

# UKRAINIAN SOCIETY, STATE AND CHURCH IN WAR. CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN UKRAINE 2023

(Information Materials)

Religion and Church in Ukrainian Society: 2000-2023 (sociological study):

- · Level and Nature of Religiosity of Ukrainian Society
- Religion, Church and Society
- The Church and the State
- Citizen Assessment of Inter-Religious, Inter-Faith and Inter-Church Relations
- · Attitudes towards the Transition to the Revised Julian Calendar

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Background: The Roundtable «Religion and Power in Ukraine: Problems of Interrelations», organised by the Razumkov Centre in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine, has been taking place since 1996, consistently bringing together the leaders and representatives of the largest Christian churches and religious organisations in Ukraine. Invitees include representatives of government authorities, the public, the media and the expert community. Key issues discussed at the Roundtable concern the improvement of state-confessional relations and the introduction of a partnership model in relations between the State and the Church in Ukraine. In particular, the Roundtable participants elaborated the draft Concept of State-Church Relations in Ukraine and presented it to the state and the public in 2004, receiving support of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations of Ukraine.

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# RELIGION AND CHURCH IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: 2000-2023

(sociological study)

The Razumkov Centre permanently monitors the church and religious situation in Ukraine, including sociological monitoring of the state and trends of Ukrainian society's religiosity, public confidence in the Church as a social institution, as well as the public opinion on the role of religion and the Church in public life, relations between the state and churches, among different churches and confessions.

In 2000 the Centre carried out the first ever large-scale survey in independent Ukraine on the level and features of religiosity of Ukrainians, their idea of the role of religion and the Church in the life of a man, society and the state. Since then, the Centre's Sociological Service has been conducting regular general and thematic surveys on these issues.

The most recent national-wide survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service in November 2023, with support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine and included a poll of Ukrainian citizens with a sample representing the adult population of the government-controlled areas of Ukraine (the poll was not held in temporarily occupied territories or the territories where hostilities were taking place).<sup>2</sup>

In addition to traditional monitoring questions, the latest survey particularly focused on citizens' perceptions of how the Church responds to the problems and challenges of the day (including its activity in the context of the russian aggression against Ukraine), citizens' ideas of the role and essence of the social mission of religious organisations, motives for commitment of religious rites.

The sociological survey results and their comparison with the data of past surveys are presented below.<sup>3</sup> The survey findings are summarised in tables and figures. Comparative analysis of the survey results makes it possible to briefly outline the trends of Ukrainian society's religiosity over the past 20 years and to draw the following conclusions.

- <sup>1</sup> For detailed research results for 2000, see N. Dudar, L. Shangina, Religion and faith in the life of Ukrainians. Razumkov Centre, 2000, Kyiv, 2001, p.267-280; for 2010, see Church and religious situation and state-confessional relations in Ukraine: outcomes of the decade, trends and problems. Analytical report of the Razumkov Centre, National Security & Defence, 2011, No.1-2, p.2-77, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD119 2011 ukr.pdf
- <sup>2</sup> Face-to-face interviews were conducted on 9-15 November 2023 in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions was only carried out in government-controlled areas not subject to hostilities).

The survey was based on a stratified multi-stage sampling with random selection at the initial sampling stages and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected based on gender and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

A total of 2,020 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the effects of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

<sup>3</sup> Comparing the results of the latest survey with those of previous studies, one should keep in mind that that surveys in 2000 and 2010 were carried out throughout the entire territory of Ukraine; the 2014 survey was conducted in all regions except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; and 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 surveys were carried out throughout the country excluding the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.



### 1. LEVEL AND NATURE OF RELIGIOSITY OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

1. Throughout the entire period of research, Ukrainian society has demonstrated a fairly high level of religiosity. In particular, compared to 2000, the number of Ukrainians who identify themselves as believers increased from 58% in 2000 to 71% at the end of 2010.4 Later, in 2010-2020, the share of believers among adult citizens of Ukraine averaged 70%.

Meanwhile, the 2014 survey found an increase in the number of believers from 67% in the «pre-war» 2013 to 76%, which is normal for society in a stress situation. This figure still remains the highest for all the years of monitoring; later, it has been declining and stood at 68% at the end of 2021. With the outbreak of full-scale russian aggression, it jumped to 74%, but then dropped slightly again in 2023 to 70.5% (from 84% of respondents in the West to 60% in the East).

If increase in the share of believers in 2022 compared to 2021 was primarily due to adults living in the Centre (from 63.5% to 76%), then figures for this region in 2023 decreased from 76% to 69%, while changes in other regions compared to the previous year are statistically insignificant (Figure «Irrespective of whether you go to church or not, who do you think you are?»).

2. Regional differences in all aspects of religious, confessional and church self-identification of Ukrainian citizens persists. Ukraine's West traditionally has the highest level of religiosity, and the East has the lowest. However, compared to 2000, the share of those who call themselves believers has increased in the Centre, South and East, and has not changed in the West. Therefore, the difference between regions in the share of believers is decreasing. Regional differences in specific aspects of religiosity, respondents'

positions and assessments are discussed further in the text.<sup>5</sup>

3. Study findings show that the level of religiosity continues to depend on gender, age, and place of residence (urban/rural).

Religiosity is traditionally higher in older age groups compared to younger ones (in 2023, the lowest number of believers was among those aged 18-24 — 55%, while ranging from 65% to 78% in other age groups).

There are more believers among women than men (78% and 62%, respectively). Also, the share of believers is higher among rural residents (75%) than among city dwellers (68%). In 2022, compared to previous years, religiosity increased among people with higher or incomplete higher education and virtually did not change among respondents with secondary and secondary special education, making the level of religiosity approximately equal across all educational groups. In 2023, the share of believers in different educational groups also did not differ statistically.

24% of respondents said that after the outbreak of russia's full-scale war against Ukraine (after February 2022), they became more religious and pious than before; 5% — less religious and pious than before the war; and 67% reported no changes in their attitudes towards religion and faith.

With older age, more respondents become firmer in their faith — their share increases from 17% among those under 25 to 28.5% among those aged 60+. The share of such people is highest in the West (31%) and South (27%), and lowest in the East (16%). They are especially numerous among the faithful of the UGCC (36%), the UOC-MP (35%), the OCU (32%). There are significantly fewer of them among «just Orthodox» (11%) and «just Christians» (15%), Figure «After the outbreak of russia's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Hereinafter, the terms «believers», «non-believers», «Orthodox», «faithful to the OCU (UGCC, UOC-MP)», «just Christians», «just Orthodox» and others mean the groups of respondents who associate themselves with relevant categories. The number of representatives of other denominations is insufficient for their statistical analysis as separate groups.

The regions are broken down as follows — **West**: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi oblasts; **Centre**: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts and the city of Kyiv; **South**: Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. «Regional affiliation» of respondents was determined by their place of residence before the beginning of the large-scale russian aggression, that is, before 24 February 2022. The only exception is that for the analysis of regional differences in answers to the question «What are the relations among believers of different churches and religions in the region where you live?», the place of respondent's residence at the time of survey was taken into account.



full-scale war against Ukraine do you think you became...?»).

4. Respondents' declaration of affiliation with a particular religious organisation or church is not always related to their identification as a believer and may be due to their socio-cultural or ethnic identity.

For instance, some respondents faithful of the OCU (11.5%), the UOC-MP (5%) and the UGCC (2%) identified themselves as individuals wavering faith and non-belief, while among the faithful of some churches (OCU and UOC-MP), a small proportion (not more than 1%) called themselves non-believers or atheists, and no more than 2% — indifferent to religious issues.

Among «just Orthodox», 70% called themselves believers, 21% wavered between faith and non-belief, 3% identified themselves as non-believers or atheists, and 4% were indifferent to religion. This suggests that some citizens' belonging to Orthodox Christians is more linked to their socio-cultural or ethnic identity rather than their religious identity. This is especially true for the group of «just Christians», as only 52% of them called themselves believers, while 21% wavered between faith and non-belief, 6% were non-believers or atheists, and 10% did not care about religion.

Meanwhile, among those who did not associate themselves with any religion, 12% called themselves believers, 18% wavered between faith and non-belief, 46.5% were non-believers or atheists, and 15% were indifferent to religious issues.

It is noteworthy that religious identity as such is far less important to Ukrainians than civic or regional (local) identities. Answering the question: «Which social community do you identify yourself with in the first place?», 75% of respondents said, «with citizens of Ukraine», 14.5% — «with residents of my city (village)», 4% — «with residents of my region», and only 2% — «with people of the same faith», and 1% — «with people of the same Church to which I belong». The importance of association with co-believers or members of the same church is more pronounced among

the faithful of the UOC-MP – 11% of them primarily identify themselves with people of the same faith or church, compared to 6% of the UGCC faithful and 3% of the OCU faithful.

During the monitoring period, most citizens expressed an opinion that religious faith does not require mandatory religious affiliation. Currently, 56% of respondents (64% in 2000) believe that «a person can be just a believer and not profess a particular religion».6 This viewpoint clearly prevails in all regions but the West, where the majority (57%) of respondents support the opinion that «a believer must profess one religion or another». Most of such respondents are the faithful of the UGCC (66%) and the UOC-MP (58%), while only 43% of the OCU faithful share this view. Representatives of the oldest age group of 60+ are more likely than members of other age groups to think that a believer must necessarily profess one religion or another (43%; in other age groups – from 30% to 36%). (Figure «Which of the following statements about a believer would you agree with the most?»).

