.

Chapter three formulates preliminary recommendations for government agencies and civil society organisations aimed at creating political culture and raising the level of efficiency of parliamentarism in Ukraine.

Informational and Analytical Materials "Political Culture and Parliamentarism in Ukraine: Current State and Main Problems" were prepared with participation of: Yu. Yakymenko (Project Manager), A. Bychenko, V. Zamiatin, M. Mishchenko, V. Musiyaka, A. Stetskiv, V. Yarema.

1. POLITICAL CULTURE OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: SPECIAL ASPECTS AND TRENDS

(Sociological Study Results)

Political culture is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Given the diversity of approaches to defining this concept and its structure, the political culture has been analysed as "a collection of typical, rather stable knowledge, ideas, principles, beliefs, values, orientations, models of behaviour, symbols that emerged as a result of historical experience of previous generations of a national (social) community, is transferred from generation to generation, but has major transformative potential and manifests itself in the activity of political process subjects and in the functioning of political institutions".[1]

In order to determine special aspects of Ukrainian citizens' political culture at the current stage, the Razumkov Centre conducted a nationwide sociological study,[2] results of which are presented below. The study covers such aspects of political culture as knowledge about the political system and its institutions, attitudes to them, political values and orientations, level of civic and political participation.

1.1. UKRAINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

Level of Competence in Politics

Ukrainian society as a whole is not inclined to be overly interested in politics – only 38% of citizens said that they are either very interested in politics (5%) or are rather interested in it (33%). 60% of citizens show little or no interest in politics.

A relatively higher level of interest in politics was shown by the residents of Western and Central regions (39-40%), slightly lower – in the South (31%).[3] Consequently, in the South, there were more respondents, who are not very interested in politics or are not interested in it at all – 67%.

The level of interest in politics grows with the age of respondents – while among 18-29 y.o. citizens this number was 24%, among citizens over 59 y.o. – it was 50%. Compared to other groups, a relatively high share of citizens interested in politics was found among citizens with higher education and the highest level of financial standing.

To compare: *The World Values Survey*, the latest, sixth wave of which was conducted in 60 countries of the world in 2010-2014, captured, in particular, a significantly higher level of interest in politics in the societies of Germany and Netherlands, where 62% and 65% of citizens, respectively, were interested in politics.[4]

Along with this, despite the rather low interest in politics, most citizens believe that people need to take an interest in it (almost 72% of respondents responded "yes" and "rather yes"). Moreover, this point of view is shared by the majority of citizens in all regions and different groups (age, education, etc.).

43% of respondents admit to feeling often or very often the inability to understand political processes taking place in Ukraine. 36% of respondents have this state of mind from time to time, 18% – rarely face the issue of failing to understand Ukrainian politics or never have had this situation.

The share of citizens who feel more competent in politics is slightly larger among older respondents. By other parameters, people's assessment of their ability to understand politics did not differ much.

The situation with citizens' defining their own stand on political issues is similar. For example, 18% of respondents can do it easily or very easily. For 29% of respondents it is hard or very hard to define their own position, for 44% – sometimes hard, sometimes easy.

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[1] See: Polishchuk I. The Notion and Structure of Political Culture. – Electronic Archive (Institutional Repository) of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, *http://dspace.univer.kharkov.ua/bitstream/123456789/2418/2/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%96%D1%89%D1%83%D0%BA%20%D0%86.%D0%9E.pdf*

[2] Here and farther, we are using materials of the study conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre on 22-27 September 2017 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Number of respondents – 2,008; age – from 18 y.o. Theoretical error of sample does not exceed 2.3%.

[3] Here and farther, the following regional division of oblasts is used: **West:** Volyn, Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi oblasts; **Centre:** city of Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts; **South:** Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; **East:** Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv oblasts, as well as parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts under Ukraine's control.

[4] For more information, see: Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Values and Guidelines Aspect.– National Security and Defence, 2017, No.2-1, p.12.

The latter option was chosen by the absolute or relative majority of citizens in all regions and socio-demographic groups.

Relatively more of those, for whom it was easier to define their attitude, were among citizens with higher education and people with better financial security, residents of big cities.

A number of questions were meant to determine **the level of people's knowledge about specific political and legal institutions, and most important events in political life.**

Over a half (55%) of citizens are aware that currently Ukraine has the parliamentary-presidential form of government. 16% responded: "presidential-parliamentary republic", which is wrong, if we talk about strict definitions, however, it does reflect the "semi-presidential" system of government that Ukraine has today.

21% of respondents could not give an answer; incorrect answers (parliamentary, presidential republic, dictatorship) were given by 8%.

In all regions and practically in all groups, the majority of respondents (48-60%) gave the correct answer (parliamentary-presidential republic).

Most citizens (56%) do not know which specific provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution were reinstated in the early 2014. Over a half of citizens with higher or incomplete higher education were not familiar with the 2014 constitutional changes. The largest number of those, who are not familiar with changes, was among 18-29 y.o. group (63%), and people with lower level of education (60%).

Only 29% of citizens are familiar with these changes, the largest part being residents of small and medium cities and urban-type localities (35%); their share increases together with respondents' education level.

About a third of citizens do not know **who received more powers as a result of reinstatement of the 2004 version of the Constitution**. The relative majority (39%) correctly believe that the Verkhovna Rada got more powers, 28% – the President. The largest share of those, who could not give an answer, was among people in the East (39%), people in the 18-29 y.o. age group (39%), and citizens with lower education level (39%).

Respondents were asked about their awareness of the responsibilities Ukrainian citizens have as per the Constitution.

Most citizens (absolute or relative majority) are aware that constitutional responsibilities include, in particular, compliance with laws and the Constitution of Ukraine (Art. 68 of the Constitution) – 79%, protection of independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine (Art. 65 of the Constitution) – 71%, respect for state symbols (Art. 65 of the Constitution) – 58%, respect for other people's honour and dignity (Art. 68 of the Constitution) – 46%, payment of taxes (Art. 67 of the Constitution) – 41%.

Popular answers also included "voting in elections and participation in referendums" (35%, not defined in the Constitution as a citizens' duty, only as their right), "having command of the state language" (34%, is not directly defined as a constitutional duty of a citizen), "protection of cultural heritage" (Art. 66 of the Constitution) – 30%.

Large shares of citizens also believe that their constitutional duty is to support children until their adulthood (25%), take care of incapacitated parents, and ensure that they and/or their children get an education (22% each), which are not in the text of the Constitution.

Only 17% of citizens know that the responsibility to do no harm to the environment is constitutional (Art. 66 of the Constitution).

Provisions that citizens would like to see as citizens' constitutional responsibilities generally match this list.

Also, citizens think that the Constitution should capture the duty to have a command of the state language (50%). Currently, the Constitution only establishes that the state language is the Ukrainian language, while the areas of use are regulated by laws.

Social support has been expressed regarding to the following duties: taking care of incapacitated parents and supporting children until adulthood (43% of answers each; these rules are regulated by individual laws); voting in elections and referendums (38%); ensuring that one and/or his children get an education (36%, the Constitution only declares the right to education); knowing basic history and culture of Ukraine (31%, there is currently no such requirement for all citizens in the Constitution).

Among notable differences in responses – a lower level of knowledge about the constitutional duty to protect Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity among residents of the East and South of Ukraine (57% and 59%, respectively, compared to the West (82%) and Centre (78%)). Among residents in the East, the share of those who would like to see this responsibility captured in the Constitution is smaller than in other regions: only half of respondents supported to include this provision in the text of the Basic Law, while 80% – in the West, 76% – in the Centre, 73% – in the South of Ukraine.

There is a notable difference in the attitude to the constitutional duty to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity among Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking citizens: in these groups 63% and 74% of respondents, respectively, supported the need to incorporate this provision in the Constitution.

People can use political party programmes as source of information on the content of policy that is being implemented or may be implemented by government bodies under certain conditions.

At the same time, **the majority (56%) of citizens state that they have never read political party programmes**. There are significantly more of such citizens in the South (71%), among younger voters, citizens with lower level of education.

Among the 44% of citizens, who have read political party programmes, most (57%) see differences between them, but 42% – do not see such differences. It is logical that these differences are better seen by better educated citizens.

Citizens were asked questions aimed at determining their knowledge about the functions of different government institutions and their purpose.

Namely, citizens were asked to define, which of the government institutions on the list, is the main body in charge of the state budget.

Half of respondents (51%) said that they do not know what this institution is, and almost half of them (49%) – that they do. Also, a lower level of knowledge was among citizens in the South (42%), 18-29 y.o. respondents (43%), and people with lower level of education (41%).

At the same time, among respondents who answered this question positively, only 36% correctly identified this institution – the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The shares of correct answers among residents of different regions and different socio-demographic, social groups were not very different.

Thus, overall, only 19% of Ukrainian citizens know, which government institution is the main body in charge of the state budget.

Citizens had better knowledge about the functions of election commissions – 61% of respondents said they can name the main task assigned to them. Among them, most respondents – 84% (over 70% in all regions and socio-demographic groups) correctly identified this task among the proposed alternatives – which is counting votes.

Most (68%)[5] **citizens believe that general secondary schools do not provide young citizens with enough knowledge on the political system** for them to effectively protect their constitutional rights and freedoms (in the East this number was 82%).

21% of respondents had an opposite opinion.

Low assessment of the level of knowledge on the political system provided by general secondary schools was typical for the majority of citizens in all groups (age, education, financial standing, region of residence, everyday communication language, etc.).

Citizens' Attitude to the Verkhovna Rada, Understanding of Its Functions

Most (63%) of Ukrainian citizens believe that the country must have a Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada). The largest share of those who believe this was among residents of the West (71%), people with higher or incomplete higher education (68%).

Compared to 2003, the share of citizens, who believe that Parliament is necessary for Ukraine, has slightly decreased – back then it was 68%.

At the same time, people's perception of this body and its tasks are different.

31% perceive Verkhovna Rada, foremost, as the only legislative body in Ukraine, its Parliament. For 28% of respondents – it is mostly a political club of influential people and their representatives; about 16% each, define Verkhovna Rada as a mechanism, via which Ukrainian citizens influence political decision-making through their representatives, and as "all people's deputies gathered in one hall".

Two thirds (67%) of citizens understand that Verkhovna Rada deputies come to power (according to the law) through constituents' voting, i.e., elections. However, while in the West, this number was almost 82%, in the South, it was only 47%, with 30% of respondents in the South not being able to answer this question.

From 5 to 11% of respondents in different regional and socio-demographic groups believe that MPs are appointed by the government or local state administrations, 2-3% – that they are appointed by the President or come to power thanks to support of other countries.

The number of those, who could not answer was between 9 and 17% (except for the mentioned instance).

Among the proposed answer options (the correct and incorrect ones) about the constitutional tasks (functions) of the Verkhovna Rada, the correct option – "approves Government composition", was chosen by 36% of respondents. 32% could not give an answer; the same percentage chose incorrect options.

The largest share of correct answers was in the South (49%) and among people with higher education (42%). From 24% to 40% of respondents could not answer this question. Only in large cities, the share of respondents, who gave the correct answer, exceeded those, who could not answer.

Among different functions of the Parliament, most valuable for society, in respondents' opinion, was "development and adoption of laws" – 55%; representation of constituents' interests and budget approval – 38% each. Supervision of Government's activity was mentioned by 35% of respondents, and its formation – by 26%.

Thus, citizens gave an objective assessment of the main Parliament functions – legislative, representational, budget, constitutive and supervisory. The hierarchy of the first five functions was practically the same in different regions.

Parliament's legislative function was more highly assessed in the West (61%) and South (60%).

Other Parliament functions, such as selection of new political leaders, communication of political elites and legitimisation of political regime, were mentioned by 8-9% of citizens.

Almost half of respondents could not assess the work of MPs in their constituency – 33% of respondents did not know them, 14% – could not give an answer. Among other respondents, 19% positively assessed their work,[6] 34% – negatively.

In the South, 41% of voters do not know their MP. Shares of these respondents are larger among the youngest voters and people with lower level of education.

Among citizens, who were able to assess the work of the political party they voted for in the 2014 election, 21% positively assessed it, and 32% – negatively. The youngest respondents were less critical in their assessments.

Overall, regarding both individual MPs and political parties people had voted for, the predominance of negative assessments over the positive ones is not critical.

Most citizens (67%) do not support the proposal on the possibility for a Verkhovna Rada deputy to keep his mandate in case he is appointed as a minister (without keeping the deputy's salary while working in the Government) and the possibility of his return to Parliament after termination of such duties. 9% of respondents support this idea.

[5] Sum of answers "*no*" and "*rather no*".

[6] Sum of answers "*positive*" and "*rather positive*".

This idea received least support in the East – 4%, and most support – in the West and Centre (11% each).

For 54%, information about the work of the Verkhovna Rada is interesting or rather interesting. This percentage is higher than that of people interested in politics in general.

This information is mostly interesting[7] for older respondents (63%). Among village residents, the level of interest is lower. The interest grows along with respondents' age.

Overall, in all social groups, the share of respondents interested in this information exceeds the number of those, who are not interested.

That said, 37% of respondents would like to get more information on the state budget for the following year, and almost a third – on the work of MPs in constituencies. Over 30% of respondents are interested in getting analytical information on the vision of state policy priorities from leading political forces.

Older citizens more often feel they lack information on the work of MPs in constituencies.

As for information regarding the parliament that, according to citizens, is concealed from them, over half of respondents (52%) believe that the concealed information constitutes behind-the-scenes arrangements between political forces. Most of such citizens are in the East (59%).

In the second place – information on parliamentarians' income (47%), third – information on MPs' past and details of their political career (40%).

31% of respondents (for each option) believe that information on interaction between political forces and owners of media outlets, and the real initiators of bills is being concealed.

Only 6% of citizens think that no information about the parliament is being concealed.

As regards the nature of information on the Verkhovna Rada people mainly get from media, over a half (56%) say that this information is predominantly negative – corrupt MPs, inefficient work, "button-pushing", etc. A quarter (26%) of respondents believe that information on the parliament is balanced, and only 8% of respondents think that this information is positive (on the laws developed and adopted, the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts).

That said, in the East of Ukraine, 62% of respondents believe that they receive predominantly negative information. There were no significant differences by other group parameters.

Regarding the sources of information, the majority (79%) of citizens do not use the official publications (newspapers "Holos Ukrayiny" (The Voice of Ukraine), "Uriadovyi Kurier" (Government Courier)), most people do not watch parliamentary TV channel "Rada" (62%) and do not listen to news and shows of the National Radiocompany of Ukraine (59%). The same goes for political party newspapers, which are not read by 70% of people. From 2% to 18% of citizens turn to these media on daily or weekly basis.

The situation with the First National TV Channel is slightly better – 35% of citizens do not watch it at all, while 29% – watch it either every day or several times a week.

Especially noticeable is the large share of those, who are not using any of the abovementioned sources among 18-29 y.o. respondents.

The overwhelming majority of citizens (74-91%) have not heard at all about NGOs, movements and projects funded by international donors, various activities of which are aimed at the Verkhovna Rada. Relatively more well-known are the Committee of Voters of Ukraine and Civil Network "Opora"; around 18% of respondents have heard about them.

Having relatively less knowledge was more characteristic of respondents from the East and citizens with lower level of education.

Attitude to Representative Institutions

Among the institutions that are supposed to represent citizens' interests in social processes, the majority of respondents mentioned none.

A relative majority (21%) named political parties; 19% of respondents – civil society organisations; 13% – trade unions; 10% – individual politicians. Even smaller groups of citizens trust media and business structures to represent their interests. 21% of citizens could not give an answer.

27% of citizens in the West spoke in favour of political parties representing their interests.

Curiously, 35% of citizens with higher level of income expressed most trust in civil society organisations and least – in political parties (8%) and individual politicians (7%). The Centre residents also trust civil society organisations (24%) more than parties (17%).

Public trust in trade unions as a potential body to represent their interests in social processes does not seem too high.

The relative majority (46%) of citizens do not see any political leaders in Ukraine, who could effectively manage the country. Almost half (49%) of citizens do not see such political parties or movements that could be trusted with governing the country.

At the same time, 39% of citizens believe that the country has a leader that can effectively govern it, and a third, who think that political forces can be entrusted with government authority.

In all regions and among different socio-demographic groups, the number of those, who do not believe the country has political leaders and parties that are able to effectively govern the country exceeds the number of those, who believe that such actors do exist.

The exception was only the West, where the numbers of those, who do and do not see any potential leaders were equal. The group of older citizens (60 y.o. and older) had slightly more of those, who believe the country has an effective political leadership (47% vs. 42%).

[7] Sum of answers "*yes*" and "*rather yes*".

Such a state of public opinion can be a consequence of disappearing of the "old", familiar political forces after the events of 2014, as well as disappointment of the major part of society with the new "post-Maidan" parties, movements and their leaders. This is also confirmed by Ukrainian society's noticeable demand for new political leaders and new political forces.[8] At the same time, it should be noted that a similar situation was also typical for Ukrainian society in other, more stable periods.

The level of trust in institutions representing citizens' interests such as the Verkhovna Rada, political parties and individual politicians is extremely low and got 2 points on the scale of 0 to 10.[9]

This indicator is common for all regions and social groups (it fluctuates between 1.5 and 2.7), yet it should be noted that this assessment is given primarily to the work of acting politicians and political forces based on the information they receive from all available sources (primarily, media).

The attitude to specific political parties operating in Ukraine is not different from the general attitude to political parties.

Thus, respondents' average assessment of their attitude to 20 listed most active political parties in Ukraine (parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) was within the range from 1 to 2.9 on the scale of 0 to 10.[10] Also, somewhat higher was the assessment of parties declaring their opposition to the current government – "Civic Position", "Batkivshchyna" and "Samopomich" ("Self-Help") – 2.9 each, and to compare: assessment of Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" – 2.3.

Regional distribution of assessments reflects the traditional distribution of people's preferences regarding political parties; differences between citizens grouped by other parameters were insignificant.

As regards means for ensuring citizens' interests representation, rather compelling are people's views of the nature of electoral system.

In determining citizens' attitude to the Verkhovna Rada electoral system reform, the average score was 4.0, where "0" means that candidates should have the right to self-nomination in territorial electoral districts, and "10" – that only parties have the right to nominate candidates.

Thus, the possibility of self-nomination in elections has rather significant support in the society and shows that citizens are more likely to vote for candidates they know, as opposed to voting by party lists, in creating which, in previous elections, they took no part.

This situation can be interpreted as society's interest in maintaining a direct connection between voters and MPs, although such an interest may now seem somewhat weakly articulated.

It is noteworthy that 47% of citizens support the self-nomination procedure for elections at all levels, which is far more than the number of those, who support candidates' self-nomination only in local elections (14%), or only in parliamentary elections (6%). Only 9% of citizens support the cancellation of self-nomination possibility.

The share of self-nomination supporters at elections of all levels was similar in all regions and socio-demographic groups.

Choosing between the proposed types of electoral systems, the relative majority (35%) of citizens preferred proportional system with open party lists. The level of support for majority electoral system and the existing mixed system is practically the same (16-17%). Least support had the proportional system with closed lists.

Thus, neither the existing mixed electoral system, nor the elections according to proportional system with closed lists or the majority system in its pure form, got the overwhelming public support that would legitimise the preservation of the current system or return to the ones we have already tried.

Instead, there is an apparent desire among a significant part of society to make an informed choice during voting. Yet, this choice is to a large extent leaning towards supporting a specific political party (which has been able to involve reputable people), rather than a separate candidate.

Society has primarily negative attitude to the bribing of voters – 68% of citizens will not justify "selling one's vote".

12% of respondents name "dire financial situation" to justify selling votes, and another 13% remain indifferent.

Least tolerant to "selling" votes are citizens in the West (79%), least negative – citizens in the South (54%).

People with lower level of income (17%) are more likely to explain the "sale" of votes with difficult financial situation. However, even among them, over two-thirds of respondents do not accept this practice.

It should be noted that since 2012 citizens grew significantly less tolerant to the sale of votes. Back then, 51% of respondents had a negative attitude to it, 24% – looked at it "with understanding", and 19% – did not care. This signifies a major shift in citizens' understanding of the importance of their one's own role in political life.

Most (56%) respondents believe that democracy is the most desirable type of government system, 18% – are ready to support authoritarianism under certain conditions, 14% believe that there is no difference, whether the country is a democracy or not.

It should be noted that starting from December 2009, there has been a steady increase in the share of people who believe that democracy is the best system of government (back then, 37% of respondents supported this idea).[11] Prior to that, in 2006-2009, the number of democracy supporters declined from 54% to 37%, respectively.

The share of authoritarian rule supporters dropped from 30% in 2009 (peak of increase) to 18% in 2017.

[8] For more information, see: Ukraine's Party System Before and After Maidan: Changes, Development Trends, Society's Demands. Analytical report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, No.6-7, 2015, p.46.

[9] Where "0" means complete mistrust, "10" – complete trust.

[10] Where "0" means that citizens strongly dislike the party, "10" – strongly like it.

[11] See: Identity of Ukrainian Citizens in the New Environment: State, Trends, Regional Aspects. – National Security and Defence, No.3-4, 2016, p.31.

In all regions, the share of democracy supporters has grown compared to 2015 from 47% (East) to 67% (West) of respondents.

The share of democracy supporters exceeds the share of authoritarianism supporters the most among the youngest respondents (by 46%), Ukrainian-speaking respondents (by 46%), citizens with higher education (by 44%), and well-off respondents (by 52%).

To compare: Among the oldest respondents this number is 29%; among Russian-speaking – 25%; among citizens with lower level of education – 30%; among least affluent – 35%.

Therefore, commitment to democracy depends on such factors as the respondents' age, language of communication, education and financial standing.

Comparing the level of support for the democratic system in the Ukrainian society with the data of a large-scale survey conducted by a reputable think tank Pew Research Center (USA) in June 2015 - July 2016 in 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it turns out that Ukrainian results (56%) exceed the corresponding numbers in the Czech Republic (49%), Hungary (48%), Poland (47%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (46%). Close to Ukraine's results are the figures from Georgia (55%), Croatia (54%), Armenia (53%), and Romania (52%).

In Russia and Moldova, the relative majority said that "under certain circumstances, the non-democratic system may be better" (41% and 44% of respondents, respectively). In Ukraine, in 2017, those who could choose the authoritarian regime under certain circumstances made up 18%, and those, who did not care – 14%. These numbers are below the corresponding results in the Pew Research Center survey for most countries in the region.[12]

At the same time, citizens have expressed an average level of satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine. The average assessment of the level of satisfaction on the scale of 0 to 10[13] is 4 points.

Village residents are slightly more satisfied with the way democracy functions, than city residents; citizens in the West – more than citizens in other regions; Ukrainian-speaking respondents – slightly more, than Russian-speaking and bilingual ones.

Despite a rather modest assessment of the level of democracy in Ukraine, citizens rather highly assessed the freedom of expression of political ideas.

This freedom is acknowledged by 60% of respondents, and the majority of respondents in all regions, except for the East, where the balance between positive and negative answers was 36% and 50%, respectively.

Rather pronounced are the differences between Russian and Ukrainian-speaking respondents. Thus, 71% of Ukrainian-speaking population believe that they are able to freely express their political ideas and 19% – deny it. Among the bilingual citizens, these numbers are 54% and 29%, among the Russian-speaking group – 42% each.

In terms of age and education level, differences among groups were insignificant, yet differences remained between assessment of the poor and the rich (the number of positive and negative responses – 48% and 40%, and 70% and 17%, respectively).

Under current conditions, the parliamentary-presidential republic is considered the best option for Ukraine by 42% of respondents.[14] Another type of a "semi-presidential system" – the presidential-parliamentary republic, was chosen by 13% of respondents.

Parliamentary or presidential republic were chosen by 8% and 5%, respectively; dictatorship – 4%. 29% of respondents could not give an answer.

Thus, most (55%) respondents tend to see Ukraine with a mixed form of government, while the share supporters of "parliamentarism" is bigger than that of "presidentialism".

The parliamentary-presidential republic, as the best form of government, is preferred in all regions. However, in the East, the dictatorship, as a form of government, was chosen more often than in other regions (8%), which can be a result of the occupation of parts of Ukraine's territory, the on-going war and the absence of clear prospects for residents of this region.

Most residents in medium and small cities support the current parliamentary-presidential form of government. Village residents more often prefer the President to take the leading role.

The dynamics of answers shows a major increase in the number of parliamentary-presidential model supporters compared to 2006-2007, when constitutional changes that introduced this model came into force. Even more so – since 2009, because of permanent political crises, the disadvantages of the introduced model became obvious and the society was waiting for new presidential elections.

Clearly, the reinstatement of the 1996 Constitution and V. Yanukovych presidency were the "shock and upheaval" for the society. This is demonstrated by the decreased (compared to 2009) share of supporters for presidential-parliamentary and presidential republic, as well as dictatorship. Meanwhile, the number of parliamentary republic supporters did not decrease.

The vast majority (75%) of respondents believe that Ukraine's economic and political sectors are divided by the spheres of influence between different interest groups, and consider this a negative phenomenon. 10% of citizens believe that this is normal.

Most (60%) citizens do not support the reinstatement of the USSR-type of order, 25% of respondents – support it.

Although, in all regions and social groups the share of opponents exceeds those in favour, the differences are very pronounced. There are many more proponents of restoring the USSR type of order in the East and South (34-36%), among people 50-59 y.o. (30%) and especially those over 60 y.o. (42%), among citizens with lower level of education (31%), Russian-speaking and bilingual (30-31%), and the least affluent citizens (44%).

[12] See: Most countries lack majority support for democracy as best form of government. Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.– Pew Research Center, *http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/democracy-nationalism-and-pluralism/pf-05-10-2017_ce-europe-08-18*.

[13] Where "0" – means "*completely dissatisfied*", and 10 – "*completely satisfied*".

[14] As noted above, 55% of respondents correctly identified the existing form of government in Ukraine.

SOCIO-POLITICAL VALUES OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE[15]

In the previous project on the issues of identity implemented by the Razumkov Centre in 2015-2017, we received data on the guiding values of Ukrainian citizens that can be compared to the results of *The World Values Survey*, a global research project carried out in a number of European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Russia).[16]

IMPORTANCE OF LIVING IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY

Evaluating how important it is for them to live in a democratically governed country on the scale of 1 ("not at all important") to 10 ("absolutely important"), Ukrainians gave it an average score of 8.3, which is lower than in Germany (8.9), Netherlands (8.9) and Poland (8.7), yet higher than in Russia (7.4).

The highest was the value of democracy among citizens in the East (8.6) and West (8.5), the lowest – in Donbas (7.8) and the South (8.0). The value of democracy was generally higher for ethnic Ukrainians compared to ethnic Russians (8.4 and 7.5 respectively); and lower for older age groups compared to younger and middle age groups.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

People's assessment of how democratically our country is governed today on a scale of 1 ("not at all democratic") to 10 ("completely democratic") is very low – 3.8 points, while Netherlands had 7.3, Germany – 7.2, Poland – 5.9, and Russia – 4.6.

Only 17% of respondents in Ukraine believe that there is a great deal or "a fair amount" of respect for human rights in the country, while in Germany this percentage is 86%, in Poland – 69%, Netherlands – 64%, Russia – 42%.

Most of those, who believe that Ukraine is governed democratically and that human rights are being respected, are in the Western region, least of them – in the East; as well as among ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking respondents.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY

Assessing the importance of different characteristics of democracy on a 10-point scale, Ukrainians (similar to residents of other countries) most often noted the following: "People choose their leaders in free elections", "Women have the same rights as men", "Civil rights protect people from state oppression" (in all compared countries these characteristics received over 8 points).

Ukrainians also gave high points to the importance of the following characteristics: "People receive state government benefits for unemployment" (7.7 points), "Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor" (7.5 points), "The state makes people's income equal" (7.2 points). In Russia, the latter characteristic received the same score (7.4 points), while in other countries this score is significantly smaller – from 5.1 points (Netherlands) to 5.6 points (Germany).

Far more Ukrainians, compared to citizens of Germany, Netherlands and Poland (but less than citizens of Russia), think that a situation when "The army takes over, when the government is incompetent" is an essential characteristic of democracy.

The characteristic "People obey their rulers" was more popular in Ukraine than in Russia; citizens of Netherlands and Poland assess this characteristic approximately at the same low level; citizens of Germany – even below that. Ukrainians think that "Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws" is the least essential characteristic of democracy.

Residents of the Western region attach less importance to such characteristics as "Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor" and "The army takes over, if the government is incompetent". Western and Central regions rated lower than other regions of Ukraine the characteristics "People receive state government benefits for unemployment" and "People obey their rulers".

ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

87% of Ukrainians believe that a democratic political system is "fairly good" or "very good" for their country (more – only among German citizens (94%), the least – among Russian citizens (67%).

Along with this, Ukraine, if compared to other countries, has the largest percentage (80%) of those, who believe that "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" is "fairly good" or "very good" for their country. The country that showed similar result was Russia (67%), while in other countries this number varied from 20% to 27%.

69% of Ukrainians view the system where "experts, not government make decisions according to what they think is best for the country" as "fairly good" or "very good", which is the second highest percentage after Poland – 75%).

12% of Ukrainians believe that a system, where "the army rule" is "fairly good" or "very good". This is lower than in Poland (19%) and Russia (14%), and higher than in Germany (4%) and Netherlands (2%).

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE

Overall, by placing their views on a scale of 1 ("left") to 10 ("right"), Ukrainians received an average score of 5.3 points, which is not very different from other countries (from 5.0 points in Germany to 5.6 points in Netherlands).

The Western region of Ukraine has shown more "right-wing" political views (average score – 6.3), Eastern – more "left-wing" (4.5 points). Ethnic Ukrainians are more "right-wing" in their political preferences (5.4 points), than ethnic Russians (4.7 points). Similar situation is with Ukrainian-speaking respondents (5.7 points) if compared to Russian-speaking (4.9 points) and bilingual citizens (4.8 points). Respondents from younger and middle age groups are more "right-wing" in their political views, than representatives of the oldest age group (60 y.o. and older).

[15] For more information, see: Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Values and Guidelines Aspect. – National Security and Defence, No.1-2, 2017, p.9-12, p.45-61.

[16] The survey in Germany was conducted in 2013 (with 2,046 respondents), in the Netherlands – in 2012 (with 1,902 respondents), in Poland – in 2012 (with 966 respondents), in Russia – in 2011 (2,500 respondents). Although surveys in these countries were conducted several years prior to the Razumkov Centre survey, our experts believe that it is possible and effective to compare results of surveys from these countries with results received in Ukraine in 2017, since the system of values is typically relatively stable and, as a rule, does not undergo dramatic changes in a period equal to several years. However, assessments of situation in society, which were also used in the comparison, are more dynamic. Here, we can expect significant dynamics of these assessments, foremost, in Ukraine.

Study results allow to claim that political "rightism" in Ukraine is positively correlated with positive ethnic stereotypes of Ukrainians, and political "leftism" – with negative ethnic stereotypes of Ukrainians.[17]

Thus, we observe a positive correlation on a "left-right views" scale, where Ukrainians receive such qualities as religiousness, patriotism, love for freedom, national pride, sincerity, peacefulness, diligence, honesty, hospitality, civic activism, as well as militancy (in the Ukrainian context, this feature has both negative and positive connotations).[18]

ATTITUDE TO ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL APPROACHES

Respondents were offered pairs of statements that characterise their political views. They had to use the 10-point scale to assess, with which of them they agree more.

Choosing between statements "Incomes should be made more equal" and "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort", Ukrainians are more likely to support the first one (practically the same, as Russians).

The first statement (though, to a lesser degree) was also more likely to be supported by Germans, while Poles and Dutchmen supported increasing the difference in income more often.

Ukrainians (similar to Poles and Russians) more often support an increase in the government ownership of business and industry.

Ukrainians (approximately the same as Russians), most often among citizens of the countries being compared, supported the point of view that "The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for".

Along with this, more Ukrainians support the idea that "Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas" (only Germans expressed more support for this idea).

Choosing between two statements "People can only get rich at the expense of others" and "Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone", more Ukrainians pick the latter option (more often than Russians, less often than Dutchmen and Poles, and almost the same as Germans).

Choosing between the statements "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" and "Hard work does not generally bring success – it is more a matter of luck and connections", Ukrainians are somewhat more likely to agree with the first one (roughly the same as residents of most other countries, except for Poland, the citizens of which are more likely to agree with the latter statement).

Among residents of different regions of Ukraine, residents of the Eastern region are more likely (than residents of the Western regions) to support the idea that "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased".

The statement "Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas" received the highest degree of support in the Western region and Donbas. The statement "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" received more support in the West, while statement "Hard work does not generally bring success – it is more a matter of luck and connections" was popular in the South and East of Ukraine.

Residents of the Western region more often, than residents of other regions, agree that "Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone" (as opposed to statement "People can only get rich at the expense of others").

Ethnic Russians, more often than ethnic Ukrainians, supported the following statements: "Incomes should be made more equal", "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased" and "The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for", "Competition is harmful", and "People can only get rich at the expense of others".

The younger the respondents, the more keen they are to support the idea that "Incomes should be made more equal", "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased", and that "Competition is good".

COUNTRY'S PRIORITIES AND AIMS

The respondents were asked to choose from lists of 10-year goals and aims that they think are important for their country.

Choosing between priorities such as "high level of economic growth", "strong defence forces", "making sure that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities", "trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful", Ukrainian citizens (just as citizens of other countries being compared) have prioritised the "high level of economic growth".

"High defence capacity" comes second (in all other countries it comes third).

Only 10% of Ukrainians have prioritised "making sure that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities" (in other countries – from 16% in Russia to 40% in Germany).

In comparison to other regions of Ukraine, residents of the Eastern region more often gave priority to the "high level of economic growth", and less often – to making sure the country has "strong defence forces".

Choosing between the aims such as "Maintaining order in the nation", "Giving people more say in important government decisions", "Fighting rising prices", "Protecting freedom of speech", Ukrainian citizens gave priority to "Maintaining order in the nation" (same as in Russia and Netherlands).

The German citizens chose the aim of "Giving people more say in important government decisions", and in Poland – "Fighting rising prices".

Ukrainian citizens place "Fighting rising prices" second (same as Russians), and "Giving people more say in important government decisions" – third, and "Protecting the freedom of speech" – last (same as residents of Russia and Poland).

Choosing between "A stable economy", "Progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society", "Progress towards a society in which ideas count more than money", "The fight against crime", most Ukrainians preferred to have a stable economy.

Similarly, the residents of all other countries give priority to a stable economy. In Ukraine, however, the share of those, who chose this option, is bigger in comparison to other countries. The aims "Progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society" and "Progress towards a society in which ideas count more than money" are less important to Ukrainians (same as in Poland and Russia). Inside Ukraine, residents of the Eastern region more often chose the option of ensuring stable economy (85%).

[17] We studied the connection between respondents' "left-right" self-identification and their value orientations (according to Sh. Schwartz's test scales).

[18] For more information, see: Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Values and Guidelines Aspect. – National Security and Defence, No.1-2, 2017, p.7.

Some Aspects of Civic and Political Participation of Ukrainian Citizens

Only a third of citizens believe that their personal participation is required in order to improve the situation in the country. 47% do not feel such a need; another 20% could not give an answer.

Participation in political processes was valued more by citizens in the West (43%), Ukrainian-speaking citizens, respondents with higher education (38% each), and better financial standing (48%).

The level of respondents' involvement in civic activity has been low. 8% participate in civic activity, while 84% answered this question negatively. The level of involvement is slightly higher among citizens with higher education and better financial status.

A study conducted in 2013 also showed that only 8% of citizens consider themselves involved in civic activity.

According to study results, the key motivation for possible activity back then was certain benefits for a citizen or his family – over 37% of respondents gave this answer. Potential assistance in removing the possible threat to life, health or well-being of a family and relatives as an incentive was named by approximately a third of respondents. Over a quarter (26%) of citizens noted that they are ready to participate in civic activity if it benefits the society.[19]

According to 2017 survey, **for those who are not involved in civic activity**, the main obstacle to their participation is the lack of free time (27%), lack of knowledge on how to reach their goal (11%), insufficient resources (9%), the threat of counteraction from government or management (7%), absence of associates (6%). 19% mention other reasons (no detail), 22% – do not know the reason.

There were practically no significant differences between regions and individual social groups.

Among citizens involved in civic activity, the hierarchy of reasons seen as an obstacle is practically the same, except the threat of counteraction from government, security forces, management, etc. – it is mentioned by 15% of those involved in civic activity vs. 7% of those not involved.

46% of citizens believe that when people have common goals and want to reach them, they should create a civil society organisation or join an existing one.

17% believe that it is better to act informally (without registration of their activity or creating an organisation), 4% – believe in individual action.

Along with this, readiness to unite with others forming NGOs to protect their rights and interests is expressed by a smaller part of respondents – 31%, while 50% are not ready for this (19% – could not give an answer). Also, citizens with higher level of education and financial standing expressed their readiness for this more often. In villages, the share of those not ready is 56%.

Overall, 11% of citizens took part in events organised by civil society organisations last year (89% – did not take part in any). People with higher level of education and financial standing did it somewhat more often.

Such a low level of participation is somewhat incongruent with the assessment of influence civil society organisations have in modern Ukrainian society – over half (52%) of respondents believe that civil society organisations have some influence, and 9% – that this influence is strong.

Different forms of conveying their opinions and interests to government agencies has not been used by Ukrainians.

Thus, the absolute majority (96%) of respondents have not turned to government agencies with proposals for improving the work of government system neither as part of associations, nor independently.

Similarly, 92% of citizens have never turned to a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (8% turned to them; citizens with higher level of education, financial standing, as well as older citizens – slightly more often). At the same time, 37% of respondents noted that they attended or personally observed events with participation of Verkhovna Rada deputies that took place in their city (village), 15% of them paid a visit during an MP's personal reception of citizens.

90% of respondents have never taken part in public hearings or citizens' councils at government agencies (10% took part in them, citizens with higher education – slightly more often).

81% of citizens have never taken part in the work of election commissions (18% – took part in their work, more often – residents of medium, small cities and urban-type localities (24%), as well as citizens with higher education (27%)).

82% of respondents have not participated in the work of trade unions in the past 15 years (18% took part in their work, more often – people with higher education (25%)).

75% did not turn to local state administrations for resolving their personal matters within the past year. Among those, who turned to them, equal shares (12% each) received and did not receive assistance. 34% of affluent citizens have turned to these institutions and 19% of them received the assistance.

Opinions were divided when answering the question on citizens' potential actions in case the Parliament considers an unfair bill.

Thus, 27% of respondents would resort to active action (trying to convince people about the unfairness of the authority's decision, appealing to authorities, joining a rally). 28% would not do anything; 22% do not care at all and do not follow the bills considered by the Verkhovna Rada; 23% – could not give an answer.

Thus, a little over a quarter of citizens expressed their readiness to actively assert their position in case they disagree with the parliament's decision, while others would adopt a passive stance.

Most people ready to take action were among citizens with higher education (33%); across different regions, the smallest share of those ready to act was in the South of Ukraine (20%).

As previously, citizens are mostly not ready to support the political party they like with their own money (89%). Only 11% expressed readiness to fund "their" political force. More respondents in the West (15%) and mostly with higher income (21%) were ready for this.

[19] The study was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre together with the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation on 17-22 May 2013. There were 2,010 respondents aged 18 y.o. and older, from all regions of Ukraine, with the sample representative of adult population of Ukraine by main socio-demographic indicators. Theoretical error of the sample does not exceed 2.3%, *http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=369.*

1.2. POLITICAL CULTURE OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS: SUMMARY ATTEMPT

Results of the sociological study conducted by the Razumkov Centre allowed to identify certain stable combinations of political culture – its types.[20]

The research of society's political culture has a long – more than half a century – tradition and its own methodology and instruments. The classical work that started this segment of political science is the work of G. Almond and S. Verba.[21] It shows how national political culture can evolve into a civic culture, thus creating a strong basis for a stable democracy.

In the Razumkov Centre's project, we used political culture classification by T. Denk and H. Christensen and the attitude to authority scale by J. Ray for analysis.

The first approach is the advanced development and modernisation of G. Almond's and S. Verba's methodology which, besides the civic type of political culture, also allows to identify other new types – stealth, critical and disenchanted. This is especially important in the age of the Internet, social networks, new forms and means of expression of civic and political activity. In this context, the current situation in Ukraine is not much different from other European countries, for which this methodology has been developed. Therefore, it will be even more interesting to look at Ukraine in comparison.

The second approach was developed in the early 1970s with the purpose of determining citizens' behavioral disposition to prefer political actions based on the principles of order and regulation. For Ukraine's current situation this is particularly relevant. On the one hand, the on-going war with Russia demands stronger regulation of social relations by the state, including the restriction of certain rights and freedoms.

On the other hand, after the Revolution of Dignity, the society strongly opposes any attempts to curtail democracy, and the overall level of trust in government and political institutions is very low. Under such conditions, it is important to understand, to which extent the existing political culture can prevent the country from slipping down to one side – either to the return of authoritarianism, even if in a "progressive, renewed form", or in the direction of destruction of government institutions, anarchy and ungovernability.

Classification on the Basis of Attitude to Politics and Interest in It

To create their classification, the Razumkov Centre's experts used methodology presented by T. Denk and H. Christensen in 2016 in their Article "How to Classify Political Cultures? A Comparison of Three Methods of Classification".[22] These authors used G. Almond's and S. Verba's concept as the basis. According to this concept, a nation's political culture is a distribution of patterns of orientation among its members: first, orientations towards the national political system, political and governance processes, and, second, orientations towards oneself as an active participant of civic life.[23]

T. Denk and H. Christensen identify two dimensions, each of them is meant to group political orientation into two categories: (1) the dimension of the attitude to political system and process; (2) the dimension of interest in politics in connection with the ability to understand it.

The first dimension is the combination of 11-point scales measuring the level of satisfaction with democracy and trust in Parliament, political parties and individual politicians, which identifies mainly positive and negative orientations towards the functioning of the democratic system and basic representative institutions.

The second dimension uses the traditional method of determining interest in politics by asking: "How interested are you in politics?" with answer options: "very interested", "more interested, than not", "not very interested" and "not at all interested", as well as two five-point scales that measure the ability to understand political process (question "How often do you feel that you cannot understand what goes on in Ukrainian politics?" and "How hard or easy is it for you to determine your own attitude to political issues?").

The "interest-understanding" dimension specifies how citizens view their own role in political life. They are also divided in two groups: those, who are not interested and/or do not understand political life, and those, who are interested and/or are able to understand it and form their own attitude.

Thus, the classical idea of G. Almond and S. Verba that democratic stability requires a positive attitude to politics and one's own active role in it, was used as the basis for identifying four types of political culture: civic, critical, disenchanted and stealth.

Bearers of the civic type of political culture demonstrate interest in political life and understanding of it, they are satisfied with the current state of democracy in Ukraine, and they maintain their trust in representative institutions.

As opposed to them, the disenchanted ones include citizens that are not satisfied with current democracy level; they have a typically low level of trust in representative institutions and low level of interest in politics. Also the representatives of the "disenchanted" type of political culture do not understand political processes and are unable to form their own attitude to political issues.

Representatives of the stealth type of political culture are satisfied with democracy and have trust in specific politicians, parties, and Parliament, however, along with this, they do not express any interest in politics and admit to not understanding it.

Citizens with critical political culture understand political processes and are interested in them, yet their level of trust in representative institutions and satisfaction with how democracy functions in Ukraine, are below average.

Some respondents were placed in borderline groups, as their scores on a certain scale were between two types of political cultures. For instance, citizens, whose type of political culture is between critical and disenchanted, are simultaneously characterised by the lack of trust in representative institutions and negative perception of how democracy functions, and a medium level of understanding of politics and interest in it.

Tables below show the distribution of respondents based on answers they gave to questions that are defining for classification.

[20] Study was conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre on 22-27 September 2017 in all regions of Ukraine with the exception of Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (total number of respondents – 2,008; age – from 18 y.o.; theoretical error of the sample – 2.3%).

[21] Almond G., Verba S. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. – Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, XI, 562 p.

[22] Denk T., Christensen H. How to classify political cultures? A comparison of three methods of classification. – Quality & Quantity, 2016, January , Vol.50, Issue 1, p.177-191.

[23] Almond G., Verba S. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. – Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989, p.13.

Political Culture Types by T. Denk and H. Christensen,
% of respondents



(*a*) did not get into any category (in the centre)
(*b*) on the border between critical and civic
(*c*) on the border between critical and disenchanted
(*d*) on the border between stealth and disenchanted
(*e*) on the border between civic and stealth

Regions (WEST)



(*a*) did not get into any category (in the centre)
(*b*) on the border between critical and civic
(*c*) on the border between critical and disenchanted
(*d*) on the border between stealth and disenchanted
(*e*) on the border between civic and stealth

Political Culture Types by T. Denk and H. Christensen,
% of respondents (*continued*)

Regions (CENTRE)



(*a*) did not get into any category (in the centre)
(*b*) on the border between critical and civic
(*c*) on the border between critical and disenchanted
(*d*) on the border between stealth and disenchanted
(*e*) on the border between civic and stealth

Regions (SOUTH)



(*a*) did not get into any category (in the centre)
(*b*) on the border between critical and civic
(*c*) on the border between critical and disenchanted
(*d*) on the border between stealth and disenchanted
(*e*) on the border between civic and stealth

Political Culture Types by T. Denk and H. Christensen,
% of respondents (*continued*)

Regions (EAST)



(*a*) did not get into any category (in the centre)
(*b*) on the border between critical and civic
(*c*) on the border between critical and disenchanted
(*d*) on the border between stealth and disenchanted
(*e*) on the border between civic and stealth

Thus, the largest share of respondents belong to the "disenchanted" type of political culture, second largest group – to "critical". Between these two groups is the largest of "borderline" groups.

The majority of Ukrainian citizens share a common characteristic – dissatisfaction with the level of democracy and lack of trust in representative institutions. Yet, one part of this group is not interested in politics and does not understand it, and another – is interested in politics and understands it.

Other types of political culture within this classification are typical for a small percentage of citizens.

Distribution of political culture types by macro-regions had no significant differences from the overall national distribution. However, there were some regional features.

In all regions, the majority of respondents belong to the disenchanted type of political culture.

Critical culture bearers were the second largest group in all regions.

In the West, the total percentage of civic and stealth culture representatives (13%) was higher than in other regions (their common characteristic being trust in political institutions).

East and South were characterised by the largest share of respondents in the undefined category (30% and 27%, respectively).

In distribution by age, the main features noted were the lower number of respondents from the youngest group and higher – from the oldest group among the "critical" culture bearers.[24]

Among representatives of the "disenchanted" culture, the number of representatives from 40-49 y.o. and 50-59 y.o. age groups was lower compared to the youngest and oldest groups.

Thus, today in Ukraine, prevail the types of political culture that are characterised by the lack of trust in politics and political institutions (61%).

At the same time, this situation is not unique in comparison with other European countries.

[24] Given the number of people in groups of different types of political culture, we analysed only the two largest groups.

Distribution of Political Culture Types in European Countries
(groups according to classification by T. Denk and H. Christensen)[25]

	Civic culture	Stealth culture	Critical culture	Disenchanted culture
Belgium	26.2	33.7	23.8	16.4
Bulgaria	4.5	5.3	47.1	43.2
United Kingdom	26.6	21.8	33.5	18.1
Greece	11.5	28.0	21.4	39.1
Denmark	69.2	20.0	8.8	1.9
Estonia	19.6	24.8	29.3	26.3
Ireland	20.6	18.7	37.1	23.6
Spain	19.2	48.1	13.8	18.9
Cyprus	44.1	35.1	12.3	8.5
Latvia	3.2	14.1	35.0	47.7
Netherlands	53.0	25.9	16.8	4.2
Germany	33.5	21.3	31.2	13.9
Norway	43.9	38.1	11.2	6.9
Poland	13.4	22.5	33.9	30.3
Portugal	9.3	27.5	23.1	40.1
Romania	17.3	20.1	30.2	32.4
Slovakia	21.2	30.6	25.9	22.3
Slovenia	21.5	26.8	32.5	19.2
Hungary	5.9	12.9	35.0	46.2
Finland	42.6	38.5	11.6	7.3
France	21.2	25.7	32.4	20.7
Croatia	9.0	20.5	25.7	44.8
Czech Republic	9.0	40.9	12.6	37.5
Switzerland	54.3	29.5	11.9	4.4
Sweden	49.2	29.1	14.9	6.8

As seen in the Table (above), among these countries, there are ones with numbers that are close to Ukraine. For example, the number of civic culture bearers in Latvia and Bulgaria is practically the same as in Ukraine, and in Hungary – not much higher than in Ukraine.

The nominal part of critical culture bearers is higher in Ukraine than in 16 out of 25 countries that have been analysed, and the nominal part of disenchanted culture bearers – in five countries. By the sum of critical and disenchanted culture bearers, the numbers of nine countries are nominally higher than Ukrainian – these include Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Hungary, Croatia.

At the same time, even these European countries (except Bulgaria) have a much higher total percentage of citizens with political culture types that imply trust in political institutions. This once again highlights the need to restore such trust among Ukrainian citizens.

"Attitude to Authority" Scale

The "attitude to authority" scale was developed at the end of 1960s - early 1970s by a group of scientists headed by J. Ray to identify specific features of a particular national political culture as regards citizens' preferences for general manifestations of power as a social phenomenon.[26] In contrast with other similar research instruments (such as the famous F-scale[27]), it is value-neutral, since it has no direct link to specific political actors or ideologies.

The attitude to authority scale is composed of three separately balanced parts, each of them can be used independently.[28] The general scale and each subscale group respondents in two categories,[29] along with which a third category is singled out that includes the undecided respondents.[30]

The first part of the attitude to authority scale (***"Leadership" subscale***) is meant to determine the

[25] Denk T., Christensen H., Bergh D. The Composition of Political Culture – A Study of 25 European Democracies. – Studies in Comparative International Development, 2015, September, Vol.50, Issue 3, p.370.

[26] Ray J. An "attitude to authority" scale. – Australian Psychologist, 1971, Vol.6, Issue 1, p.31-50. Ray J. Do Authoritarians Hold Authoritarian Attitudes? – Human Relations, 1976, Vol.29, No.4, p.307-325.

[27] F-scale (from the word "fascist") was developed after World War II by California school in order to measure the level of acceptance of authoritarian ideology (in connection specifically to far-right ideas); it did not allow to determine the presence of non-ideological predisposition towards authoritarian or subordinate behaviour. For more information, see: Titus H., Hollander E. The California F scale in psychological research: 1950-1955. – Psychological Bulletin, 1957, Vol.54, No.1, p.47-64.

[28] Ray J. An "attitude to authority" scale. – Australian Psychologist, 1971, Vol.6, Issue 1, p.36.

[29] All questions were formulated in the form of agreement/disagreement with certain statements and possible answer options: "completely disagree", "rather disagree", "hard to say, agree or disagree", "rather agree", "completely agree". Each normalised scale had values from 0 to 1. Respondents with high (>0.5) and low (<0.5) values on the scales were being compared.

[30] The "undecided" respondents (=0.5) were singled out into a separate group.

SCALES	TYPES		
LEADERSHIP SUBSCALE	Prefer leaders as executives (63.8%)	Undecided (12.8%)	Prefer leaders as directors (23.3%)
INSTUTIONS SUBSCALE	Oppose practices of execution of army-type authority (29.0%)	Undecided (7.2%)	Support practices of execution of army-type authority (63.7%)
REGULATION SUBSCALE	Support maximum freedom (55.0%)	Undecided (15.0%)	Support regulation and order (30.0%)

current vision of a leader. This subscale has eight questions and helps determine, whether respondents prefer leaders to be guides and directors, or they would prefer political leaders to be simple executives of society's demands, people's political will. By the attitude to leadership criterion, respondents were grouped into those mainly supporting the executive leader type, and those, who prefer leaders-directors.

The second subscale (***"Institutions" subscale***) is meant to determine the level of support for institutional practices of the use of authority in the state. This scale's special feature is that the content of some questions is related to the army as an institution, which represents strict regulation on the basis of strong authority (8 of 11 questions). Other three questions are about the general operation of the railway, school and public service organisations. The subscale is the basis for classifying respondents as supporters or opponents of institutional practices of the exercise of a strong army-type authority.

With the help of the third part of the scale (***"Regulation" subscale***), which is built on the classical measure of "freedom vs. regulation", respondents' attitude to punctuality, regulation and orders is determined. Namely, among the nine questions that make up this subscale, there are questions, whether it would be good to do without politics altogether, as well as whether people should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules. The third subscale allows to group respondents by reluctance to limit their freedom and support of order based on rules and regulation.

The general results by the scale showed a practically equal distribution:

- the share of citizens, who prefer leaders as executives, oppose execution of army-type authority, and support maximum freedom is 48%;
- the share of citizens, who prefer leaders as directors, support institutional practices of execution of army-type authority, regulations and order – 46%.

Comparing the three subscales between themselves, we see positive correlation between two of them – "leadership" and "regulation". Both are negatively correlated with the second subscale, and the "leadership" subscale – in a more pronounced way, than the "regulation" subscale.

It is quite possible that the "army" component of J. Ray's scale in the Ukrainian situation gave opposite results with regard to the other two scales due to special conditions – the actual state of war, in which Ukraine is currently living (in such conditions, army's authority in society grows). So, this component can be interpreted as such that primarily defines the attitude to executing strong authority only literally within the army or other security forces.

