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PRESENT-DAY SECURITY CHALLENGES REQUIRE JOINT RESPONSES

Over the past decade, the global security environment saw deep changes that prompted the conclusion of a deficit of security on all levels and speculations of a new Cold War. So-called “new threats” (along with reinstitution of “old” ones) acquired an integral character and demonstrated an extreme speed of spread to entire regions and the whole world.¹ Meanwhile, difficult processes associated with emergence of new centres of influence, along with changes in the list of the leading world actors, led to restoration and toughening of geopolitical competition and brought about aggravation of “frozen” conflicts and emergence of new conflict areas, including in the Euro-Atlantic space.

Trends of the decade brought growth of Russia’s ambitions of regional and global leadership and creation of a “privileged” area of its interests in the post-Soviet space. To push its position, Moscow resorted to economic pressure, used energy resources as a tool of foreign policy, “encouraged interest” of separate states and their officials in supporting its positions and initiatives, including those concerning third parties.

All this caused tension in the relations between Russia and the EU, USA and NATO. The security sector saw ever hotter disputes about NATO enlargement, deployment of ABM elements in Europe, the Balkan events, the military campaign in Afghanistan, etc; on the European side, the problem of Russia joining the European Energy Charter and its Treaty, the Eastern Partnership initiative, plans of joint participation in reconstruction of the Ukrainian gas transportation system came to the forefront.

Those processes not only caused a new confrontation between Russia and the West but also revealed the lack of unity between the USA and the EU, within the EU and NATO on many security issues, including building relations with Russia. That was largely prompted by difficult internal processes, related: in the EU – with its expansion and structural and institutional changes under the Lisbon Treaty, in NATO – with problems of functional, structural and resource sufficiency and different opinions as to the ways and goals of the Alliance transformation.²

Finally, Russia’s suspension of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, legislative establishment of possible use of its Armed Forces outside Russian borders and its role in the Caucasian conflict in August 2008 questioned the effectiveness of the international European and the whole Euro-Atlantic security system, resting on the Helsinki agreements, arrangements and guarantees of 1990s.

Ukraine found itself in an especially vulnerable situation, from the security viewpoint.³

On one hand, having refused from nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, it got no reliable external security guarantees and mechanisms of their enforcement; having cut its Armed Forces and started their reformation in line with the NATO standards – failed to attain full-scale integration in the Alliance. Such situation mainly stemmed from the internal weakness, inconsistent and controversial actions of Ukraine itself, ineffectiveness of the Ukrainian authorities, their focus on corporate interests to the detriment of the national interests and strategic goals.

On the other hand, however, there are also external factors preventing the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and getting effective security guarantees. The above-mentioned processes of realignment of forces in the Euro-Atlantic space, lack of unity inside the EU and NATO, unreadiness of their member states for joint solution of the problem of Russian ambitions weaken the attention of the West to Ukraine (and other Eastern European countries) and prompt a focus on Russia, as witnessed, among other things, by the US initiative of “resetting” its relations with Moscow. Now, the future of that initiative is unclear, but there is a risk of the key actors’ problems solution at the expense of weaker partners.⁴

Therefore, there is a possibility of Ukraine sliding (or being pushed out) to the Russian sphere of influence, which, along with the loss of Ukraine’s independence in foreign policy, is fraught with emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Avoidance of such developments will require efforts of Ukraine itself and assistance from its Western partners.

By and large, the described events and processes evidently demonstrated that international security systems established in the second half of the past century need modernisation. And the world financial and economic crisis of 2008 revealed not only the unreadiness of national governments for prompt and adequate actions but also the insufficiency of the Bretton Woods institutes – international financial institutions, primarily called to ensure stability of the world monetary system and prevent global financial shocks.

This prompts governments, the expert community, international institutes, the international community in general to search for joint solutions, commonly accepted ways of adaptation and transformation of international security institutes in all sectors, development of its new mechanisms, corresponding to the character and nature of present-day threats.

¹ For more detail see the article by M.Sungurovskiy “Deficit of security: factors, trends, role of expert community in its remedy”, published in this magazine.

² See, e.g., see the article by J.Bissett “Canada should push for a retro NATO”, published in this magazine.

³ See also the article by J.Sherr “Living through bad times”, published in this magazine.

⁴ See the article by A.Aslund, J.Elkind and S.Pifer “Engaging Ukraine in 2009”, published in this magazine.

UKRAINE'S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE XXI CENTURY: CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

In October 2008, Ukraine's strategic community combined the efforts of non-governmental and state experts to develop an independent Strategic Assessment. The Assessment named *Toward a More Relevant and Coordinated National Security Policy of Ukraine*¹ set out the principal challenges of consolidating Ukraine's young democracy in an increasingly challenging security environment, where global threats were compounded by renewed regional geopolitical competition and internal weaknesses were actively exploited by external forces.

UKRAINE IN DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT

In the five months since the preparation of the Strategic Assessment, a number of events and new factors have reinforced the trends noted in October 2008.

The intensification of the economic crisis has added new global, regional, and national level risks and transformed the old ones. The intensification of the economic and political situation has unfortunately confirmed the Ukrainian government's inability to develop effective and coordinated responses to the complex challenges that currently affect practically all vital activities of the state and society. The resulting overlap of internal and external destabilising factors may produce catastrophic consequences for Ukraine.

The gas conflict of January 2009 demonstrated **Russia's willingness to use strong measures** to achieve political objectives in Ukraine, even at their own considerable economic and political loss. Russia's aggressive pursuit of its interests does not appear to have been mitigated even by the devastating impact of the economic crisis. Russia's "victory" in the Russia-Georgia conflict and the Russia-Ukraine gas conflict have increased Russia's self-assurance in its dialogue with the EU, NATO, and the USA. The Kremlin openly claims the right to special influence in the post-Soviet space as an exceptional zone of Russian interests. Russia's support for separatist movements in Ukraine is growing. The intensive saturation of Russian capital in Ukraine's economy provides Moscow with new levers of political as well as economic influence. This suggests that Ukraine cannot rely on Russian self-restraint should a crisis develop. There is also a risk of possible military incidents in case of impulsive actions by either side near Black Sea Fleet bases and facilities.

The continuing lack of a unified, principled, and effective response by the Euro-Atlantic community to "new-old" regional security challenges gives the **perception of a security vacuum** to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This pertains both to military and non-military security issues: uncertainty related to Russia's suspension of its CFE Treaty implementation; disagreements with Russia concerning missile defence; the EU's failure to effectively address energy security; EU, NATO, and U.S. efforts to

revive working relations with Russia that are perceived to neglect the interests of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, the Euro-Atlantic community could forfeit its influence on the democratic development, security and stability of Eastern Europe. Moreover, a significant segment of Ukraine's political elite take the change of the framework of NATO-Ukraine relations (the introduction of Annual National Programme, ANP) as an effort by the Alliance to lower the level of cooperation.

The intensification of the economic and political crisis in Ukraine has already caused the public to lose considerable confidence in their government and doubt its ability to stabilise the situation, provide for steady development, and protect its citizens in the time of economic difficulties.

- There is a rising threat of internal conflict set off by the growing gap between elites and society, looming mass impoverishment, and lack of trust in government. Ruling parties and the main opposition alike are unable (or not interested) in counteracting these tendencies. If Ukrainian politicians continue to politicise existing conflicts, it provides grounds for external support that could transform general unrest on economic issues into active separatism. In addition to the well known issues in Crimea, there are increasing risks in Eastern Ukraine, and in some parts of Ukraine's West. Economic factors now combine with manipulation of public opinion, provocative actions by leftist parties, and the criminalisation of a society already traumatised by crisis.
- **The weakening of important state institutions**, including the judiciary and the national security system is accelerating as political conflict continues to sharpen. Civil servant appointments are increasingly politicised, and professionals remaining in the system are distracted by the dual challenges of politics and economic hardship. Political and institutional infighting have begun to merge, with a negative impact on already weak inter-agency institutions.
- **The loss of legitimacy of the democratic system** is the direct result of the state's inability to address the crisis. With its dominating position in Ukraine's information space, Russia is making efforts to highlight the

¹ That document was prepared as the result of an expert meeting conducted by the Razumkov Centre on 15 October 2008, and subsequent consultations with Ukrainian and international experts in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Network.

advantageous of Russia's authoritarian "stability" over Ukraine's "democratic chaos". The idea of the need for a "strong hand" is growing in society. The critically low level of trust in the current political elite creates opportunities for radical political actors to enter at the next elections. On the other hand, many Ukrainians are not prepared to trade their political system, flawed as it is, for a more authoritarian system. Therefore, any attempt to exercise a "strong hand" politics will create additional tensions within society and with the political elite – resulting in increased, rather than decreased, instability.

- **The combination of increased internal problems, aggravated externally, and government weakness provokes the risk of "sovereignty default".** Were this to happen, external forces or anti-democratic internal forces could use the situation to fundamentally change the nature of Ukraine's statehood. This would have impact on regional security far beyond Ukraine's borders.
- **The critical situation in the security and defence sector.** Perceptions that current defence policy is not viable, due to the lack of a solid external security guarantee, have triggered a search for alternatives – such as expanding the Armed Forces or developing new deterrence forces in anticipation of renewed nuclear potential. Such initiatives have gained some public and political resonance without the clear assessment of their economic potential, effectiveness, or unpredictable negative outcomes. Realistically, considering their size and the quantitative and qualitative condition of armaments and equipment, Ukraine's Armed Forces have already passed the point of no return in their transformation.
- **Poor inter-agency coordination has now become a crucial weakness in Ukraine's state system.** The crisis has shown that Ukraine is subject to the risks of globalisation, but neither has the necessary capability to deal with the situation internally nor to pursue its own interests in the international arena. The inflexibility of executive institutions and the weakening of key coordination institutions, like the National Security and Defence Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to efforts to use them as tools for internal political conflict, have significantly reduced Ukraine's ability to effectively consult with, or receive aid from, international partners. The ineffective use of international consultation mechanisms has encouraged the marginalisation of Ukrainian interests. For Ukraine, the ability to develop a credible first Annual National Programme, supported by cross-governmental coordination, will be a key test of whether Ukraine is capable of mobilising the capacity of the state to achieve important national goals.

Ukraine's international image has declined considerably, as has its ability to effectively present its positions internationally, due to the continuing political conflict, stalled reforms, and uncoordinated actions of state authorities (and the public statements of their representatives). Opaque decision-making mechanisms appear to ignore the legitimate interests of international neighbours and partners. Russia has taken advantage of this situation by developing focused international information efforts to cast Ukraine as an "unreliable partner" or "conflict zone". This increases investment risk, reduces opportunities for external support, and furthers the Kremlin's interests in reducing Ukraine's attractiveness as a development model in the eyes of its own citizens,

as well as its attractiveness as a partner and prospective member of NATO and the EU in the eyes of the West.

NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITIES AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS

The Strategic Assessment of October 2008 highlighted nine key priorities for national security, with independence of democratic institutions, combating corruption, defence capability, and national security management heading the list. It also highlighted that – in the short term – actions would take place within significant economic and political constraints, and would therefore need to be carefully targeted to mobilise limited resources to achieve real changes. Representatives of the public sector and security community would need to initiate most of these actions themselves, not counting on initiative from the political level, but in light of the need for political-level approval.

While the areas identified in October all remain relevant, developments in the security environment over the past five months have firmly placed economic and energy security as the new top priority. A number of other areas and their relative priority have also been revised in light of changed circumstances.

In addition to adapting policy priorities to reflect the updated situation, experts have also tried to identify approaches and practical steps that could be feasible to introduce in the current environment. While implementing some of these might be challenging in the current political environment, the increased sharpness of the risks, combined with the coordinated efforts of internal and external advocates, may provide new opportunities for building political support.

First and foremost, there must be greater coherence in the executive branch, in its formation and implementation of policy. This requires an end, or at least some mitigation, of the political feud between the President and Presidential Secretariat, on the one hand, and the Prime Minister and Cabinet, on the other. Absent some reconciliation, it is difficult to see how the government will be able to deal effectively with the domestic and foreign policy challenges currently facing Ukraine.

Economic Security. The principal aim is to form an anti-crisis agreement, in cooperation with the IMF and other international lenders, that can become a positive signal and will permit access to external financial resources. The essential condition is a clear governmental action programme that addresses the following interconnected issues:

- Targeted actions to protect the health of Ukraine's financial system and overcome negative trends in the currency exchange system, while taking into account the need to protect the hardest-hit and most unprotected segments of the population and public trust in the banking system;
- Budget restructuring to reduce the growing deficit and provide for its financing;
- Restructuring external debt, taking into account all debt obligations – governmental and corporate – in order to prevent default, and avoid unforeseen shocks on the internal currency exchange market;
- Support and stimulating economic activity, in the first place in the internal market demand. Priorities for sectoral support should target those with maximum growth potential: energy, agricultural, high-tech, and development of small and middle business.



Energy Security. Despite feelings by some that the gas conflict has been resolved, many factors remain that could allow for the conflict to be quickly renewed, should Russia so desire. To avoid (and prepare for the possibility of) the revival of the conflict, Ukraine must take the initiative in forming clear, goal-oriented, and effective energy policy capable of convincing European partners that it can be a contributor to European energy security. Mitigating – and perhaps eventually solving – the gas conflict and its possible consequences is possible only in the context of stabilised relations in the gas market, aimed at increasing reliability all along the energy supply chain – extraction, trade, transit, consumption – with consideration of the interests of all shareholders. Priority directions must be:

- Providing for transparency of gas contracts and the whole chain of the energy supply, including monitoring of gas transit with the participation of interested external parties;
- Increasing the effectiveness of market mechanisms and governmental regulating policy in the domestic gas market, especially in terms of payment for consumption. Energy prices should be allowed to rise to cover costs of production and distribution, to encourage conservation and energy efficiency, and to increase domestic production;
- Shifting Ukraine's energy balance to increase energy security, through diversification of energy routes and sources; a key precondition is reducing the influence of the gas lobbying in political decision-making;
- Moving to practical implementation of policies to stimulate energy conservation;
- Attracting external investments to modernise Ukraine's gas transit system; initiating multilateral projects to use Ukraine's gas storage capability to provide for reliability of gas deliveries to Europe in case of natural or technical catastrophes that disrupt gas supplies.

Renewing Relations with Russia. Ukraine's Russia policy should be based on pragmatism. Maintaining the best possible relations with Russia will help speed Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration by lowering political concerns both inside the country and among NATO/EU partners. Yet today, Russia has little interest in developing normal relations with Ukraine on the principles of equal partnership between sovereign states. Under these conditions, Ukraine should seek to integrate its policy with NATO/EU approaches that seek partnership relations with Russia based on mutually-beneficial cooperation and active efforts to take into account Russia's legitimate interests. To accomplish this, Ukraine can:

- Mitigate possible areas of confrontation, such as energy, Crimea, Russian language, and NATO membership by avoiding diplomatic demarches and taking practical preventative measures. E.g. – refrain from repeated public declarations regarding the departure of the Black Sea Fleet in 2017 while accelerating work to better regulate its presence in Crimea;
- Restart bilateral negotiations in areas of cooperation that may be attractive to key Russian elites or societal groups;
- Develop a long-term strategy and appropriate tools to build the foundations for constructive Ukraine-Russia relations through networks of economic, elite, and societal links. Consultations with NATO/EU partners

(informally, if necessary) with relevant experience could be helpful;

- Coordinate with NATO/EU partners to positively support their efforts to achieve a successful rapprochement with Russia, while seeking to ensure protection of vital Ukrainian interests.

Democratic Institutions. An important pre-condition for overcoming the crisis and moving toward development is to increase the effectiveness of key governmental and public institutions (or at least to prevent damage at this initial stage). This year's main task is improving the election system and preparing for free and fair presidential elections. Vital issues are:

- The timely resolution, according to principles of consensual democracy and European standards, of the following issues: improving electoral legislation; completing a national voters' register; ensuring substantial internal and external monitoring of the election campaign;
- Depoliticising and increasing the autonomy of the judicial system: providing for public transparency of judicial decisions (while protecting legally-defined privileged information); improving legal, personnel, and resource support for judicial activities; and clear regulation of the appointments, terms of service, and responsibilities of judges (excluding possibility for unilateral dismissal of judges by the executive);
- Strengthening civil society efforts to ensure media freedom, protect journalists against retaliation, and introducing a code of ethics.

Increasing Effectiveness of the National Security and Defence System. The Russia-Georgia conflict has shown that a country that has chosen to move toward collective security may face a transitional period prior to its full integration in which it has a "security deficit" compared with a potential (or real, in the case of Russia-Georgia) rival. This reality demands revision of approaches (although not strategic goals) both by the country and its partners.

For Ukraine today, this is complicated by the economic crisis, which requires revision of previously established priorities. In the short term, the priority in reforming the security and defence sector must shift from finance-intensive programmes (transition to contract service, technical modernisation, development of unified civil protection systems, etc.) to human- and intellect-intensive reforms like improving processes, restructuring, improving legal and procedural frameworks, and developing human resource potential. It will be important to continue developing interoperability between Ukraine and NATO countries in the framework of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and gradually increasing the number of units and other Armed Forces' bodies and security institution taking part in PARP.

Beyond defence, a key priority should be actions to reduce the polarisation and increase the professional coordination of law enforcement agencies, including those with special status. It is important to increase the priority for Special Services' tasks related to countering external threats and continue the reform of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in accordance with the legislatively defined priorities.

Regional Policy. The economic crisis and external factors have further underlined the important role of regional policy as a national security instrument. Priorities



for government policy should be: ensuring balanced regional development; the development of common values and Ukrainian national identity in harmony with regional/minority identities; and building partnerships with neighboring countries to meet the interests of people in border regions.

In addressing language issues, and to increase trust towards government, civil servants and representatives of governmental institutions should use not only the national languages, but also languages spoken by significant groups of local communities, according to the principle "dialogue with government has to be comfortable not to the department, but most importantly for the citizen".

RECOMMENDATIONS

Improve approaches and introduce practical mechanisms for developing and implementing ANPs. The content of ANPs must concentrate on achieving concrete results.

Successful implementation of ANPs is possible under following conditions:

- Clear regulation of tasks, division of responsibilities, and interaction between the National Security and Defence Council, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Parliament;
- Creation of permanent inter-agency working groups on ANP issues that meet at the level of deputy ministers and (most frequently) department heads;
- Existence of effective monitoring mechanisms, including public oversight;
- Active use of NATO-Ukraine consultation mechanisms, particularly at expert level;
- Ensure linkage between ANPs and other strategic planning documents, such as the National Security Strategy and the Government Programmes.

Seek political consensus on NATO-Ukraine cooperation. The NATO-Ukraine partnership is a crucial factor for Ukraine's future as a contributor to European security. In accordance with Ukraine's foreign policy course toward Euro-Atlantic integration (which is established in legislation) and the Bucharest Summit declaration, maintaining a positive trend in NATO-Ukraine cooperation is important.

- It is necessary to initiate a wide public discussion focused on security and defence policy based on Euro-Atlantic principles and the solidarity of the democratic community, independent of the official membership status;
- In light of the realistic timeframes for Ukraine's accession to NATO under modern economic and political conditions, it could be helpful to develop a political compromise that ensures proper implementation of ANP actions, while removing NATO issue from the presidential campaign, via a politically-agreed moratorium postponing through 2014 any referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO or accession process to NATO itself.

Wisely develop defence capabilities. NATO-Ukraine cooperation is a crucial factor of the defence reform. It supports the structural optimisation of Armed Forces, improvement of the defence management system, increased military professionalism, and the development of interoperability and Euro-Atlantic standards.

- The main tasks of Armed Forces development should remain in reaching interoperability with and standards of the Armed Forces of the EU and NATO countries, as well as active participation in international operations, trainings and other events;
- In the course of the Defence Review:
 - Consider alternative types of forces and methods for their use to address the "security deficit" that could occur during the transitional period of integration into NATO;
 - Ensure effective inter-agency coordination and consultations with parliamentary political forces;
 - Hold consultations with NATO experts concerning practical aspects of possible interaction across the full range of possible future scenarios.
- In the current financial conditions, concentrate resources on preserving human resource potential in key professions, in order to allow renewed full combat training when the necessary funding becomes available.

Intensify dialogue and enhance the level of NATO-Ukraine cooperation

- More intensively use consultation mechanisms across a wide spectrum of security issues, not only in general terms, but also as regarding timely consultations on specific cases (e.g., the gas conflict and the spy scandal with Romania);
- Increase strategic dialogue using official, academic, and non-governmental means to build common understanding of the principles of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, the responsibility of national governments in decision-making, and the conditions under which a country that is not yet a member of the Alliance might seek Western support and the means to receive and effectively use such assistance.

Intensify the role of civil society

Under conditions where important reforms are blocked or undermined due to political interests, civil society should redouble its efforts to support implementation, using both think-tanks and local civil society organisations. In cases where there state institutions are not supportive, external expertise and support for the work of civil organisations are critically important. Today, the main tasks of non-governmental sector are to:

- Encourage broad public discussion to raise awareness of the Ukrainian electorate regarding the importance of national security policy in the pre-election programmes of political parties and political leaders;
- Increase the capabilities of local civil organisations and support events that engage the civil society in developing and implementing policy on local (human) security issues;
- Provide expert support for state institutions in developing, implementing, and assessing national security policy;
- Help the public better understand their interests and assess the results of actions by state institutions and political representatives in terms of their impact on these interests. ■

UKRAINE'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN PRESENT-DAY CIRCUMSTANCES

Another discussion held within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network summed up the results of the Planning Conference of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR) "National Security Policy: Current Challenges, Adequate Responses" on March 23-25, 2009, in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany).¹

At the Conference, working groups were discussing the following sectors: military threats; non-military threats; interdepartmental coordination; programmes of development. Working groups and plenary sessions reviewed the results of the previous stage of the NATO-Ukraine partnership and outlined, in the context of assessment of the present-day threats, its immediate tasks, including for their consideration at finalisation of Ukraine's Annual National Programme's draft (ANP).

The Conference also saw a presentation of the Strategic Assessment worked out by an expert group within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network.² The document was praised by the Conference participants, and it was proposed to discuss the possibility of its practical use at the following meeting of JWGDR in Warsaw (May 2009).

Discussing the Conference results, the panellists noted **serious deterioration of Ukraine's national security, first of all, in the information, energy, and defence sectors**. Most experts see one of the main problems in the **ineffectiveness of the state authorities and loss of public confidence in politicians and power institutions**.

Presentations made by the panellists are published below.³



FRUITFUL CONTRIBUTION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS TO UKRAINE'S SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT



Ihor ARHUCHYNSKYI,
*Deputy Head of Department
of Foreign Policy's Aspects of
National Security – Head of
International Security Division
of Ukraine's NSDC Staff*

Presentation at the Garmisch Conference of the document prepared by an expert group within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network was a very positive signal, in the context of complaints

about the extremely low implementation rate of quite professional recommendations of non-governmental organisations. I hope that after finalisation and discussion at the following high level meeting of JWGDR in Warsaw in May 2009 it will be presented for consideration to the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

On the other hand, the document is already being used for preparation of the new National Security Strategy. Use of that Document by experts of state institutions is good for the state policy formulation and is an evidence (and guarantee) of their more considerate approach to that activity and its results. Recommendations cited in the document will also be used in the JWG activity during preparation of plans and implementation of existing projects. The document prepared at this table not only gave the tone to discussions in working groups of the Conference but was used by them to prepare recommendations for further activities.

Generally speaking, the informal character of the Conference was favourable to exchange of opinions and experience between representatives of NATO and the Ukrainian side.

¹ The Conference was held with assistance from the Marshall Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Bundeswehr and the NATO International Secretariat. Ukraine for the first time attended the event with a large delegation of 24 persons representing both state structures and non-governmental organisations.