5. Distribution of Ukrainians' confessional preferences has not changed much since the beginning of the monitoring, as most respondents identify themselves with Orthodoxy (61% in 2023); quite many people called themselves Greek Catholics and «just Christians» (11% each).

Other denominations and religions (Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Judaism, etc.) have fewer followers. In 2021, the Razumkov Centre recorded the highest share of those who did not identify themselves with any religion (19%) for the entire history of studies, but after the outbreak of full-scale war their share dropped to 12% in 2022, slightly rising to 13% in 2023 (Figure «Which religion do you belong to?»).

Confessional self-determination has distinct regional specifics. The largest number of Orthodox Christians is typical for the Centre (72%). They make up 66% in the South, and only 56% in the East, which is significantly less than in 2022 (64.5%). At the same time, compared to last year, the East saw a significant increase in the share of those who do not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This opinion was shared by the majority (from 56% to 64%) of respondents throughout the entire period of the Razumkov Centre's surveys on the topic (2000-2023).



identify with any religion — from 17% to 24%. In the West, Orthodox Christians make only 45%, while 40% of residents of this region call themselves Greek Catholics. Also, in the West there are significantly fewer people who identify themselves as «just Christians» (3.5%, compared to 14% in other regions). Similarly, there are fewer people in the West and Centre (8% and 10%, respectively), who do not associate themselves with any religion, compared to the South and East (18% and 24%, respectively).

Just as the number of believers increases with age, the share of Orthodox Christians goes up from 44% among young people aged 18-24 to 67.5% among those aged 60+, while the number of believers of other denominations and religions shows no statistically significant differences across age groups. The younger the respondents, the higher the number of those who do not belong to any religion (from 9% among those aged 60+ to 27% among those under 25).

6. In contrast to fairly stable confessional affiliations, notable changes occur in the church self-determination of Orthodox believers, due to changes in the organisational pattern of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and the impact of russia's full-scale aggression on public consciousness.

Until 2018, three major Orthodox denominations acted in Ukraine de jure and de facto - the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (UAOC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). In 2010-2018, the number of the UOC-MP followers was steadily decreasing (from 24% in 2010 to 12% in 2018), while the number of believers of the UOC-KP was growing (from 15% in 2010 to 29% in 2018).

In December 2018, the UOC-KP and the UAOC merged into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which received a Tomos of Autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in January 2019.

However, the number of the OCU faithful in 2020 was lower (20%) than the number of the UOC-KP followers in 2018, reflecting a certain disorientation of many believers in

their church identification after the statements of Patriarch Filaret of the UOC-KP to revoke his signature under the decision to establish the OCU and proclaim the restoration of the UOC-KP. At the same time, the number of Ukrainians who identified themselves as «just Orthodox» increased from 23% in 2018 to 27% in 2020 (another 1% did not know which Orthodox church they belonged to. See Figure «Which Orthodox church do you belong to?»). However, already in 2021, the share of those who identified themselves as the OCU faithful increased to 24%, further growing to 36% in 2022, and 42% in 2023.

After the outbreak of a full-scale war against Ukraine, the number of those who associate themselves with the UOC-MP has dropped significantly from 13% in 2021 to just 6% in 2023.

In recent years, there has been a steady decrease in the number of those who identify themselves as "just Orthodox" — from 27% in 2020 to 22% in 2021, to 19% in 2022 and to 13% in 2023.

In 2023, the largest share of the OCU faithful was found in the Centre (52%), followed by the South (40%), the West (36.5%), and the East (31%). Followers of the UOC-MP in western and central make up only 4% of all respondents, but their share is higher in the East (8%) and the South (11%). The lowest number of «just Orthodox» is found in the West (4%), while in other regions their shares range within 15-16%.

Socio-demographic structure of the faithful of the largest churches. Residents of the central regions are most represented in the regional structure of the OCU faithful (51.5% of all followers of this church) (Figure *«Structure of religious and church groups»*). Also, residents of the Centre make up the majority of *«just Orthodox»* (51%) and *«just Christians»* (53%).

The regional structure of the UOC-MP faithful is most represented by residents of the Centre (33%) and East (27%), while the UGCC structure is dominated by those living in the West of Ukraine (95%). As for Ukrainians who do not identify themselves with any religion, the largest number of them live in the East (36%) and the Centre (32%).



The faithful of the UOC-MP are most represented by the oldest age group of 60+ (43%), while people of this age make up 32% among the faithful of the OCU and only 25% among the UGCC followers.

The structure of the UOC-MP followers is also distinctive in that more than two-thirds (67.5%) of them are women. For comparison, women make up 59.5% among the faithful of the OCU, 56.5% among the faithful of the UGCC — 56.5%, and 55.5% among «just Orthodox». Instead, men form the majority among «just Christians» (55%) and those who do not identify themselves with any religion (60.5%).

7. There is a significant difference between the declared religiosity (70.5% of respondents call themselves believers, and 61% — Orthodox) and their identification with a particular religious community.

When describing church and confessional self-identification, researchers often focus on the citizens' nominal self-attribution to one or another church, although churched people must belong to a certain religious community. Only 24% admitted to being a member of a community (which, however, is still higher than in 2020, when their number was only 16%) (Figure «Are you a member of a certain religious community (parish)?»). The largest number of religious community members is found in the West (46%), with the Centre (18%), the South (13%), and the East (12%) falling far behind. With age, the respondents are more likely to call themselves members of a religious community (from 17% in the age group of 18-24 to 29% among those aged 60+). Rural residents are also more likely to be members of such communities than city dwellers (28.5% and 21%, respectively); the same is true for women and men (26.5% and 20%, respectively).

Belonging to a particular Church does not necessarily mean belonging to a religious community. Therefore, community membership was confirmed by 58% of the UGCC faithful, by 55% for the UOC-MP faithful, and by 25% of the OCU followers. Also, 7% of «just Christians», 9% of «just Orthodox» and 1% of those who do not identify themselves with any religion, called themselves members of religious communities.

Members of religious communities who associate themselves with the OCU make up 10.5% of all respondents (6% in 2021), and members of the Greek Catholic communities — 6% (same as in 2021). 3% of all respondents identified themselves as members of UOC-MP communities (4% in 2021).

8. The attendance of religious services by citizens did not change much. While in 2000, 49% of respondents reported attending religious services and meetings, and 51% did not attend them, later on more than half of respondents reported attending services (53% in 2023). Residents of the country's West attend religious services much more often (82%), than their compatriots in the East (33%), the South (41.5%), and in the Centre (47%).

Attendance of religious services increases from 41% among young people aged 18-24 to 58% in the oldest age group pf 60+. Rural residents are more likely to attend religious services than urban residents (60% and 49%, respectively), and women are more active church-goers than men (61% and 43.5%, respectively). The largest number of those who attend religious services is found among the UGCC faithful (95%), followed by the believers of the UOC-MP (73%) and the OCU (66%). Church services also attract some of «just Orthodox» (32%), «just Christians» (27%), and even those who do not identify with any religion (5%) (Figure «Do you attend religious services, meetings, ministries?»).

Meanwhile, only 31% of those who reported attending religious services and meetings do it regularly, at least once a week, which is, however, significantly more than in 2021, when their share was 20%. Now, they make 48% in the West, 36% in the South, 19% in the Centre, and 13% in the East. UGCC believers attend services most often – 54% of them do it at least once a week. The shares of those who attend such services among the faithful of the UOC-MP and the OCU are 43% and 24%, respectively. Those aged 60+ are more likely to report attending services at least once a week (40%), followed by those aged 50-59 (34.5%). In other age groups, the respective figures range from 22% to 27% of those who attend religious services.

A relative majority (42%) of those who attend religious services do that only on religious holidays. In the West, they make only 27%, but their share is notably higher in other parts of the country — 39% in the South, 50% in the East, and 56% in the Centre. The lowest number of those who only attend church on religious holidays is found among the faithful of the UGCC (21%), while their share increases among the followers of other Churches — the UOC-MP (34.5%), OCU (49%), as well as among «just Christians» (42%), and «just Orthodox» (64%) (Figure «How often do you attend religious services, meetings, ministries?»).

When asked "Did you attend the service last Sunday (Saturday, Friday)?", 23% of respondents give an affirmative answer (47% in the West, 20% in the South, 15% in the Centre, and only 9% in the East; from 30.5% among those aged 60+ to 12% of those aged 18 to 24; 31% of rural residents and only 19% urban residents; 27% of polled women and 17% of men, 59% of UGCC believers, 34.5% of the UOC-MP faithful, 24.5% of the OCU followers, as well as 8% among "just Christians" and 7% of "just Orthodox").

In recent years, some believers have been participating in religious services online. According to the latest survey, 15% of respondents took part in such services. Residents of western regions are much more likely to attend online services (35%), while in other regions this share ranges from 5% to 13%) (Figure "Did you participate in online religious services?").

As many as 47% of the faithful of the UGCC have participated in online services, while the followers of other churches were far less likely to do so (only 18% of the UOC-MP followers, and only 14% of the faithful of the OCU).

Based on the above, quite expectedly, the Church's use of the latest information technologies (social media, «church in a smartphone», etc.) is most welcomed by the faithful of the UGCC (66%), while the believers the UOC-MP (43.5%) and the OCU (47.5%) are a little less positive. Region-wise, the West has the largest support for such technologies (57%), and in other regions it ranges from 35% to 38%, with the country average of 42% (Figure «Currently the Church is actively using the latest information technologies...?»).