At the same time, a detailed analysis of results in the context of questions that make up this scale shows that respondents' understanding of it is broader. Namely, the need for strict discipline for schoolchildren is supported by 45% and not supported by 25%, trains running on time in Stalin's period of the Soviet regime is considered an achievement by 42% vs. 22%; 35% vs. 12% believe that there is a good reason for every rule in the work of public service institutions, organisations or enterprises, – these questions are not directly related to the army.

Among questions related to army principles there is no uniformity. For example, 39% of respondents believe that one should not obey an order if it is morally wrong, even in the army. The number of those, who are ready to support democracy-based liberalisation of army procedures is also relatively significant – 32%.

Within the "leadership" subscale, there is a noticeable prevalence of those, who prefer a consensus model of democracy. The majority (53%) of respondents tend to believe that a leader should give up the policy, if there is a disagreement about it in the community; a relative majority (48%) – that a leader should always change his actions to ensure agreement and harmony in the community.

With respect to the third subscale, respondents expressly showed their disagreement with other people deciding what they are to do, or advising them how to do it (60%); relative majority (48%) believe that in the future people will be less likely to conform, than today.

Possibly, the tilt towards freedom on this scale would have been stronger, had it not been for the punctuality measure, which is an indicator of commitment to order. In our opinion, this indicator – almost three quarters of respondents believe that punctuality is important (72%) – in Ukrainian conditions can be interpreted as such that is not in conflict with Ukrainian citizens' overall support of democratic principles.

"LEADERSHIP" SUBSCALE	SUPPORTERS OF LEADERS-EXECUTIVES (%)	UNDECIDED (%)	SUPPORTERS OF LEADERS-DIRECTORS (%)
1. If there is disagreement about a policy in society, a political leader should be willing to give up its implementation	a leader should give up policy implementation (53.3)	(32.1)	a leader should not give up policy implementation (14.6)
2. A leader should always change his actions to ensure agreement and harmony in the community	a leader should always adjust the political course (48.3)	(30.7)	a leader should not always adjust the political course (21.0)
3. It is important for a leader to get things done even if he displeases people by doing them	a leader should give up what he started (27.3)	(6.5)	a leader should not give up what he started (36.2)
4. A political leader should follow the wishes of the community, even if he thinks the citizens are mistaken	a leader should follow any wishes of the community (36.9)	(41.4)	a leader should not follow any wishes of the community (21.7)
5. If a leader is himself sure of what is the best thing to do, he must try to do this, even though he has to use some pressure on the people	it is unacceptable for a political leader to use pressure on people (28.4)	(9.4)	a leader, who is sure of the best thing to do, can exert certain pressure on the people (32.2)
6. It is all right for a leader to do something unauthorised, if he is sure it will be for the good of the people in the long run	doing something unauthorised is unacceptable for a political leader (32.2)	(31.6)	a leader can do something unauthorised, if it will do good in the long run (36.1)
7. It is most important to have the participation of everybody in making decisions, regardless of their knowledge of the issues involved	participation of everybody in making decisions must be ensured, regardless of their knowledge (48.1)	(27.2)	participation of everybody in making decisions, regardless of their knowledge, is unnecessary (24.7)
8. It is always better to try to talk people into doing things, rather than give them straight out orders	a leader should convince people (69.7)	(20.9)	a leader should give people straight orders (9.4)
"INSTITUTIONS" SUBSCALE	**OPPONENTS OF ARMY-TYPE PRACTICES OF EXECUTING AUTHORITY (%)**	**UNDECIDED (%)**	**SUPPORTERS OF ARMY-TYPE PRACTICES OF EXECUTING AUTHORITY (%)**
9. There's generally a good reason for every rule and regulation in the work of public service institutions, organisations and enterprises	there are no good reasons for every rule (12.3)	(52.8)	there are good reasons for every rule (34.9)
10. In the army, soldiers should not obey an order if it is obviously morally wrong	an order that is morally wrong should not be obeyed (38.8)	(35.2)	all orders should be obeyed in the army (26.0)
11. If the army allowed more room for individuality it might be a better institution	the army needs more room for individuality (32.1)	(37.2)	the army does not need more room for individuality (30.7)
12. There is something wrong with anybody who likes to wear military uniform	it is wrong to like to wear military uniform (14.6)	(32.3)	to like wearing military uniform is normal (53.1)
13. When Stalin made trains run on time, that was an important achievement	trains running on time in Stalin's times cannot be seen as a major achievement (21.5)	(36.9)	trains running on time in Stalin's times was an achievement (41.6)
14. Years in the army would do everyone the world of good	years in the army are not useful for everyone (23.1)	(28.3)	years in the army are useful for everyone (48.6)
15. The army is very good for straightening men out and smartening them up	army experience does not improve personal qualities of young men (20.0)	(25.7)	army experience has positive influence on personal qualities of young men (54.3)
16. Civilians could learn a lot from the army	civilians have nothing to learn from the army (20.3)	(30.8)	army has qualities that civilians could learn from (48.9)
17. I disagree with what the army stands for	disagreement with army principles (21.9)	(44.9)	agreement with army principles (33.2)
18. You can be sure that army procedures will be good, because they have been tried and tested	army rules do not have particularly high qualities (20.6)	(37.8)	army rules have an advantage of being tried and tested (41.7)
19. Schoolchildren should have plenty of discipline	schoolchildren do not need plenty of discipline (25.3)	(30.2)	schoolchildren need plenty of discipline (44.5)

"REGULATION" SUBSCALE	SUPPORTERS OF UNREGULATED FREEDOM (%)	UNDECIDED (%)	SUPPORTERS OF ORDER (%)
20. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules	feelings should be the dominant motive for behaviour (24.8)	(35.9)	rules should be the dominant motive for behaviour (39.3)
21. People should be made to be punctual	punctuality is not compulsory (7.4)	(20.3)	punctuality is important (72.3)
22. Efficiency and speed are not as important as letting everyone have their say in making decisions	getting everyone a chance to speak is more important than speed and efficiency of decisions (41.3)	(41.5)	efficiency and speed are more important than listening to all opinions (17.2)
23. There is far too much regimentation of people nowadays	life is overly regulated (42.6)	(36.8)	life is not overly regulated (20.6)
24. You know where you are going when you have a clear order to obey	a clear order is not compulsory for knowing where you are going (46.7)	(29.8)	a clear order is important for knowing where you are going (23.6)
25. In the future, people should not be expected to conform as much as they are today	people will not conform as much, as they do today (48.3)	(36.3)	in the future, people will tend to conform as much, as they do today (15.4)
26. People who say we do not have enough freedom here in our country, do not know what they are talking about	we do not have enough freedom in our country (27.5)	(38.7)	we have enough freedom in our country (33.8)
27. I do not mind if other people decide what I am to do, or advise me how to do it	I will decide what I am to do on my own (60.3)	(27.3)	I do not mind if other people decide what I am to do (12.4)
28. It would be much better if we could do without politics altogether	it would be much better if we could do without politics (35.2)	(36.7)	politics is an important common cause and we cannot do without it (28.1)

ATTITUDES	AGE CATEGORIES				
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	59-50 y.o.	60 y.o. and older
Tend to believe that army rules have an advantage of being tried and tested	36.1	34.7	44.7	42.3	48.7
Tend to believe that army as an institution has qualities that civilians could learn from	42.7	41.8	51.5	50.8	56.0
Tend to believe that years in the army are useful for everyone	42.0	45.4	47.4	50.8	55.5
Tend to believe that schoolchildren need plenty of discipline	39.6	40.7	43.7	45.9	50.8

Curiously, between citizens grouped by age, there were almost no differences in all questions on the "leadership" and "regulation" scales.

At the same time, there is a difference in the attitude to some questions on the second subscale between the respondents aged 60 and older (whose socialisation happened during the USSR times) and 18-29 y.o. and 30-39 y.o. respondents (born in the period of Ukraine's independence or living in this period most of their life).

Almost half (49%) of representatives from the age group 60 and older support the statement that army rules are valuable and validated, while among young people, this idea is supported by 36%.

By the parameter of army having qualities that civilians could learn from, the share of respondents aged 60 and older reached the majority (56%), while among younger age groups, it was 43%.

The question about the general usefulness of army experience for everyone was positively answered by the absolute majority (56%) of the older age group and 42% of younger respondents.

In general, the analysis according to J. Ray's attitude to authority scale demonstrated that Ukrainian citizens' political culture contains a combination of the desire for personal freedom, the demand for leaders that would be accountable to society, and an understanding of the importance of adhering to certain institutional norms, especially amid the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

The level of people's interest in politics and their knowledge of the main topics of political system organisation is low. Most citizens admit to having trouble understanding political processes and determining their own attitude to political issues. Along with this, general public believes that one should take an interest in politics, which allows to infer the presence of high social demand for accessible information on political processes. The low level of political competence is more typical for youngest respondents, a possible reason for which is insufficient provision of information about political organisation by the school system.

Most citizens understand the need for the functioning of Parliament – the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; know the principles of its formation and its main functions. At the same time, the level of trust in the current Verkhovna Rada and institutions that play an important role in its formation and operation – political parties – is very low. Citizens have a critical attitude to the work of parliamentary political parties, for which they voted in elections, as well as the MPs elected in single-mandate districts.

Citizens combine a critical attitude to the Parliament with a rather high level of interest in its work, namely, in the information that has practical use for them – formation of state budget, work of MPs in constituencies and the vision of priorities in politics of different political forces.

Along with this, most of the information citizens get from media covers the negative aspects of Verkhovna Rada's work – corruption of MPs, inefficiency, etc. Official sources that provide information on the work of the Verkhovna Rada have very low level of popularity with the public. The overwhelming majority of citizens do not know about NGOs, movements, projects funded by international donors that focus their work on the Verkhovna Rada.

Citizens' attitude to institutions meant to represent their interests in socio-political processes is mostly negative. Relatively more citizens accept political parties and civil society organisations as such representatives. The level of trust in political parties and assessment of their work are critically low. The overwhelming majority of respondents are not ready to support financially the political force with political views similar to theirs.

Almost half of citizens do not see a political force they could trust with governance and political leaders that could effectively manage the country.

Citizens' perception of electoral systems rather clearly shows the desire for personification of choice, and maintaining direct connection between voters and MPs. Proportional system with open party lists has slightly more supporters among all other types of parliamentary election systems. Citizens demonstrated more negative views about the "sale of votes" in elections, which is a sign of growing awareness of their own role and responsibility in the election process.

Most citizens believe that democracy is the best type of social system for Ukraine, and this number has a strong tendency to grow exceeding the corresponding indicators in the neighbouring EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Commitment to democracy is correlated with such factors as the respondents' age, language of communication, education and financial status. At the same time, citizens have expressed an average level of satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine (4 points on the scale of 0 to 10).

Most citizens highly assess the freedom of expression of political views in the country. However, this is less so for the residents in the East of Ukraine and Russian-speaking citizens.

Parliamentary-presidential model is chosen as the best form of government for Ukraine at the moment by the relative majority. People's support for this model has notably grown in the past 10 years. Parliamentary and presidential republic options, as well as dictatorship have the support of a small percentage of citizens. At the same time, a large part of respondents could not make their choice.

The vast majority of respondents acknowledge that Ukraine's economic and political sectors are divided by the spheres of influence between different interest groups, and consider this a negative phenomenon.

Most respondents would not want a return to the USSR-type of order, although a quarter – would want this. Support for this type of order was more pronounced among citizens in older age groups, with lower level of education, lower financial status, Russian-speaking citizens, residents of the East and South of the country.

Only a third of citizens believe that their personal participation is required in order to improve the situation in the country. Despite the fact that the relative majority of respondents understand that to reach common goals citizens have to come together forming civil society organisations, readiness for this is expressed by significantly less respondents, and only each ninth citizen took part in the events of such organisations in the past year.

The majority of citizens are not involved in civic activity. Also, the majority of respondents did not use any forms of conveying their opinions and interests to government agencies. Similarly, most citizens would not take any action if Parliament was adopting an unjust (in their opinion) bill.

Thus, Ukrainian citizens' political culture is characterised by controversies, where the low level of knowledge is combined with interest in politics; low level of trust in political institutions and dissatisfaction with them – with a rather high level of support for democracy and parliamentary-presidential republic; as well as the unwillingness to take an active civic stand, and use options available to represent own interests in government bodies.

Main differences in different aspects of political culture are associated with age, level of education, financial standing, and in some cases – region of residence and language of communication.

An attempt to determine types of political culture of Ukrainian citizens using T. Denk's and H. Christensen's approach demonstrated the prevalence of the two types with a common characteristic of negative orientations towards operation of Ukraine's government institutions – the "disenchanted and "critical" types (61%). That said, percentage of "disenchanted" culture bearers, whose negative attitude is complimented by the lack of interest in politics is 40%, and the percentage of "critical" culture bearers, who express interest in politics, is 21%.

The positively-predisposed political culture types – "civic" and "stealth" – include only 8% of Ukrainian citizens. This distribution with small variations is typical for all macro-regions of Ukraine.

Compared to other European countries by distribution of political culture types, Ukraine is significantly different, for instance, from Switzerland or Netherlands, where the percentage of just civic culture bearers is over 50% of citizens, however, has a lot of similarities with such countries as Bulgaria, Latvia, and Hungary.

An analysis according to J. Ray's attitude to authority scale demonstrated that, in Ukraine, 48% of citizens prefer leaders as executives of public will and at the same time oppose army-type execution of authority and support maximum freedom. Yet, not very different is the share of citizens, who prefer leaders as directors, support institutional practices of execution of army-type authority, regulations and order – 46%.

This shows that Ukrainian citizens' political culture contains a combination of the desire for personal freedom, the demand for leaders that would be accountable to society, and an understanding of the importance of adhering to certain institutional norms, especially amid the on-going aggression against Ukraine.

Does Ukraine need a Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada)?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	63.2	63.2	64.3	62.5	61.3	56.5	62.6	67.8
No	19.3	19.3	20.9	19.5	21.8	24.1	20.3	17.2
Hard to say	17.5	17.5	14.7	18.0	16.9	19.4	17.1	15.0

	CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	64.1	63.4	67.4	61.4	68.2	51.3
No	18.4	22.1	14.1	21.5	20.1	27.9
Hard to say	17.5	14.4	18.5	17.1	11.7	20.8

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is foremost…?
% of respondents

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
…the only legislative body in Ukraine, its Parliament	35.7	28.7	30.7	31.6	30.9	33.5	32.2	28.3	31.5
…a political club of influential people and their representatives	23.8	28.6	27.4	29.9	26.7	25.6	28.3	32.8	26.1
…a mechanism, via which Ukrainian citizens influence political decision-making through their representatives	20.4	15.1	12.9	16.4	14.6	16.1	17.7	16.6	17.1
…all acting deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine gathered in one chamber	14.0	18.9	14.9	13.8	18.2	16.9	13.9	13.6	16.5
Hard to say	6.0	8.7	14.1	8.3	9.7	7.9	8.0	8.7	8.8

	EDUCATION			CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
…the only legislative body in Ukraine, its Parliament	31.6	30.0	32.8	26.7	29.1	34.2	36.4	31.8	23.6
…a political club of influential people and their representatives	26.8	29.0	26.8	29.6	30.4	20.7	25.0	26.0	34.7
…a mechanism, via which Ukrainian citizens influence political decision-making through their representatives	14.2	16.3	18.4	18.6	17.7	22.8	14.4	11.7	16.0
…all acting deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine gathered in one chamber	16.1	16.9	14.7	17.3	14.7	15.8	15.0	24.0	13.8
Hard to say	11.3	7.8	7.4	7.9	8.0	6.5	9.2	6.5	12.0

According to legislation, in what way (how) do deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine come to power?
% of respondents



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	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine come to power through voting of constituents	81.7	65.8	47.3	63.4	64.4	67.7	69.4	66.8	65.6
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are delegated by local state administrations	2.8	8.6	10.5	9.1	9.7	7.1	6.5	8.1	7.0
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are proposed by the Government	3.4	6.4	8.4	7.7	5.7	7.4	5.9	6.9	5.8
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are appointed by the President	3.8	2.3	2.5	3.8	3.1	3.2	2.1	3.6	3.4
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine come to power through the support of other states	0.6	3.0	1.7	5.1	2.4	3.2	3.2	1.5	3.6
Hard to say	7.7	13.8	29.7	10.9	14.9	11.4	12.9	13.2	14.7

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine come to power through voting of constituents	63.1	64.7	71.7	62.3	68.8	70.1
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are delegated by local state administrations	7.7	6.2	9.2	8.5	7.9	6.3
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are proposed by the Government	6.0	8.5	4.1	7.7	5.7	5.1
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are appointed by the President	3.8	2.7	2.9	3.4	3.9	2.1
Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine come to power through the support of other states	2.6	3.5	2.3	4.1	2.4	1.7
Hard to say	16.8	14.5	9.7	14.0	11.3	14.7

In the early 2014, the 2006-2010 Constitution of Ukraine was reinstated.
Are you aware, which specific provisions of the 2006 Constitution were reinstated in early 2014?
% of respondents



2017



	AGE				
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over
Yes	22.9	32.2	32.7	30.6	28.2
No	62.5	51.7	52.5	53.5	56.6
Hard to say	14.6	16.1	14.7	15.9	15.2

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	23.2	29.3	33.3	26.7	34.6	27.4
No	59.8	56.7	51.2	55.9	51.7	58.8
Hard to say	17.0	14.0	15.4	17.5	13.7	13.8

According to constitutional changes in early 2014, who received more powers, the President or the Verkhovna Rada?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
President	21.0	25.9	32.1	27.9	30.6	25.0	24.9	32.5
Verkhovna Rada	40.0	39.3	37.9	39.0	36.8	36.5	39.2	39.6
Hard to say	39.0	34.8	30.0	33.0	32.6	38.5	35.9	27.9

Which of the following tasks is entrusted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine according to the Constitution?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Approve the composition of the Government	36.4	35.7	48.5	29.4	31.9	36.2	38.9	35.8	36.2
Steer executive power bodies	21.9	17.3	10.9	14.0	17.5	17.2	15.6	16.4	16.7
Appoint heads of local administrations	4.7	7.8	3.3	8.3	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.4	9.0
Appoint judges	10.2	5.9	3.3	5.3	7.1	5.3	5.9	7.2	6.6
Appoint ambassadors to other states	2.8	1.8	0.8	2.5	2.4	1.6	3.5	1.5	1.9
Hard to say	24.0	31.5	33.1	40.6	35.2	33.6	30.1	33.7	29.6

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Approve the composition of the Government	32.1	33.4	41.5	44.4	33.2	27.4
Steer executive power bodies	17.3	16.3	16.8	15.2	15.4	19.7
Appoint heads of local administrations	8.0	7.1	5.1	6.4	6.5	7.2
Appoint judges	5.7	6.5	6.9	4.7	5.4	9.3
Appoint ambassadors to other states	2.2	1.8	2.4	2.5	1.3	2.3
Hard to say	34.7	34.9	27.4	26.8	38.2	34.1

Does Ukraine have political leaders that could effectively manage the state?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	37.4	34.9	35.0	40.2	46.5	42.0	38.6	38.2
No	47.3	46.6	48.5	43.8	42.2	44.2	47.2	44.4
Hard to say	15.4	18.5	16.5	15.9	11.3	13.7	14.1	17.4

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			GENDER	
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Male	Female
Yes	41.6	37.5	35.9	38.5	40.1
No	44.3	48.1	45.7	46.6	44.5
Hard to say	14.2	14.4	18.4	14.8	15.4

Would you like for the USSR-type of order to be reinstated now?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Yes	9.9	16.9	22.1	30.0	41.5	30.8	25.7	19.4	20.1	31.2	29.9
No	74.8	67.3	61.5	55.0	44.7	50.9	60.5	66.5	68.4	48.0	51.9
Hard to say	15.3	15.8	16.5	15.0	13.9	18.2	13.9	14.1	11.5	20.9	18.2

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			GENDER		FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Cities	Towns	Villages	Male	Female	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	25.8	27.4	22.0	21.7	27.5	43.5	24.9	15.7	16.9
No	57.9	57.6	64.2	63.6	56.9	42.0	58.0	70.7	74.7
Hard to say	16.3	15.0	13.8	14.7	15.6	14.6	17.1	13.7	8.4

Do you know which government institution is the main state budget funds manager on the national level?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	43.2	49.5	52.2	52.1	47.7	40.8	47.6	55.9	46.0	53.9	47.3
No	56.4	50.0	47.8	46.7	52.0	58.9	52.0	43.4	53.7	45.2	52.3
No answer	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.9	0.5

Do you know, which of the following government institutions is the main state budget funds manager on the national level?
% of those, who answered that they know, who the manager is



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	33.3	39.4	33.7	35.2	38.3	35.1	36.7	35.8	35.6
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	34.6	34.3	26.7	18.8	30.1	26.1	31.1	31.8	29.2
National Bank of Ukraine	6.8	8.8	17.8	22.8	11.5	20.2	13.6	12.1	8.7
President of Ukraine	7.7	9.3	10.9	17.6	10.9	9.6	11.3	8.7	14.2
Parliamentary Committee on Financial Policy and Banking	9.0	4.9	9.9	1.6	7.1	3.7	3.4	7.5	5.9
Accounting Chamber	5.6	1.5	0.0	3.6	1.6	2.7	2.8	2.3	4.3
Antimonopoly Committee	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.4
Hard to say	2.6	1.5	1.0	0.4	0.5	2.7	1.1	1.2	1.6

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	37.8	32.1	39.6	37.1	29.6	41.6
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	27.5	31.0	29.6	33.1	26.1	28.6
National Bank of Ukraine	12.6	15.6	10.3	8.9	19.9	10.8
President of Ukraine	9.5	12.4	11.1	12.5	14.8	6.3
Parliamentary Committee on Financial Policy and Banking	7.2	5.1	5.3	5.7	4.8	6.3
Accounting Chamber	3.6	2.2	2.9	1.1	3.8	4.1
Antimonopoly Committee	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0
Hard to say	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.4	0.7	2.2

It is often said that Ukrainian economy and politics are divided into spheres of influence between interest groups named "oligarch groups" by the media. With which answer do you agree most?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Division of spheres of influence between interest groups does exist in Ukraine and this is a negative phenomenon	80.6	72.5	62.5	78.9	68.9	74.4	75.2	79.0	77.1
Division of spheres of influence between interest groups in Ukraine exists and this is a normal phenomenon	7.4	10.6	12.1	8.9	10.6	10.3	11.2	9.9	6.9
Such phenomenon as division of spheres of influence in economy and politics between interest groups does not exist in Ukraine	3.0	2.2	7.5	2.8	2.8	4.0	3.5	2.1	3.6
Hard to say	8.9	14.7	17.9	9.4	17.7	11.3	10.0	9.0	12.4

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Division of spheres of influence between interest groups does exist in Ukraine and this is a negative phenomenon	74.8	74.7	75.1	74.3	77.2	73.5	77.9	74.3	74.7	68.7
Division of spheres of influence between interest groups in Ukraine exists and this is a normal phenomenon	7.8	9.8	10.7	10.6	9.3	8.7	5.5	10.0	10.6	15.7
Such phenomenon as division of spheres of influence in economy and politics between interest groups does not exist in Ukraine	2.2	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.5	3.0	1.5	3.1	4.6	3.6
Hard to say	15.1	11.8	10.4	11.8	10.0	14.7	15.1	12.6	10.2	12.0

Do general secondary schools provide young citizens with enough knowledge on the political system for them to effectively protect their constitutional rights and freedoms?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	11.9	6.6	5.0	2.3	7.5	6.1	7.4	6.3	5.8	6.6	6.2	7.1
Rather yes	14.0	21.0	14.2	6.4	16.2	15.6	13.8	14.7	13.3	17.5	14.5	12.6
Rather no	35.5	34.6	37.5	36.2	36.5	37.4	38.2	30.3	35.2	30.8	34.5	40.6
No	31.9	25.3	25.0	45.7	33.2	32.6	31.2	35.1	29.9	29.9	33.4	32.6
Hard to say	6.6	12.5	18.3	9.4	6.6	8.2	9.4	13.5	15.8	15.1	11.4	7.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	7.7	5.2	5.3	5.4	6.3	8.1	7.0	7.7	5.5	5.6	6.5	5.3
Rather yes	17.3	8.8	14.9	11.5	15.0	18.4	16.6	19.1	11.5	10.6	16.9	16.8
Rather no	35.4	32.9	38.2	34.8	38.6	34.0	36.0	28.8	41.5	39.5	35.1	30.5
No	29.3	41.3	29.6	37.4	30.4	27.4	30.3	33.8	34.4	30.0	35.1	38.1
Hard to say	10.2	11.8	12.0	11.0	9.6	12.0	10.0	10.7	7.1	14.3	6.5	9.3

Which of the following functions of parliament are the most valuable for the society?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over
Development and adoption of laws	61.4	54.5	59.6	49.2	55.0	58.2	56.8	52.9	54.1
Expression of voters' interests	38.5	31.2	42.9	44.3	36.8	36.4	36.3	40.4	38.8
Approval of state budget	43.4	38.2	37.1	32.1	38.3	35.1	37.1	38.1	39.0
Supervision of Government's actions	35.7	35.1	37.5	31.3	30.3	33.5	40.6	39.0	32.1
Formation of Government	29.1	29.8	20.8	19.1	24.8	25.3	22.9	27.0	27.6
Selection of new political leaders	7.4	10.7	10.8	8.7	11.3	9.5	8.5	7.8	9.2
Parliament is a communication platform for peaceful resolution of conflicts between political elites	8.5	9.6	13.3	6.4	9.0	9.2	8.6	8.4	9.6
Existence of parliament ensures legitimacy of political system	8.1	8.0	13.3	5.8	9.4	9.3	7.6	6.9	7.3
Hard to say	5.1	7.6	10.8	9.8	8.7	7.7	7.9	7.2	8.1

	EDUCATION			CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Development and adoption of laws	54.5	54.2	57.4	58.5	54.0	61.7	55.0	51.3	47.3
Expression of voters' interests	36.4	37.2	39.6	38.9	39.6	43.2	36.6	36.4	31.0
Approval of state budget	33.8	38.6	39.6	42.5	36.5	45.9	38.0	31.8	28.3
Supervision of Government's actions	32.2	36.7	34.2	37.0	33.4	38.3	33.7	31.2	32.9
Formation of Government	26.5	24.1	26.8	32.3	25.5	25.7	24.4	21.4	18.7
Selection of new political leaders	8.6	9.4	10.0	11.8	11.0	4.9	6.7	11.0	10.2
Parliament is a communication platform for peaceful resolution of conflicts between political elites	8.8	9.9	8.1	10.9	8.1	9.2	7.7	8.4	11.1
Existence of parliament ensures legitimacy of political system	7.1	9.1	7.6	6.8	6.4	8.2	9.0	11.7	8.8
Hard to say	10.8	7.9	5.6	4.3	6.0	6.0	8.6	11.0	14.2

* Respondents were asked to choose up to three acceptable options.

How interested are you in politics?
% of respondents



REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Very interested	2.8	2.4	2.6	9.6	7.3	4.0	3.2	7.9
Rather interested	21.5	30.7	33.2	32.4	43.0	31.1	32.2	34.8
Not very interested	43.9	51.1	46.5	42.0	35.5	44.1	46.1	38.8
Not at all interested	29.2	14.6	15.6	13.5	12.4	18.6	16.7	16.4
Hard to say	2.6	1.3	2.1	2.4	1.7	2.2	1.8	2.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Very interested	5.0	6.7	3.6	6.0	4.8	4.2	7.8	4.0	4.9	3.7
Rather interested	34.4	33.7	27.3	31.8	37.0	30.5	33.2	33.3	31.7	40.2
Not very interested	41.0	41.9	49.3	42.7	44.5	42.3	43.5	44.5	41.7	36.6
Not at all interested	17.2	16.8	17.6	17.9	12.8	19.8	13.1	16.9	20.1	14.6
Hard to say	2.4	0.9	2.2	1.6	0.9	3.2	2.5	1.4	1.7	4.9

	GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Very interested	5.7	4.5	7.1	5.0	2.2	4.7	1.9	5.3
Rather interested	37.1	29.1	37.0	31.9	36.1	29.4	37.7	28.3
Not very interested	40.1	45.4	41.5	40.9	46.4	44.3	43.5	42.0
Not at all interested	15.5	18.6	12.8	19.8	13.7	19.6	14.9	21.7
Hard to say	1.5	2.4	1.7	2.3	1.6	2.0	1.9	2.7

How often do you feel that you cannot understand, what is going on in Ukrainian politics?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
This never happens	3.4	3.9	1.7	4.7	3.8	4.0	3.8	2.1	4.7	3.3	3.5	4.6
Seldom	13.9	13.4	13.8	14.0	10.4	11.6	13.8	14.5	17.1	13.3	14.1	13.4
From time to time	34.8	38.5	39.2	31.1	31.6	40.1	40.0	36.1	33.0	33.6	36.9	36.2
Often	30.5	28.3	27.5	29.8	32.8	28.5	28.5	26.5	28.5	29.6	28.1	30.0
Very often	14.3	13.4	9.2	15.3	15.1	11.6	10.3	16.9	13.9	15.9	13.8	11.2
Hard to say	3.2	2.5	8.8	5.1	6.4	4.2	3.5	3.9	2.8	4.2	3.6	4.6

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
This never happens	3.2	4.9	4.0	4.1	4.8	2.4	3.3	3.2	4.9	4.9
Seldom	13.7	15.7	11.8	12.7	14.4	14.1	11.8	14.0	14.9	9.8
From time to time	35.3	29.7	42.7	35.7	36.7	35.1	34.8	39.6	32.2	30.5
Often	29.5	30.5	26.7	30.3	30.0	27.0	30.3	27.3	30.3	32.9
Very often	14.6	13.8	11.1	12.7	10.0	17.6	17.8	11.4	13.5	13.4
Hard to say	3.6	5.4	3.8	4.4	4.1	3.8	2.0	4.5	4.2	8.5

How hard or easy is it for you to determine your own attitude to political issues?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Very hard	7.0	9.4	7.9	6.6	10.2	7.1	7.3	8.4	6.9	8.4	8.1	7.5
Hard	17.7	21.6	17.2	24.0	19.6	21.1	16.1	21.0	24.2	27.6	19.7	16.5
At times hard, at times easy	51.1	44.5	46.4	36.6	42.8	42.7	53.1	42.0	41.8	39.7	46.7	45.0
Easy	14.3	15.0	12.1	17.9	12.3	17.4	13.5	17.1	16.1	12.4	13.8	19.1
Very easy	4.0	1.8	1.3	4.2	2.8	3.2	2.1	4.2	2.4	2.4	2.8	3.4
Hard to say	6.0	7.7	15.1	10.8	12.3	8.4	7.9	7.2	8.4	9.5	8.8	8.5

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Very hard	8.6	7.8	6.4	6.6	7.6	9.9	8.8	7.3	8.4	6.1
Hard	22.2	20.3	18.0	18.2	22.8	22.1	25.9	18.9	20.4	19.5
At times hard, at times easy	45.9	35.8	48.6	41.0	45.8	46.6	39.9	48.8	41.9	39.0
Easy	12.8	20.7	15.7	20.3	12.1	11.7	12.6	14.2	18.4	14.6
Very easy	2.5	4.5	2.4	4.7	0.7	2.6	2.8	2.0	3.5	6.1
Hard to say	8.0	11.0	8.9	9.2	10.9	7.1	10.1	8.9	7.4	14.6

How happy are you in general with the way democracy functions in Ukraine?*
average score



* On the 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means "completely unhappy", and "10" – "completely happy".

2017

To what extent do you trust politicians, political parties, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?*
average score



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Verkhovna Rada	2.7	2.1	1.9	1.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1
Political parties	2.5	2.0	1.8	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.9	2.1
Politicians	2.6	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Verkhovna Rada	2.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.8	2.2	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.5
Political parties	2.2	1.9	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.4
Politicians	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.8	2.1	1.6	2.1	2.2	2.6

* On the 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means you do not trust them at all, and "10" – trust them completely.

Should people be interested in politics?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	31.5	24.6	16.6	24.9	22.4	26.9	23.2	27.9	26.3	21.7	24.9	28.8
Rather yes	44.7	48.5	41.5	47.1	42.0	43.3	49.4	47.4	49.6	46.5	47.5	45.3
Rather no	11.5	8.6	16.6	12.1	14.6	10.8	12.6	8.1	9.4	10.8	11.4	11.0
No	4.7	5.5	2.5	6.8	6.6	4.7	4.1	5.7	5.3	4.9	5.3	5.3
Hard to say	7.7	12.8	22.8	9.2	14.4	14.2	10.6	10.8	9.4	16.1	10.9	9.6

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	28.5	22.2	20.7	25.8	25.6	24.5	27.1	23.9	30.1	29.2	28.3	20.7	24.0	19.0
Rather yes	46.7	44.9	47.6	46.6	46.5	46.2	45.2	47.5	49.1	41.3	45.1	47.4	54.5	42.5
Rather no	11.1	13.0	9.3	11.5	7.6	13.7	10.8	11.4	7.5	14.8	14.1	11.4	7.1	11.9
No	4.4	7.1	5.3	5.5	5.2	5.1	5.7	4.9	4.5	7.0	3.3	6.7	2.6	6.2
Hard to say	9.3	12.7	17.1	10.7	15.2	10.5	11.2	12.3	8.8	7.7	9.2	13.9	11.7	20.4

Among the existing political parties and movements in Ukraine, are there such that could be trusted to govern the state?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Yes	28.8	28.5	32.7	33.3	40.0	34.4	33.0	32.3	34.3	34.3	29.2
No	49.5	52.2	50.4	49.8	44.5	47.7	49.7	48.9	48.2	48.5	50.8
Hard to say	21.7	19.3	16.8	16.8	15.4	17.9	17.3	18.8	17.5	17.2	20.0

Are you ready to provide financial support for the political party that you like the most?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	11.1	9.3	10.3	12.3	11.8	8.6	10.8	13.2
No	88.9	90.2	89.4	87.7	87.6	91.0	89.0	86.5
No answer	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	11.8	12.5	8.0	7.8	9.3	13.5	20.7
No	87.9	87.3	91.8	91.7	90.5	86.3	78.0
No answer	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	1.2

	GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	12.3	10.1	10.9	11.4	20.1	8.1	11.7	10.7
No	87.6	89.5	89.1	88.0	79.3	91.5	88.3	88.9
No answer	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.4

Have you ever read political party programmes?
% of respondents





	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	11.1	9.3	10.3	12.3	11.8	32.4	45.2	52.2
No	88.9	90.2	89.4	87.7	87.6	67.5	54.7	47.6
No answer	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	44.2	45.5	42.8	48.3	43.7	39.2	44.5	41.8	46.3	47.6
No	55.7	54.5	57.0	51.4	56.1	60.8	55.5	58.0	53.6	52.4
No answer	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0

	GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	46.5	42.1	48.1	48.0	41.3	38.0	46.8	43.8
No	53.4	57.7	51.9	51.7	58.7	61.8	53.2	56.2
No answer	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0

Are programmes of various political parties different from each other?
% of those, who have read political party programmes





	AGE (y.o.)					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			GENDER	
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Male	Female
Yes	60.7	57.1	53.8	54.3	58.1	66.7	55.7	53.1	57.7	56.1	55.2	56.0	57.6
No	39.3	42.3	46.2	45.1	41.5	32.8	44.0	46.6	42.3	43.4	43.8	43.6	42.2
No answer	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.2

Which of the following citizen's duties are set out in the Constitution of Ukraine?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
To abide by the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine	80.5	79.9	72.1	77.9	79.2	79.2	78.5	77.5	78.2	78.6	77.7	79.6
To defend Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity	81.7	77.6	58.8	57.2	71.7	72.2	72.6	69.7	68.8	70.9	69.7	72.2
To respect state symbols	64.5	58.1	45.0	58.9	62.0	57.9	57.9	54.5	58.2	55.2	58.3	60.7
Not to infringe upon other people's honour and dignity	38.9	50.5	40.8	47.0	46.2	46.7	45.4	41.0	47.6	42.2	45.4	48.7
To pay taxes	38.2	32.3	36.7	57.2	39.2	40.1	40.7	43.5	40.7	40.2	40.6	41.5
To vote in elections and take part in referendums	34.2	34.4	36.7	35.1	31.6	37.3	36.2	32.4	36.1	32.3	34.6	37.1
To know state language	41.1	36.0	30.0	27.4	34.9	35.4	32.6	35.3	33.2	34.0	33.0	35.7
Not to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other citizens, foreigners, or people without citizenship	23.6	37.2	32.9	34.5	34.0	30.9	31.6	31.8	34.6	30.3	32.2	35.4
To protect cultural heritage	31.5	26.7	37.9	28.7	32.1	30.3	31.5	28.5	27.0	25.4	30.8	32.2
To support children until they reach the age of majority	28.0	16.4	27.1	33.4	25.5	25.1	25.3	23.1	25.2	24.7	25.3	24.6
To ensure that one and/or his children get an education	16.1	19.2	32.5	26.2	23.3	21.1	23.6	19.8	21.4	20.1	21.6	23.7
To take care of disabled parents	23.8	15.0	21.3	29.8	23.3	20.1	22.4	19.2	22.6	19.4	22.1	23.2
To do no harm to nature	16.6	16.0	20.8	15.3	17.2	15.6	14.7	15.6	18.2	14.8	16.8	17.5
To know basic history and culture of Ukraine	10.6	19.6	10.8	9.2	14.2	12.7	13.6	14.7	13.5	12.6	13.7	14.6
To support the welfare of the community	11.5	10.8	17.1	17.7	11.6	14.0	13.3	13.8	14.7	12.4	14.1	13.8
To take part in political parties	3.6	7.6	6.7	7.9	6.1	6.9	8.8	6.6	5.5	6.0	8.3	5.3
To take part in trade unions	3.4	6.8	5.8	7.7	5.2	5.5	7.4	6.3	6.2	4.6	7.7	5.6
Hard to say	6.8	6.9	17.9	9.6	8.5	7.7	9.4	10.8	8.6	9.3	10.4	6.9

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Which of the following citizen's duties are set out in the Constitution of Ukraine?*
% of respondents (*continued*)

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
To abide by the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine	79.9	71.6	82.4	79.2	78.1	79.5	76.5	82.6	81.3	76.0	69.9
To defend Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity	75.9	61.6	68.3	71.6	70.2	75.2	68.1	85.9	67.1	70.8	57.1
To respect state symbols	60.0	56.7	55.3	58.1	58.5	63.0	58.4	65.2	53.8	61.0	49.6
Not to infringe upon other people's honour and dignity	43.1	45.3	52.4	45.7	45.6	52.1	46.8	37.0	42.7	47.4	42.7
To pay taxes	37.8	48.0	40.7	39.7	41.7	38.2	37.2	46.2	42.0	48.7	40.4
To vote in elections and take part in referendums	34.4	37.8	32.9	36.2	33.7	37.4	30.8	31.0	32.4	36.4	38.9
To know state language	37.3	27.6	32.9	34.5	34.0	40.6	27.2	42.4	31.5	35.1	25.2
Not to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other citizens, foreigners, or people without citizenship	30.7	33.0	37.7	33.4	32.3	38.7	32.6	25.5	30.0	31.2	32.7
To protect cultural heritage	27.6	33.2	31.6	29.6	29.8	31.7	36.8	26.1	23.4	33.8	27.9
To support children until they reach the age of majority	21.1	33.1	25.9	23.1	26.4	26.3	26.2	26.8	21.3	19.5	27.0
To ensure that one and/or his children get an education	17.5	31.0	23.3	22.0	21.8	24.4	23.5	15.2	19.7	27.3	23.1
To take care of disabled parents	19.5	29.2	19.6	20.5	22.6	20.5	22.8	26.8	17.3	24.0	25.3
To do no harm to nature	14.6	19.8	17.6	16.8	16.2	18.8	16.4	15.2	13.9	21.4	12.8
To know basic history and culture of Ukraine	13.2	13.4	15.3	13.3	14.0	19.0	11.7	11.5	11.9	13.6	9.7
To support the welfare of the community	10.9	19.6	13.6	12.6	14.3	15.0	14.8	10.9	13.7	10.4	13.3
To take part in political parties	5.0	9.1	8.4	6.3	6.9	8.5	5.7	1.6	7.0	7.1	6.2
To take part in trade unions	4.7	8.6	7.1	5.8	6.3	7.1	8.4	1.6	5.4	4.5	6.6
Hard to say	7.1	15.1	7.3	8.7	9.1	8.1	10.1	4.9	8.3	9.7	14.2

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Regardless of whether these duties are set out in the Constitution now, which citizen's duties should be set out in the Constitution of Ukraine?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
To abide by the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine	75.8	76.3	79.2	73.2	75.7	77.2	75.0	75.1	75.4	75.4	77.2	74.1
To defend Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity	79.8	76.0	73.3	49.8	71.2	70.4	73.5	67.6	67.0	68.4	69.4	71.0
To respect state symbols	62.6	61.5	59.2	53.0	58.3	60.4	60.5	60.4	57.7	58.5	62.3	56.3
Not to infringe upon other people's honour and dignity	46.5	65.8	57.5	48.8	58.9	56.1	55.9	55.6	53.3	54.0	57.2	55.7
To know state language	65.6	49.3	50.4	37.7	49.8	53.4	51.5	49.8	47.7	48.4	52.6	49.0
To protect cultural heritage	44.3	51.8	53.8	37.0	48.8	45.0	48.1	45.0	45.0	43.2	46.0	49.4
Not to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other citizens, foreigners, or people without citizenship	36.2	52.4	52.1	41.9	46.7	45.9	44.7	44.4	46.5	46.4	45.2	45.9
To support children until they reach the age of majority	42.3	47.4	40.0	40.0	42.6	46.4	45.6	40.5	42.2	42.8	44.2	42.7
To take care of disabled parents	43.5	48.4	35.4	38.3	41.3	42.6	44.1	41.7	44.8	42.3	43.6	42.8
To pay taxes	41.6	35.5	51.7	50.9	41.7	42.1	44.7	43.5	42.9	41.5	44.3	42.5
To vote in elections and take part in referendums	36.9	39.1	47.5	34.7	35.6	39.7	40.3	36.6	39.8	37.3	39.4	38.2
To do no harm to nature	38.2	40.4	36.3	30.9	37.0	36.7	37.6	38.1	35.7	36.0	37.5	36.9
To ensure that one and/or his children get an education	27.2	40.5	46.7	33.8	39.2	34.0	39.2	34.2	35.3	37.2	35.3	36.8
To support the welfare of the community	30.2	33.2	37.9	32.6	32.1	30.9	36.9	30.5	34.1	31.3	33.1	34.1
To know basic history and culture of Ukraine	31.5	35.9	32.5	21.5	29.5	28.8	32.4	30.9	31.8	28.2	31.2	32.2
To take part in political parties	3.8	10.7	12.5	10.4	7.8	9.5	9.1	11.4	8.8	8.0	10.8	8.4
To take part in trade unions	4.5	10.3	10.0	11.5	6.8	10.3	9.4	10.2	9.6	9.3	10.8	7.5
Hard to say	4.7	6.5	8.3	9.1	5.9	7.7	7.1	7.8	6.8	7.9	7.7	5.4

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Regardless of whether these duties are set out in the Constitution now, which citizen's duties should be set out in the Constitution of Ukraine?*
% of respondents (*continued*)

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			GENDER		CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Male	Female	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
To abide by the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine	75.9	69.8	80.7	75.8	75.6	76.9	67.8	84.8	79.5	70.8	69.5
To defend Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity	74.0	62.7	66.7	69.8	69.6	76.7	63.1	90.2	65.2	68.2	57.5
To respect state symbols	61.1	52.8	61.3	60.6	58.2	62.2	53.0	71.6	57.5	62.3	54.4
Not to infringe upon other people's honour and dignity	54.5	50.6	64.0	55.9	55.7	62.4	48.5	53.6	54.6	59.1	50.2
To know state language	57.4	35.7	47.6	50.0	50.4	57.7	39.6	72.8	48.3	44.2	37.3
To protect cultural heritage	46.4	43.5	49.0	46.5	46.3	52.4	39.6	48.1	42.2	50.0	44.7
Not to infringe upon the rights and freedoms of other citizens, foreigners, or people without citizenship	42.7	47.1	52.0	45.4	46.1	50.9	40.9	43.5	47.1	39.6	43.6
To support children until they reach the age of majority	43.2	45.0	42.2	40.8	45.4	48.5	37.2	49.2	41.3	46.8	34.5
To take care of disabled parents	43.8	44.8	39.6	39.2	46.2	48.3	39.8	51.6	39.4	44.2	33.2
To pay taxes	40.3	50.4	41.1	42.8	43.0	42.9	40.6	52.7	43.1	46.1	42.9
To vote in elections and take part in referendums	38.0	40.9	37.3	37.8	38.9	41.3	34.4	36.4	37.5	37.7	46.2
To do no harm to nature	37.5	34.9	37.7	35.2	38.3	43.8	36.9	36.4	34.8	34.4	26.7
To ensure that one and/or his children get an education	32.0	42.9	40.4	34.4	37.9	37.6	32.4	36.4	38.4	42.9	32.3
To support the welfare of the community	30.8	33.5	37.8	30.5	35.0	37.2	29.5	38.8	32.4	28.6	29.8
To know basic history and culture of Ukraine	32.4	26.1	31.1	30.7	30.6	34.6	24.5	41.3	29.0	27.3	24.8
To take part in political parties	6.5	13.8	11.1	9.2	9.2	9.4	8.7	4.9	10.8	7.8	10.6
To take part in trade unions	7.5	13.3	9.6	8.6	9.7	10.3	9.4	5.4	9.6	8.4	9.3
Hard to say	5.9	10.6	6.0	7.5	6.5	4.3	10.7	3.3	5.8	8.4	13.3

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Who should represent your interests in social processes in the first place?
% of respondents



REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Political parties	22.0	21.2	21.8	19.0	21.2	19.2	22.0	21.6
NGOs	19.4	19.1	20.6	21.7	14.5	15.5	17.5	22.5
Trade unions	10.6	13.3	13.3	12.7	15.4	13.3	12.6	13.8
Separate politicians	9.2	8.8	10.0	9.6	12.2	10.4	11.3	8.5
Mass media	4.7	6.6	5.3	5.7	5.8	5.3	5.0	6.6
Business entities	2.8	1.9	2.1	1.8	1.7	2.4	1.9	1.9
Other	8.3	9.8	8.6	7.2	9.6	8.4	9.4	8.2
Hard to say	22.9	19.4	18.3	22.3	19.5	25.4	20.4	16.6

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Political parties	21.4	21.1	20.7	23.7	18.4	20.3	14.6	24.3	22.4	8.4
NGOs	21.1	13.4	18.3	21.7	17.6	15.8	13.8	17.3	21.2	34.9
Trade unions	9.2	16.8	18.9	12.7	13.7	13.2	15.1	13.3	12.3	8.4
Separate politicians	11.1	10.3	7.3	9.0	11.5	10.4	9.3	12.2	8.5	7.2
Mass media	6.5	5.4	3.8	4.1	7.1	6.5	4.0	6.0	5.6	10.8
Business entities	2.1	3.0	1.1	1.5	2.4	2.4	1.0	1.9	3.0	1.2
Other	9.7	5.4	9.4	5.1	13.9	9.0	15.1	6.9	7.0	12.0
Hard to say	18.9	24.6	20.5	22.3	15.4	22.4	27.1	18.0	19.9	16.9

In the past year, have you participated in any events organised by NGOs?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	11.3	11.1	9.7	12.6	9.9	5.1	9.7	16.6	9.8	12.1	12.2	14.6	8.5	8.1
No	88.2	88.6	90.3	87.4	89.9	94.5	90.1	83.2	90.1	87.9	87.4	85.3	91.3	91.6
No answer	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	8.5	8.1	15.0	17.1	10.7	15.4	8.7	12.3	8.5	7.5
No	90.5	91.9	85.0	82.9	88.9	84.6	91.3	87.7	91.2	92.5
No answer	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0

Have you ever taken part in public hearings or public councils at government bodies?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	8.0	10.0	7.4	11.4	12.0	5.9	8.0	15.3	10.1	11.9	7.5	9.9	10.6	9.5
No	91.7	89.7	92.3	88.0	87.4	93.6	91.4	84.7	89.4	88.1	91.8	90.0	89.1	89.8
No answer	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.8

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	7.5	9.1	12.3	12.0	9.2	14.8	6.6	7.6	11.7	8.9
No	91.5	90.9	87.1	88.0	90.0	84.9	92.9	92.1	88.3	91.1
No answer	1.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0

Are you ready to unite with other citizens into civic organisations for protection of your rights and interests?
% of respondents





	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	34.0	30.4	33.9	30.9	27.4	26.1	27.7	38.8	31.8	28.9	31.3	33.2	32.0	27.7
No	46.2	47.1	47.8	49.5	57.9	53.6	54.6	42.6	51.8	51.9	45.2	49.1	45.6	55.6
Hard to say	19.8	22.5	18.3	19.5	14.7	20.3	17.7	18.5	16.4	19.2	23.5	17.7	22.4	16.7

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	26.4	30.8	33.1	43.9	34.0	36.6	30.4	29.2	29.2	21.2
No	56.0	48.9	49.9	37.8	47.4	52.0	49.5	51.0	48.7	57.1
Hard to say	17.6	20.3	17.0	18.3	18.6	11.4	20.1	19.8	22.1	21.7

Can you say that you are actively involved in civic activity?
% of respondents





	AGE					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	9.4	8.2	9.7	7.8	6.8	5.1	6.4	13.1	8.3	8.2	8.6	9.0	8.9	6.9
No	83.3	82.5	84.1	85.3	85.3	86.8	87.5	77.9	83.7	85.4	83.6	82.8	84.2	85.7
Hard to say	7.3	9.3	6.2	6.9	7.9	8.0	6.0	9.0	8.0	6.5	7.8	8.2	6.9	7.4

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	6.0	6.1	11.6	16.9	6.0	11.4	7.1	6.5	10.4	9.7
No	85.9	86.2	82.1	69.9	83.3	82.6	88.0	87.2	76.6	85.4
Hard to say	8.0	7.7	6.4	13.3	10.7	6.0	4.9	6.3	13.0	4.9

What prevents you from participating in civic activity?
% of respondents



% of those, who are not actively involved in civic activity

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Lack of free time	31.5	26.7	20.3	27.2	32.4	32.4	30.6	28.7	16.7
Lack of knowledge on how to reach my goal	11.4	12.1	9.4	8.0	12.8	11.2	9.9	11.2	8.1
Lack of money and other resources for execution of such activity	8.0	7.7	6.4	11.2	6.5	10.3	8.1	6.6	10.3
The threat of counteraction from government, security forces, management, etc.	2.9	6.7	6.9	10.1	6.0	6.1	6.7	8.4	7.0
I have no associates	7.5	5.6	5.0	5.6	6.8	2.9	7.0	6.3	6.4
Other	17.7	19.7	19.3	19.0	13.6	16.0	12.0	16.4	31.2
Hard to say	21.1	21.5	32.7	19.0	21.9	21.2	25.7	22.4	20.2

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Lack of free time	22.7	28.8	29.4	26.5	25.4	31.1	29.9	28.0	23.7
Lack of knowledge on how to reach my goal	10.9	10.8	9.8	12.4	7.0	9.3	8.4	12.6	11.2
Lack of money and other resources for execution of such activity	9.9	8.1	7.7	8.8	10.3	5.6	8.7	7.5	9.1
The threat of counteraction from government, security forces, management, etc.	5.7	7.8	6.6	5.5	9.8	6.9	8.1	5.5	6.1
I have no associates	6.7	5.3	6.2	5.9	6.5	5.6	5.4	4.8	7.4
Other	21.8	17.6	17.9	18.2	17.6	22.3	19.5	19.8	17.7
Hard to say	22.3	21.7	22.4	22.6	23.4	19.1	19.9	21.8	24.7

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Lack of free time	22.8	27.6	29.4	28.8	29.0	26.8	30.4	26.3	20.3	24.4
Lack of knowledge on how to reach my goal	8.8	11.1	10.7	13.6	9.5	8.5	12.4	11.8	6.8	15.0
Lack of money and other resources for execution of such activity	11.4	7.5	8.1	6.8	8.5	9.8	4.3	8.3	16.1	8.8
The threat of counteraction from government, security forces, management, etc.	7.0	6.2	7.4	8.5	4.6	9.3	1.2	6.8	11.0	9.3
I have no associates	7.6	4.8	6.3	8.5	5.1	4.5	11.2	5.4	5.9	6.2
Other	26.6	18.2	15.4	13.6	21.5	18.7	17.4	21.5	15.3	13.5
Hard to say	15.8	24.6	22.6	20.3	21.8	22.4	23.0	19.9	24.6	22.8

When people have common goals and want to reach them, what should they do to maximise the efficiency of their actions?
% of respondents



REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Create a civil society organisation or join an existing one	49.5	50.1	44.1	43.1	42.9	44.0	45.4	48.0
Act together informally (without registration of their activity or creating an organisation)	15.3	14.2	16.8	20.1	17.5	14.4	15.4	20.2
Act individually	4.2	4.7	4.1	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.2	4.7
Other	7.8	8.4	8.5	8.7	10.7	9.7	9.9	7.2
Hard to say	23.1	22.4	26.5	23.7	24.4	27.4	25.0	19.9