² The Strategic Assessment logically continues the material "Towards more adequate and coordinated national security policy in Ukraine" prepared for NATO-Ukraine consultations on the level of defence ministers in Tallinn on November 12-13, 2008. For the Document text see: Security of Ukraine in 21st century: challenges and needs of collective measures. – Kyiv, Razumkov Centre, 2009; http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/securityXXI_ukr_eng.pdf

³ The expert discussion was held on April 23, 2009. The texts are prepared after the discussion records and are published in a shortened form, in the order of presentation at the discussion.

Presented at the Conference was a letter from the management of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) with proposals for the development of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network. I hope that after the Warsaw meeting, DCAF will become one of the Network's agents and join implementation of all projects by providing expert and, importantly, financial and technical assistance. Everybody knows the capabilities of that Centre, so, I believe that the appearance of such a strong actor in the Partnership Network will contribute to the promotion of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Now, regarding further intentions. The results of the Garmisch Conference will be specifically considered at a session of the JWGDR meeting in Warsaw. The agenda items will include the possibility of use of the Strategic Assessment prepared by the Partnership Network in JWGDR practical activity. ■

WE SHOULD STAND ON FIRM SOIL



Viktor KORENDOVYCH,
*Director, Military Policy
and Strategic Planning
Department of the Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine*

We consider the results of the Garmisch Conference as logical continuation of the achievements of the Bucharest (optimism) and December Brussels (realism) summits. The Conference added realism to the assessment of the situation in and around Ukraine, gave an opportunity to make right conclusions, concentrate on practical implementation of our commitments.

The conference discussed, in particular, the progress of drafting of the first Annual National Programme (ANP). The working group on military threats considered one of the best prepared sections of ANP drawn up by the Defence Ministry jointly with NSDC Staff and dealing with the defence sector problems. During the discussion it was noted that, unfortunately, the gap between words and deeds in the country continues to grow. In particular, all agencies verbally supported the idea of ANP, gave advice, but when it came to ANP drafting, realised that interdepartmental coordination was missing, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not perform such coordination. Meanwhile, despite the noted problems, the presented section in principle was praised by the Conference participants.

Further steps for ANP preparation, namely – a meeting chaired by Vice Prime Minister Nemyria, may be assessed as positive. Common understanding was achieved regarding the need to enhance coordination for ANP finalisation and soonest presentation of the national document to our partners for familiarisation before subsequent review in Warsaw.

Assignment of the coordination functions of ANP development and implementation from the Foreign Ministry to the Coordination Bureau of the Government's Secretariat may also be praised. I am sure that concentration

of coordinating functions in the Cabinet of Ministers (in the hands of a Vice Premiere) will add realism to ANP and promote its implementation.

As regards military security issues, the main conclusion is as follows: we should stand on firm soil and realise that Ukraine should guarantee its military security through its own forces. It is a highly conceptual, very important conclusion proven with preliminary assessments obtained within the framework of the Defence Review started in October, 2008.

At its first meeting, the analytical group of the Interdepartmental Commission for Defence Review led by V.Horbulin assessed threats in the domains of home and foreign security and their influence on the national security as a whole.

The obtained results and conclusions prove the difficult situation in which Ukraine appeared and therefore require publicising and appropriate public reaction. Urgent actions are needed with respect to physical components (arms and military equipment), human resources of the Armed Forces, as well as conceptual decisions concerning the actual capabilities.

Solution of those problems is now hindered by the economic crisis that became a determinant of the year. In particular, the passed budget endangered prospects of maintenance of Ukrainian peacekeeping forces abroad. If no proper decisions are passed, after June, collapse will come – there will be no possibility to withdraw or to further keep the troops. The economic crisis rendered unrealistic all talks of the Armed Forces' professionalisation, their provision with arms and military equipment. The stabilisation fund is merely exhausted. It is proposed that we take the small allocations to arms and military equipment and spend those funds on maintenance of the peacekeeping forces. But if we do this, we will, first, kill all prospects of rearmament of the army, and second, inflict the damage to the domestic defence industry.

In absence of funds, we can go forward in conceptual terms. This opportunity should be used, and we are doing that. We are using proposals worked out within the framework of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network under the Razumkov Centre leadership, during the Defence Review, and this is a serious contribution.

Working groups of the Conference in Garmisch reviewed the issues of risks assessment and threats for Ukraine.

The long discussion proved that those issues can be solved effectively only within Ukraine. Just as we find it difficult to assess risks and threats for Norway or Spain, foreign experts find it difficult – morally and psychologically – to assess our problems.

While discussing potential challenges and threats in the field of military security, the first working group came to the conclusion that such threats exist, we are aware of them, but they should be finally identified as part of the Defence Review or in any other format acceptable for Ukraine.

And one more important conclusion: information about military threats should be made known to the public. We should find effective forms to make society aware of military threats, arguments of the need of bringing up the political will for change implementation, passage of decisions, at this stage – at least conceptual but realistic. ■

THREAT OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS LOSS BY ARMED FORCES BECAME A REALITY



Yevhen SHELEST,
*Head of the board,
Military and Security
Policy Centre*


Among the main outcomes of the Conference in Garmisch, it was proposed to add to the list of new potential threats the threat of combat effectiveness loss by Armed Forces, now in sight. Such proposal deserves discussion, at least.

Viewing the current situation, one should note the lack of basic data for planning in the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. The State Programme of the Armed Forces development for 2006-2011 lost all sense, including due to the complete disruption of budget funding and unjustified assessments of rapid accession to NATO. Those assessments were critical for determination of the Armed Forces strength, all reform measures and their phased character. But today, those data proved erroneous, while new data are unavailable. For instance, how can one plan tasks of training the required number of officers for military educational institutions in absence of basic data? What shall we do with military personnel training plans worked out five years ago, using old basic data that envisaged a strong reduction in the number of military units? **So, there arose a deficit of basic data on whose basis the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff is performing strategic and defence planning.**

Publicising of those problems is getting increasingly important. We realise that if the public is unaware of the real defence capability and existing threats, Parliament and the Government, already entirely neglecting the needs of security and the Armed Forces, will persist. So, following the latest public hearings held by the Military and Security Policy Centre, we proposed establishment of an expert group made up from representatives of public organisations, to jointly perform the task of public information on national security and defence issues.

For the public opinion to influence the authorities, a common platform for expert discussion of security problems is needed. It is unimportant which public organisation takes the lead – it is not a matter of leadership. We should start with expert meetings, like those arranged by Razumkov Centre. **We should work out a programme of action (not necessarily long-term), identify the subjects, target audience, generate an expert opinion on the most topical for society issues – and start working.** ■

PRIORITY TASKS INCLUDE RENOVATION OF THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF COORDINATION OF UKRAINE'S COOPERATION WITH NATO



Petro KANANA,
*Deputy Head of Euro-Atlantic
Integration Department, Principal
of Policy and Security Section,
European and Euro-Atlantic
Integration Coordination Bureau
of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine Secretariat*

During the Garmisch Conference, at the working group “interdepartmental coordination in Ukraine” chaired by the Director of the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau of the Cabinet of Ministers Secretariat Mr. Tryukhan, many panellists noted the importance of efforts and actions coordination of different agencies in Ukraine. In particular, it was stressed that reforms in the security sector lacked an integral approach and coordination. Irregular reformation of the security sector elements bars solution of tasks of its all-round restructuring, namely: more optimal redistribution of functions, required structural changes over the entire range with account of changes in kinds of threats and their nature. It was stressed that in absence of coordination in that field, positive effects are greatly reduced or totally absent.

The working group, involving representatives of Ukraine and NATO countries, made the following conclusions:

- there is a need of improvement of approaches and introduction of effective mechanisms of reforms (e.g., development and implementation of ANP, assessment of its implementation). This can be done only through creation of an effective system of interaction between all branches;
- the available mechanisms hinder effective participation of the Government in formulation, implementation and control in the field of national security, defence and foreign policy;
- the effectiveness of NSDC, despite the available powers in the security and defence sector, needs enhancement;
- the attitude of central executive bodies to implementation of annual NATO-Ukraine Target Plans remains formal – effective control of their implementation is absent;
- ineffective coordination of current activity of executive bodies in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration retards achievement of strategic goals of Ukraine's foreign policy;
- improvement of the Ukrainian executive and other state bodies activity coordination in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration should take place in line with the realities of the present stage of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO;

- there must be one centre of decision-making in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration.

On the basis of analysis and assessments of the state of coordination in the field of national security, the working group worked out a number of practical recommendations aimed at improvement of the national system of coordination of the Euro-Atlantic integration along the following lines.

1. Improvement of horizontal and vertical interaction of state bodies by means of: strengthening the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat structure, to support operation of the appropriate executive bodies and promote information exchange among them; facilitation of efficient coordination among the key actors (Cabinet of Ministers, NSDC, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Justice); use of informal mechanisms, employment of non-governmental organisations.

2. Formation of a common view and understanding of the problems of Euro-Atlantic integration through: creation inside the system of inter-agency coordination of a platform for exchange of ideas and opinions of the goals (as the case is with the ANP preparation); issuing a directory of inter-agency coordination on the Euro-Atlantic integration.

3. Enhancement of inter-agency interaction through better skills of state servants – employing the Main Department of State Service and using the NATO Programme of Professional Development of civilian personnel in the security and defence sector.

4. Reliance on support from Ukrainian and international non-governmental organisations of member states of the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Network for improvement of inter-agency coordination, outside monitoring of achieved results (in particular, implementation of ANP and the National Security Strategy).

Given the subjects of today's discussion and the noted recommendations, I wish to briefly dwell upon some measures taken by the Government for amelioration of the NATO-Ukraine coordination system.

In July 2008 the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau was established within the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat. That body is charged with horizontal coordination of the majority of internal tasks in the field of the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The main task of the Bureau lies in provision and improvement of horizontal coordination in the activity of executive bodies, since the majority of issues associated with implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan measures for 2009, ANP drafting, etc. falls within the competence of executive bodies.

A draft of the President of Ukraine Decree "Issues of the National System of Coordination of Ukraine's Cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" provides for creation of a new effective mechanism of interdepartmental coordination of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, with one centre of decision-making.⁴ Such centre is to be presented by the relevant State Commission, to be set up as an advisory body under the Cabinet of

Ministers and led by a Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine. Its functional powers are to cover issues of Euro-Atlantic integration. The Commission will regularly report about its activity to the President of Ukraine.

To sum up, it should be noted that the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine can be a success only on the condition of joint concerted actions of the state authorities and non-governmental expert community. Our today's meeting is an element of that process. ■

SECURITY POLICY SHOULD BE PLANNED AND ASSESSED REALISTICALLY



Oleksandr BELOV,
Advisor to the Head
of the Security Service Ukraine

The NATO-Ukraine Working Group on democratic civilian control of the intelligence sector has been active since October, 2006 – since its foundation at a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission on the level of defence ministers in Sintra, Portugal. It incorporated experts from Ukraine (from the Presidential Secretariat, NSDC Staff, Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, other intelligence bodies), representatives of all member states and the NATO International Secretariat, which is supporting organisational issues. All in all, seven meetings were held. The latest one was held in 2008 in Kyiv.

The main task of the working group at the Conference in Garmisch was to hold consultations and get advice on approximation of the Ukrainian intelligence system – the home security service and intelligence bodies in the Western sense – to the political, legal, moral and professional standards applicable in EU states and countries of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The group worked only with unclassified materials, bypassing operational issues. The discussion covered general principles of organisation in Ukraine of special services, the system of democratic civilian control over the intelligence activity, funding, assessment of the reformation lines of special services in Ukraine by our partners. By and large, **the group got the required advice on the issues under review, and its work was deemed useful.**

Two years of preparatory work brought creation of effective cooperation mechanisms between Ukraine and NATO in the field of the national intelligence sector reform.

From the end of 2008 we work in the format of *staff talks*, i.e., consultations on a request of the Ukrainian side on issues whose list for the current year is already in place.

⁴ As of December 7, 2009, the Decree is not signed.



Ukraine implemented some recommendations and assessments jointly prepared by experts of the Working Group. Say, using the mechanism of discussions and expert consultations, the Concept of the Security Service reform was adopted. The relevant law is now under discussion.

Preparation of reports about the most secret things in the state became a usual practice – [in the form of] the White Book of the intelligence sector activity. The year of 2008 saw publication of the White Book “Security Service of Ukraine”. In 2009, a separate subject White Book on the Security Service of Ukraine was compiled, with information on reformation of the Security Service, its international cooperation, public relations, as well as declassification of the former KGB archives.

Many experts of the Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service and military intelligence underwent language and professional training in different countries within the framework of the Programme of Professional Development.

Finally, the level of confidence on the part of NATO partners we managed to win let us extend cooperation to other, not less sensitive domains of the national security. In 2008, an international seminar on topical problems of fighting cyberthreats was held. Establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Working Group for fighting cyberthreats is being considered.

Under the auspices of the President of Ukraine, the Security Service jointly with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and National Institute of International Security Problems under NSDC arranged in April 2008 the first international scientific conference “Democratic Values and Human Rights Observance by Intelligence Agencies”; the second such conference was held in April 2009.

I note that the working group enjoyed steady support from the NSDC staff and the Presidential Secretariat, the Security Service of Ukraine leadership, Ukrainian intelligence bodies.

Finally, a few words about other problems. I suggest that we should **very realistically plan and assess the security policy, whereby events should be properly backed with resources. Many of today’s problems arose exactly because of inadequate backing of planned events with resources. That is why we are left with what we have got.**

I do not envy the experts now working on the Defence Review. Forecasts of defence expenditures make the core of the Defence Review, indispensable for realistic planning.

Now, the whole expert community should think how, in the conditions of tough resource limitations, to attain the goals set in the expert report delivered in Garmisch. I would like to invite you to attend the permanent seminar on budget planning in the security and intelligence sector that we are starting together with DCAF. This year, four events dedicated to budget planning and management in the intelligence sector are planned. ■

UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE UNDER THREAT



Valeriy CHALYI
Deputy Director General,
Razumkov Centre⁵

The public will not solve issues of state bodies interaction. For that, appropriate coordination mechanisms are created on the state level. Such mechanisms include the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau. The future of that structure is not clear yet but today, there are at least the people, a new team seeking to give a new impetus to interdepartmental coordination.

Some issues we now discuss cannot be solved without political will of top officials and clear understanding of resources usage priorities. After all, today, the problem lies not even in the scantiness of resources but in the perception of priorities. For instance, the state found UAH 12.5 million for collection of biometric data. Is that task really so important that we cannot do without it?

Who must decide the priorities of funds usage? The Government. With what mechanism? With the budget. However, the budget is not amended because of fears that the funds will be spent on the election campaign.

Solution of all more or less critical issues is transferred to a higher political level – “President – Prime Minister – opposition leaders”, with business structures, corporate and personal interests added there. Due to some not quite clear connections existing on the top level (that, furthermore, are rapidly and unpredictably changing), the process of prioritisation, political decision-making, distribution of resources can hardly be forecasted.

The absence of basic data for planning at the Defence Ministry and the General Staff indicates a more common problem: politicians and state leaders do not know what will happen in two months. In such situation, one can barely hope for clear answers to other questions. So, a solution must be found how to work in such system of coordinates, in the conditions of uncertainty, how to work and to minimise threats and challenges for the national security.

In 2010, presidential elections will be held. As a rule, it is a very uneasy time for Ukraine. One need not be an experienced expert to predict that they will bring another trial for our democratic system.

In particular, a threat of reversal of the foreign policy course arises. Discussions of the new format

⁵ Presently, Valeriy Chalyi is a Deputy Minister of Foreign affairs of Ukraine.

of the parliamentary coalition (BYuT and the Party of Regions) involved appearance of provisions in the Ukrainian Constitution that may lead to amendment of the Law "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine", which defines the goal of NATO membership.

So, along with messages of the security sector funding needs, there should also be messages of the irreversibility of the course taken, as the one serving the national interests and resting on the effective Strategy of National Security. That course should not be a small coin in domestic political play.

Another new point: a psychological factor – growth of apathy, frustration in society. Such spirits are more dangerous than social protests and actions, since they witness public mistrust in the authorities and under certain conditions can grow into uncontrolled processes, attempts of society's problems solution without involvement of the state.

Today, we should try, using representatives of different structures – people preparing expert assessments for the President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister, other ministers and heads of power structures – to push our proposal of formulating a common coordinated stand of the leaders. Its importance is especially growing now, on the eve of transfer of power. Policy in Ukraine is overly personified. So, I propose finding mechanisms of soonest beginning of work with those proposals and their implementation.

The situation is changing even more dynamically than we discuss problems. At our meeting before last, we spoke about Georgia, then, of the situation in Transdnistria, then – of dangers emerging in Ukraine. Often, we seem to be harbingers of future events.

Two things should be done. *First*, try to form a hierarchy of threats in analytical materials and work out methods of their assessment. This is required to visualise the dynamic of the situation.

Second, after each discussion we should come to more concrete technological proposals, starting with passage of concrete documents and decisions that should be put forward now or in the near future. ■

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



ACTIVE USE OF NATO-UKRAINE CONSULTATIONS MECHANISMS GETS EVER MORE TOPICAL



Mykhaylo HONCHAR,
Energy Programmes Director,
NOMOS Centre

At a meeting of the working group on non-military threats at the Garmisch Conference we could not discuss the whole range of threats. We concentrated instead on the key problems – energy, information security, illegal migration.

The discussion of information security problems focused on domination of foreign influences in the Ukrainian media space. This is no discovery, and the results of Razumkov Centre's sociological surveys released today show the effects of the Russian domination. Stereotypes inherited from the Cold War not only survived in public consciousness but are on the rise, now actively promoted by Russian sources.

In the context of the events of January 2009, energy security problems aroused particular interest of our partners. Perception of that threat by the Alliance is not the same. They suggest that energy security mainly lies within the EU competence. Despite particular mention of that problem in declarations of the Riga and Bucharest NATO summits, it has not yet got the proper echo and reaction on the level of the Alliance's bureaucracy.

There is some progress but the whole set of energy threats is largely identified as an issue of commercial relations of two corporate entities of Ukraine and Russia. The reasons included, among other things, Russia's promotion of its stand during the gas conflict.

At the group meeting it was noted that during the gas conflict, **information about the Ukrainian stand was lacking.** Different interpretations were based on information from Russian sources. The subsequent sceptical perception of the Russian position in Europe was a result of "domestic" analysis of the events made in the partner states. After that, there appeared more questions to Russia than answers. However, the Ukrainian assessment of the events was missing.

It should be noted that the Garmisch event took place in parallel with implementation of one of the proposals of our common document, namely – attraction of foreign investments for modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transportation system. You know that a relevant declaration was signed in Brussels that caused a negative

reaction in Russia, but, as a Latin proverb says, danger can not be overcome without taking risks. Evidently, we will face some stages of escalation of tension in the energy sector, and this makes active use of mechanisms of bilateral NATO-Ukraine consultations even more topical.

Meanwhile, if we try to draw up a rating of non-military threats, it will probably be topped by information threats. They are manifest not only in the media sector. Reviewing energy security, we see that an “energy war” is always accompanied with an intense large-scale information and propaganda campaign. Similarly, any other issues of NATO-Ukraine or Ukraine-Russian relations are influenced by some information campaigns, consciously inspired and thoroughly planned to hit its target – the public consciousness of Ukrainian citizens. ■

THOSE PROBLEMS CANNOT BE REMOVED BUT CAN BE LIMITED



Oleksandr LYTVYENKO,
Deputy Department Head,
Security Service of Ukraine

All non-military threats should first of all be divided into two levels. The first level that can hardly be influenced by experts is associated with the political aspect, i.e., confrontation in the top bodies of state governance, destabilisation of the political situation in the country, etc. The second one is more of a technical nature, and exactly there we can propose actual measures.

Nevertheless, the expert community has some tools of influence even on the first level. This may seem strange but I mean the need of initiation and promotion of a discussion on security in Ukrainian society. We should insistently impose on and explain to society and political elites the clear for experts but not for the majority of citizens (as witnessed by the Razumkov Centre studies) idea of national interests, strategy and policy of national security.

At that, such discourse and our activity in general should be divided into two elements – strategic and tactical. The strategic component should cover the period at least through 2015, when one may hope for some changes in the thinking of the forthcoming political elites – if a large-scale campaign for change is started now. The tactical component should focus on response to specific challenges and threats of the day.

Now, on threats proper.

One cannot but agree with the opinions of the priority of threats to information security, although I would prefer to revise its perception. In reality, it deals

not as much with fighting subversive influences from outside and inside as with reformatting the information and, first of all, the national intellectual space.

Our society and, even worse, establishment has very strange, sometimes primitive, truly “unique”, as for our country, notions. Great many of our leading political figures and officials still mentally and consciously live in Russia and see priorities of the Russian Federation as their own.

Too many people live in the 19th century, unaware, for instance, of globalisation processes, considering formulation of the national security strategy relying on the domestic potential (I do not mean the defence sector, this is a separate issue). There is no understanding of the value of participation in international organisations. For instance, one may sometimes hear a Stalin’s style answer to the question of the weight of Estonia in our regions – “How many infantry divisions does it have?”. Such people are just unaware that Estonia as a member of NATO and the EU influences global decisions.

That is why that knowledge, in principle simple but incomprehensible for the bulk of our political establishment, should be promoted. Then, the required public opinion will also be formed at a much faster pace.

Another threat that should be mentioned and can be practically fought now is posed by corruption, eroding state institutions. One can argue what – excessive politicisation or corruption – paralyses the state machinery worse, but that threat is very serious.

There are simple, very clear recipes of fighting corruption. For instance, recently, the Blue Ribbon Analytical and Advisory Centre has presented a report on economic and institutional reforms in Ukraine.⁶ It rather clearly and comprehensibly set out anticorruption proposals, such as the creation of an anticorruption bureau, deprived of repressive law-enforcement functions, declaration of expenditures by officials, along with incomes, and so on. Those measures are of a technical nature, they will not lead to fundamental changes but can seriously curtail the basis of corruption.

The same may be said about **other non-military threats**: drug trafficking, drug addiction, illegal migration, intelligence and subversive activity of foreign special services. Comprehensible recipes do exist in all those domains. Those problems cannot be removed but can in principle be limited, even in the present, very difficult conditions. ■

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



⁶ Policy recommendations on economic and institutional reforms 2009. – Kyiv, April 2009, brc.undp.org.ua/publications/books

**APPEAL TO SOCIETY
IS STILL POSSIBLE**

Yuriy RUBAN,
*Director, National Institute
for Strategic Studies*

We should speak not just about Russia's information influences. Indeed, Russia is waging a well thought-over information war against Ukraine. This has long been clear to everyone. Any event, from arms contracts to the international arbitration court ruling delimiting the sea shelf, gives a pretext for its unleashing.

Another problem mentioned in the Document is the "readiness to take tough measures". But if we speak about the formation of an adequate discourse, let us have it formed. Even this brilliant document names one of the sections in Ukrainian "*Vidnovlennia druzhnikh stosunkiv z Rosiyyeu*" – Restoration of friendly relations with Russia, while in English – "Renewing relations with Russia". That is, we are trying to seat on two chairs even verbally.

So, as soon as we speak about the formation of discursive practices, it is clear that in a situation where the political class is inclined to revision of previous gains, there must be some intellectual opposition. This is a process of discourse-making.

If in the conditions of an information war, an absence of a serious appeal of the Ukrainian authorities to society, 3.4% of citizens have managed to trace the origins of the threat for Ukraine, this means that appeal to society is still possible.

The problem of the Ukrainian authorities lies in the absence of leadership and of what Americans call vision – a view of the prospects. The President of Ukraine alone stood in Tbilisi at a meeting when Russian tanks were a few kilometres from the capital. In my opinion, despite all his shortcomings, this is an evidence of his vision.