9. Changes in the believers' behaviour in wartime. When asked how the frequency of their visits to the church (house of prayer) has changed after the outbreak of the war, 53% of respondents said they attended church as before, 11% started attending the church more often, and 8% — less often (another 25% said they «neither went there before nor go there now»). The number of the latter is highest in the youngest age group (41.5% among those under 25). In contrast, those who admitted going to church more often are the most numerous among respondents aged 60+ (15%). In other age groups, these figures range from 6% to 11%.

More frequent church visits after the outbreak of the war were reported by 21% of the UGCC followers, 18% of the UGC-MP believers, 13% of the OCU believers, and only by 6% of «just Christians» and 4% of «just Orthodox». Also, 17% of Ukrainians living in the West, 10% in the Centre and the South, and only 4% in the East began attending church more often. In the East and South, 13% of respondents reported attending church less often than before the war, while in the West and Centre, only 5% and 7% of respondents respectively said so (Figure «Go to church (house of prayer)?»).

8% of respondents said that since the outbreak of the war they have started communicating with clergy more often, 7% have started communicating less often, and 44% communicate as before. Another 38% admitted that they «neither communicated before nor do it now», and the number of such people is the highest in the youngest age group (60%).

Residents of eastern regions (4%) are the least likely to admit that they have started communicating with priests more often after the beginning of the war, compared to other regions (8-10%), (Figure "Personally communicate with priests?").

7% of those polled have acknowledged that after the outbreak of the war they needed to communicate with fellow believers (members of their religious communities) more often, while 5% have said that their need for such communication reduced. For 51%, such a need has not changed, while another 30% have said they did not belong to any faith or religious community. Members of the oldest (60+) are the most likely (12%) to report greater



need for communication with other believers after the start of the war, while in other age groups this share ranges between 4% and 6%. (Figure «Need to communicate with fellow believers (members of your religious community?»).

10. In the period between 2000 and 2020, the share of those who reported regular donations to the Church ranged from 9 to 11%. According to the latest survey, this share has slightly increased to 15%. Compared to the beginning of 2000, there is a decline in the share of those who provided such assistance «rarely» (from 38% in 2000 to 26.5% in 2023) and those who did it (from 36% to 25%, respectively). Over the past decade, the share of those who make donations on major holidays and pay for prayers and rites has remained almost unchanged, ranging within 29-34% (33%, according to the latest survey), which is notably higher than in 2000 (16%). (Figure «Do you support the Church financially?»).

In 2023, 38% of religious community members regularly provided financial assistance to the Church, and only 8% of those who did not belong to the community; 33% and 24%, respectively, rarely do that; 25% and 35.5%, respectively, make donations on major holidays and pay for rites; and 4% and 32.5%, respectively, never support the Church financially.

Since western Ukraine has the largest number of residents who are members of religious communities, the share of those who regularly make donations to the Church is the highest there (33%), compared to other regions (6% to 11%). Among the faithful of different churches, the UGCC believers are most likely to regularly support their Church (43%). Among the faithful of the UOC-MP and the OCU these figures make 19% and 16%, respectively.

The highest number of those who never help the church can be found in the East (38%), among young people aged 18 to 24 (43%), and among those who do not associate themselves with any confession (76%). As for "giust Orthodox" and "giust Christians", the relative majority of them (45% and 44%, respectively) make donations on major holidays and pay for religious rites.

11. Motivation for attending religious services. Speaking about the motivation for

attending religious services, the attendees mostly mention communication with God (51%) and participation in prayers and religious rites (45%). Also, people say that attending religious services helps them calm down and forget about everyday worries (35%), that they want to listen to a sermon (34%), and that service helps address burdensome moral issues (30%).

15.5% do that because they have been doing this all their lives; 14% motivate their church attendance by the need to stay among the like-minded people and those who they like, and only 3% say that the religious community gives them some kind of help or support (Figure «What is the purpose of you attending religious services, meetings, ministries?»). Compared to the «pre-war» 2021, the number of those who explain their attending of religious services by the fact that this allows them to forget about everyday worries and helps address moral issues has somewhat increased.

Residents of Ukraine's West (64%) are more likely than residents of other regions (33% to 44%) to mention communication with God; the same applies to participation in prayers and religious rites (53% in the West vs 35% to 43% in other regions). At the same time, those living in the West are less likely to motivate their church attendance by the fact that they have simply done so all their lives (9%, compared to 17% to 21% in other regions).

While in 2022, the youngest age group demonstrated the increasing motivation to participate in religious services because it helps them calm down and forget about everyday worries (from 17% to 30%), the importance of this motive in 2023 dropped back to 15.5% and is now not statistically different from the «pre-war» figures.

Women are more likely than men to mention communication with God (53% and 46%, respectively), the calming effect of the Church (38% and 30%), and its help in addressing difficult moral issues (33% and 26%) as reasons for attending religious services.

Compared to the followers of other religions, the faithful of the UGCC and the UOC-MP are much more likely to mention the motive of communication with God (70% and 62%, respectively), while the faithful of the UOC-MP



additionally say that attending religious services helps them calm down and forget about everyday worries (52%). The followers of the UOC-MP more often than others mention the fact that the religious community provides them with help and support (11%).

Those who do not attend religious services mostly say that it is not necessary to attend religious services, meetings or ministries in order to practice a particular religion (42%), they do not feel any need to do so (31%), and they do not have time for this (28%). Less frequently mentioned reasons include being a non-believer or an atheist (12%), and the fact that none of their acquaintances attends religious services, meetings, or ministries (9%). Only 2% point at the absence of any religious community where they live; 3% say that there are no communities of the church or religion to which they belong; and 2% attend religious services, meetings and ministries online, listen to services on TV or radio (Figure «Why don't you attend religious services, meetings, ministries?»).

Among the residents of the West who do not attend religious services, the share of those who explain this by being non-believers or atheists is notably higher (23.5%) than in other regions (6% to 12%). In the South, there is a higher number of those who say they do not have time for this (39%), compared to other regions (23% to 28%) and those who admit that none of their acquaintances attends religious services (19%, vs 2% to 9% in other regions).

The younger are the respondents, the more likely they are to call themselves non-believers or atheists (the share of such respondents increases from 9% among those aged 60+ to 25% among those aged under 25), or to tell that they do not feel any need for it (27% and 39%, respectively).

12. Does the Church need modernisation? When asked whether something needs to be changed in the activities of the religious community whose religious services, meetings or ministries they attend, those respondents who attend such services mostly answer that no changes are needed (57%).

12% believe that more attention should be paid to various types of assistance to community members; 12% want more attention to psychological support of community members; 10.5% point at the need for services and sermons done in their native language (in 2021, this figure was only 5%); 10% suggest simplifying rituals and reducing the duration of services; 8% would like more attention to the problems of community members; 6% suggest greater focus on familiarising community members with the basics of religious doctrine; 5% point at the need for meetings and services done at a more convenient time (Figure «Do you think something needs to be changed in the activities of the religious community...?»).

Residents of the South (25%) are more likely than others (4% to 16%) to believe that more attention should be paid to various types of assistance to community members and their support.

Those living in the Centre and the East (16.5% and 13.5%, respectively) are more likely than residents of the West and the South (6% and 3%, respectively) to consider the need for services done in their native language to be an urgent problem.

#### 2. RELIGION, CHURCH AND SOCIETY

1. Most citizens of Ukraine trust the Church. However, compared to 2010, when the level of public trust in the Church reached its maximum (72.5%), this indicator is now lower

Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions was only carried out in government-controlled areas not subject to hostilities). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

A total of 2,016 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. Additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the effects of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Data on public trust in the Church are based on the results of a survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service on 21-27 September 2023 as part of the PACT's ENGAGE (Enhance Non-Governmental Actions and Grassroots Engagement) programme in Ukraine funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).



at 59%7 (Figure «Do you trust the Church?»). The Church is trusted the most in the West (72%) and the South (69%). The level of trust reduces in the Centre to 54%, and the lowest trust in the Church was found in the East (47%), which is only 7% higher than the share of those who do not trust it.

2. The recognised moral authority of the Church is lower than people's trust in it. This indicator was going down consistently from 56% in 2010 to 44.5% in 2020, while the share of those who did not see the Church as a moral authority increased from 27% to 40% during this period. However, figures for 2021 and 2022 were more optimistic, as 48% and 49%, respectively, considered the Church to be a moral authority, while and 31% and 33%, respectively, shared the opposite opinion (Figure «Is the Church a moral authority for you today?»). In 2023, however, somewhat fewer respondents (44%) saw the Church as a moral authority, and 40% said that the Church wasn't a moral authority for them, suggesting that the situation returns to 2020 figures.

Citizens' opinions on this issue vary from region to region and depend on their confessional and church affiliation: the Church is a moral authority for 64% of Ukrainians living in the West, and only for 30-42% of those living in other regions. Since the last year, however, the Church's moral authority has decreased in the West (from 72% to 64%) and the East (from 43% to 30%). While in 2022, the shares of those who saw the Church as a moral authority and those who did not think so in the East, the Centre and the South did not differ statistically, in 2023, those who do not consider the Church to be an authority already make up the majority in the East (55%), and a relative majority in the Centre (44%). In contrast, the relative majority (42%) in the South are those who trust the Church.

In terms of confessional and church affiliation, the Church is a moral authority for 81% of the UGCC faithful (the highest figure); to a lesser extent — for the faithful of the UOC-MP (68%) and the OCU (53%); and even less so — for «just Orthodox» (26%) and «just Christians» (22%). Only 8% of those who do not identify themselves with any religion see the Church as an authority.