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Create a civil society organisation or join an existing one	45.0	46.1	47.8	46.8	48.0	43.2
Act together informally (without registration of their activity or creating an organisation)	19.3	16.4	11.1	18.7	15.0	15.8
Act individually	4.5	5.6	3.3	5.0	2.0	5.7
Other	8.1	7.1	12.4	7.3	11.1	9.0
Hard to say	23.1	24.8	25.3	22.2	23.9	26.3

	CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Create a civil society organisation or join an existing one	45.9	50.3	48.9	48.6	45.5	34.1
Act together informally (without registration of their activity or creating an organisation)	18.2	17.1	17.9	12.1	20.8	16.8
Act individually	4.9	5.4	4.3	2.9	5.2	6.2
Other	7.1	11.1	4.9	12.1	5.8	8.4
Hard to say	23.9	16.1	23.9	24.4	22.7	34.5

How strong is the influence of civil society organisations (NGOs) in modern Ukrainian society?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over
Strong influence	12.1	11.2	5.4	5.3	10.9	7.9	8.8	9.9	8.1
Some influence	57.5	54.8	45.0	47.0	51.5	54.5	52.8	47.7	53.6
No influence	20.6	23.7	37.9	33.0	27.9	23.5	28.6	31.2	25.8
Hard to say	9.8	10.3	11.7	14.7	9.7	14.0	9.7	11.1	12.6

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Strong influence	9.0	9.9	8.5	9.8	8.0	8.7
Some influence	47.5	52.3	55.7	56.4	41.6	52.7
No influence	26.9	27.1	27.2	22.6	39.0	26.2
Hard to say	16.6	10.8	8.5	11.2	11.4	12.4

In the past 12 months, have you turned to local administrations (district, oblast) for resolving your personal matters and to what extent were you satisfied with the outcome?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Did not turn	79.1	74.5	75.5	71.9	81.3	74.7	72.4	72.7	73.5	76.4	74.1	75.0	74.5	76.3	74.7
Turned, but with no results	7.7	14.5	15.4	11.9	8.5	11.9	13.5	15.3	12.8	11.7	12.7	12.4	12.3	13.1	11.6
Turned and received help	13.0	10.0	9.1	15.5	9.5	12.7	12.9	11.4	13.5	11.2	12.3	12.4	12.6	10.2	12.8
No answer	0.2	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.9	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.9

	FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Did not turn	72.9	76.5	75.2	66.3	70.5	67.4	83.2	80.7	76.5	69.9
Turned, but with no results	16.1	10.5	12.2	14.5	13.5	18.8	4.9	9.9	9.8	16.8
Turned and received help	10.8	11.9	12.2	19.3	15.6	12.8	11.4	8.8	13.1	12.4
No answer	0.3	1.1	0.5	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.9

Have you ever submitted to authorities your ideas or proposals for improving the work of local administrations or central government bodies (from NGOs, research institutions, or independently)?
% of respondents



	AGE				
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over
Yes	2.4	5.3	4.7	2.1	6.0
No	97.2	94.2	95.3	97.9	93.8
No answer	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.2

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	2.2	4.0	6.2	4.4	4.8	3.8
No	97.4	95.6	93.8	95.6	94.8	95.8
No answer	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5

Have you ever turned to a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	6.6	4.8	7.4	7.5	11.3	4.4	6.9	11.6
No	93.4	94.4	92.6	92.5	88.3	95.3	92.8	88.2
No answer	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	9.2	6.8	6.8	6.3	6.6	9.9	13.3
No	90.6	92.6	93.1	93.0	93.4	89.8	86.7
No answer	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0

Which of the following events involving Verkhovna Rada deputies have you attended or witnessed personally in your town (village)?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Personal reception of citizens	12.8	20.7	11.3	10.9	12.0	17.4	14.1	16.5	16.0
A speech at a festival, sports competition, celebration, scientific conference	11.7	17.2	11.3	9.4	12.7	14.8	12.7	13.8	12.0
A meeting with representatives of local self-government or local authorities	7.9	13.4	9.2	10.0	9.2	10.0	11.2	10.5	12.2
Public discussion of an important problem with participation of settlement activists, a round table, a working party	7.9	8.5	7.5	5.3	5.9	8.2	8.5	5.7	8.3
Opening of a monument, residential building or company	12.6	5.2	5.4	4.0	6.4	6.3	6.5	7.5	6.6
A visit to an organisation and meeting with its staff	2.8	10.0	4.6	4.0	6.6	7.7	5.3	5.1	5.4
Nothing of the above	58.2	46.7	67.9	62.1	60.4	53.6	55.8	53.8	55.8
Hard to say	5.9	8.6	7.1	6.4	6.8	7.9	6.2	5.7	8.5

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Personal reception of citizens	12.2	13.5	19.4	21.7	13.3	8.9
A speech at a festival, sports competition, celebration, scientific conference	8.0	12.6	18.1	14.7	14.3	10.4
A meeting with representatives of local self-government or local authorities	9.3	10.0	12.6	8.6	13.3	11.1
Public discussion of an important problem with participation of settlement activists, a round table, a working party	12.2	13.5	19.4	7.2	7.4	7.5
Opening of a monument, residential building or company	3.3	6.3	9.6	7.7	5.7	6.0
A visit to an organisation and meeting with its staff	4.4	4.9	9.0	8.8	4.6	3.9
Nothing of the above	64.8	57.7	46.9	53.5	56.9	58.3
Hard to say	7.5	6.9	7.2	5.5	8.0	8.6

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Did you take part in the work of trade unions in the past 15 years?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	8.5	16.4	22.1	24.9	19.9	10.8	16.9	25.3
No	91.5	83.3	77.3	74.8	80.1	89.0	82.7	74.7
No answer	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0

What is your attitude to voters "selling" their votes?
% of respondents

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Negative, "selling one's vote" cannot be justified by anything	78.6	69.4	53.8	64.2	65.3	64.8	70.1	69.1	71.3
I do not care, have not thought about it	8.7	13.3	17.9	12.1	16.5	14.0	10.6	10.8	10.5
I understand them, they are doing this due to dire financial situation	8.5	11.2	14.6	15.8	9.4	13.5	12.0	14.4	12.2
Hard to say	4.2	6.1	13.8	7.9	8.7	7.7	7.3	5.7	6.0

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Negative, "selling one's vote" cannot be justified by anything	65.8	67.0	71.8	65.5	67.4	72.3	67.3	69.8	66.8	68.3
I do not care, have not thought about it	13.2	12.7	11.7	14.5	11.1	11.0	9.5	12.0	14.3	17.1
I understand them, they are doing this due to dire financial situation	12.8	13.5	10.3	13.1	12.2	11.3	16.6	10.7	12.5	7.3
Hard to say	8.2	6.8	6.2	6.9	9.3	5.4	6.5	7.4	6.4	7.3

Have you ever taken part in the work of an election commission?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	13.7	16.1	18.8	22.8	21.0	8.4	17.8	27.2
No	86.1	83.3	81.2	76.6	78.8	90.9	82.0	72.6
No answer	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.1

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Cities	Towns	Villages	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	16.2	24.1	16.5	23.7	20.5	12.0	15.6	16.9	14.2
No	83.8	75.6	82.9	76.3	79.2	88.0	83.8	82.5	85.8
No answer	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.0

Can you name the main task of an election commission?
% of respondents



	AGE (y.o.)					EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	56.6	60.2	61.9	63.1	64.8	58.7	59.7	65.6	59.4	68.7	57.9
No	40.1	36.7	35.1	33.6	32.3	38.6	37.1	31.1	36.0	28.0	40.9
No answer	3.3	3.2	2.9	3.3	2.8	2.7	3.2	3.2	4.6	3.3	1.2

The main task of an election commission (characteristic specifically of election commissions' work) is …
% of those, who can name the main task of election commissions



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
...counting votes	85.7	85.5	74.8	83.1	79.2	86.0	82.3	87.7	85.2
...keeping a registry of voters' place of residence	2.1	4.3	2.9	5.6	5.4	3.1	2.9	4.7	4.1
...issuing certificates to citizens about participation in elections	1.7	1.4	2.9	2.3	2.5	1.3	1.9	2.4	1.5
...collecting information on pre-election preferences of citizens	1.7	0.8	3.9	2.0	3.3	0.4	2.4	0.9	1.2
...informing judicial authorities about errors in the voter register	0.7	2.0	1.0	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.4	0.9	0.9
...distribution of funds between political parties taking part in elections	2.1	0.4	2.9	0.8	0.4	1.8	1.0	0.9	0.9
...facilitating the communication between candidates' and political parties' headquarters	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	1.3	0.5	0.5	1.2
Hard to say	4.9	4.5	11.7	3.1	5.8	3.5	6.7	1.9	5.2

	EDUCATION			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Cities	Towns	Villages
...counting votes	86.6	83.5	82.1	79.7	86.6	86.8
...keeping a registry of voters' place of residence	3.7	4.5	4.0	5.7	3.2	3.1
...issuing certificates to citizens about participation in elections	2.2	1.3	2.0	2.9	0.5	1.8
...collecting information on pre-election preferences of citizens	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.6
...informing judicial authorities about errors in the voter register	1.2	2.4	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6
...distribution of funds between political parties taking part in elections	0.9	0.9	1.6	1.5	1.1	0.5
...facilitating the communication between candidates' and political parties' headquarters	0.3	0.9	1.6	1.7	0.8	0.3
Hard to say	3.4	4.7	5.6	5.2	4.3	4.4

There are different points of view on reforming the system of electing Verkhovna Rada deputies. Where would you place your position on this issue on the 11-point scale?*
average score



* 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means candidates should have the right for self-nomination in territorial electoral districts, and "10" – only parties have the right to nominate candidates.

2017

Should there be a possibility for a Verkhovna Rada deputy to keep his mandate in case he is appointed as a minister (without keeping the deputy's salary while working in the Government) and the possibility of his return to Parliament after termination of such duties?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	8.0	8.5	8.6	9.9	8.4	5.3	10.1	9.6
No	64.2	66.9	71.1	68.0	67.5	66.0	69.3	66.2
Hard to say	27.8	24.6	20.4	22.2	24.0	28.7	20.5	24.3

If the Verkhovna Rada started considering a bill that you think is very unfair, would you undertake some action?
% of respondents

REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
No, even if I knew about such a bill, I would not undertake any action	24.1	26.1	30.0	28.5	31.7	28.5	30.0	26.0
Yes, I would act, for example, convincing people about the unfairness of such a law, writing to authorities, joining a rally	26.9	26.1	26.8	27.6	26.5	25.9	22.1	32.9
I do not care, I am not following what bills are considered by MPs in Ukraine	27.8	24.5	20.6	19.2	16.9	25.2	23.0	17.2
Hard to say	21.2	23.2	22.6	24.6	25.0	20.4	24.9	23.9

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
No, even if I knew about such a bill, I would not undertake any action	28.8	26.3	28.9	28.6	30.6	26.0
Yes, I would act, for example, convincing people about the unfairness of such a law, writing to authorities, joining a rally	27.8	25.6	25.3	28.9	24.1	26.1
I do not care, I am not following what bills are considered by MPs in Ukraine	19.5	23.5	24.9	22.6	16.9	24.3
Hard to say	23.8	24.6	20.9	20.0	28.4	23.6

	CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
No, even if I knew about such a bill, I would not undertake any action	32.1	31.8	16.4	27.9	32.0	24.3
Yes, I would act, for example, convincing people about the unfairness of such a law, writing to authorities, joining a rally	30.6	30.4	32.8	21.4	21.6	23.9
I do not care, I am not following what bills are considered by MPs in Ukraine	18.4	18.1	16.9	25.4	24.2	27.0
Hard to say	19.0	19.7	33.9	25.2	22.2	24.8

What is your attitude to the possibility of citizens nominating themselves as candidates for a Verkhovna Rada deputy (self-nomination in elections)?
% of respondents



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

	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Self-nomination should be possible in both parliamentary and local elections	42.8	46.9	50.7	50.6	47.2	41.8	49.7	49.3
Self-nomination should only be possible in local elections	15.8	14.9	12.4	11.4	12.8	14.1	13.0	13.7
Self-nomination must be cancelled	7.8	8.2	8.3	10.2	11.7	9.5	8.7	10.0
Self-nomination should only be possible in parliamentary elections	5.0	5.8	6.5	4.5	5.6	4.8	5.9	5.6
Hard to say	28.6	24.1	22.1	23.4	22.7	29.9	22.7	21.5

	CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Self-nomination should be possible in both parliamentary and local elections	47.8	50.0	40.4	56.9	37.3	32.0
Self-nomination should only be possible in local elections	15.4	10.1	21.3	7.7	24.2	14.2
Self-nomination must be cancelled	9.4	14.4	7.7	7.4	9.8	9.8
Self-nomination should only be possible in parliamentary elections	5.3	7.4	3.8	4.0	9.8	7.6
Hard to say	22.2	18.1	26.8	24.0	19.0	36.4

Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine?
% of respondents



2017

	REGIONS			
	West	Centre	South	East
Proportional system with open party lists (people vote for a certain party, and also select the most appropriate candidates from this party in their opinion; a candidate's place on the party list depends on the number of people, who voted for this candidate)	32.3	29.1	38.8	42.5
Mixed system with closed lists – as is currently in effect (a part of deputies are elected by closed lists, when parties themselves determine the order of candidates on the list, and another part – in their majority constituencies)	24.0	18.3	17.9	9.2
Majority system (all deputies are being elected in their majority constituencies without voting for party lists)	15.7	22.0	10.0	10.9
Proportional system with closed party lists (parties approve their lists of candidates and determine their order on the list, while people vote for the list of a certain party)	4.9	6.4	5.4	3.4
Other	2.8	4.0	3.8	2.6
Hard to say	20.2	20.2	24.2	31.3

	AGE				
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over
Proportional system with open party lists (people vote for a certain party, and also select the most appropriate candidates from this party in their opinion; a candidate's place on the party list depends on the number of people, who voted for this candidate)	31.4	37.5	33.2	34.5	35.5
Mixed system with closed lists – as is currently in effect (a part of deputies are elected by closed lists, when parties themselves determine the order of candidates on the list, and another part – in their majority constituencies)	15.6	17.4	17.6	18.3	17.6
Majority system (all deputies are being elected in their majority constituencies without voting for party lists)	15.6	14.2	18.5	18.3	15.0
Proportional system with closed party lists (parties approve their lists of candidates and determine their order on the list, while people vote for the list of a certain party)	7.3	5.0	6.2	3.6	4.1
Other	3.1	3.4	4.1	1.8	4.1
Hard to say	27.1	22.4	20.3	23.4	23.6

	EDUCATION		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Proportional system with open party lists (people vote for a certain party, and also select the most appropriate candidates from this party in their opinion; a candidate's place on the party list depends on the number of people, who voted for this candidate)	30.3	36.0	36.1
Mixed system with closed lists – as is currently in effect (a part of deputies are elected by closed lists, when parties themselves determine the order of candidates on the list, and another part – in their majority constituencies)	18.5	17.2	16.2
Majority system (all deputies are being elected in their majority constituencies without voting for party lists)	13.2	16.7	18.0
Proportional system with closed party lists (parties approve their lists of candidates and determine their order on the list, while people vote for the list of a certain party)	3.8	5.3	6.2
Other	3.3	2.9	3.8
Hard to say	30.9	21.9	19.7

Are you interested in information on the work of parliament?
% of respondents



REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	8.3	11.6	11.8	17.4	17.6	11.2	12.4	16.6
Rather yes	32.1	39.3	40.4	41.6	45.8	41.3	39.9	39.3
Rather no	33.7	26.1	27.1	20.7	21.0	26.3	25.6	25.0
No	17.9	13.7	14.5	11.7	8.8	13.0	13.7	12.4
Hard to say	8.0	9.2	6.2	8.7	6.8	8.2	8.3	6.6

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	12.7	17.6	11.5	16.4	14.6	9.2	15.8	11.8	14.1	19.3
Rather yes	41.6	39.6	36.6	38.5	43.3	39.3	42.9	41.4	37.7	33.7
Rather no	27.0	19.1	28.8	23.5	21.3	31.5	24.1	24.6	28.0	21.7
No	12.3	14.4	13.7	15.4	8.7	14.0	9.5	13.1	15.2	14.5
Hard to say	6.4	9.2	9.3	6.1	12.2	6.0	7.8	9.1	5.0	10.8

	CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	15.4	14.1	12.0	11.5	9.8	14.1
Rather yes	40.2	42.6	38.8	41.8	42.5	33.9
Rather no	26.3	24.2	31.1	25.2	28.1	20.7
No	12.4	12.4	10.9	13.2	12.4	18.5
Hard to say	5.8	6.7	7.1	8.3	7.2	12.8

What type of information about the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do you receive from the media?
% of respondents



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

	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Negative (for instance, on its corruption, inefficiency, "button-pushing" by MPs, etc.)	53.9	54.6	56.3	57.7	58.1	57.7	55.5	55.6
Media information about the Verkhovna Rada is balanced	27.1	26.4	24.2	27.9	25.2	23.2	25.6	29.0
Positive (for instance, on the laws developed and adopted, the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts, etc.)	8.2	7.9	9.4	7.5	8.1	8.6	8.7	7.4
Hard to say	10.8	11.1	10.0	6.9	8.6	10.6	10.1	8.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Negative (for instance, on its corruption, inefficiency, "button-pushing" by MPs, etc.)	56.9	55.8	54.4	55.3	56.4	57.1
Media information about the Verkhovna Rada is balanced	27.0	24.1	26.2	26.3	23.9	27.5
Positive (for instance, on the laws developed and adopted, the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts, etc.)	8.8	9.5	5.3	8.0	9.5	7.5
Hard to say	7.3	10.6	14.0	10.5	10.2	7.8

What information about the parliament is concealed from citizens (i.e., citizens do not have access to it)?*
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
On behind-the-scenes arrangements between political parties	53.3	46.0	50.8	58.7	46.9	53.0	51.3	51.8	54.4
On parliamentarians' income	43.9	46.9	50.0	46.8	43.9	49.1	43.5	47.1	48.4
On the past of Verkhovna Rada MPs, details of their political career	33.8	40.9	44.2	42.0	39.4	39.9	41.2	39.3	39.8
On interaction between political forces with owners of media outlets	30.6	33.2	21.7	33.0	29.5	29.8	33.5	31.8	31.7
On real initiators of bills	28.9	32.6	25.8	33.2	30.5	32.8	30.7	33.0	29.1
Other	1.3	2.6	2.9	0.8	1.9	2.4	1.2	1.8	1.7
There is no concealed information	8.9	6.8	7.1	2.5	6.6	4.5	7.6	5.7	6.2
Citizens do not have to know all the details about parliament	1.9	2.5	1.7	2.8	3.5	3.7	0.9	2.7	1.3
Hard to say	7.7	8.6	15.4	13.4	10.6	10.8	10.3	11.1	9.8

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
On behind-the-scenes arrangements between political parties	52.0	49.3	54.0	51.1	49.1	55.3
On parliamentarians' income	45.3	46.3	47.9	45.3	51.7	44.3
On the past of Verkhovna Rada MPs, details of their political career	39.4	40.6	39.7	37.6	44.3	41.1
On interaction between political forces with owners of media outlets	29.3	31.9	32.0	31.7	30.8	30.4
On real initiators of bills	28.9	31.7	32.1	29.7	35.8	29.1
Other	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.2	0.9
There is no concealed information	6.6	5.3	6.8	7.1	4.3	5.8
Citizens do not have to know all the details about parliament	2.7	2.3	2.1	2.6	3.0	1.1
Hard to say	11.5	11.7	8.2	8.3	11.9	14.0

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

What information on the work of parliament is currently lacking?*
% of respondents

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Specific data on amounts of funds foreseen in the draft state budget for the next years	39.5	34.6	37.9	38.7	36.3	36.7	35.7	37.8	38.6
Information on the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts	24.0	33.6	29.6	37.5	26.7	28.5	30.6	34.8	37.6
Summarised analytical materials on policy directions developed by political forces in the bills discussed by the Verkhovna Rada	24.4	34.3	37.1	27.7	30.2	29.0	26.5	32.6	33.3
Information on decisions made by parliamentary committees	17.6	27.3	24.2	22.8	21.7	20.4	23.8	24.0	26.5
Other	1.9	6.1	8.8	6.2	5.0	5.3	7.4	4.8	5.4
I am satisfied with the existing information	25.1	24.0	20.0	15.9	24.8	22.4	23.0	22.5	16.9
Hard to say	13.8	6.6	10.0	13.0	11.6	11.9	10.3	8.1	9.8

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Specific data on amounts of funds foreseen in the draft state budget for the next years	36.6	36.3	38.7	37.4	40.3	33.6	35.4	37.5	39.1	31.7
Information on the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts	32.4	31.2	32.5	29.1	35.3	35.6	31.9	31.8	33.1	26.5
Summarised analytical materials on policy directions developed by political forces in the bills discussed by the Verkhovna Rada	27.8	31.7	31.5	31.8	30.8	27.1	30.3	29.0	33.0	26.5
Information on decisions made by parliamentary committees	21.6	24.4	24.0	21.9	26.9	23.5	20.9	23.0	25.2	28.0
Other	4.0	5.4	6.6	4.3	8.2	5.5	7.0	5.3	5.0	6.1
I am satisfied with the existing information	22.3	21.3	21.6	22.4	17.4	24.2	19.8	22.2	21.7	18.1
Hard to say	12.2	11.0	8.1	10.8	9.5	10.2	9.8	11.0	9.9	12.0

* Respondents were asked to choose all acceptable options.

Have you heard anything about the work of the following NGOs, movements, projects?
% of respondents

"CHESNO" MOVEMENT



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	9.2	15.8	14.7	14.5	13.0	8.8	13.2	16.8
No	84.7	81.3	78.2	79.8	81.4	86.1	82.4	76.3
Hard to say	6.1	2.9	7.1	5.7	5.6	5.1	4.4	6.9

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	14.2	9.7	14.6	15.2	11.7	12.2
No	81.7	82.2	79.6	78.7	83.3	82.9
Hard to say	4.1	8.2	5.8	6.1	5.0	5.0

CIVIL NETWORK "OPORA"



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	17.0	18.5	19.7	20.2	16.9	11.7	18.6	23.1
No	77.1	76.3	72.4	74.7	77.9	83.0	76.3	69.9
Hard to say	5.9	5.3	7.9	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.1	7.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	22.3	11.4	15.3	20.2	17.4	16.5
No	72.9	80.2	79.1	73.5	76.5	78.3
Hard to say	4.9	8.4	5.6	6.4	6.1	5.1

Have you heard anything about the work of the following NGOs. movements, projects?
% of respondents (*continued*)

REANIMATION PACKAGE OF REFORMS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	12.3	14.0	12.6	17.4	13.1	9.5	12.5	18.8
No	80.2	82.3	78.2	74.8	80.9	85.6	81.1	72.8
Hard to say	7.5	3.7	9.1	7.8	6.0	4.9	6.4	8.4

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	13.7	11.0	16.9	16.2	11.7	12.5
No	81.4	78.1	76.7	76.1	82.4	81.7
Hard to say	4.9	11.0	6.4	7.7	5.9	5.9

"RADA4YOU" PROJECT



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	3.3	4.2	3.2	3.9	3.6	2.7	4.2	3.7
No	91.7	91.5	90.6	88.3	90.2	93.4	90.0	88.8
Hard to say	5.0	4.2	6.2	7.8	6.2	3.8	5.8	7.5

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	4.0	3.2	3.3	2.6	3.3	5.1
No	91.7	86.9	91.8	90.9	91.1	89.6
Hard to say	4.3	9.9	4.9	6.5	5.6	5.3

Have you heard anything about the work of the following NGOs, movements, projects?
% of respondents (*continued*)

USAID RADA PROGRAM





	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	3.3	4.7	3.5	4.5	3.6	2.0	4.1	5.0
No	91.0	89.7	89.7	88.0	90.0	94.1	89.1	87.1
Hard to say	5.7	5.5	6.8	7.5	6.4	3.8	6.8	7.9

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	4.4	3.0	3.3	3.2	5.0	3.6
No	90.5	86.9	90.9	89.0	89.1	91.3
Hard to say	5.1	10.1	5.8	7.7	5.9	5.1

COMMITTEE OF VOTERS OF UKRAINE





	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	14.9	18.3	20.4	21.3	17.7	10.9	17.8	24.7
No	79.2	75.9	69.0	71.2	74.2	82.1	74.8	66.8
Hard to say	5.9	5.8	10.6	7.5	8.1	6.9	7.3	8.5

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	19.9	15.9	16.9	22.6	17.8	13.5
No	73.3	73.8	76.4	68.8	75.6	79.4
Hard to say	6.8	10.3	6.7	8.6	6.7	7.1

How often do you watch each of the following TV channels, listen to the following radio stations, read the following newspapers?
% of respondents

FIRST NATIONAL TV CHANNEL



2017

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	5.5	11.5	19.1	11.3	5.0	7.7	7.1	12.3	19.6
Several times per week	20.8	16.9	19.5	17.9	10.2	15.0	18.8	22.9	24.3
Several times per month	19.7	20.6	12.9	17.2	13.9	20.3	17.4	18.7	21.7
Once or several times per year	11.9	12.1	5.4	6.4	10.6	9.5	12.9	8.1	8.1
Less than once a year	4.9	7.4	4.6	4.7	7.1	6.3	7.1	4.5	4.3
Do not watch at all	36.7	30.2	36.1	40.4	52.5	38.8	35.0	31.6	21.1
Hard to say	0.4	1.3	2.5	2.1	0.7	2.4	1.8	1.8	0.9

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	12.8	10.3	10.3	10.2	7.8	16.0	9.1	14.8	10.1
Several times per week	17.7	19.6	17.4	21.0	14.9	15.7	13.5	20.2	22.9
Several times per month	17.6	20.5	17.2	20.2	20.3	12.9	19.7	19.6	16.3
Once or several times per year	10.2	9.2	10.0	10.9	6.0	10.4	9.7	10.0	9.5
Less than once a year	4.4	5.6	7.2	5.4	5.8	6.7	7.9	3.3	5.1
Do not watch at all	36.4	33.7	35.6	31.2	42.5	37.3	38.7	30.4	34.8
Hard to say	0.9	1.0	2.3	1.1	2.8	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.4

PARLIAMENTARY TV CHANNEL "RADA"



2017

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	1.3	1.8	1.7	0.2	0.5	0.3	1.5	1.2	2.4
Several times per week	5.7	5.1	15.0	7.6	1.6	3.7	6.5	9.9	12.2
Several times per month	10.4	9.9	14.6	11.2	8.5	9.5	8.8	10.5	15.4
Once or several times per year	8.1	10.2	4.2	9.3	5.9	8.2	9.7	9.3	10.5
Less than once a year	8.1	9.1	6.7	5.1	7.8	7.9	8.8	8.1	5.8
Do not watch at all	65.2	61.5	54.6	63.9	74.1	68.1	61.5	58.9	50.8
Hard to say	1.3	2.3	3.3	2.8	1.6	2.4	3.2	2.1	2.6

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	1.1	1.0	1.6	1.8	0.6	0.4	9.1	14.8	10.1
Several times per week	8.2	6.8	6.5	5.9	6.9	10.0	13.5	20.2	22.9
Several times per month	8.4	12.6	11.0	11.3	11.2	9.5	19.7	19.6	16.3
Once or several times per year	6.9	9.2	9.6	8.5	8.0	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.5
Less than once a year	6.6	6.9	9.0	8.4	6.5	6.4	7.9	3.3	5.1
Do not watch at all	66.0	62.1	59.2	61.9	62.5	62.5	38.7	30.4	34.8
Hard to say	2.7	1.4	3.1	2.1	4.3	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.4

How often do you watch each of the following TV channels, listen to the following radio stations, read the following newspapers?
% of respondents

(*continued*)

NEWS AND SHOWS OF THE NATIONAL RADIOCOMPANY OF UKRAINE (INCLUDING THE PUBLIC RADIO)



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	6.2	9.6	10.0	7.5	3.3	4.5	8.6	9.9	13.9
Several times per week	15.1	10.2	10.0	8.9	7.1	7.9	9.4	12.5	16.0
Several times per month	8.5	9.6	6.3	8.3	6.1	9.8	10.3	9.6	8.1
Once or several times per year	4.9	7.3	5.0	3.4	5.9	4.5	8.0	5.7	4.1
Less than once a year	5.3	5.6	4.6	4.5	4.7	6.9	3.5	3.3	6.6
Do not listen at all	58.9	55.3	61.1	64.0	71.9	63.1	58.1	56.1	48.7
Hard to say	1.1	2.3	2.9	3.4	0.7	2.4	1.8	1.8	0.9

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	10.2	8.2	7.1	9.5	6.0	8.2	5.7	11.7	8.7
Several times per week	10.2	12.3	9.9	11.6	9.1	11.3	9.5	11.1	12.8
Several times per month	6.6	8.2	10.7	8.0	9.1	9.5	10.5	7.6	7.2
Once or several times per year	5.1	5.6	5.4	6.4	2.8	5.8	5.6	3.9	6.5
Less than once a year	4.6	5.3	5.4	5.8	5.0	4.0	5.9	2.6	6.3
Do not listen at all	60.1	58.5	59.0	56.6	64.0	60.1	60.9	60.6	55.9
Hard to say	3.1	1.8	2.5	2.1	4.1	1.1	1.9	2.6	2.7

NEWSPAPER “HOLOS UKRAINY” (THE VOICE OF UKRAINE)

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	0.8	0.5	1.2	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.5
Several times per week	1.1	2.2	2.5	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.2	2.4	1.9
Several times per month	3.6	4.8	5.4	2.6	3.3	3.2	2.6	3.3	6.8
Once or several times per year	5.7	6.1	5.8	4.0	3.8	5.0	7.6	5.1	5.8
Less than once a year	6.8	6.8	8.3	5.3	6.6	6.6	6.8	6.9	6.0
Do not read at all	81.1	77.2	73.0	83.2	83.7	81.2	78.5	78.8	74.7
Hard to say	0.8	2.3	3.7	4.0	1.2	2.6	3.2	3.0	3.4

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.2	1.1	0.4	0.2
Several times per week	1.5	0.9	2.3	1.7	1.9	0.7	1.4	1.3	2.1
Several times per month	3.5	4.2	4.3	3.8	3.2	5.5	4.1	3.7	4.1
Once or several times per year	4.6	5.3	6.2	6.1	3.7	5.5	5.9	6.1	4.2
Less than once a year	5.5	5.1	9.3	7.2	6.7	5.1	6.8	4.6	7.8
Do not read at all	81.4	81.9	74.3	78.6	78.7	81.2	78.5	81.1	78.8
Hard to say	3.1	2.2	2.8	2.1	4.7	1.8	2.2	2.8	2.9

How often do you watch each of the following TV channels, listen to the following radio stations, read the following newspapers?
% of respondents

(continued)

NEWSPAPER "URIADOVYI KURIER" (GOVERNMENT COURIER)

	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	0.4	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.8
Several times per week	1.5	1.3	1.3	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.8	0.9	2.4
Several times per month	4.0	5.3	7.9	3.6	4.5	4.7	1.8	8.7	5.1
Once or several times per year	4.9	5.2	4.6	4.5	3.5	4.7	6.8	6.0	4.3
Less than once a year	5.5	7.2	8.3	5.1	5.7	8.4	6.2	6.9	5.6
Do not read at all	82.3	78.1	73.3	81.9	84.9	78.7	79.7	74.9	78.0
Hard to say	1.3	2.7	3.8	3.6	0.7	2.6	3.8	2.7	3.8

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	0.0	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.0
Several times per week	0.5	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2
Several times per month	3.5	5.5	5.3	4.2	6.0	5.3	6.2	4.1	3.9
Once or several times per year	3.1	4.7	6.6	4.8	5.2	5.1	4.9	5.0	5.1
Less than once a year	6.2	5.0	8.2	7.1	6.7	4.4	6.9	3.9	7.8
Do not read at all	83.2	81.0	74.6	79.8	76.3	81.6	78.3	81.8	79.0
Hard to say	3.5	2.2	2.8	2.5	4.1	2.2	2.0	3.5	3.0

POLITICAL PARTY NEWSPAPERS



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Every day or almost every day	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.9
Several times per week	0.6	0.8	3.3	2.3	0.7	1.3	0.3	2.1	2.4
Several times per month	4.3	3.4	7.1	5.1	3.3	3.2	4.7	4.8	6.2
Once or several times per year	16.6	13.0	7.9	6.4	7.7	12.7	11.5	11.7	13.9
Less than once a year	7.4	13.8	8.3	4.9	7.7	9.5	11.2	9.9	8.8
Do not read at all	69.4	64.7	69.6	76.6	77.9	70.7	68.2	68.0	63.0
Hard to say	1.1	4.0	3.3	4.2	2.1	2.6	3.8	3.0	4.7

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Every day or almost every day	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.2
Several times per week	1.1	1.8	1.3	1.0	2.6	1.3	2.4	1.3	0.5
Several times per month	4.8	4.4	4.4	3.7	5.4	5.3	6.1	3.7	3.3
Once or several times per year	11.5	12.9	9.9	14.1	9.3	7.6	10.2	12.9	11.9
Less than once a year	7.5	9.5	10.5	10.6	6.9	8.9	9.4	8.9	9.6
Do not read at all	71.3	68.3	69.4	66.9	70.4	75.1	68.5	69.7	70.4
Hard to say	3.7	2.6	3.8	3.2	5.0	1.6	2.6	3.1	4.2

Can people in Ukraine freely express their political views today?
% of respondents



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Yes	60.8	60.9	59.7	57.7	61.2	61.1	59.4	60.6
No	25.5	24.8	28.8	28.2	25.7	24.8	28.5	25.1
Hard to say	13.7	14.2	11.5	14.1	13.1	14.1	12.1	14.2

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Yes	70.5	42.0	54.4	57.5	57.0	66.3	48.2	61.6	64.4	69.5
No	18.5	42.2	29.1	26.8	29.7	23.3	39.9	24.3	22.8	17.1
Hard to say	11.0	15.7	16.4	15.7	13.4	10.4	11.8	14.2	12.8	13.4

Is your personal participation required in order to change political and economic situation in Ukraine for the better?
% of respondents



	AGE (y.o.)					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Yes	35.9	32.7	29.4	38.9	29.5	27.4	32.6	38.1	37.8	26.3	27.9
No	45.6	44.1	50.0	40.1	52.8	51.6	47.5	42.6	44.9	49.6	49.9
Hard to say	18.4	23.2	20.6	21.1	17.7	21.0	19.9	19.3	17.3	24.1	22.2

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	29.9	34.8	35.3	31.9	30.7	34.8	47.6	36.4	35.2	42.6	30.8	26.6	25.2
No	49.6	44.6	45.9	53.3	45.7	47.4	29.3	43.7	49.7	36.1	50.3	53.9	47.3
Hard to say	20.4	20.6	18.8	14.8	23.6	17.8	23.2	19.9	15.1	21.3	18.9	19.5	27.4

Which of the statements below do you agree with?
% of respondents

	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Democracy is the most desirable type of government system for Ukraine	67.2	56.9	53.5	47.0	61.9	54.5	58.5	60.1	49.4	50.3	56.5	60.9
Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than a democratic one	13.0	17.2	10.4	27.0	15.6	18.3	16.2	19.2	19.9	19.9	17.2	17.5
For a person like me, it does not matter whether the country has a democratic regime or not	9.8	14.3	19.1	14.2	11.8	14.8	13.2	12.3	15.8	14.6	14.9	11.6
Hard to say	10.0	11.6	17.0	11.9	10.6	12.4	12.1	8.4	14.8	15.2	11.4	10.0

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Democracy is the most desirable type of government system for Ukraine	61.5	45.5	54.7	56.0	55.2	57.7	51.5	54.9	59.9	65.1
Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than a democratic one	16.2	20.3	20.0	19.1	17.4	17.2	15.6	20.5	17.2	13.3
For a person like me, it does not matter whether the country has a democratic regime or not	11.6	19.2	13.3	15.3	11.5	13.7	19.8	12.0	12.8	8.4
Hard to say	10.7	15.1	12.0	9.6	15.9	11.4	13.1	12.6	10.2	13.3

Did you take part in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the end of 2014?
% of respondents





	AGE (y.o.)					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Yes	48.2	69.9	70.6	75.6	76.0	63.3	69.7	70.0	73.7	60.8	61.6
No	49.2	27.7	24.4	21.7	20.3	33.6	27.2	26.5	24.0	34.3	34.4
Hard to say	2.6	2.4	5.0	2.7	3.8	3.1	3.1	3.5	2.3	5.0	4.0

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING				CHURCH AFFILIATION					
	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases	UOC-KP	UOC-MP	Greek Catholic	Just Orthodox	Just Christian	Do not affiliate myself with any religious denomination
Yes	64.2	68.5	72.2	64.9	68.3	69.8	63.9	71.9	64.8	86.3	65.2	66.9	56.4
No	32.4	27.2	25.6	31.8	27.7	27.8	32.5	23.8	32.6	12.6	31.5	32.5	36.4
Hard to say	3.4	4.3	2.3	3.3	4.0	2.4	3.6	4.3	2.7	1.1	3.2	0.6	7.1

How would you rate the work of the Verkhovna Rada deputy representing your constituency?
% of respondents



REGIONS



	AGE					EDUCATION		
	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Positive	5.2	3.7	3.8	3.3	4.3	2.9	3.9	5.3
Rather positive	13.7	16.1	14.4	13.8	16.1	13.9	14.4	16.5
Rather negative	9.5	13.8	13.5	19.5	13.9	12.1	14.2	14.7
Negative	15.1	17.7	21.8	20.1	23.0	20.5	19.8	19.0
I do not know the MP that represents our constituency	43.5	35.4	29.1	30.3	28.1	36.7	32.3	31.5
Hard to say	13.0	13.2	17.4	12.9	14.6	13.9	15.4	13.1

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Positive	4.9	5.0	1.3	3.6	4.1	4.8	2.3	4.2	4.9	7.3
Rather positive	16.7	12.9	12.9	14.6	15.4	15.0	10.0	15.9	16.8	14.6
Rather negative	16.2	10.6	11.1	13.0	10.4	17.4	12.3	14.4	14.0	15.9
Negative	18.2	22.4	20.2	18.8	20.6	20.2	23.3	18.3	19.6	18.3
I do not know the MP that represents our constituency	30.3	36.0	38.0	36.6	33.0	29.5	36.8	32.1	32.3	31.7
Hard to say	13.8	13.1	16.4	13.4	16.7	13.1	15.3	15.1	12.4	12.2

How would you rate the work of the political party you voted for in the Verkhovna Rada elections of 2014?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Positive	9.3	6.1	7.1	9.1	5.2	7.4	8.3	8.4	9.2
Rather positive	17.6	14.0	12.9	10.0	11.3	13.5	11.8	15.9	15.4
Rather negative	18.0	20.3	21.2	19.1	16.5	20.6	20.4	18.0	21.6
Negative	16.8	12.6	9.1	8.1	7.6	10.1	13.3	15.6	13.9
The political party I voted for did not get into the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	9.8	8.6	7.1	7.7	6.1	9.8	8.0	7.5	10.3
I did not vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the end of 2014	14.6	16.8	26.1	32.8	38.1	22.5	21.2	15.9	12.0
Hard to say	13.8	21.5	16.6	13.2	15.1	16.1	17.1	18.9	17.5

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Positive	7.3	7.2	8.8	8.4	8.0	6.2
Rather positive	12.2	14.0	14.6	15.5	10.8	12.2
Rather negative	18.2	20.3	19.9	19.8	18.1	20.2
Negative	14.0	12.9	9.3	15.2	6.5	10.0
The political party I voted for did not get into the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	5.6	9.4	9.7	8.4	10.6	6.7
I did not vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the end of 2014	25.1	19.7	20.9	16.4	28.0	27.9
Hard to say	17.5	16.5	16.9	16.5	18.1	16.9

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Positive	7.1	9.1	7.5	9.5	6.0	8.4	11.0
Rather positive	14.1	12.2	14.1	10.8	14.6	14.3	12.2
Rather negative	15.2	20.9	23.9	20.6	20.4	18.2	19.5
Negative	9.3	12.4	14.7	9.8	13.9	11.4	7.3
The political party I voted for did not get into the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	11.6	7.4	5.7	9.8	7.4	8.8	12.2
I did not vote in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine at the end of 2014	24.9	20.6	18.6	24.9	19.2	22.3	23.2
Hard to say	17.8	17.4	15.3	14.6	18.3	16.6	14.6

Attitude to political parties*,
average score



	REGIONS				AGE					EDUCATION		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29 y.o.	30-39 y.o.	40-49 y.o.	50-59 y.o.	60 y.o. and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher
Party "All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (Y. Tymoshenko)	3.5	2.8	2.9	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.6	3.2	3.2	3.2	2.6	2.9
Party "Civic Position" (A. Hrytsenko)	4.1	2.8	2.6	1.8	2.4	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.2	2.8	2.7	3.1
Party "Self Help Union" (A. Sadovyi)	4.3	2.6	3.2	1.7	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.7	3.2
Political party "For Life" (V. Rabinovych, Ye. Muraiev)	1.7	2.2	2.6	3.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.3
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	2.7	2.5	2.9	1.8	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.4
Party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"	3.1	2.5	2.4	1.2	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.6
Party "All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (O. Tiahnybok)	3.3	2.1	1.7	0.9	2.4	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.3
Party "Opposition Bloc" (Y. Boiko)	1.2	1.7	2.8	2.8	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.9
Party "Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP" (D. Borysenko, B. Filatov)	3.0	1.7	2.0	1.0	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.1
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (V. Skotsyk)	2.2	1.7	2.4	1.3	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.9
Party "Movement of New Forces of Mikheil Saakashvili"	2.7	1.5	1.9	1.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.6	2.0
Party "Revival" (V. Bondar)	1.3	1.4	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.7
Political party "Democratic Alliance" (V. Hatsko, V. Ptashnik)	2.3	1.4	1.8	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.7
Party "Governmental Initiative of Yarosh" (D. Yarosh)	2.6	1.5	1.9	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.8
Party "Right Sector" (A. Tarasenko)	2.7	1.5	1.8	0.7	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.9
Party "People's Front" (A. Yatseniuk)	2.4	1.4	1.6	0.8	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.7
Party "National Corps" (A. Biletskyi)	2.3	1.3	1.8	0.9	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.7
"Our Land" party (Yu. Hranaturov)	1.3	1.2	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.5
Political party "Civic Movement "Hvylia" (V. Chumak, V. Kasko, N. Novak)	2.0	1.3	1.6	0.9	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.6
Party "Left Opposition" (Communist party of Ukraine and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine) (P. Symonenko, N. Vitrenko)	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.3	0.9	1.0

* On the 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means you strongly dislike the party, and "10" – strongly like the party.

Attitude to political parties*,
average score (*continued*)

	LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Party “All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Y. Tymoshenko)	3.0	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.6
Party “Civic Position” (A. Hrytsenko)	3.3	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.2
Party “Self Help Union” (A. Sadovyi)	3.3	2.4	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.3	2.9	3.1	3.8
Political party “For Life” (V. Rabinovych, Ye. Muraiev)	2.0	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.8	1.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.0
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5	3.2
Party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity"	2.7	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.6	1.5	2.4	2.6	3.2
Party “All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (O. Tiahnybok)	2.6	1.4	1.3	2.0	2.0	2.2	1.6	2.1	2.2	3.1
Party “Opposition Bloc” (Y. Boiko)	1.5	2.8	2.3	2.4	2.2	1.5	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9
Party “Ukrainian Association of Patriots – UKROP” (D. Borysenko, B. Filatov)	2.3	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.8	2.1	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.6
Agrarian Party of Ukraine (V. Skotsyk)	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.8
Party “Movement of New Forces of Mikheil Saakashvili"	1.9	1.7	1.2	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.7	1.9	2.6
Party “Revival” (V. Bondar)	1.4	2.2	1.5	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.9
Political party “Democratic Alliance” (V. Hatsko, V. Ptashnik)	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.9	1.9
Party “Governmental Initiative of Yarosh” (D. Yarosh)	1.9	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.6	1.8	2.4
Party “Right Sector” (A. Tarasenko)	2.0	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.0	1.6	1.7	2.9
Party “People's Front” (A. Yatseniuk)	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.6	0.9	1.6	1.7	1.8
Party “National Corps” (A. Biletskyi)	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.5	1.4	1.5	0.9	1.5	1.6	2.0
"Our Land” party (Yu. Hranaturov)	1.2	1.9	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6
Political party “Civic Movement “Hvylia” (V. Chumak, V. Kasko, N. Novak)	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.3	0.8	1.4	1.6	1.7
Party “Left Opposition” (Communist party of Ukraine and Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine) (P. Symonenko, N. Vitrenko)	0.9	1.4	0.9	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8

* On the 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where “0” means you strongly dislike the party, and “10” – strongly like the party.

Do you know, what system of government Ukraine currently has?
% of respondents



	REGIONS				AGE (y.o.)				
	West	Centre	South	East	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Parliamentary-presidential republic	60.0	53.7	52.7	53.7	54.5	56.7	58.1	57.2	51.2
Presidential-parliamentary republic	21.3	15.8	14.9	13.4	15.8	15.8	17.4	18.1	15.4
Presidential republic	0.4	2.1	4.1	7.0	4.0	1.8	3.5	3.0	3.8
Parliamentary republic	1.9	3.3	6.2	1.5	2.8	2.9	1.8	3.0	3.2
Dictatorship	0.6	1.8	0.8	3.2	0.9	1.8	0.9	1.8	2.8
Hard to say	15.7	23.3	21.2	21.3	21.9	20.8	18.3	16.9	23.6

	EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY			TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Cities	Towns	Villages
Parliamentary-presidential republic	49.4	56.0	58.5	59.2	47.6	52.4	52.0	60.1	54.6
Presidential-parliamentary republic	16.4	15.6	17.4	17.3	14.7	16.0	15.2	13.9	20.0
Presidential republic	2.2	3.5	3.7	1.1	7.8	3.8	3.9	3.3	2.4
Parliamentary republic	2.2	3.3	2.8	2.1	4.1	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.4
Dictatorship	2.6	1.3	1.8	1.1	3.9	1.3	2.1	1.3	1.8
Hard to say	27.3	20.3	15.9	19.2	22.0	23.3	23.9	18.3	18.8

In your opinion, what is the best form of government for Ukraine in the current situation?
% of respondents



2017

REGIONS



	AGE (y.o.)					EDUCATION			LANGUAGE SPOKEN IN THE FAMILY		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Primary, incomplete secondary or general secondary education	Secondary specialised	Higher or incomplete higher	Ukrainian	Russian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian
Parliamentary-presidential republic	42.5	41.8	42.8	42.9	41.2	37.7	42.8	44.8	45.9	37.9	37.0
Presidential-parliamentary republic	12.3	14.8	14.2	15.3	10.7	13.2	12.8	13.4	15.2	8.2	13.1
Presidential republic	6.6	6.3	7.1	7.2	9.2	7.7	7.2	7.7	5.6	11.4	8.2
Parliamentary republic	5.9	3.2	2.7	5.7	5.5	5.9	4.2	4.3	3.5	6.9	4.9
Dictatorship	3.5	3.2	3.5	4.8	4.5	4.2	3.2	4.6	2.2	6.7	5.3
Hard to say	29.2	30.7	29.8	24.0	28.9	31.3	29.7	25.3	27.6	28.9	31.5

	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT			FINANCIAL STANDING			
	Cities	Towns	Villages	We barely make ends meet, we are short of money even for food	We have enough for food and purchase of low-cost necessary items	In general, we have enough money to live on, but purchasing durable goods is difficult	We are well off, but remain unable to make certain purchases
Parliamentary-presidential republic	40.5	49.9	37.9	40.1	42.8	42.4	45.1
Presidential-parliamentary republic	11.8	10.2	17.0	11.3	11.5	16.4	13.4
Presidential republic	7.5	7.4	7.5	7.3	7.9	7.8	2.4
Parliamentary republic	5.6	2.6	5.3	4.8	5.1	3.6	6.1
Dictatorship	5.7	2.8	2.7	5.0	3.2	4.3	6.1
Hard to say	28.9	27.1	29.6	31.6	29.6	25.5	26.8

Are you ready to unite with other citizens into civic organisations for protection of your rights and interests?
% of respondents



In the past year, have you participated in any events organised by NGOs?
% of respondents



Can you say that you are actively involved in civic activity?
% of respondents



How strong is the influence of civil society organisations (NGOs) in modern Ukrainian society?
% of respondents



When people have common goals and want to reach them, what should they do to maximise the efficiency of their actions?
% of respondents



Who should represent your interests in social processes in the first place?
% of respondents



Awareness on changes to the Constitution,
% of respondents



Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine?
% of respondents



What is your attitude to voters "selling" their votes?
% of respondents



Does Ukraine need a Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada)?
% of respondents



In the past 12 months, have you turned to local administrations (district, oblast) for resolving your personal matters and to what extent were you satisfied with the outcome?
% of respondents



* Source: Ukrainian Society of 1992-2013. State and Change Dynamics. Sociological Monitoring (ed. by Dr. of Ec. Sc. V.Vorona, Dr. of Soc. Sc. M.Shulha). – Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2013, p.463.

** Source: Razumkov Centre survey data, September 2017.

What should be the role of the President in Ukraine?*
% of respondents



* Sources: 1994-2013 data – Ukrainian Society of 1992-2013. State and Change Dynamics. Sociological Monitoring (ed. by Dr. of Ec. Sc. V.Vorona, Dr. of Soc. Sc. M.Shulha), Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2013, p.463; 2014 data – Tables of Monitoring Survey "Ukrainian Society – 2014", *http://i-soc.com.ua/files/u/US-2014.pdf*.

Can people in Ukraine freely express their political views today?
% of respondents



* Sources: 1994-2013 data – Ukrainian Society of 1992-2013. State and Change Dynamics. Sociological Monitoring (ed. by Dr. of Ec. Sc. V.Vorona. Dr. of Soc. Sc. M.Shulha). Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine. 2013. p.463; 2017 data – Razumkov Centre survey. September 2017.

Does Ukraine have political leaders that could effectively manage the state?
% of respondents



* Sources: 1994-2013 data – Ukrainian Society of 1992-2013. State and Change Dynamics. Sociological Monitoring (ed. by Dr. of Ec. Sc. V.Vorona, Dr. of Soc. Sc. M.Shulha), Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2013, p.463; 2014-2015 data – Tables of Monitoring Surveys "Ukrainian Society", *http://i-soc.com.ua/files/u/US-2014.pdf, http://i-soc.com.ua/files/u/US-2015.doc; 2017 data – Razumkov Centre survey, September 2017.*

2. MAIN PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARISM IN UKRAINE

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – its Parliament, is the only state body authorised to represent the entire Ukrainian nation – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities. In the process of national elections of people's deputies of Ukraine, citizens delegate their power to participate in administration of public affairs to their representatives – people's deputies. Henceforth, citizens' interests are realised through Parliament's execution of its main functions – legislative, constituent, and controlling.

This section analyses the problems in the execution of the representative function, which are caused by the Parliament's place in the system of government institutions and internal institutional problems, as well as presents the perception of these problems by the parliamentarians themselves, as expressed in the survey of Ukrainian MPs.[1]

2.1. VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF STATE POWER

On 21 February 2014, the 7th Verkhovna Rada approved the Law "On Restoration of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine",[2] which reinstated the constitutional and legal order, modified by the anti-constitutional decision of the Constitutional Court on 30 September 2010, and created a proper constitutional basis to revive government institutions and overcome the consequences of the authoritarian rule.

At the same time, the reinstated constitutional provisions also contained a number of inconsistencies, which emerged in the work of previous parliaments and in relations between top government institutions in 2007-2010.[3] Consequently, some of these issues can resurface in the future, reducing the efficiency of parliament's execution of its representative function.

From the point of view of people's interests representation, parliamentary elections are just the first step. The next steps of the elected Parliament are to appoint the Prime Minister and approve Government composition. Here, Parliament's ability to influence key executive government officials is crucial, so that it is able to reject candidates or dismiss/remove officials from office.

Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers and Approval of Its Action Programme

The Constitution of Ukraine gives the Parliament considerable powers at the stage of approving the Head of Government and its composition. Verkhovna Rada makes an independent decision regarding support or rejection of the Prime Minister candidacy and the appointment of Government members (Insert "*Verkhovna Rada's Powers in Government Formation Compared to European States*", p.82).

In contrast with the Basic Law of 1996, which had Verkhovna Rada just approve the Prime Minister candidacy appointed by the President, and Cabinet composition – submitted by the Head of Government and appointed by the President, – in the current Constitution, the Parliament has wider powers.

Besides appointing the entire Cabinet of Ministers, according to Art. 85 of the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada also reviews the Government's Action Programme, which is approved by the majority of the Parliament's constitutional makeup.

At the same time, a major drawback in the current formula for Parliament's approval of the start of Government operation, is the separation of its two parts: Government formation and Programme approval. Namely, the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" (Art. 11) sets a 30-day period since the day the Government is formed for it to submit its Action Programme, and determines that the Parliament may grant an additional two-week period for Programme completion. However, neither this Law, nor the current Constitution foresee a dismissal of the Cabinet in case it fails to have its future Action Programme approved.