Other politicians impose pragmatism upon us, but that is the road of pragmatism without vision. So, in that situation, intellectuals are to play a critical role, especially in the national security sector. I do not claim to make the contribution like Volodymyr Horbulin makes with his publications, or the authors of this Document do. But we should do what we can, that is, shape the discourse and clearly understand what the discourse is – with its lexical practices, relevant rhetoric, with all ensuing consequences. I see the beginnings of such discourse in publications by Mr. Horbulin and in this Document. So, I suggest just continuing those efforts. ■

**PROCESS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION
IS HINDERED BY PROBLEMS
OF STATE GOVERNANCE**

Mykola SUNGUROVSKYI,
*Director, Razumkov Centre
Military Programmes*

The quality of state governance in Ukraine does not let society move forward at the desired pace, and the situation is unlikely to improve during the next at least five years. The managerial team cannot be reformatted so rapidly – it involves the change of generations. As Nils Bohr once joked, if a new paradigm is introduced in human life with mother's milk, an old one dies together with its bearers. Its signs include viability of old methods of governance. The authorities are still trying to solve problems arising, in particular, on the road of Euro-Atlantic integration, by old administrative methods – creating new bodies.

The newly-established Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination Bureau will face serious difficulties. On one hand, it is expected to produce a new quality of work and a faster pace of development of the NATO-Ukraine relations, on the other – the environment in which it will have to work cannot be termed favourable: old myths persist and new ones appear in society about the Alliance, and in the system of state governance, corrupt and bureaucratic mechanisms are very viable, that hamper any development and can extinguish any constructive initiative, including of the Bureau staff.

What is promising is that the Bureau staff are no novices – many of them have the experience of similar work at other executive bodies. But it will be very sad if due to the complexity of the case, administrative and procedural drawbacks will make the newly established coordinating body another bureaucratic link in the chain of the Euro-Atlantic integration process management. An alarming signal thereof is presented by the lack of logical thinking in the Bureau staff – what and how should be coordinated, as well as an integral idea of elements of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and needs of their coordination.

Coordination requires efforts of different actors (not only the state) at management and implementation of reforms in many sectors: economy, defence, border control, internal affairs and justice, etc. Identification of the goals of reforms in those sectors, their planning and implementation are performed under different state programmes and plans (including ANP) with their specific management, coordination and control systems. The bodies responsible for implementation of those programmes, plans and their elements will hardly be willing to share powers, even with a branch of the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat.



If a state programme is correctly designed, it sets out a certain algorithm of performance of set tasks – in a due sequence, with appropriate mechanisms of interaction and passage of output from one executive to another. Such algorithm also specifies the functions of coordination of the actors' activity: a manager (division of a ministry or agency) responsible for the programme administers and coordinates it. Even if implementation of a programme involves several ministries and agencies, one manager is appointed, charged with administrative and coordinating functions. Coordination of coordinators is all too much.

So, "outside" coordination may be necessary and possible only at the stage of passage of decisions, programmes, plans, state orders. If there is a need to employ state and non-state actors alike for the programme implementation, one should predict in advance and clearly specify mechanisms of their effective interaction – this is the sense of coordination. But under the existing approaches to state strategic planning, it is next to impossible to combine measures of different programmes and plans in one process (and coordinate their implementation).

Reforms in the Armed Forces are a showy example. A reformation programme was adopted in 2005, envisaging, among other things, cuts in the troops number. Everybody knows the problems related with contractual service, technical modernisation, combat training, which as early as at the beginning of 2008 made it clear that the programme failed. At the end of 2008, the Ministry of Defence started the Defence Review, to be completed in October 2009 and designed to assess the current situation, new threats, defence needs and capabilities, resource limitations. Following the review, the effective model of the Armed Forces and the ways of their further development are to be identified. But suddenly, before the appearance of even preliminary results of the Review, at the beginning of 2009, the Defence Minister initiated a strange decision to increase the Armed Forces' number, and *post factum* (as usual), that decision found "scientific" substantiation. So, if the process of reformation is not coordinated on the level of political decision-making, what coordination on the level of clerks can we talk about?

Moreover, that example reminds that there are those willing and even the mechanisms that can reverse the defence reform. In absence of a single concept of reformation of power structures, such attempts can seriously deregulate the system of national security, while fragmentation of that system (a general concept of the security sector reform is still absent) during the election campaign bears a threat of "privatisation" of power structures with unpredictable consequences. That is why processes of the security sector reform should be coordinated, beginning from the stage of political decision-making. That seems to be up to the NSDC level.

The Coordination Bureau could coordinate implementation of events initiated by it (including preparation and conduct of appropriate information campaigns). But for that, it should administer the relevant budget funds. **In absence of tools of financial influence, that body, most probably, will only slow down the promptness of management and add mistakes.**

What ways can there be out of the difficult situation, where society feels the need for efficient actions, but the authorities cannot formulate a constructive state policy? There are two ways: *on one hand*, influence on

the authorities through improvement of their human resources potential – through training and practical events on national security issues and strategic management in general involving young promising politicians and state servants; *on the other* – influence on the citizens who elect those authorities and feel the results of their actions (inaction) – through implementation of projects aimed, in particular, at teaching regional analytical centres and representatives of communities the principles of drawing up local development plans and comparison of those plans with election programmes of politicians. Forms of such influence may be many – involving representatives of the state and non-state sectors. By the way, this opinion is shared by the Coordination Bureau staff, as was witnessed at a meeting of its management with representatives of public organisations after the NATO-Ukraine Conference in Garmisch. ■

WHERE IS THE CRITICAL POINT?



Vadym HRECHANINOV,
President,
Atlantic Council of Ukraine

Speaking of changes in the military-political situation, one should take a new look at the threats and challenges for Ukraine, already mentioned today. One should analyse and consider such things as the role of Romania in the events in Moldova, or a new classification of enemies in Russia, where they are now classified as virtual, potential and actual. One should find the answer to the question: "What kind of an enemy Ukraine is treated like?" Now, Russia put forward a new interesting thesis, in my opinion, applicable to Ukraine in the first place – that there are states seeking to guarantee their security at the expense of other states. In fact, they are using this as a cover for solution of many issues. We should be realists in those things.

Is there any difference in the assessment of threats from Russia by the whole population, experts, intellectuals, students? I ask because I see it expedient to single out intellectuals in a separate group. Recently, I have spoken a lot at universities. Students put very specific questions: "Who is to blame for the failure of integration in NATO? When did it happen? Where was the critical point?"...


That is why, when polls are held, we should speak not about the whole population but about groups distinguished according to such classification. Probably, during polls, emphasis should be made on the more educated stratum of the people, to find them and work with them.

Results of public opinion polls show that over the past three years we did not manage to achieve positive results trying to enhance the trust of Ukraine's citizens in NATO. And the lack of funds for information events is not the only reason.

The thing is that the authorities do not understand the role of public organisations. When representatives of the authorities speak of their adherence to NATO, this causes many false rumours and contradictions, mainly involving Russia. If public organisations could do more in that field, if they could operate not only for foreign grants but also for state subsidies, the problem might be solved in an entirely different manner. Moreover that vast experience has been accumulated. For instance, “*Molodyi (young) Rukh*” and “*Molodyi BYuT*” (Young BYuT) begin to play a greater role now – they should not be left unnoticed, since their stand substantially differs from that of political leaders; we should cooperate with them.

It is a pity when some politicians suggest dropping the subject of NATO, using various party interests as an excuse. This is not just antipatriotic – this is unwise and short-sighted. ■

THEORETICAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO THE NEEDS OF SPECIFIC SOCIAL GROUPS



Oleh BODRUK,
*Head of Military Policy and
Security Department,
National Institute for
International Security Problems*

I wish to say about the information war Ukraine is waging against itself. Now, there are lots of “*talking heads*” – so-called experts who consider themselves specialists in all sectors, comment all events, give all kind of advice. At that, each of those experts enjoys absolute confidence in his rightness, ambition, disrespect for the opinions of others. Their number is growing in a geometric progression. Unfortunately, we ourselves turn out such “*experts*”. For instance, recently, the Internet carried an article by Mr. Paliy, pretending to be an expert in the Black Sea Fleet problems. He says that the Black Sea Fleet will go, and statements by representatives of the Russian establishment should be ignored.

Those experts represent some institutes or centres, although our community well knows who is who, who can or cannot do something. **However, the existing demand, some kind of a request create the stratum actually waging a war against Ukraine in our information space.**

How can that be opposed? We speak little about professional things, do not comment specific examples and events. This leaves space for that stratum.

Having studied the Document, I came to rather pessimistic conclusions.

First, I saw that the state is actually losing all state functions, first of all, the function of defence. If the population feels unprotected, if the majority of people are not confident in their future, the state set up to defend the people, not just to collect taxes and establish “*rules of the game*”, does not perform its main task and therefore

loses the sense of existence. This should be said aloud and brought to attention on all levels.

Problem of experts. A minister is appointed – no matter who he is and what experience he has. A minister is appointed on political grounds. Nobody knows what he will do on the ministerial post. He leads people devoted to him personally. They change people who for years dealt with specific problems and are recognised experts. This creates the problem of experts – officials who “*shape*” politicians.

Lack of funds. In 2008, when funds for NATO support were distributed, who took them? The main grant went to the Ministry of Education, as if for the promotion of NATO. What have they done, who reported of that work, what was the result? No answer. They sank in the bureaucratic structure. And nobody is responsible for nothing.

We speak about propaganda, but when talking to the people, we operate in abstractions. NATO for the people is an abstraction, very few know the difference between CSTO and NATO. We should speak about specific things, clear for everyone. We should clearly say to the people: “*Ladies and gentlemen, if you want to feel defended as a neutral country, for that, military expenditures of some 7-10% of the GDP are needed (compared to the present 1-1.5%), we must maintain an army of a far greater strength and set entirely different tasks for it*”.

By the way, strategic tasks for the Armed Forces of Ukraine were actually set as for an advanced armed forces: conduct of operations and high intensity war. But nobody says whether the Armed Forces will be able to perform them. Nobody specifically says about the state of the Armed Forces, that they have passed the red line, after which, something could be reanimated. If this is not discussed, everybody thinks that we have an army. We have the draft, we have the Defence Ministry, some tanks crawling, but nobody says what that all can do.

In the current political rivalry, every political force is solving tactical issues. But Ukraine as a whole is losing a strategic perspective of its place in the world, its strategic tasks. The authorities cannot set those tasks for power structures. They are in a permanent state of transformation, and in the end result, “*we are left with what we have*” [as president Kravchuk once put it]. They cannot fulfil the tasks vested in them by the state, the state is losing the main motive of its existence, and sooner or later, we will come to the point where we are considered a failed state, ruled from outside by the countries that make the policy. We must tell the people about such alternatives, too. The people should be aware of the possible alternatives. And we speak about general things and targets – NATO, CSTO!

Now, back to alternatives. The situation that arose in the neighbouring country is uneasy. Moscow and St.Petersburg live in isolation, all the rest lies beyond the borders of that “*state*” and is funded with what is left. Every regional governor is the plenipotentiary ruler who can do anything he wants. The main thing is that he must report and bow to the head of state, show his respect and subordination. By the way, problems also exist with the new stage of the military reform in Russia. The tasks set in 2000 are still set in 2008-2009. Ambitious goals were not achieved then and will not be achieved now.



That is, if we come back to our alternatives: “if you want to Russia – welcome”, but in that case, Ukraine will have to contribute its defence budget to the total budget of Russia or a union state, take part in armed conflicts in the Caucasus, send our soldiers there. Why is Russia now refusing from the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? Because it is adopting a strategy of use of tactical nuclear weapons in low-level conflicts against non-nuclear states – this is written in the Russian military doctrine, – contrary to all international agreements and conventions.

Therefore, there are specific things, while we speak of abstractions, incomprehensible for the people. **Our theoretical projects should be adapted to the needs of specific social groups, to be clear for everyone.** ■

ALL THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, REPEATS FROM YEAR TO YEAR



Andriy SOBOLEV,
Leading expert,
Institute for National
Security Problems

Problems in the sector of the national security policy arose not today, they were roughly the same yet 15 years ago. They were discussed all the time, serious studies were written about them, but nothing changed. The Armed Forces are still funded with what is left. The budget is planned, then, it appears that money is lacking, it is taken from the military to plug some hole in the state budget... unfortunately, the situation repeats from year to year.

The value of the matter is one of the main issues of the national security policy. The cost of building an armed forces possessing the required capabilities is very high, counted in hundreds billions of dollars. One can not procure all the required arms and equipment within 2-3 years. Yet in mid-1990s, serious calculations of the army needs were made. The average service life of equipment is 20 years, that is, 4.5% should be replaced every year. If procurements are not funded this year, the next year, as much as 9% will be needed. And what if nothing has been procured for 17 years? Calculations of 1994-1995 showed that around 2010, actually all weapons would be outdated.

Now, it is very important to work out a realistic draft of Ukraine's national security strategy through 2020. 10 years is the minimum term to implement at least some practical reforms, to “raise” the Armed Forces, not to cherish illusions that we have them – without combat training, maintenance, servicing and renovation of equipment. Those who served in 1970s-1980s know what maintenance of equipment means. Who is doing that in the Armed Forces now?

Now, there are even no specialists who could look for themselves and train more or less competent maintenance people.

Speaking on the alternatives, it makes sense to figure out several scenarios for our top political leadership. Say, one scenario – “Ukraine as a NATO member”, the other – “Ukraine as an CSTO member”, with realistic calculations of the value of each of them.

As regards our information defeat, one should be aware that every state defends its national interests and pursues its policy. Russia, indeed, is waging a serious information war on the territory of our state “for minds and hearts”. It is our problem that we let it behave the way some Russian circles want.

Are we a virtual, potential, or actual enemy for Russia? I think, virtual. Russia does not view us as a serious enemy. It does not want us to become a potential enemy. ■

THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS, WITH COORDINATION, EVEN IF THE EXECUTIVE HIERARCHY IS NOT ESTABLISHED



Oleksandr SEMIKOV,
Deputy Head of Staff,
National Centre for Euro-Atlantic
Integration of Ukraine

A few words about coordination. The annual national programme means the change of the format of the NATO-Ukraine relations. **If we speak in terms of challenges and opportunities for Ukraine, we missed that challenge but have not yet missed the opportunity. Why it happened is clear.**

This week, one year has passed after non-implementation of the NSDC decision on amelioration of the Ukraine-NATO cooperation system. Probably we should lend an ear to the opinion that in Ukraine, any business is hindered when raising the decision-making level. The same occurred with the system of coordination. In 2008, the task was set, proposals prepared and submitted to the concerned structures – and stalled there. We lost one year.

Now, we returned to the same proposals put forward last year, seemingly came to accord, but again, the decision cannot reach the level of a presidential decree for six weeks.

That is why the ANP format, designed as a higher level of Ukraine's dialogue with NATO, failed to meet its goal. The relevant decision was passed in Brussels yet in December 2008, but did not become “a direction for action”. Why? Because **nobody assumed responsibility for preparation and implementation of the ANP.**

January and December passed, then, the Foreign Ministry began to do something, but in the result, we've

got what we have got. The draft prepared and even passed to the NATO International Secretariat for discussion was assessed rather critically – despite the rather diplomatic language of the letter Ukraine got in response.

What should be done and is being done for coordination? We already mentioned the working meeting held by Vice Prime Minister Nemyria, that finally gave an impetus for thorough preparation of the ANP. What did not let hold such a meeting at least in February? It is hard to say.

If we speak of vertical or horizontal coordination, this time, horizontal coordination worked. What is in the focus of disputes here? – “who will be held responsible?”, “who will be in charge?” As soon as a higher level is reached, problems begin with decision-making. Invited to the meeting held by the Vice Premiere were representatives of different ministries and agencies, including those not subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers. That is, experts already involved or planned to be involved in that process. Everybody came, frankly discussed problem issues without any conflicts, and literally the following day, meetings of the first working groups were held, for amelioration of the prepared ANP draft.

At that meeting, mid-level executives themselves took decisions, set terms – first, second, intermediary and final, for preparation of an acceptable document for review on a higher level. That was a good example of horizontal coordination.

Indeed, it would be nice if those issues – who is responsible for what, who does what, who prepares a report for someone else, etc. – were solved on the top level last year. But if that was not done, for political reasons – and the reasons were purely political – this does not mean that experts working in that domain cannot use horizontal coordination. We (at least, the experts working in the field since 2002, when Ukraine moved to the Action Plan after the Prague summit) know each other by sight, and there are no problems with coordination here, even if the hierarchy is not established. Such is the practical situation in the managerial staff.

Where is the problem now? As the Document rightfully says, **ANP preparation became a test for the Ukrainian authorities, whose results for the time being may be termed as negative**, first of all – from the organisational viewpoint: we lost time. The main thing now – the **test should not be negative for us also from the viewpoint of substance**. That is, the substance of ANP draft, now being prepared, should make up for the organisational problems present in the country that sets ambitious goals, although their achievement is now hampered by politicians.

Support, advice and proposals of the non-governmental sector will be very useful for that work. Why is that important? ANP for 2009 will be transitional. Now, the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan containing a long list of objectives – nearly 400 – is being implemented. ANP will at some stage (after approval) absorb it. **The task is to exclude from ANP measures that cannot be implemented**. This was said in comments and proposals, including from the NATO International Secretariat. That is, **that Programme should be realistic**.

To prove that, I will cite the following figures. The National Centre for Euro-Atlantic integration summed up

implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan in the 1st quarter of 2009. One of the conclusions was that there was no information about the progress of implementation of every fourth measure of the Target Plan. This has never been the case before – not at all! This should be taken into account at the ANP preparation. There is a budget, there are “holes” in the budget, and one already sees what is realistic, and what is not.

On information. To make statements of propaganda and agitation, one should once or twice visit regions and talk to the people. I suggest that the past year of 2008 was a turning point in information issues. The work indeed went an entirely different way. That was neither propaganda nor agitation for NATO, at least in the events held by the Ukraine-NATO Civic League and the National Centre. In 2008, our employees took part in more than 160 events, 80% of them – on the regional level. Those events were not round tables in Kyiv but talking to people face-to-face. They are attended not only by those who needn't be convinced of NATO anyway but by different people representing different political parties, including communists and Vitrenko's adherents with their slogans. When not 20 experts but students, lecturers, state servants of lower ranks with different political views gather in a room, they really have a quiet discussion about national interests, different options of guarantee of the national security. Nobody is agitating for NATO.

Such events, of course, are not intended to immediately convince someone or the majority that the Euro-Atlantic is the only right endeavour for Ukraine. But people at least begin to think about those things, and this is the most important. ■

CITIZENS OF UKRAINE ARE UNITED BY THE PERCEPTION OF HUMAN SECURITY



Serhiy DZHERDZH
Head of the Ukraine-NATO
Civic League

It is very important that society is discussing security issues. If there are fears that the issue of NATO may alert some social groups or is controversially viewed in the regions, security issues are taken by everyone in the same way, because everybody needs security. **That is what we speak with people about. Not only about the national security in general – economic, political, environmental, information, but also about personal security – security of an individual citizen who needs secure dwelling, workplace, environment – things needed and comprehensible for everyone. Such perception of security unites citizens of Ukraine**, and through that understanding, we show what Ukrainian citizens need – the same feeling of true security as citizens of NATO member states.



Speaking on information about NATO, we are doing a lot. The Ukraine-NATO Civic League in 2008 arranged 223 events, mainly in the regions – conferences, seminars, interviews, articles, etc. Regions badly need information platforms: people want to hear something, learn something. What actually differs our activity from, say, the analytical work of Razumkov Centre – also very important? We deal with regional information. At that, we are aware that we will not be able to make all citizens of Ukraine experts on NATO who will consciously vote at the future referendum.

On the 18th of May, 2009, Kharkiv will host a conference, invited to which were members of the Interdepartmental Working Group (IWG) on Information Policy, led by A. Murakhovskyi (First Deputy Head of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting). The previous 25 IWG meetings were held in Kyiv, it for the first time moves to Kharkiv – a big city with a huge potential. It is important for us that state servants, mass media, all those concerned in the regions see that issues of NATO are not scholastic talk in the newspapers, on TV, but practical work made by state servants, daily work that brings result, brings gains. ■

WHAT AND WHOM TO COORDINATE?



Ihor DOLHOV,
*Deputy Head, Department of
Defence Mobilisation Activities,
Head, Sector of Defence
Activities of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine's Secretariat*

Proceeding from my experience of a state servant, I wish to stress that a certain sector and cooperation in that sector cannot be coordinated. Why? There is a minister in the country responsible for those things, and you will not impose your opinion upon him. Nobody, even the Cabinet of Ministers' leadership, may impose his opinion – look into our legislation. Then, a big issue arises: what to coordinate?

Another question: if a minister, as an official, his deputies, his staff enjoy no support – scientific, practical support from experts who understand in what domains that ministry can cooperate with NATO countries, there will be no cooperation.

Show me at least one minister who knows all. There is none, and never will be. A minister is made by his staff, and if the staff has no required division and experts, one should think: why? Who should do that in a state? Maybe, public organisations? Thanks a lot


for the attempts to replace the state machinery, but the state machinery cannot be replaced entirely.

We rightfully speak about the security policy, explaining how it will be implemented. **But if our citizens see no personal interest, if our citizens do not understand what cooperation with NATO and EU gives them, what material benefits it brings – they will reject it.** This task may be implemented only when a specific ministry works jointly with the relevant NATO committee, cooperating within the framework of concrete programmes.

The Ministry of Education and Science is one example. Recall their involvement in the URAN network.⁷ Nobody actually coordinated their cooperation with NATO. When their experts took it upon them, the result was produced. But coordination of the work of an individual expert is senseless. One can help him, organisationally coordinate issues of cooperation, but not interfere into his work. He will immediately set you down, because he is the expert and knows the nuances unknown to a broader specialist.

So, we should think well, what and how to coordinate? Even in the issue of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In due time, I dealt with those issues. Everything looked as follows. The Government had commissioners on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. I would not say that those persons helped but they at least signed documents. There were deputies who kept those documents for several months, and when they went on leave, I commandeered them, to pass further. So it was. That is why one should very sceptically view the past experience and realise what we want to do and, the main thing, by what means. I do not believe that this can be done through pure enthusiasm. ■

ON ILLUSION AND REALITY



Volodymyr VAHAPOV
*Chief Editor,
Nauka i Oborona magazine*

There are things that cannot be assigned to anyone, that one should personally take care of. Guarantee of personal security and security of one's family may be the most important of them. And although this requires much funds, we put armoured entry doors, buy a gun, get ourselves a dog or, together with neighbours, hire a security guard, install TV surveillance cameras, hoping that this will protect us, our property, life and calm.

⁷ Ukrainian Research and Academic Network (URAN) was created under decision of Ministry of Education of Ukraine and National Academy of Science of Ukraine with support of universities, institutes of Ministry of Education of Ukraine and National Academy of Science of Ukraine in accordance with Joint resolution of Presidium of NAS of Ukraine and Board of Ministry of Education of Ukraine of June 20, 1997. The main concept of the Network was approved by International Meeting "Ukrainian network for institutions of higher education and science" with participation of representatives of the Scientific department of NATO (April 24-26, 1997 Kyiv) and by an international conference the "Networks in higher education" (May 26-28, 1997, Kyiv).

History teaches that there may always be someone seeking our land. Despite declarations of peacefulness and will to cooperation, from time to time, border claims are heard, or attempts of interference into our home affairs are made. Is there a guarantee that we will not appear guilty though guiltless? So we should think about defence, military security of the state.

Now, a few points about the problem of choice the Ukrainian society now faces in the defence sector.

Defence and taxes. The majority of Ukrainian citizens now cares about not political and military issues but, first of all, economic – a general decrease in the standard of life, economy, employment. However, military security as the guarantee of normal peaceful life of citizens has always been among the main duties of the state. For the sake of security, people pay taxes, with which the state creates and maintains an army.