The level of recognition of the Church as a moral authority is the highest in the oldest

age group of 60+ (54%), and goes down with younger age, up to 33% among those under 25. Relevant views of women and men on the issue differ radically: while most women (53%) see the Church as a moral authority and 33% do not see it this way, the situation with men is opposite (35% and 47%, respectively).

3. Citizens are quite critical about the clergy's morality. Only 21% of respondents expressed confidence that «the majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people» (Figure «Which statement would you agree with the most?»). The share of those who believe that most priests are deeply moral and spiritual persons is higher in the West and the South (28% and 29% respectively), and lower in the Centre (17%) and the East (17%).

This figure is the highest among the faithful of the UOC-MP (34%), gradually reducing among the followers of other churches — the UGCC (31%), the OCU (25%), and among «just Orthodox» (15%), «just Christians» (12%), and those who do not belong to any religion (5%). Members of the oldest age group are somewhat more likely to consider clergy as a moral authority (25%), and the youngest are least likely to think so (15%).

The opinion that «clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins» prevails throughout the monitoring period, ranging from 44% to 52%, and 44% in the last survey. This viewpoint prevails across all regions and in all confessional and church groups, excluding those who do not belong to any religion: a relative majority of the latter (41%) believe that most priests think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things (26% among all respondents also share this opinion).

4. Assessment of the Church's role and functions in society. The positive social role of the Church has been appreciated by citizens throughout the entire monitoring period. However, with the outbreak of hostilities in the east of the country, the share of those who noted the Church's positive role (52.5% in 2014) dropped to 40% in 2020. In 2021, the share of those appreciating the positive role of the Church increased to 49.5%, in 2022, after the onset of russia's full-scale aggression, it increased even more to 59%, which is the highest figure since 2000. In 2023, this figure was slightly lower at 54% (Figure «What role does the Church play in modern Ukrainian society?»).



Residents of Ukraine's West are much more likely to mention the Church's positive role (75%), compared to the South (60%), the Centre (47%), and especially the East (37%), which, in fact, is not statistically different from the share of those in the East who think that the Church does not play a significant role (35.5%). As for the country as a while, 28% of Ukrainians do not consider the Church's role as significant (33% in 2021). It should be emphasised that it is not about the Church's negative role: during the entire monitoring period, the number of those sharing this opinion never exceeded 7% of respondents (3% in 2023).

With younger age, the respondents are less likely to point at the positive role of the Church (from 64% of those aged 60+ to 43% of those under 25).

The overwhelming majority of followers of Ukraine's major denominations and churches point at the positive role of the Church, namely UGCC (84%), UOC-MP (71%) and OCU (66%). As for «just Orthodox» and «just Christians», these figures are much more modest at 39% and 32%, respectively. The lowest number of those who appreciate the Church's role (15.5%) is found among the respondents who do not identify themselves with any religion.

5. Answering the question about the main goals of churches and religious associations in Ukraine, respondents mostly mention providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis (50%), worshipping God, praying together (50%), helping vulnerable populations (29%), promoting moral recovery of society (27.5%), protecting traditional values (22%) (Figure "What are the main goals that churches and religious associations in Ukraine should pursue?").

Compared to other regions, Ukrainians living in the West are more likely to mention worshipping God and praying together (70% vs 40% to 45% in other regions) and educating youth (19% vs 7% to 13%). Similarly, those living in the South tend to name providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis (62% vs 46% to 52% in other regions), as well as involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible (19% vs 7% to 10%). For residents of central regions, the

Church's priority task is helping vulnerable populations (38% vs 19% to 30% in other regions).

Residents of the East and the South (21% and 20%, respectively) are more likely than those living in the Centre and the West (14% and 9%, respectively) to believe that churches and religious associations in Ukraine should promote peace and tolerance.

Members of the youngest age group (18-24) are less likely (38%) than those belonging to other age groups (48-53%) to believe that churches and religious associations should aim at providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis. Also, with younger age, the respondents mention the goal of moral recovery of society less often.

If one compares the answers to two questions «What are the main goals that churches and religious associations in Ukraine should pursue?» and «What are the main goals implemented by the church or religious association that you belong to?», they appear quite similar, that is, respondents mostly feel that the church or religious association to which they belong meet their expectations. Respondents mentioned the following main goals implemented by their church: worshipping God and praying together (59% of those who associate themselves with a particular church or religious association); providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis (47%); promoting moral recovery of society (28%); protecting traditional values (28%); and helping socially vulnerable populations (24%), (Figure «What are the main goals implemented by the church or religious association that you belong to?»).

Residents of the West are more likely than those living in other regions to mention worshipping God and praying together (76% vs 44% to 55%) and educating youth (20% vs 8% to 13%) as the main goals of their religious organisation.

Ukrainians living in the Centre and the South (31% and 30%, respectively) are more likely than their compatriots in the West and the East (14.5% and 19%, respectively) to say that their religious organisation helps socially vulnerable populations. Residents of the West



and the East (33% and 35%, respectively) more often than residents of the Centre and South (24% and 20%, respectively) mention that their religious organisation pursues the goal of moral recovery of society. Also, residents of the South mention involving as many believers to their church (religious association) as possible somewhat more often than other Ukrainians (14.5% vs 4% to 6% in other regions).

6. Ukrainians believe that providing social service, helping people and supporting them should be one of the leading or more important activities of the church or religious association.

33% of respondents agree that that social service should play a leading role in the church activities; 32% think that social service is important but not the primary activity of the church. Only 10% believe that social service is an insignificant church activity, and only 8% think that the church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all (Figure «What place should social service occupy in the church, religious association activities?»). This year's responses are hardly different from those recorded in previous years.

The idea that social service should be a leading or important activities of the church is shared by most residents across all regions (71% in the West, 64% in the Centre and the South, and 61% in the East), and by most followers of major churches (75% of the OCU, 72% of the UGCC, 63.5% of the UOC-MP, 60% of «just Orthodox», 54% of «just Christians» and 44% of those who do not identify themselves with any religion).

When assessing the types of social service of churches and religious associations that are the most important for society, respondents psychological mostly mention assistance (68%) and protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.) (48%). Also, they mention religious education (32%), child rearing (30.5%), financial assistance (24%), organisation of leisure time (7%), vocational guidance and training (5%). 3% of respondents said that no types of social service are important for society (Figure «In your, opinion, what types of social service of churches, religious associations are the most important for society?»).

Ukraine's West stands out among other regions in the vision of the main tasks and areas of social service, as people here consider child rearing (39% vs 18% to 31% in other regions) and religious education (45% vs 22.5% to 30%) to be the main types of social service, but less often — protection of vulnerable populations (31% vs 48% to 58% in other regions). Residents of the South are more likely to mention financial assistance (37% vs 16% to 26% in other regions), and those living in the East — psychological assistance (74% vs 65% to 68% in other regions).

The faithful of the UGCC attach greater importance to religious education (51%) and child rearing (47%) than the followers of other churches, and less importance to the protection of vulnerable populations (40%). Members of older age groups attach greater importance to financial assistance and child rearing than younger respondents.

Speaking about the types of social service of churches and religious associations that would be interesting to them personally, respondents mention psychological assistance (42%), religious education (20%), protection of vulnerable populations (19%), child rearing (17%), financial assistance (16%), organisation of leisure time (7%) and vocational guidance and training (4%). 26% report not to be interested in any social services of the church.

To this end, residents of Ukraine's West are more likely to mention religious education (31%) and child rearing (24%), while those living in the South – financial assistance (28%) and protection of vulnerable populations (36%) (Figure «What types of social service of churches, religious associations would be interesting for you personally?»). Residents of in the East are much more likely than others to say they are not interested in any social services (42%).

Psychological assistance is particularly interesting for the faithful of the UOC-MP (55%) and the OCU (52%), while protection of vulnerable populations and financial assistance are of interest to the faithful of the UOC-MP (34% and 24%, respectively). Child rearing is especially interesting for the faithful of the UGCC (31%) and the UOC-MP (28%), as is the organisation of leisure time (14% and 14%, respectively). 59% of those who do



not identify themselves with any religion and 36% of «just Christians» are not interested in any social services offered by churches.

Members of older age groups are much more likely than younger respondents to express interest in psychological and financial assistance, as well as protection of vulnerable populations. With younger age, respondents are increasingly likely to say that they are not interested in any type of social services.

54% of respondents claim that they have never personally experienced any type of social service of churches or religious associations. This answer is the most widespread among residents of the East (63%) and the Centre (60%), among those who do not identify themselves with any religion (79%), «just Christians» (67%) and «just Orthodox» (63%). Younger respondents are also more likely to give this answer.

Instead, this answer is the least common among residents of the West (44%) and the South (38.5%), as well as the faithful of the UGCC (40%) and the UOC-MP (34.5%) (Figure «What types of social service of churches, religious associations have you experienced personally?»).

The most popular type of church's social service that respondents have received personally is psychological assistance (26%). In 2021, before the outbreak of the full-scale war, this share was notably lower at 18%. Other relatively popular services include religious education (11%), financial assistance (10%, compared to only 4% in 2021), child rearing assistance (6%), protection of vulnerable populations (5%), organisation of leisure time (2%), and assistance in vocational guidance and training (1.5%).