It is worth noting that early publication of a draft Government Programme would allow the MPs and constituents to become familiar with policy directions of the future Cabinet of Ministers. According to Art. 228 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure, the progress and results of implementing the submitted and approved Government Action Programme are subject to optional parliamentary control, which may be carried out at any moment at the demand of at least 1/3 of Verkhovna Rada's constitutional makeup.

[1] Expert survey of the people's deputies of Ukraine was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 5 October to 22 November 2017. 45 people's deputies were surveyed.

[2] The Law "On Restoration of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine with Amendments Introduced by the Laws of Ukraine dated 8 December 2004 No. 2222-IV, dated 1 February 2011 No. 2952-VI, dated 19 September 2013 No. 589-VII" (21 February 2014).

[3] For more information on the problematic issues, see: Constitutional Reform in Ukraine: Progress, Current State and Prospects. Analytical report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, No.1, 2007, p.23-28.

FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS PROCEDURE, 2006-2010, 2014-2017



Yet, the "non-compulsory" nature of Government Action Programme submission at the moment of its formation, in reality, leads to late submission, at the very least, and to Cabinet's work without an approved programme altogether – at most.

The absence of a clearly determined connection between appointing the Government and approving its Action Programme causes different versions of non-compliance with Art. 11 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" in our country: from "being 15 months late" to non-submission at all.

An original instance of "exceeding" this legislative requirement was presented by the first Government of V. Yanukovych (2002-2004) – in the 776 days that this Cabinet worked, the Action Programme was submitted twice. At that time, in the situation when Ukrainian politics was overrun by authoritarian practices, public attention to both documents was scarce. At the same time, as per Art. 87 of the Basic Law (both, former and current), Programme approval ensured V. Yanukovych Government's one-year "immunity" from the potential no-confidence vote.

It is also interesting that after the Orange Revolution, in the situation of a greater freedom of speech, instances of non-submission of Government Action Programmes became more frequent. In particular, they were not submitted by Yu. Yekhanurov, V. Yanukovych, and, later, twice by M. Azarov. At the same time, after public demonstrations against presidential vote rigging in 2004, another practice emerged – to submit the Programme together with Government approval. As of today, this practice was applied by Yu. Tymoshenko, A. Yatsenyuk and V. Hroysman.

Nevertheless, there is one more institutional drawback – absence of detailed requirements for this document's content. This gap allows to:

- submit declarative Programmes without a clear connection with further budgeting, which, therefore, provide no grounds for future political accountability of political forces represented in the Government;
- use the Programme in the work of the Cabinet only as political means for securing one-year immunity from potential consideration of the issue of Government accountability by the Parliament, with the possibility of no-confidence vote.

Thus, the key problem in the Ukrainian model of Cabinet formation is the separation of Government appointment and approval of its future Action Programme in the current legislation, as well as the gap related to the absence of requirements for the Programme's content. This contributes to the neglect of the Programme component and narrowing of Government parties' and blocs' political responsibility.

Since defining directions of the future government policy is non-compulsory, it adversely affects the quality of representation, and complicates or makes it altogether impossible to exercise effective parliamentary control over the work of the Cabinet.

Submission of the Cabinet of Ministers Action Programmes to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2017-1997

CONVOCATION (years)	PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT (by years)	DRAFT CABINET OF MINISTERS ACTION PROGRAMMES SUBMITTED FOR PARLIAMENT'S CONSIDERATION	CONSIDERATION STATUS	TIME OF SUBMISSION (after appointment)
3rd convocation 1998-2002	*V. Pustovoitenko's* Government (16.07.1997 – 22.12.1999)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 2195 dated 24.10.1998	Not included on the agenda and returned for further development (29.12.1999)	Submitted after 15 months
	V. Yushchenko's Government (22.12.1999 – 29.05.2001)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the draft Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 5231 dated 04.04.2000	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 06.04.2000 No. 1618-III	Submitted after 106 days
	A. Kinakh's Government (29.05.2001 – 21.11.2002)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Radaof Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1175 dated 07.06.2002	Draft recalled (11.07.2002)	Submitted after 12 months. Approved by Government Decree dated 5 June 2002 No. 779
4th convocation 2006-2002	First Government of *V. Yanukovych* (21.11.2002 – 04.02.2005)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 3240 dated 17.03.03 Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 5256-P dated 15.03.04	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 17.04.2003 No. 729-IV Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 16.03.2004 No. 1601-IV	Submitted after 118 days
	First Government of *Yu. Tymoshenko* (04.02.2005 – 22.09.2005)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Towards People" No. 7048 dated 04.02.2005	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 04.02.2005 No. 2426-IV	Submitted simultaneously with appointment for the position
	Yu. Yekhanurov's Government (22.09.2005 – 04.08.2006)	**Not submitted and not considered**	–	–
5th convocation 2006-2007	Second Government of *V. Yanukovych* (04.08.2006 – 18.12.2007)	**Not submitted and not considered**	–	–
6th convocation 2007-2012	Second Government of *Yu. Tymoshenko* (18.12.2007 – 11.03.2010)	Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Ukrainian Breakthrough: for People, not Politicians"	Draft recalled and withdrawn from consideration (11.03.2010)	Submitted after 30 days. Approved by the Government Decree dated 16 January 2008 No. 14
	First Government of *M. Azarov* (11.03.2010 – 13.12.2012)	**Not submitted and not considered**	-	-
7th convocation 2012-2014	Second Government of *M. Azarov* (13.12.2012 – 27.02.2014)	**Not submitted and not considered**	-	-
	A. Yatsenyuk's Government (27.02.2014 – 01.12.2014)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 4252 dated 27.02.14	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27.02.14 No. 799-VII	Submitted simultaneously with appointment for the position
8th convocation 2014 – until present	*A. Yatsenyuk's* Government (02.12.2014 – 15.04.2016)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1330 dated 09.12.14	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 11.12.2014 No. 26-VIII	Submitted after 10 days
	V. Hroysman's Government (15.04.2016 – until present)	Draft Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 4426 dated 14.04.2016	Approved by the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 14.04.2016 No. 1099-VIII	Submitted simultaneously with appointment for the position

Source: Besedina N. Approval of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Action Programme: Issues of Constitutional and Legislative Regulation. – *http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/1603/*. Supplemented with 2014-2016 data.

The Issue of Government Accountability to the Parliament

According to the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada has the right to take a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet. In Ukraine, the no-confidence vote is taken regarding the entire Government at once (the so-called collective responsibility). The decision is made by the absolute majority of the constitutional makeup of Ukraine's Parliament in the form of the no-confidence resolution.

At the same time, the Ukrainian version of the no-confidence vote is limited, as the Parliament can consider the issue of Cabinet's responsibility only once per one regular session (except for the last one, when it is altogether impossible); consideration of this issue is also prohibited within a year after Parliament's approval of Government Action Programme.

Along with this, the Verkhovna Rada cannot dismiss individual ministers on its own. According to the 1996 Constitution, this power was vested in the President. Yet, after the 2004 constitutional amendments took effect (since 1 January 2006), the initiative to dismiss Government members was transferred to the Prime Minister.[4] Parliament itself cannot initiate the mechanisms of accountability regarding individual ministers. Absence of such possibility limits Parliament's capacity to control Cabinet's implementation of state policy in different areas and, if necessary, influence this process, in particular, through human resources rotation.

Also, the domestic version of the no-confidence vote is not constructive: the Government is dismissed without any proposals as to the alternative composition of the future Cabinet and its Action Programme. This creates institutional conditions for the development of government crises. Also, Art. 90 of the Constitution sets a 60-day term after Cabinet's dismissal as the maximum period for the formation of a new Government, after which the President can initiate an early termination of the Verkhovna Rada. Thus, government crises can last up to two months without any consequences for the Parliament, and in case the President wishes them to go on – much longer.[5]

Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada's influence on the Cabinet of Ministers after its formation is limited. Government accountability to the Parliament in Ukrainian politics is characterised by a limited time-frame for a no-confidence voting in the entire Cabinet, and absence of individual responsibility of separate ministers. This does not help stimulate Government and its individual members to implement policies aligned with programme provisions of parliamentary political forces that have formed the Government and, thus limiting the realisation of citizens interests' representation in the work of executive government. Meanwhile, the lack of constructive component in the no-confidence voting, creates conditions for long-term government crises and weakens the efficiency of government system operation as a whole.

PARLIAMENTARY ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF UKRAINE, 2006-2010, 2014-2017

[4] P.1 of Art.18 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" requires the Prime Minister's submission in the situation of a minister's dismissal. Note, that Cabinet ministers can resign on their own initiative (on the basis of a personal notice).

[5] As, according to the Constitution, early termination of Parliament's duties is a right, not a responsibility of the Head of State.

Division of Policy Implementation Sectors between Parliament and President, Cohabitation Issue[6]

The current Constitution determines the following division of policy implementation sectors between the President and the Verkhovna Rada: security, defence and foreign affairs sectors are separate from others. According to Art. 102 of the Constitution, the President implements policy related to protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, abidance by the Constitution of Ukraine, human and citizen rights and freedoms. Other types of policy are the responsibility of the Prime Minister and his Government appointed by the Verkhovna Rada.

The priority of the President in the defence and foreign affairs sectors is defined in more detail in p. 3-5, 17-20 of Art. 106 of the Constitution, according to which, in particular, the President is the one making all staffing decisions in the diplomatic and military hierarchy. At the same time, accountability of the respective bodies to the President is not legally defined. Instead, due to inconsistencies and gaps in legislation, there is a possibility of conflicts regarding their appointment and dismissal, as well as formation of Government without the defence and foreign affairs ministers altogether.

This problem is aggravated in the situation of cohabitation, when political forces opposed to the President hold the majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Implementing a comprehensive state policy in this situation is complicated and slow, as the Head of State, according to the Basic Law, has a strong power of veto, which the Parliament can override only by 2/3 or more of its constitutional makeup.[7]

Due to this, approval of any decision requires coordination with the President.[8] As of today, our country has had no Head of State, apart from V. Yushchenko, who has worked in a cohabitation situation. Experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives counted that just in the 2nd half of 2006, presidential veto was used over 100 times,[9] which led to a major drop in the number of laws adopted by the Parliament.

Due to the combination of the two abovementioned issues, conflicts occur regarding those sectors, where, according to the Basic Law, ministers belong to the "President's quota".

First of all, for the Government to be functional, 2/3 of its members is enough.[10] Clearly, two ministers make up less than a third of all Cabinet, so the President's submission of candidates is not interfering with Government formation. Also, as regards certain positions, there is a possibility of separate submission, i.e. they can be absent in the main submission of Government composition

Presidential Veto in a Situation of Cohabitation (Ukrainian Experience)



Source: Power of Veto: Foreign Experience, National Law and Practices, Proposals. - "PARLIAMENT" journal, No. 5, 2009, p.18-19

by the Prime Minister of Ukraine.[11] Therefore, in the situation of a conflict that accompanies cohabitation, parliamentary majority can approve Cabinet composition without the ministers of defence and foreign affairs.

Second, despite the fact that the Constitution defines President's priority in defence and foreign policy, there is no legally determined accountability of the heads of corresponding ministries to the President. According to p. 12 of Art. 85, Verkhovna Rada has the power to make decisions on the dismissal of these two Government members as well. At the same time, according to p. 2, part 1 of Art. 18 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine", dismissal of the defence and foreign affairs ministers can be initiated by the Prime Minister, as well as the Head of State.

Although the Law states that such initiative by the Prime Minister requires President's approval, there is no procedure for providing such approval in the legislation. Thus, despite the priority the Head of State has as regards national security and defence and foreign policy sectors, the Parliament has the power to make decisions on dismissal of the corresponding ministers.

6 Situation, when the President is from a different political party than the majority of the Verkhovna Rada members.

7 P. 4 of Art. 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

8 Another situation occurs in the absence of cohabitation, when after elections the President is the leader of the parliamentary faction that has the majority in the Verkhovna Rada, or is at least the largest political force in the Parliament. The extent of the President's influence on policy implementation in this case depends on his standing within his own political party. If party leadership that has nominated him dominates over the President, then the level of influence the parliamentary party leader has on policy implementation exceeds that of the President. In the opposite case, the President has an indirect influence on all policy sectors.

9 Power of Veto: Foreign Experience, National Law and Practices, Proposals. – "PARLIAMENT" journal, No. 5, 2009, p. 18-19.

10 P.5 of Art. 10 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine".

11 P. 3 of Art. 9 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" states: "Candidates for certain positions, listed in the submission on Government composition, can be submitted separately."

So, the division of policy implementation areas introduced by the Constitution (since 2006) is incomplete. Gaps in legislation regarding appointment and dismissal of the defence and foreign affairs ministers can lead to destabilisation in the management of these two strategically important sectors.

The Basic Law of Ukraine contains a conflict, the essence of which is that the Head of State forms the entire top military and diplomatic corps, but its heads are not accountable to the President. Therefore, it would be logical to capture in legislation the presidential power to dismiss the ministers of defence and foreign affairs, and parliamentary power – to dismiss all other Cabinet members. This will allow to strengthen the constitutional division of policy implementation areas and remove institutional conflict factors from the sectors of defence and foreign affairs, thus minimising adverse effects of cohabitation.

Verkhovna Rada – Cabinet of Ministers Relations within the Budget Process

Another important issue that concerns not only the division of powers between the Parliament and the Government, but also the functionality of parliamentarism, is the Verkhovna Rada's role in the process of development, consideration and approval of State Budget.[12]

The power of initiative in our country's budget process belongs to the executive government, and control – to the Parliament. According to p. 6 of Art. 116 of the Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers develops the draft law on the State Budget of Ukraine, and after its approval by the Verkhovna Rada, ensures its implementation. During presentation of the draft law on the State Budget for the following year and reviewing annual reports on the implementation of budget programmes, the Verkhovna Rada can require main government budget managers to give a presentation at its plenary session.[13] Also, the Parliament can implement measures of external financial state control. This is done via the Accounting Chamber, the members and leadership of which are appointed by the Verkhovna Rada with the majority of its composition. A decision on the surprise inspection of auditors from this body can be made at any time by a third of parliamentarians.[14]

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is a very important participant of the budget process in the planning stage as well. It has the power to change any provision in the Government draft. Only the Parliament has the right to approve the State Budget. During its approval, MPs introduce several thousand amendments: for instance,

last year, there were 1,167.[15] Thus, many proposals to improve the future State Budget turn it into a whole new document.

The first possible reason for such hyperactivity on the part of parliamentarians is the low quality of the government draft. Formally responsible for its development is the Minister of Finance. However, in reality, the draft budget is determined by: first, the information base for forecasting and analysis of socio-economic development trends and patters, developed by the State Statistics Service (which is responsible for its accuracy),[16] and, second, – analytical materials of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT), based foremost on the data received from the State Statistics Service. MEDT has to annually submit this analysis to the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank until 1 March.[17]

This extremely important research document is based on indicators of foreign direct investment, external trade, inflation, GDP and other data that determine the validity and amount of expenses in each sector, and the amount of revenues to be accumulated in the following budget period, which is crucial for balancing the budget. Yet, these institutions are not mentioned in the Budget Code. So, formally, the only authority responsible for Draft Budget quality is the Minister of Finance. The responsibility of the Minister of Finance to develop Draft Budget and Government's exclusive right to initiative in this matter were borrowed from a British model, however, in the UK, any amendments to the draft budget are made only after consultations with the minister. Ukrainian legislation does not require this from MPs.

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[12] Financial powers were historically Parliament's first function as an institution. The UK House of Commons, for instance, got them two centuries before the legislative powers, the Parliament of France – almost four centuries earlier.

[13] P. 1 of Art. 154 and p. 3 of Art. 162 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure.

[14] P. 7 of Art. 161 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure.

[15] The table of proposals from subjects of the right to initiative regarding the draft Law of Ukraine on the State Budget of Ukraine for 2017. – *http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=60032&pf35401=403860*.

[16] Paragraph 4 of the Regulation on the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 481 dated 23 September 2014.

[17] Paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On the Development of Forecast and Programme Documents for Economic and Social Development and Creating the Draft of the State Budget" No. 621 dated 26 April 2003.

Second possible reason for the large number of changes and proposals is political fighting and the use of the budget process as its instrument. This claim is supported by the fact that there is a sharp increase in the number of changes and proposals for the Draft Law on the State Budget as political battle aggravates. For instance, at the end of 2004, this number reached 14 thousand.[18]

Also, the budget becomes a hostage in political battle due to the lack of provisions on budget planning for a period longer than a year, which is often mentioned by experts.[19]

This is why every year the budget is a new document from start to the end, composed based on current reality, without consideration of the state's development strategy. Consequently, every year, there is a fight for each of the planned indicators, while global practices show that this problem has an easy solution.

According to S. Frolov, in Canada, the bulk of items is planned for four years ahead, with annual adjustments. Deviations from the inflation-adjusted indicator cannot exceed 5%. Programmes are complete and are calculated for the entire period. Thus, all political battles take place around the small 5% of the entire volume of public funds, and the new programmes that are being implemented.[20]

Also destructive are domestic parliamentary practices to adjust tax and social legislation every year using laws on the State Budget – in certain European countries such as Italy and Spain this is directly prohibited by law.

The Verkhovna Rada has a lot of power within the budget process as compared to parliaments (lower chambers) of the vast majority of European states. The indicators of Parliament's powers and capacity index within the budget process[21] are higher in Ukraine, than the corresponding values in other countries.

The abovementioned politicisation of the budget process brings forward one more issue – the delayed adoption of the State Budget. Consequently, new initiatives of the executive government are not getting funded, benefits and social security payments are being delayed, and financial planning of all state institutions is getting blocked, especially on the local level.

According to Art. 41 of the Budget Code of Ukraine, if the State Budget is not adopted, last year's Budget remains effective in a limited form: p. 2 of part 1 of this article provides for the funding of protected headings of the budget only, with the total monthly payments not exceeding 1/12 of the total budget allocations in last year's State Budget.

Thus, despite the considerable power and authority the Verkhovna Rada has to adjust the state budget, there are some institutional problems in the national Parliament's implementation of its budget function, such as the unlimited individual legislative initiative, the possibility of annual budget planning "from scratch", and the absence of legally determined responsibility to support the budget process with data from the State Statistics Service and expert analysis by the respective ministry.

Budget Powers and Capacity of European Countries' Parliaments



[18] Tkachenko O. Ukrainian Reality of State Budget Consideration and Approval. – Investment: Practices and Experience, 2011, No. 5, p.38.

[19] For example, according to S. Frolov, the absence of long-term financial plans in the country leads to the lack of coordination between financial-budget and socio-economic state strategies: "Ukrainian state has essentially no possibilities for implementing counter cyclical policy, i.e. balancing budget deficit and surplus depending on the economic cycle stage". See: Frolov S. The Study of Issues of Organisation and Implementation of Budget Process in Ukraine. – Economy Regulation Mechanism, 2010, No. 3, V. 2, p.32-40.

[20] Frolov S. The Study of Issues of Organisation and Implementation of Budget Process in Ukraine. – Economy Regulation Mechanism, No. 3, 2010, V. 2, p.33.

[21] This refers to the index of powers and capacity of parliaments in the budget process, applied by J. Wehner. It can have different values from 0 to 100 points in different countries. The index consists of two sub-indices with the total value of each – up to 50 points. The first one – the sub-index of powers – is the sum of points for parameters of the volume of Parliament's budget powers and its importance during budget approval and implementation. Second component – the sub-index of organisational capacity – is the sum of points for parameters of time resources, institutional and research capacity of parliament's budget institutions. For more information, see: Wehner J. Legislatures and the Budget Process. The Myth of Fiscal Control. – London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp.60-61.

Powers and Capacity of Parliament in the Budget Process
(*by points*)

	Volume of powers to adjust Draft Budget[1] (the extent, to which Parliament is empowered to make adjustments to the Government Draft)	**Importance of budget approval by the Parliament**[2] (what happens if the Parliament does not approve the budget)	**Importance of parliament's decisions at the stage of national budget implementation**[3]	**Sub-index of powers** (sum of values by the parameters of the volume of budget powers, parliament's importance at the stage of budget approval and implementation)	**Time resource**[4] (how many months before the fiscal year is Draft Budget submitted)	**Institutional resource**[5] (existence of a separate auditing body, a separate budget committee and the role of sectoral committees)	**Research resources**[6] (presence and size of the analysis and research section of the budget/finance committee that studies Draft State Budget)	**Sub-index of organisational capacity** (sum of values by the parameters of time, institutional and research capacity)	**Parliament's powers and capacity INDEX in the budget process**
Austria	10.0	6.7	6.7	**38.9**	3.3	6.7	0.0	**16.7**	**55.6**
Belgium	10.0	10.0	0.0	**33.3**	0.0	8.3	0.0	**13.9**	**47.2**
Czech Republic	10.0	6.7	0.0	**27.8**	3.3	5.0	0.0	**13.9**	**41.7**
Denmark	10.0	6.7	3.3	**33.3**	6.7	6.7	0.0	**22.2**	**55.6**
Finland	10.0	0.0	6.7	**27.8**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**38.9**
France	2.5	0.0	0.0	**4.2**	3.3	5.0	0.0	**13.9**	**18.1**
Germany	10.0	6.7	3.3	**33.3**	6.7	5.0	0.0	**19.4**	**52.8**
Greece	0.0	6.7	0.0	**11.1**	0.0	5.0	0.0	**8.3**	**19.4**
Hungary	10.0	10.0	6.7	**44.4**	3.3	10.0	0.0	**22.2**	**66.7**
Iceland	10.0	0.0	6.7	**27.8**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**38.9**
Ireland	0.0	0.0	3.3	**5.6**	0.0	6.7	0.0	**11.1**	**16.7**
Italy	10.0	0.0	3.3	**22.2**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**33.3**
Luxembourg	10.0	10.0	0.0	**33.3**	3.3	6.7	0.0	**16.7**	**50.0**
Netherlands	10.0	6.7	6.7	**38.9**	6.7	3.3	2.5	**20.8**	**59.7**
Norway	10.0	10.0	6.7	**44.4**	3.3	6.7	0.0	**16.7**	**61.1**
Ukraine	10.0	6.7	6.7*	**38.9**	3.3	6.7	5.0	**25.0**	**63.9**
Poland	7.5	0.0	0.0	**12.5**	3.3	6.7	5.0	**25.0**	**37.5**
Portugal	10.0	6.7	0.0	**27.8**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**38.9**
Slovakia	10.0	0.0	3.3	**22.2**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**33.3**
Spain	5.0	6.7	3.3	**25.0**	3.3	5.0	0.0	**13.9**	**38.9**
United Kingdom	2.5	3.3	3.3	**15.3**	0.0	3.3	0.0	**5.6**	**20.8**
Sweden	10.0	10.0	6.7	**44.4**	3.3	6.7	2.5	**20.8**	**65.3**
Switzerland	10.0	10.0	10.0	**50.0**	3.3	3.3	0.0	**11.1**	**61.1**

* 6.7 points for Ukraine as the indicator of parliament's importance at the stage of budget implementation only indicates the formal flexibility of budget implementation, which is not always the reality. Although, government does not have the power to move funds between budget items without parliament's approval, according to experts, in reality, it is possible. Similarly, the annual state budget does not allocate any reserve funds, yet the financial resources in the form of unused local funds become such a reserve.

Source: Wehner J. Legislatures and the Budget Process. The Myth of Fiscal Control. – London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.60-61.

1 **0 points** – Parliament's powers are limited to approving or not approving Government's Draft Budget without adjustments; **2.5** – powers to cut the existing articles and/or adjust their language; **5** – powers to move funds between budget items without increasing the volume of total expenses; **7.5** – powers to move funds between budget items without increasing the deficit; **10** – unlimited powers to move funds between budget items, adjust their language, cut existing articles, etc.

2 **0 points** – budget proposed by the executive government is effective or snap parliamentary election is called; **3.3** – each item of expenditure takes a separate vote; **6.7** – last year's budget is effective; **10** – no expenses.

3 Parliament's importance indicator at the stage of budget implementation is calculated based on three parameters: a) whether the executive government can move funds between programmes and budget items; b) whether the executive government can delay public spending without parliament's approval; c) whether there are reserve funds in the annual state budget. **0 points** means answer "yes" for all three parameters, **3.3** – answer "yes" for two out of three parameters, **6.7** – answer "yes" for one out of three parameters, **10** – answer "no" for all three parameters.

4 **0 points** – State Budget Draft is submitted 2 months before the start of fiscal year, **3.3** – 4 months before the start of fiscal year, **6.7** – 6 months before, **10** – more than 6 months before.

5 Institutional resource indicator is measured by three parameters: a) existence of a separate budget or financial Parliament committee; b) existence of a separate body that performs audit based on budget implementation data (revenues and expenses); c) whether sectoral committees have full authority over the corresponding budget segments. **0** points means answer "no" for all three parameters, **3.3** – answer "no" for two out of three parameters, **6.7** – answer "no" for one out of three parameters, **10** – answer "yes" for all three parameters.

6 **0 points** – there is no analysis and research section in the budget committee; **2.5** – there is a small analysis and research section up to 10 persons; **5** – there is a medium analysis and research section from 11 to 25 persons; **7.5** – there is a large analysis and research section from 26 to 50 persons; **10** – there is a very large analysis and research section with over 50 persons.

VERKHOVNA RADA'S POWERS IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION COMPARED TO EUROPEAN STATES

The Electoral Power Index[1] of Parliament is the indicator of its decisions' importance in the matters of Government formation.

In its calculation, it is considered, whether the Parliament is involved in the process of Government formation, whether it has the power to approve Government composition, the Prime Minister candidacy, and/or approve the Government Programme. The maximum possible number of candidates for the Prime Minister position, subjects with the right to propose candidates, are also taken into account. Rules of decision-making are an important index parameter, in particular, whether the absolute majority is required for this, and which type of voting is used.

Unexpected, but true: the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has second highest Electoral Power Index value in Europe after the German Bundestag.

Parliament's Power in Government Election

	Is the Parliament involved in Government formation?	Does the Parliament have the power to approve the entire Government composition and/or the Prime Minister and/or approve the Government Programme?	Acceptable number of candidates for the Prime Minister position	Who has the right to propose the Prime Minister candidacy?	Which method is used for decision-making?	Which type of voting is used?	**Electoral Power Index**
Austria	No	No	–	–	–	–	**0**
Belgium	Yes	No	1	Monarch	relative majority*	open	**0.5**
Czech Republic	Yes	Yes	1	President or parliament	relative majority	open	**0.83**
Denmark	No	No	–	–	–	–	**0**
Estonia	Yes	Yes	>1	Party group with not less than 5% of MPs	relative majority	open	**1**
Finland	Yes	Yes	>1	Every deputy	relative majority	open	**1**
France	No	No	–	–	–	–	**0**
Germany	Yes	Yes	>1	25% of MPs or a party group with over 25% of deputies	absolute majority	secret	**1.83**
Greece	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	relative majority	open	**0.5**
Hungary	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	absolute majority	open	**0,75**
Ireland	Yes	Yes	1	Every deputy	relative majority	open	**0.83**
Italy	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	relative majority	open	**0.5**
Latvia	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	relative majority	open	**0.5**
Lithuania	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	relative majority	secret	**0.83**
Luxembourg	Yes	Yes	1	Monarch	relative majority	open	**0.5**
Malta	No	No	–	–	–	–	**0**
Netherlands	No	No	–	–	–	–	**0**
Portugal	Yes	No	1	Head of state	relative majority*	open	**0.5**
Slovakia	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state	relative majority	secret	**0.83**
Slovenia	Yes	Yes	1	Head of state, 10 deputies or a party group with not less than 3.3% of MPs	relative majority	secret	**1.16**
Sweden	Yes	No	1	President or parliament	relative majority*	open	**0,83**
Spain	Yes	Yes	1	Monarch	relative majority	open	**0.5**
United Kingdom	Yes	Yes	1	Monarch	relative majority	open	**0.5**
Ukraine	Yes	Yes	1	coalition of majority with not less than 226 deputies (50%+1)	absolute majority	open	**1.245**

* In Belgium, Portugal and Sweden a decision can be made by even fewer votes than the relative majority, as the only requirement is not to have the absolute majority "against".

Source: The Electoral Power Index was developed by taking into consideration the study by Sieberer U. Checks or Toothless Tigers? Powers and Incentives of External Officeholders to Constrain the Cabinet in 25 European Democracies. – Government and Opposition, 2012, October, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp.517-543.

[1] The Electoral Power Index (EPI) – the index of parliament's power in government election, which is calculated with the formula EPI=IxD+V, where: D – method of decision-making (D=1.5, if the decision is made with the absolute majority of parliament members; D=1, if there is the relative majority rule), V – type of voting (V=0 in case of an open vote, V=0.33 in case of a secret vote). Parliament's level of involvement in the election of government (I) is calculated using the scale, where I=0, if the government is elected without parliament's participation, I=0.5, if the parliament does not propose the Prime Minister candidacy and votes for a single candidate only, I=0.66, if the parliament does not propose the Prime Minister candidacy and votes for several proposed candidates, I=0.83, if the parliament proposes the Prime Minister candidacy and votes once to approve or reject a single candidate, I=1, if the Prime Minister candidacy is proposed by the parliament, which takes a vote regarding several proposed candidates. Thus, index value can be from 0 to 1.83.

Index of Parliament's Power in Government Election



The values of this index for 26 European countries, including Ukraine, are divided into several groups by common features. The first group includes Germany, Estonia, Finland and Poland. In these four countries, parliaments vote for a certain ranking of potential government heads, i.e. there are more candidates than one. The difference is that in the Estonian Riigikogu, Finnish Eduskunta and Polish Sejm it is enough for the winner to get at least one more vote over his nearest competitor, i.e. there is a rule of relative majority. At the same time, there is one more rule in the German Bundestag: in order for the Chancellor to be considered authorised to lead Germany's government, he has to be supported by the absolute majority, i.e. ½+1 MP. Thus, Germany's Parliament, according to the Basic Law, has to say a very powerful "yes", even though there are alternatives in the voting. So, the index of parliament's power in government election is much higher in Germany, than in Poland, Finland and Estonia.

The second group of countries, includes Ukraine, as well as Slovenia, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden. Compared with the four abovementioned countries, in these seven the Parliament also nominates the Prime Minister, however votes only for one candidacy. In this group, Ukraine has the highest index value for the same reasons that Germany is the leader in group one – because the future head of the Cabinet has to be approved by the majority of Parliament's constitutional makeup. Instead, in all other countries, the relative majority of those present is enough.

In all other countries, the Parliament has no power to nominate the Prime Minister. The index value for these seven countries, which equals 0.5 (and 0.75 for Hungary),[2] means that the parliament votes for the candidate proposed from outside (by the monarch or head of state). The states with the zero value of electoral power index are characterised by their parliaments' complete non-involvement in government formation. Nevertheless, in the Constitutions of Norway, Denmark, Austria and Netherlands, parliamentarians have maximum powers for terminating operation of the entire Government, or each minister individually.

[2] Hungary's value of 0.75 is higher in this group again due to the rule of absolute majority in government formation.

2.2. CERTAIN ISSUES OF VERKHOVNA RADA'S INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Representation and the Problem of Electoral System Optimisation

The institution of elections is one of the most stable institutions within Ukraine's political system. The majority of citizens (67%) name elections as the way, through which a Verkhovna Rada deputy comes to power.[22] Depending on the region, this percentage is from 47% (South) to 82% (West). Each fifth adult in Ukraine has taken part in the electoral process. Percentage of participation in election commissions is from 17% in the Centre to 22% in the South of Ukraine. As a result, the majority (52%) of citizens can correctly identify the main function of district election commissions – the counting of votes.

Electoral system plays an important role in realising the principle of democratic representation. At the parliamentary elections stage, interests of individual voters are aggregated (collected, coordinated), which is reflected in their joint voting for a list of candidates of a certain political party or for individual candidates, whose programmes are most consistent with these interests.

[22] The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 22-27 September 2017 in all regions of Ukraine, except Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Number of respondents – 2,008, age – from 18 y.o. Theoretical error of the sample does not exceed 2.3%.

From the point of view of ensuring representation, there are four aspects of electoral law:

- geographical representation (representatives are elected to the legislative body from all regions and population centres, and are ultimately responsible to their regions);
- representation of ideological differences existing in the society in the legislative body – through representatives of political parties, independent representatives, or both;
- representation of political parties existing in the country in the legislative body, even if they have no ideological basis: "if half of voters give their vote for a party, and yet this party gets no or almost no seats in the legislative body, such system cannot be viewed as the one expressing people's will";
- according to the concept of "descriptive representation",[23] the legislative body has to serve as the "nation's mirror" to a certain degree, i.e. it should reflect and represent the whole nation in all of its actions. An adequate descriptive legislative body should include men and women, young and old, rich and poor, as well as representatives of different religious denominations, language and ethnic groups within the society.[24]

Experts assessed that Ukraine has made "major steps towards introducing European standards of democratic elections through implementation of corresponding norms in the national electoral legislation",[25] and the national regulatory framework for conducting elections is mostly harmonised with these standards.[26]

Documents of international organisations that define these standards, do not specify a preference for a specific electoral system. For example, the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters adopted by the Venice Commission states that within the respect of the general European principles in electoral matters mentioned in the document, "any electoral system may be chosen".[27] This allows individual countries to adopt electoral laws based on their national features and priorities.

Key characteristics of Ukrainian parliamentary elections legislation are, first of all, its significant variability (there were no more than two consecutive elections conducted under the same electoral law), and second, a rather limited "corridor" of variations: Until today, there were two "extreme" models (by the type of candidate nomination) – majority system with single-mandate districts or proportional election system with closed lists, and their combination – parallel mixed system. Each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages,[28] given the fact that there is no perfect electoral system at all.

Attempts to go beyond the limits of this "corridor", in particular, through the introduction of modifications to the proportional or majority system, gave first practical results only in 2017. The Electoral Code, adopted in the first reading, introduces electoral system with regional lists of political parties with preferences (in the part on elections to the Verkhovna Rada).[29]

The system of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has often changed, primarily because it has been the subject of political calculations and agreements between government and leading political forces. All six major versions of the electoral law – 1989,[30] 1993,[31] 1997,[32] 2001,[33] 2004[34] and 2010[35] – were adopted a year or two prior to elections. Thus, as of today, four campaigns were conducted according to the mixed system and two according to each – majority and proportional. So, Ukraine has the longest experience of using mixed electoral system.

Characteristics of Electoral Systems Used in Ukraine (1994-2014)

Years	Majority segment		Connection between majority and proportional segments	Proportional segment		
	Formula	Number of territorial electoral districts		Type of lists in the proportional segment	Magnitude of the national electoral district	Electoral threshold
1994	absolute majority in two rounds	450	–	–	–	–
1998	relative majority	225	none	closed	225	4%
2002	relative majority	225	none	closed	225	4%
2006	–	–	–	closed	450	3%
2007	–	–	–	closed	450	3%
2012	relative majority	225	none	closed	225	5%
2014	relative majority	225	none	closed	225	5%

[23] See: Political Representation: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation*.
[24] See: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, *http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/introduction/es20*.
[25] See: Kliuchkovskyi Yu. On the Issue of the Nature of International Election Standards. – Scientific Notes, V.144-145, p.73-77, *http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/2981/Kliuchkovskyi_do_pytannia.pdf*.
[26] See, for example: Seriohina S. European Standards of Elections and Electoral Legislation of Ukraine. – Central Election Commission Journal, No. 1 (7), 2007, p.38-44.
[27] Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Guidelines and Explanatory Report, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 51st and 52nd Plenary Session (Venice, 5-6 July and 18-19 October 2002), p.11, *http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vsu/vsu.nsf/7864c99c46598282c2257b4c0037c014/229b826c8ac787dec2257d87004987c3/$FILE/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%81_%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%87%D1%96_%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8.pdf*.
[28] For more information on advantages and disadvantages of different electoral systems in brief, see, in particular: Wall Alan, Electoral System Briefing Paper. – ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, *https://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/electoral-systems/SDOC1584.pdf*.
[29] See: Draft Electoral Code of Ukraine. – *http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=56671*.
[30] The Law of Ukrainian SSR "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukrainian SSR" dated 27 October 1989.
[31] The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 18 November 1993.
[32] The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 24 September 1997.
[33] The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 18 October 2001.
[34] The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 25 March 2004.
[35] The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 17 November 2010.

All types of electoral systems that have been used in Ukraine as of today have a different level of disproportionality, i.e. the number of constituents' votes, whose will has not been taken into account.

Traditionally, most disproportionate results are typical for the majority system in its pure form, which is a result of the majority principle it employs. This is why the national experience of voting for candidates in single-mandate electoral districts used as part of the mixed system in 1998, 2002, 2012 and 2014, shows a high level of disproportionality.

For instance, in 2012, percentage of votes of constituents, whose candidate got elected, ranged from 19.4% to 80.1%, consequently, there were from 19.1% to 80.6% of votes that were unaccounted for, depending on the district; and the average level of disproportionality was 54.6% (in the 2014 elections, due to a lower turnout, it was even higher – 73.4%).

At the same time, proportional representation, with the fragmented and volatile party system in today's Ukraine, also represents a certain level of disproportionality: on the average, in voting for party lists, about 20% of voters is being ignored, and in times of drastic changes of the party system, this percentage is even higher.

For instance, in 1998, the votes of 29% of citizens turned out to be unaccounted for in the proportional segment, as their votes were redistributed between parties, for which they did not vote. In 2014, this percentage was 23.5%. Note that when the proportional system was used in its pure form, the level of disproportionality of the electoral system was slightly lower. Namely, in 2006, the will of 22% of voters was changed, in 2007 – 12%.[36]

So, despite the fact that both, the majority and the proportional electoral systems demonstrate disproportionality in Ukraine, proportional representation, from this point of view, looks like a better option.

In conditions, where the electoral system is not stable yet and is being actively shaped, it is interesting to consider the views of citizens on this institution. According to the Razumkov Centre's survey results, starting from the 2000s, the number of citizens, who could not give an answer to the question "Which system of elections do you consider the best for Ukraine?" was decreasing. Thus in 2001-2009, percentage of undecided respondents dropped from 35.5% to 25.5%.

The relative majority of Ukrainian citizens preferred the majority system, the support for which grew from 25.2% in 2004 to 47.6% in 2009. Popularity of the proportional system with closed lists was at the lowest level – especially noticeable was a drop in its support after it was used in two election campaigns in 2006-2007.

At the same time, this tendency does not go further, and at the end of 2011, the number of answers "hard to say" grows to the maximum level, and as for the different types of electoral systems, people's opinions divided with a slight tilt in favour of the majority system.

In the focus of the Razumkov Centre's research was one more question, important for electoral system operation: who should be the subject of candidate nomination. Essentially, two opposite options are possible: candidate-centred and party-centred. In Ukraine, Art. 10 of the current Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" provides for the institution of self-nomination, along with the right of political parties to nominate MP candidates.

Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine?[37]
% of respondents



[36] All data on disproportionality presented here is calculated based on official information from the Central Election Commission, *http://www.cvk.gov.ua.*

[37] 2009 and 2011 data is from the studies conducted by Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service on 18-28 December 2009 and 9-16 December 2011. 2001-2007 data is from the following source: "Sociological Survey" section, question "*Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine? (dynamics, 2001-2007)*". – Web-site of the Razumkov Centre, *http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=99*.



In order to determine citizens' attitude to this issue, we used a survey[38] with the 11-point scale, where "0" meant that candidates should have the right to nominate themselves in territorial electoral districts, and "10" – that only parties have the right to nominate candidates (Diagram "*Distribution of Citizens' Attitude to the Issue of Candidate Nomination*").

Results showed that society expresses more support for self-nomination of candidates. 24.3% of respondents placed their position within the 0-2-point range on the 11-point scale (supporting candidates' right to self-nomination). Giving parties the exclusive right to nominate candidates (8-10 points) was supported by 7.9% of citizens. 20.4% of respondents placed their position regarding this issue in the middle of the scale (5 points). Rather supportive of the parties' right to nominate candidates (6-7 points) were 10.9% of respondents, yet almost twice as much – had a degree of support for self-nomination (3-4 points) – 18.7%.

These results are not unexpected, given the low level of public trust in political parties. They also demonstrate the significance of personal factor for citizens at the time of MP candidate nomination.

One of the key reservations about the majority electoral system in Ukrainian reality is its higher susceptibility to the phenomenon of "buying" ("selling") of constituents' votes. For example, in the 2012 elections, these practices were used by candidates in single-mandate districts more often than by political parties and blocks taking part in electoral campaigns.[39] This problem is directly connected with the state of voters' political culture. According to experts, it is still relevant today[40] and requires improvement of legislation.[41]

During the survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in September 2017, respondents' attitude to voters "selling" their votes was studied. It has been found that such practices are perceived mostly negatively by the society, and that, at the same time, the condemnation of such practices among the population tends to increase in time.

What is your attitude to constituents "selling" their votes?
% of respondents



Most citizens – both, in 2012, and in 2017 – believed that "selling one's vote" cannot be justified by anything. Notably, the share of respondents with a negative attitude to these practices has grown by 18% in the past five years; along with this, the number of those, who tolerate them, has decreased two-fold, and the category of those indifferent to pre-election bribery has reduced by 6%.

Distribution of Citizens' Attitude to the Issue of Candidate Nomination



[38] Data of the study conducted by Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service on 22-27 September 2017.

[39] For more information, see: Kochubei L. Features of Electoral Technologies in the 2012 Verkhovna Rada Election Campaign. – Ukrainian Information Environment, 2013, Number 1, Part 2, p.92-98; The Regionals Arrange a Pre-Election Circus with Gifts for Budget Funds. – Tyzhden (The Week), 25 August 2012, *http://tyzhden.ua/News/58546*.

[40] Elections in UTC (United Territorial Communities): Key Problem – Vote-Buying. – Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), 1 May 2017, *http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/05/1/7142805*.

[41] According to experts from the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, it is necessary to ensure that vote-buying is treated, i.a. as provision of illegal benefits to constituents by charitable foundations, NGOs whose names are look-alikes with the names of the parties that are subjects of electoral process, candidates, or use the same combination of symbols (words, letters, numbers, image elements, colour combinations) as the party that is a subject of electoral process or a candidate during the election campaign. Also, the notion of vote-buying in the Criminal Code should be harmonised with that in the electoral law. In particular, see: Committee of Voters of Ukraine Held a Round Table: "Lessons Learned in the 2017 Local UTC Elections and Ways to Improve Electoral Law". – Committee of Voters of Ukraine, 13 November 2017, *http://cvu.org.ua/nodes/view/type:news/slug:vidbuvsia-kruhlyi-stil*.

In the past several years, there has been an interest to the open-list electoral system, which is new for our country. Among today's parliamentary parties, its introduction was foreseen in the election programmes of AUU "Batkivshchyna",[42] "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" party,[43] the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko.[44] This type of electoral system was also proposed in the previous parliamentary elections of 2012 by AUU "Svoboda" and political party "Vitali Klitschko's UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform)".[45]

Besides, according to the "European Ukraine" agreement of the effective deputy faction coalition in the 8th Verkhovna Rada, in the part of electoral law reform aimed at ensuring Parliament's accountability and efficiency, stability of the party system and a possibility for the rotation of political elites at the end of 2014 – the abandoning of the mixed system (proportional-majority) was planned and the introduction of the proportional system of elections to the Verkhovna Rada, in the framework of which, voters will be able to vote for specific candidates in multi-mandate constituencies (open-list proportional system).[46] Among government regeneration measures, the Action Programme of the current Government also provides for its introduction.[47]

It should be added that this type of electoral system has major public support. Even after a certain decrease of its support in 2014-2017, it is still considered the best by 34% of citizens (Diagram "*Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine?*", p.88).

The preferential system (another name for the open-list system) has advantages as compared to the closed party list system. On the one hand, the regional type of open lists preserves the benefits of personal connection between voters and their MPs, and on the other – the proportional principle of vote distribution in the preferential system also helps strengthen political parties. Thus, the introduction of open regional lists election system is better suited to public expectations and the need to improve representative democracy in Ukraine.

Arguments in favour of implementing regional lists turned up as the result of a survey of European Parliament members conducted at the end of the 20th century by the research group headed by S. Bowler and D. Farrell.[48] Researchers singled out two groups of proportional election systems used in elections to the European Parliament. The first group included such countries as Germany, Italy and Belgium, where regional lists are used. The second group – Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece, where national lists are used. The results showed a clear correlation between the type of election lists and the form of contact with the voter (Table "*In what form do you communicate with individual voters?*").

All surveyed members of the European Parliament combine different forms of communication with individual voters. At the same time, German, Belgian and Italian MPs demonstrated a much higher level of continuity and regularity of such communication in permanent offices or during regular reception sessions.

Representatives of other countries prefer the practice of ad hoc reception sessions, with 90% of them stating they do not hold regular meetings, and 42% – do not have permanent offices. So, the regional type of party lists is more effective for improving contacts between MPs and voters, than national lists.

In what form do you communicate with individual voters?[49]
% of European Parliament members

Form of contact with voters	European MPs elected in elections with *regional* lists		European MPs elected in elections with *national* lists	
	Practice, %	Do not practice,%	Practice, %	Do not practice,%
Running *a permanent office* with full-time staff	69	27	55	42
Reception of voters on *a regular basis*	18	77	7	90
Reception of voters on *an ad hoc basis*	27	66	33	64

[42] Election programme of the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" – "Ukraine Will Win!", *https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/vyboru2014/party/p2/program*.

[43] Programme of the "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" party – "To Live in a New Way!", *http://solydarnist.org/?page_id=874*.

[44] Programme of Oleh Liashko's Radical Party "Lyashko's Plan. Ukraine's Victory", *http://liashko.ua/program*.

[45] Parliament and Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine in 2012: Political Situation, Public Sentiment and Expectations. – Information-analytical materials of the Razumkov Centre, Roundtable "Ukraine On the Eve of Parliamentary Elections: Will People's Expectations Come True", 26 September 2012, p.81, *http://old.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Przh_Partiyi_2012_fnll.pdf*.

[46] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 8th Convocation, Agreement "On the Coalition of Deputy Factions "European Ukraine" dated 27 November 2014, *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/file/text/33/f439014n8.pdf*.

[47] Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved by the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 1099 dated 14 April 2016.

[48] Bowler S., Farrell D. Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring Impacts of European Parliament Electoral Systems upon Legislator-Voter Relationships. – Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, Vol.31, No. 1, p.45-69.

[49] Source: Ibid., p.57.

Which system of parliamentary elections do you think is the best for Ukraine?[50]
% of respondents



Thus, in the entire period of independent Ukraine's Parliament operation, the system of elections was being reformed within the range of two most well-known models – majority and proportional systems. Both, these fluctuations and instability of the electoral system, as well as the models that were being chosen, had various degrees of adverse impact on democratic representation.

As of today, the most appropriate option for electoral system reform is the introduction of the preferential system with regional party lists. This option would combine the party principle of conducting elections, which provides for their more understandable programme and ideological content and corresponds to the constitutional principles of Government formation by the coalition of deputy factions, with society's request for a more pronounced local and personal component of the representative institution.

However, the upcoming elections can impede the final approval of the Electoral Code with the above-mentioned system of parliamentary elections.

Deputy Factions and Groups: the Minimum Size Issue

Two types of separate parliamentary subjects – factions and deputy groups – is a special feature of Verkhovna Rada's internal structure. As opposed to factions, deputy groups are made by individual deputies, who are not united by a common political identity during the campaign, and do not declare common political goals.[51]

As a rule, deputy groups are formed not by political party principle, so they have no political responsibility to the voters for their activity as collective subjects. At the same time, the rights of deputy groups, according to the current Rules of Procedure, are the same as the rights of party factions. Thus, establishing reasonable limits for the minimal size necessary to create a separate parliamentary subject is important for parliament's operation and society's understanding of its political structure.

Deputy groups were historically the first subjects of the Ukrainian Parliament defined in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of 1990.[52] The first Verkhovna Rada (1990-1994) had only MP groups representing oblasts and cities of republican subordination. Factions emerged in the legal field only in 1994, when the "Provision on Deputy Groups (Factions) in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"[53] and the "Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"[54] were adopted.

As of today, these two terms are defined as synonyms in the current Rules of Procedure (one of them in parentheses). Also, deputy factions and deputy groups have an identical set of rights.[55]

[50] Source: Ukraine's Party System Before and After Maidan: Changes, Development Trends, Society's Demands. – Materials of the Roundtable on 16 September 2015, p.27, *http://old.razumkov.org.ua/upload/1442416518_file.pdf*.

[51] The main difference between deputy factions and groups is that, unlike groups, in accordance with Art. 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine, factions take part in the formation of deputy faction coalition in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

[52] Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 12th Convocation. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 22 May 1990. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/6-12/print1453195225059594*.

[53] Provision on Deputy Groups (Factions) in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 13 May 1994.– *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/11/94-вр/print1509519571539504*.

[54] Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27 June 1994. Section 1-4. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/129a/94-вр/print1453195225059594*; Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27 June 1994. Section 5-11. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1296/94-вр/print1453195225059594*.

[55] P. 6 of Art. 59 of the Rules of Procedure gives the following definition: "A registered deputy group has the rights of a deputy faction". See: the Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010.– *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

Status of Deputy Factions and Groups in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Rights of deputy factions and deputy groups	Additional requirements
Deputy faction (deputy group):	
1. has a registered right to a speech from the podium on any topic on the agenda limited to 15 mins (p. 1-2 of Art. 33)	Registration in the electronic system on the day of consideration
2. has a registered right to a speech limited to 3 mins during consideration of the issue of Cabinet's accountability (p. 3 of Art. 232)	-
3. has a registered right to a speech limited to 1 min on the voting motives (p. 5, part 2 of Art. 31)	-
4. has a registered right to a speech limited to 3 mins during full discussion (p. 5, part 1 of Art. 30)	-
5. has a registered right to a speech, if a faction (group) member was mentioned (p. 4 of Art. 51)	-
6. initiates a five-day suspension of an MP that offended a faction (group) representative (p. 5 of Art. 51)	decision is made by the majority ½+1
7. delegates the chairman with the right to the casting vote to the Conciliation Council (p. 2 of Art. 73)	-
8. proposes candidates for the Chairman and his deputies positions (p. 2 of Art. 74, p. 1 of Art. 79)	-
9. has a reserved quota representation in committee management (p. 4 of Art. 81, p. 7 of Art. 83)	-
10. has the right to its own representative in the Special Temporary Commission and Temporary Investigation Commission (p. 3 of Art. 85, p. 2 of Art. 173)	-
11. initiates unscheduled audit of the Accounting Chamber (p. 7 of Art. 161)	decision is made by the majority ⅓+1
12. proposes a candidacy to the High Council of Justice (p. 3 of Art. 208-1)	-
13. proposes a candidacy for the Constitutional Court judge position (p. 4 of Art. 208-4)	-
14. initiates a meeting with the candidate for the Prime Minister post for a question-and-answer session (p. 3 of Art. 205)	-
15. during consideration of the issue of the Cabinet's accountability, initiates hearings of individual government members and has the right to ask them questions (p. 2 of Art. 232)	-
16. proposes topics for the weekly "hour of questions to the Government" and has priority (compared to non-faction deputies) for oral or written questions for members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (p. 3 of Art. 229, p.3 -2 of Art. 230)	-
17. gets information from the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus, which is not sent to individual MPs (e.g., Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers, p. 2 of Art. 227)	-
Deputy faction (deputy group) together with one more deputy faction or group:	
1. initiates a 30-min break (p. 15, part 1 of Art. 27)	-
2. has a registered right to a speech limited to 2 mins during brief discussion (p.3, part 2 of Art. 31)	-
3. makes a written proposal on the two-day suspension of the Chairman in case of gross or systematic violation of the Rules of Procedure (after a brief discussion) (p. 2 of Art. 29)	decision is made by ½+1
4. initiates a break in case of a disagreement as to the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure provisions, which threatens to disrupt the plenary session (p. 7 of Art. 51)	-
Deputy faction (deputy group) together with two more deputy factions or groups:	
1. initiates a special plenary session (p. 14 of Art. 73)	-

Source: the Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/17-1861/print1453195225059594*.

Separately, each deputy faction or registered deputy group have equal rights. Yet, this set of rights grows somewhat more extensive when two or three individual Verkhovna Rada subjects come together. This concerns, for example, the initiation of special plenary sessions and breaks, as well as participation in the brief discussion of items on the agenda and disciplinary decision proposal on the two-day suspension of the Chairman. The latter requires the support of the absolute majority.

A special type of deputy groups in the Verkhovna Rada are groups of non-faction MPs that bring together 15 or more people's deputies, who are not part of any group or faction.[56] They are also created with 15 or more MPs. This type of individual parliamentary subjects has a limited status. According to the Rules of Procedure, a group of non-faction MPs has none of the above-mentioned rights of a deputy faction (deputy group), except for one, yet very important right: to propose a candidacy for the Constitutional Court judge position (p. 4 of Art. 2084).

Also, non-faction parliamentarians can individually participate in the legislative process, sending committees their changes and proposals for bills, while preserving their right to legislative initiative, however, they cannot influence the formation of the agenda and cannot be nominated for top positions in committees. According to Ukrainian law, the non-faction status is allowed only for the MPs elected in single-mandate districts.[57]

During 1990-2017, the faction structure of the Ukrainian Parliament was composed of deputy factions and/or deputy groups with the minimal number of parliamentarians, which varied from 14 to 25 people, depending on the electoral system, provisions in the Rules of Procedure, and (since 2004) citizens' vote.