The bulk of arms and military equipment of the Armed Forces Ukraine is the legacy of the former Soviet Union, their service life is almost over. Our funds invested in the Soviet Army devaluated, as did our deposits in the Soviet Savings Bank, while the money and resources spent on the military over the years of independence brought no dividends for Ukraine's military security.

However, today, Ukraine cannot afford to invest much in the military. At the beginning of 2009 the Defence Minister said that full implementation of reformation programmes required UAH 32.4 billion a year, another 17.5 billion – on discharge of the functions of the country defence. Meanwhile, this year's state budget allocates to defence only 8.4 billion – 0.87% of the GDP.

What to do, when you are short of money? Defence, when deprived of the veil of patriotic secrecy, is nothing more than a business project. Before spending money on defence, the state is to decide the level of threat of an armed attack. The General Staff should on the basis of all-round analysis calculate how many soldiers, how much and what type of arms, military equipment, ammunitions, fuel, etc. are needed for reliable protection of the country against a potential aggressor.

And when money is not enough for defence orders, we should think whether we correctly organise the military security of the state. Maybe we should join efforts with other countries, building common defence? Clear thing, it will be cheaper, although in that case, the issue of confidence in the alliance members and their reliability in a hard time arises. Furthermore, enemies of our new friends will become our enemies, too.

Absence of an international "demand" for a neutral, non-aligned Ukraine, economic inability to ensure reliable defence on its own prompt consideration of possible accession to a collective security system. Detailed calculations of "pros" and "contras" of all alternatives of military security will be accepted better than political slogans. Even if a person does not care about politics and considerations of choice between the Eastern perception of the Slavic unity and democratic values of the West, he is not indifferent to the money spent by his state.

Expert discussion, April 23, 2009



When the people realise that the state cannot financially ensure military security on its own, that funds are not enough for butter and for guns at a time, they will understand that there is no alternative to collective security.

On the problem of choice. Ukraine has two options of a collective security system: Euro-Atlantic – NATO, and Eurasian – CSTO.

In fact, the problem of choice is simple: to join, or not to join NATO? However, the essence of that choice is very difficult, since NATO is a defence alliance of the countries – potential enemies of the Soviet Union, the predecessor of the modern Ukrainian state. In fact, it is about the civilisational choice.

The following question: "is the problem of accession to NATO really so pressing now?" The probability of an armed attack from the North, with which some politicians frighten us, is so low that it may be considered theoretical. That is, there is no danger for human lives from that side.

Meanwhile, due to internal reasons, Ukraine's population steadily goes down, and according to demographic forecasts, in 2050, we will number some 30 million, because of alcoholic intoxication, tuberculosis, AIDS, road chaos, occupational traumatism, labour emigration, substantial reduction of the age of chronic diseases and so on. In fact, it is a war that took lives of 6 million citizens of Ukraine in course of 17 years.

I think that in a few years the public opinion on joining the Alliance will change for the better for two reasons: first – natural reduction in the number of those who now ardently oppose NATO (mainly elderly people); second – further implementation of the state information policy concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. So, there is no need to boost the process of accession to the Alliance.

On illusions and reality. Accession to the Alliance will not raise the national economy, not teach working and respecting the law, not bring political stability and not eliminate corruption. Accession to the Alliance will only give additional tools for building a civilised democratic state. We shouldn't abase ourselves now and bother NATO and the EU, insisting on accession. We should solve our internal problems. ■

DEFICIT OF SECURITY: FACTORS, TRENDS, ROLE OF EXPERT COMMUNITY IN ITS REMEDY



Mykola SUNGUROVSKYI
Director, Razumkov Centre
Military Programmes

The present-day globalised world presents an integral system where security of separate countries and their unions cannot be fully guaranteed if hotbeds of insecurity exist in their vicinity (immediate or more remote). Meanwhile, the global processes that led to serious changes in the geopolitical landscape and created new conditions for the world development also caused the comprehensive nature of threats and their effects. The capacity of international security systems set up in the last century to prevent and counter threats is nearly exhausted, which causes a substantial deficit of security and, therefore, gives rise to the need of transformation and strengthening of those systems.

The situation requires new approaches to solution of security problems by joining efforts of both collective security system participants and other countries, including those cooperating with such systems and seeking to join them.

All this is of particular significance for Ukraine, undergoing a “double breaking point” – without completion of the transitional stage and ultimate establishment in the world system after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it has to look for a new place in the post-crisis world, now in the making. In such conditions, internal reforms should be “imbedded” not only in the present but also in the future trends of the world order.

Challenges for international security systems

As we know, the modern world witnesses aggravation of old and appearance of new global risks and threats: proliferation of mass destruction arms and materials; emergence of more sophisticated forms of cybercrime; accelerated exhaustion of natural resources and growth of dangerous trends in climate change, etc. There are also complex in-depth processes of reformatting the geopolitical map of the world, fraught with the risks of conflicts, emergence of new dividing lines, resumption of the arms race.

In particular, **the list of the key world actors and their relations are changing**, contradictions among traditional and new centres of power – separate states and their alliances – appear and gain strength. With economic growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), their claims of regional and global leadership, economic and political influence on the world processes go up. **The ideological context of international security gets more complicated:** instead of the definite “ally – enemy” system, inherent of the Cold War times, uncertainty and inconstancy are emerging. Meanwhile, **disparity between state and**



non-state actors deepens, asymmetry in their actions, countering and bringing threats alike, is on the rise.¹ Terrorism acquires international traits, massive forms, and is more actively used as a weapon against outside pressure and interference, including humanitarian.

Disintegration processes are intensified, leading to emergence of new potential conflicts areas. Meanwhile, international institutes have found no acceptable methods of reconciliation of the contradictions between the principle of territorial integrity – and the right of nations to self-determination, the right to sovereignty and non-interference – and the right to humanitarian interference. In such conditions, and given the growth of separatist movements, events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia may be not the last examples of undesired scenarios of shaping the new geopolitical map of the world.

The gap and contradictions are growing between developed countries and the rest of the world, especially in countries with a low life-standards. Risks of “weak states” bankruptcy go up, accompanied with the rise of opponents to legitimate governments

there and ever more frequent emergence of the threat of use of force.² **Regional security environments (first of all, in conflict areas) turn to the hostages of the world leaders policy**, whose interests not always meet the demands of regional security and needs of the local population. Signs are many that developed countries (and their unions), resorting to interference, pursue goals of not only imposing of peace and security but also of presence in the areas of their economic interests.

Crisis phenomena and their effects are spreading ever more rapidly under the influence of globalisation, liberalisation of economic relations, mutual penetration of economies and cultures. Global economic crises, violence and armed conflicts, epidemics of dangerous diseases, environmental accidents keep growing in scale, involve more countries, demand a higher price from the mankind.

Against the background of those and other processes, one sees the striking inconsistency of the structures and capabilities of contemporary collective security systems to the nature of present-day threats, their unreadiness to cope with the challenges posed by said processes, unless they are timely put under control.

The main drawbacks of the present security systems include, **first, conservation of the hierarchic structure of international and national security, its numerous and cumbersome bureaucratic machinery**, which reduces their flexibility and adaptability – while threats and their effects get a network nature and spread at an extreme speed. This reduces the promptness, effectiveness and adequacy of actions of said systems to prevent and counter threats.³

Second, insufficiency of the resource support for member states joint actions in international security systems. As we know, contribution to collective security is voluntary. We are also aware that some member states were either unwilling to provide troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations of the UN, NATO, African Union (AU) in hotspots, or were unable to do so in the required volumes.⁴ The reason may lie not only in actual scantiness of national resources but also in inadequate perception by some states of the interconnection of national, regional and global security, where national security is seen by governments as a vital need, and collective – only as an extra burden. So, if at the stage of a decision passage to begin the peacekeeping operations member states show political solidarity, during the

¹ The main features of such disparity include the loss of the state monopoly of the force usage, greater capabilities of non-state actors to influence the state and the world situation, enhancement of their role in global processes. See, e.g.: Bailes A. Global security governance: a world of change and challenge. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2006, p.1-12.

² Schnabel A. The human security approach to direct and structural violence. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2008, p.87-95.

³ Bailes A. A world of risks. – *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oxford University Press, 2007, p.1-20.

⁴ In particular, the lack of resources is mentioned as the usual reason for the low effectiveness of the UN and AU missions in Darfur, NATO in Afghanistan and so on. See: Soder K. Multilateral peace operations in 2007 – *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, p.129-130.



conduct of operations and provision of resources (human, material, financial) solidarity often yields to national egoism, fraught with erosion of collective security systems.

In the end result, **disparity is growing between the level and nature of threats, declared intentions of their prevention and available capabilities** – now specific of actually all international security systems (UN, EU, NATO, CSTO, AU). This brings to the forefront the need of their adaptation (transformation) to the new conditions. In particular, NATO faces serious problems whose solution requires a shift of accents from external aspects of its activity (expansion of the security space, improvement of forms and methods of peacekeeping activity) to internal ones: perfection of the structure, provision of the required capabilities, political solidarity and joint efforts. Such strengthening is to be secured by the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

Strengthening of Russian ambitions and growing aggressiveness of its policy

Starting from 2000, there is a growing trend towards greater aggressiveness in the policy of the Russian Federation, first of all, against neighbouring post-Soviet countries: the conflict of the Tuzla island, economic and energy wars with Belarus and Ukraine, finally – the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008. The effects of those actions (along with not always effective and coordinated political steps of the West before and after them) give Russia more confidence, feeling of impunity and grounds to view the post-Soviet space as its sphere of influence.

The seriousness of Russia's political intention is proven, in particular, by its firm stand regarding the observance of the Istanbul arrangements (on withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova), control of conventional weapon systems in Europe (Russia's suspension of obligations under the current CFE Treaty), hard "exchanges" with the USA on the issues of strategic offensive weapons, European AMD, the Iranian nuclear programme, permanent gas conflicts with Ukraine, proving that Russia will continue to use its standing of the gas monopolist as a tool of pressure on Ukraine and European countries as a whole.

One should also note the aggressive character of the Russian information policy, its focus on consolidation of Russian society and pro-Russian communities in

other countries, trying to present neighbours, including Ukraine, as nearly enemies.⁵

Against that background, we see weak attempts of the EU to find adequate responses to unfriendly actions of the Russian Federation, even worse – "commercialisation" of relations of separate EU members with it (especially in the gas sector).⁶ The generally weak position of the EU may well bring about a danger of "frozen conflicts areas" in the CIS space (Transdnistria, Karabakh) and potential conflict areas (including in Ukraine) becoming a small coin in the game of the world and regional leaders.

Presence on the territory of those countries of zones of "frozen" or potential conflicts, a large share of the Russian-speaking population (or people with dual citizenship), Russian military bases and peacekeeping forces, combined with Russia's readiness to use the army for "repulsion of aggression against other states" and protection of "compatriots" are fraught with solution of internal problems turning armed conflicts.⁷ And this poses a threat not only for Ukraine and other post-Soviet states but for the security of the entire Eurasian continent and the whole world.

Challenges for Ukraine

The developments in the world security environment did not bypass Ukraine, experiencing a transformational deficit of security caused by the impairment of its defence potential due to the large-scale cuts in the Armed Forces, within the framework of their modernisation in line with the NATO standards.⁸ The situation is further aggravated by a number of internal and external factors, whose aggregate effects may deepen the mentioned deficit of security and bar its removal in the near future.

Lack of political unity of the Ukrainian elite, prevalence of personal and narrow party interests over national within it. Corruption (including political) is widely spread, strategic state management is replaced with tactical steps of doubtful use, focused professional discussion/dialogue on the problems of security on the national and interstate levels – with propagandist declarations. All this results in a political crisis, institutional weakness of the state authorities, low effectiveness of the state policy, deterioration of the international image of Ukraine – combined together, undermining the pace of its reformation and development.

⁵ In relations with Ukraine, the Russian establishment used to treat its independence disrespectfully, sometimes – insultingly. Given the ineffectiveness of Ukraine's information policy, this presents another very weighty factor of deterioration of the international image of Ukraine.

⁶ Meaning the extension of *Gazprom's* control to companies (and even politicians) of some European states – so-called "Schröderisation". The term was introduced by Russian analyst A. Piontkovsky – after Germany's former Chancellor G. Schröder, now heading the *North European Gas Pipeline Company* – operator of the Russian *Nord Stream* project. According to the analyst: "Schröderisation proved a universal picklock to the hearts of Western 'intellectuals' and politicians". See: Piontkovsky A., *Pir Dukha Tikhona* (Feast of Tikhon's spirit). – *grani.ru*, 13 February 2008.

⁷ Russian military bases and/or peacekeeping forces are located in actually all post-Soviet countries, except Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Baltic states. On Russia's readiness see: Law of the Russian Federation "On Defence", as amended in 2009.

⁸ If the deficit of security on the global and regional levels arises primarily because of the lack of capabilities of collective security systems, the transformational deficit of security arises from conscious limitation by specific countries seeking integration in a collective security system of their defence capabilities and resultant weakening of the defence potential during the process of integration.



In such conditions, even in absence of serious threats, any situation is actually uncontrolled and can turn dangerous. In combination with destabilising external influences, this is fraught with the loss of sovereignty and “political default”.⁹

Critical state of the system of national security.

In the years of independence, the security sector accumulated many structural problems that cannot be solved by target measures usual for the Ukrainian authorities. Their most demonstrative traits include the following:

- **deregulation of the national security system**, caused, in particular, by the lack of coordination in reformation of its elements, which makes the system fragmented, ineffective, impairs its capability to prevent critical phenomena and react to them;
- **impairment of the effectiveness of power structures**, in particular, due to their politicisation and “privatisation”; political bias in the human resources policy turned some power structures and institutes of governance (courts, public prosecutor’s offices, law-enforcement bodies) into tools of fighting political (and economic) rivals, which enhances the risk of a violent conflict in society;
- **impairment of the defence capability of the country** due to, *first*, too long transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,¹⁰ with uncertain targets, priorities and end goals, in the result of protraction of NATO accession, *second*, due to the long-standing shortage of funds for the Armed Forces and ineffective use of the limited resources allocated to their maintenance.

Growing Russian pressure. Growth of aggressiveness in the Russian policy noted above

most directly deals with Ukraine. In particular, some Russian organisations and political figures promote in Ukraine’s regions a large-scale PR campaign aimed at instigation of separatist spirits, public discontent with actions of the Ukrainian authorities and, by contrast, propaganda of the Russian government effectiveness.¹¹ That campaign often addresses the subjects of a possible a Ukraine-Russian armed conflict¹²; limitations of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 application by NATO (in case of Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance); topicality of a neutral status for Ukraine, etc.

Preoccupation of politicians and public with those subjects diverts attention from another (quite real) threat for Ukraine – economic and political absorption of attractive for the Russian business economically developed (and largely pro-Russian minded) Eastern and Southern Ukrainian territories by Russia. Implementation of that scenario threatens not only Ukraine – with the loss of integrity, but entire Europe – with the emergence of new dividing lines and areas of conflicts on the continent.

Hindrance of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Given the above-mentioned deficit of security, Ukraine might naturally be interested in reduction of the term of joining NATO. However, this process is hindered by a number of obstacles.

(1) *Lack of political will, uncoordinated and ineffective actions of Ukraine itself.* The behaviour of the Ukrainian side shows inability of its political leaders and authorities in general for coordinated actions at promotion of the declared foreign political course, which causes largely justified references (in particular, by Germany and France) to Ukraine’s internal unreadiness for accession. Even official representatives of NATO and its member states find it increasingly difficult to conceal their “fatigue” from the instability and hesitation in Ukraine’s policy.

(2) *Counteraction of Russia, setting non-admission of Ukraine to NATO as one of the priority tasks of its foreign policy.* To attain that task, Russia does not stop at economic pressure and concealed threats of use of force, contrary to the Budapest Memorandum.

(3) *Lack of unity regarding Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic community,* fears of practical losses from deterioration of relations with Russia outbalancing potential gains of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

(4) *Aggravation of relations of several Alliance members with Ukraine.* In particular, unfriendly steps of Romania (the “spy scandal”, renewed statements of territorial claims, instigation of separatist spirits in the border regions of Ukraine) do not meet due criticism within the Alliance.

⁹ See also: Towards more adequate and coordinated national security policy in Ukraine: Strategic Assessment for NATO-Ukraine consultations on 12-13 November 2008, Tallinn. – Kyiv, Razumkov Centre, 2008.

¹⁰ The 2004 Strategic Defence Bulletin outlined the future model of the Armed Forces, with a view of Ukraine’s participation in the Euro-Atlantic collective defence system. The Programme of Reformation of the Armed Forces Ukraine for the period of 2005-2015 was worked out and adopted on that basis.

¹¹ For more detail see: Ukraine-Russia: from crisis to effective partnership. – *National Security & Defence*, 2009, No.4, p.12-14.

¹² See, e.g., the books: Kalashnikov M. Independent Ukraine: Project failure; Savitsky G. Battlefield Ukraine. Broken trident; Shirokorad A. Russia and Ukraine. When guns speak...



(5) *Change of the format of NATO-Ukraine cooperation from Target Plans to ANP* – instead of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – met mixed reaction of the Ukrainian politicians and experts. Some consider it to be a positive development – ANP with its mechanisms of verification is seen as the best replacement of MAP; others allege that the Alliance in that way demonstrated a decrease in the level of cooperation with Ukraine.

Now, when prospects of Ukraine's accession to NATO remain illusive, the Ukrainian public, especially political scientists and military experts, raise the issue of revision of approaches to provision of the defence capability of the state, namely: proclamation of the permanent neutrality status by Ukraine, accession to CSTO, an increase in the Armed Forces' strength, restoration of the nuclear potential.

In the conditions of weakness of the authorities, controversial foreign political orientation of society, promotion of those unrealistic proposals may (and is actually intended to) result in revision of the legislatively provided course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, curtailment of its European project and further drift to the zone of the Russian influence.

Drift (forcing out) of Ukraine to the buffer zone between the West and the East. In addition to the weak policy of Ukraine itself, it is conditioned, on one hand, by the so-called "reset" of US relations with Russia and the wait-and-see position of the EU and NATO (especially – the indulgent to the Russian Federation policy of Germany, France, Italy), on the other – by Russia's desire to make the CIS space the CSTO area of responsibility recognised by the West, with its gradual transformation into the "Eurasian NATO" enjoying the respective status.

Against the background of the weakening position of the Alliance, caused by the need of its transformation, strengthening of CSTO means for Ukraine a more definite stand on the alternative (Eurasian – by contrast to Euro-Atlantic) vector of outside security guarantees. In absence of a proper public relations campaign, this substantially complicates its orientation and conscious choice of foreign political priorities, prompts political speculations and threatens with deepening dividing lines in Ukrainian society.

A concealed danger of any of those vectors' choice (NATO – CSTO) may be posed by unjustified expectations. In particular, orientation to NATO standards in military technologies and expectation of arrival of investments and advanced technologies – without due

results of the ANP implementation, proper funding of the Armed Forces and development of the national defence industry – will result in gradual "freezing" of Euro-Atlantic (and European) aspirations. On the other hand, the desire to make use of CSTO preferences of getting cheaper arms is fraught with saturation of the Armed Forces with obsolete weapon systems, which will keep the structure and quality of the Armed Forces at their present level for a long time.

Need of new common approaches

The world economic crisis added to the need of finding the equilibrium: between market principles of the national and world economy – and the level, forms and methods of influence of government, international organisations and economic alliances on it; between economic expediency – and supremacy of social values and environmental protection needs; between national interests – and the imperative of global survival; between state sovereignty – and the need of joint actions.

As a result, more attention is paid to the problem of deep reformation of the systems of global and regional security and international law. This is witnessed by the attempts:

- to apply the old paradigm of violent confrontation "friend or foe" to the processes of preventing and countering new threats ("global war against terrorism" proclaimed by the USA);
- to expand the concept of security, with emphasis on preventive measures at solution of socio-economic problems (implementation of development assistance programmes, initiatives of joint threat reduction, the European neighbourhood policy by the EU, creation of province rebuilding groups within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan);
- to replace (supplement) ineffective international systems with more workable organisations capable of prompt response to threats (appearance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CSTO, US-led situational coalitions for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq);
- to renew and adapt to the new conditions old systems, in particular, the Bretton Woods institutes and the Euro-Atlantic security system (decisions of the Brussels summit of G-20 and the Strasbourg NATO summit¹³);
- to propose establishment of new collective security systems (Russian proposal of creation of a new European security system¹⁴).

¹³ Main novelties approved at the G20 summit: the increase of IMF resources with expansion of the scale of measures, "necessary for resumption of economic growth, stabilisation of banks, growth of consumer demand and limitation of reduction of jobs"; creation of the Financial Stability Fund empowered to control the market of capitals and banks. See: Results of G20 summit: continuation of anti-crisis measures and reformation of IMF. – *NEWSru.ua* news agency, 8 September 2009, <http://www.newsru.ua>

¹⁴ At a world policy conference in Evian (October 2008) the Russian President D. Medvedev put forward five principles of building the new European security system: (1) observance of the international law; (2) inadmissibility of the use of force or threat of use of force in international relations; (3) equal security guarantees; (4) refusal of states and international organisations from the exclusive right to maintenance of peace and stability in Europe; (5) introduction of basic parameters of arms control and reasonable sufficiency in defence-building. See: Arbatova N. Reconstruction of European security. – *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 23 March 2009, <http://www.ng.ru>

However, deepening disparity between the present threats and capabilities of security systems of all levels, increasingly grave consequences and protracted character of crises prompt the conclusion that attempts of revival of old international systems are futureless, and the longer their agony lasts, the deeper and more dangerous the effects of critical phenomena are.¹⁵

The would-be result of reformation of the existing security systems – a network of international organisations with a modernised hierarchic structure, a new hierarchy of specialised international organisations with a network structure, or another option of an international security system – is to be produced by serious studies, large-scale consultations and talks.

Meanwhile, now, in the conditions of the global deficit of security noted above, there arises an urgent need of search of mechanisms of joint actions, which, with respect to Ukraine, is to cover the following domains:

- **prevention of threats, minimisation of their effects.** A threat (even unlikely) of instigation of a conflict in Ukraine involving neighbouring countries requires initiation of multilateral economic, political, cultural projects, whereby “potential enemies” would get practical benefits from partnership. In particular, the energy security of the EU and NATO countries in the conditions of the Russian gas monopoly requires joint efforts in such domains as: formulation of a common European energy policy and a “common order” for energy resources; integration of the Ukrainian gas transportation system in the European one; introduction of transparent mechanisms of supply and transit of Russian gas on mutually advantageous conditions;
- **enhancement of effectiveness and acceleration of the defence reform.** Today, Ukraine faces a dilemma: to continue the process of approximation of the Armed Forces to NATO requirements and standards, or to quit it and concentrate on territorial defence by own forces. Meanwhile, both options require large-scale re-equipment of the Armed Forces and large expenditures, which, in the conditions of resource limitations and neglect of threats, looks questionable. All this requires fundamental revision of the defence reform parameters – its pace, content, phases, resources, personnel training, and enhancement of civilian control of the military sector;¹⁶
- **design, provision and acceptance of assistance, granted by the principle of political solidarity,**

until the accession to the collective security system. The probability of actualisation of the threat of an armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine and its spread to the neighbouring countries is low, but possible consequences require from NATO and the EU the mechanisms of conflict localisation and management at early stages that, unlike analogues of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, would remove aggravation of confrontation with Russia; there is a need of intensification and enhancement of effectiveness of NATO-Ukraine partnership and consultations mechanisms. Legal principles of acceptance of foreign assistance by Ukraine (including admission of foreign troops for joint exercises, border crossing, information exchanges, use of financial and technical assistance for disposal of ammunitions and missile fuel, etc.) require serious revision;

- **reduction of the integration period – as a condition reducing probability of a conflict before the actual accession to a collective security system.** Ukraine is facing a number of problems complicating sooner Euro-Atlantic integration: insufficient public support for that course; lack of political will and ability of the state authorities for joint actions; aggravation of relations with Russia; absence of a common stand in NATO. Exactly their solution should in the first place be addressed by ANP and NATO assistance.