Ukrainians living in the South have received financial assistance (23.5%) and assistance in the protection of vulnerable populations (16%) more often than residents of other regions. Meanwhile, people in the West have report receiving assistance in organising leisure activities (6%).

Representatives of older age groups were more likely than younger respondents to

receive psychological and financial assistance from churches and religious organisations.

As for the followers of specific churches, the UOC-MP faithful received material assistance (18%) more often than others, while the believers of the UGCC received assistance in raising children (14%).

Social service of religious associations in wartime. When asked to share their ideas about the religious associations' top priorities during the war, respondents mostly mentioned assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (53% and 45.5% in 2022, respectively), psychological assistance (52% and 54%), raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine (34% and 28%) and assistance in addressing social and living problems of citizens (30% and 39.5%). Other services included assistance to internally displaced persons (21%), mitigation of the aftermaths of destruction of cities, villages, social and transport infrastructure (17%), and meeting the needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad (4%) (Figure «What is your idea of the priority tasks for religious associations in wartime?»).

In the western and central regions, they name assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine as the most important type of social service, whereas it is psychological assistance in the East and the South. The UGCC believers are much more likely to stress the importance of supporting the Armed Forces compared to psychological assistance, while in all other church and confessional groups, the shares of those who consider these two types of social service important do not differ statistically.

49% of respondents are aware of cases when religious communities of any religious affiliation provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine after the onset of russia's large-scale war against Ukraine. Residents of Ukraine's West (72%) and the UGCC faithful (79%) are the most likely to report such cases (Figure "Are you aware of cases where religious communities...?").

41% of respondents are aware of cases when religious communities gave shelter to refugees (55% of IDPs know about such cases). Ukrainians living in the West (55%) and the



South (50%), as well as the faithful of the UGCC (65%) and the UOC-MP (53%) are the most likely to report such cases.

40% of respondents are aware of cases when religious communities provided material aid to refugees (50% of IDPs know about such cases). Residents of Ukraine's West (52%), the faithful of the UGCC (54.5%), and the UOC-MP (54%) are most likely to report such cases.

30% of respondents are aware of cases when religious communities brought humanitarian aid from abroad or distributed it. This answer is most often given by residents of the South (50%).

25% of respondents are aware of cases when religious organisations provided assistance to institutions, and these cases are most reported by the faithful of the UOC-MP (39%) and the UGCC (33%).

25% of respondents are aware of cases of religious organisations helping residents of the liberated and frontline territories (36% of respondents who have lived in the occupied territories for some time, and 23% of respondents from the frontline territories). This is more often mentioned by the faithful of the UOC-MP (39%).

24% of respondents are aware of cases of churches arranging bomb shelters in their premises. These are most reported in the Western region (35%) and by the faithful of the UGCC (41%).

22.5% of respondents are aware of cases when religious associations helped evacuate residents from the occupied territories and areas under fire (39% of respondents who have lived in the occupied territories for some time, and 22% of residents from the frontline territories).

For most types of assistance provided by churches to citizens, residents of the East are less likely to report them compared to Ukrainians in other regions.

9% of respondents have reported cases when religious communities expressed support for russia's actions after the onset of its large-scale war against Ukraine (4% of those who

lived in the temporarily occupied territories). 6% are aware of cases when religious communities helped the invaders (4% of respondents who lived in the temporarily occupied territories).

Also, 6% of respondents are aware of cases when religious communities misappropriated humanitarian aid or used it for own benefit (4% of respondents in the West, 9% in the East).

When asked about the **Church's side in** the «poor and disadvantaged vs powerful and rich» paradigm, citizens tend to believe that the Church is somewhat more supportive of «powerful and rich» (on a ten-point scale, where «1» means «defending the rights of the poor and disadvantaged» and «10» means «defending the rights of the powerful and rich»). Since 2010, when this question was first asked in the monitoring, the assessment of the Church's position has constantly shifted towards the belief in its greater support for «powerful and rich» (from 5.2 points in 2010 to 6.2 points in 2020).

However, the most recent surveys in 2021 and 2023 no longer confirm this trend, as the average score is 5.5 points. To some extent, this may be due to the growing moral authority of the Church compared to previous years (Figure «Is it true that churches in Ukraine defend the rights of the poor and disadvantaged or are they always on the side of the powerful and rich?»). The faithful of the UGCC are more likely to believe that the Church stands with the «poor and disadvantaged» (4.2 points). Meanwhile, those who do not identify themselves with any religion are the most likely to believe that the churches in Ukraine are on the side of the powerful and rich (7 points).

20% of respondents are aware of cases when the church or religious association built and maintained health and social institutions (hospitals, hospices, nursing homes, orphanages, etc.), but the vast majority (77.5%) had never heard of it. Residents of the West are the most (28%), and residents of the East are the least (11%) knowledgeable of such cases (Figure «Are you aware of any cases when the Church built and maintained...?»).

Provision of specific types of assistance by the Church. When answering the question



whether religious communities (of any church) provided sufficient assistance to refugees, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, residents of the liberated and frontline territories since the onset of russia's large-scale war against Ukraine, 18.5% of respondents say that religious communities to their best in providing assistance to refugees, 30% say that they do a lot, 15% – that they do little, and 5% – that they do nothing. Speaking of the assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the respective numbers are 21%, 28%, 14% and 6%; and in the area of helping residents of the liberated and frontline territories, the numbers are 14%, 22%, 15% and 6% (Figure «Do you think that religious communities... do enough of the following?»).

In terms of providing assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and refugees, residents of the West are more likely to view the activities of religious communities in the most positive way, whereas those living in the East are less likely than Ukrainians in other regions to mention such assistance provided in all three of these areas.

47% of those polled who belong to a particular church or religious association are aware of the participation of priests of their church in the defence of Ukraine (as chaplains, servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial defence), (Figure «Do you know about...?»). Region-wise, the distribution of such answer was as follows: 59% in the South, 53% in the West, 46% in the Centre, and only 30% in the East. Also, many faithful of the UGCC (53%), the OCU (51%), and the UOC-MP (31%) answered positively to this question.

46% of respondents are aware of humanitarian aid and social support provided to internally displaced persons in Ukraine by the priests of the church or religious association to which they belong (last year, this number was 53%). The affirmative answer to the question can be mostly heard in the South (66%) and the West (52%), and from the faithful of the UGCC (58%).

34% of respondents confirm that the church or religious association to which they belong has brough humanitarian aid from abroad to help Ukrainian citizens affected by the war (this answer is given the most in the South (51%)).

33% of respondents are aware of statements by the leaders of the church or religious association to which they belong drawing attention of the world leaders and societies to the situation in Ukraine and calling for condemnation of the Kremlin's aggression. This answer is given the most by those living in the West (40.5%) and by the UGCC followers (45%).

25% of respondents are aware of priests of the church or religious association to which they belong accompanying humanitarian cargoes or participating in the organisation of humanitarian corridors, evacuation from the areas of hostilities and adjacent territories.

19% of respondents are aware of priests of the church or religious association to which they belong providing humanitarian aid and social support to Ukrainian refugees abroad. This answer is most often given by respondents living in the South (28%).

18% of respondents know that priests of the church or religious association to which they belong provide for the spiritual and religious needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad. Those living in the South are also most likely to answer this question affirmatively (29%).

Most members of religious communities report that after the onset of russia's large-scale war against Ukraine, their community has provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (77%); provided shelter (57%) and material aid (57%) to refugees; brought or distributed humanitarian aid from abroad (37%); provided assistance to residents of the liberated and frontline territories (34%); helped health and social institutions (33%), arranged bomb shelters in the church buildings (29%); helped with the evacuation from the occupied territories and territories under artillery fire (22%) (Figure "Did the religious community to which you belong...?").

Also, during the war, members of religious communities reported receiving moral support (50%), psychological support (44%), and material support (18%) from their community. Among different kinds of assistance, the position of the UGCC faithful stands out, as most of them did not require psychological (66%), moral (61%) and material (86%) support from their religious community (Figure *«Did* 



you receive the following from your religious community during the war?»).

**7. National orientation of the Church**. In 2000, most Ukrainians (53%) opposed the Church's national orientation in the country, and 29% supported this position. During 2010-2020, the share of those who opposed the national orientation of the Church ranged within 37-43%, and the share supporters fluctuated around 31-34% (Figure *«Should the Church, religion be nationally oriented?»*).

However, according to the 2021 survey, the share of supporters of the Church's national orientation of the Church increased to 39%, and the share of opponents made 44.5%. According to the 2022 survey conducted after the beginning of full-scale aggression, the share of those who support the national orientation of the Church increased even more to 49%, while the number of their opponents dropped to 32.5%.

2023 saw further growth in the number of those who support the Church's national orientation to 57%, and their opponents fell to 27%. Apparently, the supporters of this position impart a positive connotation of «patriotic stand of the Church» in this concept, while the opponents, on the contrary, put a negative connotation of «national narrow-mindedness». It is also obvious that the public demand for the Church's patriotic position has grown significantly in wartime.

In the West and the Centre, supporters of the Church's national orientation make up more than half of respondents (72% and 57%, respectively). While in 2022, opponents of the Church's national orientation made up a relative majority (46%) in the East in 2022, their rivals — those who support the Church's national orientation — already make a relative majority (48%) in 2023. Opponents of the Church's national orientation retain a relative majority (41.5%) only in the South, although back in 2021 they made an absolute majority (61%).