The current Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada define the number of MPs in deputy groups depending on the results of elections in the proportional segment of the electoral system. According to p. 4 of Art. 59 of the Rules, the number of MPs in such a deputy group should equal the size of the smallest party faction among election winners.[58]

Requirements for the Minimal Size of Factions and Groups in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1990-2017)

Years	Minimal size of a faction (deputy group)	Document that defines requirements for the minimal size of deputy factions and groups	
		Name of the document	Regulatory act
1990-1994	The minimal size of a deputy group equals the size of the smallest group of people's deputies of oblasts and cities of republican subordination. (factions are not mentioned in the document)	"Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 12th Convocation"	Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 22 May 1990
1994	25 deputies	"Provision on Deputy Groups (Factions) in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"	Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 13 May 1994
1994-2005	14 deputies	"Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"	Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27 June 1994
2006-2008	21 deputies* (actual size of the smallest party faction with > 3% votes based on results of elections according to proportional electoral system)***	"Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"**	Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 16 March 2006
2008-2010	24 deputies* (actual size of the smallest party faction with > 4% votes based on results of elections according to proportional electoral system)	"Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"**	Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Certain Issues of Regulatory and Legal Support for the Work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 8 April 2008
2010-2017	The minimal size of a deputy group cannot be smaller than the size of the smallest party faction formed in the first session (p. 4 of Art. 59 of the Rules of Procedure)	"Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine"	The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010

Sources: Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 12th Convocation. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 22 May 1990. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/6-12/print1453195225059594*; Provision on Deputy Groups (Factions) in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 13 May 1994. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/11/94-вр/print1509519571539504*; Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27 June 1994. Section 1 - Section 4 – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/129a/94-вр/print1453195225059594*; Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 27 June 1994. Section 5 - Section 11 – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1296/94-вр/print1453195225059594*; Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated 16 March 2006. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3547-15/print1453195225059594*; Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Appendix to the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Certain Issues of Regulatory and Legal Support for the Work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 8 April 2008. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/247-17/print1453195225059594*; The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010.– *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

* The minimal number of party faction participants in the 5th and 6th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is different, because of the different number of constituents that voted for political parties that did not pass the 3% threshold.*** Accordingly, the smallest faction based on results of 2006 elections had 21 MPs (the faction of the Communist Party of Ukraine), and after the 2007 snap elections – the smallest faction consisted of 24 deputies (faction of the Lytvyn Bloc).

** At the time, when Ukraine had the proportional system (2006-2010), there were no deputy groups. Thus, in the 2006 and 2008 Rules of Procedure this notion was absent.

*** See: the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 25 March 2004, – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/15-1665/print*.

[56] In the current Parliament, there are 51 MPs with the non-faction status. See: Deputy Factions and Groups of the 8th Convocation. – *http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_fractions*.

[57] The exception are the three MPs, who are part of Verkhovna Rada leadership, and are prevented from participation in the faction structure by Art. 59 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure.

[58] The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

It is interesting to look at the abovementioned domestic norms in comparison to other states. Faction structure has been legally captured in European states comparatively recently. In some Western Europe parliaments, the history of regulating the creation and operation of factions has approximately 100 years (Denmark, France, Germany), in others – such standards were only introduced after World War II (Belgium, Netherlands).

However, this does not mean that the faction structure did not exist in these countries' parliaments earlier – the written norms became necessary due to exacerbation of political fighting between parties that used to dominate the arena and their new competitors. Similarly, post-communist Central Europe countries, such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, introduced legal regulation on the issue of factions during their transition from the one-party monopoly of the Communist Party to multi-party system.

Introduction of faction structure and the minimal size of factions in the parliaments of European states

	Year of faction structure introduction	Minimal required number of MPs to form a faction (percentage of the whole parliament or its lower chamber)	Total number of MPs in the parliament (lower chamber*)
Austria	1932	5 deputies (2.7% of the entire makeup)	183
Belgium	1962	5 deputies (3.3% of the entire makeup)	150
Czech Republic	1990	10 deputies (5% of the entire makeup)	200
Denmark	1898	1 deputy (<1% of the entire makeup)	179
France	1910	20 deputies (3.5% of the entire makeup)	577
Germany	1922	36 deputies (5% of the entire makeup)	709**
Hungary	1990	15 deputies (7.5% of the entire makeup)	199
Netherlands	1966	1 deputy (<1% of the entire makeup)	150
Slovakia	1990	8 deputies (4% of the entire makeup)	200
Ukraine	1994	over 11 deputies (>%2.4 of the entire makeup)	450

Source: Parliamentary party groups in European democracies: political parties behind closed doors / [edited by K.Heidar and R.Koole]. – London: Routledge, 2010, pp.250-251.

* For the countries with a bicameral parliament, data is presented for the lower chamber.

** 709 deputies is the size of the current Bundestag after elections on 24 September 2017 – according to German electoral system, it changes depending on election results.

Given the current electoral threshold of 5%, theoretically, the smallest faction of the Verkhovna Rada can have 12 MPs (5% of 225 deputies in the proportional segment equals 11.25).[59] In reality, this situation is impossible, and for the current Parliament, the size of the smallest deputy faction has to be 19 and more MPs, as there were 19 parliamentarians in the smallest party faction after the 2014 elections (AUU "Batkivshchyna" faction).

P. 2 of Art. 58 of the Rules of Procedure[60] prevents political parties from forming more than one faction, while self-nominated MPs can create many minimum-sized deputy groups within the majority segment, and these groups will have rights equal to parties.

Special features of the faction-group structure of the current Parliament are determined by the current electoral law. Greater transparency of representation would emerge if all deputies were elected under one electoral system requiring party and political identification of people's deputies. Given such uniformity, minimal faction size could be determined either based on the size of the minimal faction possible within a specific electoral system, or based on the overall number of MPs in the parliament (e.g., 7.5% in Hungary, 5% – in Germany and Czech Republic, 4% in Slovakia, 3.5% – in France).

Before the introduction of changes to the electoral law, the existing way of determining the minimal number of MPs in a deputy faction or group is justified.

Imperative Mandate and the Problem of Democracy Within Factions

The imperative mandate was used in Ukraine in 2006-2010, and has been in effect since the end of February 2014 until now. The imperative mandate version as per the current Basic Law (Art. 81), has two components:

- "non-participation",[61] i.e., a refusal of an MP elected by lists to become part of his party's faction at the start of his parliamentary term, when Verkhovna Rada members are forming factions after elections;
- an MP's exit from the faction of the political party, as part of which he has been elected to the Verkhovna Rada, on his own initiative.

Ukraine's imperative mandate has certain special features.

First of all, it does not include the situation of an MP's exclusion from a faction on its leadership initiative, which is foreseen in the Rules of Procedure (p. 3 of Art. 59).[62]

Second, an MP's exit/non-participation in a faction does not entail an automatic loss of his mandate.

[59] The 5% threshold is established by p.3 of Art.98 of the current electoral law. See: the Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine" dated 17 November 2010 – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4061-17/print1478565704496912*.

[60] The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010 – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

[61] Term "non-participation" is used in p.6 of Art.81 of the Constitution of Ukraine.

[62] The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010 – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

According to p. 6 of Art. 81, it is terminated "on the basis of the law by the decision of the highest governing body of the relevant political party (electoral bloc)". As of now, neither the Law "On Political Parties", nor the Rules of Procedure or other laws contain any norms on the imperative mandate.

Third, the imperative mandate is effective only for half of Parliament, i.e. people's deputies elected in the national district. The law contains no limitations for reformatting the structure of deputy groups. Becoming a member of a deputy group and leaving it is voluntary. It is dissolved 15 days after the group was left by the number of participants necessary for complying with the minimal size requirement,[63] after which MPs can form new deputy groups with a different composition.

Fourth, there are no norms preventing MPs from voting against their faction's position.

In its decision dated 25 June 2008 regarding the imperative mandate, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the Basic Law defines MPs' faction membership as their constitutional duty, not their right, which "is intended for consolidation of effort in reaching goals and tasks set out in programmes of political parties (electoral blocs of political parties), and objectively implies the need for people's deputies to comply with the requirements of faction discipline".[64] At the same time, Venice Commission experts believe that corresponding provisions of Art. 81 of the Ukrainian Constitution contradict the free mandate principle.[65]

In practice, the use of imperative mandate contributed to an increase in the percentage of parliamentarians, who support their faction's position in making their decision on the vote. According to expert surveys of MPs conducted in 2006 and 2009, after the adoption of the Law "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" as of 8 December 2004, which (among other things) introduced the imperative mandate and proportional electoral system with closed lists,[66] faction's position clearly becomes the main factor in determining MPs' decisions in a vote.

Yet, after imperative mandate cancelation at the end of 2010,[67] an opposite trend is observed. It was also present in 2014-2015, when constitutional norms on the imperative mandate were brought back into effect.[68]

Thus, the imperative mandate, through certain stimulation of faction discipline, has a positive effect on the representative function realisation, as it encourages MPs to adhere to the position of the party, for which constituents voted. "Soft" Ukrainian version of the imperative mandate also allows deputies to vote against their faction's position, as they see fit, without a threat to their mandate. In the event of changes in electoral legislation (transition to electing all deputies under one electoral system), such problem as different requirements for MPs elected by party lists and in single-mandate constituencies will lose its relevance.

At the same time, the presence of imperative mandate should include institutional safeguards against selective

Influence of the Imperative Mandate Factor on Decision-making Motivation in Voting



[63] P. 4 of Art. 60 of the Rules of Procedure. See: The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

[64] Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated 25 June 2008. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v012p710-08/print1509519571539504*.

[65] Free mandate gives priority to voters' connection with a specific MP and allows for his unrestricted freedom in joining or not joining a faction. See: Venice Commission Report on the imperative mandate, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 79th Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 June 2009). – *http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2009)027-e*.

[66] The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" dated 8 December 2004. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2222-15*. The enactment of this law was planned for 1 January 2006, according to p. 2, part 1 of Final and Transitional Provisions.

[67] The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine" dated 8 December 2004 was deemed unconstitutional. See: Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as of 30 September 2010. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v020p710-10*.

[68] The Law of Ukraine "On Restoration of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine" dated 21 February 2014. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/742-18*.

application of this instrument by political party leadership. This problem is especially topical given the absence of regulations on internal faction democracy.

As seen in the table, some European countries' parliaments have a practice of regulating internal faction rules, in others – political parties themselves determine such rules. There are also requirements for the regularity of faction meetings and the frequency of considering issues of electing faction chairmen.

At the same time, in Ukrainian legislation, there is only one general Rules of Procedure provision regarding internal faction democracy,[69] which requires the use of democratic principles in deputy faction operation and consistency with the requirements of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine". This Law states that organisation of work of deputy factions (groups), as well as the work of an MP in a deputy faction (group), is determined by laws and the Provision on a Deputy Faction (Group) adopted according to such laws.[70] At the same time, the official web-site of the 8th Verkhovna Rada has no mention of such provisions regarding existing factions and groups, there is no public access to them either.

The absence or lack of access for the general public to internal rules that govern the functioning of parliamentary factions allow their leadership to introduce additional internal faction norms for parliamentarians to conform with.[71]

Given the low level of citizens' trust in the Parliament and political parties, increasing public disclosure and comprehensibility for citizens of procedures and mechanisms used in decision-making by the Verkhovna Rada party factions and deputy groups could have a positive effect.

Institutionalisation of Opposition

The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees equal rights, including the right to participate in administration of public affairs, to all citizens regardless of their political preferences. At the same time, the decision-making method used in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (vote by the majority of its constitutional composition) requires to ensure observance of rights and guarantees of the parliamentary minority, which also represents a part of citizens. In this case, we are talking foremost about the right to freely express opposite views and beliefs, alternative visions of government policy.

Capturing in the Constitution the special status and powers of parliamentary majority became the basis for the requirement to determine the special status of opposition. In particular, the connection between the issues of constitutional determination of parliamentary majority status and the corresponding regulation of parliamentary minority (opposition) status was mentioned in Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine back on 27 June 2000.[72]

Regulation of Faction Operation in European Parliaments

	FREQUENCY OF FACTION MEETINGS	FREQUENCY OF CONSIDERING THE MATTER OF FACTION LEADER ELECTION	PRESENCE OF WRITTEN INTERNAL PARTY RULES
Austria	before each plenary meeting	at the beginning of term	only in some political parties (Social Democratic Party of Austria, Freedom Party of Austria, the Greens)
Czech Republic	before each parliamentary session	at the beginning of term	only in some political parties (Civic Democratic Party)
Denmark	every day	every year	only in some political parties (Social Democratic Party of Denmark, Progress Party, Venstre)
Finland	every week	every year	yes
France	every week	at the beginning of term	yes
Germany	every week	at the beginning of term	yes
Hungary	every week	at the beginning of term	yes
Netherlands	every week	at the beginning of term	only in some political parties (Labour Party, Christian Democratic Appeal)
Slovakia	before each parliamentary session	at the beginning of term	yes
Sweden	every week	n.r.*	yes
Ukraine	n.r.*	n.r.*	only in some political parties ("Batkivshchyna", "Self Help")

Source: Parliamentary party groups in European democracies: political parties behind closed doors/edited by K.Heidar and R.Koole. – London: Routledge, 2010, p.254.
*"n.r." – not regulated.

[69] Refers to p. 3 of Art. 58 of the Rules of Procedure. See: The Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1861-17/print1453195225059594*.

[70] P. 3 of Art. 13 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine" dated 17 November 1992. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2790-12/print1509519571539504*.

[71] See, for example: "Self Help" simplified the terms of elimination from the faction and banned individual opinions." – Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), 30 August 2015.

[72] Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case of the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to provide a conclusion on the compliance of the draft Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine Based on Results of the National Referendum by Popular Initiative" with the requirements of Art. 157 and Art. 158 of the Constitution of Ukraine (the case on introducing changes to Art. 76, 80, 90, 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine) dated 27 June 2000. – Official web-site of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. – *http://www.ccu.gov.ua/*.

According to the Conclusion, "the introduction of the concept of parliamentary majority logically necessitates the addition of guarantees for the part of the Verkhovna Rada that can be provisionally characterised as parliamentary minority. Lack of guarantees for the operation of such minority can lead to violation of a cornerstone principle of Ukrainian society's operation – political and ideological diversity (Art. 15 of the Constitution), and limiting of citizens' constitutional rights, foreseen, in particular, in Art. 34 and Art. 38 of the Constitution of Ukraine."

On 19 September 2008, the Verkhovna Rada approved the Act of "Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine".[73] This Act introduced into the Rules of Procedure: Chapter 12 "The Coalition of Deputy Factions in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" and Chapter 13 "Parliamentary Opposition". The range and nature of parliamentary opposition rights determined therein, as a whole, follow the recommendations of international organisations on these issues.[74]

On 10 February 2010, Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine",[75] which gave the parliamentary opposition a rather broad range of rights ensuring access to Parliament's supervisory powers, opportunities for public presentation of alternative positions on the state policy in various areas, legislative and executive acts.

However, after constitutional amendments were repealed, all provisions that contained the term "parliamentary opposition" were removed from the Rules of Procedure, as well as all provisions that had a direct or indirect relation to them. Chapter 13 "Parliamentary Opposition" that regulated the status of opposition and its operation procedures were removed altogether. Another provision was repealed in Art. 81 – it provided for priority of the subject of parliamentary opposition in the right to select senior positions in a number of parliamentary committees. In addition, provisions in Art. 25 were repealed – on consideration of written proposals of parliamentary opposition in forming the agenda for the plenary week, and allocating time each Wednesday on the days of plenary sessions for consideration of issues prepared by the opposition.[76]

After the reinstatement of certain provisions of the Constitution in February 2014, these sections of the Rules of Procedure were not reinstated, and currently, there is a legal vacuum regarding this matter, which is expected to be filled either by the adoption of a separate law on parliamentary opposition, or by reinstating the corresponding sections in the Rules of Procedure.

We believe that whichever option is chosen, it has to maintain the balance between ensuring effective support of the political course implemented by the parliamentary coalition and Government and supported by the majority of citizens, and guaranteeing the rights of the opposition. With this approach, there are some debatable issues, like giving opposition priority rights in formation of plenary meetings' agenda, senior positions in the budget committee and committees responsible for certain areas of state policy, institutionalisation and state funding of the "opposition government".

The idea of institutionalisation of a separate political subject with a special opposition status comes from the Westminster model, in which there is an opposition Government. At the same time, the Westminster system uses the efficiency principle regarding formation of agenda by one centre with powerful authority, which is controlled by government majority (this goes for plenary and committee work).

Besides, in the UK, opposition has only several days a year – on all other occasions, it is the Government that determines what should be discussed in the Parliament and what decisions should be voted upon. The UK majority "first-past-the-post" principle used in single-mandate district elections prevents the emergence of small opposition forces, as well as unexpected reformatting of the party system with each abrupt change in public opinion, allowing only for a gradual growth of new parliamentary subjects.

Without the entire set of the abovementioned institutional elements, the introduction of specific provisions for institutionalisation of opposition may slow down or even block the policy-making process.

Loss of Representation in the Moment of Government Formation by Parliamentary Coalition

In the process of Government formation, the pivotal role is given to the parliamentary institution with a constitutional status – the coalition of deputy factions, creation of which is a mandatory condition for the empowerment of the Verkhovna Rada.[77] This institution of national parliamentarism has specific features.

The first one, is the requirement that the coalition is formed by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada.

Second feature is the constitutional mechanism, designed to prevent the long-term absence of a coalition: parliamentary political forces have to unite in a coalition of deputy factions within one month after the elections or official termination of the previous coalition – otherwise, according to the Constitution, the President of Ukraine has the right to terminate the powers of the Verkhovna Rada early.

Third, and most important from the point of view of representation feature is that deputy faction coalition is the subject of Government formation. Only the coalition has the right to propose the Prime Minister candidacy and the entire composition of the Cabinet of Ministers (except for Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers).

As the same time, there is a number of issues in the formation of coalition and government.

[73] Registration number No. 547-VI.

[74] See, for instance, Guidelines of the rights and duties of the opposition in parliament. – web-site of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, *http://www.ipu.org/dem-e/opposition.pdf*.

[75] Draft Law "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 9 February 2010.

[76] Art. 25 p. 1 of the Rules of Procedure stated: "The agenda of plenary sessions of the Verkhovna Rada for each day of the plenary week is prepared by the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus on the basis of the approved schedule of plenary sessions of the Verkhovna Rada, taking into account the priority provided for therein and the actual state of readiness of each issue to be considered by the Verkhovna Rada, and also taking into account the written proposals of the parliamentary opposition. Written proposals from the parliamentary opposition, which must contain registration numbers and names of bills (including, alternative ones), indicate subjects of the right of legislative initiative, speakers and co-speakers, as well as information on the conclusions of the main committees on preparation and preliminary consideration of such bills, shall be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine not later than the Thursday preceding the plenary week, in which, in accordance with part three of this article, they will be considered". According to p. 3 of Art. 25 of the Rules of Procedure, "…On the days of plenary sessions, every Wednesday, time is allocated for consideration of issues prepared and proposed (in the order determined by these Rules of Procedure) by the parliamentary opposition".

[77] Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated 25 June 2008. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v012p710-08/print1509519571539504*.

First of all, Ukraine has no tradition of parties making agreements before elections on the principles of coalition formation in case they get into parliament and approaches to distribution of government positions. This gap is filled with non-public agreements.

Second – the coalition can nominate any of Ukrainian citizens that comply with requirements in Art. 7 of the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers" for Government positions, not necessarily representatives of a political party supported by the voters.

Third – an MP that continues to represent his constituents and his political force in the Government, according to Art. 3 of the Law "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine", irrevocably loses the parliamentary mandate, while in a number of European countries[78] he would preserve it and would be able to return to parliament after the end of his term in the government.

Such strict separation between MP's "representative function"[79] and his participation in the Government prevents the continuity of representation of people's interests on the government level. Therefore, a reasonable question is – who does a government official represent? Obviously, upon losing his potential possibility to return to parliament, an MP "at work" in the Government will depend on the government team, not on the mandate given to him by the voters.

Thus, the current procedure of Government formation by the deputy faction coalition has two major aspects that negatively impact the process of representation: the possibility to appoint to government positions persons that are not at all connected with the political force, whose programme guidelines they should implement in their activity, and the irrevocable loss of an MP's mandate that ensures his connection with voters and political responsibility to them, at the time of being appointed for a Government position.

If potential coalition partners made public their ideas on the areas of responsibility in the future Government, their political approaches and specific candidates, the society would have a better understanding of the foundations for creation of a future parliamentary coalition based on election results and the process of Government formation. This practice has been used by a number of parties, namely, in the election campaign of 2014, and have had a rather positive response from the public.[80]

The Issue of Individual Legislative Initiative

Within the period of operation of the 8th Verkhovna Rada, from the end of 2014 to mid-2017, 4,894 draft laws were registered in the Parliament. 91.5% of them were submitted by MPs. The volume of government draft laws within this period was only 6.3%, and presidential – 2.3%.

From almost 5 thousand draft laws, 490 became laws.[81] Among them, only 23% – from the executive government, and 66.5% of adopted laws were the draft laws of people's deputies.[82]

The large number of submitted draft laws (almost 1.8 thousand per year on the average in the current convocation) is the result of active use of their right to initiative defined in Art. 93 of the Constitution by some MPs. This is in sharp contrast with corresponding annual average numbers for other countries.

The hyperactive drafting of laws by people's deputies is largely conditioned by their desire to formally fulfil public expectations formed under the influence of monitoring programmes run by civil society institutions and media. This especially goes for MPs elected in

Individual Legislative Initiative in European Parliaments

COUNTRY AND PERIOD	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL MP LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES IN THE PERIOD	PERIOD LENGTH (years)	AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES BY PARLIAMENTARIANS
Norway, 1977-1990	83	14	5.9
Switzerland, 1971-1990	122	20	6.1
Greece, 1977-1990	190	14	13.6
Austria, 1972-1983	559	12	46.6
United Kingdom, 1971-1990	1 320	20	66.0
Iceland, 1971-1990	1 428	20	71,4
Denmark, 1971-1990	1 499	20	74,9
Portugal, 1971-1990	2 310	20	115.5
Belgium, 1971-1990	4 548	20	227.4
Finland, 1971-1990	5 153	20	257,6
France, 1971-1990	6 759	20	337.9
Italy, 1971-1990	12 887	20	644.3
Ukraine, end of 2014 - 1st half of 2017	4 476	2,5	1 790.4

Source: Mattson I. Private Members' Initiatives and Amendments. – Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe / ed. by H.Döring. – Frankfurt: Campus-Verl., 1995, p.748; Three Years of Petro Poroshenko's Presidency: Which Laws Are Supported and Blocked by the President. Committee of Voters of Ukraine. – *http://doslivno.org/try-rokyprezydentstva-poroshenka/*.

[78] Such practice exists in Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, Denmark, Belgium, Austria.

[79] This is the wording in p. 1 of Art. 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine" dated 17 November 1992. – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2790-12/print1509519571539504*.

[80] See: Party System After Maidan: Consequences and Factors. – National Security and Defence, No. 6-7, 2015, p.19.

[81] Three Years of Petro Poroshenko's Presidency: Which Laws Are Supported and Blocked by the President. Committee of Voters of Ukraine. – *http://doslivno.org/try-rokyprezydentstva-poroshenka/*.

[82] Only 19% of adopted laws were proposed by the head of state and only 14.5% – by the Cabinet of Ministers. For more information, see: Three Years of Petro Poroshenko's Presidency… – *http://doslivno.org/try-roky-prezydentstva-poroshenka*.

single-mandate districts. The number of submitted bills, requests and appeals, speeches from the podium, etc., is a more convenient document for public demonstration than, for example, legislative work in committees.

This hyperactivity leads to the overload of parliamentary committees and other expert institutions of the Parliament. As a result, the Verkhovna Rada does not have time to support most of the initiatives of the Government it formed, and on the other hand – lifts responsibility from it and transfers it to political parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada or to individual MPs. The quality of lawmaking in this situation drops.

In large parliaments,[83] such as the Verkhovna Rada, individual legislative initiative is usually limited. For instance, in the German Bundestag, in order to become the subject of legislative initiative, an MP has to have support of over 5% of his colleagues – for the current makeup of the lower chamber of Germany's parliament, this is 35 or more MPs. Such limitations are also in place in France, Spain, Greece, the UK, and in the countries with small parliaments – in Austria and Ireland.[84]

Thus, it is appropriate to introduce limitations for individual initiatives in the form of establishing the minimum number of MPs required to register a bill, which would streamline the work of the Verkhovna Rada, help coordinate efforts of the Parliament and the Government in policy-making, and strengthen the responsibility for each proposed and discussed draft law.

On the other hand, there is a need to shift the emphasis in coverage of parliamentary activities for the public from formal and organisational to content-related aspects.

Improvement of Committee Structure and the Issue of Control in Policy-Making

Verkhovna Rada committees are bodies created from people's deputies of Ukraine for drafting laws in specific fields, preparation and preliminary consideration of issues within the Parliament's areas of responsibility, executing control functions.[85]

From the point of view of representation, their most important functions are preparation of draft laws and control. As for the first one, as noted above, the main problem here is the overload of committees by bills due to the excessive activity of individual MPs in using their right to legislative initiative.

The second priority in the work of parliamentary committees is the function of control, which includes responsibilities captured in Art. 24-33[1] of the law.[86]

Realisation of these functions includes a significant amount of analytical work on processing subordinate legislation issued by government structures together with local self-government bodies.[87] The result of committees' control function is mainly preparation of recommendation materials.

From the point of view of representation, the key drawback is the excessive number of committees' "control" tasks foreseen in the Rules of Procedure. This prevents the realisation of the most important type of control: control over the political course implemented by the Government and proposed by the Parliament. This disrupts the Verkhovna Rada's control function on the institutional level, diverting committee resources from developing policies declared by political forces during the electoral campaign, to production of recommendation documents.

Control Powers of Verkhovna Rada Committees

Rights and responsibilities of parliamentary committees	Results of implementation of these rights and responsibilities
1) an analysis of summaries on State Budget revenues and expenses and other statements under Art. 7 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Accounting Chamber"	proposals for improvement of legislative acts (p. 2, part 1 of Art. 31)
2) analysis of the Cabinet of Ministers Programme	committee conclusions and recommendations (p. 1, part 1 of Art. 25)
3) participation in making decisions on loans and economic assistance	committee conclusions and recommendations (p. 3, part 1 of Art. 25)
4) hearing the annual report and analysing other materials of the Ombudsman	committee conclusions and recommendations (p. 4, part 1 of Art. 25, part 2 of Art. 32)
5) analysis of subordinate legislation issued by government structures of all levels, as well as local self-government	committee recommendations with the status of mandatory review and feedback on the measures taken (p. 1 of Art. 24)
6) holding parliamentary and committee hearings	analytical materials (p. 4, part 1 of Art. 28)
7) participation in considering issues of expressing no confidence to the Cabinet of Ministers and Prosecutor General	committee conclusions and recommendations (p. 2 and 5, part 1 of Art. 25)
8) participation in Government Days	receiving information from the Cabinet of Ministers and analysis of submitted documents on the issues to be considered (p. 2, part 1 and part 3-2 of Art. 26)
9) participation in the approval of appointment and dismissal of the heads of state bodies within the area of committees' responsibility	procedure of approval and consultations is determined by a joint decision of the committee and the corresponding state body (p. 2 of Art. 33[1])
10) initiating an enquiry to the President of Ukraine	the enquiry is sent only if it is supported by over 150 MPs (p. 2, part 4 of Art. 15 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine"*)
11) participation in the budget process	proposals to the Draft Law on the State Budget (limited by the period from 15 September to 1 October) and preliminary review of its implementation by competence areas (p. 2 and 4, part 1 of Art. 27)

* Unless indicated otherwise, the paragraphs, parts and articles in brackets are from the Law of Ukraine "On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine".

[83] A parliament is considered large, if it has over 300 members.

[84] Mattson I. Private Members' Initiatives and Amendments. – Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe / ed. by H.Döring. – Frankfurt: Campus-Verl., 1995, p.748.

[85] Art. 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine". – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/116/95-%D0%B2%D1%80*.

[86] Law of Ukraine "On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" – *http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/116/95-вр/print1453195225059594*.

[87] This task is executed by committee secretariats according to p. 2, part 13 of the Provision on the Secretariat of Verkhovna Rada Committee, approved by the Order of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman as of 22 February 2008 No. 305. – *http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/-08/305%D%80%1D%0B3/print*.

Comparison of Parliamentary Committee Strength in Different European Countries[88]

	Does the Parliament's committee structure correspond to the Government's ministry structure?	Do committees review bills prior to their first reading in a plenary session?	Are the committees free from decisions of the plenary session or Parliament's leadership regarding the timing of their work on bills and/or possibility to consider a bill?[89]	Do committees have the right to legislative initiative?	Do committee versions of bills get put to a vote?[90]	Is the committee stage of bill consideration the last chance to introduce changes/proposals?	Are ministers required to be present at committee sessions at the request of the latter?	Are government officials required to be present at committee sessions at the request of the latter?	Do parliamentary committees have the right to require documents from the Government on subjects of their competence?	Is committee work separated from plenary work in time?	Is the work within parliamentary committees distributed between subcommittees?	Do parliamentary committees have the de facto possibility to support their operation with sufficient intellectual resources?	**INDEX of parliamentary committee strength (number of positive responses*)**
Belgium	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	**9**
Estonia	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	**9**
Finland	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	**9**
Hungary	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	**9**
Lithuania	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	**9**
Austria	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	**8**
Czech Republic	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	**8**
Poland	yes	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	**8**
Germany	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	**7**
Ireland	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	**7**
Latvia	no	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	**7**
Slovakia	yes	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	**7**
Ukraine	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes	no	**6**
Denmark	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	**6**
France	no	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	**6**
Iceland	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	**6**
Italy	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	**6**
Luxembourg	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	no	**6**
Portugal	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	**6**
Slovenia	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	yes	yes	**6**
Sweden	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	**6**
Netherlands	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	**5**
Norway	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	**5**

* Positive responses indicate committee strength. Therefore, each "*yes*" answer is 1 point, "*no*" – 0 points.

A positive effect can be achieved by establishing the priority of control over Government's legislative initiatives as the foundation of Parliament's internal institutional structure. In this case, representation of interests based on election results will achieve its main goal – policy-making. The problems with parliamentary control of Government's activity also come out in the comparative analysis of practices used by Ukrainian and European parliamentary committees in executing their functions (Table above).

Data above shows that Verkhovna Rada committees do not stand out among parliamentary committees of other European states – Ukraine's composite index of committee strength is 6 out of 12 points. That said, for each of the countries it did not go above 9. At the same time, there was an imbalance between negative answers by basic indicators of control over the Government and positive answers according to some parameters uncharacteristic for parliamentary democracies.

[88] Martin S., Depauw S. Coalition Government and the Internal Organization of Legislatures. Paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. – Toronto, Canada, September 2009, 6-2, *http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.2789&rep=rep1&type=pdf*. Data for Ukraine added by Razumkov Centre based on expert survey of people's deputies conducted from 5 October to 22 November 2017.

[89] This refers to the absence/presence of the right to make a decision on setting the timeframe for committee consideration or transfer of a bill from one committee to another (change of the main/specialised committee) by the leadership of the Parliament or at the plenary session.

[90] If at a plenary session bills are voted on as a whole, as per committees' proposal, this is a sign of committee strength. Otherwise, if only individual changes, proposals are put to vote, instead of bills as proposed by committees, – this is an indicator of the weak status of parliamentary committees.

On the one hand, an unusual reinforcement of Ukrainian committees comes from the institution of written proposals to the bills, which, in Ukraine, can only be introduced at the stage of committee consideration.[91] Verkhovna Rada committees, compared to committees of European parliaments, have the monopoly for accepting MP proposals, which is notably different from typical European practices – all European parliaments have the freedom to change the draft law during plenary discussion, except in Ukraine and Hungary.

On the other hand, the ability of Ukrainian parliamentary committees to control government policy is rather weak, and comparison results confirm this. From the four indicators of committee strength in the control of government work, the only right that is still there is the right to request documents from the Government. In addition, decisions of parliamentary committees requesting the presence of ministers and other civil servants at their meetings are not binding. In contrast, in European parliamentary democracy practices, it is generally accepted that key representatives of executive power have to arrive at parliamentary committee meetings at their request.

The discrepancy between the areas of responsibility of parliamentary committees' with those of the ministries is also contrary to the generally accepted European tradition. At this moment, the number of parliamentary committees (including the Special Control Commission for Privatisation) is 28, while the number of ministries is 18. Some ministries have several "matches" among committees (e.g., MEDT), and some committees have no direct "matches" among ministries.

It is clear that we cannot expect a full conformity in this case, as some committees have unique functions that are not reflected in a particular direction of executive policy. Yet, there is a potential for achieving a more precise compatibility in the future.

2.3. PARLIAMENTARISM AND REPRESENTATION ISSUE: THE MP SURVEY

In order to provide a comprehensive perspective on the current Parliament's work, as well as to determine certain political and cultural features of the deputy corps, the Razumkov Centre conducted a survey of people's deputies of Ukraine.[92]

The politicians were asked several sets of questions:

- Assessing the degree of relevance of problems that the country is facing;
- Questions regarding the institutional capacity of parliamentary committees as important instruments of state policy formation, in which MPs evaluated the degree of committee strength (through the influence committees have on determining the agenda for their meetings); relations between Verkhovna Rada committees and Government; possibilities to provide the proper level of expertise for decisions prepared in committees;
- Assessment of influence of state institutions (the Verkhovna Rada, the President, the Government, executive bodies and local self-government), as well as other society institutions (political parties, trade unions, media, civil society organisations) on political life;
- Assessment of influence of Verkhovna Rada's internal aspects (parliamentary committees, leadership of the Verkhovna Rada, leaders of factions and deputy groups, people's deputies as separate subjects, etc.) on its work;
- MPs' opinion on electoral system reform, self-nomination institution;
- MPs' opinion on faction and party discipline, freedom of MP voting, possibility of retaining an MP's mandate in case of appointment to Government;
- MPs' opinion regarding the proposed package of institutional reforms in the Verkhovna Rada;
- MPs' attitude to a number of civil society organisations, the work of which is connected with researching the Verkhovna Rada (monitoring support of various aspects of parliamentary activity, cooperation on preparation of reform decisions, etc.);
- MPs' assessment of the level of objectivity of information on the activity of the Verkhovna Rada;
- Attitude to division of politics and economy of the country into spheres of influence between interest groups.

Assessment of Relevance of Political Problems

Almost half (47%) of surveyed MPs named the war in Donbas as the most relevant problem for the country. 18% could not give an answer, while two groups, 11% each, believe that the most topical issues are decentralisation and fighting corruption.

20% of MPs could not name second most important issue. For 18% of parliamentarians named fighting corruption. For 16% – this is war in Donbas, 11% believe that this issue is the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

Rather important, according to people's deputies, are also such problems as the degree of state interference in economy (9% named it second most relevant), excessive tax burden, social expenditure, decentralisation (these were named second most topical by 7% each).

16% of MPs gave the third place, according to its relevance, to fighting corruption, 11% – to the problem of returning the Crimea to Ukraine. 22% of surveyed deputies could not name third most relevant issue.

[91] According to Art. 89 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure, making changes to the content of the bill is called a proposal, which can only be submitted in the written form through the specialised committee. Instead, "changes" do not correspond to the English term "amendments", and are defined in this article only as editorial corrections, clarifications, elimination of errors or contradictions in the text. For more information, see: the Law of Ukraine "On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine" dated 10 February 2010.

[92] Expert survey conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 5 October to 22 November 2017; there were 45 people's deputies participating in the survey. One-dimensional distribution of answer results is presented in tables on p.101-104 of this journal.

The absolute majority of MPs do not consider the following issues listed in the questionnaire too relevant: privatisation, excessive state interference in economic life, an unstructured system of social expenditure, ineffective healthcare, ecology, hypothetical provision of land ownership right to foreigners, – while television channels and social networks often focus on them.

Attitude to Division of Economy and Politics into Spheres of Influence between Interest Groups

MPs' attitude to division of national economy and politics between interest groups is generally negative, but slightly more lenient than the attitude of society towards this issue. Such division is acknowledged by 80% of surveyed MPs. And while among citizens, this situation is seen as normal by approximately 10%;[93] 20% of MPs support this point of view. Respectively, 75% of citizens and 60% of MPs view such division into spheres of influence as negative. 16% of parliamentarians did not have an answer to this question.

Among those, who acknowledged the division of influence between interest groups, over a half (53%) believe that these groups coordinate their interests between themselves, 7% – that there is no such coordination, and 40% could not give an answer at all.

Emergence of new interest groups in national politics and economy is confirmed by 29% of MPs, over 44% – deny this fact. 27% could not answer.

Work of Parliamentary Committees as an Institutional Cornerstone of Parliamentarism

People's deputies do not question the importance of work of parliamentary committees, yet have considerable doubts as to their freedom from external influences.

Answers to the question, whether parliamentary committees have priority influence on the formation of agenda for their meetings, diverged. The majority (58%) believes that committees have autonomy in determining their meetings' agenda, and 42%, which is a large percentage, state that formation of committee meetings' agenda is influenced by extra-parliamentary forces.

According to MPs, heads, deputy heads, secretaries, and members of parliamentary committees more often than other deputies act as legislative initiative subjects regarding relevant issues. This is the opinion of 87% of MPs.

The absolute majority (96%) of surveyed deputies state that conclusions of specialised committees on bills are mostly taken into account before their first reading.

Parliamentary Committees' Relations with the Government and Other Executive Power Bodies

Over two thirds (69%) of surveyed MPs believe that parliamentary committees' areas of responsibility do not coincide with those of the ministries. 29% of deputies have opposite opinion.

Deputies also confirm that the Verkhovna Rada has certain influence on the work of Government: as ministers attend parliamentary committee meetings mostly on the initiative of committees themselves – 87% of deputies confirm this. 13% state that this initiative more often comes from ministers.

Other representatives of executive power bodies also attend parliamentary committee meetings on the initiative of committees – 93% gave this answer.

In most cases, committees receive documents requested from the Government – 89% of MPs state so. 9% say that the Government mostly denies requests for provision of necessary documents.

Expert Capacity of Committees

Most of MPs directly and indirectly recognise the need to involve external experts in the work of parliamentary committees. Thus, 62% of surveyed deputies believe that committee expert groups must be formed from professionals selected by MPs as their assistants. 64% of deputies complain that involvement of paid experts is impeded by limited funds.

Instead, a third of surveyed deputies (33%) say that parliamentary committees do use the right to contract experts. The same number of MPs believe that on the overall, the current system of expert support in the form of committee secretariats is effective and does not require changes.

Regarding conclusions of the Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus on bills prepared by committees, the absolute majority of surveyed deputies (76%) believe that such conclusions are taken into account in preparation for the first reading. Almost a quarter – disagree with this. So, in general, parliamentary committees are rather thorough in draft law expertise.

Assessments of the Existing and Desired Distribution of Power

The methodology for assessing the distribution of power is designed to determine the existing and desired level of influence that the Verkhovna Rada has among other political institutions, as well as the correlation between the levels of influence of internal parliamentary actors (expert assessment on the scale of 0 to 10 points).

During the expert survey, people's deputies were asked to assess the existing/desired degree of influence of listed institutions in political life: "0" meant that the institution has no influence on political life at all, and "10" – that the institution is very influential.

By their level of influence, five groups of political institutions/parliamentary subjects were singled out: with very strong influence (8-10 points experts), strong influence (6-8 points), medium influence (4-6 points), weak influence (2-4 points) and very weak influence (0-2 points).

The application of the methodology revealed some peculiarities as to how the MPs' perceive current distribution of state power and ways to balance it.

As regards the political system in general, there is a clear demand from current parliamentarians to reduce the influence of financial and business circles and media on political life. According to these two parameters, there is the sharpest decline of average scores – for media (–1.8 points) and for business (–3.8 points). Thus, the surveyed MPs believe that the power of financial and business circles should be weak instead of strong, and the power of media should also decrease, although to a lesser degree than the power of business, and remain at the medium level.

[93] See materials of public opinion survey, p.22-74.

In this survey of people's deputies of Ukraine, the Razumkov Centre used the methodology of power distribution analysis used at the end of the 20th century to study the attitude to power distribution in the unicameral Swedish parliament – Riksdag.[94] A significant aspect of this methodology, is the politological content of power distribution, which is not necessarily the same as the norms officially captured in legislation.[95] Thus, researchers studied experts' perception of the real distribution of power.

The list of institutions proposed for evaluation of the level of power was modified in accordance with national reality, and some terms were adapted. In particular, to avoid a formalistic approach in VR deputies' answers to the questions, we used term "level of influence" instead of "level of power" in our questionnaire.

The MPs were assessing both, the level of influence of institutions external to the Parliament, as well as internal institutional environment of the Verkhovna Rada itself.

The first group, in addition to the Parliament, included the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, central executive authorities, local administrations, local self-government authorities, NGOs, trade unions, political parties, financial and business circles, and media.

The second group of assessment objects includes parliamentary committees, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada, heads of political parties represented in the Parliament, and leaders of parliamentary factions and groups, heads of faction and committee secretariats, as well as people's deputies of Ukraine as separate subjects.[96]

One more important aspect of the methodology is the separation of two assessment planes of power distribution – existing and desired. In the original Swedish study, the first question asked was about which political subjects/political institutions are considered more powerful by parliamentarians, and which are perceived as less powerful; the second question aimed to find out the ideal vision of power distribution.[97]

Existing and Desired Level of Institutions' Influence in Political Life
(as assessed by people's deputies on the scale of 0 to 10)

Level of influence	EXISTING LEVEL OF INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS IN POLITICAL LIFE		DESIRED LEVEL OF INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS IN POLITICAL LIFE	
	Average score	Institutions	Average score	Institutions
Very strong (8-10 points)	9.31	President of Ukraine	9.3	Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
	8.48	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	8.56	Political parties
			8.13	President of Ukraine
Strong (6-8 points)	7.8	Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	7.73	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
	7.5	Media		
	7.22	Finance and business groups		
	6.65	Political parties	6.73	Local self-government authorities
	6.49	Central executive power authorities		
			6.07	Central executive power authorities
Medium (4-6 points)	5.27	Local administrations	5.81	Trade unions
	5.18	Local self-government authorities	5.79	NGOs
			5.7	Media
	4.2	NGOs	5.48	Local administrations
Weak (2-4 points)	2.43	Trade unions	3.37	Finance and business circles

* None of the institutions were assessed as having very weak influence (2-0 points).

According to experts, status quo has to be preserved regarding Government's level of influence. As for the Cabinet of Ministers, central executive power authorities and local state administrations – there is not much difference between the indicators of existing and desired levels of power.

The received results also captured the demand for a certain increase of Verkhovna Rada's status in its external institutional environment. Namely, respondents believe that the influence of Parliament has to grow (+1.5 points). According to them, the same amount of growth is also required for the influence of civil society organisations and local self-government bodies. At the same time, there is a negative dynamics for the head of state, whose power, in MPs' opinion, has to slightly decrease (–1.2 points).

A somewhat unexpected result of applying the methodology for assessing power distribution in our national environment was the opinion of parliamentarians about the need for a sharp increase in the influence of trade unions, which should be above average, whereas in the actual configuration of the domestic political system, experts assess this institution's power as extremely weak.

Along with the need to reduce the role of business in political life, the demand for a stronger role of trade unions (the difference between the existing and desired power distribution indicators for trade unions is +3.4 points) highlights the existing imbalance in the Ukrainian model of social partnership, where among the three social partners – business, state and trade unions – the third party looks obviously weaker.

[94] Esaiasson P., Holmberg S. Power in the Swedish Parliament. – Scandinavian Political Studies, 1993, Volume 16, No. 3, p.227-250.

[95] In English-language political science literature, the term "distribution of power" is used to define the real distribution of power in society, Parliament or individual political party. This is the term used in P. Esaiasson's and S. Holmberg's research. For more information on the use of the term "power distribution" in political science see, e.g., the following works: Shapley L., Shubik M. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. – American political science review, 1954, September, Volume 48, Issue 3, p.787-792. McKenzie R. British political parties: The distribution of power within the conservative and labour parties. – London: Heinemann, 1955, 623p.

[96] Each of the elements proposed for assessment, can actually be interpreted both, as a political subject and as a political institution at the same time. This is why, for the sake of clarity of interpretation, the wording of expert survey questions contains a distinction: the first group is characterised by the term "institutions", and second – "subjects".

[97] Esaiasson P., Holmberg S. Power in the Swedish Parliament. – Scandinavian Political Studies, 1993, Volume 16, No. 3, p.228.

Let us take a separate look at the MPs' opinion on the correlation between the existing and desired power of one of the most important institutions of representative democracy – political parties.

Their current level of influence is assessed as strong, yet, according to parliamentarians, it should be even stronger. In the hierarchy of the desired distribution of power, MPs placed political parties second among all institutions proposed for assessment, preceded only by the Verkhovna Rada.

This result may indicate an increase in understanding of the need to build party structures with an extensive network of local organisations, stable authority among Ukrainian citizens and, accordingly, with very strong influence – on an equal footing with the Parliament and the President.

The MPs were asked to assess the level of subjects' influence on parliamentary activity on the scale of 0 to 10 ("0" meant that the subject has no influence on the activity of the Verkhovna Rada, and "10" that it is very influential).

The MP survey results according to the second component of the methodology for assessing power distribution are not as pronounced – the difference between average scores of existing and desired influence of internal parliamentary subjects is within the 0-2-point range.

Most desirable, from the MPs' point of view, is the increase in the level of influence that parliamentary committees have. The existing power of the latter is assessed as strong, yet should be even stronger (+2.05 points). The surveyed MPs also desire to increase the influence of heads of committee secretariats, although to a slightly lesser degree (+0.91 points). Along with this, the influence of leaders of faction secretariats is defined as currently and desirably weak.

The power of deputy faction and group leaders, as well as the Speaker, should remain very strong, according to experts. Also, there should be an increase in power of the First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (+1.09 points).

Ukrainian MPs assess their own existing level of power as medium, and demonstrate a desire to increase it (+2.05 points). At the same time, they would like to slightly decrease the influence of party leaders (–0.9 points), which is currently assessed as the strongest among all political subjects in the Parliament. This result can be interpreted as indicative of the existing demand in the 8th Verkhovna Rada to raise the status of the people's deputy of Ukraine, as well as to introduce specific regulations on internal faction democracy.

Motivation for Parliamentary Engagement

A deputy's desire to be re-elected is higher, if he values the deputy mandate he receives. In this regard, it is important, which motivation guided him to run for Parliament – power required to implement certain policy-related ideas/projects, fulfilment of his moral (e.g., patriotic) obligations, or simply desire to get a privileged status.

Existing and Desired Level of Subjects' Influence on Parliamentary Activity
(as assessed by people›s deputies on the scale of 0 to 10)

Level of influence	EXISTING LEVEL OF SUBJECTS' INFLUENCE ON PARLIAMENT OPERATION		DESIRED LEVEL OF SUBJECTS' INFLUENCE ON PARLIAMENT OPERATION	
	Average score	Institutions	Average score	Institutions
Very strong (8-10 points)	8.77	Leaders of political parties that are represented in the Parliament	8.89	Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
	8.65	Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine		
	8.28	Heads of parliamentary groups and factions	8.21	Parliamentary committees
			8.19	Heads of parliamentary groups and factions
Strong (6-8 points)			7.91	Leaders of political parties that are represented in the Parliament
			7.76	MPs as separate subjects
	6.32	Deputy Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	7.41	Deputy Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
	6.14	Verkhovna Rada Committees		
Medium (4-6 points)	5.71	MPs as separate subjects		
			4.16	Heads of secretariats of parliamentary committees
Weak* (2-4 points)			3.91	Heads of secretariats of parliamentary groups and factions
	3.44	Heads of secretariats of parliamentary groups and factions		
	3.25	Heads of secretariats of parliamentary committees		

* In the expert survey, none of the subjects were assessed as having very weak influence (0-2 points).

This study used the classification by J. Payne and O. Woshinsky[98] with the motivation to run for parliament as a criterion. According to the authors, such incentives can include interest in policy-making in a certain area, ideological beliefs, the feeling of responsibility to other citizens for the situation in the country, or the desire to get a status.[99]

Accordingly, based on results of expert survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, each respondent was measured against the criteria of one of the four types below:

1) "programme-oriented" – those MPs, who wish to improve people's lives, for example, in the sector of education, healthcare, energy, security and defence, etc.; these participants of the Verkhovna Rada are perceived as such that are oriented at resolving specific issues and are satisfied by the development and implementation management of policies in a certain area;

2) "ideological" – those MPs, who are focused on a specific ideological doctrine and tend to look at all political issues through the lense of this ideology, and believe that it is their life's work to spread this ideology;

3) "patriotic" – those MPs, who decided to run for parliament due to their feeling of moral responsibility to themselves, their family, friends for the situation in society;

4) "status-seekers" – MPs, who decided to run for parliament in order to multiply their achievements using the MP status; they are guided by the goals that will bring them prestige and respect.

Types of MPs by the motivation for parliamentary engagement criterion

	%
"Programme-oriented"	46.7
"Ideological"	6.7
"Patriotic"	35.6
"Status-seekers"	0
Undecided (chose "hard to say" option)	11.1

According to these criteria, Ukrainian MPs mostly divided into two groups: 47% of "programme-oriented" and 36% of "patriotic". Only 11% were unable to decide what the most important incentive for them was to run for parliament. There were only 7% of "ideological" parliamentarians among respondents.

None of the deputies admitted to seeking status benefits as an incentive for their parliamentary engagement.

Along with J. Payne's and O. Woshinsky's classification, we used one more, simpler research instrument – classification of MPs into those, who want to be re-elected, those, who have no intention to run for the next Verkhovna Rada, and those, who are undecided as of now. Also, among the MPs that seek re-election, we singled out a group of career-oriented deputies, who would like their position in the next Verkhovna Rada to be above what they currently have (in parliamentary administration or committees).

MP Types by Their Desire to Be Re-Elected

Their desire to get a mandate in the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation expressed 40% of respondents, out of which 31% – would like to move up their parliamentary career ladder. 13% do not want to be re-elected. Meanwhile, 47% – the most numerous group – consists of Ukrainian MPs that are currently undecided as to their future re-election prospects.

Attitude to future re-election as a people's deputy and further career in parliament

	%
Want to be re-elected and get a position higher than the current one (in a committee or Parliament administration) in the Verkhovna Rada of next convocation	31.1
Want to be re-elected and keep their current position	8.9
Do not intend to run for the next Verkhovna Rada	13.3
Undecided as to their nomination to the next Verkhovna Rada	46.7

MPs' Attitude to the Issue of Faction Discipline and Keeping Their Mandate While Working in the Government

People's deputies are more or less unanimous on the matter of non-participation in factions, free exit from them and the right to join the majority coalition, while their party is in opposition. The relative majority of MPs (over 60%) deny the necessity of such possibilities. 58% also believe that deputies should not have the right to go free of any sanctions in case excluded from their faction.

At the same time, most respondents supported MPs' right to take their own position in a vote, even if it is against their faction line (62%). Only 29% spoke against MPs' freedom to diverge from the party-faction line.

Same percentages of MPs supported and denied a deputy's right to publically criticise their faction's position.

Regarding the **possibility of an MP preserving his mandate for the duration of his work in the Government, opinions divided**: 38% support this idea, 33% do not support it, and 30% could not answer.

As for the self-nomination institution, MPs' opinions distributed in the following way: 40% believe that it has to be applied both, in parliamentary and local election, 36% – only in local elections, 7% – supported its cancellation.

[98] Payne J., Woshinsky O. Incentives for Political Participation. – World Politics, 1972, July, Volume 24, Issue 4, p.518-546.

[99] In order to identify these types, J. Payne and O. Woshinsky conducted an extensive qualitative analysis of interview materials from MPs of four countries with different level of development – the Dominican Republic, Brazil, France and the United States.

Assessment of Certain Provisions of a Possible Verkhovna Rada Reform (P. Cox Roadmap)

A separate survey section covered the assessment of the influence of potential changes on the efficiency of parliamentary work, in case of introduction of innovations as per the Report and roadmap on internal reform and capacity-building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, prepared by the European Parliament's Needs Assessment Mission (led by P. Cox).[100]

Most positive expectations are connected with such proposals as the introduction of the Behaviour Code of the People's Deputy of Ukraine, regulation of the status of opposition, introduction of "white papers" for each governmental draft law – these initiatives are considered useful or rather useful by 70% of respondents.[101]

Also, positive changes are expected from other reforms aimed at optimising cooperation between the Parliament and Government: introduction of a unified format of ministry reporting (69%), matching ministry responsibility areas to those of parliamentary committees (58%), proportionality of agenda formation according to the number of factions/groups (56%).

51% of MPs believe that the introduction of voting for regular laws by the majority of deputies present in the session hall will be beneficial; yet, a smaller percentage support division of laws into regular and special (44%).

The relative majority (44-46%) think that the following procedural innovations are beneficial: cancellation of only committee weeks, and introduction of mixed, plenary-committee weeks; limiting the number of draft laws considered in a session; formation of agenda at a Conciliation Council without the presence of media.

Most scepticism was expressed regarding proposals to limit the number of draft laws considered in a session (27%), closed format of Conciliation Council, and introduction of voting for regular laws by the majority of members present (24% each).