Ukraine’s response to internal and external challenges can be adequate only on the condition of political actors and society consolidation, mobilisation of the scanty internal resources (financial, human, political) for practical changes. Success can be achieved with the refusal from the fallacious policy of isolated steps, not combined in a single technology of priority goals attainment, and transition to strategic management of the country development.

From this viewpoint, attempts of setting the priorities of Ukraine’s development through “European standards” look irrational. The variety of those standards in the EU countries misleads the executive branch, and in case of NATO standards – arouses suspicion (or rejection) in society. Why not specify the desired for Ukraine standards (development priorities) unambiguously – in numerical terms? In this case, with approach to those standards, the Western vector of integration would mean progressive accession to the relevant European socio-economic and security institutions, and the Eastern one would sound like “Back to Russia”.

¹⁵ Interview with L.Larouche: “International monetary and financial system is breaking apart and has no future in its present form”. – *Planeta*, October 2008, <http://www.larouchepub.com>; Kornilov H. Geopolitics: “double fracture with a shift”. – *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, 5 April 2009.

¹⁶ See the article by L.Polyakov “Civilian control: the Pentagon experience”, published in this magazine.

Tasks for expert community and public organisations

Positive shifts in Ukraine may be ensured on the condition of renovation of the political elite: not only new figures coming to power, but accumulation within the authorities of the critical mass of the new generation of politicians – pragmatic realists, ready for changes and capable of their implementation, with ambitious goals of building a strong Ukraine on the principles of civil society, who can work in the conditions of transparency, abidance by the principles of the rule of law, unconditional domination of national interests. However, the current ruling elite, now controlling the resources, not only deeply established in power (due to corruption and solidarity), but also obstructed all approaches to it, actually barred “team” arrival of the new elite.¹⁷

The situation requires from the expert community and public organisations concentration on the sectors that were neglected previously: training of experts for the state sector and young politicians, their acquisition of skills of strategic management and public policy; change of the public political demand – i.e., the attitude of citizens to their role and the role of public associations in the formation of representative bodies of power, state policy and control of the state machinery.

At the same time, the third sector should use the traditional tools of influence on the authorities, on its own initiate the policy of change and find workable mechanisms of implementation of those initiatives even in the conditions of active or passive obstruction on the part of disinterested political actors and the state bureaucracy.

One cannot say that nothing is being done in those domains, but such activity is fragmentary and therefore, not too effective. The reason lies in the specificity of activity of the third sector organisations that, in absence of the state order, *have* to survive and work with funds of domestic non-state sponsors and foreign donors. So, resource support for non-governmental think-tanks and other public organisations now representing Ukrainian civil society remains a key issue.



CONCLUSIONS

The feature of the present international situation is the deficit of security, both in the member states of collective security systems and other countries, including those seeking membership in such systems.

Presence of key world actors in Europe and its vulnerability to present-day challenges give rise to the need of implementation of a joint project, politically and economically attractive for all European countries, whose implementation would promote confidence and security in the region.

The probability of conflicts emergence on the territory of Ukraine fraught with consequences unacceptable for Ukraine and whole Europe requires joint efforts, search and introduction of effective security mechanisms.

The key internal preconditions for threat reduction and provision of the acceptable level of Ukraine's national security include consolidation of the political elite and society, stabilisation of the home political situation and effective implementation of the foreign political course of the state.

The main tasks of public organisations in this situation include enhancement of influence on formation of the new political elite, and a more exacting public attitude to the activity of the Ukrainian authorities. ■

¹⁷ Even changes in the Ukrainian political community after the Orange revolution resembled reshuffling of the old cadres, rather than renovation of the elites.

LIVING THROUGH BAD TIMES



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The ability to live with uncertainty, not to say bad times, is a defining Ukrainian national characteristic and strength. That ability rests on a combination of tolerance, cynicism, ingenuity and humour that few nations possess. The ability to transform bad times into good ones is not a Ukrainian national characteristic. That ability rests upon a combination of competence, self-confidence and national cohesion that has not been developed in Ukraine's brief history as an independent state. Lacking the instincts and disciplines required to transform its own fortunes, Ukraine has habitually relied upon others to do so. Often, more effort has been devoted to demanding attention than deserving it.

These habits could not be less suited to the times. The financial crisis, which began in the West, has profoundly damaged the collective self-confidence of Ukraine's partners, not least of all the United States. If governments know how to overcome the crisis, they have failed to convince the economy's producers, investors and consumers. Not only governments, but the most venerable institutions of liberal market capitalism now appear infirm and vulnerable. In Russia, the crisis is bringing out the country's endemic fissures and dysfunctions. Nevertheless, the country has achieved a malign and well-targeted influence that is difficult to counter and impossible to ignore. Washington's "reset" exercise is also impossible to ignore. Whether it results in strategic realignment, damage limitation or disappointment, it has shifted the focus from Russia's neighbourhood to Russia itself, however strenuously this is denied. The Western institutions that are most alert to these neighbourhood dynamics, the European Union and NATO, are divided about how to influence them. For all of these reasons, there is a serious risk that Ukraine will paint itself out of a picture that is already receding from view – or, worse still, spoil the visible parts of it by petulant and ill-considered steps. The greater risk is that all of us will lose control over events.

Resetting expectations and paradigms

The Russia-Georgia conflict has called into question several of the core assumptions of the post-Cold War international regime codified, *inter alia*, in the 1990 Paris Charter, the 1994 OSCE Budapest Review Conference and summit and the 1994 US-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Agreement. We must now adjust to the following realities:

- war is possible;
- the former Soviet borders are no longer sacrosanct;
- questions long regarded as settled (e.g. the status of Crimea and Sevastopol) can be reopened at any moment;
- "civilisational" and "humanitarian" factors (e.g. the status of the Russian diaspora) can constitute a *casus belli*;
- where there is no Article 5, there is no collective defence.

That the Kosovo conflict and subsequent recognition of the independence of that territory provided a precedent for two of these revisions – violation of territorial integrity and the humanitarian *casus belli* – is beyond doubt. But the basis for Russia's intervention in Georgia was Russian national interests and nothing else. Great powers do not expend resources, endanger relationships and shed lives in order to mimic other great powers. They do so in response to their own distinctive calculus of gains and threats. The basic calculation and motive, in President Medvedev's words, was to demonstrate conclusively that Russia would "no longer tolerate" the West's "unfair and humiliating policy" in its "regions of traditional interests"¹. More conclusively, the conflict testified to the change in Russia's mood: from *obida* [injury] pure and simple to a confidence that, at long last, Russia had the means to do something about it².

¹ President Medvedev's lunch in Moscow with the Valdai Club on 12 September 2008 at which the author was present.

² As then President Putin warned at Munich in February 2007: 'We have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential'. As the author said in January 2008, 'the risk...is not that Russia's Armed Forces repeat the follies of the 1990s but that Russia's neighbours and NATO find themselves surprised'. James Sherr, *Russia and the West: A Reassessment*, *The Shrivenham Papers* No 6, p. 27 (Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, January 2008). As we also said in the same publication (p. 5), 'whilst the post-Cold War status quo is not reversible, we should not assume that it cannot be undermined or revised'.



These changes not only have put in question the future of the post-Cold War order, they raise concerns about the longevity of the Helsinki principles adopted in 1975. These concerns are amplified by realities that were not on people's minds in 1975, realities that now come under the heading of "interdependence" and geo-economics: the use of economic tools for geopolitical gain. The emergence of geo-economics alongside the revival of the Russian state and Russian national pride constitute the defining features of the Putin era, and Russia's Western partners have done little as yet to persuade the country's current leadership that this combination will not continue to prove effective.

This is not to say that the members of NATO are unmindful of what has taken place. Although NATO has absorbed many shocks and reverses in its 60-year history, never has it been more confused about its purpose and its future. The combined impact of the Georgia events and the financial crisis can be seen at four levels:

1. *Collapse of NATO-Russia partnership.* Although there have been earlier breakdowns in relations, notably during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the 1990s paradigm survived. Whatever the rhetoric and conduct of Moscow, Western political establishments held to the belief that as Russia became more prosperous and confident, as trade and investment developed, as a middle class emerged and matured, the Darwinian, *Realpolitik* instinct would mellow, "enemy images" would dissipate, and Russia would become more "normal" and *communautaire*. These beliefs have been profoundly shaken. In the 1990s, most believed that a weak Russia would cause problems for itself and its neighbours. Today, few are prepared to argue that life would be better if Russia became stronger.

2. *Consensus has broken down not only between member states, but within them.* This is not an altogether negative development. In Germany, a growing body of officials, politicians and experts are prepared to question the 1990s paradigm, and fewer than ever believe that German-Russian partnership is in a sound condition. But this further erosion of consensus inside the Alliance makes relationships more confused, less predictable and less collegial. Behind the scenes, dialogue within the Alliance has become more incriminating and sharp – with some reproaching their partners for being too complacent about dangerous trends in Russia and others reproaching their

partners for failing to heed Russia's warnings and respect its legitimate interests. Moreover, the erosion of confidence in NATO's cohesion and resolve is leading some in new member states to hedge their bets and retreat from the positions on enlargement they advanced at Bucharest with such conviction and forcefulness.

3. *A revival of interest in Article 5* (and military-political issues) after a decade in which many members saw the Alliance evolving into an Article 4 (political-military) organisation, preoccupied with soft security challenges and the promotion of partnership, confidence and "common security". NATO's systematic diminution of territorial defence – and its desire that new member states and partner countries focus much of their effort on the provision of costly contributions to expeditionary operations far from Europe – is seen by a growing body of professionals as a mistake³. The absence of contingency plans for defending new members against "armed attack" (in the words of Article 5) is seen as a greater mistake. Moreover, the Alliance is also discussing military contingencies that might arise in connection with the exploitation of seabed hydrocarbons in the legally contested waters of the high north, not to say then President Putin's October 2006, claim that Russia's Baltic Fleet will play the leading role in the construction, protection and environmental security of the Nord Stream pipeline. Finally, it is asking whether immobilising cyber attacks and energy supply cut-offs should be treated as armed attack by other means.

4. *Reassessing the "art of the possible".* With respect to Ukraine and Georgia, there has been a change of direction. But what does it mean: recovery and consolidation or a loss of direction? With respect to Georgia, these initiatives encompass the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission (long overdue), commitments by NATO to "assess the state of the Georgian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces" and by the United States to rebuild the latter. With respect to Ukraine, the various initiatives – the Tallinn Defence Ministers meeting, the strengthening of the two NATO offices, the formulation of the Annual National Programme – is designed to shift the focus from MAP and membership timetables to the rectification of vulnerabilities and concrete improvements in national security cooperation. But will these initiatives be effective, let alone welcome, in the absence of adequate finance and convincing steps to persuade Ukraine that its membership prospects are undiminished? Today, the Alliance is in no position to provide such an assurance.

Given these uncertainties and the stakes involved, the European Union is becoming increasingly concerned about vacuums in confidence and security. The Eastern Partnership and the 23 March declaration between Ukraine, the EU, World Bank and others on the modernisation of Ukraine's gas transit system have drawn the EU into unmistakably geopolitical territory, and this has been plainly underscored by Moscow's acerbically sharp reaction to both initiatives. Yet with respect to these same initiatives, the EU has displayed a characteristic ambivalence about its own conceptual breakthroughs and its own potential strength. Despite the impulse provided by the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine energy crisis – which

³ Apart from the fact that on 7 August, one of four Georgian combat brigades was deployed in Iraq, it is indicative that the US Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme in Georgia, routinely described as 'aggressive' by Russian commentators, consisted of a small command subordinate to a lieutenant colonel, providing training for unit level (as opposed to combined arms) 'crisis response operations' in multi-national peace-keeping operations rather than territorial defense.

brought the EU's collective interests into the clearest possible focus – the EU still fails to define itself clearly in East-Central Europe.

If Russia cannot be the catalyst for greater cohesion inside the EU and NATO, will the United States? Of all the questions raised by the Obama administration's "reset" initiative, not the least problematic are its implications for Europe. If Europe cannot articulate a clear vision for the countries between Russia and the EU, will the United States and Russia do so over its head? Here it is important to distinguish between the views of the Obama administration and those of distinguished outsiders who claim to advise it. But this is a difficult exercise. Discussion in the wider US policy community makes it prudent to ask whether European perspectives and interests will be overshadowed despite the best of intentions in the United States. As a case in point, the report of one distinguished expert speaks of the necessity of consulting European allies in order to "ease European concerns"⁴. But that is not why consultations are needed. They are needed in order to avoid mistakes and protect long-term Western interests. With all of its divisions, it is probably Europe, not the United States, that has the better understanding what has changed in the syntax and grammar of European security. Europe might also have a better understanding of what has changed and what has regressed in Russia. But who in the United States will concede this?

Who in Washington worries that its own approach to European security might be dated? In several high-level reports supporting the "reset" effort, NATO is discussed in the classically twentieth-century language of security guarantees and membership. There is far less discussion of the role that NATO has played in transforming security and defence cultures in East-Central Europe. Equally dated is the much of the discussion about economic relations and energy security (in the words of one report, "we do not fear Russian downstream investment in the United States or Europe")⁵. Not enough awareness is shown of the aggressive uses of Russian economic power and its intelligence presence, not only in the former Soviet Union but, with increasing confidence and guile, in the new EU member states of Central and Southeastern Europe. Russia today might have nineteenth century aims, but it is pursuing them with twenty-first century tools: intelligence and covert penetration, commerce and joint ventures, "network diplomacy" and "lobbying structures", litigation, energy and downstream investment and, in the former USSR, Russian diasporas and other "civilisational" forms of soft power. If neither the United States nor Europe find twenty-first century responses to these challenges, Russia's neighbours might conclude that they are being cast adrift.

Ukraine against its partners and itself

Given these uncertainties, the worst course for Ukraine would be to base its policy on indignation. Yet there already are signs of such a course:

- *Defence Reform*. For almost ten years, Ukraine's scheme of defence reform has been directed to the establishment of an army that is small, modern, professional, well-equipped, well-trained and

affordable. If the scheme is implemented, it will produce armed forces in conformity with NATO principles, compatible with NATO forces but specific to Ukrainian conditions. Today Ukraine risks abandoning this model in exchange for a larger, more traditional force which is likely to be less modern, poorly equipped, inadequately trained and unfinanceable. Whether the issue is defence reform or the drafting of the Annual National Programme, a new tone has emerged: "if you won't give us membership, then we will do without your advice and input". However justified it is for Ukrainians to be irritated, it would be wiser to recall that the main purpose of meeting NATO criteria is to modernise and strengthen Ukraine, not join NATO. As then Minister of Defence Hrytsenko stated before the 2006 Riga summit: "We in Ukraine will continue to do MAP whether we receive MAP or not". That commitment might now be lost.

- *Energy Security*. The 2009-10 season of energy disputes between Kyiv and Moscow has opened with opaque deals between the latter and one branch of Ukrainian power and charges of treason by the other branch of power. The Russia-Ukraine agreement of January 2009 was the product of *force majeure*. It was a promissory note of Ukrainian insolvency and a blank cheque for Russian pressure and influence. Both the terms of the agreement and the deals cobbled together to mitigate them are ruinous to energy security. They will deprive Europe of an effective partner in Ukraine at the height of the election season. They will also persuade many Europeans that the March EU-Ukraine gas transit modernisation initiative was not far-sighted but foolish.
- *Visa Policy*. The punitive policy adopted on 8 April by the Cabinet of Ministers on work permits and foreign residence would possess a destructive logic if it were able to alter Schengen visa policy. But because it has little chance of doing so, it is merely destructive. To understand the practical effects of the new regulations, one need only ask two questions: What role does Ukrainian investment play in the European economy? What role does European investment play in Ukraine's economy? It is difficult to do business in Ukraine at the best of times. The CabMin has just made it more difficult.

Ukraine today has little to be cheerful about. But bad moods make bad policy. Unfortunately, NATO is losing the credibility that once enabled it to make that point, and the EU is not increasing its credibility swiftly enough. The risk is not that the Euro-Atlantic community "loses" Ukraine to somebody else. Most of the country's business leaders now realise that Ukraine has no future outside that community, and their interests are likely to place limits on the folly of politicians. Instead, the risk is that Ukraine loses hope, and its partners lose their sense of purpose. And as these processes proceed, the danger is that the rules of the 1975 Helsinki system and 1994 OSCE system continue to erode and unravel. ■

⁴ Thomas Graham, 'Resurgent Russia and US Purposes' (New York: The Century Foundation, April 2009), p. 24.

⁵ Hon. Chuck Hagel & Hon. Gary Hart (Co-Chairs), Dimitri K Simes (Director) and 24 Members, *The Right Direction for US Policy toward Russia: A Report from the Commission on US Policy toward Russia* (Washington: Nixon Center and Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard University, March 2009) p. 12.

ENGAGING UKRAINE IN 2009¹



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to Ukraine

Ukraine and Ukrainians will be tested over the course of 2009. The global financial and economic crisis already has provoked a deep recession and falling living standards. Kyiv will need to make a real effort to strike a balance between integration into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community and maintaining stable relations with Russia. Doing so will not be easy, as Russia regards Ukraine's pro-Western policy as inimical to Russian interests, and Ukraine's politics are subject to influence from Moscow. In particular, Ukraine must address its energy security situation, where it remains vulnerable to Russian pressure.

Ukraine is the most democratic state in the post-Soviet space, and its domestic debate is vibrant and open, but its politics are highly dysfunctional. The bitter political feud between President Victor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, former allies in the Orange Revolution, has paralysed most policymaking. With a presidential election likely to be held in January 2010, the infighting will only get worse. Regions Party head Victor Yanukovych, the main opposition leader, has little incentive to work for good policies, as he stands to gain politically as disapproval of the president and prime minister grows.

All of this makes dealing with Ukraine difficult for the US government, but it also makes working with Ukraine more urgent. It remains in America's interest that Ukraine continue its development as a stable, independent, democratic market economy, with growing links to Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. In the circumstances of the coming year, however, engaging with Kyiv to advance that goal will prove no easy task.

As it organises its policy toward Ukraine, Washington should focus on four areas:

- structure a bilateral dialogue to have maximum influence with Ukraine's leaders.
- assist Ukraine in dealing with the financial/economic crisis.
- promote serious actions to strengthen Ukraine's energy security.
- help Ukraine deepen its relations with the European Union and NATO while avoiding a crisis with Russia.

US interests in Ukraine

With everything else on the Obama administration's policy agenda, finding time to address Ukraine will be difficult. Over the past seventeen years, however, Washington has made a significant investment of time, energy, and assistance resources in Ukraine. It should remain engaged to promote that country's successful transformation into a modern European democracy.

Ukraine had the world's third largest strategic nuclear arsenal on its territory at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Kyiv's decision to give up those arms

¹ This is the short version of the article published in the Policy Paper No.13, March 2009, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., – www.brookings.edu

dramatically reduced the number of nuclear systems that could target America and provided a breathtaking success in the nuclear non-proliferation effort. However, by late 1993, US officials had come to recognise that, while the nuclear weapons issue was extremely important, the United States had broader interests in Ukraine.

Clinton administration policy statements thereafter identified Ukraine's development as a stable, independent, democratic market economy, with growing links to Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, as being in the US interest. *First*, such a Ukraine was seen as likely to be a net contributor to shaping a wider, more stable and secure Europe – a high priority for the United States. *Second*, given Ukraine's decisions to give up nuclear arms and adopt responsible controls on its missile technology, Washington saw Ukraine as a partner in tackling key proliferation challenges. *Third*, with a population in the early 1990s numbering some fifty million, a reforming, economically growing Ukraine offered an attractive market for US trade and investment. It was not surprising, therefore, that then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated Ukraine as one of four pivotal countries in the world whose development as a stable democratic partner for the United States deserved greater attention of time and resources from US policymakers.

While Ukraine remains an important non-proliferation partner, and American business has become increasingly involved there (with cumulative direct investment of some \$1.5 billion in 2008), the primary reasons for engaging Ukraine remain geopolitical. A successful Ukraine promotes stability. Moreover, a democratic and prosperous Ukraine firmly anchored in Europe will offer a model that might encourage Moscow to pursue a more cooperative, integrative foreign policy and give up any thought of seeking to restore the Russian empire. A weak and unstable Ukraine, on the other hand, would not be an attractive partner for the European Union or NATO, would worry its Central European neighbours, could prove an unreliable energy transit country, and might tempt Moscow even further to interfere in its politics. Were Ukraine to plunge into severe crisis, become a "grey security zone", or turn away from Europe back toward Russia, it would be a major setback for US policy, particularly the objective of promoting a more stable and secure Europe.

Between the mid-1990s and 2008, US-Ukrainian relations made significant progress. Washington and Kyiv created a binational commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore and President Leonid Kuchma in 1996. US officials led the drafting of an Alliance policy that in 1997 produced a NATO-Ukraine charter on a distinctive partnership and established a standing NATO-Ukraine Commission. The Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's assumption of the presidency in January 2005 gave US-Ukrainian relations a new impulse. The April 2005 Bush-Yushchenko meeting produced warm atmospherics and a road-map for further developing US-Ukrainian relations.

Over the course of the next year, US and Ukrainian officials resolved most of the key questions on the bilateral agenda. At the start of 2009, few bilateral

problems burden the US-Ukrainian agenda, and the two countries enjoy positive relations. This means that the Obama administration can focus on broader issues that affect Ukraine's ability to proceed down its reform path. Those questions include: grappling with the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis, strengthening its energy security position, improving its investment climate, tackling corruption, and managing its foreign relations. The potential vulnerability of Central European states to an economic collapse in Ukraine gives the US government an additional incentive to engage Kyiv.

Four major challenges facing Ukraine in 2009

Ukraine in early 2009 faces four major challenges. The *first* is the lack of political coherence in Kyiv, brought about primarily by the feuding between the president and the prime minister and their almost complete inability to work together. This is a problem in and of itself. It also complicates Ukraine's ability to deal with the other three challenges.

Second, as the impact of the global financial and economic crisis has deepened, Ukraine has plunged into a major recession. The country's financial stability will be severely tested.

Third, Ukraine's energy sector is dysfunctional and non-transparent, providing ample opportunity for economic rent-seeking through market manipulation and for Russian interference in Ukrainian politics. As demonstrated in January 2009, the Kremlin remains prepared to use energy as a political tool.

Fourth, Ukraine needs to develop its links with the European Union and NATO at a time when its relations with Moscow are tense and European states are striving not to provoke Russia.

Political disarray in Kyiv

Ukraine has gone through a gradual constitutional reform from a predominantly presidential system to a mixed presidential and parliamentary system, as agreed in the constitutional compromise of December 2004 at the end of the Orange Revolution. The result is that Ukraine today has neither a presidential nor a parliamentary system, but a hybrid. In this system, neither the president nor prime minister has been able to rule.

The infighting between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, and between the presidential secretariat and the cabinet, has meant that the governmental authorities – the president, prime minister, and their staffs together – have performed abysmally in addressing Ukraine's needs. Many had hoped at the start of 2008 that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko could work together to consolidate needed reforms. However, very little was accomplished over the course of the year.² A particular failing has been the lack of movement in consolidating economic reforms. The government carried out no major privatisations. Despite a large pro-business majority in the Rada, it passed few major pieces of economic reform legislation.