The vast majority of believers of the UGCC (79%), the OCU (70%), and the relative majority of «just Orthodox» (44.5%) and «just Christians» (47%) think that the Church should be nationally oriented. Opponents of the

Church's national orientation are in a relative majority among those who do not identify themselves with any religion (42%), and the UOC-MP faithful (48%).

#### 3. THE CHURCH AND THE STATE

1. Citizens' attitude to the idea of introducing a state church. During the monitoring period, the number of its supporters decreased from 20% in 2000 to 11% in 2020. In 2021, however, their share increased to 18%, and in 2022 to 28%, although they continued to be a minority. In 2023, the share of those in favour of introducing a state church equalled the share of the opponents for the first time ever (37.5% and 38%, respectively). If last year the number of opponents of the state church outnumbered the number of supporters in all regions, now they are in a relative majority only in the Centre and the South (41.5% and 44%, respectively), while their opponents make up a relative majority in the West (49.5%) and the East (42%).

Also, supporters of the state church make up a relative majority among the faithful of the OCU (42%) and among «just Christians» (38%). Instead, most of the UOC-MP followers (45%) and those who do not identify themselves with any religion (45%) reject this idea. Among the UGCC faithful and «just Orthodox», the number of supporters and opponents of this idea does not differ statistically (Figure «In some countries...»).

The main arguments of the opponents of a state church include its inconsistency with either the right to freedom of conscience or the multi-denominational nature of Ukraine (45% and 41% respectively) (Figure «If you disagree with the introduction of the state church in Ukraine, why so?»). While residents of the East are more likely to appeal to the right to freedom of conscience (61% of those who in this region believe that it is inappropriate to introduce a state church in Ukraine), people in the West tend to appeal to the multi-denominational (55%). In other regions, the shares of those using these arguments are similar.

2. Citizens increasingly support wider involvement of the church in state and public rituals and ceremonies (blessing during the



oath taking by military personnel and members of other security forces, consecration of state institutions, local government buildings, and educational facilities).

58% of respondents are positive about it (only 42% in 2021), only 9% have negative attitude to this idea (17.5% in 2021). 33% and 41%, respectively, were indifferent or found it difficult to answer (Figure «How do you feel about the increasing involvement of the Church...?»).

The share of those who are positive about the Church's greater involvement makes a relative majority in the East (45%) and an absolute majority in other regions (58% to 62%). With older age, the respondents become increasingly supportive of this idea (from 42% among those under 25 to 65% among those aged 60+). Also, the vast majority of believers of the UGCC (72%), the OCU (70%), the UOC-MP (70%) and «just Orthodox» (55%), as well as a relative majority of «just Christians» (49%) have a positive attitude to this practice. Instead, most of those who do not identify themselves with any religion (55%) are indifferent.

# 4. CITIZEN ASSESSMENT OF INTER-RELIGIOUS, INTER-FAITH AND INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS

1. When assessing own attitudes towards the most widespread religions and religious movements in the country, the vast majority of Ukrainians (76%) are positive about Orthodoxy, while 17% are indifferent and only 2% have a negative attitude towards it (Figure «How do you feel about the following religions, religious movements and churches?»). However, the picture gets more complicated when respondents assess their attitude towards specific Orthodox churches.

Among the **Orthodox churches**, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine enjoys the most positive attitude (67% of respondents are positive about it, 22% are indifferent and only 4% have a negative attitude, compared to 55%, 22% and 4%, respectively, in 2021). At the same time, there is significant negativity in relation to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (12%, 19%, and 58.5%, respectively), which has only deteriorated after the outbreak of the full-scale war (34%,

24%, and 20% in 2021) and is expressed more often than in the case of any other religious organisation in Ukraine.

Positive attitudes towards the OCU are expressed by most residents in all regions, from 58% in the East to 71% in the Centre. Meanwhile, negative attitudes towards the UOC-MP are most pronounced in the West (79%) and Centre (60%) and expressed by a relative majority of those living in the East (40%) and the South (36%) regions. For comparison, in 2021, only in the western regions did a relative majority of respondents express a negative attitude towards this church, while people in all other regions were relatively positive about the UOC-MP.

36% of respondents have a positive attitude towards **Greek Catholicism**, 40.5% are indifferent, and only 3% are negative about this church. As one might expect, positive attitudes toward Greek Catholicism are most pronounced in the West (64.5%), ranging from 23% in the East to 32% in the South. At the same time, no more than a few percent of respondents in each region are negative about this denomination.

Support for **Roman Catholicism** is distributed in approximately the same way, with the highest levels of sympathy found in the West (40%), and the lowest — in the East (18%), and small numbers of those with negative attitudes in all regions (in general, 28% of respondents are positive about Roman Catholicism, 46% are indifferent, and 5% have a negative attitude).

Different picture is observed in people's attitudes towards Protestantism — across Ukraine, the shares of those who have positive and negative attitudes towards this denomination are roughly the same (14% and 15%, respectively). If in the South, those who have a positive attitude outnumber those with negative feelings about Protestantism (22% and 10%, respectively), then their shares do not differ statistically in the East and in the Centre, while in the West, there are more respondents who are negative about it (13% and 19%, respectively).

The share of those being positive about **Judaism** is somewhat lower than the number of those who have a negative attitude (10.5%



and 12.5%, respectively, and 47% are indifferent). Also, the West is the only region where negative attitudes toward Judaism are more pronounced than positive ones (8% positive and 17% negative). In all other regions, the shares of those with positive and negative attitudes are not statistically different.

Similarly, the number of those with a positive attitude towards **Islam** is smaller than the number of those who have a negative attitude (10% and 16% respectively, 46% are indifferent). Negative attitudes towards this religion are more pronounced in the West (20% vs 7% of those with positive attitudes) and in the Centre (15% and 9.5%, respectively). In the South and East, the shares of those who have a positive attitude are not statistically different from the number of those with a negative attitude.

The vast or relative majority in all confessional and church groups express a positive attitude towards the OCU. The only group that is largely indifferent (53%) is found among those who do not belong to any religion. On the contrary, the vast or relative majority of members of all confessional and church groups are negative about the UOC-MP, except, of course, the faithful of this church, who have a mostly positive attitude, and those who do not identify with any religion (most of them are indifferent.

Interestingly, there is a rather high share of those with a negative attitude towards Protestantism among the faithful of the UOC-MP and the UGCC (32% and 31% respectively). Also, the share of those who have a negative attitude towards Islam is higher among the UGCC faithful (27%) compared to other confessional and church groups.

Positive attitudes towards Orthodoxy in general and the OCU in particular increase with the age, while positive attitudes towards the UOC-MP are more pronounced in the oldest age group of 60+ (17%) compared to other age groups.

Positive attitudes towards Roman Catholicism in middle and older age groups (40 years and older) are more pronounced than among those who did not reach 40.

2. Most respondents (59%) claim that relations between the followers of different churches and religions in their areas are quiet. Another 8% call such relations friendly (Figure "How can you describe relations between the faithful of different churches and religions in your area?"). If in 2022, compared to 2021, there was an increase in the share of those who thought that relations were conflicting (from 3% to 6%) and tense (5% to 14%), then in 2023, the perceived assessment of the level of conflict and tension decreased (now 3% of respondents say that relations are conflicting and 8% — that they are tense).

Conflicts or tension in relations between the followers of different churches is reported by 13% of respondents in the Centre, 12% in the West, 10% in the East, and none in the South.

In most cases, conflicts or tension in relations between the followers of different churches is reported by the faithful of the OCU (14% vs 28% last year) and the UOC-MP (15% vs 27% last year), while the faithful of the UGCC are the least likely to report such tensions (4.5% vs 8% last year). These results indicate, on the one hand, that tensions are most pronounced exactly between the faithful of the OCU and the UOC-MP (as in the previous year), but on the other hand, they are less intense compared to the previous year but still higher than in 2021.

Answering the direct question *«Which churches (or members of religions) in your area have conflicting or tense relations?»,*<sup>8</sup> respondents mostly often answered *«the OCU and the UOC-MP)»* (9% of all respondents). Conflicts between other churches are mentioned far less frequently.

3. During the monitoring period, public opinion on the factors of conflict between the faithful of different churches has changed. Since 2000, the significance of political factor has been growing steadily, and now it tops

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This question was open-ended, that is, respondents were not offered options to choose from and articulated answers themselves.



the ranking (44% of respondents believe that conflicts between churches are purely political, while in 2000 only 20% of those polled thought so).

31.5% think that «conflicts are mainly around property and buildings». The popularity of this reason has also increased since 2000, when it was 22.5%, which appears to be inspired by media reports of disputes and conflicts over the use of church buildings, which occur mainly between the OCU and the UOC-MP communities (Figure «Why are there conflicts between the faithful of different churches in Ukraine?»). At the same time, compared to 2021, the frequency of mentioning this reason has declined (in 2021, as many as 40% of respondents mentioned it).

30% of respondents see the source of conflicts in the fact that «church hierarchs seek power».

The share of those who believe that «national question is the essence of the conflicts» has increased from 15% in 2021 to 23% in 2023. Other popular reasons for conflicts are that «the media incites religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts» (17%) and that «the true Church must prove its superiority over others» (12%).

Perceptions of the political nature of inter-church conflicts are most common in the Centre (51%). Residents of the East (35.5%) mostly see the cause in the fact that church hierarchs seek power, while those living in the West (26%) are the least likely to see them in political terms. The faithful of the UOC-MP are the most likely to stress the political nature of conflicts (59%), as well as the fact that "the media incites religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts" (33%).