Assessment of Information Published by Media on the Work of Parliament

Media mostly spread negative information about the Verkhovna Rada (corruption, inefficiency, "button-pushing", etc.). This is the opinion of 84% of surveyed MPs.

Balanced nature of media information on the Parliament was noted only by 9% of MPs, and only 4% noticed positive information on the Parliament in the media (on developed and adopted laws, parliamentarians' work in electoral districts, etc.).

Parliament's Relations with Civil Society Organisations

Parliamentarians are noticeably more knowledgeable than the society about the work of civil society organisations that monitor different aspects of Verkhovna Rada's operation or have cooperation programmes with it.[102] Thus, almost half of MPs are familiar with the work of USAID RADA Program and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) (among deputies of current convocation, there are two of its former heads) – 49% each; another 36% and 33% of MPs, respectively, know something about their work. "Chesno" movement is well-known to 47% of MPs, another 40% – know something about it.

Reanimation Package of Reforms and Civil network "Opora" are well-known to 44% of MPs, and another 47% and 38%, respectively, are just familiar with their activity. Project "Rada4You" is less known in the parliamentary environment (implemented by Civil network "Opora") – only 7% of deputies say that they know it well, while 13% – know something (40% have never heard about this project).

A look at deputies' assessment of the usefulness of work done by these NGOs presents a rather interesting picture.

USAID RADA Program definitely gets the first place – 58% of surveyed MPs noted its usefulness in their work (22% – "yes", and 36% – "rather yes"). 16% of deputies did not feel the Program benefited their work, and another 18% – answered "rather no".

53% of MPs feel the benefits from Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) (coalition of 80 civil society organisations and 22 expert groups supported by western partners).[103] 22% of MPs negatively assessed the usefulness of RPR activity, another 20% answered "rather no".

Positive impact of the work of CVU for deputies' activity was assessed like this: 11% – "yes", 38% – "rather yes". 20% of deputies did not feel any positive effect at all, another 24% answered "rather no".

Deputies' assessment of the usefulness of other NGOs and projects was mostly negative. While 18% of MPs felt the usefulness of "Chesno" movement activity for them; 22% said "rather yes"; 29% – gave it a negative assessment, and another 22% said "rather no".

11% of deputies noted the usefulness of Civil network "Opora" activity for them, 31% said "rather yes". At the same time, 27% of MPs assessed its activity negatively, and 24% said "rather no" (overall correlation – prevalence of negative assessments, 51% of answers "no" and "rather no").

A positive effect of the "Rada4You" project was noted by only 2% of MPs; another 20% said "rather yes". Instead, a third of MPs answered the question negatively, and another 16% said "rather no".

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[100] Report and Roadmap on internal reform and capacity-building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Commissioned by Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group. Compiled by T. Tashtanov, independent Ukrainian expert, *http://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20160301RES16508/20160301RES16508.pdf*.

[101] Sum of answers "Will improve significantly" and "Will somewhat improve".

[102] For comparison, see results of public opinion survey, p.21.

[103] Sum of answers "yes" – 20%, and "rather yes" – 33%.

CONCLUSIONS

The reinstatement of constitutional amendments in February 2014 had a positive effect of turning Ukraine away from the establishment of an authoritarian regime and restoring the semi-presidential model of power with a strong Parliament. At the same time, despite the significant amount of trust voters had in the system, a major regeneration of the deputy corps via the arrival of society representatives with high level of people's trust, adoption of a significant number of reform bills by the Verkhovna Rada, – the Parliament faces crisis in public confidence.

Reasons include problems that have a systemic nature. In particular, a number of constitutional provisions that regulate Verkhovna Rada's powers in its relations with other top government authorities and affect the implementation of its main functions, enable conflicts between them and negatively affect its representative function.

Parliamentary influence on the work of the Cabinet is limited for a number of reasons. *First of all*, the issue of Cabinet's responsibility can be considered only once per one regular session of the Parliament (except for the last one, when it is altogether impossible); consideration of this issue is also prohibited within a year after the approval of Government Action Programme. *Second*, the Verkhovna Rada cannot dismiss individual ministers on its own. Thus the control function of the Parliament is limited.

Third, motion of no confidence in the Government is imperfect as it is applicable only to the entire Government composition (without a mechanism of individual responsibility of ministers). There are also no provisions for proposing an alternative composition of the future Cabinet and its Action Programme. This creates institutional conditions for the development of government crises and a threat of weakening the efficiency of government system operation as a whole.

The Basic Law of Ukraine contains a conflict, the essence of which is that the President, being responsible for realisation of security and foreign policy, forms the entire top military and diplomatic corps, and, at the same time, appointment and dismissal of the defence and foreign affairs ministers belong to the competence of the Verkhovna Rada. This incomplete division of powers enables a situation, where these two strategically important areas of state policy may function without leaders.

In the situation of cohabitation, when political forces opposed to the President hold the majority in the Parliament, implementing a comprehensive state policy becomes significantly complicated. Because the President has a strong power of veto, which the Parliament can override only by not less than two-thirds of its constitutional makeup, there are grounds for tension and constant conflicts in relations between state institutions, which reduces the potential for productive legislative work.

Another key problem with the Ukrainian model of Cabinet formation is the absence of a clear connection between the appointment of the Cabinet and approval of its Action Programme, as well as the lack of detailed requirements for this document's content. As a result, there appears a possibility for approval of declarative Government Action Programmes, the use of these Programmes as an instrument for getting annual immunity from a parliamentary motion of no confidence. This contributes to the neglect of the Programme component and narrowing of Government parties' and blocs' political responsibility. The non-compulsory nature of outlining directions of the future government policy adversely affects the quality of representation, and complicates or makes it altogether impossible to exercise effective parliamentary control over the work of the Cabinet.

The Verkhovna Rada has a lot of power within the budget process as compared to parliaments (lower chambers) of the vast majority of European states. Yet, in Ukraine, the budget issue often gets politicised through the use of the budget process as an instrument of political struggle.

The current model of Ukrainian parliamentarism has a number of peculiarities and specific problems, caused by imperfect legislation and the lack of stable traditions (among others, this applies to the party system and electoral legislation, as well as their influence on the formation of deputy corps).

One of the peculiarities of Verkhovna Rada operation is the presence of deputy groups (along with factions), which are formed not by ideological (party and political) principle, and are not politically accountable to constituents, yet have the same rights and opportunities as factions. This imbalance is a consequence of weaknesses in the party system and the current electoral law.

Inequal situation of deputies elected by political party lists and in the majority districts is manifested through the imperative mandate: it is only applicable to the part of the Verkhovna Rada elected by party lists. In turn, the imperative mandate has its own peculiarities: an MP's non-participation in a faction, his voting against his faction's position do not entail a mandatory revoking of deputy's mandate (without a corresponding decision of his party's leaders), an MP's exit from a faction is a voluntary action. The imperative mandate contributes to strengthening faction discipline, on the one hand, yet on the other – contradicts the free mandate principle.

Deputy faction coalition is the subject of Cabinet formation. That said, Ukraine has not developed a stable tradition of pre-election agreements between parties that would be comprehensible for constituents, and would determine the principles of coalition formation in case such parties get into parliament, as well as approaches to distribution of government positions. Virtually all agreements between political forces in this area are temporary and non-public.

Candidates for future ministers do not necessarily have to be representatives of coalition parties. Thus, they are not obliged to implement programme principles of parties that created parliamentary coalition. An MP appointed to Government loses his deputy's mandate, which contradicts European practices of Government

formation, and impedes the continuity of citizens' interest representation on the government level.

After the reinstatement of the 2004 version of the Constitution, there appeared a legal vacuum in the issues of regulating the operation of parliamentary opposition, its rights and responsibilities.

Legislative activity of the Verkhovna Rada is characterised by excessive legislative activity of individual MPs, which negatively affects the work of parliamentary committees, scientific and expert institutions, and does not contribute to a better quality of laws that are being adopted. Activity of most parliamentary committees is focused on control tasks, instead of controlling policy directions proposed and implemented by the Government. The structure of parliamentary committees does not match the government structure, which reduces the effectiveness of communications between the Parliament and the Government.

A survey of people's deputies of Ukraine showed both strengths and weaknesses of the deputy corps. For instance, the way MPs structure the hierarchy of problems that the country is facing, makes us question whether a part of them is fit to deal with the current challenges – even the war in Donbas was not considered one of the most topical issues in the country's development by some MPs. Most deputies do not perceive the issues of economic development and social problems, as well as European integration as relevant. Note that almost all political forces present in the Verkhovna Rada today have declared their commitment to the country's European path of development.

In the parliamentary environment, there is a clear need for raising the status of the Verkhovna Rada. Along with this, we see a definite demand for decreasing the influence of financial and business groups on political life. Influence of these groups is viewed as strong, and MPs believe that it should become weaker compared to other institutions. Deputies would also like to see the role of media decrease as well.

As for the level of influence of the Cabinet of Ministers, central executive power authorities and local state administrations, – MPs support the status quo. Along with this, according to a popular opinion among parliamentarians, it is necessary to somewhat decrease the influence of the President.

A large number of MPs support an increase in the role of parties (placing them second after the VRU), which is definitely a positive signal.

There was a notable difference between assessments of the existing and the desired level of influence of trade unions: according to respondents, they have to exercise more influence on political life, than they currently do. It is important that people's deputies acknowledged the need to strengthen the role of civil society organisations, as well as local self-government bodies.

In the MPs' vision of Parliament's development, there is a logical desire to strengthen the influence of parliamentary committees, as well as see the influence of faction and group leaders grow. Instead, they would like to bring somewhat down the influence of leaders of parliamentary parties. Party leaders often stay outside the Parliament, and thus MPs' desire to decrease the Verkhovna Rada's dependence on the influence of external factors is logical. This desire is naturally combined with the desire to increase the status of people's deputies as political subjects.

Deputies mostly support their right to free voting, express major support for the right not to become a part of factions and publically criticise activity of their factions and parties. So, there is an apparent readiness of a large part of the deputy corps to withstand pressure coming from outside or from the leadership of their own faction/party.

The problem of improving the quality of legislation that is being prepared in parliamentary committees, is, as MP survey showed, relevant and complicated. On the one hand, a significant part of MPs are aware of this issue and support its resolution through improving draft law expertise by contracting experts, however, they note the lack of funds for this purpose. On the other hand, a large percentage of MPs (a third) do not wish to change anything in the existing system, which is indicative of the real motivation for working in Parliament that political forces, as well as individual deputies have.

A positive sign is that over three quarters of MPs confirm that conclusions of the Scientific and Expert Department are taken into account during preparation of bills. Obviously, this situation is different in different VRU committees.

Information on parliamentary work provided by media is mostly negative – corruption, inefficiency, "button-pushing", etc. Both, results of the public opinion survey and results of the MP survey show that a lot of other information on parliamentary work that society needs, is omitted by the media. It seems that regardless of their owners, Ukrainian media outlets consciously or unconsciously discredit the Parliament. This results in a negative perception of the Verkhovna Rada in the society and mistrust of it as an important government institution.

People's deputies are aware of civil society initiatives involved in the monitoring of parliamentary activity, as well as in different cooperation projects with the Parliament. Some of them are mostly seen as positive (USAID RADA Program, RPR, CVU). Along with this, a large part of the deputy corps either does not care for this activity or views it as negative, which was also a characteristic feature of the previous periods. Reasons for such attitude can be different – from inability to accept the idea of openness to society and closer cooperation with civil society to irrelevance of NGO projects.

There is no uniform support for different provisions of the future parliamentary reform among MPs. Most positive expectations are connected with raising the level of deputies' morality through the adoption of the Behaviour Code, regulation of the status of opposition. At the same time, most issues expected to increase Parliament's efficiency are connected with optimisation of its cooperation with the Government.

Which of the following issues do you consider most relevant in a decreasing order?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

	Most relevant	Second relevant	Third relevant
War in Donbas	46.7	15.6	4.4
Overcoming corruption	11.1	17.8	15.6
Decentralisation	11.1	6.7	0.0
Ineffective state healthcare system	4.4	4.4	4.4
Eurointegration	4.4	0.0	6.7
Excessive tax burden	2.2	6.7	0.0
Lustration	2.2	0.0	4.4
Granting land ownership rights to foreigners	0.0	0.0	6.7
Return of Crimea to Ukraine	0.0	11.1	11.1
Privatisation	0.0	2.2	2.2
Limits of state interference in the economy	0.0	8.9	8.9
Social expenditure	0.0	6.7	6.7
Environmental pollution	0.0	0.0	4.4
Prevalent representation of city over village interests in politics	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ukraine's excessive openness to the world	0.0	0.0	2.2
Ukraine's excessive concentration on its internal problems	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hard to say	17.8	20.0	22.2

Do parliamentary committees' areas of responsibility coincide with those of the ministries?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Parliamentary committees' areas of responsibility coincide with those of the ministries	28.9
Parliamentary committees' areas of responsibility are different from those of the ministries	68.9
No answer	2.2

Are the conclusions of specialised committees on bills taken into account before their first reading?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Specialised committees' conclusions on bills are mostly taken into account before their first reading	95.6
Conclusions of committees defined as the main ones are usually not taken into account	4.4

Do parliamentary committees have real autonomy in determining the issues of their own agenda and the schedule for reviewing these issues?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

In practice, the agenda for committees' work is chiefly determined by committees themselves	57.8
The list of issues on the committees' agenda and the schedule for reviewing these issues are often determined by outside parties and controlled by factions, whose representatives dominate in the committee, or by Parliamentary leadership	42.2

How often do representatives of committees (or their leadership) act on their right to a legislative initiative in the area within their authority, compared to other law-making subjects?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Heads, deputy heads, secretaries or committee members more often than others act on their right to a legislative initiative on the issues within the scope of their committee's authority	86.7
Committee representatives propose less bills in their specialised area than other legislative initiative entities	13.3

As a rule, at whose initiative do the ministers attend parliamentary committee meetings?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Most such instances are initiated by parliamentary committees	86.7
Mainly the minister himself takes initiative to attend a committee's meetings	13.3

And at whose initiative do other representatives of executive power attend parliamentary committee meetings?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Most such instances are initiated by parliamentary committees	93.3
The initiative to attend committee's meetings mostly comes from representatives of executive government	6.7

Do Verkhovna Rada committees always get the documents they request from the Government on the issues within their scope of authority?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

In most cases parliamentary committees get the documents they requested	88.9
Government mostly refuses to grant permission to receive the documents	8.9
No answer	2.2

Do parliamentary committees have the de facto possibility to support their operation with sufficient intellectual resources?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

No, realisation of committees' right to hire paid experts is mostly impeded by insufficient funds allocated for the operation of the Verkhovna Rada	64.4
Yes, parliamentary committees do use their right to involve outside experts as contractors	33.3
No answer	2.2

Do committees take into account conclusions of the Main Scientific and Expert Department?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Yes, its conclusions are mostly taken into account by committees during preparation for the first reading	75.6
No, its conclusions are mostly ignored during preparation for the first reading	24.4

Is it practical to form committee expert groups out of assistants of MPs, who are members of corresponding committees?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Committee expert groups should be formed from relevant specialists in committees' areas of expertise selected by MPs as their assistants	62.2
The current system of expert support in the form of committee secretariats is effective and does not require changes	33.3
No answer	4.4

Should there be a possibility for MPs to keep their mandate in case he is appointed to the Cabinet of Ministers (without keeping the deputy's salary while they work in the Government) and the possibility of their return to Parliament after termination of such duties?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Yes, there should be	37.8
No, there should not be	33.3
Hard to say	28.9

There are different points of view on reforming the system of MPs election. Where would you place your position on this issue on the scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means the majority vote system with the possibility of self-nomination, and "10" – the proportional system with strict imperative mandate?
Average score



How INFLUENTIAL in politics IS each of the following institutions?*
average score

President of Ukraine	9.31
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	8.48
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	7.80
Media	7.50
Finance and business groups	7.22
Political parties	6.65
Central executive power authorities	6.49
Local administrations	5.27
Local self-government authorities	5.18
NGOs	4.20
Trade unions	2.43

* On the 11-point scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means that an institution has no influence on political life, and "10" – an institution is very influential.

How INFLUENTIAL in politics SHOULD BE each of the following institutions?*
average score

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	9.30
Political parties	8.56
President of Ukraine	8.13
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	7.73
Local self-government	6.73
Central executive power authorities	6.07
Trade unions	5.81
NGOs	5.79
Media	5.70
Local administrations	5.48
Finance and business circles	3.37

* On the 11-point scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means that an institution should have no influence on political life, and "10" – an institution should be very influential.

How strong IS THE INFLUENCE of each of the following entities ON THE WORK OF PARLIAMENT?*
average score

Leaders of political parties that are represented in the Parliament	8.77
Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	8.65
Heads of parliamentary groups and factions	8.28
Deputy Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	6.32
Parliamentary committees	6.14
MPs as separate subjects	5.71
Heads of secretariats of parliamentary groups and factions	3.44
Heads of secretariats of parliamentary committees	3.25

* On the 11-point scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means that an entity does not influence the work of Parliament, and "10" – an entity is very influential.

And how strong SHOULD BE THE INFLUENCE of each of the following entities ON THE WORK OF PARLIAMENT?*
average score

Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	8.89
Parliamentary committees	8.21
Heads of parliamentary groups and factions	8.19
Leaders of political parties that are represented in the Parliament	7.91
MPs as separate subjects	7.76
Deputy Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	7.41
Heads of secretariats of parliamentary committees	4.16
Heads of secretariats of parliamentary groups and factions	3.91

* On the 11-point scale of 0 to 10, where "0" means that an entity should not influence the work of Parliament at all, and "10" – an entity should be very influential.

Should the MPs elected by party lists have the possibility of…?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

	Yes	No	Hard to say
Vote against their faction	62.2	28.9	8.9
Publicly criticise their faction's position	42.2	40.0	17.8
Freely leave the faction at their own initiative	24.4	60.0	15.5
Be expelled from the faction without any sanctions	24.4	57.8	17.7
Enter a coalition of deputy factions, in case their party or bloc is in opposition to such factions	17.8	77.8	4.4
Not enter the faction of the party (bloc), on the list of which they have been elected	6.7	88.9	4.4

What is your attitude to the institution of self-nomination in Ukraine's electoral law?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

It should be in effect for both parliamentary and local elections	40.0
It should only be in effect for local elections	35.6
It should be repealed	6.7
It should only be in effect for parliamentary elections	0.0
Hard to say	17.8

Are you familiar with the work of NGOs, movements, projects listed below?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

	Well aware	Know something	Only heard about it	Not familiar	Hard to say
USAID RADA Program	48.9	35.6	6.7	6.7	2.2
Committee of Voters of Ukraine	48.9	33.3	13.3	2.2	2.2
"Chesno" Movement	46.7	40.0	11.1	0.0	2.2
Civil Network "Opora"	44.4	46.7	4.4	4.4	0.0
Reanimation Package of Reforms	44.4	37.8	15.6	0.0	2.2
"Rada4you" Project	6.7	13.3	33.3	40.0	6.6

Does the work of these NGOs, movements, projects help you in your work at the Parliament?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

	Yes	Rather yes	Rather no	No	Hard to say
USAID RADA Program	22.2	35.6	17.8	15.6	8.9
Reanimation Package of Reforms	11.1	37.8	24.4	20.0	6.6
"Chesno" Movement	17.8	22.2	22.2	28.9	8.9
Civil Network "Opora"	20.0	33.3	20.0	22.2	4.4
Committee of Voters of Ukraine	11.1	31.1	24.4	26.7	6.6
"Rada4you" Project	2.2	20.0	15.6	33.3	28.9

How will the efficiency of the Verkhovna Rada change as a result of introduction of each of the following innovations as per the report and roadmap on internal reform and capacity-building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, prepared by the European Parliament's Needs Assessment Mission (led by P. Cox)?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

	Will significantly drop	Will somewhat drop	Will remain unchanged	Will somewhat improve	Will significantly improve	Hard to say
Introducing the Behaviour Code of the People's Deputy of Ukraine	51.1	24.4	13.3	4.4	0.0	6.6
Regulation of the status of opposition	46.7	33.3	6.7	2.2	0.0	11.1
Introducing annual ministry reporting procedure with uniform format	42.2	26.7	20.0	0.0	0.0	11.1
Introducing the practice of submitting documents that explain political goals of each government bill (the so-called "white papers")	40.0	33.3	13.3	2.2	0.0	11.1
Introducing the system of voting for ***regular*** laws by the majority of MPs present in the session hall	37.8	13.3	11.1	2.2	22.2	13.3
Reducing the number of committees, which should be in precise correlation with ministries' responsibility areas	35.6	22.2	20.0	8.9	8.9	4.4
Determining the issues on the agenda for plenary sessions based on the proportional principle, according to the size of parliamentary factions/groups	28.9	26.7	17.8	8.9	8.9	8.8
Abandoning the practice of weeks solely allotted to committee work, and introduction of plenary-committee weeks (combined)	28.9	17.8	15.6	13.3	8.9	15.5
Limiting the number of bills initiated by MPs to be considered to 20 per one session	26.7	17.8	15.6	6.7	20.0	13.2
Setting the agenda at the Conciliation Council in closed session only (without media presence)	22.2	24.4	24.4	4.4	20.0	4.4
Introducing law classification into ***regular*** and ***special*** laws	15.6	28.9	22.2	4.4	17.8	11.1

What type of information about the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do you prevalently receive from media?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Negative information (for instance, on its corruption, inefficiency, "button-pushing" of MPs, etc.)	84.4
Positive information (for instance, on the laws developed and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, the work of parliamentarians in electoral districts)	4.4
Media information about the Verkhovna Rada is balanced	8.9
Hard to say	2.2

It is often said that Ukrainian economy and politics are divided into spheres of influence between various interest groups. What is your attitude to this point of view?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Division of spheres of influence between interest groups does exist in Ukraine and this is a negative trend	60.0
Division of spheres of influence between interest groups does exist and this is a normal trend	20.0
A division of spheres of influence in economy and politics between interest groups does not exist in Ukraine	4.4
Hard to say	15.6

Have new interest groups emerged in 2015-2017 that previously were not there?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

No, new interest groups have not emerged	44.4
Yes, new interest groups have emerged	28.9
No answer	26.7

Do these groups coordinate interests between themselves?
% of interviewed people's deputies of Ukraine

Yes	53.3
No	6.7
Hard to say	40.0

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall state of political culture, basic knowledge and competency of Ukrainian citizens regarding the political system, human rights and freedoms is unsatisfactory. This contributes to the growth of mistrust of the state and its key institutions, alienation of citizens from politics and civil society life, forms passive attitude to socio-political processes.

Given the nature of Ukrainian citizens' political culture and its prevalent types, **the main task in this area is to gradually increase the number of citizens – civic culture bearers**, who combine interest in politics with trust in political institutions and are ready for competent political participation.

The process of development can go like this: "***through the interest in political system – to knowledge about it, through interest and knowledge – to increasing trust; through interest, knowledge and trust – to political participation***". It is especially important to increase these indicators among young people, whose level of political interest is lower than that of other age groups.

Political Education

The task of forming the civic type of political culture requires an integrated approach to political education. Currently, this approach is absent both from the content of training programmes, and from the system of institutions necessary for their implementation.

As a result, various elements and institutions used to carry out political education (state education system, political parties, NGOs, media, etc.) operate separately from each other, which makes their influence work in different directions and sometimes leads to opposite goals – alienation of citizens from politics instead of formation of a conscious interest in it.

Therefore, in today's situation, there is an urgent need to:

a) develop a concept document that would define the main goals, tasks, principles, ways and mechanisms of political education in Ukraine;

b) create a system of government and non-government institutions necessary for implementing political education of citizens of different age groups in all regions of the state.

As the basis for such document, draft Political Education Concept can be used, developed in 2005 by the NaUKMA Institute for Civic Education with support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine.

On the institutional level, it is recommended to create a coordination centre for organising and coordinating the process of political education. Among potential options – creating a separate state body to act on the national level (e.g., like German Federal Centre for Political Education), state-public coordination body at the Cabinet of Ministers or at the specialised ministry (as was proposed by the authors of the 2005 Concept).

At the same time, certain practical steps in political education sector can be made straight away. This primarily concerns secondary and higher education.

Fostering a Better Understanding of Parliamentarism and Representative Institutions

To raise the level of public understanding of the pivotal role of Parliament in the political system as the highest representation and the only legislative body, it is recommended to:

- increase people's knowledge about the Verkhovna Rada and its main functions;
- inform citizens on the vision that parliamentary parties have of state policy priorities in various sectors, common and different points in their approaches;
- distribute analytical materials (in easy to understand form) on the goals of adopting and main provisions of bills in different areas that are most important for the society;
- gather comparative data illustrating the work of the Ukrainian Parliament in the global and European context, i.e. among the parliaments of other democratic states;
- promote parliamentary parties' programmes, inform citizens about their work in the Parliament, both, through media, as well as directly – through the work of local branches, public reception offices, etc;
- spread information about the work of MPs in single-mandate districts;
- inform citizens on possible opportunities to defend their rights and interests by appealing to people's deputies (personally and through reception offices of MPs and political parties), appealing to local government bodies. Educate about the mechanisms for exercising this right.

In order for citizens to understand the budget function of the Verkhovna Rada, it is necessary to present information (in the popular, easy to understand form) on the draft State Budget for the following year in due time, namely: on the main macroeconomic and social indicators; main income and expenditure items; the volume of expenses on social purposes; on the main changes to the State Budget as compared to the previous year, etc.

In the information policy, it is crucial to:

- change the tone of media information on the work of Parliament from "exposing" to "informing";
- introduce a series of popular science programmes on political institutions in the world and in Ukraine (Parliament, Government, President, etc.) on the First National television channel;
- have foreign donors that support NGO projects connected with the Parliament set a priority to form public respect for it, its understanding, establish a positive image of the Verkhovna Rada, and increase the society's trust in it.

In order to develop and promote other representative institutions:

- recommend that parties, trade unions, civil society organisations be more active in informing citizens about the local work, spread contact information of their local organisations;
- in reforming electoral system, provide for citizens' demand for personalised choice;
- use the means and resources of political parties, trade unions to inform citizens about the possibilities for effective protection of their rights and interests through their participation in these associations; make contact information of local branches available to citizens;
- donor organisations should set a priority for NGO projects sponsored by them to implement political education of people in regions and increase their civic participation.

Increasing the Efficiency of Parliament's Performance of Its Representative Function

In order to increase the efficiency of Parliament's performance of its representative function, improve the mechanism of distributing responsibilities between top government institutions, increase stability of their operation, it is recommended to:

- During parliamentary election campaigns, introduce the practice of political parties publishing their views on the future state policy directions in different sectors, potential coalition partners, and candidates for positions in the Cabinet and other government bodies formed by the Parliament.
- Make the submission of Cabinet Action Programme a compulsory element of Government formation process, without which its composition cannot be approved.
- Set the requirement for preliminary submission of Cabinet Action Programme before the issue of Cabinet formation is considered, and formulate legislative requirements for the structure and content of this government document, in order for people's deputies and public to familiarise themselves with key directions of the future government policy.
- Capture the party membership principle (as membership in a political party or public declaration of support for a certain party's programme and ideology) as a mandatory requirement for potential candidates for ministerial positions, as well as public responsibility of parties for their nominees to the Government.
- Establish the institution of constructive no-confidence vote regarding the Cabinet of Ministers.
- Introduce individual accountability of ministers to the Parliament – Verkhovna Rada's ability to dismiss individual ministers (except for the minister of defence and foreign affairs) on its own initiative.
- Establish a priority discretionary power of the head of state to dismiss ministers of defence and foreign affairs (in case provisions in Art. 102 and Art. 106 of the Constitution on the powers of the President in corresponding sectors remain in place).
- Establish an MP's right to retain his mandate during his tenure in the Cabinet of Ministers (without the MP salary), as well as reinstatement of his deputy's mandate after the end of his term in the Government (for one parliamentary term).
- Introduce medium term State Budget planning. Provide for the responsibility of respective heads of State Statistics Committee sections for the data they provide, respective heads of MEDT departments – for the analysis they conduct at the initial stage of State Budget planning. Introduce specific sanctions for low-quality performance of analysis and research, organisational and other work in the process of State Budget planning.
- Prohibit MPs from introducing amendments to the Draft Law on the State Budget, which increase total expenditures and/or budget deficit.
- In the event of adoption of electoral legislation, under which the entire parliament will be elected according to one electoral system, introduce a minimal quantity principle for the formation of deputy factions/groups depending on the number of deputies in the smallest faction or according to a certain established percentage of the total number of MPs in the Parliament.
- Establish priority of party factions' rights over deputy associations formed by MPs excluded from their factions.
- Provide detailed requirements in the Rules of Procedure for internal operation rules of deputy factions and groups, democratic principles of their organisation and decision-making mechanisms. Ensure that these rules are made public.
- In determining the course for legal regulation of parliamentary minority rights, proceed from the need to find a balance between ensuring effective implementation of the Government and parliamentary coalition's political course supported by the majority of citizens, and guaranteeing the rights of the minority.
- With this approach, there are some debatable issues, like giving opposition priority rights in formation of plenary meetings' agenda, senior positions in the budget committee and committees responsible for certain areas of state policy, institutionalisation and state funding of the "opposition government".
- Introduce restrictions for MPs' individual legislative initiative, setting a requirement to secure the support of other MPs to introduce a bill; the number of such MPs should correspond to the number of the smallest faction (group) as of the start of the first parliamentary session (or the minimum percentage of MPs from the total number of deputies in the parliament, needed to create a faction).
- Harmonise the structure of Verkhovna Rada committees with the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as much as possible. Adopt legal provisions on obligatory representation of ministries and departments at parliamentary committee meetings at the request of the latter, providing for situations, where the appearance of a minister or a head of a central executive power authority is compulsory. Set the priority for consideration of Cabinet's legislative initiatives as a power of parliamentary committees, as well as control over Government realisation of corresponding policy directions. ■

FEATURES AND TRENDS IN BUILDING A UKRAINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE: EXPERT OPINIONS

From 1 November to 1 December 2017 the Razumkov Centre conducted expert interviews dedicated to the topic "Features and Trends in Building a Ukrainian Political Culture: Expert Opinions".

The following questions were asked:

1. In your opinion, what are the typical features and trends of Ukrainian political culture? Which of them are crucial for the development of parliamentarism?

2. In your opinion, which of these trends are likely to develop in the next 10-15 years, and therefore require the immediate attention of the government, civil society, expert and academic community?

3. In your opinion, which measures implemented by the state, media, civil society could improve citizens' awareness about political processes, raise the level of civic engagement and, thus, increase the efficiency of representative democracy in Ukraine?

Anatoliy YERMOLENKO,
Deputy Director for Research, Head of Social Philosophy Department, H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine

1. Citizens of Ukraine still lack political culture, which manifests itself in insufficient awareness, poorly developed independent thinking, and hence lack of ability to critically perceive manipulative actions of mass media, fake information, etc., amplified by digital technologies.

Weakness of communicative and argumentative skills, underdevelopment of communicative practices and argumentative discourses generate the lack of "courage to publically apply reason" as an important component and factor of modern democratic culture. Participants of these practices are treated not as equal *entities* to reach a mutual understanding with, but as objects, means, resources in the hands of political strategists showing off their work.

The critical foundation for such political practices is the "friend-enemy" distinction proposed by a German political theorist Carl Schmitt.[1] This situation is observed not just at the highest level of legislative power, but also in many public discussion practices related to certain projects of state institutions reform, promoting economic projects, etc.

Most of the times, public is not involved in developing reforms altogether, they find out about them post factum, in the best case scenario, reform projects are "brought to people's attention", in the worst – people find out about them "from newspapers", after they have been approved by the Parliament. This is "government-***to***-public communication" in action, whereas, what we should have is "communication ***between*** government and public".

This situation is also taking place in the so-called public discussions, for instance, in the process of approving urban development projects for the whole city, its separate parts, etc., when procedural requirements are violated, votes of discussion participants are bought and results are falsified.

I would also like to stress the regular (open or concealed) violation of the principle of separation of powers, which is a legacy and a distorted relic of Soviet era manifested in the form of "telephone law", adoption of by-laws by certain state institutions in violation

[1] Carl Schmitt-Dorotic, 1888-1985, German jurist and political theorist, researcher of state (constitutional) law, representative of the so-called Conservative Revolution. Had ambiguous reputation. Carl Schmitt's work influenced the development of theory of politics, law, European philosophy, especially, extreme right-wing and neoconservative.

of laws, use of administrative resources, or just corrupt practices. The extremely high level of anomie[2] in Ukrainian society has also penetrated the Parliament, where instead of reasoning MPs use force, a kind of "force-based positivism".

All these factors lead to a distorted perception of representative institutions, parliamentarism as such, when the Parliament, compared to other political institutions in the Ukrainian society, has almost the least amount of trust among citizens.[3]

And this is rather dangerous. Let us remind ourselves that underdeveloped parliamentarism and weakness of Temporary government were the cause of 1917 October coup in Russia, and parliamentary democracy crisis in the 1930's Weimar Republic led to national socialism dictatorship in Germany. Developed countries are undergoing a type of representative democracy crisis today as well, which is manifested in diagnoses like "the end of democracy", "simulation democracy", etc., causing them to look for new forms of democracy, emerging in such concepts as "discussion democracy", "advisory democracy", "deliberative democracy", etc.

2. Lately, Ukrainian society has been seeing new trends aimed at developing new democracy forms, civil society institutions, which are supported by communication and discourse practices, formation of social, political and legal competences of citizens.

As far as political culture is concerned, there has been an increase in "maturity of citizens", their ability to detect false communications, distorted by manipulations of political technologies.

I believe that in the next 10-15 years, establishment and development of new forms of direct democracy will be on the rise, which will manifest itself in institutionalisation of deliberative democracy as a social meta-institution and an important factor in civil society.

The foundation of such deliberative democracy, using the research of modern German philosopher Dietrich Böhler,[4] is public discourse, i.e. dialogue of reasons as a thorough, self-critical, and partnership-based search for truth.

The main requirements to the discourse are such: first, argumentative discourse requires a thorough search for facts, data that form the empirical basis of a thought, statement, therefore, the search for truth. Thus, the ***first principle*** is: look for a more powerful argument!; ***second discourse principle*** specifies the first one: refrain from emotions, from fast conclusions, from coercion of digital technologies and non-critical own or party's statements on the Internet; which leads to the ***third,*** social, *discourse principle*: always respect the human dignity of everyone, of whom you talk or write.[5] These discourse requirements are at the same time ethical and moral. Regrettably, at this point, our society tends to ignore these requirements in parliamentary debates, as well as in different public hearings.

Of course, establishment of deliberative democracy does not at all mean that the institutions of traditional representative democracy, especially in the form of parliamentarism, will play a smaller role. On the contrary, government will receive more and more control, motivation and argumentative legitimacy from civil society.

We can say that after the Revolution of Dignity and especially during the war with Russia, there appeared new forms and manifestations of civil society, namely, volunteer movements and non-governmental organisations that took upon them those responsibilities and functions that the government proved unable to execute in a crisis.

These are new civil society movements that are coming from inside the society, as opposed to the so-called non-governmental and non-profit organisations of the 1990s – first decade of 21st century that were being created "from outside" and existed mostly thanks to financial support of foreign funds. Obviously, at that time these organisations (environmental, gender, etc.) executed an important social function and they still do today. I think that in the next several decades, society will be looking for mechanisms and procedures to institutionalise the "social mind" of its people via effectively influencing government decision-making, in particular, adoption of laws by the parliament, orders – by representative bodies of local self-government, etc.

For the development of representative democracy, parliamentarism we require further strengthening of civil society, in particular, development of deliberative democracy institutions.

First of all, we need to develop education in the broadest sense of the term, which by definition means clarification of meanings, formation of independent critical thinking, political competence and democratic competences of citizens, their ability to distinguish the true consensus of real communications from the false, distorted by manipulation technologies.

This foremost includes political and sociological education as a permanent, ongoing process of creating mechanisms for society's self-reflection (feedback). This process is connected with the development of forms of direct democracy, which means participation in new democratic movements, civil society based on the foundation of developing citizens' competences.

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[2] Anomie – lack of regulation, disruption of traditional values, institutions, connections in the period of social upheaval. French sociologist E. Durkheim, who introduced this term in science, defined anomie as increased alienation in society with weak consensus, crisis of value system, loss of effective social and moral norms that regulate collective and individual life.

[3] See Basic Principles and Ways of Building a National Identity of Ukrainian Citizens // National Security and Defence. – No. 1-2 (169-170). – 2017. – p.4.

[4] Dietrich Böhler, born in 1942 – German philosopher, representative of "Berlin Discourse Pragmatics".

[5] See: Böhler D. Thoughts On Our Environment Amidst External and Internal Threats. Translated from German by A. Yermolenko / Philosophical Thought. – 2017. – No. 2. – p.55.

Second. An important factor in the establishment of representative democracy is consolidation and consistent compliance with the principle of separation of powers. This requires a more accurate identification of state power branches in terms of their competences and powers, which also demands an improvement of constitutional norms. The parliamentary-presidential form of government proclaimed by the Constitution of Ukraine contains traps and dangers of diarchy.

Third. To improve parliamentarism, Ukraine needs to introduce changes to electoral law, namely, provisions on the open party list election system. This will be the foundation of responsibility identification of an MP, as they will feel their responsibility not just to their constituents or political party, but (which is most important) to the people of Ukraine in general.

Fourth. The principle of separation of powers should not be limited to state institutions, it should be extended to all of socio-political life, which also implies active involvement of the "fourth power" (media). In the process of creating new means of representative democracy, digital technologies of the so-called "fifth power" (social networks) may also be useful. However, in this case, we must remember about the abovementioned discourse requirements.

So, increasing efficiency of representative democracy is explicitly related to the development of direct democracy mechanisms and procedures, forms of self-organisation and self-governance, strengthening activism of the civil society and each citizen. All of this is manifested in the social meta-institution of deliberative democracy. Thus, development of deliberative practices should become the basis and an indispensable condition for further development of representative democracy in Ukraine. ■

Oleksandr MAIBORODA,
Deputy Director of I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies, NAS of Ukraine

1. Today's overall state of culture (including political) in the Ukrainian society is the exact reflection of the current development stage of the latter. In political science, this stage is often defined as "neo-feudalism". "Neo-" is frequently interpreted as a return to the pre-socialist socio-political system. This contains a certain paradigm error. The thing is that Soviet Union's socialist system itself was also "neo-feudalism".

The February Revolution of 1917 was an attempt to break away from the long-standing feudalism of the European part of the Russian Empire. That type of feudalism resembled European – with ancestral possession of land, hereditary titles and class privileges, etc. Instead of this quasi-European feudalism, the Bolsheviks introduced essentially Asian type of feudalism – with ruling class' common ownership of national resources, the rule of viceroys in regions, and unlimited power of the autocrat, etc.

The class that until recently ruled in Ukraine (not legally, but de facto), which gave it the opportunity to get its hands on finances and production resources, attempted to revive the European-type feudalism – with personal rule of the land, introduction of hereditary transfer of sinecure positions in the government system, clan organisation, confronting central government through regional rulers, etc.

At the same time, steps were made in the direction of overcoming this "neo-feudalism" and transitioning to the true democracy. So, it is the battle between these two incompatible models that defines the state of society today.

Political culture of the majority of the ruling class is distinctly feudalistic – contempt for the people, law, lack of ideological and spiritual principles, social irresponsibility, selfish use of power mechanisms for personal gain. Clearly, this segment is interested in political indifference of the bulk of the population.

How can we evaluate the political culture of this bulk of population in this situation? There cannot be a uniform assessment. On the one hand, we can theoretise about the inertia of the vassal culture created by the prior feudalistic systems that still persists.

On the other, – the fight started by the "modernisers" against the "neo-feudals" in the upper levels of government stimulates activist political culture that can also be called "public conscience".

Of course, the inertia of vassal culture cannot be eradicated fast, and so far, it defines the character of political culture of both, the "upper" and the "lower" levels. The last illustration on the subject: the situation between the Supreme Commander (the President of Ukraine) and the National Guard Commander (the Minister of Internal Affairs).

Everyone can see the signs of tension in their relations – the "backpack case" against the Minister's son. In the society with unwritten rules of political culture that are mandatory for everyone, by default, there should not be any tensions between the Supreme Commander (aka the head of state) and heads of security forces. Those, who are entrusted with weapons (ministers of defence, internal affairs and SBU head), must immediately voluntarily resign in case of a disagreement with the President. The reason is simple – society should not be hostage to their relations, being constantly perplexed regarding the further actions of armed forces managers. Such resignations are the manifest of social responsibility – a compulsory feature of political culture.

The lack of political culture in the "lower" levels is illustrated by their passive observation of what is happening "over there", "in the masters' chambers".

The majority does not realise, and does not feel that they are essentially hostages, they seem not to care, whose vassals they are to become.

An active crowd is dangerous, but in its passive state it is equally dangerous, as it can silently approve any developments, instead of influencing the formation of the national agenda.

2. Political culture is manifested through actions, and the latter are motivated by accepted principles and values, as well as current sentiment. Therefore, prediction of long-term trends in the development of political culture is not just hard, it is almost impossible.

Similarly to general culture, political culture is shaped by the general public, but it is the ruling class and political establishment that should influence its final shape, in order to then come back down to the general public in its better form, foremost, as examples of behaviour of the top level representatives. Civic activists, experts and the media can observe and comment on this behaviour. Everything will depend on the nature and content of their observations – how independent and objective they are.

3. Commenting on, criticising political behaviour of the top tiers should be just one of many directions, in which political culture is shaped. Focusing on criticism only, stimulates passivity even more, as it is nurtured by mass narcissism (we all know that politicians are immoral, and we are the impersonation of virtue).

Society has to be self-critical at large, without this it cannot improve itself. Society can use regular open dialogues between its different levels in the format provided by modern telecommunications as a mirror.

In general, there are numerous ways to influence mass consciousness, and it is mostly down to sponsors of this influence – how prepared they are to listen to the truth about themselves (which is worse than lies) for their own money. If they are not ready for it – they have no sense of self-preservation. ■

Ihor POLISHCHUK,
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1. A strategically important component of Ukraine's traditional political culture is its *community-centred nature* as a proclivity towards different forms of self-organisation and self-government.

This trait is characteristic of both the historical tradition, and the modern political mentality of the Ukrainian society. The self-government potential of Ukrainian mentality is an inseparable part of Ukrainian people's historical "image". It is one of the basic traits of Ukrainian people. And they certainly find their reflection in the mentality of modern Ukrainians and socio-political reality of Ukraine's current life.

I am talking about ability to find various individual and group forms of rational management even under most unfavourable conditions, which is a form of struggle for survival; about the desire for freedom, independent functioning of an individual (the desire "to know neither a king, nor an overlord", M. Kostomarov[6]); about a rather high level of Ukrainian people's civic and political self-organisation (starting from the veche times and until now).

At the moment, a community-centred nature is the necessary mental ground for *decentralisation*, which is gaining momentum in today's Ukraine with full support of the majority of population.

This is the case, when Ukrainians stand as typical Europeans, for whom an effective system of local self-government is the basis of political polyarchy. Besides, it is this community-centred approach that can and should be the effective alternative to the pseudo-federalism and Ukrainian state anomie at the current stage of state-building.

By ideological orientation, political mentality of modern Ukraine is characterised by ambivalent division of society into leftist values supporters (mostly people of pre-retirement and retirement age) on the one hand, and centre-right conservative-liberal values supporters – on the other (mostly young and middle-aged people).

On the overall, today's Ukraine is leaning towards western European political values, but some other noticeable mental and cultural traits include those from eastern nations, in particular, etatistic paternalism, reliance on charismatic leaders, etc.

Modern political culture of Ukrainian people is fragmentary, it is not monolithic as it lacks stable components, and many of those that have formed – have not taken their final shape yet. It must be noted that most of political and cultural elements of modern Ukrainians are not typical for traditions of the Ukrainian nation and our national character.

The political mentality of the current Ukrainian nation, according to many researchers, has post-colonial, post-Soviet, post-socialistic nature. Although, at the moment this mentality has lost its monopoly and functions mostly by inertia. Gradually, a new, pro-western *activist type of mentality* is being born. This new type of mentality is in many ways reminiscent of the ardent forms of political activity typical of Cossacks.

Will and freedom have become the existential imperatives in the lives of many generations of Ukrainian people, so in the situation of an authoritarian threat, the prospect of another Maidan is quite realistic.

[6] In original: "a true Ukrainian, be he of simple or overlords' descent, can now love neither a king, nor an overlord, instead he must love and remember one Lord Jesus Christ, the king and overlord in earth and heaven". Book of Genesis of Ukrainian People.

2. So far, we still have (but with continuously less rigidity) the regional cultural division into *Naddnipriantsi* (central and northern Ukrainians) and *Halychany* (western Ukrainians), and the social division into rural and cossack mentality. Along with this, the external factor of Crimea's annexation and Russia's military aggression in eastern Ukraine is a catalyst for formation of a single, consolidated Ukrainian nation.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 have demonstrated radical unacceptance of dictatorship and authoritarian-voluntaristic practices by modern Ukrainian mentality.

Soviet political culture retains a visible position in the Ukrainian society (mainly, among the elderly people, who demonstrate significant electoral activity), but with time, this way of thinking will be losing its positions due to the objective time factor.

Further destiny of an independent Ukrainian state as a historical Motherland of the multimillion Ukrainian ethnic group and a large-scale democratic project in the post-Soviet space, is to gain global significance.

3. In the situation, where Ukrainian political nation is not formed yet, electoral culture is at a low level and youth is affected by political anomie, the first thing to be done is to restore the mandatory status of politology and sociology, history of Ukraine, introduce such courses as "History of Ukrainian Statehood", "Basic Democracy" in all Ukrainian universities. By the way, this idea is supported by the majority of students.

In education policy, Ukraine cannot blindly copy standards of certain European countries, which have had a national state for over 500 years, and whose civic culture has been passed from generation to generation; ours – is not yet formed, which is why we received "LPR-DPR" with a motto "Putin, come!". With our current education policy, especially with complete destruction of social disciplines and domination of corporate voluntarism in technical universities, we may well see such fake republics springing up all over the country.

We should introduce proportional system with open party lists with regional preferences for national parliamentary and oblast council elections, so that each candidate's "place under the sun" is determined not by party leaders and governing bodies of the party, but by voters – the only source of state power in a democratic system.

Such an electoral system would neutralise the disadvantages of the majority system (domination of administrative resources, total bribery of the electorate, unstable party membership of candidates) and the shortcomings of the proportional system with closed lists (loss of connection and the element of personal responsibility between voters and party deputies, non-transparent formation of electoral lists without participation of electorate, transformation of parties into commercial interest corporations, the weakening of internal party democracy, strengthening of the roleof parliamentary faction leaders and simultaneous devaluation of "ordinary" deputy mandate, charismatic leader-centred voting, catastrophic decline of professionalism in the deputy corps and the quality of law-making).

An attractive option is the type of proportional system currently in effect in Bulgaria. There, MPs are elected by the proportional system in 31 multi-member electoral districts. The number of mandates in each of these districts, depending on the number of constituents in a district, varies from 4 to 13.

In order to accelerate the formation of *integrative democratic electoral culture of Ukrainian people*, the following things must be done:

- create special PR-programmes for children to develop a positive image of Ukraine's reformed political system;
- state should use various media for extensive introduction of educational programmes teaching voters about their rights, electoral procedures, election system, etc.
- create a long-term broad PR campaign "We Are Ukrainians!", which would combine elements of commercial and social advertising in order to form patriotic outlook, and involve famous sports and pop culture celebrities, public opinion leaders;
- support political socialisation of citizens through their involvement in political life of the state (membership in political parties, civic political associations, participation in elections, referendums, meetings, etc.);
- broadly use national democratic traditions, ideals and values in political PR projects;
- revitalise domestic film-making and create a series of films about historical and modern heroes of Ukraine;
- expand programmes for training political scientists as a human resources basis for raising the professional level of domestic political processes, establish political science departments in top universities.

Considering problems in building a *democratic culture*, we need to keep in mind that persistent work is required to resolve them, which should include the below:

- establishing the new national Ukrainian idea (the essence of which is in the large-scale reforming of the sovereign state with the purpose of its democratisation and humanisation: "Ukraine is a people's state that operates not just for oligarchs, but for all of its citizens!");
- substantiation of Ukraine's national interests, clearly determined strategy of democratic state-building;
- asserting the principle of respecting people as the highest value in the society and political activity; increasing efficiency of state institutions that ensure realisation of this value. ■

Valeriy BORTNIKOV,
Head of Politology and Public Administration Department, Lesya Ukrayinka Eastern European National University

1. I would like to point out at least three aspects that define the current state of political culture of Ukrainian citizens. First of all, clearly, after Euromaidan, Russian aggression and the loss of a part of territory, certain changes took place in the quality of political consciousness and culture. These changes are: ***an increased level of patriotism, statehood spirit and an overall drop in Ukrainians' affection for the so-called "Russian World".***

Second, there is a split or controversy in society on a number of issues (language, historical memory, foreign policy direction, etc.), which correlate with the regional division and significantly affect political orientation of the population. Thus, ***we can hardly talk about single political culture of Ukrainian citizens***.

Third, it is important to recognise the idea of prioritisation of problems in Ukrainian society, which determines people's mindset. As observed by sociologists, issues that divide Ukrainians – language and culture and geopolitical issues – were at the end of a long list as least important ones (with the exception of Crimea, where the status of Russian language was among the top ten problems). Indisputably, at the top of the list in all regions were economic and social issues.

So, people's political culture is under pressure of social and economic troubles or is to a large extent determined by them. Consequently, without fundamental changes in economy and people's social life, any attempts to implement efficient political reforms will be doomed.

According to experts from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who studied changes in the value priorities in Ukrainian society (Safety. Social comfort. Self-realisation. Democracy), the experience of democratisation in Ukraine demonstrates challenging and unstable value transformations towards the culture of true democracy.

Main factors that determined the nature of value dynamics in the post-Soviet period are still there: "the deeply rooted paternalism, strength of holistic ties formed within tightly connected groups, mostly family groups, …retention of control over the public sphere by the government, …insufficient development of civil society institutions and, consequently, civic values".[7] At the same time, the percentage of paternalistically-minded citizens has slightly decreased: from a third of the population in 2006 to a quarter – in 2016.[8] A significant percentage of votes received by openly populist leaders and political parties testifies to the effectiveness of influence that their rhetoric has on public consciousness, ***as populism has become an inseparable attribute of modern politics***.

It is extremely difficult to determine key trends in political culture that assist in the development of parliamentarism, as the influence of political culture on institutional changes is indirect and depends on a number of objective and subjective factors.

In this context, the following example is illustratory. Lately, Ukraine has been experiencing a growth in the number of civil society organisations. However, questions arise as to their alignment with the values of democracy and true civil society. Among the main contracting authorities that initiated foundation of new NGOs were certain politicians, as well as political forces. Just as citizens need different organisations to help them realise their sovereign rights, similar organisations are also necessary for politicians, in order to ensure their personal needs are met.

Therefore, complex social structures typical for a developed democracy serve a dual goal: they help citizens realise their political activity, and assist politicians in building their careers.[9] Another aspect of the dual nature of civil society unions at the beginning of the 21st century is the fact that government agencies themselves almost always create new participatory mechanisms, as the ruling institutions "also need to organise more advanced networks for gathering information to ensure decisions are made in situations with a heightened threat of blocking".[10]

2. Political culture is a derivative of processes taking place in society, therefore a typical culture for societies in transition would be the "intermediate" type: it accumulates the remnants of past social relations, as well as the beginnings of new ones.

Among the reasons that condition the low level of public activity in Ukraine, are the following: the presence of socio-psychological stereotypes connected with paternalistic mindsets left over from the Soviet era, which are partially recreated in the situation of an unfair and imperfect system of resource distribution at all levels;

[7] The State of Modern Ukrainian Society: Civilisational Dimension / [O. H. Zlobina, N. V. Kostenko, M. O. Shulha et al.]; scientific editing by M. O. Shulha. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2017. p.72-82, 86.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ordeshook P. Lessons for Citizens of a New Democracy/transl. from English and scientific editing by V. Pasisnychenko. Kharkiv: Centre for Education Initiatives, 2005, p.28–29.

[10] Rosanvallon P. Democratic Legitimacy. Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity/transl. from French by Ye. Maricheva. Kyiv: "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" Publishing House, 2009, p.244, 245.

the low level of financial security, which correlates with minimal indicators of social activity; the lack of political ideals that would stimulate civic activism; the loss of citizens' trust in government institutions and the possibility of influencing them, as well as lack of effective feedback mechanisms between authorities and the community; underdeveloped institutional structure of civil society, etc.

Most dangerous for the development of representative democracy are patron-client relations and nepotism manifestations, as well as privatisation of socio-political relations sphere by business structures, which are able to have a decisive influence on electoral processes at any level: hiring professional politicians, political technologists, media and communications specialists, etc., who will in turn shape public political consciousness in a designated way.

Main efforts of state and society should be aimed at overcoming the monopoly in economy, social and political relations, social sphere, etc.; creating an effective system of state control with simultaneous transfer of control over the work of separate government bodies to parliamentary opposition and civil society institutions.

3. As we know, deputies of different levels are primarily people with a university degree. Consequently, the state of our education system affects the minds and level of political culture of our deputy corps, and thus, the broad public. It is not a secret that higher education and science in Ukraine are underfinanced, which is followed by a drop in prestige and quality of education, while some innovations in higher education sphere are quite worrisome.