As noted, ambiguities in Ukraine's constitutional order add to the confusion. As one example, the constitution appears to grant to the prime minister and her cabinet

² See Janusz Bugajski, Steven Pifer, Keith Smith and Celeste A. Wallander, "Ukraine: A Net Assessment of 16 Years of Independence," Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2008 for the kinds of recommendations that Western analysts advocated and thought possible in 2008. Few of the recommendations were implemented, as the same authors noted in a report entitled "Implementation of Key Tasks and Recommendations," Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2009.



primacy for management of the economy. Nonetheless, the president and his secretariat have persistently inserted themselves into operational considerations of economic policy, including on energy, privatisations and macro-economic matters. No progress on constitutional reform or clearing up such ambiguities was made during 2008. The lack of a credible, functioning constitutional court compounds the problem.

Ukraine Plunges into Financial and Economic Crisis

As the global financial crisis has deepened, Ukraine has become one of the countries most severely hit. In September 2008, the Ukrainian economy seemed to be in good health. Unfortunately, the economy turned out to be highly vulnerable. *First*, the steel sector was a prime driver of GDP growth during 2000-2007. In the first half of 2008, steel accounted for no less than 42% of Ukraine's exports.³ In the second half of the year, however, international steel prices and demand collapsed – and with them, Ukrainian exports.

Second, the National Bank of Ukraine insisted until spring 2008 on maintaining a fixed peg of the hryvnia to the US dollar, something no other country in the region did. As a result, the hryvnia depreciated sharply in relation to the Euro, and the hryvnia's depreciation attracted short-term bank speculation. The short-term capital inflows, in turn, boosted Ukraine's money supply by 51% in 2007.⁴ That aggravated inflation, which accelerated rapidly at the end of 2007 and peaked at 31% in May 2008, compared with a year earlier.⁵ The speculative currency inflow caused Ukraine's current account deficit to widen to 6.6% of GDP in 2008, which increased Ukraine's private foreign debt.⁶ Still, the Ukrainian economy did not appear that bad off, apart from high inflation. In August 2008, Ukraine's international reserves peaked at a respectable \$38 billion.⁷

The *third* cause was Ukraine's messy politics, in particular the constant clashing between the president and prime minister. International investors perceived Ukrainian politics as irresponsible and dysfunctional, blocking major investments and privatisations, and began to stay away.⁸

A run on the hryvnia started in late summer 2008, and international financial markets closed completely to Ukraine in September. Suddenly, it became virtually impossible for Ukrainian companies to refinance foreign loans, which meant that any requirement for major refinancing caused an enterprise failure.

The Ukrainian economy has experienced a major shock since October 2008. The three industries hit the worst

have been steel, mining and construction. By January 2009, industrial production had fallen by 34% compared to January 2008. The decline is broad-based, but the key industries are recording declines of approximately 50%.⁹ Exports measured in US dollars are projected to fall by almost 50% in 2009, and imports are expected to fall even more (the silver lining is that this should minimise the current account deficit).¹⁰ Nobody can offer a precise forecast for GDP in 2009, but in January, GDP fell by 20% compared to January 2008.¹¹ Many analysts see a double-digit slump for the year as likely.

Fortunately, Ukraine approached the IMF as an early applicant for assistance in October 2008. The IMF Board adopted a two-year standby program, worth a potential total of \$16.4 billion, on November 5. It contained three main conditions. *First*, Ukraine had to let its exchange rate float to render the value of the hryvnia realistic. The hryvnia has depreciated by about 50% since last summer. With this new, more realistic value, the exchange rate appears to be bottoming out and stabilising.

Second, the IMF insisted on a responsible fiscal policy. The negotiations within the Ukrainian government and with the IMF have focused on the scale of the budget cuts that will be necessary as the economy contracts and state revenues plummet. Budget cuts in an election year are difficult, and the president and his staff appear to relish the fact that Tymoshenko must make hard choices about curtailing some popular expenditures. Although the IMF standby agreement called for the 2009 budget to be in balance, the budget approved by the government and Rada included a 3% deficit of GDP, which the IMF reckons will realistically be a 5% deficit.¹² The IMF can accept a small budget deficit, but then the Ukrainian government needs to find other international financing. In February, disagreement over Ukraine's budget deficit stalled the second disbursement of IMF financing.

Third, the IMF demanded bank restructuring. Unlike most other countries, the National Bank of Ukraine has scrutinised most of the country's commercial banks and identified their bad loans, so bank restructuring is proceeding apace.

The negative impact on the real economy will be dramatic. A double-digit GDP decline could amount to a contraction in US dollar terms by over 40% due to the hryvnia's fall. Perhaps two million Ukrainians will lose their jobs. An additional two million who work across the Europe may have to return due to Europe's economic downturn. The economic situation is bound to fuel social and political tensions.

³ State Statistics Committee of Ukraine online database, www.ukrstat.gov.ua (accessed March 4, 2009).

⁴ National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), www.bank.gov.ua (accessed February 27, 2009).

⁵ State Statistics Committee of Ukraine online database, www.ukrstat.gov.ua

⁶ Dragon Capital, "Ukrainian Economy: Making Progress to Unlock IFI Lending."

⁷ National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), www.bank.gov.ua

⁸ Anders Aslund, *How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 2009.

⁹ State Statistics Committee of Ukraine online database, www.ukrstat.gov.ua

¹⁰ Dragon Capital, Monthly Macro Research, "Ukrainian Economy: Bracing for Tough Year," January 30, 2009.

¹¹ Dragon Capital, "Ukrainian Economy: Bracing for Tough Year."

¹² Unian, "Verkhovna Rada Passed State Budget – 2009," December 26, 2008, <http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-292400.html>.



Ukraine, however, may well be able to escape default. Even if it receives only IMF funding this year, its own reserves likely will stay above the \$20 billion mark. That is not good, but it is far from default. The greatest structural weakness is the state oil and gas company *Naftohaz*, which loses a couple of billion dollars a year due to adversely regulated prices (which means that *Naftohaz* cannot recover its costs in many sales), mismanagement and corruption.

Looking to the longer term, there are reasons to believe the Ukrainian economy could recover rapidly, provided the global recession does not deepen too far. At present, Ukraine has a highly competitive exchange rate, which should help it expand exports faster than other states. With the decline of the steel sector, the Ukrainian economy is likely to become much more diversified; this could include expansion of its agricultural and machine-building sectors. As a member of the World Trade Organisation, Ukraine has secured reasonable market access, although it is important to broaden its access further. The more quickly the government acts now to deal with the crisis, the more likely a faster recovery.

Threats from the new gas deal and weak energy policy

Ukraine uses energy prodigiously. Its economy is said to be the single most energy-intensive in the world. For example, it uses more than twice as much energy per unit of GDP as does Poland. Moreover, Ukraine imports most of its fuel, almost all of it from Russia. Although most analysts believe that Ukraine could significantly expand domestic extraction of natural gas and oil from on-shore and offshore deposits, price caps and government policies that interfere with market mechanisms have kept domestic production of energy well below what it should be. The price caps and government policies have also sustained excessive demand and contributed significantly to recurring energy-related tensions with Russia.

The January gas war between Russia and Ukraine drew broad attention to the weakness of Ukrainian

energy policy, as well as to Ukraine as a vulnerable link in Europe's gas supply chain (through which Europe receives some 20% of its total gas needs). Russia stopped all gas flowing to Ukraine. The effect was to cut off consumers in Central and Western Europe as well, thereby provoking a major European energy crisis. The matter was resolved only after several false starts and bitter recriminations. Two new agreements were signed on January 19, and by January 22, pipeline volumes were starting to return to normal in all the European countries whose supply had been affected by the standoff.¹³ The new agreements are a significant departure from past Russian-Ukrainian practice,¹⁴ but they include significant risks for Ukraine, and they only begin to address the longstanding shortcomings of Ukrainian energy policy.

Ukraine is obliged to pay by the seventh day of each month the amount owed for gas delivered in the preceding month. If Ukraine fails to pay by the prescribed date, then from that moment on, Ukraine is obliged to pay in advance for the month ahead. This provision poses a very serious challenge to *Naftohaz*: a single, one-day delay in payment can trigger the change to month-ahead payments for the duration of the agreement.

More broadly, Ukraine's energy policies thrive on non-transparency, waste, and politicisation. In the political year that is 2009, with the upcoming presidential election, the combination of the new deals and bad overall policy could prove highly destabilising. Urgently needed reforms are again at risk, which could magnify the macroeconomic and political difficulties.

Ukraine's energy sector is far more complex and troubled than it needs to be.¹⁵ The country has a long history of producing, processing, and transporting oil and gas. It has significant hydrocarbon deposits both on-shore and under the waters of the Black Sea. Its strategic location and extensive existing infrastructure give it great significance in the gas markets of Eurasia. Unfortunately, in the period since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, the energy sector has served successive rounds of leaders as a political trophy and tool. Decisions regarding energy policy have traditionally been made to favour certain industrial and personal interests. Deals reached by one political leader are reversed when successors come to power.

Perhaps most significant of all, Ukraine is a country in which the price of energy – the most fundamental instrument that guides the allocation of resources – is thoroughly and deliberately subverted. The gas prices charged to retail consumers consistently fail to cover the cost of gas plus the services of distribution and marketing, because political leaders have been unwilling to take the unpopular step of raising prices.

In the first quarter of 2009, when Ukraine imported gas for \$360 per TCM, the prices paid by industrial users and consumers within Ukraine were substantially lower. The import price at the Ukrainian-Russian border (before

¹³ For a useful chronology of the crisis, see Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, "The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2009, <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG27.pdf>.

¹⁴ *Ukrainska Pravda* published what it said were the agreed texts of the new agreements. This assertion was not officially confirmed, but neither was it contradicted. For the sales-purchase agreement, see *Ukrainska Pravda*, "Gazovoye Soglasheniye Tymoshenko-Putina – Polniy Tekst," January 22, 2009, <http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2009/1/22/87168.htm>, and for the transit agreement, see *Ukrainska Pravda*, "Kontrakt o Transite Rossiyskogo Gaza + Dopsoglasheniye ob Avansye 'Gazproma'," January 22, 2009, <http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2009/1/22/87178.htm>.

¹⁵ This discussion draws heavily on analysis by Edward Chow and Jonathan Elkind, "Where East Meets West: European Gas and Ukrainian Reality," *The Washington Quarterly*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, vol. 32, number 1, January 2009.

value-added tax was applied) translated to a price of 2,772 hryvnia per TCM at the end of January (when the exchange rate was 7.7 hryvnia to the dollar). In January, the price of gas (including value-added tax) for industrial consumers was 2,570 hryvnia per TCM; for utility companies 873 hryvnia per TCM; and for households 650 hryvnia per TCM.¹⁶ Consequently, each cubic meter of gas consumed contributes to a cascade of indebtedness, a situation that only worsens when gas bills are not paid.

Domestically-produced gas is treated worse than imported gas. Gas from Ukrainian wells is meant to be sold for use in the residential and institutional (government budget-supported) sectors, and the prices are capped far below the already-subsidised gas price for industrial consumers. This artifice only further misdirects market forces. It deters investment in domestic gas production and creates lucrative opportunities for corruption – such as when domestically-produced gas is resold to favoured traders and re-labelled as “imported” so that it can be sold for higher prices.

As a result of weak energy policies and the new gas deal with Russia, energy will remain a major challenge throughout 2009 and beyond. In fact, throughout the entire period of negotiating the new gas deal, the presidential secretariat constantly attacked the actions of the government and accused them of acting counter to Ukraine’s interest. Fighting over the gas arrangements by domestic political forces that seek financial advantages contributes to the instability of the contracts. Some analysts in Europe and the United States believe a new gas dispute could break out as early as the spring 2009.

The tug between the west and Russia

Although Kuchma first announced NATO membership as a goal in 2002, the prospect only began to appear serious following Yushchenko’s election as president. While Kuchma sought a balance between the West and Russia, Yushchenko made integration into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, including ultimate membership in the European Union and NATO, his primary foreign policy goal. In April 2005, NATO and Ukraine launched an “intensified dialogue.” Many expected that Ukraine would receive a NATO MAP by the end of 2006. The country by then had implemented political, economic, and defence reforms comparable to those made by countries such as Albania and Romania when they received their MAPs in 1999. However, the selection of Yanukovich as prime minister in August 2006 derailed Ukraine’s MAP prospects. He made clear that, while wanting good NATO-Ukraine relations, he did not favour a MAP.

Yushchenko reopened the debate in January 2008, when he, Tymoshenko, and then-Rada Speaker Arseniy Yatseniuk co-signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer requesting a MAP at the April NATO summit. This time, Moscow became far more alarmed than it had over NATO-Ukraine relations in the past. Then-president Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia would target nuclear missiles at Ukraine, while

other senior Russian officials pledged to do everything that they could to block Ukraine’s integration into NATO. Meeting with allied leaders at the April NATO-Russia summit, Putin even called into question Ukraine’s territorial integrity.¹⁷

Speaking in August in the aftermath of the conflict with Georgia, President Dmitriy Medvedev described five principles underpinning Russia’s foreign policy. One was a sphere of “privileged interests” in the post-Soviet space, a formulation that appeared intended to assert for Russia a voice in the foreign policy choices of its neighbours.¹⁸ Russian officials spoke of NATO enlargement as posing an existential threat to Russia.

While NATO leaders decided not to extend Ukraine a MAP in April, they did declare that Ukraine would be a member of the Alliance. NATO foreign ministers in December decided to develop NATO-Ukraine relations further on the basis of an annual national program and work in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, setting aside the MAP issue.¹⁹

Ukrainian-EU relations in 2008 focused on negotiation of an association agreement, which will include a free trade arrangement. However, unlike previous EU association agreements with other European countries, this one will not include language recognising a membership perspective for Ukraine. This reflects longstanding EU reluctance to envisage the possibility that Ukraine might one day join the Union. The European Union also offered to develop relations with Ukraine through the EU’s Eastern Partnership outreach to post-Soviet states, though some in Kyiv worry that this is an effort to sideline any prospect of Ukrainian EU membership.

Ukraine’s relations with Russia, which have been tense since the Orange Revolution, became increasingly difficult over the course of 2008. In January 2009, the relationship between Kyiv and Moscow was at one of its lowest points since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, reflecting the growing accumulation of difficult issues between the two.

Ukraine’s integration into NATO tops, but by no means exhausts, the list of Moscow’s problem issues with the Ukrainian government. Over the past year, Russian officials have also expressed concerns about: Yushchenko’s support for Georgia and Ukrainian arms deliveries to that country; Ukrainian proposals that the two countries begin negotiating now on a plan for withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol and Crimea in 2017; the status of the Russian language in Ukraine; and Kyiv’s push for international recognition of the Holodomor (the 1930s’ famine that killed millions of Ukrainians) as an act of genocide. Ukraine and Russia differ over demarcation of the sea boundary in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. A new mini-crisis erupted in February 2009, when “unfriendly and openly undiplomatic” comments about Yushchenko by Russian Ambassador Victor Chernomyrdin led the Ukrainian foreign ministry to threaten to expel him.²⁰ And the January gas war demonstrated how destructive the Ukrainian-Russian energy relationship could be.

¹⁶ Information provided to authors by IMF official, March 2009.

¹⁷ Unian, “Text of Putin’s Speech at NATO Summit,” April 18, 2008, <http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-247251.html>.

¹⁸ President of Russia website, “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channel One, Russia, NTV,” August 31, 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912_type82916_206003.shtml.

¹⁹ NATO, Final Communiqué, “Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels,” December 3, 2008, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/po8-153e.html>.

²⁰ Kyiv Post, “Ohryzhko: Foreign Ministry’s Response to Chernomyrdin’s Comments is Timely and Adequate,” February 18, 2009, <http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/35710>.

This tug between the West and Russia has a domestic angle within Ukraine. Internal frictions over geopolitical orientation, the future of the Black Sea Fleet, Crimea, and official status for the Russian language could worsen. Accelerating tensions could cause the east-west divide in Ukraine to reopen. Moscow has levers to influence these tensions and has an incentive to keep them going: the Kremlin sees a divided, politically incoherent Ukraine as making the country a poor candidate for NATO or the European Union and as offering a political model that will be unattractive to the populace in Russia.²¹

An agenda for us engagement with Ukraine

As the Obama administration defines its approach toward Europe and Russia, it should pay serious attention to Ukraine. Given the relative absence of bilateral problems on the US-Ukrainian agenda, Washington can and should focus on broader issues that could accelerate, or hinder, Ukraine's development. A crowded foreign policy agenda and political incoherence in Kyiv may tempt Washington to wait to engage until Ukraine's political leadership can get its act together. But the US government do not have that luxury; absent US engagement, the situation in Ukraine will likely worsen – and later require significantly greater time and attention from Washington and European capitals.

Structuring a regular, high-level dialogue

The Bush administration's high-level engagement with Kyiv was episodic. In 2001, it downgraded the binational commission that Gore and Kuchma had chaired, leaving in place the working groups without any overarching structure. Given concerns about Kuchma, there was little engagement with him. Following Yushchenko's assumption of the presidency, high-level contacts resumed haltingly over 2005-2008. The Obama administration should regularise a high-level dialogue with Kyiv.

Washington should revive the binational commission that operated between 1996 and 2000 as a structure for managing US-Ukrainian relations. The commission should oversee the existing bilateral working groups, which deal with foreign policy issues, economic and commercial relations, energy, and defence questions. Restoring the commission would ensure that senior political levels on both sides monitor the overall state of US-Ukrainian relations and that they are positioned to intervene to break deadlocks at the working level. Vice President Joe Biden should chair the US side.

As for the Ukrainian side, it made sense in the 1990s for Kuchma to be the Ukrainian chair, as the presidency then controlled the executive branch. In contrast, executive power in Ukraine today is shared by the president and prime minister. The foreign and defence ministers report directly to the president, while most other ministers report to the prime minister. This complicates determining the chair on the Ukrainian side: in the current political circumstances in Kyiv, if Washington proposes the Ukrainian chair be Tymoshenko, Yushchenko is unlikely to cooperate, and vice versa. The alternative is to suggest that the Ukrainian side be co-chaired by the president and prime minister. Such a structure could – and should be intended to – have the effect of forcing Yushchenko

and Tymoshenko to forge common positions. When the commission meets in Kyiv, it will also be important that the vice president see the leading opposition leader, at present, Yanukovich.

This structure would create a channel between the US vice president and the Ukrainian president and prime minister that could be used to pass candid messages on reform and on sensitive issues, such as how Ukraine might deal with NATO and Russia. The vice president and other senior US officials must be blunt: they need to make clear to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko that, if the two of them cannot work together, US efforts to help Ukraine cope with the economic crisis, strengthen its energy security, or develop closer relations with Europe will yield minimal results. This message should be targeted foremost at Yushchenko, as he and the presidential secretariat bear the greater responsibility for the incoherence of Ukrainian policy over the past year.

Assisting Ukraine to deal with its financial/economic difficulties

despite assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), Ukraine likely will face a financing gap of about \$5 billion in 2009. A deepening crisis in Ukraine will be bad not just for the country's economy, but could have a deleterious impact on Central Europe. The US government should lead in organising an international donors' conference involving the United States, European Union, IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and other IFIs and countries with the goal of raising \$5 billion in financial support for Ukraine in 2009 that would be linked to the IMF's current program. (Consideration should be given to including Russia in this effort). This should be support for one year, as the Ukrainian economy appears positioned to recover rapidly once it bottoms out, unless the global recession dramatically deepens.

While the IFIs should contribute the bulk of the additional financing, the US government should consider contributing as well. This financing should be conditioned on Ukraine sticking with conditions agreed between the donors and the Ukrainian government, including those in the November IMF standby arrangement and specific new requirements concerning energy sector reform.

The US government should also press the Ukrainian government to take other steps that would facilitate economic recovery and provide appropriate technical assistance. These actions include: abolishing the commercial code, whose outdated provisions on business contradict those in the more modern civil code and create a confused legal environment; allowing the free sale and transfer of agricultural land, which is key to establishing a land market and opening new private capital financing for Ukraine's agricultural sector; and modernising the tax code. Washington also needs to continue technical assistance to facilitate crisis management, privatisation, and other necessary structural reforms, particularly in the energy sector. For such assistance to be effective, the Ukrainian government must adopt and implement reforms. Here, too, senior US officials, including on the binational commission, must be blunt.

²¹ See Steven Pifer, "Averting Crisis in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 41, January 2009 for a fuller discussion of the internal frictions within Ukraine and tensions between Ukraine and Russia, as well as for recommendations on US policy steps to alleviate those frictions.

Among other things, the binational commission should look at ways to promote greater political and academic exchanges between the United States and Ukraine, including funding to bring young Ukrainian political leaders, young professionals, and high school and college students to visit and study in the United States, including a target of college scholarships for 1,000 Ukrainian students per year. This can help Ukraine develop a larger cadre of key professionals with the skills to manage a modern economy and financial system.

The European Union and Ukraine are now negotiating an association agreement, which will contain a deep free-trade arrangement. The US government should align its approach with the EU's by adopting measures to remove barriers to Ukrainian products. While politically difficult at present, Washington might also consider the possibility of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with Ukraine. For Ukraine, this would imply a substantial market opening; it would strengthen Ukraine's economic links to the West and the US standing in Ukraine.

Pressing Ukraine to bite the bullet on energy sector reform

the year 2008 ended, and 2009 began, with what could be described as the cross-border equivalent of a barroom brawl – a ferocious confrontation over Russian-Ukrainian gas trade and transit that exploded into a full fledged energy crisis for Europe. The crisis had a particular impact in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkans, where the gas cut-off meant no heat in freezing apartments.

At this stage, the most important questions are where Ukraine stands in relation to its long-delayed energy reform agenda, and what it should do next. The January crisis starkly demonstrated that Ukraine's actions directly affect European energy security. The crisis also makes clear the dangers – to Ukraine and to the interests of the United States and its European partners – of not addressing that agenda. Ukraine has to embrace reforms that will make it a viable member of the Euro-Atlantic community, which Kyiv says it hopes to be.

The US government must work hand-in-hand with the European Union and key member states to press Ukraine to engage in energy reform. First and foremost, Washington and its partners should secure a clear commitment from Ukraine to transition to rational energy pricing in an agreed, finite period – for example, within the next two years. This will be difficult to do, especially in the current circumstances, but the reluctance of numerous Ukrainian governments over the years to act on this is a primary reason for the weakness of Ukraine's energy sector. US and European advisors should also work with Ukraine to develop realistic projections of, and financing plans for, the subsidies that will be needed in the two-year period until pricing achieves cost-recovery levels.

The masking of real energy prices has the inevitable effect on the Ukrainian energy economy of promoting over-consumption. Many politicians in Ukraine have clung to the illusion that the country's industrial competitiveness is enhanced by artificially low energy prices. In fact, the opposite is true. Until and unless energy is rationally priced in Ukraine, and until political leaders engage in the painful task of educating the public about the dangers of artificially low energy prices, the



country will continue with hugely inefficient production that is effectively subsidised by every taxpayer in the country. Reducing energy consumption also could have the effect of providing Ukraine with further greenhouse gas emissions credits that could be sold on international markets under the Kyoto Protocol and Framework Convention on Climate Change. To date, potential buyers have shown interest in Ukraine, though that interest has been tempered by the broader challenges of the Ukrainian investment climate.

The US government should also work with its European partners to provide technical assistance that facilitates Ukraine's transition to market pricing. Support for greater energy efficiency is the logical place to start, and existing programs being undertaken by US Agency for International Development in the area of residential district heating systems (which contribute more to the debt-build-up in *Naftohaz* than any other sector) can be scaled up relatively easily. Another component of enhanced technical assistance should focus on helping the Ukrainian government to develop a program of targeted assistance whereby it can help those households that legitimately cannot afford to pay true market prices for heat and electricity. This would be more sensible than the current system, under which Ukraine provides implicit energy subsidies to most if not all energy consumers. In a future scenario of more serious-minded energy reform, prices will provide an incentive to economise on consumption and to increase domestic production, and subsidies should be directed only to those who are genuinely unable to pay.