4. Public opinion on the acceptability of banning the activities of specific churches or religious associations by state authorities. More than half of respondents (54%) consider it acceptable in some cases, while only 17% believe that such a ban is unacceptable in any case (in 2021, the figures were 47% and 28%, respectively) (Figure «Is it acceptable in principle to ban activities of individual churches

by state authorities (e.g., courts)?»). The vast majority of Ukrainians in the West (63%) and the Centre (56%) and a relative majority of those living in the East (47%) support the possibility of such a ban. In the South, the shares of those who would allow such a ban (36%) and those who consider it unacceptable (30%) do not differ statistically.

The vast or relative majority of members of all confessional and church groups support the possibility of such a ban, except for the UOC-MP faithful, 48% of whom consider banning the churches unacceptable. Obviously, this is due to the fact that the possible ban is often expressed in relation to the UOC-MP.

Those who support the possibility of banning specific religious associations, mostly mention the following grounds: such an association publicly supports the aggressor country's policy (81%), practices violent religious rites threatening the lives and health of citizens (64%), preaches misanthropic ideas (62%), is a totalitarian sect that fully controls and subjugates its believers, exerts dangerous psychological influence on them (59%), calls for violence against members of other religions (51%), and violates the laws of Ukraine (50%).

Other grounds include the religious association prohibiting its believers to perform certain civic duties or exercise rights, such as serving in the military, voting in elections (34%), operating without being officially registered in Ukraine (30%), and promoting teaching, which is not traditional for the country's religion (18.5%) (Figure «In what cases is such a ban acceptable?»).

Among citizens who believe that it is acceptable in principle for state authorities to ban the activities of certain churches or religious associations, 65% believe that in Ukraine there exist churches or religious associations whose activities should be banned (this is 35% of all respondents) (Figure "Are there churches or religious associations in Ukraine whose activities should be banned?").

Answering the question *«Which churches or religious associations, in your opinion, should be banned?»*, 30% of respondents

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This question was open-ended, that is, respondents were not offered options to choose from and articulated answers themselves.



named the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, whereas less than 1% of respondents mentioned any of other churches and religious associations in Ukraine.

Answering the question «On what terms should the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate exist?», only 4.5% of respondents said that it should operate on the territory of Ukraine without any restrictions. 3% noted that it should operate without any restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). 9% agreed that it should operate without any restrictions, but only after it declares autocephaly and completely withdraws from canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). 12% believe that it should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Still, the majority of respondents (55.5%) think that the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine should be banned.

Those living in the East and the South (8% and 11%, respectively) are more likely than residents of the Centre and the West (3% and 2%, respectively) to believe that the UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions. Compared to other regions, residents of the South are more likely to believe that the UOC-MP should operate without any restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (8%), and that it should operate only after it declares autocephaly and withdraws from subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (20.5%). Instead, Ukrainians in the East are more likely to say that UOC-MP should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (17%).

The total ban on the activities of the UOC-MP in Ukraine is supported by the vast majority of respondents in the West (74%) and the Centre (57%), as well as by relative majority in the East (40%) and the South (34%).

Among the faithful of the UOC-MP itself, 38% believe that it should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions; 5% think that it should operate without any restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate); 19% think that it should operate

without any restrictions, but only after it declares autocephaly and completely withdraws from canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate); 24% believe that it should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; and 2% think that its activities should be banned in Ukraine.

Absolute majority of the faithful of the UGCC (93%) believe that the activities of the UOC-MP should be banned, followed by the OCU believers (66.5%). This opinion is further shared by 48% of «just Orthodox», 38% of «just Christians», and 36% of those who do not belong to any religion.

Most respondents (71%) fully or rather support the ban on the activities of religious organisations and associations whose governing centre is located in the state that has committed military aggression against Ukraine, and 13% do not support it (Figure «What do you think about banning the activities of religious organisations and associations whose governing centre is located in the state that has committed military aggression against Ukraine?»). Such a ban is supported by an absolute or relative majority of respondents in all regions (from 49.5% in the South to 80.5% in the West), as well as by most members of all confessional and church groups, except for the faithful of the UOC-MP (32% of them support the ban and 42% do not).

70% of respondents fully or rather support decisions of central and local authorities to refuse extension of the lease and use of churches, other religious buildings and land plots by communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, while 11% do not support it (Figure «Now central and local authorities refuse the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate...»). As in the previous case, these decisions are supported by an absolute or relative majority of Ukrainians in all regions (from 47% in the South to 85% in the West), and by most members of all confessional and church groups in Ukraine, again except for the faithful of the UOC-MP (only 24% of them support such decisions and 64% do not).

In particular, 71% of those polled fully or rather support the termination of the lease agreement



between the National Preserve «Kyiv Pechersk Lavra» and the Holy Dormition Monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in March 2023, while 11% did not support it (Figure «In March 2023, the National Preserve «Kyiv Pechersk Lavra» terminated the lease agreement...»). Region-wise, such support ranged from 46% in the South to 86% in the West. Again, members of all confessional and church groups generally supported this decision, except for the faithful of the UOC-MP (22% of them supported the termination of the lease agreement, and 66% did not).

The opinion shared by most Ukrainians that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate should be banned in the country is due to their conviction about its association with the Russian Orthodox Church, whose role in the Russia-Ukraine is viewed by most Ukrainian citizens as extremely negative.

In particular, 65% of those polled believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine. Only 4% believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill stand for peace and against war, and only 8% believe that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill do not have a clear position on the Ukraine war (Figure «What is the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine war?»).

The vast or relative majority of Ukrainians in all regions, from 47.5% in the East to 82% in the West, are convinced that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine. Instead, only a few respondents, from 1.5% in the West to 9% in the South, think that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill stand for peace and against war.

Also, most representatives of all confessional and church groups agree that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine, with the exception of the UOC-MP faithful. Their position is uncertain, as among them, 25% agree with the above

opinion; 23% think that the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill stand for peace and against war; 14% think that the Russian Church and Patriarch Kirill do not have a clear position on the Ukraine war, while a relative majority of the UOC-MP believers (37.5%) either have no opinion or are reluctant to answer this question.

When assessing the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, 47% of respondents believe that members of the UOC-MP clergy spread russian propaganda and justify russia's actions, while 34% think that the UOC-MP priests cooperate with the russian occupation authorities (Figure «What is the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine?»). Only 7% of those polled said that the UOC-MP priests and parishes in the temporarily occupied territories spiritual support to Ukrainian citizens, and another 7% said that they carry out social service, provide material and humanitarian aid to Ukrainian citizens.

However, there are significant differences in answers to the above question between the regions. More specifically, while in the West and the Centre, 66% and 51% of respondents, respectively, believe that the UOC-MP clergy spread russian propaganda and justify russia's actions, the number of those sharing this opinion is much lower in the East (32%) and in the South (16%). The shares of respondents in the respective regions thinking that the UOC-MP priests cooperate with the occupation authorities are 50%, 32%, 28% and 20%; that the UOC-MP priests and parishes in the temporarily occupied territories provide spiritual support to Ukrainian citizens are 3%, 4%, 11% and 20%; and that they carry out social service and provide material and humanitarian aid are 1.5%, 7%, 8% and 20.5%, respectively.

Representatives of most confessional and church groups, with the exception of the faithful of the UOC-MP, are more likely to mention the negative role of the UOC-MP in the occupied territories (spreading russian propaganda, cooperating with the occupation



authorities). Among the UOC-MP faithful, 33% believe that priests and parishes of their church in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine provide spiritual support to Ukrainian citizens; 37% think that they carry out social service, provide material and humanitarian aid. Only 11% believe that the UOC-MP clergy cooperate with the russian occupation authorities, and only 12% think that they spread russian propaganda and justify russia's actions.

# 5. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TRANSITION TOWARDS THE REVISED JULIAN CALENDAR

50% of those who consider themselves Christians are positive about the decision of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to switch to the Revised Julian calendar. Meanwhile, 15% have negative attitude towards this transition, 14% are indifferent, 9% do not understand what this means, and 11% are hesitant to answer this question (Figure «What is your attitude towards the decision of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to switch to the Revised Julian calendar?»).

The largest number of Ukrainians happy with this decision are found in the West (75%), followed by those living in the Centre (45%), the South (40%) and the East (28%). Negative attitudes ranged from 6% in the West to 24% in the East. The latter region also showed the highest total share of those who are either indifferent or do not understand what this means or are hesitant (48.5%).

This decision is welcomed by 82% of the UGCC believers, 62% of the OCU followers, 24% of «just Orthodox», 21% of «just Christians» and 20.5% of the UOC-MP faithful. Negative attitudes were expressed by 5%, 11%, 23%, 9% and 61%, respectively.

Among those who consider themselves Christians, 35% said that they celebrate Christian holidays according to the Revised Julian calendar; 28% use the Julian calendar («old style»); 27% celebrate holydays differently, depending on the circumstances; 3% do not celebrate Christian holidays at all; and 7% hesitated to answer this question (Figure «Do you personally celebrate Christian holidays

according to the Revised Julian calendar or the Julian calendar?»).

Many Ukrainians already use the Revised Julian calendar to celebrate Christian holidays, including 66% in the West, 24% in the Centre, 22.5% in the South, and 20% in the East. Another 19%, 30.5%, 30% and 29%, respectively said that they celebrate Christian holidays according to either the Revised Julian or Julian calendar, depending on circumstances; and 11%, 34%, 38% and 35%, respectively, use the Julian calendar only.