For example, one of erroneous moves of the former MOE leadership was transferring a number of fundamental philosophical disciplines (politology, sociology, economic theory, etc.) from the mandatory curriculum to the "electives", which essentially removed them from the educational process. This has a catastrophic impact on the level of students' knowledge, their understanding of the meaning of fundamental categories and notions, the essence of processes taking place in socio-political relations. These disciplines must by all means be returned in the category of obligatory ones, i.e. required for study, at least in universities – "the temples of science and culture".

An important area of media activity should be the demonstration of positive results of the work done by policy makers: there is more than enough criticism, – ***what we lack is systematic coverage of best practices in implementation of national and local projects, coverage of civic initiatives, etc.*** with participation of MPs, activists, volunteers, local self-government bodies, etc. On the one hand, this would boost confidence of those, who do something for the country, on the other, – it would promote positive experiences and actions of people able to think and act creatively, and, thus, represent the community at various levels of government.

There is also value in the awareness work that NGOs do while covering the work of the Ukrainian parliament and controlling the work of MPs. In this context, I would like to mention the positive experience of work done by activists of Civil Network "Opora" in the youth and student community of Volyn oblast in the framework of USAID RADA Program (Responsible Accountable Democratic Assembly). ■



Iryna KRESINA,
Associate Member of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, Head of Department of Legal Issues in Politology, V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law, NAS of Ukraine

1. Modern Ukrainian society is characterised by activist type of political culture. It is also often called civic. This is the very type of political culture that determines the process of formation of an active civil society in a transitional society.

It has the following characteristics:

- increased level of political consciousness;
- presence of dialogue;
- ability to mobilise;
- liberal-democratic nature;
- participatory character;
- value-based guidelines in political consciousness and political behaviour narrative;
- predominance of mainly value-based, law-based goals and guidelines instead of material ones (e.g. social justice, equality of all before the law, observance of human rights, human-centred development of political, legal, economic systems, rejection of all kinds of corruption);
- active inclusion in the informational, legal sectors of state life;
- establishing the values of the national idea, consolidation of society, unity, sovereignty of state, protection of national interests;
- demands for institutional capacity of the Ukrainian state;
- a shifting focus of political consciousness from paternalistic to individualistic and self-sufficient;

- post-totalitarian presence of strong feelings and sensitivity in reaction to anti-democratic, discriminatory political decisions and policies.

In order to develop parliamentarism in Ukraine, the following characteristics of political culture of Ukrainian citizens are fundamental: presence of dialogue; establishing values of a national idea, consolidation of society, unity, sovereignty of state, protection of national interests; demands for institutional capacity of the Ukrainian state.

2. Speaking about support and stimulation, special attention must be paid to the trends of increased level of political consciousness; a shifting focus of political consciousness from paternalistic to individualistic and self-sufficient; post-totalitarian presence of strong feelings and sensitivity in reaction to anti-democratic, discriminatory political decisions and policies, etc.

3. Determined, patriotic national information policy. Creating corresponding content in media, focus on coverage of positive developments, instead of solely on "hot crime news". State support and funding of educational programmes (to increase tolerance, respect for history, cultural heritage, etc.). ■

Anatoliy ROMANIUK,
Professor of the Politology Department, Lviv National Ivan Franko University

1. It is difficult to identify universal features, typical for all citizens, irrespective of the region, throughout the entire period of independence, and common for all age and ethnic groups. These markers determine significant differences. Certain trends can be simultaneous, yet quite often they work in different directions.

My assessment goes primarily for Western Ukraine. Positive trends:

a) willingness of a large part of the population to invest their personal time, money and life in order to overthrow the authoritarian rule and protect their country;

b) ability to volunteer to reach socially important goals;

c) critical attitude/perception of events in the country and its separate political leaders;

d) distrust of government institutions on the national level and of national political institutions (political parties, interparty blocs, etc.). There is also distrust of regional and local authorities (representative and executive/administrative), but it is less intensive and more specific, and hence – selective;

e) disappointment in the ability of the political class/politicians currently in power to work for the benefit of the country and carry out reforms in the interests of the majority of population.

Problematic trends:

a) insufficient level of knowledge on the key topics of operation of democratic institutions and processes, resulting in predominantly emotional perception of events;

b) dependence on manipulative influence of media, especially television as a primary source of information;

c) increased frustration with the work of political institutions and politicians (observed in the last year) leads to wider circulation of ideas that a politician should be assessed according to his specific achievements in the region, his ability to bring money for renovations/construction, etc. This can be perceived as readiness to support not certain values, but buying out voters";

d) a continued existence of the ethnic nationalism paradigm and the corresponding low tolerance for "Russian-speaking Ukrainians", construction of a political Ukrainian nation;

e) the non-critical perception/assessment of one's own situation in comparison with other countries, i.e., the presence of the "friend-enemy" distinction.

2. There are many possible options of how the situation will develop: from integration into EU structures as a result of successful reforms, to preservation of the current patrimonial system.

We need the following:

a) the state must work on mutual integration of regions and formation of a political Ukrainian nation;

b) electoral process must become cheaper, and there has to be a chance for quality people to come to power, instead of it being open exclusively to wealthy people ready to pay for elections;

c) "red lines" have to be established in political life, both, for politicians and for civil society;

d) we need to abandon the practice of feeding numerous negative examples to media, which helps citizens believe that "my family and I do not have it that bad", move to a balanced presentation of information and focus on the positive.

Other tasks are outlined in the numerous models/programmes for reforming the country.

3. Citizens' involvement in politics will grow as they see a chance for improvements in the country. This vision has nothing to do with government and media messages, but is directly related to real changes and people's perception/experience of improvement prospects. ■

PROBLEMS OF FORMATION AND FUNCTIONING OF UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARISM: EXPERT INTERVIEWS

Iryna KARMELIUK,
Head of Press Service of the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus

– Is it possible to expressly state that information from the media on the work of the Verkhovna Rada allows citizens to understand its main functions and tasks, its role within the political system? How objective is the coverage of Verkhovna Rada's work by national TV channels?

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – Ukrainian Parliament – the country's highest legislative body, is a wonderful example of representative democracy in action. The main functions of the parliament are legislative, representative, control, institutional and publicity. So, we need to take an in-depth look at how citizens of Ukraine can obtain information on the Parliament implementing its other tasks through publicity.

In the law-making process, the Parliament uses all available resources of interaction with the public – both through direct interaction in constituencies, and through the use of media.

Resources used by the Verkhovna Rada are rather varied. First of all, all plenary sessions are broadcast through the online parliamentary channel "Rada", the adopted legislative acts come into force after being published in the parliamentary newspaper "Holos Ukrayiny" (The Voice of Ukraine); Parliament's web-site publishes official information on the events with people's deputies, on the course of legislative process, on committee meetings; all legislative acts, resolutions are published; key messages from meetings, briefings with the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada, their statements, greetings, appeals are also being posted, etc. In this way, official coverage is done on a highly professional level.

The problem with official coverage and reporting on important information is the low ratings of such sources of information among the majority of voters. At the same time, an important criterion for understanding the events happening behind the walls of the Parliament, is the adaptation of complex legislative information for various categories of citizens.

This task should be performed by leading media outlets: 11-12 television channels with nationwide coverage, seven top news agencies, popular Internet publications, newspapers.

The Parliament issues accreditation to media outlets both in the form of permanent accreditation, and one-time passes – for attending committee meetings and roundtables. I would like to note that there are no restrictions on accreditation, as provided by the Law "On Information", yet such broad access of media to information sources in the very Parliament (4,260 accredited persons, who represent: 233 newspapers, 92 magazines, 83 news agencies, 79 Internet publications, 87 television channels, 70 journalists from 20 countries, 168 independent journalists) does not allow to ensure efficient representation of the real law-making process for the public. Also quite sad is the situation with understanding of the role, place and functions of the Parliament as a state institution, its mission in the parliamentary-presidential republic.

Looking at each media outlet through the prism of belonging to a certain owner, capital share, main ideas published on its screen/pages/web-site, we can see that legislative activity coverage is rather one-sided, at times biased, with emphasis placed on the moments convenient for this or that outlet.

Therefore, in order to get a more or less complete picture for even one law or reform, a citizen has to view several different sources, including official ones, turn to independent experts, study a wide range of scientific

works, which could help him understand the essence of a document or an important decision. Most constituents are unable to undertake this major effort, even less so – to make conclusions; relying on information in top media, their conclusions depend on their preferred source of information.

On a separate note, each of the leading television channels aims for higher ratings in order to retain its competitive potential in the advertising market, – which defines its profits and authority. This causes a distortion in the coverage of Parliament's activity, its role as an institution through a large number of made-to-order materials on populist topics – "whether an MP has a mistress", "what he is having for breakfast", "sing a song in the corridor", "demonstrate floor push-ups", demonstration of fights/quarrels/mobile phone use, etc.

– Are citizens able to use this information to make up their own mind as to what state policy issues are most topical today, how the laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada help in their resolution, what the expected results are and who is responsible for execution of adopted laws?

Analysing journalists' questions during interviews today, we see that in most cases they have little to do with the content of bills, effect of the approved reforms or the history of development of different processes. Most media representatives lack knowledge in economics, finance, international activity, particularly, as regards international organisations, to say nothing of their knowledge of the Constitution of Ukraine or the Verkhovna Rada's Rules of Procedure.

In our opinion, it is important and counter-populist to provide media with an opportunity to gain information on the work of apparatus, process management, separate departments within the Parliament; as state apparatus is supported with taxpayers' money, therefore, it has to account for it, justify its expenses and report on proper organisation of work. These practices have been introduced and are showing overall positive results.

I would like to note a rather high professional level of journalists representing such news agencies as Interfax, Unian, Ukrinform, LigaBusinessInform, RBC, UNN, Ukrainian news – they carry reasonable and reliable information. The problem is that consumers rarely read news directly from these sources – these news can be used by TV channels, adjusted to be more popular by various Internet publications with added colourful interpretation.

Communication with students, including those specialising in journalism, makes it clear that the main sources of news for young people are social networks and such news hubs as ukr.net, Google. Television and newspapers are also not their source of information on the Parliament and its activity. Middle-aged and elderly people, with roots in the previous century, are used to getting news from TV shows and sometimes from newspapers (mostly, men).

In order to receive feedback on the work of different MPs, their ability to govern the state, and to make a decision, whether they should be re-elected to the Parliament in the next elections, information from national media is not enough.

Modern world is rapidly evolving, new technologies are emerging – this urges us to respond quickly in terms of their use to provide important information on the role, place and functions of the highest representative body of the State.

One of such means for parliamentary information dissemination is the use of social networks, such as *facebook*, *twitter*, *googlechat*, etc. The sign of awareness of this necessity is the growing registration and regular posting on social media pages by almost all state structures, including the Verkhovna Rada. Moreover, *facebook* pages of some MPs are most popular not just among citizens, but also among national media. Among them – pages of people's deputies Iryna Herashchenko, Boryslav Bereza, Hanna Hopko, Maria Ionova, Viktor Halasiuk, Svitlana Voitsekhovska, Serhiy Leshchenko, Anton Herashchenko, etc. Also, facebook's *Messenger* allows media to get an answer directly from an MP, instead of his office.

Why do modern consumers turn to such "silent" sources increasingly more often, instead of national media? First of all, television does not allow time for reflection – the fast pace of messages, frequent change of information, interruption with advertising, and added emotional exhaustion from negativity: quarrelling on talk shows, lack of professionalism of some "pseudo-experts" on the screen, young age and sometimes overly revealing attire of TV show hosts. Whereas, the "silent" sources allow the brain to process information, check it, compare it with other sources.

A brief analysis of the use of parliamentary information by citizens shows that information about the Parliament is not systematic, does not work pre-emptively, does not form a consistent idea about the nature of legislative work, does not increase respect for a state institution, does not explain democratic society principles. Mosaic presentation from different sources creates a distorted environment, and cannot be the foundation for raising the status and credibility rating of the highest democratic body.

A famous political commentator, journalist, writer Walter Lipmann, author of the Public Opinion concept, thought that "Democracy is much too important to be left to public opinion".[1] A person's cognitive abilities are limited – they cannot know absolutely everything, be informed about all spheres of life. Each of us makes up our mind about the world, including about legislative activity, based on our established principles, considerations, stereotypes, beliefs, preferences, environment – our so-called social reality.

Citizens get their answers to the questions about social activity from experts, information carriers and public opinion leaders, which include national media. Therefore, it is extremely important to change the emphasis in the most popular news shows from the "clip" format to the explanatory one. This will satisfy the demand for

[1] See: *http://www.azquotes.com/quote/917808.*

consistency, rationality of decisions that are being adopted, understanding of legislation, and importance of the representative institution's role.

– Is there a need to introduce a national information policy, which would include dissemination of basic knowledge on the principles of democratic distribution of power in a democratic society, functions and tasks of each of government branch, its responsibility to citizens?

Since not every citizen can be competent in the issues of state-building and legislative decision-making, the representative form of government allows to choose the most competent in the society, ensuring their immunity and support.

However, the feedback provided to constituents has to contain full information on the work of Verkhovna Rada in general, each individual MP, and the essence of legal acts. Therefore, information about Parliament as the representative of people's interests and will, on its functions as the source of national or people's representation has to be explained and extensively communicated.

The task of communicating, explaining and stressing this information is not just the responsibility of media. Here, the function of state information policy as a whole becomes relevant and important. French philosopher Charles Montesquieu noted that "the great advantage of elected representatives is that they are able to discuss matters, while the public is not fit for it – which is one of the weakest sides of democracy".[2] This is why the introduction of a nationwide information policy, part of which should be the dissemination of basic knowledge about the principles of democratic distribution of power in a democratic society, functions and tasks of each branch of power, responsibility of the government to citizens, is becoming increasingly relevant.

Citizens' awareness of their responsibility in regular or snap elections should be based on this knowledge, instead of "buckwheat". The role and place of national media in this process have to be determined according to sociological studies on the use of different information sources by citizens. The information has to be relevant in the context of important law-making processes and adjusted for the corresponding public – be it pensioners, students, or children.

The main principles to adhere to are accessibility of information (this task has been achieved), credibility (journalistic ethics standards are often ignored), and respect for human rights.

Recently, the Parliament has approved Communications Strategy for 2017-2021, aimed at raising the level of trust to Verkhovna Rada and formation of its image as an efficient institution in the eyes of Ukrainian citizens, civil society organisations, media and international public. This strategy can be viewed as a component, a brick in the nation's comprehensive information policy.

The strategy is meant to solve the following six tasks: (1) improve the Parliament's image through introducing comprehensive communications via a single communications centre inside the Parliament, introduction of an ethics code and branding rules in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; (2) raise citizens' awareness about parliamentary processes; (3) ensure active public participation in the decision-making process and establishing feedback; (4) improve cooperation with parliamentary and independent media and journalists, including international media; (5) strengthen the Parliament's presence on the international arena; (6) optimise internal communications and information exchange within the Parliament.

Strategy implementation approaches will require structural changes and a redistribution of communication flows, a review of information exchange procedures inside the Parliament, introduction of new technologies and means of information delivery, modernisation of technical equipment, robust multi-level training and advisory support for communications staff, coordinated cooperation of different departments of the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus, consistent outreach work with MPs on their external communications on behalf of the parliament as an institution, as well as corresponding changes to the legislative framework that regulates operation of the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus.

An important component of the communications strategy is ensuring feedback from citizens, public associations, media and international audience, in particular: accountability to the public, creating a possibility for participation in law-making and being reliable secondary sources of information on parliamentary processes. ■

Viktor MUSIYAKA,
People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 2nd and 4th convocations, Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2nd convocation), Legal Research Consultant at the Razumkov Centre

– What is your assessment of the development of parliamentarism in Ukraine from the moment the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted in 1996 until now, from the point of view of Verkhovna Rada's authority, its place within the political system, relations with other branches of power and higher power institutions?

Ukrainian parliamentarism today is characterised by uneven progress – it has not acquired the necessary signs of steady development. The reasons for it include "birth trauma", as well as subjective factors that accompanied the formation process.

The leadership of the new Ukrainian state, brought up in the totalitarian autocratic tradition, did not internalise the idea of parliamentarism as defined in the Basic Law. They sought to adapt the constitutional government system to the framework they were used to: President (Secretary General/First Secretary) – Political Bureau (top of the government) – Government that obeys the President – Verkhovna Rada (embodying the formal expression of democracy, representation of people in power institutions, adopts the necessary laws).

[2] Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws.

This manifested itself immediately after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution through the organisation of the 2000 referendum on introducing respective changes to the Constitution. Unfortunately, authoritarian and anti-parliamentary way of thinking is inherent to all Ukrainian presidents, who blatantly demonstrate their lack of political and legal culture, cynically ignore provisions of the Basic Law, while being the guarantor of its observance.

And yet, the 2nd Verkhovna Rada that adopted the Constitution of Ukraine, gained certain features of a true Parliament – a body that represents people and makes laws – despite the unfavourable conditions in the form of the presidential-parliamentary form of government. Standards of the legislative process were being worked out, cooperation with the Government was being established on the issues of legal support of executive power operation.

The Accounting Chamber was created that supervised the use of budget funds; institution of the Ombudsman was established. The Parliament adopted dozens of laws that defined the mechanisms for implementing constitutional provisions. At the same time, the time was wasted to create mechanisms of holding government entities accountable for the non-compliance with constitutional requirements.

At the same time, the Parliament rather effectively resisted attempts to interfere with its status of people's representative. At the end of his second presidential term, political motives prompted President L. Kuchma to propose amendments to the Constitution that were supposed to ensure a transition to the parliamentary-presidential government system. Notably, representatives of the so-called "democratic political spectrum" in the Parliament strongly opposed this proposal: they wanted the next president to be "theirs" and for him to have widest possible autocratic powers.

Transition to the parliamentary-presidential republic system in 2006 has hardly changed the situation in relations between government agecies, even though their statuses have changed. The new President[3] did not accept the loss of a set of powers that had allowed him to directly influence the financial and economic sectors of state operation. On the other hand, parliamentary opposition[4] together with the Prime Minister,[5] were ready to change the Constitution in order to introduce an exclusively parliamentary government model, where President would be elected by Parliament and have limited, essentially representative functions.

It would seem that a transition from a mixed model of governance to a more democratic, European one, would be a step towards the development of parliamentarism. But the mechanism of Parliament/deputy corps formation (largely, depending on the will of the chiefs of two parties that benefitted from the process) was far from being a democratic one.

Early unconstitutional termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada in 2007 as a result of infighting between potential participants of the future presidential elections led to debasement of the role of Parliament, increasing the role and influence of subjective factors on its functioning. It was becoming ever more obvious that the Verkhovna Rada was turning into a body that was politically representing oligarch business interests.

Profound discord in a notionally democratic political spectrum brought to power V. Yanukovych, who definitively turned Parliament into an obedient instrument for adoption of necessary laws. The Government was building a caricature copy of Russian "managed democracy" with Ukrainian specificity. The parliament was reshuffled, the depreciated Constitution was adjusted to the vertical of power. The opposition was deprived of political influence, and charismatic leaders got isolated from society.[6] Parliament, as well as the Government, courts and other bodies of state power, together with local self-government, were subordinated to authoritarian government.

The events of 2013-2014 freed Ukraine from the consequences of a brazen usurpation of power. A correct decision was made on the early termination of powers of the Parliament that served as usurpators' instrument.

– Which features are characteristic of the current, 8th Verkhovna Rada as compared to parliaments of previous convocations? Which of these features can be categorised as positive, and which – as negative?

I am extremely disappointed with many aspects of the current Parliament's work. Possibly, exactly because I can compare them. And not in the context of "…in our times"… Everyone who is concerned about the development of Ukrainian parliamentarism is absolutely clear that each next convocation of the Verkhovna Rada does not concern itself with preservation of previous parliaments' achievements and building upon them: everything is started as if "from scratch". Moreover, each new convocation is ever further away from adhering to the main principle of parliamentary activity: all that is done within the walls of the Verkhovna Rada should serve as a model of respect for the Constitution, the law, for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. It is hard to find an explanation, for instance, for how the Verkhovna Rada could have adopted the new law "On the Judiciary and Status of Judges" before amending the Constitution.

Rules of procedure of the Verkhovna Rada state imperatively that a bill cannot be adopted "as a whole" having received negative conclusions from the Scientific and Expert and/or Legal Departments. The bill "On Introducing Amendments to the Economic Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code, the Code of Administrative Legal Proceedings of Ukraine and Other Legislative Acts" had a number of remarks from the Scientific Experts Office, including over 90 provisions of the bill that were in conflict with provisions of the Constitution. Yet, on 3 October 2017, the Parliament voted in favour of the bill "as a whole", later it was signed by the President, and is taking effect on December 15. And these are not standalone instances in the practice of parliamentary law-making together with the president.

It is considered an achievement that dozens of laws get voted on in the Parliament four times a month. One could welcome the fruitful cooperation of the Government with the Verkhovna Rada. But we could use a careful review of the quality of bills, regarding which there are some serious doubts. This is evidenced by first readings of bills in a half-empty session hall. Second readings in their original meaning hardly ever take place. The so-called "button-pushing" is back in style.

[3] V. Yushchenko.

[4] The opposition force at the moment was the Party of Regions.

[5] Here – Yu. Tymoshenko.

[6] Opposition politicians Yu. Tymoshenko and Yu. Lutsenko were sentenced to imprisonment in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

– Is there a need to improve the constitutional and legal status of the Verkhovna Rada, parliamentary committees, people's deputies of Ukraine? What are the main directions and specific means of such improvement?

The committees have the same "heap" of bills as the plenary session hall. It is impossible to review them, understand and professionally study their content and purpose. It is clear that the race for MPs active involvement ratings has become a source of draft law "spam". It is appropriate to establish a rational filter for individual legislative initiatives by MPs in the Rules of Procedure: every bill by an MP must be supported by either a faction or a group. Non-factional deputies should have signatures in support of their bill, the number of which equals, at least, the number of deputies in the smallest faction.

Verkhovna Rada Chairman and his deputies have a significant role in ensuring parliament's effective functioning. Parliament's leadership, especially its Chairman, cannot forget that in the parliamentary-presidential form of government they are not managing the Parliament, but rather act as its organisers and "process moderators". It would be desirable, if they showed constant respect for the Constitution, Rules of Procedure, and tact in relations with colleagues.

The obvious need is to document the status of parliamentary coalition and parliamentary opposition in the Rules of Procedure.

The parliament exercises almost no control over the Government's implementation of laws, an inconceivable quantity of which it has adopted at Government's initiative. Unacceptable is the long-term absence of a legitimate Accounting Chamber, which should execute permanent monitoring of the flow of funds to the state budget (incl., foreign loans) and their use, on behalf of the Verkhovna Rada.

Parliament should operate in such a way so as to be seen by society, regardless of the balance of political segments in it (parliamentary coalition and opposition), as a unified body focused on the interests of the people and the state. ■

Pavlo PYNZENYK,
People's Deputy of Ukraine, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Organisation of Work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

– In your opinion, are there problems with legal regulation of the status of a People's Deputy of Ukraine and the work of the Verkhovna Rada at large? Which of them must be resolved in the first place?

The legal status of a People's Deputy of Ukraine according to p. 21 part 1 of Art. 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine is determined solely by the Laws of Ukraine. This special Law that defines the status (rights, duties and responsibilities) of a People's Deputy of Ukraine in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and outside of it, and establishes legal and social guarantees of a People's Deputy of Ukraine fulfilling his deputy's responsibilities, – is the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine".

The current version of the Law is dated 22.03.2001 (No. 2328-III). Since the current version of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine" was adopted in 2001, amendments were made on numerous occasions, yet they were not conceptual, dealt with separate uncoordinated issues, or were necessary as new laws were being adopted or changes made to the existing regulations, implementation of which was related to the issue of a People's Deputy status.

General principles of the Law, its provisions that define the rights of a people's deputy of Ukraine in the Verkhovna Rada are consistent with the Constitution.

At the same time, there are often complaints as to unresolved issues, in particular, in the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine", there is the ethical behaviour issue. Article 8 of this Law generally outlines the duty of a people's deputy of Ukraine to observe generally accepted moral standards. However, along with such complaints, no one is offering changes that would define an MP's responsibility for violating ethical conduct norms or a procedure for settling disputes on unethical behaviour.

Provisions in Art. 51 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure define the terms of an MP's observance of discipline and ethical norms at Verkhovna Rada plenary sessions, and the course of action in case of violating the said requirements: the issue is to be reviewed by the committee in charge of procedural rules issues, followed by a corresponding decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Along with this, provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine" and Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure only determine the norms of ethical behaviour at parliamentary sessions and do not regulate MPs' behaviour outside of parliament.

Besides, there are no regulations for limits of MPs' violation of professional ethics and committing an offence, which requires legal and procedural support.

Separate regulation is required for the issue of preventing the conflict of interest. Thus, according to part 1 of Art. 35 of the Law of Ukraine "On Preventing Corruption", the rules for settling the conflict of interest in the work of, for instance, MPs are determined by laws regulating the status of relevant persons and organisational foundation of relevant authorities.

At the same time, when the Law of Ukraine "On Preventing Corruption" was adopted, changes were not made to the Laws of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine", "On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine", which guide MPs in the execution of their duties, with the exception of changes made to Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure that regulate the settlement of a conflict of interest only in cases mentioned in Art. 311, 85, 87, 173 on participation in discussion of issues at Verkhovna Rada plenary sessions and at the time of creating temporary commissions.

Also, the order has not been determined for resolving existing conflicts of interest in the work of MPs outside Verkhovna Rada plenary sessions, namely, in committees, commissions, etc., and no changes have been made in this regard.

In the context of the need to adopt amendments to Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure it should be noted that there is no urgent necessity to reform parliament through introducing changes to the Rules of Procedure.

I believe that currently, legal regulation of Verkhovna Rada's work should come in the shape of harmonising Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure with provisions in the Constitution of Ukraine. Several years have passed since separate provisions of the Constitution have been reinstated by the Law adopted on 21 February 2014, yet, to this day, changes to Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure that would be consistent with constitutional provisions have not been adopted.

The corresponding bill (reg. No. 5522) was submitted for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Its provisions contain changes to operational procedures of the parliamentary coalition of deputy factions, Government formation procedures, participation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in certain political appointments.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine play a key role in regulating the internal activity of the parliament and regulate procedural issues. Therefore, the efficiency of its provisions should be guaranteed by observance of existing norms, and parliamentary reforms, despite the numerous recommendations of missions that visited Ukraine, should not be implemented via radical changes to the Rules of Procedure, they just need to be followed.

– In your opinion, what are the major problems in the organisation of law-making process at the 8th Verkhovna Rada, and how can we increase its efficiency?

One of the biggest problems is the preparation of a bill for submission to the Verkhovna Rada.

The committee has pointed out on numerous occasions to legal entities with the right of initiative, namely, Ukrainian MPs, who are the authors of the majority of bills and other draft acts, that the Verkhovna Rada receives a rather significant number of draft legal initiatives prepared with violations of Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure, without consideration of risks for the state of Ukraine in case of their adoption, without proposals for the implementation of corresponding laws, without quality research of Ukrainian laws to check for inconsistencies, without the necessary economic and financial analysis, etc.

This results in a large number of bills being returned to entities with the right of initiative without consideration, alternatively, specialised committees consider such bills and advise the Parliament to decline them.

– What is your opinion on the existing practice of MPs losing their mandate when being appointed to Government positions? What do you think about a possible reinstatement of an MP's mandate after the end of his tenure in the Government and his return to the Parliament?

The practice of an MP losing his mandate with the possibility of its reinstatement is not foreseen in the active legislation, as the Constitution of Ukraine (Art. 78, 81), Laws of Ukraine "On the Status of the People's Deputy of Ukraine" (Art. 1, 3), "On Preventing Corruption" (Art. 25) state that people's deputies of Ukraine execute their duties on a full-time basis.

MPs cannot have another representation mandate, be in public service, hold other paid posts, engage in other paid or entrepreneurial activities (with the exception of teaching, scientific and creative activity), be part of a governing body or supervisory board of a company or organisation that aims to earn profit through its operations.

I, however, believe that a possibility to combine the duties of an MP and a member of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, would be effective, as practiced in foreign parliaments, e.g. in the United Kingdom. This would require amending the Constitution of Ukraine. The corresponding legal initiative has been registered in the parliament – draft Law of Ukraine "On Adopting Amendments to Article 78 of the Constitution of Ukraine for Creating Political Preconditions for Stable and Efficient Work of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" (reg. No. 4357 as of 01.04.2016), which sets out that MPs can combine a representation mandate with work as the Prime Minister of Ukraine, members of the Cabinet of Ministers.

– How well do you think are the current MPs provided with quality expert analysis in the area of specialisation of committees, in which they work? What are the ways of improving research and expert support in the work of Ukrainian MPs?

In the issue of realising the right of initiative by Ukrainian MPs and execution by the Verkhovna Rada of one of its main functions – legislative, expert analysis is of utmost importance, as it should assist in preparation and filtering of proposed bills.

At present, analysis of draft legislation submitted to the parliament is performed by a wide range of entities: at the stage of preliminary processing – to determine whether it is recommended to put the bill on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada – by main committees, for the first reading – by main committees and Verkhovna Rada committees specialising on budget issues, countering corruption, assessment of draft laws' compliance with international legal commitments, and Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada, for the second reading – by Main Legal Department of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada.

Similarly, one of the reasons a bill or another draft act can be returned without being included on the agenda and without being considered at a plenary session, is the conclusion of the constitutional law committee that a bill is in conflict with provisions of the Constitution.

One way to improve research and expert support for the work of Ukrainian MPs can be the institution of consultative-advisory councils at Verkhovna Rada committees, as it is the committees that do the bulk of the work on analysing proposed draft laws. ■

STUDY "UKRAINIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND PARLIAMENTARISM TODAY: PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS, WAYS OF IMPROVEMENT"

On 14 December 2017, Expert Discussion "Ukrainian Political Culture and Parliamentarism Today: Problems and Development Trends, Ways of Improvement" took place, organised by the Razumkov Centre together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine.

At the event, the Razumkov Centre presented the research findings and invited the participants to discuss relevant issues in the development of political culture of Ukrainian society, as well as possibilities for improving Verkhovna Rada's execution of its representative function.

Below are the participants' opinions in the order they were presented during the discussion. Texts have been prepared using discussion transcripts and are presented in a somewhat shortened form. Some presentations include references made by editors.

▶ PRESENTATION ◀

Yuriy YAKYMENKO,
Deputy Director General, Director of Political and Legal Programmes of the Razumkov Centre

On the one hand, the presented project has multiple components, yet on the other – all of these components are integrally combined. These are: political culture, parliamentarism and representative democracy.

Foremost, extremely relevant is the current role of the Parliament and how society perceives it. Today, these assessments are often inconsistent with the role and significance of what the Parliament is actually doing. Looking, for instance, at the number of bills that have been adopted, their content, remembering the situation in which the current Verkhovna Rada was being elected, and taking into account that its current composition is 60 % new, we can state that the Parliament is the manifestation of people's expectations, their idea of what it should be. And from the point of view of law-making, as well as by quantitative and qualitative measure, its work was rather efficient.

Yet, today, the work of Verkhovna Rada is fully supported by less than two percent of citizens, given the fact that the Parliament is implementing reforms, adopting reform laws. In this situation, we clearly have some questions for the Parliament, but there are also questions for the society.

At a certain stage, problems appear in the chain of representation – from voters, through political party and elections, on to the Parliament, where citizens' political will is transformed into regulatory acts and decisions.

This is why this research has several components. The primary stage is the analysis of political culture and its aspects using the sociological study, which allows to compare the situation to other countries.

The second component is the survey of people's deputies of Ukraine, in which they had to rate different aspects of Parliament's activity and their role within it, both desired and real. The third component is the analysis of Verkhovna Rada's institutional capacity in the system of government, existing problems from the point of view of implementing its representative function, from citizens' political will to bills. For this, besides our own study, we collected the opinions of experts, academics and politicians.

Talking about the citizens' survey results, what attracts the attention is people's rather low level of

interest in politics – 60% of respondents say they are not interested in politics altogether, or are hardly interested in it. Meanwhile, in Germany and the Netherlands, the share of people interested in politics is 62% and 64%, respectively.

Concerning is also the fact that the category least interested in Ukrainian politics is youth. From poor interest comes poor understanding of what is happening in politics. A major percentage of citizens say that they often or sometimes have a feeling of not understanding what goes on in politics (43% of respondents). At the same time, citizens are aware of the need to take an interest in politics.

Citizens are somewhat informed about the basic parameters of political system operation, its set-up, some of their constitutional rights, etc. For instance, 10% are familiar with the text of the Constitution, and half of respondents are familiar with it partially. Over half of citizens have never read political party programmes. Most citizens also believe that schools do not provide adequate knowledge about politics and processes in it.

Most citizens understand that the Verkhovna Rada is the body, the primary function of which is law-making, however, a closer look shows that their familiarity with its other functions, for instance, budgetary function, – is not as strong.

Over a half of citizens cannot assess the work of the MP from their district, while a third of citizens do not know them at all. Along with this, for over a half of citizens, information about the Parliament is interesting, but most of them are from older age groups.

A major part of citizens wish to have information about the budget, a third – about the work of MPs in districts, 30% are interested in analytical data on approaches of different political forces to policies. Meanwhile, over a half of citizens believe that information about agreements between factions is concealed, large groups of respondents also think that information on personal data of MPs, their income, career aspects is also being hidden, a third of respondents – that information on the real initiators of bills being adopted by the Parliament is also hidden.

Significantly, 56% of citizens admit that the information they get about the Verkhovna Rada is predominantly negative: button-pushing, corrupt practices, scandals, etc. Only 26% believe that the information about the Parliament is balanced, and 8% think that it is mostly positive.

That said, most citizens do not use official sources of information about the Verkhovna Rada like official parliamentary and government newspapers, do not watch the "Rada" channel, and only sometimes watch the First National TV channel, where they can get official information about the Parliament, from the original source. And the main problem is that young people are the ones that do not use any of these sources.

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From 74 to 91% of citizens have never heard and know nothing about the work of civil society organisations with the focus on the Parliament. Citizens are somewhat more familiar with the work done by the Committee of Voters of Ukraine and "Opora" Network, but the level of familiarity with other projects is very low.

Most citizens cannot name any of the representation institutions, through which their political interests are being achieved. 21% of citizens see such qualities in political parties, 19% – in public associations, 13% – in trade unions.

Consequently, the level of trust and assessment of Parliament's and political parties' practical activity is low. On the scale of 0 to 10, it was given between 1-1.9 points.

Along with this, 56% of citizens believe that democracy is the best system, which is more than in Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland. However, if we ask citizens, whether they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Ukraine, on the scale of 0 to 10 – their score is 4 points.

Talking about political participation, the situation is even worse. Only 33% of citizens are aware of the need for their personal participation in order to change the situation in the country, while 47% – do not feel this is required, and 20% – are undecided. I.e., only a third of citizens believe that their political participation can have value. And only 8% of people take part in civic activity. This percentage has been stable since 2003. This means that we have an increase in the number of civil society organisations, their activity, the amount of funds allocated for their work, and, despite this, the level of people's activism is not growing. 46% believe that associations are useful, but they are not ready to become a part of associations themselves.

92% of citizens have never turned to an MP, 90% have never taken part in public hearings or councils. I.e., the majority of citizens are not included in any mechanisms of political participation and, thus, they form their perception of this participation primarily through media.

In this study, we attempted to classify the types of political culture using T. Denk's and H. Christensen's

methodology, which is a modified version of G. Almond's and S. Verba's classification. According to it, there are 4 types of political culture: civic, stealth, critical and disenchanted. They differ in two dimensions. First – presence of knowledge and interest, second – presence of trust and participation. Civic culture is a combination of "I know", "I am interested", and trust in institutions. Disenchanted culture – two "negatives", critical – presence of interest and understanding, but absence of trust, stealth culture – people trust the government, but express no interest in politics.

In Ukraine, 40 % of the population belong to a disenchanted culture, 21% – to critical. Meaning that in Ukraine, over 60% of citizens have no trust in politics and representation; total mistrust generates all other negative developments. Two main features of Ukrainian citizens' political culture are mistrust and absence of knowledge and interest.

Regarding the survey of MPs, it is worth mentioning that people's deputies are interested in strengthening the role of the Verkhovna Rada, political parties, trade unions, civil society organisations, self-government bodies and local administrations in political life, and at the same time – decreasing the role of financial and business groups, President and the media.

At the parliamentary level, MPs are interested in strengthening the role of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman and his deputies, committees, MPs themselves, secretariat, and decreasing the role of political leadership, party/faction/groups leaders.

MPs admit that VR committees have a rather strong position both with regard to the Government, and in the Parliament. At the same time, there is a lack of expertise, which the MPs could be bringing in from outside: 64% of respondents complained about the lack of funds to involve external experts for analysis of draft laws and other work.

MPs also expressed their opinion on the proposals for parliamentary reform issued by the European Parliament's Mission led by P. Cox. Over 70% of MPs support proposals for adopting the ethical code of conduct for MPs, proposals for regulating the status of opposition and the need to write "white papers" on government policy, which would be submitted in the process of adoption of conceptual bills.

Over 60% of MPs support proposals on standardising the format of ministry reports and the need to harmonise the structure of VR committees with that of the Cabinet of Ministers, on formation of agenda by factions on the proportional basis. But at the same time, there are questions regarding closing the operation format of the conciliation council and on the introduction of voting by the majority vote of those present in the VR hall.

Regarding civil society organisations that study the work of the Verkhovna Rada, MPs have a positive attitude towards them. But not everything is so certain: they give rather positive assessments to USAID RADA Program, Reanimation Package of Reforms, Committee of Votersof Ukraine, yet such projects as "Chesno", "Rada4you" are either less known to them or negatively assessed.

We also analysed certain institutional problems in the work of Parliament since its formation. More information on the analysis and recommendations can be found in our materials.[1]

This study's conclusions can be grouped into two parts.

First – problems in the formation of political culture, where the key issue is political education. This problem was extensively discussed around 2005. At that time, a concept of political education in Ukraine was developed. We should re-launch this work.

Second part – organisational. We need to ensure the consistency of institutions and processes. Here, joint effort of the state, political parties, NGOs and other institutions is required. Main initiative should be coming from the state. For instance, Germany has a specific federal agency for civic education. Also, we need to facilitate the process of increasing trust in the Parliament, and the entire system of government. ■

▶ OPENING REMARK ◀

Jakob WÖLLENSTEIN,
Desk Officer, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Germany is currently going through a situation of historic dimension.[2] The British weekly "The Economist" recently entitled our country as "sleeping beauty" making reference to the fairy tale princess surrounded by noblemen trying to wake her up from a hundred-year-slumber.

The ostensible inaction of German politics is exaggerated – for example two days ago the Parliament agreed to prolong some contested Germany military missions abroad.[3] Yet, it is true that in recent history it

1 Analysis and recommendations presented in this publication.

2 Text of the speech reflects the situation in Germany's political system as of 14 December 2017.

3 On 12 December 2017, the Bundestag extended the mandate of several peacekeeping and anti-terrorist missions, namely, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, and Syria, as well as participation of the German military in the Sea Guardian mission in the Mediterranean. See: German Parliament Voted to Extend Five Foreign Bundeswehr Missions. – Interfax, 12 December 2017, *http://www.interfax.ru/world/591569*.

has never taken so long to form a government after a general election. Usually coalition talks in Germany last for about two months. The longest period yet was 86 days – that was in 2013 during the negotiations to form a grand coalition (Große Koalition – "GroKo") between the sister parties Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) as well as the Social Democrats (SPD). That threshold will be surpassed by next Monday.

How did we get here? The parliamentary elections of September 24th came with some remarkable changes for the German political landscape. Besides the return of the Liberal Party (FDP) to national parliament, a party which is often labelled as "right wing populist", the so-called "Alternative for Germany (AfD)" made its advent to the Bundestag as third strongest force after having barely missed their entry to parliament in 2013.

The traditionally big parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, suffered substantial losses. However taken together CDU and CSU still managed to achieve their strategic goals of (1) being the single strongest political force (by far!), (2) breaking the arithmetical parliamentary majority of left-wing parties that – despite the grand coalition government – was inherent to the last Bundestag and (3) being strong enough that no conceivable government can be formed without them. Yet, the election results came as a blow both to Christian and Social Democrats who respectively reached the weakest result since 1949. This was broadly interpreted as a vote against the grand coalition – despite its relatively successful performance in government. After the elections some 56% of voters were in support of Angela Merkel remaining chancellor – those voters being mostly supporters of the Christian Democrats and the Greens. All others parties' supporters were against a continued chancellorship of Merkel – up to 90% among AfD-supporters but also including some 62% of SPD-voters.

Regarding coalition scenarios, Germans didn't seem to have a clear preference in autumn 2017. The first attempt to form a government went under the title "Jamaica"-alliance in reference to the colours of the parties involved – Christian Democrats (black), Liberals (yellow) and Greens – which account for the flag of the Caribbean state. The exploratory talks in which grounds for a coalition were tested, lasted for about a month. During this time public support for this new coalition concept had risen to 57% and Germans seemed confident that the talks would be successful – particularly supporters of the Liberal Party. Ironically, it was the FDP which dealt the decisive blow to the negotiations when their party leader Christian Lindner declared that no acceptable compromise had been found. As a result his personal popularity ratings dropped from 45% to 28%. A strong majority of Germans subsequently stated that they regret the failure of "Jamaica".

Three options are now on the table:

1. *New elections.* Although the supporters of FDP and AfD would support new elections and some leading politicians of those parties have shown their support, this idea is currently off the table since the big parties have ruled it out. Furthermore, a new ballot wouldn't change the situation substantially since according to the latest polls, the parties' support hasn't changed much since the election day in September.

2. *Grand coalition – again.* A repetition of the Grand Coalition scenario does not spark yells of enthusiasm among Germans. Although no more than 16% clearly oppose it, only 45% of the electorate outspokenly support that scenario. And this is mainly due to the overwhelming approval among supporters of the Christian Democrats. Among CDU/CSU-supporters an alliance of the twin parties with the Social Democrats is viewed favourably by some 69% – among supporters of all other parties a clear majority opposes it (up to 69% among Liberals, 72% among the "Left"-Party and 84% among AfD).

The Social Democrats' party base as well as some prominent top-level representatives, such as the leader of the party's youth organisation, are sceptical. SPD-Chairman Martin Schulz had clearly ruled out another grand coalition twice, declaring that his party would strive for a "renewal" in the opposition. Some observers credit this decision with the SPD's victory in the Lower Saxon state election a few weeks after the General Election. Reversely, Angela Merkel has openly questioned the SPD's ability to govern.

Anyhow, 60% of SPD-supporters stated that their party should not categorically refuse to negotiate with the Christian Democrats. Accordingly, on December 7, a party convention voted in favour of taking up exploratory coalition talks with the CDU and CSU on the basis of a position paper which points out Social Democratic positions on core topics ranging from reform of the health care system to family reunification programmes for refugees, tax raises for the rich, a solidary pension system and a reform of the European Union.

On December 13 first talks began and on Friday that week the SPD board voted in favour of starting negotiations in January. The timeline they agreed upon clearly states that, in the event of successful exploratory talks between the parties' highest representatives, a special party convent of the SPD would be called upon to give green light for the launch of official coalition talks. The paper that would be agreed upon as a final outcome of those talks would then be presented to the SPD member base in order to be ratified in an internal referendum.

This procedure poses some serious prenatal obstacles for the grand coalition to be taken. A sceptical party base will have to be turned around and there is much room for controversy between the parties. Ranging from the SPD's concept for a thorough reform of the public and private health care system, refugee policy or visions for the future of Europe much remains to be discussed and the room for manoeuvre and compromise between the party leaders is limited.

2. *Minority government.* A minority Government would be something new to the federal level of German politics. The only experiences date back to 1966 and 1983, when a provisional minority cabinet took over

temporarily after ministers of the Liberal Party left the coalition governments. The most commonly cited exception to this rule is a regional one in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, which was minority-governed from 1994-2002. Whereas some observers have pointed out that other European countries have successfully performed in governmental minority constellations, especially in the North, critics claim that those examples transferable to the German scenario due to social and legal differences.

In theory, there are several conceivable options for a minority constellation: CDU and CSU could govern alone, having to arrange different majorities for each and every topic anew. The Union Parties could also form a minority coalition with either the Greens or the Liberals. Furthermore, some more unconventional concepts have been put forward, such as "GroKo plus" or "KoKo" – a model in which CDU/CSU and SPD would contractually agree on certain key topics like budget or foreign policy while the Social Democrats would act as an opposition party in other areas. Supporters of a minority government-model argue, that it could vitalise parliamentary debates and be a strong sign of change and "fresh air" in German Federal Politics.

Anyhow, all of these concepts have been clearly ruled out by leading representatives of the Christian Democrats, including the Chancellor, who doubt that this model could provide the country with the necessary stability.

In the face of this complex and tricky situation it seems hardly possible to make a precise prediction, which course the developments in German Federal politics will take. The Union-Parties largely strive to form a stable government; President Steinmeier has called upon all parties to meet their responsibility that comes with having a mandate in the Bundestag – yet many members of the Social Democratic Party feel they might have to choose between responsibility EITHER vis-à-vis their party (which they believe could use some opposition years to "recover" from their role of "Groko"-junior partner) OR towards the country in re-joining a grand coalition.

At the same time the patience of international partners and the broader population towards the political stalemate might not be unlimited – people wish for their country to have an orderly government again. ■

Expert Discussion, 14 December 2017

▶ DISCUSSION ◀

Mykola KNIAZHYTSKYI,
Head of the Committee for Culture and Spirituality, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Clearly, there is no true parliamentarism in Russia; what Belarus has is a decorative body. As we observe such low trust in Parliament in Ukraine, we need to analyse, how this happened and when.

When Ukraine proclaimed its independence – back at the time of the well-known "Group 239" – the role of Parliament was extremely important. This is where the main laws were being written that allowed to proclaim independence. Thus, under Kravchuk's Presidency, Ukraine was essentially a parliamentary-presidential republic.

As Kuchma came to power, he started building a one-person authoritarian leadership system. The Parliament was manageable. Although the multi-party system had started developing in Ukraine, in Kuchma's times, its alternative was a multi-vector oligarchic system. At that time, Russia had a similar situation. The influence of oligarch families on politics has been and still is extremely strong. As these groups or families had conflicts, everything was done in order to diminish the role of competing parliamentary parties and the Parliament as it is. So, the tradition to diminish Parliament's authority dates back to Kuchma times.

Parliament's authority was being diminished by the authoritarian leader, and by Russia, which tried to destroy the elements of our country's democratic structure. And it is impossible to build a democratic country without an efficient Parliament.

Assessing parliamentarism by the number of pushes on different buttons, as some civil society organisations do, is an absolutely primitive approach to parliamentarism that does not explain the role of Parliament to society and the tasks, with which it works.

Parliament has to form and control the Government and essentially manage the country. In democratic countries, laws are mostly drafted by the coalition government, while the parliament discusses and adopts them. It also holds the right of initiative, and in the presence of a stable majority and a government that cooperates with the parliament, the government's and the parliament's right of initiative is essentially the same thing.

But in Ukraine, Parliament's main role is to push the buttons. Political decisions are made outside of Parliament. This is why its reform is taking so long.

Even though Cox's mission has done its work and provided recommendations. Among them – voting by the majority vote of those present in the VR session hall, which is unconstitutional. And the role of parliamentary committees, in particular, has to be more important.

People in Maidan demanded two things: to protect the country's independence and to return to the parliamentary state in order to safeguard the country from depending on one dictator. The demand to return to the old Constitution was the main requirement of Maidan, and it has not been fulfilled, because right now we have a strong President, oligarch groups influencing political powers, weak leader-based political parties and complete discrediting of the Parliament by oligarch-owned media, pro-Russian media, and, as strange as it is to admit, civil society organisations.

The only alternative to such destructive development of the country and its virtual demolition is for the Ukrainian elite to realise the need for and to contribute to increasing the importance of parliamentarism, working out strategic directions for the country's development. We need the responsible politicians and citizens to create an efficient group, which would really start thinking about the strategy for our country's development.

Looking today at the laws being adopted by the Parliament, about 60 percent of them are lobbying documents, 30 percent – documents that are beneficial for the country and are being adopted under the pressure of the EU and partners, which helps us receive funds, and 10 percent – are populist laws that satisfy MPs' ambitions. Even government bills cannot pass through the parliament, so the Government submits bills through MPs in order to simplify their passing. This means that the Government is isolated from the Parliament.

There is a need to build an effective parliamentary-presidential republic. And this model has to become an effective model of cooperation between political parties in the parliament. ■

Roman BEZSMERTNYI,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

Clearly, the existing constitutional model of Ukrainian state has exhausted itself back at the start of 2005. 2006 was the year of chances, when in changing the constitutional model of the state, we needed to change the parliamentary one as well, thus, fundamentally altering the role of state institutions and the parliament; altering the role, function and place of an MP in Ukraine's political system.

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Obviously, we needed to define the electoral model. This endless changing of electoral law from one extreme to another, and ending up with the most imperfect system – a mixed one. All of this led to disrespect for Ukrainian parliamentarism, and for subjects or objects that filled this Parliament.

This led to Parliament's extremely poor reaction to current developments. First draft law on the possible ways of resolving the Donbas situation was developed 2.5 years after the start of the war. Previously, response to events used to be instantaneous.

Clearly, Ukraine needs to transition to a bicameral parliament. There are two problems that require this step. A conflict of interest between the central and regional elite. Representatives of certain regional elites have become so powerful that they are currently Kyiv's strong competition. It is not by accident that Kyiv was taken over by Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk groups, currently we have Vinnytsia group in power, and tomorrow – Lviv is coming. This is happening because parliament is not channelling these power vectors. Second. The topic of responsibility for human resources – is the topic of parties. Germany has captured this in the constitution. Human resources are trained by parties. While we keep jumping from proportional to majority electoral system, understandably, Ukraine has no party school to share expertise.

The problem also lies in the supervising function of the Parliament, starting from Government days and ending with the work of committees. NACP, NABU, SAPO and all others are failing at bringing political figures to justice. In the upper chamber, there needs to be an organisation that would prosecute political figures. There has to be an institution that oversees the operation rules of both local self-government and government employees. Can you imagine European prime ministers hearing the phrase "Mr. so and so, there is an authorised individual here to see you, and you have to see them"? This thing has to be ensured by the upper chamber of the parliament.

Obviously, the dominant role of political parties on the political scene is not accepted by many, because our memory is still haunted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with pro-government parties, etc. The requirements to inner party organisation, control of its statutory activities, and the issue of abandoning

party structure modelled on CPSU… There is a law on political parties and several individual laws, but in truth, comparing them, for instance, to Germany's legislation regarding the parameters of political party activity, we will observe that our laws are driving us into creating conditions for absence of inner party democracy. Laws to create the legal framework for political party operation have to be the next step.

There is a problem in institutional aspects, such as the distribution of authority between different branches of power.

Specialised training and education of MPs are also very important. My generation of Ukrainian politicians has the entire world to thank. As soon as we were elected MPs, we were taken by the hand and for a year and a half, just as students, we were taught, internships were organised for us. They tried to pull us out of the post-Soviet system and teach us the basics.

Ukrainian parliamentarism today consists of scattered beads with French, American, Polish and post-Soviet elements. We need to use them to create a Ukrainian mosaic. We have lost the Ukrainian tradition of parliamentarism, which is connected with its history. For instance, representation of religious, national groups, etc. in the parliament. At times, these elements were present. ■

Viktor MUSIYAKA,
People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 2nd and 4th convocations, Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2nd convocation), Legal Research Consultant at the Razumkov Centre

I am extremely disappointed with the condition, to which our Parliament has been reduced. The problems in the Verkhovna Rada operation are obvious; furthermore, they are not just organisational problems. The Parliament is not representing interests of the entire population, otherwise, it would have immediately reacted to the content of Minsk Agreements on the part of Ukraine, namely, regarding the requirement to adopt a new Constitution.

A single power centre has been formed, which took upon itself all functions of state management, without too much regard for abiding by the Constitution.

In regard to the latest law on certain changes to procedure codes,[4] Main Research and Expert and Legal Departments have provided their commentary, which remarks on over 90 provisions in conflict with the Constitution. But the law was adopted without taking these remarks into account.

Same with the Law "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges". It has been adopted prior to amendments to the Constitution, amendments, which were the basis for developing this law. This fact called into question the legitimacy of all implementation processes in the judiciary.

I have heard numerous times that we need to change the constitutional model of government. I believe that experts first need to develop a thorough theoretical framework for such model, instead of perplexing the public with premature ideas. Speaking of a bicameral parliament, I realise that something new may be born in regions in the process of decentralisation, which will make this idea acceptable. But in the current environment, giving more powers to the regions, poses a threat to the country's unity. We need to be very cautious, bearing in mind the dangers of implementing ideas related to the special status of certain Donbas areas.

Ahead of us lies plenty of work aimed at reforming the entire system of government, but these reforms must be based on fundamental, comprehensible projects. In this context, parliamentary reform parameters may become clearer in the nearest future.