Given the inherent instability of the January 2009 gas agreements with Russia, the US government and its European partners should undertake a systematic assessment of measures to help stabilise, strengthen, and increase the transparency of the gas operations of *Naftohaz*.

Getting Ukrainian leaders to adopt the necessary energy reform steps will be a tough challenge. Energy reform should be a key part of the agenda for a restored binational commission, and it should be at the top of the vice president's list of issues. Making firm actions on energy sector reform the conditions for additional international financing for Ukraine should provide leverage to press Kyiv to adopt those reforms.



Helping Ukraine deepen its links with the west while avoiding crisis with Russia

Yushchenko remains committed to integrating Ukraine into the European Union and NATO, and deepening those links is in the interest of the United States and Europe. Advancing that integration is difficult at present. The Ukrainian elite and a growing number of Ukrainians (who may now exceed a majority) favour Ukraine's integration into the European Union. NATO membership, however, remains controversial both among the elite and the public. Moreover, the Russians regard Ukraine in zero-sum terms and see any deepening in its relations with the West as representing a loss for Russia. And concerns in Europe about provoking Russia undercut support for a MAP for Ukraine. Equally damaging to Yushchenko's policy has been the feuding in Kyiv; the lack of coherence in the Ukrainian government severely weakened Ukraine's case for a MAP in the second half of 2008 as well as its ability to cope with the January gas dispute.

NATO ministers in December 2008 agreed that the annual national program and NATO-Ukraine Commission would be the mechanisms for now to develop NATO-Ukraine relations. European concerns about Russia and political turmoil in Kyiv mean that a MAP is not possible anytime soon. The Ukrainian government appears to understand this. Most, if not all, of the substance of a MAP – in terms of planned reforms, exercises, exchanges and other contacts with the Alliance – could be put into an annual national program. (Here, too, however, the financial crisis may have an impact. Defence Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov told his NATO counterparts in February that limited budget resources might cause Ukraine to scale back some planned exercises).

The US government should counsel the Ukrainians to proceed on the basis of an annual national program and set aside their desire to receive a MAP. There is no reason now for Kyiv to get bogged down in an unrealistic attempt to secure a MAP, especially when it can develop its practical relations with NATO in an annual national program. Washington should also offer to consult privately with the Ukrainians as they develop their proposed program, so that the plan – which Kyiv hopes to share with NATO in the spring – is as robust as possible and crafted in terms likely to secure Allied support. The administration might suggest that the Ukrainians consult with the Polish government, which wants to help Ukraine thicken its relations with NATO. US officials should work at NATO to win approval of a substantive annual national program.

In the run-up to the April NATO summit, US officials should seek language for the summit statement that reaffirms the Bucharest statement that Ukraine will be a member of the Alliance. US officials should also press for language that makes clear that the Alliance does not accept the notion of a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space or that Moscow's claimed "privileged interests" allow it to determine the foreign policy courses of other post-Soviet states, in order to reassure countries such as Ukraine.

Washington should also urge that the European Union maintain robust engagement with Ukraine. Given that MAP has been put on hold in large part due to the concerns of European allies about provoking Russia, US officials should ask that EU engagement with Ukraine take up some of the slack to signal Kyiv that Western

interest remains strong. Accelerated negotiation of the association agreement, and its free trade arrangements, would send such a positive signal. The European Union should also use its Eastern Partnership to strengthen links with Ukraine.

More broadly, Washington should coordinate with the European Union on the key points to stress to Kyiv. Tough messages – for example, on the need for Ukrainian leaders to press reforms – will carry greater weight when delivered by US and EU officials in unison.

To the extent that the Obama administration can improve US-Russian relations and if there is parallel improvement in NATO-Russian relations, these will be positive developments for Kyiv. The Ukrainian government have historically had greater freedom of manoeuvre in the context of warmer relations between the West and Russia.

The US government will want to monitor the tense relations between Kyiv and Moscow. On the one hand, it should advise the Ukrainian government not to provoke needless crises or fights with Russia. For example, it might make sense for the president not to press Moscow to begin negotiations now – in a fractious political year in Ukraine – on withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet when its lease expires in 2017. Washington should also be clear with Kyiv as to the extent of – and limits on – American support the Ukrainian government can expect if a confrontation between Ukraine and Russia breaks out.


At the same time, Washington should be equally clear with Moscow on the risks for Russian relations with the United States and the West should Moscow fan internal tensions within Ukraine or provoke a crisis with Kyiv. Washington's desire to "reset" the relationship with Moscow likely would not survive a Russian-Ukrainian crisis caused by the Russians. As appropriate, US officials may wish to remind Moscow of the security assurances extended to Kyiv by the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom in the 1994 Budapest memorandum regarding Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom from economic coercion.

Conclusion

Dealing with Ukraine in its current state will not be easy for Washington, but it is important. A lack of attention to Ukraine now could well require far greater attention in the future, should the country go off track or become immersed in crisis. Ukrainian leaders of course must do their part. Robust US engagement, however, could prove decisive in prompting them to act. Robust engagement includes tough messages delivered in full candour.

For all the frustrations of watching developments in Kyiv, it is not the time for "Ukraine fatigue". It remains in the US interest that Ukraine continue its democratic and market economy transformation, and that it avoid internal crisis – either political or economic – or confrontation with Russia. Establishing a high-level, political channel; assisting Kyiv in avoiding a financial calamity; pressing the Ukrainian government to take the long-needed steps on energy sector reform; and advising the Ukrainians on how to deepen relations with the West while avoiding crisis with Moscow should be central parts of the US strategy to achieve these goals in the difficult circumstances of 2009. ■

CANADA SHOULD PUSH FOR A RETRO NATO¹



James Bissett²,
former Ambassador for Canada to Yugoslavia

It was inevitable that NATO expansion eastward would at some point run into a hostile Russian reaction. The attack on South Ossetia by President Saakashvili on August 8, 2008, was the last straw and Russia finally showed its teeth by crushing the Georgian offensive in 48 hours. The Russians then added insult to injury by recognising the independence of South Ossetia and the other breakaway region, Abkhazia. Now we are facing the prospects of a new arms race and – if not the spectre of nuclear warfare – at least a serious set back to global peace and security.

The responsibility for this rests primarily with the US-led NATO powers. The problem stems, in part, from the ideological driven obsession by US political leaders for US global hegemony – an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine³ to apply to all regions of the world – and pressure from human rights advocates and idealists to scrap the principle of national sovereignty and replace it by new concepts: humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect and the export of democracy. This combination of selfish desire for domination and a crusading passion to meddle in the affairs of other countries has proven deadly. It has also turned the NATO treaty on its head and converted the Alliance into an aggressive military machine. This was not supposed to happen.

NATO origins and purpose

Although few Canadians may be aware of it, the idea of a North Atlantic treaty was first proposed in 1948 by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis St. Laurent. The Foreign Minister had represented Canada at the post war conferences leading up to the formation of the United Nations and he believed that the United Nations would be ineffective without a military capacity.

He therefore proposed that the European Defence Alliance of five European countries established by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 should be expanded to include Canada and the United States. A year later, in April, 1949, in Washington, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born.

NATO was meant to be a purely defensive military alliance. Its primary purpose was to counteract any attack

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² This is an edited version of the article, which first appeared in "C2C-Canada's Journal of Ideas". – www.c2cjournal.ca/public/article/72

³ Monroe Doctrine, principle of American foreign policy enunciated in President James Monroe's message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823. It initially called for an end to European intervention in the Americas, but it was later extended to justify US imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. – <http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/>



by the Soviet Union against the democratic countries of the West. It also pledged to support and act in accordance with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Article 1 of the Treaty made this abundantly clear. It read, "The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved, by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered ... and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

For forty years the Alliance was successful in deterring the Soviet Union from any act of aggression against NATO members. A combination of conventional forces and the ever present nuclear threat was sufficient to create a mutual understanding that armed conflict between the two opposing powers was not an option.

NATO's overriding principle was to abstain from threatening or using force to resolve international disputes. It was this principle, backed up by military might, that secured peace in Europe. During the Cold War years the Soviet Union had no reason to fear aggression from the West because the Soviets accepted the validity of NATO's doctrine of defence. If conflict was to break out it would be as a result of Soviet attack against a NATO member – not the reverse.

During those "Cold War years" NATO represented more than just a military organisation. It had strong moral underpinnings and symbolised the determination of the free world to stand for and vigorously defend the ideals of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, but – to do so by following the rules laid down in the UN Charter.

These rules were drafted in the closing years of the first half of the 20th century. Those fifty years that had proven to be some of the bloodiest of all time. Aggressive warfare had been the cause of the horrific slaughter and destruction of two world wars and the dropping of the atom bomb on Japan. These cataclysmic events were fresh in the memory of those who created the United Nations and NATO. These were men who realised that some form of global institution to govern the peaceful relationship among states was essential. In a nuclear world what was at stake was civilisation itself.

NATO and the UN

We hear a good deal of criticism today about the weakness of the United Nations because it gives Russia and China the power of veto over proposed actions by the United States or Great Britain, but it is easy to forget how difficult it was to get agreement among the great powers about voting rights in the Security Council. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of July – October, 1944 had ended without agreement on this critical issue. It was finally settled at Yalta in February 1944 when provision was made for giving each of the so-called "Great Powers" the right of veto. It was this arrangement that finally got the Russians to accept the structure and working methods of the Council. Thus the veto became an integral part of the UN structure and it still is.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union at first appeared to foretell the beginning of a new age. The "evil empire" had imploded and as we approached the beginning of the 21st century hopes were raised that a Pax Americana would bring with it, peace and security to the world. These hopes were reinforced when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the UN Security Council agreed, without a veto from any of the major powers, to authorise military action forcing the Iraqis to withdraw.

NATO as an organisation did not become engaged in the First Gulf War because its treaty did not authorise it to operate outside of Europe and North America. Instead it was a coalition of 34 nations led by the United States that participated in defeating the Iraqi armed forces liberating Kuwait. The UN system for regulating the use of force in international disputes seemed to be working.

NATO in the Balkans

The break up of Yugoslavia and the armed conflict that broke out in Bosnia between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims and Croats provided a new role for NATO. In June, 1992, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Oslo agreed to support peacekeeping measures in Bosnia first under the authority of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE) and later that year under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council. These activities included enforcing the arms embargo on the warring participants, providing air support to the United Nations Protection Force and eventually carrying out air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

NATO's role in Bosnia was not without controversy. Despite its role in enforcing the arms embargo it was an open secret that the United States was clandestinely supplying arms to both the Muslim and Croatian forces. Later it was disclosed that President Clinton authorised the movement of several thousand veteran Mujahideen fighters into Bosnia. These actions were at cross purposes with the NATO mandate to enforce the arms embargo but were in conformity with US policy goals of supporting the Muslim side in the civil war. This would not be the first time the Americans were prepared to use NATO as a means of achieving US policy objectives.

The US-led NATO involvement in Bosnia had demonstrated that NATO was still needed in Europe. It also revealed with clarity that the European Community nations were not in a position to undertake large scale military operations. It was United States military power that provided NATO with the punch needed to do so. Bosnia had given new life to NATO and brought an end to previous talk of dismantling the Alliance.

The significant point underlying NATO operations in Bosnia which involved using force was that they were fully in compliance with the United Nations Charter and authorised by the Security Council. It was another encouraging example of how the United Nations in the post-Cold War period could operate to secure peace and order in global trouble spots. Unfortunately such optimism was short-lived.

Kosovo

Armed rebellion in the Serbian province of Kosovo by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 provided the United States with the opportunity of again demonstrating the importance of NATO in maintaining peace in Europe. This time it was allegedly to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population in Kosovo by the Serbian security forces of Slobodan Milosevic.

The United States realised, because of the Russian and Chinese veto, that the Security Council would not authorise the use of force in Kosovo. The Americans, therefore decided to ignore the UN and use NATO to intervene militarily. The refusal of President Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet Agreement⁴ was the trigger to begin air strikes against Serbia.

This was the first time that NATO operated without UN approval and in so doing not only violated its own Treaty but was in contravention of the Charter itself and of international law. It was a historical turning point and a serious blow to the framework of world peace and security. NATO was converted from a purely defensive body acting in accordance with the principles of the United Nations into an organisation that could use force to intervene whenever and wherever it deemed it necessary to do so.

NATO's new role was officially announced on its fiftieth birthday in Washington by President Bill Clinton. The announcement came as NATO warplanes continued their air strikes against Serbian targets. Curiously, the President's announcement caused little comment either from political leaders or from a generally sympathetic and compliant media. NATO's bombing campaign was justified because it was intervention for humanitarian reasons.

Almost ten years after the bombing of Serbia there is growing evidence that the KLA was armed, trained and equipped by US and British intelligence agencies with the purpose of creating instability in Kosovo and of provoking a situation that would provide an excuse for NATO's intervention. The accusations by NATO leaders about genocide have been proven to be completely false and to date only about 2,000 bodies including Serb and Albanian have been discovered. In addition, the Americans have admitted they deliberately set the bar high at Rambouillet to force Milosevic to reject its terms.

The bombing of Serbia had little to do with humanitarian issues or with events taking place on the ground. It had everything to do with NATO credibility and the desire of US leaders to change the very nature



of the Alliance. In this they were successful NATO. However, was not as successful in bringing peace and good government to Kosovo. The Alliance refused to implement or comply with any of the key features of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that brought an end to the conflict.

The KLA were not disarmed and almost all of the non-Albanian population was expelled from Kosovo. Under the watchful eyes of NATO troops over 120 Christian churches and monasteries were destroyed. As required by 1244 Resolution, Serbian security forces were not allowed back to Kosovo to guard religious institutions and to patrol the borders. Finally, under the terms of 1244 Resolution, Serbia's sovereignty was reaffirmed but this provision was also breached when, in February 2008, the US and most of the NATO countries including Canada, recognised Kosovo independence. In doing so they violated Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Accords.

Broken promises and expansion

NATO's performance in the Balkans has been marked by duplicity, double standards and hypocrisy. Looking back, its overall performance since the collapse of the Soviet Union has left much to be desired.

In November, 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall immediately raised the question of the unification of the two Germanys. The Russians, as to be expected, were opposed but the United States and its NATO allies wanted a united Germany with membership in NATO. In February, 1990, at an "Open Skies" conference in Ottawa, the NATO foreign ministers met with their counterparts from the Warsaw Pact countries and decided that the leaders of Britain, France, The United States and Russia should meet with the leaders of the two Germanys and settle the issue.

The result was the signing of the so called "Two Plus Four Treaty" in September, 1990, that among other things

⁴ It is now generally understood that fearing Milosevic might sign it the Americans attached at the last moment an appendix "B" which provided for among other things access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO troops and a referendum on independence for Kosovo within three years. This appendix was designed to ensure that Milosevic would not sign the agreement and hence the bombing could begin.



authorised the reunification of Germany and membership in NATO. There remains controversy about the promise that was made to President Gorbachev by President George Bush senior that in return for obtaining Russia's consent to the Treaty there would be no expansion of NATO eastward. Gorbachev and others at the conference swear the promise was made not only by President Bush but also to the Russian Foreign Minister by US Secretary of State, James Baker. In any event, the Russians believe it was made and have deeply resented that the promise has been broken.

In March, 1999, despite Russia's misgivings, the first three former Warsaw Pact countries became NATO members: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since then the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have all been given membership. In effect, NATO has encircled Russia with former members of the USSR and is seriously considering adding Ukraine and Georgia to this list. Should it come as a surprise that Russians interpret this expansion as a hostile threat to Russian security?

The decisions by NATO to abandon its adherence to the UN Charter by using force to resolve international disputes and to operate "out of area" have not served to reassure Russia of the Alliance's peaceful intentions. The United States decision in June, 2003, to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Treaty and more recently to establish antiballistic missile shield systems in Poland and the Czech Republic have confirmed Russia's belief that the United States continues to see it as the primary obstacle to the US desire for global hegemony.

CONCLUSION

Russia's show of strength in repulsing the Georgian attack against South Ossetia has introduced a new dimension to NATO-Russian relations. At a time when Russia was staggering from the shock of the Soviet Union's collapse it was in no position to counteract the expansionist ambitions of a US-led NATO. In the 1990s and early 2000s Russia had no choice but to accept a number of humiliating provocations from the Western powers. That has now changed and a resurgent Russia is back in business. How the United States and the other NATO countries react to this new reality will have a critical impact on world peace and security.

The initial reaction by the US and by other NATO countries has been disappointing. There have been

stridently hypocritical protests about the violation of Georgian territorial integrity. In this, the western mainline media have been equally vociferous and seem to have forgotten entirely the violation of Serbia's sovereignty a few months previously. Despite Russian concerns, NATO spokesmen have announced that plans are going ahead to admit Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance. President George Bush Jr. has rushed to provide Georgia one billion dollars to rebuild its military. These are not helpful developments.

One can only hope that the bombastic protestations are not serious and that cooler heads within the Alliance will prevail. Can the leaders of NATO really believe it worth satisfying the political ambitions of a Mikhail Saakashvili to run the risk of a military conflict with Russia or worth causing a civil war in Ukraine?

The Georgian-South Ossetia conflict has served a useful purpose and it has come at an opportune time. It has shown NATO that further expansion of the Alliance may do more harm than good and it has happened on the eve of the collapse of the financial structure of the United States. Furthermore, the recovery of Russia and the rise of China and India as world powers have brought an end to the unipolar world dominated by American military prowess.

These new realities call for a reassessment of NATO's role in the world. I would suggest two possible approaches. *First*, if NATO is sincerely dedicated to peace and security as their leaders continue to profess, then it should invite Russia to join the Alliance. It was former Soviet President Gorbachev who in 1989 first proposed the creation of a common "European House," with Russia as part of it. His proposal worried the Americans at the time and may have been premature, but today NATO with Russian membership would be a more powerful Alliance in forwarding and securing peace in the world.

Russian membership would finally end the Cold War and be a powerful move towards establishing global peace and security – not to mention bringing Russia into the orbit of the West. The question is whether Russia would accept the invitation – but if it did not then we (the West) would know where we stand. I believe it unlikely that Germany or France will accept Ukraine into the NATO alliance despite US pressure. With the election of Obama who knows what might happen? A rapprochement between the USA and Russia is overdue, given the emerging threat from radical Islam and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The argument that Russian democracy has not evolved satisfactorily to meet NATO standards does not hold, when borderline democracies like Ukraine and Georgia are being touted for NATO membership. Furthermore, NATO's primary role is to preserve international peace, security and stability. The admission of Russia would strongly reinforce the Alliance's capacity to accomplish these goals.

The second suggestion and linked to the first above, would be to return NATO to its original role as a purely defensive organisation and to reaffirm the validity of the first Article of its Treaty – that is – never to threaten or use force to resolve international disputes and always to operate in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter. In other words we need a "retro" NATO. ■

CIVILIAN CONTROL: THE PENTAGON EXPERIENCE



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Today, at the close of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the principle of democratic civilian control over the military is a widely accepted norm of defence management, which does not require much detailed substantiation, as may have been necessary 10-15 years ago. However, recent global developments in the field of defence have expedited the next priority of civilian control – from merely establishing democratic civilian control (i.e., assuming civilian responsibility for national defence and security) to providing truly effective democratic civilian control.

Necessity – in the previous decade – for the US military to adapt better to changes in the post-Cold War geostrategic environment, exacerbated – in this decade – by the stress resulting from two simultaneous military operations, in Iraq and Afghanistan, naturally catalysed the search for new ways and techniques of providing for organisation, support and control of troops going into battle. Some results of this search were widely publicised by the media, like the rapid introduction of unmanned warfare, widespread use of civilian contractors in the combat zone, the growing role of ready reserves, etc.

Meanwhile, efforts by Americans to increase the effectiveness of civilian management in the Pentagon have been less publicised. These efforts also were very energetic, resolute, and sometimes controversial, but they had no less profound a significance, than, for instance, the broad introduction of “robotisation” or “contractisation”. The gist of these efforts has been to provide for better motivation of about 700,000 of the Pentagon’s civilian workforce, and to organise more effectively their professional development – first of all, of those 2,000 or so senior executives who, at the very top of the hierarchy, define the quality of civilian control.

Such efforts stand in contrast to the situation in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), where modernisation of military equipment, as well as the establishment of a viable democratic civilian control system, are still lagging behind the world’s best practices. Presented below are some thoughts on the current measures to strengthen civilian control in the US Department of Defence (DoD), and the applicability of this experience to Ukraine.¹

Indeed, since the time (October 2000) of publication of the Razumkov Centre’s background study “Democratic Civilian Control over the Military in Ukraine: The Path from Form to Substance”, the attention of both the general public and the expert community in Ukraine has somewhat shifted from the wider issues of troop readiness and the establishment of democratic civilian control towards the more specific projects of professionalisation, NATO accession, weapons modernisation, disposal of obsolete ammunition, housing, and other problems.

Nevertheless, the passage of time has proved again that some “basics” of democratic civilian control should always be remembered. The creation of civilian defence

ministries in post-communist countries marked not only a formal tribute to the standards of modern democratic governance. First and foremost, it carried the key function of democratic civilian control over the military. Democracy, in its true sense, means (among other things) public accountability. In other words, it expects individual governmental officials and structures to function legally and effectively, and to be transparent to parliamentary, media and society control. This is in contrast to an authoritarian or a totalitarian regime, where the head of the defence ministry in most cases is a uniformed general responding directly and solely to the leader of the state, who also very often either wears the uniform or has some type of military background.

¹ The author is grateful to Mr. James Greene for encouragement in preparation of this article and to Dr. Lubomyr Hajda for editorial support.

Democratic civilian control also means that civilian authorities within the MOD assume responsibility for the state of the country's defences and for the state of military institutional (i.e., Armed Forces) readiness, equipment and morale. This responsibility is delegated to them by the people (*demos*) through the mechanism of democratic elections. For the viability of civilian control, civilians are supposed to maintain close ties to, but still remain outside of, the corporative military ranks and provide for the appropriate spending of resources in the interest of defence, effective personnel policies, and other managerial tasks. The civilian leadership of the MOD is expected to implement major policy development, administrative control, legal support, procurement and budgetary functions, leaving for the uniformed military their proper tasks of training troops, operations planning, and conduct of operations.

The above truism holds for all democracies, be it the USA or Ukraine. Effective civilian leadership, or lack of it, predetermines the degree of success or failure in all areas of development of the national defence. But the definition of effectiveness for civilians in the MOD in many respects has a meaning rather similar to what constitutes effectiveness for the military in the General Staff with whom they work. Apart from specific communications, managerial and political skills, being effective for civilians in the MOD (or in the Pentagon) means having effective selection and motivation systems, and acquiring of necessary skills and practices through individual experience and through the formal system of civilian professional education and development.

US DoD Civil Service: the search for better performance

The US system of civilian control, with its decades-long tradition of development and practice, might seem quite mature – from the perspective of Ukraine, where even after a decade democratic civilian control was still at the stage of introduction. Nevertheless, some American experts like, for instance, Ashton Carter, have subjected it to criticism.²

Ashton Carter has insisted that there were significant security issues in the US requiring repair. For instance, he has insisted on a greater involvement by the president in the management of defence: *“One need not look far to find signs that the next president must start paying attention to his role as a manager of means, not just a definier of ends.”*³

His fundamental thesis was that institutions that support and complement the combat forces do not correspond to present-day and future requirements. He identified a general human resource problem of security governance that: *“Top-flight people refuse to serve at all levels of government, from high political posts to the civilian and uniformed services, because the conditions of public service are often demeaning and frustrating. Good people already in government are leaving, and those who remain often feel that their potential for creative leadership is stifled.”*

For the Pentagon in particular, Ashton Carter suggested that: *“The DOD's civilian personnel system needs even more fundamental reform. Unlike the uniformed system,*



the civilian system has not had the edge in quality for some time. This system is out of touch with the labor market and the changing needs of the DOD. Worse, it stifles professional development and innovation in its workforce.”