I would like for the Verkhovna Rada to constantly demonstrate in its work, its aspiration to be the body that represents interests of the entire population, instead of individual political or economic forces present in it. It is the Parliament that has to present the society with not only ideas, but a coherent project for transforming the state's political-legal framework, which will clearly define the goal of state operation where civil society has a decisive role. ■

Vitaliy SHYBKO,
People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 2nd, 4th and 5th Convocations

I have personally experienced that parliament is not a sanctuary. And not just in Ukraine. This is a rather pragmatic formation with brutal rules of the game. Game, where everyone stands for himself, regardless of whether the game is played on behalf of an individual or a political group represented in the legislative body of any country.

And voters understand this. Results of the sociological study presented by the Centre confirm the above. Take a look: "The level of trust in institutions representing citizens' interests (!) such as the Verkhovna Rada, political parties and individual politicians is extremely low and got 2 points on the scale of 0 to 10". This is the answer, without comment, to a "simple question" considered by V. Dukhnevych in his article in the Razumkov Centre's materials prepared for our discussion:

[4] The Law of Ukraine "*On Introducing Amendments to the Economic Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code, the Code of Administrative Legal Proceedings of Ukraine and Other Legislative Acts*", adopted on 3 October 2017.

what is the percentage of citizens, who can share the following thought: "Parliament takes care of simple people's interests and expresses their will"?[5]

Low level of trust and even negative attitude to the Verkhovna Rada and political parties is also expressed by millennials – young people under 35. In 2017, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Foundation Max van der Stoel (FMS) together with Institute for Democracy and Social Progress of Ukraine (IDSP), under my leadership, made an attempt to analyse and understand the motivations of this sentiment among the youth of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The work we conducted showed that statements about absenteeistic attitude among youth can be true only, and specifically, with regard to election campaigns, leading political parties, and membership in them, work of legislative bodies. Young people do not see that representative government bodies, political party leaders take them as equal partners and represent their interests. Therefore, as modern history of Ukraine confirms, they are more inclined towards so-called street democracy, which acts as a driving force and has certain achievements. But is this in harmony with the traditional perception of the term "political culture"?

Who is at the forefront?

And here, I would like to pay attention that in scientific studies and political discussions more and more often we see the term "precariat", which defines a social class of the "new restless", the "drifters". It is them that we see at the forefront of parliamentarism manifestations in the streets. You have to agree that from the standpoint of traditional perception of parliamentarism this is definitely a cause for reflection.

And finally, I will voice the idea that may look absurd in the context of parliamentarism and political culture development. We either take into consideration a stable trend that the street will be pushing buttons in Rada's session hall. Or it is time to abandon the existing form of parliamentarism, and move to a representative assembly as a legislative branch of power. ■



Iryna KARMELIUK,
Head of Press Service of the Verkhovna Rada Apparatus

First of all, I would like to raise the issue of parliamentary correspondents. Democracy has given us the widest possible representation, but it also demands high responsibility from each citizen, which is completely absent. Looking at what journalists are asking about, the topics that they focus on, – they are quite far from being knowledgeable about the legislative process.

Today's Ukraine lacks an integrated state information policy. This includes not just the development of a national idea, but has to include all branches of power, then, there may be a result at the end.

We have had delegations from the parliaments of Ireland and Scotland. And as we asked them, whether they conduct sociological studies about the level of trust their parliaments have, they said they do not conduct such studies, as this is dangerous.

However, their parliamentary work is successful without this. The number of their parliamentary correspondents does not exceed 120 people. Our parliament has 4,260 accredited journalists. The latest law on information adopted in 2010 allowed to accredit all media registered in Ukraine. The Ministry of Justice registers essentially all submitted requests, regardless of whether they actually publish anything. And this is rather dangerous.

Recently, "Journalists Against Corruption" publication was registered. Today, everyone is doing detective work, instead of educational. This publication is dangerous, because they are taking over the function of Ukraine's National Union of Journalists. For UAH 500 one can get press credentials, for extra UAH 100 per month one can get legal support, assistance in publication placement, accreditation in the Parliament. In this way, there can be dozens of thousands of journalists, and it is unclear, what to do with them. In the situation of Russia's aggression this poses grave danger.

Also, there is no political culture, which has to be of great importance. 90 percent of students have no political culture at all. They do not understand the meaning of branches of power, the workings of parliament, who its head is, and what his responsibilities are. Political culture should be a separate subject, both at school (starting from the 9th grade) and in higher education institutions, in order to have responsible constituents coming out of our education system.

Today, voters who come to polling stations have no idea, what they vote for, and what MPs do. This is a huge problem. Besides this, we need to educate not just journalists and students, but MPs as well, who often lack political culture. They cannot provide clarifications to journalists at the necessary level. We need to sit down with information system subjects and make an agreement about what has to be present in the information space, introduce the elements of education into it.

The Parliament has no press centre. It could provide a platform not for briefings, but for professional awareness work. ■

[5] The speaker refers to the article by V. Dukhnevych "*Changing Motivation to Protest to Motivation for Involvement*" in this publication.

Oleksiy ANTYPOVYCH,
Director of Sociological Group "Rating"

We need to try looking at the Parliament not from the inside, but from the outside. It is clear, why MPs in their survey said that they lack powers and want to reduce the influence of parliamentary leaders and increase the influence of the Verkhovna Rada Chairman, Verkhovna Rada itself, its committees, etc. Attitude to the Verkhovna Rada after independence was proclaimed and Kuchma came to power, based on focus group study results, was the following: embezzlers and freeloaderes. This was the formative period, when at least 80 percent of Ukrainians placed responsibility for the situation in the country on the president.

Now, as opposed to MPs' point of view that their influence is declining etc., Ukrainians' attitude to Parliament as an institution is improving. Please, do not confuse this with trust.

In today's focus groups, MPs are not embezzlers and freeloaders anymore, they are just corrupt officials who promote their own interests. This is a softer line. Only 60 percent of Ukrainians believe that the President influences the entire situation in the country, while the Parliament with its previous 5-10 percent started growing up to 20%. Perception of the Prime Minister as a person, who defines the situation in the country grew to approximately 20%. There is a correlation there. If the Prime Minister is active – his influence is growing. President is always in the first place by his influence (over a half of people believe so).

As for the Parliament, talking about September-November 2017, when it was adopting the healthcare reform, etc., – Ukrainians started paying attention to it and saying that Parliament defines state policy. I.e., in the past 20 years, there has been a tendency towards Parliament's increasing role in administration of power in the eyes of the public.

A Ukrainian calling a parliamentarian a freeloader or a corrupt official, will become exactly the same after becoming an MP himself. In other words, people hate MPs, but this is foremost a manifestation of envy.

The growing ratings of singers and showmen in politics, is an example of political culture development. If there is a demand for a show, politics becomes a show. Let us be honest: today's political leaders are showmen. Ukrainians actually consume a lot of political information in the news, but in the form of a show. And this is not helping in the development of political culture. ■



Volodymyr KIPEN,
Associate Professor at the Chair of Politology and Public Administration of the History Department of Donetsk National University

I was watching the wave of "Donetsk campaign" in Kyiv. As due to the conflict, the university I work at has moved to Vinnytsia, I am now able to observe another wave. There is a connection between political culture of Ukrainian society and the state of Ukrainian parliamentarism.

To a certain extent, sociology allows to determine fundamental trends in the state of political culture and its changes. Overall values and principles of the absolute majority of population as shown by the 60 percent support for democratic values is a big plus. Yet, the other part of political culture that characterises the attitude to political institutes and parliamentarism, on the contrary, highlights utter de-legitimisation of the main institutions, in particular, the Parliament.

Participation characteristics are very varied. This obviously depends on the political state of society, political time the society is living in, – mobilisation period of the Revolution of Dignity with an outburst of people's mass activism and high level of participation in political processes, including direct pressure on the Parliament.

Along with this, we can talk about a state of depression our society is undergoing. Sociology shows this very clearly. Undoubtedly, there is a need for political education, which would increase people's knowledge about the Parliament, provide arguments regarding the importance of this political institution. But I would like to stay away from thinking that people are doing bad things, because they do not know how to do good. This is not true. In case of a qualitative improvement of political communication between the Parliament and society, the effect will not be too significant, which is mostly due to the quality of Parliament itself and its political culture.

I believe that Ukrainian political class, representatives of Parliament have largely demonstrated their inability to ensure adequate policy, failing to create a foundation for a successful Ukrainian society and state. There are many reasons for this. They include byzantine-like behaviour in politics, when the Parliament is overrun by trading, backroom deals, where clientelism thrives, as well as the fact that political forces that have come to power are perceived as representatives of different oligarch groups by the society.

I strongly doubt that improving the coverage of Parliament's work alone can change society's attitude to it.

This attitude can be changed by one thing only – a makeover of the country's political class, which is currently being blocked. New political forces and projects that have appeared in the past 2-3 years are now discredited together with some new politicians that came to Parliament.

Lately, we have been observing crucial laws being adopted solely due to external pressure of the West. So, political system renewal is overdue.

Political culture characterised by 40% of people with a negative attitude towards political institutes, and 26% taking a patriarchal stand, is a very negative thing. Revitalisation of Parliament, its mechanisms of operation, changing of political structure, along with political education, – that is the long road that we have to walk, if we want to see Ukraine become a successful democratic country. ■



Iryna KRESINA,
Associate Member of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, Head of Department of Legal Issues in Politology at V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of the NAS of Ukraine

Our country has a low level of political inclusion, and negative attitude of people to representative institutions of power. Your study says that citizens' attitude to the institutions meant to represent their interests is mostly negative. Level of trust in political parties and assessment of their work are very low. If people have this negative attitude, one needs to think why. Second conclusion: "there is an evident desire for personification of choice – maintaining a direct connection between voters and MPs".

I believe that these are the two key starting points to build the further strategy for political culture development and the work of representative bodies of power, not just the Parliament, but also local government bodies, which are also meant to represent people's interests locally.

At the same time, citizens have expectations for these government bodies. Today, we can make projections with regard to the electoral system proposed for implementation. If the current attitude to political parties is so negative, how can we keep pushing forward the idea of exclusively proportional election system with open party lists? Where in this picture are the voters, their influence, attitude to individual deputies who will be representing their interests? And if the voters do not see any prospects for real influence on the representative body through a real deputy, they will not vote. Especially passive are young people, who believe that election results will be fraudulent anyway and their vote changes nothing. That is, young people do not believe that political parties are capable of expressing citizens' interests.

Voters want to see a direct connection to MPs. If it existed, voters could actively cooperate with, visit, argue, hold discussions with MPs, and demand that they fulfil their campaign pledges and those necessary tasks that society requires. A voter cannot raise any issues with a party. This is a huge problem.

Today, we need to rehabilitate the principle of electivity itself. It has to be introduced into election of all government bodies. Judicial power is also a branch of state power, which nevertheless stands separately in terms of citizen's ability to influence it. We have to go back to the principle of electivity of judges. All the competition and qualification commissions that we see demonstrate results that are absolutely opposite to what society expects.

Lawlessness is all about in local courts, judges bear no responsibility for decisions they make. Bringing back the electivity principle and revocable mandate for all elective bodies, so as to enable the recall of judges and deputies of different levels, will allow the community to have some real influence on them. USA and some western countries apply the principle of electivity of judges. There, a judge can also be recalled.

So, we need to allow for responsible influence of individual constituents on the formation of representative government bodies, then the person will understand that a bad judge is his personal responsibility, an MP is also his responsibility. There is no need to abandon the majoritarian component of the electoral system, no need to disgrace it through buying votes. It is necessary to raise criminal and political responsibility for bribery and abuse of power, but the fact that they exist does not mean that the system itself is bad.

Today, we can state that the probability of adopting new election legislation is low. Political parties are not mature enough to assume full responsibility for their work, for the future of society and state. In a democratic society, citizens have to not only participate in political actions, but also be responsible for executing them. Only such "protestant" ethic will save us from absenteeism, citizens' indifference. It will lead to inclusion in political processes, responsibility and formation of high political culture, which, above all, is a manifestation of citizens' responsibility for public affairs. ■

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Yuriy KLIUCHKOVSKYI,
President of
Election Law Institute

We should look at the problem from the very top.

The problem with the Constitution. In this context, I am always amazed by Germany. They have no Constitution, but have the Basic Law. It has this name, because at the time of its adoption it was thought to be temporary. Yet, Germans have learned to live according to it, they do not doubt it.

We adopted a Constitution in 1996, and started talking about changing it already in 1999 – three years after its adoption. The goal of the 2000 referendum, among others, was to discredit the constitutional system, in particular, the Parliament. The entire campaign that was waged at that time was under the theme "there are 450 of these freeloaders, let's at least make 300, or even better – disperse them altogether".

This is the time, when parliament's decline started. It was being blamed for everything, fairly and unfairly. I have numerous complaints against today's Parliament. When the Parliament knowingly adopts unconstitutional laws, this leads to discrediting of both, the Parliament and the Constitution.

As I came to the Parliament, 40 years of age, the MPs without legal education were provided with free legal training at law universities of Ukraine. Meanwhile, today, no legal argument matters for an MP, as they claim to be implementing their party's political will. What is there to talk about then?

Many complaints against the Parliament are absolutely unfair. An example is the campaign for attendance of Verkhovna Rada sessions. An MP cannot be present at all plenary sessions; he will not be able to execute his other functions then. MPs should not be held accountable for this. Button pushing – yes, but not for absences.

I would like to point out that in the modern history of Ukraine, on four occasions, it was the Parliament that made fateful decisions that ascertained the possibility of state's existence. In 1991 – adoption of the Independence Act, 1996 – adoption of the Constitution, 2004 – adoption of the Verkhovna Rada Decree that allowed for the positive scenario of the Orange Revolution,[6] and 2014 – when for half a year the only backbone that held the country together was the Parliament, no matter how bad it was.

Public discreditation of government institutions means essentially the discreditation of the state itself. And those not willing to feed their own state will feed others.

Political parties play a major role in all of this. I am saying this, because the phenomenon of political parties has disappeared today. Possibly, the last party that attempted to be a true political party was People's Union "Our Ukraine", which was later destroyed by leadership. After that, there have been no political parties in Ukraine. What we do have is political projects. Moreover, today's parties are not modelled on CPSU, instead they are more like business-oriented financial-economic associations. Party owner, the one who pays, is its master. This brings all the negative characteristics of Ukrainian business into politics. Until we deal with this, we will have no politics and no political parties, instead, there will be political deals between oligarchs and their satellites.

Three key problems are connected with the inability to restore true political parties in Ukraine.

First of all, there is the problem of legal funding for parties. Even the introduction of public funding has taken a repressive form. This works against the development of true political parties, independent from business.

Second, the problem of absence of inner party democracy. We cannot expect a political organisation functioning on rigid authoritarian principles to train its members in a democratic spirit, and to start implementing democratic methods of administration upon coming to power. These things are just incompatible. In Germany, the requirement for inner democracy is captured in the constitution. I.e., German Constitutional Court can rule a party unconstitutional and disperse it, if it is not democratic inside. Without this, it is impossible to talk about improving political and legal culture in the society.

Third, is the imperative mandate that is a vestige of the 2004 Constitution revived in the 2014 Constitution, which is simply ruining democracy in the country today, turning MPs into button-pushers.

Talking about public sentiment and people's assessment of different government institutions, we realise that society accepts this criticism and nihilism, which turns into nihilism towards the state. Coverage of these issues by journalists is absolutely far from the problems of raising political culture level in the society.

The level of illiteracy of journalists commenting on political events is extremely high. And political talk

[6] On 27 November 2004, the Verkhovna Rada held a special session, in which it adopted the Resolution "On the Political Crisis in the State that Developed in Connection with Elections of the President of Ukraine" No. 2214. According to this Resolution, results of the repeat vote in the Presidential elections on 21 November 2004 were invalidated, no confidence was expressed to the Central Election Commission, and it was proposed that the President file a submission to the Verkhovna Rada until 1 December 2004 in regard to early termination of its members' powers.

shows are a form of final discrediting of all politicians without exception, as they are designed to search for scandals, not for a sensible outcome of discussion. This is detrimental to a society's political culture.

It is impossible to introduce political culture into society institutionally, it needs to be grown. Western societies were not always as politically cultured as they are today. Reading Dickens you can see that he was ridiculing elections in the mid-19th-century England.[7] 200 years passed, and everything changed in England. We cannot afford ourselves 200 years of waiting around just because we are behind, but also because the global social situation is very different. So, the only way for Ukraine is a targeted programme for raising the level of political culture. We need to start with categories that will work later: politicians, journalists, universities, schools.

If we keep just talking about it without actually doing something, nothing will change. Quoting Feuerbach: "One needs to move from describing the situation to attempting to change it". ■

Oleksandr MAIBORODA,
Deputy Director for Research I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the NAS of Ukraine

When we say that presidents were pressuring parliaments and attempting to pin down parliamentarism, we need to remember that they came from the society, in which they became presidents. Looking at sociological data from all years of independence, we see that the majority of people have always believed that a couple of strong leaders can do more for the country, than any number of discussions.

People have paternalistic mindset, which gives rise to vassal-type political culture. Presidents understood that and acted accordingly. Today, the majority of people are still the same. It is sufficient to just be popular for someone to turn you into a political figure.

Any country, even the most democratic one, is really ruled by those, who control the means of production and finance. We need to accept this. Talking about political parties – society needs to know, who the people are behind each of them, the interests of corporate groups behind these parties, whether the work of these groups benefits the country or not.

In the past 25 years, oligarchs were creating political parties, giving money for elections, forming lobby groups in government bodies, and now, in order to escape responsibility for everything they have done, they use the money taken from the society to channel people's resentment of authorities and the state. In what other country with the largest part of production being in private hands do people demand a salary increase from the government? Do media talk a lot about protests that sometimes occur in the manufacturing sector that are aimed against oligarchs?

The main question now is whether the society can make the oligarchy act in its interests. This will define the image of the Government, Parliament and President. In order to do this, we need the funds owned by the oligarchs, we need to make them act responsibly, with accountability to society, and even more, – to the future generations.

I think that there should be an imperative mandate. Political party is not a discussion club, it is an integrated group of like-minded individuals, who act according to one plan towards a single goal, and those who disagree can discard their mandate. ■



Oksana KLYMENKO,
Head of Department at the Legislation Institute of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

Recently we have prepared several scientific projects and publications on different aspects of parliamentary reform. Our main focus was that all aspects of Parliament's work and policy implementation (we consider policy to be a tool, an art and a technology for reaching corresponding general social development goals) have to be consistent with the respective legislative format.

We are coming from the fact that main guidelines are defined in the Constitution of Ukraine. Social values have to be at the centre of all activity. Thus, Parliament and any subjects of the legislative process have to operate exclusively in the legal format. Democratic processes have to be at the core. All these three principles have to be the foundation of organising the work of a legislative body. These are the concept approaches that we used in the main projects at the Legislation Institute.

From start to finish, the main concept is optimising the work of the legislative body. Here, we focused on constructive and innovative recommendations provided by the Cox mission, including the recommendations developed in the format of the

[7] Apparently, this refers to the novel "The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club", published in 1836.

Jean Monnet Dialogue.[8] This study was presented at the Verkhovna Rada in June 2017. Some of our projects were developed further – they were used in a number of legislative ideas and initiatives.

Randomness, irregularity of the law-making process bring out the problem of training of not just the parliamentarians, but also the apparatus staff that supports legislative initiatives.

We see the appropriate level of training and legal awareness among those who have had advanced training at the Ukrainian school of law-making. Training courses at the Institute are in high demand, but its available capacities do not allow to fully satisfy this demand.

We have certain ideas as to improving the institutional capacity of the Verkhovna Rada. Our approach is that following the legislative path exclusively, using precise regulation and development of certain institutions, procedures of the legislative process, we can raise the level of political and legal culture. Our initiatives concern both, general approaches and requirements for the formation of legislative ideas and initiatives, as well as passing them through specific expert discussions, in particular, at the level of the White Paper format. Only the law and its execution are the ways to improve and form proper political culture both in the parliament and in society. ■

Anatoliy ROMANIUK,
Head of Politology Chair at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

Today, we observe that determining a regional breakdown is not enough anymore. While prior to 2014 we had a more or less consolidated position of people and voters in a specific region, 2014 elections demonstrated absence of clear-cut preferences within one region, and in 2014-2015 it turned out that people in different oblasts of the western region have different reactions, and this difference is rather significant.

Talking about political awareness, we should take a look at average voters, but view them[9] and the political class as separate categories. We can see the characteristics of these voters using sociology and focus groups.

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I will give you two examples that characterise today's voters. There is certain conditionality, mythological thinking and imaginary political categories, using which we want to assess them.

When we are trying to understand constituents' attitude to such value systems as liberalism, democracy, republicanism, conservatism, besides nationalism, the rest are perceived as some bad word. This is within the 5% range. When later we are trying to figure out, what meaning they attach to these value characteristics, we see that there are all sorts of things there.

So, there is a very broad range of notions about what democracy is. In the situation, when our school is not involved in political education, the only source of political knowledge is source material, i.e. the information that comes from television or radio, neighbours at the market. All of it forms the constituents' mindset.

Talking about the political class from political party members and up, except for MPs, as we did not analyse them together with party members, heads of oblast, district, city branches, – their level is the same as our constituents. They do not know even their political party's programme. When presented with several options, they guess.

So, we have a situation, when the level of political culture is very low. We need to start with political parties. Our political parties have the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and All-Union Leninist Young Communist League in them. Looking at parliamentary party charters, there is democratic centralism everywhere. We did a study of inner party democracy and found out there is none by any of the parameters. We do find elements of democracy in party factions. There are discussions there. But the elements of democracy present in party factions are not transferred to political parties. Thus, a political party is not a democracy institution. It is an all-purpose political party that is not focused on representing society's interests.

Studying political parties of Central and Eastern Europe countries, we can say that until the beginning

[8] "Jean Monnet Dialogue" (named thus after the founder of the EU, in whose house the meetings take place) – a parliamentary platform created for people's deputies to make decisions through a consensus, which is implemented by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in cooperation with the European Parliament, United States Agency for International Development in Ukraine (USAID), National Democratic Institute (NDI) and others. Meetings take place several times a year on neutral ground involving the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and heads of deputy factions and groups. Discussion participants make a commitment to implement the agreed upon decisions together. The first meeting in the framework of this dialogue took place in October 2016 in the Jean Monnet House in France, second – in Irpin (April 2017), third – in the Jean Monnet House (November 2017).

[9] A "median voter" is a centrist voter, a "voter" whose interests are positioned in the middle of the linear scale of public interests". For more information, see: Romaniuk A. Main Stages of Political Thought Development in the 20th Century. *http://old.filos.lnu.edu.ua/bulletin_philosophy/ua/docs/visnyk01/articles/romanyuk.pdf*

of this century, they also were all-purpose one-day parties focused on the leader. However, they gradually changed. And, today, we can see a whole range of political parties that align with the socio-political division structure. This will also come to us.

Talking about constitutional amendments, they have to be not just about the Parliament, Government and President – they also have to include political parties.

There can be many different points in the discussion about different electoral systems, but one should become familiar with the 1998 UK Parliament speech by Lord Jenkins, in which he analysed Europe's electoral systems. The issue was that the relative majority electoral system that existed in the UK was complicated and bad. He argued how bad it was, and also talked about systems that were good. He came to a conclusion that a good system was a mixed one. Yet, overall, he concluded that all systems were good. The question is what results we wish to get.

This conclusion can be applied to our reality. Our system is rather parallel, not mixed. When we talk about electoral systems, we know the advantages and disadvantages of each. We need to think, what we want to get in the end, instead of just arguing about the benefits of different systems. ■

Anatoliy YERMOLENKO,
Deputy Director for Research
H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine

Political culture and parliamentarism are interconnected to a great extent. A famous classic[10] said that each nation has the government it deserves. But we can only talk about this, when there are certain forms of verification and certain procedures for action and cooperation of people and government. The studies that are being presented are rather disappointing. Citizens' participation, political culture and its influence on government are less than desirable.

On a positive note, a certain crisis of democratic institutions is observed not only in our country, but also in developed democracies. Social scientist Blühdorn[11] talks about simulation democracy and the end of democracy. Often these are just figures of speech, especially for developed countries, yet this also has some meaning.

We can talk about citizens' ability to influence government institutions only if certain mechanisms and procedures are in place. Looking at political culture,

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it should be said that in a complex society this is rather complicated. Culture means not just knowledge about political actions and institutions. Kant used to say that the motto of Enlightenment was "Have courage to use your own understanding".

Lack of trust in political institutions exists not only because citizens do not have enough information, but also because they do not believe they can influence the situation and government. And they cannot influence government because the media that we have often give them untruthful information. The discussions that they have there, different talk shows – they have no procedures for reaching consensus. There is a lack of reasoned discussions in making decisions. There are often subject relations between opponents; there is administrative and government influence. Second, our government views citizens through the subject-object prism. People often find out about reforms and their strategy "from newspapers". There is no discourse for discussing reforms and government actions.

Comparing Ukraine and Germany, we have to keep in mind that the latter has the properly working separation of powers principle. There, the power is vested in the government that is formed on the basis of party or coalition majority. In Ukraine, the separation of powers principle captured in the Constitution is not operational.

There are certain disadvantages in different forms of government, but one needs to see certain dangers in each of them. We have seen this during Yushchenko's presidency, when there were constant conflicts between the Government and Presidential Administration. This situation must be changed, as we are observing the same type of processes now. I am leaning towards parliamentary republic, like in Germany. There is no such thing there that some security ministries are subordinate to the President, and others – to the government. The Chancellor is also the supreme commander, that is, there is no diarchy there.

I do not wish to claim that our situation is very distressing, and that changes can occur only in the future. However, we need to keep in mind that people are going through a learning process. As Kant used to say, the public will educate itself, if you give it freedom. ■

[10] Joseph de Maistre – Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sardinia to the court of the Russian Emperor Alexander I.

[11] Ingolfur Blühdorn – Professor, Institute for Social Change and Sustainability of the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

Vasyl TKACHENKO,
Associate Member of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine

Ukraine exists in the situation of Russia's military aggression. The entire world is in a situation of information aggression. The EU is allocating funds in order to somehow fight it. Ukraine lacks comprehensive information policy. There is no coordinating body or agency responsible for creating a political culture.

Yet, all is not well in the West, too. Remember the 53rd Munich Conference. The main report by Ischinger was titled "Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?"[12] This report talks about post-order taking the lead in politics, provoked not in the least by distribution of fake news. Ukraine is not confronting this in any way.

Leibniz said that truth can be found in two areas: the truth of reason (science) and truth of fact.[13] The task Ukraine is facing is to ensure the fusion of science and media, and facts. It is necessary to create a coordinating body that would work on political culture. We need to have a scientifically based knowledge. ■

Ihor KOHUT,
Director of the USAID RADA Programme

Two years ago, there could even be no talk about the parliamentary ethics code, white papers. A lot depends on the internal institutional development of the Parliament. Our programme works on the issues of Parliament's openness, transparency and accountability.

These are key things for people to trust the Parliament. The Parliament has to be predictable, strictly adhere to its procedures, rules, plan the legislative process. It is important that it has the culture of complying with its own institutional rules and standards. ■



Olena BOIKO,
People's Deputy of Ukraine (Faction of Political party "People's Front")

It seems to be the first time that the issue of political culture is tackled in the context of Parliament's work. So, we will try to take into consideration the presented research and opinions voiced during the discussion in our work. This work should be continued.

Indeed, political culture is not so much the issue of the legal concept, but of mentality and upbringing in the first place. This is why the matter of organising comprehensive educational analytical culture is crucial, and has to be one of the directions for public administration reform.

It is important to see the whole picture of parliamentarism and government institutions. The exposing approach that media takes is unacceptable in the context of Parliament's work. In this context, it is important to develop a correct way to monitor the work of Parliament. Assessing MPs' quality based on the bad-good principle is incorrect, and does not help to provide qualitative assessment of their work. This is why efficiency monitoring has to assess many parameters, not just the number of submitted bills, or button pushes, or the absence of missed days. This issue is much broader. We need to take into account the efficiency of legislative work, MPs' work outside of parliament, etc.

Of course, it is very important to raise the efficiency of the parliament itself. I disagree that changing the concept of electoral system will solve all problems. There are no perfect electoral systems, and each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. However, the change in the mentality of all political culture subjects is very important. I do support the idea that political culture has to be based on the subject-to-subject principle.

I would also like to stress the development of participatory democracy. We are discussing this topical issue in the Parliament and on the local level.[14] ■

Yuriy SHAIHORODSKYI,
Lead Research Fellow at I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the NAS of Ukraine

Talking about political culture, the main thing here is a range of knowledge, values, and ideas about politics as a basis for political behaviour. I would like

[12] This refers to the main report of the Munich Security Conference 2017 (Munich Security Report 2017: "Post Truth, Post West, Post Order?"). Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference.

[13] Gottfried Leibniz is considered the founder of the two truths concept – the truth of reason and the truth of fact.

[14] The so-called participatory democracy is a type of democracy with direct involvement of territorial community members in its administration, in the development and approval of management decisions and control over their implementation.

to stress that school does not provide an understanding of politics, does not develop the concepts of state and law.

In our study, we took the overall amount of study hours and counted the number of hours devoted to introduction to politics, state and law. In the first 9 years of secondary school, out of 9,000 hours, only 120 are designated for these subjects. This is 1.3 percent. Only owing to 10th and 11th grade, we got up to 2 percent from the entire course load. This allows to assert that our secondary school and the Ministry of Education are not working on the issue of transferring political knowledge to children. ■

Vitaliy DUKHNEVYCH,
Head of the Laboratory for Psychology of Political-Legal Relations, Institute of Social and Political Psychology, National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine

Obviously, the main thing I would like to say and that has pleasantly surprised me, is that a major part of concepts voiced at the Expert Discussion on 14 December 2017, were psychological in essence. I am not ruling out the fact that the issue at hand is multidisciplinary and is considered by different fields of knowledge, but as a representative of my scientific domain, I would like to add the following.

Colleagues were talking about "lack of trust in the Parliament" and government institutions, "low level of interest in politics", in particular, among young people, "negative attitude to …", etc. Essentially, "trust" and "attitude" are psychological concepts used to describe certain aspects of Ukrainian society's political culture.

However, what is behind the word "attitude"? In psychology, attitude is the image of the nearest prospective future. People in the street turn for help to those, who inspire trust: not to anyone. People "scan" surroundings and choose someone, who, as they believe, can help; they form an image – who they can turn to for help and how.

It is the same with political reality: negative attitude to Parliament does not come out of thin air. What are regular people's expectations from the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine? And what do MPs expect from citizens? How are these expectations met? How are they balanced against each other? It is important to remember that behind attitude (as the image of the nearest prospective future), different political scenarios can potentially unfold and are unfolding. Unfortunately, people are not always aware of their own personal political preferences or motivations, and yet people's attitude is what determines the content of society's political culture and their strategy of political participation, as well as specific actions in the political context.

Colleagues spoke about the need to inform people about the work of Parliament. Informing is good, but will this provide the desired results? If I do not want this, if I am not interested – what attitude will this informational influence create? And what attitude is being created now, as information on the work of the Verkhovna Rada is coming through the same media? Obviously, things are not as clear-cut as it seems at first glance. Yes, there has emerged a need for political education, as said before. However, maybe not just political, but rather political-legal education? Education must be aimed at acquisition of political participation skills, problem-solving skills in political and legal dimensions. Simply informing people will remain an external, unclaimed knowledge, while an opportunity to influence the end result, even a small one, is more important to engage people in political reality.

Clearly, this is not a quick process, but it seems to me that a young person with an experience of problem-solving in the political-legal plane, will be more involved in integration processes in the society, which means that this person will be more interested in the work of the institution that establishes and approves the standards and regulations of society's life – the Verkhovna Rada. Besides, this path (through acquisition of skills) will definitely enrich the palette of ideas about possible scenarios for actions and interaction with government representatives. Including MPs, who are so far elected not just by party lists.

Besides, this will increase young people's responsibility for political choices they make or their own actions in the political-legal plane. Responsibility, by the way, is also a psychological category. This is a measure of commitment that an individual assumes in different situations or in resolving an issue. What responsibility do young people assume at the moment? Meanwhile, political-legal education oriented at problem solving will help develop a responsible attitude of young people to participation in social transformation processes, different political events, etc.

And the last thing I would like to note. Returning to the model of "subject-to-subject relationship" in contrast to "subject-to-object relationship". Maybe, it is this factor that underpins the mistrust: the other party is perceived to be a tool or "something" that can satisfy my needs, give me something that only I need.

The gap between common citizens and politicians that "represent their interests in the Parliament" is rather significant. This is a fact. We can assume that if the former party becomes a subject, i.e. a potential partner in resolving topical issues or in the search for a common mutually beneficial solution – changes in the attitude will follow, as well as changes in establishing a "citizen-Verkhovna Rada" relationship built on trust. I would like to emphasise one more time that political culture development should happen through acquisition of action skills in problematic political-legal situations. ■

CHANGING MOTIVATION TO PROTEST TO MOTIVATION FOR INVOLVEMENT

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Before we talk about political culture of Ukrainian citizens, I believe, it is important to describe the socio-political conditions, in which this culture emerges and transforms. Today, the defining influences in the life of ordinary citizens and the country as a whole, are the Revolution of Dignity, the loss of a part of territory (annexation of Crimea), military activities on our territory (Donbas and Luhansk regions).

History lets us know that none of the revolutions has ever brought a fast improvement of people's well-being. Moreover, any revolutionary way of society's development entails a psychological tear in the fabric of time and disruption of continuity and sustainability, which leads to economic troubles affecting primarily average citizens. In our situation, these troubles are intensified by events in the East of the country.

These factors bring forward two powerful motivational trends in Ukrainian society: on the one hand, it is **the actualisation of civic activity**, and on the other – psychology of **survival**. These are the two motivation trends that define the character of Ukrainian citizens' political culture at the current stage.

On the one hand, we are observing a major uplift, spread of volunteer movement, aimed at helping our Armed Forces (which, for instance, was not there five years ago). Not on paper, but in real life, a group of people has emerged, who are focused on changes and they are ready to invest their own energy and resources to achieve these changes.

This is a significant step in the development of civil society: it is virtually the first time that we see a bottom-up formation of civil society institutions, when concerned citizens invest their own energy and funds in common welfare as volunteers or activists, or take part in public discussions of various problematic issues (e.g., through internet voting in support of funding different community projects from the state budget).

On the other hand, there is a visible trend of deteriorating level of people's life, mostly, of retirees and socially vulnerable categories of citizens, due to further impoverishment, growth of tariffs, food and non-food product prices. Adding to this the internally displaced persons, who lost their accommodation and business on the occupied territories, or just left there their family and loved ones, the number of vulnerable categories of citizens grows even more. For such people, issues

of survival come to the forefront, which means that the motivation they develop is, so to say, "getting what I can here and now, because tomorrow may never come". Both, for such people, and for active citizens, politicians are "a thing of its own", and they do not care for the interests of common people. This idea is proven by unbelievably high indicators of distrust of different politicians and state institutions.

Now, as for the parliamentarism per se. Historically, parliament as a political institution has served as an intermediary between society and executive authorities. According to this logic, a parliament is the expression of citizens' will through representation of structured interest groups at the state level.

In Ukrainian situation, the parliament plays the role of a legislative mechanism, or the mechanism for adopting required laws, rather than "an intermediary", "a spokesman for people's interests". This raises a simple question: ***what is the percentage of citizens, who can share the following thought: "Parliament takes care of people's interests and expresses their will"?*** And the same for the statement: "The MP elected in my electoral district advocates for the interests of our district"?

Mostly, the situation is just the opposite: volunteers and activists assume responsibility, take an active civic stand and execute tasks, for which MPs cannot allocate time. Who and, importantly, how the interests of healthcare workers or disabled people, teachers or scientists, labour unions or sportsmen, independent professional unions (associations), etc. are represented in the parliament?

The Verkhovna Rada does adopt or propose separate laws or state programmes, however, the extent, to which these documents represent interests of certain professional or social groups, is a debatable issue.

Thus, in our country, Parliament as a state institution that should represent interests of citizens and communities, belongs to one realm, and citizens – to the other. These two realms hardly ever intersect. So, probably, the development of motivation for involvement and belonging has to be a two-way deal: from parliamentarians to citizens, and from constituents to those, whom they elect.

Currently, the prevailing motivation in the society is that of protest: the level of life, economic and psychological well-being of citizens, no vision of development prospects, loss of trust in political slogans and politicians' calls to action, etc. create the foundation for the development of negative psychological perceptions, which can be summarised the following way: "*Nothing's changed. Government does not care for people's interests and remains as corrupt, as it has been before. If nothing changes, we need to go to Maidan…*".

Given that in the past ten years Ukraine has experienced the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2014), presence of such ideas among people

is an important indicator of dissatisfaction with government.

Although civil society institutions are emerging and developing through volunteer movements and NGOs, still, compared to the overall number of population – this is not enough.

Although integration processes did receive a push forward, in case of absence of further support, if the gap between parliamentarians and common people remains – we can expect a new explosion of civil unrest.

Of course, the fact that citizens got a chance to influence the course of events via the so-called "Public budget", or participatory budget, – is an important and serious step forward. This is exactly why we need to create new opportunities for involving people in socio-political processes. And this has to involve not just the active and concerned citizens, but retired people as well, who are unlikely to support different initiatives through the Internet. They do not have the necessary experience; and if they do get to experience this process once – will they be able to repeat it?

This is why we have to start thinking now on the mechanism of involving people in constructive transformation processes, possibly through discussing different problems and issues on the level of individual territorial communities. Maybe, now we should not be just thinking about, but already implementing mechanisms that would allow communities to cast a vote of mistrust of their MP or dismiss him, strip him of the deputy's mandate. But the issue of limiting deputies' impunity still remains unresolved.

Thus, it is unlikely that a person able to think critically will believe in improvements "here and now". It is necessary to create opportunities for common people to be able to influence the course of events and

actions of politicians. While NGOs have become a powerful instrument, what do we do, when it turns out that some of them operate under the sponsorship of certain political forces? I am not ready to recommend something, but this is a point of tension, which surely requires attention.

A possible way to make changes in this area – revival of state orders (and hence, funding) for socio-psychological, sociological research in the area of relations between state institutions (including Parliament) and citizens, development of programmes for restoring people's trust in power structures (not individual politicians, but state institutions).

Also relevant would be different applied studies and developments on involving people in integration processes, creating mechanisms for participation in discussions on financing of public projects for not just active internet users, but also those, who do not have such possibility/skills.

I do not want to resort to slogans, but in order to prevent further public protests, politicians should turn their attention to the issue of citizens' economic welfare. When the difference between the salary of a government official (tens, sometimes hundreds of thousands of *hryvnias*, with different additional bonuses) and the pension of an ordinary citizen (minimal – UAH 1,452) is, to put it mildly, significant, – there is something to think about. Such differences between living standards can obviously lead to social explosions. I am not a specialist in economic issues. But I cannot perceive the principles our law-makers and public servants are guided by, when they create such precedents.

Maybe **we should start working on each problem by defining principles that are clear for everyone and make ambiguous interpretation impossible**. And then use the same principles to assess the decisions we have made. So-called "principle-based negotiations" have been used abroad for a while now, but in our country, for some reason, it is easier to forget about them, than to accept and try to apply in debates about problems.

I believe that **the technology of principle-based negotiation can become the basis for establishing a dialogue between parliamentarians and citizens. Such negotiations should be used in the development of different political and economic issues; and such development sessions should involve civil sector representatives.**

Involving community representatives in developing different programmes and initiatives, consultations and negotiations between government and community representatives using the principles and schemes of principle-based negotiations can make decision-making more transparent and understandable, decrease the possibility for machinations through developing a simple and clear criteria used to evaluate the final decision.

I have already mentioned the need to develop motivation of participation and belonging. This is possible only when a person can influence the course of events, when they offer something and are ready to assume responsibility for it. It is important not just to come up with a proposal and declare one's readiness to undertake responsibility (a declaration cannot be brought to court), but to create conditions when a dialogue is transparent, and assessment criteria do not raise any questions or criticism.

Maybe we should **create a platform for negotiations, where using principle-based negotiations, we will be able to develop programmes and initiatives, and check important socio-economic or social issues for their alignment with generally accepted values and assessment criteria. The same platform can be used to thoroughly review the possible consequences of adopting this or that decision**.

Given the relevance of citizens' welfare issue and taking into account the major potential of motivational factor connected with survival, it is quite possible that salary and pension differences between common citizens and public officials will be coming forward in the nearest future.

Obviously, if the mechanisms for ensuring justice are not in place and working (e.g., on obeying the principle "laws are the same for everyone without exception"), if the gap between salaries and pensions keeps getting wider (the level of salaries and pensions should be at least high enough not to develop the survival motivation in people), if steps are not made to restore people's trust in government institutions, if a dialogue is not organised using principle-based agreements – we can expect some quite unpleasant developments. ■

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS AN INDICATOR OF DEVELOPING PARLIAMENTARISM: UKRAINE'S CHARACTERISTICS

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Ukraine is a multi-ethnic, multi-denominational state with a complex structure of interests. In this context, most appropriate for our country is a consociational democracy,[1] which is best implemented with the parliamentary form of government. Attractiveness of parliamentarism is in the broad involvement of different interest groups in political decision-making. This principle ensures high legitimacy of political decisions and reduces the level of conflict in society.

However, parliamentarism as a system of power organisation implies presence of certain attributes – institutions that ensure the quality of parliamentarism. Most important among them is the parliamentary principle of government formation and broad constitutive powers of the parliament.

Besides this, a necessary condition for the development of full-fledged parliamentarism is the way the parliament is formed – an electoral system that ensures an adequate representation of interest groups in the parliament; presence of a full-fledged party system, a structured civil society, which reflect the structure of political and public interests. Consequently, the nature of citizens' participation in elections, the work of political parties and civil society organisations is converted into the quality of parliamentarism.

In Ukraine, the quality of parliamentarism is conditioned both, historically and by the type of political system that has emerged in Ukraine since independence. Long-term existence as a part of other states led to development of political alienation, when there was no reason for various forms of political participation, as hardly anything depended on an individual citizen. The philosophy of existence as a part of other states was to minimise the negative influence of the metropolis, which is characterised by the famous Ukrainian saying "my house stands on the fringe…" (it is no concern of mine).

Long-term existence as a part of the USSR in the environment of "socialistic levelling" and state guarantees

[1] In political science, a consociational state is a state with internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group. Consociationalism was discussed in academic terms by A.Lijphart, who stated that the key to a stable consociational state is agreement and co-operation between social elites.

also induced Ukrainians to develop a paternalistic perception of the state. The introduction of democracy instruments after gaining independence in 1991 did not do much to change political participation traditions. Society at large remained passive and ambivalent. Financial and industrial groups (FIG) used this to their advantage, and "took over" the state rather quickly.

Ukraine's political transition is characterised by the fact that the country did not roll back to its previous authoritarian state, as was the case for some post-Soviet states, but instead gained the features of a hybrid (neo-patrimonial) political regime.

The idea is that FIG monopolise power and adjust political institutions in such a way that would enable their replication in government. The consequence of such political engineering is preserving the form of supposedly democratic structures and institutions without the respective content inside.

Thus, the aforementioned attributes of parliamentarism have also undergone significant deformations. In particular, the dystrophy of social lifts explains why individuals, who often have not proven themselves in any way, take positions of power, just by virtue of their belonging to a FIG.

The result of negative selection is the dystrophy of political institutions, which keep replicating new extremely inefficient political practices, and the weakening of the state as a whole.[2] Our state has gained the characteristics of a "parastate", which carries out functions typical for a classical state partially, often by a leftover principle. Instead, the "parastate", through tight merging of government and business interests, became the servant of FIG and other groups' interests in the first place (namely, the "old" Soviet and the "new" post-Soviet ruling elites) and, consequently, adjusts key state institutions to serve their needs.

Until 2010, the essence of political life in the country was determined mostly by the competition between different groups of interests for the influence on decision-making, which was the driving force for creation of political forces, their struggle for victory in elections, and development of government-opposition relations. Then, the country's political system underwent an attempt to monopolise power by one group represented in politics by the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, which, furthermore, had outside control. All of this together drove the situation to a severe socio-political crisis.

Following the events of the Revolution of Dignity, which became the climax of this crisis, along with state structure restoration, steps were taken to restore the functioning of parliamentarism as its key element.

Namely, through reinstating the 2004 version of the Constitution of Ukraine after the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On Restoration of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine", Parliament's constitutive functions were expanded. Parliament was returned its functions of government formation, its dismissal and the ongoing adjustment of its composition, which strengthened the Parliament's role in the triad of power. This, in its turn, limited presidential influence within the structure of central government institutions and created conditions for increasing political competition in the state as a whole.

However, for the development of full-fledged parliamentarism, we require symmetric development of its other attributes – political parties and civil society institutions, as well as mechanisms for representation of these interests.

Intensification of civil society activity, radical (61%) renewal of parliament's composition after the 2014 elections, did not lead to any major institutional changes. The unreformed electoral system remained a tool for replicating interest groups' influence on the government, while the Parliament, as earlier, operates in the format of a joint-stock company.

The majoritarian component of the electoral system remained the instrument that allowed for mass vote-buying, and later, in the course of Verkhovna Rada's work, helped achieve voting results necessary for those in power. In addition, the current electoral system enabled formation of a "preventive measures" system, which allowed for the high potential of obtaining the desired result even at the stage of election campaign. This was achieved by "squeezing out" potential opponents of the desirable candidates on formal grounds (incorrectly completed declaration, documents), lack of adequate reaction from territorial election commissions to complaints, court dismissal of claims regarding the violation of rights of desirable candidates' potential opponents, or their delayed consideration, ignoring of mass violations during the electoral process by competent authorities, forming "desirable" election commissions, etc.

[2] For more information, see: Institutional Changes of Ukraine's Political System: Assessment of Current State, Development Trends. Scientific paper. Ed. by H.I. Zelenko. – K. : I. F. Kuras IPENS of the NAS of Ukraine, 2014. – P.94-104.

These electoral system "advantages" are being actively exploited by post-Maidan political forces as well, who arrange political bargaining on various issues in the similar way, mobilising the votes of factions and individual deputies, who declare their opposition.

The number of political parties is not at all appropriate as compared to the number of political party members. With 354 political parties registered in Ukraine, only 2% of citizens state that they are a political party member. This discrepancy is visible during elections. Parties claiming to have millions of members cannot meet the required threshold in parliamentary elections. In other words, elections cast light on fictitious party membership, which completely erodes the political structure of society.

Another side of the problem is that parties are being created as business projects, and are a part of the said "preventive measures system" to ensure interest groups' influence on government. Thus, parties are turned into goods that may be rented or purchased at an appropriate price during elections.

Of course, the existence of business-project-parties does not exclude the existence of real ideological parties. However, such parties have to engage in politics on conditions created without their participation.

Locally, ideological parties can be rather successful. However, to get to the national level, they require additional resources to pay for promotion of their ideas in media; they also have to take into account administrative resource and reach agreements with the unofficial "owners" of different regions. Being forced to play according to the rules (i.e., within legal boundaries), they lose to the forces that have the possibility to bypass the law and use administrative resource in the absence of reaction from competent authorities (territorial election commissions, prosecutor's office).

Thus, the starting position of non-ideological parties aiming to please those in power, are a priori stronger than that of those, who truly wish to present an alternative to current government. The party that was successful in reaching certain agreements becomes accountable to current authorities (formal or informal), not to voters, who elected it. If, however, it does not agree to such conditions, this means its literal renunciation of political ambition.

Another problem is that citizens demonstrate almost no involvement in the work of political parties, or at least in their funding. In particular, the adopted by the parliament mechanism of state funding for political parties that is very effective from the point of view of stimulating the development of party system, is supported only by 14% of Ukrainian citizens, which makes it extremely difficult to form real political parties.

The Revolution of Dignity was another boost in a "bottom-up" socio-political transformations.

In recent years, the number of NGOs has increased significantly: while in 2014 Ukraine had 74,260 NGOs registered, in 2015 – 67,866, in 2016 – 74,102, in 2017 – the number was 77,129.[3] NGOs are among the top leaders of public trust. According to the Razumkov Centre, almost 66% of citizens trust volunteer organisations, and almost 52% trust civil society organisations in general.[4]

Along with this, according to the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 80 % of Ukrainians are not and have never been a member of any NGO. Thus, an increase in the number of civil society organisations does not necessarily mean an increase in civic activity.

The process of civil society development in Ukraine can literally be compared to society's "reconquering" certain areas of competence from the state. That said, the state is glad to share its own competencies in areas that are most burdensome and least attractive in terms of revenues, but is very reluctant to "allow" NGOs into the areas that are financially attractive, or where rules of the game are being created.

There are public councils at all government bodies and state institutions. However, their operation often depends on the goodwill of their leadership. Thus, any activity of a specific government authority (legal, illegal, with signs of corruption, violations of current legislation, etc.) "is sanctified by the public". Clearly, the chairman of the public council and its board members, regardless of whether it works or not, have the opportunity to solve their own issues, overseeing, at least on paper, the work of the executive body, while, in fact, being "its partner, not overseer".[5] Thus, creation of public councils is often a form of political regime's self-legitimisation, when the appearance of consideration of public opinion is created through simulation of involvement.

One of components of the current situation in Ukraine is the struggle between various groups that influence the government and are interested in undermining reforms, on the one hand, and civil society that continues to reconquer various competencies, – on the other. In this fight, an extensive system of methods is used that are aimed at offsetting (discrediting) changes necessary for the country's further development. Namely, pro-government critics of civil society have adopted the borrowed from the past clichés regarding "grant-eaters".

[3] Number of EDRPOU (Uniform State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine) entities by organisational and legal forms of management. State Statistics Service of Ukraine. URL: *http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/*.

[4] On the State of Development of Civil Society in Ukraine: Analytical Report / [Yablonskyi V. M., Balakirieva O. M. et al.] ; gen. ed. by O. Korniievskyi. – K.: NISS, 2017. – 56 p.

[5] Ibid.

At the same time, some NGOs do provide grounds for criticism, which leads to discrediting of the very idea of civil society empowerment. In particular, this concerns the existing practices of inappropriate use of grant money provided by foreign donor organisations or NGOs' statutory funds.

Further pressure is created by the deformed, from the point of view of standard legal perceptions, corrupt institutional climate within the society itself and the state.[6]

Inside civil society, there is a significant differentiation of roles: some organisations are actively involved in developing civic initiatives, while others often act as an instrument that is used either for civic support of government or a certain group interested in lobbying for their interests and ideas, or for discrediting opponents. Quite often, an NGO is really a business in disguise.

A common practice is establishing "pocket" charitable funds at government institutions, law enforcement agencies, etc. for implementation of corruption schemes. For instance, anti-corruption NGOs in Kyiv, in the framework of "Concealed Interests" project, have found approximately 600 agencies that belong to 120 Kyiv Council deputies and 45 – to top officials in the city and district state administrations. Among these 600 agencies, there were 96 NGOs and 34 charitable organisations. Such organisations allow to detect connections between deputies that can provide corrupt services to one another.[7]

It is worth noting that in Ukraine, results of public discussions and public consultations have little effect on the work of government bodies of different levels. Namely, if the content of bills registered in the Verkhovna Rada does change, this happens mainly as a result of various agreements between agencies, parties, and within a party, but not as a result of public discussion.

Citizens and experts have the right to express their opinion on a bill, but nobody is obliged to take their opinion into account. Thus, the institution of public discussion turns into a decorative instrument, the task of which is to ensure legitimacy of adopted decisions.

So, in the current situation in Ukraine, we are talking about attempts to limit the influence of civil society on transformation and decision-making processes in the country, and, at the same time, about attempts to artificially construct certain substitutes for fundamental democratic instruments. In a healthy democracy, the process of feedback between society and government is ensured through regular free elections on different levels, and the quality of bills – through a multistage, open, regulated discussion within expert environment.

So, despite a major revitalisation of social activity, and increased level of civic participation after the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has preserved its "surrogates of parliamentarism" – agencies that essentially imitate feedback between state and society, an electoral system that is extremely ineffective in terms of national representation, and an extremely weak party system, all of which completely reduce the role of conventional forms of political participation.

We should bear in mind that a deficit of conventional political participation is converted into non-conventional participation, as public dissatisfaction and public needs are not going anywhere. In turn, this creates significant threats and risks for both, parliamentarism and democratic development in general.

To sum up, Ukraine experienced significant strengthening of the role of society in political processes, yet the nature of its political regime minimises the effectiveness of the forms of political and public participation provided by the law, and, therefore, constrains the development of parliamentarism. By analogy with physics, active interest groups that demand to play a decisive role in decision-making are a kind of obstacle that reflects the ray of light, resulting in refraction and a distorted image.

This is why the main problem that hinders the development of parliamentarism in Ukraine is still the institutional problem. Claims of social passivity as the reason for ineffectiveness of the state are hardly substantiated. As demonstrated by last years' practices, areas, where society feels its efficiency, are filling up with civic initiatives rather fast. The most striking example is the creation and active work of volunteer organisations at a time when the Armed Forces had to be practically created anew in 2014-2015.

Therefore, as previously, Ukraine faces the task of ensuring institutional support for conventional forms of political participation, de-monopolising government and business, and thus, neutralising the "oligarch factor" in domestic politics. ■

[6] Stepanenko V. Civil Society: Discourses and Practices. – K.: Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2015. – p.250.

[7] Holub A. From Transparency to Control – 13 February 2017. *http://tyzhden.ua/Economics/185040*.