As a true expert, Ashton Carter suggested his vision of building a more effective and flexible civilian personnel system: *“The new system would have more flexible pay and hiring rules, portable pensions, and other provisions that allow people to enter, leave, and reenter government service. The civilian system should tie compensation to performance ... And it should provide for professional training ...”*

It should be noted that the Pentagon leadership under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, especially after the events of 9 September 2001, which occurred soon after the critique by Ashton Carter was published, indeed undertook to implement a number of the suggested measures and even more.

In order to provide for better motivation of senior DoD executives (SES Corps – senior executive service)⁴, the Congress supported the Pentagon in introducing the “pay-for-performance” system, which with time was supposed to spread over the entire civilian governmental workforce. This allowed a much greater financial stimulus both for career civil servants, and for political appointees, and permitted more flexibility for the supervisors in the application of these stimuli (up to the salary level for the Under Secretary of Defence). A special provision was adopted to allow a number (as many as 300) of much needed talents to be hired at a salary reaching the level of the Vice-President's.

Certainly, not all senior executives were happy, and many complaints were lodged with Congress. The Congress, in turn addressed the Secretary of Defence (Donald Rumsfeld and later Robert Gates) with requests for clarifications and demands for reviews and revisions of certain particular practices. By the time President Barack Obama's administration came into office, it became obvious, that some amendments indeed might be necessary in order to reduce subjectivity on the part of managers in applying criteria for “pay-for-performance” application. But the flexible approach itself, which links pay to performance, will probably remain in place, since it is unlikely that the salary system will fully revert to the previous generally non-stimulating bureaucratic state.

² Ashton Carter was former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during President Bill Clinton's first term. On March 18, 2009, nominated by President Barack Obama as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

It may be noted that Ashton Carter visited Razumkov Centre in late February 2000, with a delegation headed by former Secretary of Defense, William Perry. (See picture in *NS&D* #2, 2000, p.39). Issues of democratic civilian control were discussed during the meeting.

³ A.Catrer hereinafter quoted from: Ashton B. Carter. *Keeping America's Military Edge*. – Foreign Affairs, vol.80, no.1, January/February 2001, pp.90105.

⁴ The total number of the Pentagon's senior executive service (SES) employees stands at over 1,200. In this case, SES employees roughly correspond to military general officers. Their Ukrainian equivalents (since Ukraine still doesn't have the rank of “brigadier general”), would approximate all civilian state servant positions from section head/deputy head of directorate (kerivnyk viddilu/zastupnyk kerivnyka upravlinnia) and above.



On another point, in cases when there was urgent need for quality civilian experts, but not enough availability of qualified civil servants, the Pentagon greatly expanded the hiring of private defence contractors. In order to fill vacant positions of governmental employees at the middle and lower levels quickly and effectively and maintain a high level of collective performance, the Pentagon allowed a much deeper penetration of contractors into areas of sensitive authority, like, for instance, intelligence or acquisitions. With time, the mixing of public and private roles became so deep that in 2008 the US Government Accountability Office expressed concern over a situation when in the US Army contractors often replaced governmental employees in the decision-making process, which they were not fully authorised to do. *"The line separating contractor from government employee is blurry, and we found situations in which contractor employees were not clearly identified as such to the general public and cases where they were listed as the government's point of contact on contract documents. In situations such as these, contractor employees may appear to be speaking for the government, a situation that could create the impression in the general public that they are government employees."*⁵

In this case, the DoD decided to reverse the increased reliance on the private sector and revert more attention back to governmental employees. Such a shift was already suggested by Secretary Gates in the 2010 DoD budget proposal to the Congress. According to some observers, *"The budget would reverse a contracting boom, beginning after the 2001 terrorist attacks, in which the proportion of private contractors grew to 39 percent of the Pentagon's workforce. Gates said he wants to reduce that percentage to a pre-Sept. 11 level of 26 percent. The government said it would hire as many as 13,000 civil servants to replace contractors in the coming year and up to 39,000 over the next five years."*⁶

It would appear from the above two cases, that despite the fact that these reforms in civilian management in the Pentagon provided urgently needed short-term answers, they also proved that not every quick and decisive solution for issues of motivation and flexibility of civilian employees would easily pass the test for longer term requirements for a stable working environment.

However, in the third major effort to increase the effectiveness of civilian control, i.e., in strengthening the system of civilian professional training, the Pentagon has seemingly managed to find the appropriate solution. In the search for the most appropriate model, improvements resulted from such efforts as increasing the civil servants' general knowledge of national security environment; providing mid-level executive leadership with more exposure to the joint war-fighting and interagency perspective; and, most importantly, bringing senior civilian leader development programs up to the level of those for senior professional military programs.

IMPROVEMENT OF SENIOR CIVILIAN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Formally, programs for mid-level executive leader development (ELDP – Executive Leader Development Program) and senior civilian leader development

(DLAMP – Defence Leadership and Management Program) already existed when Ashton Carter published his critique. However, senior civilian career advancement depended on the professional education qualifications to a much lesser degree, than in the military. As a result, the previous approach to SES professional development – rather less effectual and less connected to criteria of career advancement – was viewed more and more as a liability in efforts to create a true Total Force.⁷

As was noted in a May 2006 DoD Defence Business Board report: *"We found in our interviews that the concept of "executive development" for SES Corps within the Department is virtually non-existent. Executive development is under funded, undervalued, and underutilised. Those who participate in development activities are either self-nominated or sent by their organisation because they can be spared. This is quite unlike the officer Corps where development opportunities are either mandated or a prerequisite for advancement, with prioritisation given to those with the highest potential. This must change if the SES Corps is to reach its potential as equal partners with the military in helping the Department achieve mission objectives. The need is most acute in developing the general management capabilities of those with the potential and aspiration to advance to higher levels of responsibility."*⁸

This observation simply confirmed the already evident necessity of reform. Attempts to modify senior civilian leader development program DLAMP started during President George W. Bush's first administration and continued through his second term. These attempts led to making DLAMP more inclusive (involving more participants from lower grades), longer term (about five years in total duration), and more encompassing (requirement for senior level professional military education (PME) course, courses in national security studies and business management courses).

In the middle of the decade, at any given moment the program included hundreds of senior participants in three different tracks (see the DLAMP chart), which evidently made it difficult to manage. And lacking still was a significant enough link between education under DLAMP and career advancement.

However, in 2007, after the transition of DoD leadership from Rumsfeld to Gates, DLAMP was modified again, this time in order to become shorter in time (two years, reduced from five years in DLAMP), more straightforward (two tracks, reduced from the three tracks in DLAMP), but more rigorous. The successor program was named the Defence Senior Leadership Development Program (DSLDP). The new program envisioned about 100 participants selected from among 120 nominees.

Candidates, among other things, should display senior leader competence and exceptional performance, possess a minimum of one year (preferably more) of significant supervisory experience, and provide supervisory recommendation. They should occupy service positions at the two governmental levels (of GS-14 or GS-15 – approximately equivalent to the military ranks of Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel) – proceeding to the SES level (civilian equivalents of the military ranks of general officers), and

⁵ Government Accountability Office. "Defence Contracting: Army Case Study Delineates Concerns with Use of Contractors as Contract Specialists." GAO-08-360, March 2008, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08360.pdf

⁶ Dana Hedgpeth. "Contracting Boom Could Fizzle Out: Jobs Would Return to Pentagon." *Washington Post*, April 7, 2009.

⁷ In general, the concept of Total Force means that all DoD components (Active Troops, National Guard, Reserves, civilian governmental employees and contractors) meet equally high performance standards.

⁸ Defence Business Board. Report to the Secretary of Defence: Shaping and Utilizing the SES Corps Task Group. Recommendations regarding better utilisation and overall executive selection, development, performance pay, and retention of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in the Department of Defence, May 2006, p.16.



obtain a Top Secret clearance. Additionally, they had to sign a Continuing Service Agreement, meant to provide for mobility of the employee and service up to “three times the length of the program after completing their studies.”

During the two years, they would have to study together with senior military officers (in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, colonel, brigadier general) in a 10-month course at one of the five top-level military colleges (Army War College, College of Naval Warfare, Air War College, National War College, or Industrial College of the Armed Forces) and take part in selected leadership seminars. They would also be required to commit to individual development (i.e., to complete the IDP – Individual Development Program). For instance, the progression model for the future DSLDP Class of 2010 is shown below.

With regard to the DSLDP seminars (#1 – Joint Leadership; #2 – Interagency Leadership; #3 – Multinational Leadership; #4 – Capstone), these would be held at one specific location (unless specified otherwise). Typically, participants would have to come to the Center four times for 3-5 days’ “real-world” seminar to address the issues facing the Department today.

It is indicated in the DSLDP that formally, the successful completion of the program does not “guarantee” promotion. However, it is stated that DSLDP graduates will be “highly competitive” for responsible positions. In any case, it is evident that apart from the purely “civilian” (in contrast to military) specifics of age, uniform, less demanding requirements for length of service in a position, or fewer requirements for the level of physical fitness, the other professional qualifications for civilian executives at the DoD (education, mobility, operational experience) very closely approximate those for the active military leadership.

The state of affairs in Ukraine

In Ukraine, more-or-less substantive progress in introducing a system of democratic civilian control appeared only in 2002, when Ukraine’s political leadership took a decision to declare Ukraine’s course towards accession to NATO. At about the same time, the first attempts were made to organise professional education and development for MOD civil servants. The governmental decision was made⁹ to provide for a 10-month resident professional military education course (18 months by correspondence) at the National Defence Academy (since 2008 – University).¹⁰

Soon after, in 2003 – 2004, a Strategic Defence Review was conducted for the first time in Ukraine, with support of NATO international staff experts. This review stressed the importance of development of a viable system of democratic civilian control over the military in Ukraine. The first practical results at that stage were the transformation of the MOD main directorates controlled by military personnel into departments controlled by civilian personnel. The leadership of the MOD became mostly civilian, and a key structure of the civilian MOD (Department of Policy and Planning) was created. However, transformations at this stage were mostly structural; there was still a significant shortage of qualified civilian personnel to manage MOD functions and a lack of developed procedures and techniques, especially in the areas of policy development and strategic planning, defence diplomacy, budgeting and resource management.

The arrival in February 2005, after the Orange Revolution, to the MOD of a new team under the leadership of the Minister, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, allowed the beginning of the first systemic transformations. In fact, during 2005, the creation of the new civilian-run Ministry of Defence was completed. The practice of appointing civilian officials as minister and deputy ministers of defence was approved, and standards for all important functions of a civilian MOD were established.

However, new structures with new functions required new people, especially for the civil service. Earlier existing opportunities to train civilian specialists at the National Academy of State Administration (under the Secretariat of the President), at the National Defence University of Ukraine (under the MOD), and in the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany) were not utilised to their existing capacity and thus did not produce the necessary numbers of professional civil servants, and were not flexible enough to support the growing needs of the MOD and other security structures.

To assist Ukraine meet its needs, in October 2005, NATO initiated the Professional Development Program providing funds and training opportunities for Ukrainian civilian security personnel (and in some cases also military). Under the supervision of the Head of NATO Liaison Office, the NATO-national Program Manager, and the UK Special Defence Advisor (representing the lead nation), together with representatives of the respective Ukrainian authorities, a matrix of requirements was developed and assistance in the civil servants’ selection, training abroad and placement processes was organised. As a result, by the period 2007-2008, the most urgent needs in civilian personnel, capable to exercise effectively the day-to-day functions of democratic control over the military were satisfied.

CONCLUSIONS

At the moment, three major Pentagon reform efforts at civilian control, which have practical value for Ukraine, can be distinguished: a more substantial differentiation of civilian pay dependent on the assessment of their performance; broad introduction of private defence contractors to make up for the gaps in expertise in some urgent cases; and, finally and most importantly, the strengthening of the system of professional development for civil servants, in the first instance from the senior echelon.

With time, in the MOD of Ukraine, the pool of retired military personnel with necessary education and experience still willing to contribute to the country’s defence in a civilian capacity after retirement from active service, will naturally shrink. The cost of an effective professional military will definitely grow. So, while the pool of educated retired military officers will get smaller, more efforts will be needed to provide for effective senior civilian defence management. In other words, more efforts will be needed to make the system of development of career defence and security civilian force operational.

The recent experience of the Pentagon in improving its civilian management could prove useful to Ukraine. This experience could help to attract attention to similar Ukrainian needs and to put the system of civilian professional development on the right track. ■

⁹ See: Resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine #1749, November 11, 2002.

¹⁰ Budgetary constraints on the one hand, and a still abundant number of educated retired officers willing to continue their work at the MOD in a civilian capacity on the other, make this provision yet to be fully implemented and pending to be included in a more systemic national civilian development program.

SECURITY IN THE PUBLIC EYES: FROM NATIONAL TO PERSONAL

Steady social and economic development of a society vitally depends on the adequate level of a country's security. Effective security, first of all – human security, should be among the priority functions of the state.¹

The shift of accents from state to personal security, human security in present-day approaches is not just a trend of the day but a reflection of the fact that the level of national security may be deemed acceptable, when protected are not only the territory or sovereignty of the state but also basic rights of every human being and entire society. This in no way means that issues of national security should be considered secondary, since there is a direct connection and interdependence of the state and citizens' security. Threats to national security, as a rule, have a comprehensive nature and, as the world experience shows, the greatest risks for the state breakdown arise where there are multiple problems of personal, economic, political or environmental security.²

Attempts of purely numeric identification of the level of security are questionable. Meanwhile, there are indicators that can present reference points for assessment of the level of specific threats by politicians and experts. Such indicators may include: the history of earlier conflicts on the country's territory and near its borders, indices of economic development, pressing political, economic, environmental problems, unresolved ethnic and religious contradictions, the character of public mood, dependent on the standard of life and guarantee of social justice, etc. As we know, the urgency of threats, risks, problems depends not only on unbiased indicators but, not last, on its perception by politicians, the citizens, entire society.

People's assessment of their personal security, security of their friends and relatives, protection of their homes, property, business more depends on internal rather than external factors. The political and economic crisis at home, environmental and industrial accidents, military conflicts in the region and all over the world, daily criminal news and reports of terrorist attacks influence the people's feeling of their security, even if they are not immediately affected by those threats.

Evidently, the public assessment of the personal security level or national security of a country may seriously differ from the official or independent expert conclusions. Meanwhile, data of public opinion polls should always

be taken into account at formulation of the state security policy and its information support.

Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service regularly studies the public opinion on different aspects of security.³ Despite some changes in assessments of personal security and national security as a whole, the feeling of insecurity of Ukraine's citizens from both military and non-military threats remains unchanged.

In particular, the results of the poll held in April 2009 prompt the following conclusions.

1. People assess the level of their protection against military and non-military threats as low: from 75.8%

¹ "...The activity of all state bodies should concentrate on forecasting, timely identification, prevention and neutralisation of external and internal threats to the national security, ... guarantee of personal security, constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms, eradication of crime, perfection of the state governance system, strengthening of law and order and maintenance of socio-political stability in society, consolidation of Ukraine's position in the world, maintenance on the proper level of its defence potential and defence capability....". – Law "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" (2003).

² Human Development Report 1994, Chapter 2 "New Dimensions of Human Security", p.38. – http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf

³ This material grounds on the results of polls held by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in June 2002 (2,006 respondents polled), April 2004 (2,020 respondents), October 2006 (2,006 respondents), March 2008 (2,010 respondents), August 2008 (2,009 respondents), April 2009 (2,010 respondents), and December 2009 (2,010). All polls were conducted with samples representative of the adult population of Ukraine in terms of the key socio-demographic indicators (age, sex, settlement type, area of residence). The theoretical margin of error of each sample does not exceed 2.3%.



to 85.8% of those polled call themselves unprotected against natural disasters, terrorist attacks, military aggression, industrial accidents, attempts of alienation of property, epidemic diseases.

2. **People's assessments of internal and external sources of threat to Ukraine's security** are manifest. **Half (50.6%) of those polled believe that the main threat goes from the Ukrainian authorities.** The level of that threat is much higher than the level of external threats originating, in people's opinion, from NATO (30.9%), the USA (27.6%), Russia (21.4%). Another internal factor – confrontation between regions of Ukraine – poses, in people's opinion, as great insecurity for the country as international terrorism (35.6% and 36.7%, respectively).

Notable changes were recorded in assessments of internal and external threats over the past three years (2006-2009). Specifically:

- **the number of people seeing the national authorities as the main threat to Ukraine increased by 10.6%;**
- although, as before, the majority of those polled considers the level of external threat from the West to be higher than from the East, **the number of people beware of NATO fell by 6%, of the USA – by 9.2%;**
- the balance of affirmative and negative answers about Russia somewhat deteriorated: **the number of those polled viewing the Russian Federation as a threat to Ukraine increased by 3.4%,** while the number of those who share the opposite opinion actually did not change.

3. **The people's idea of the best model of Ukraine's national security substantially differs from the official position of the state.** Only 13% of those polled suggests that Ukraine "should be a NATO member", which is 3.2% lower than in 2006. The share of adherents of accession to the defence alliance involving Russia and CIS states (Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO) increased by 8.2%. There is a strong trend to a decrease in the number of adherents of the non-aligned policy and the policy of neutrality. The number of those who want Ukraine to be a non-aligned state over the past three years decreased by almost 10%, and of those who suggest that Ukraine should stay utmost neutral in case of a conflict between Russia and NATO decreased from 40.7% (2002) to 31.2% (2009); those who see Ukraine as a mediator in conflict settlement – from 22.9% to 16.7%, respectively. Meanwhile, an increase is recorded among those polled who in case of such conflict know whom Ukraine should side with: with Russia – from 20.8% (2002) to 33.7% (2009); NATO – from 3% to 5.8%, respectively. By and large, as before, the number of those polled who preferred Russia remains almost six times higher than those ready to side with NATO.

Many those polled also hope for assistance to Ukraine from Russia in case of foreign aggression:

32.6% – "under any circumstances", 30.8% – if Ukraine were an CSTO member. Despite the weak support for the Euro-Atlantic choice, four out of 10 polled see NATO as a defender in the event of aggression or a threat of aggression from a third country. The share of those who hope for NATO assistance "under any circumstances" remains stable in the range of 7-9%, of those who admit such a possibility on the condition, "if Ukraine were a NATO member" – fell from 46.1% (2002) to 32.4% (2009).

4. As we noted above, **half of all citizens believe that the main threat stems from the Ukrainian authorities.** This opinion correlates with the extremely low assessment of Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies performing the tasks of guarantee of citizens personal security, protection of their rights and freedoms; prevention of infringements, protection and provision of public order; detection and disclosure of crimes; provision of road traffic safety; protection of ownership against criminal encroachments; provision of social and legal assistance to citizens. Also evident, in the period of 2004-2009, no serious changes were observed in people's assessment of the work of one of the most critical sectors of the state.

Surveys conducted in October and December of 2009 dealt with people's perceptions and assessments of problems of the national Armed Forces. The survey results witness to the following.

1. **The activity of the Armed Forces, compared to other state institutes, enjoys the greatest support of the population, but in absolute figured that support is not too high.** For instance, in 2009, full support for the Armed Forces' activity ranged within 13-19%; the Armed Forces' activity was disapproved by 34-37% of those polled; from 31% to 40% of citizens supported separate steps made by the Armed Forces. Noteworthy, the dynamic of approval/disapproval of the Armed Forces' activity generally correlates with similar figures for other state institutes (that, as we mentioned, are much lower⁴) and from February 2005 till October 2009 in fact reflects the disappointment of the Ukrainian society about the actions of the "new rulers" who came to power in the result of the Orange Revolution that accompanied the presidential elections at the end of 2004.⁵

2. **The majority (63.3%) of citizens supports demands of the military for an increase in the state defence budget;** they are not supported by only 18.3%.

3. **People see the main reasons for the inability of the state to meet at least minimum demands of the army in the incompetence of the state leadership** (46.8%), concentration of the state on diplomatic methods of security guarantee (11.4%) and neglect of the security functions by the state (10%).

4. **In the situation where the state is unable to meet its obligations of providing privileges envisaged by the law for military servants, people would in the first place support revision of those**

⁴ For detailed data of monitoring of public support for the activity of state institutes see Razumkov Centre web site, <http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/socpolls.php>

⁵ Ibid. See also the dynamic of indices of social well-being and assessment of developments in the country.


privileges and practical provision of only the most important of them (47.6%); cancellation of privileges for military servants is accepted by only 10.6% of those polled.


5. The list of measures that could improve enrolment of people for military service was topped by implementation of extra non-material stimuli (priority right to employment in state service, law-enforcement

structures, etc.) – this step would be supported by 68.4% of those polled.

The majority (59.9%) of those polled would also support introduction of a tax on those who are obliged but unwilling to serve in the army, with the tax proceeds channelled to the defence budget.

The results of the mentioned public opinion polls are summed up in tables and diagrams below.




**Does Ukraine face a threat from...?**
% of those polled

	AGE																	
	18-29			30-39			40-49			50-59			60 and over					
	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say	Yes	No	Hard to say
Ukrainian authorities	52.6	36.1	11.3	49.4	40.2	10.4	51.2	40.0	8.8	55.1	39.1	5.8	47.0	39.0	14.0			
International terrorism	37.2	48.8	14.0	36.3	48.7	15.0	35.5	49.0	15.5	36.7	47.6	15.7	37.2	43.3	19.5			
Confrontation between different regions of Ukraine	38.4	46.7	14.9	31.1	50.7	18.2	35.8	49.1	15.1	39.3	49.1	11.6	34.0	47.5	18.5			
NATO	27.8	53.5	18.7	30.3	56.2	13.5	27.3	55.1	17.6	28.6	60.1	11.3	37.5	45.7	16.8			
USA	26.4	56.9	16.7	27.4	58.2	14.4	21.8	63.5	14.7	25.7	62.7	11.6	33.8	49.2	17.0			
Russia	23.4	65.5	11.1	25.1	67.7	7.2	22.8	69.7	7.5	16.7	74.5	8.8	18.7	72.8	8.5			
Other states	14.5	59.5	26.0	13.5	66.0	20.5	11.9	65.5	22.6	12.7	68.8	18.5	13.5	63.0	23.5			

What prevents Ukraine from formulation and implementation of an effective course of guarantee of its national security?*
% of those polled


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* Respondents were supposed to mark all acceptable answers.


Which model of national security of Ukraine do you support? % of those polled

April 2009




Would Russia defend Ukraine in case of aggression or a threat of aggression from a foreign state? % of those polled

April 2009




Would NATO defend Ukraine in case of aggression or a threat of aggression from a foreign state?
% of those polled

April 2009




How would you vote if the referendum on Ukraine's NATO accession was held the following Sunday?
% of those polled




How should Ukraine behave in case of a conflict between Russia and NATO? % of those polled


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
Do you support the activity of the Ukrainian army? % of those polled




**Today, the Ukrainian state can't satisfy even the minimum needs of the army.
To which assessment of this fact you agree the most? In your opinion this is...**
% of those polled




Do you support the activity of the police?
% of those polled



How do law-enforcement bodies cope with the following tasks?
% of those polled



Imagine the situation: you see a policeman at night, in an empty street. You will see him as...?
% of those polled






Do you support the demand of the military to increase the defence budget?

% of those polled


December 2009



How should the state behave in circumstances when it is unable to fulfill its obligation to provide due benefits for servicemen?

% of those polled

December 2009



Protection of Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity is the constitutional duty of its citizens. However, a small percentage of those eligible to military service are involved in the duty fulfillment. Would you support the following measures that might possibly improve the situation?

% of those polled

December 2009