Among the UGCC faithful, 80% celebrate Christian holidays according to the Revised Julian calendar, 9.5% switch between both calendars depending on the circumstances, and 7% only according to the Julian calendar. These shares are 39%, 27% and 27.5%, respectively, among the OCU faithful; 15%, 37% and 33% among «just Orthodox»; 11%, 40% and 24% among «just Christians»; and 6%, 13% and 75% among the UOC-MP faithful.

The following generalisations and conclusions can be drawn from the above.

Throughout the entire period of research, Ukrainian society has demonstrated a fairly high level of religiosity. The number of those who call themselves believers increases after the outbreak (escalation) of military conflicts, as was the case in 2014 and 2022, but then there is a rollback to previous levels. At the same time, about a quarter of respondents said that after the onset of russia's large-scale war, they felt that they had become stronger in their faith and more religious.

Regional differences in all aspects of religious, confessional and church self-identification of Ukrainian citizens persists. However, compared to the early 2000s, the difference between regions in the shares of those who consider themselves believers is diminishing (the number of believers in the Centre, the South and the East has increased, while it has not changed in the West since 2000). Study findings show that the level of religiosity continues to depend on gender, age, and place of residence (urban/rural): in particular, religiosity is higher in older age groups vs younger ones, in women vs men, and in rural residents vs city dwellers.



Respondents' declaration of affiliation with a particular religious organisation or church is not always related to their identification as a believer and may be due to their socio-cultural or ethnic identity. Religious identity as such is far less important to Ukrainians than civic or local identities.

Most citizens express an opinion that religious faith does not require mandatory religious affiliation («a person can be just a believer and not profess a particular religion»).

In contrast to fairly stable confessional affiliations, notable changes occur in the church self-determination of Orthodox believers, due to changes in the organisational pattern of Orthodoxy in Ukraine a nd the impact of russia's full-scale aggression on public consciousness.

Compared to 2020, the number of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine faithful has increased significantly (from 20% to 42% of the adult population), mainly due to a decrease in the number of «just Orthodox» (from 27% to 13%). Also, russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine reduced the number of those who considered themselves the faithful of the UOC-MP (from 13% in 2021 to just 6% in 2023).

There is a significant difference between the declared religiosity (70.5% of respondents call themselves believers, and 61% — Orthodox) and their identification with a particular religious community — only 24% admitted to being a member of a community.

Since 2021, the share of members of religious communities associated with the OCU increased from 6% to 10.5%; the share of members of Greek Catholic communities remained unchanged at 6%; and the share of members of the UOC-MP communities reduced from 4% in 2021 to 3% in 2023.

Only 17% of Ukrainians attend religious services and meetings regularly (at least once a week), which, however, is a significant increase since 2021, when the share of such people was only 10%. Among those who attend religious services and meetings,

a relative majority do so only on religious holidays.

When asked how the frequency of their visits to the church (house of prayer) has changed after the outbreak of the war, 11% of respondents started attending the church more often, and 8% — less often.

In recent years, some believers have been participating in religious services online. According to the latest survey, 15% of respondents took part in such services. This is most pronounced among Ukrainians living in the West and the faithful of the UGCC.

Those who do not attend religious services rarely explain it by the absence of any religious community where they live or that there are no communities of the church or religion to which they belong. Instead, they claim that it is not necessary to attend religious services, meetings or ministries in order to practice a particular religion, or that they do not feel any need, or that they have no time for that. Therefore, improving church attendance is not so much about the development of a network of religious buildings as the formation of interest and motivation of people to go to churches.

When asked whether anything needs to be changed in the activities of the religious community whose religious services, meetings or ministries they attend, more than half of community members insist that no changes are necessary. Those who are committed to change say that more attention should be paid to helping and supporting community members (including by providing psychological support), as well as to conducting sermons in their native language, simplifying rituals, reducing the duration of services, holding meetings and services at more convenient times, and dedicating more effort to teaching basics of religion to community members.

Most citizens of Ukraine trust the Church. However, compared to 2010, when the level of public trust in the Church reached its maximum (72.5%), this indicator is now lower at 59%.



The recognised moral authority of the Church is lower than people's trust in it. In 2023, 44% of respondents saw the church as a moral authority, and slightly fewer (40%) said that the church wasn't a moral authority for them.

Citizens are quite critical about the clergy's morality. Only 21% of respondents expressed confidence that «the majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people».

Answering the question about the main goals of churches and religious associations in Ukraine, respondents mostly mention offering spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis, worshipping God and praying together, helping vulnerable populations, promoting moral recovery of society and protecting traditional values.

If one compares the answers to two questions «What are the main goals that churches and religious associations in Ukraine should pursue?» and «What are the main goals implemented by the church or religious association that you belong to?», they appear quite similar, that is, respondents mostly feel that the church or religious association to which they belong meet their expectations.

Ukrainians believe that providing social service, helping people and supporting them should be one of the leading or more important activities of the church or religious association. When assessing the types of social service of churches and religious associations that are the most important for society and those they are personally interested in, respondents usually mention psychological assistance, protection of vulnerable population, religious education, child rearing and financial assistance.

More than half of the respondents claim that they have never personally experienced any type of social service of churches or religious associations. The most popular type of church's social service that respondents have received personally is psychological assistance. Compared to 2021, the share of those who received psychological and financial assistance from religious associations has increased.

When asked to share their ideas about the religious associations' top priorities during the war, respondents mostly mentioned helping the Armed Forces of Ukraine, providing psychological assistance, raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine, and helping to solve social and material problems of citizens.

A lot of Ukrainians (40% and more) are aware of cases of religious communities providing assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, material aid and shelter to refugees.

Most members of religious communities assert that their community has provided material aid and shelter to refugees since the outbreak of russia's large-scale war against Ukraine, as well as helped the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the same time, 9% of respondents have reported cases when religious communities expressed support for russia's actions after its full-scale invasion. 6% are aware of cases when religious communities helped the invaders. Also, 6% of respondents know cases when religious communities misappropriated humanitarian aid or used it for own benefit.

47% of those polled who belong to a particular church or religious association are aware of the participation of priests of their church in the defence of Ukraine (as chaplains, servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial defence); 46% are aware of humanitarian aid and social support provided to internally displaced persons in Ukraine by the priests of the church or religious association to which they belong.

During the war, members of religious communities reported receiving moral



support (50%), psychological support (44%), and material support (18%) from their community.

Public demand for the Church's patriotic position has grown significantly in wartime: for the first time in the entire monitoring period, the share of supporters of the church's national orientation made the majority.

The share of those in favour of introducing a state church has increased and in 2023 equalled the share of the opponents for the first time ever.

Most respondents claim that relations between the followers of different churches and religions in their area quiet calm or friendly. Meanwhile, 11% say that relations are conflicting and tense (which, however, is 9% less than last year). If in 2022, compared to 2021, there was an increase in the share of those who thought that relations were conflicting and tense, then in 2023, the perceived assessment of the level of conflict and tension decreased.

The survey findings indicate that tensions are most pronounced between the faithful of the OCU and the UOC-MP, but they are less intense compared to the previous year.

During the monitoring period, public opinion on the factors of conflict between the faithful of different churches has changed. Since 2000, the significance of political factor has been growing steadily, and now it tops the ranking.

A deterrent to inter-religious, inter-faith and inter-church conflicts is that religious and church identity is of very little importance to Ukrainians, as only 4% of them identify themselves primarily with people of the same faith or church as themselves.

More than half of respondents (54%) consider it acceptable in some cases to ban the activities of specific churches or religious associations by state authorities.

Those who support the possibility of banning specific religious associations,

mostly mention the following grounds: an association publicly supports the aggressor country's policy; practices violent religious rites threatening the lives and health of citizens; preaches misanthropic ideas; is a totalitarian sect that fully controls and subjugates its believers, exerts dangerous psychological influence on them; calls for violence against members of other religions; and violates the laws of Ukraine.

Answering the question «On what terms should the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate exist?» the majority of respondents (55.5%) think that the activities of this church in Ukraine should be banned altogether.

Among the faithful of the UOC-MP itself, 19% think that their church should operate without any restrictions, but only after it declares autocephaly and completely withdraws from canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church, and 24% believe that it should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Most respondents (71%) support the ban on the activities of religious organisations and associations whose governing centre is located in the state that has committed military aggression against Ukraine. 70% of respondents support central and local authorities' decisions to refuse extension of the lease and use of churches, other religious buildings and land plots by communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. In particular, 71% of those polled fully or moderately support the termination of the lease agreement between the National Preserve «Kyiv Pechersk Lavra» and the Holy Dormition Monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in March 2023.

The opinion shared by most Ukrainians that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate should be banned in the country is due to their conviction about its association with the Russian Orthodox Church, whose role in the Russia-Ukraine is viewed by most Ukrainian citizens as extremely negative. In particular, 65% of those polled believe that the Russian Orthodox




Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine.


When assessing the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, 47% of respondents believe that members of the UOC-MP clergy spread russian propaganda and justify russia's actions, while 34% think that the UOC-MP priests cooperate with the russian occupation authorities.

50% of those who consider themselves Christians are positive about the decision of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to switch to the Revised Julian calendar. 15% have negative attitude towards this transition.


Among those who consider themselves Christians, 35% said that they celebrate Christian holidays according to the Revised Julian calendar; 28% use the Julian calendar; and 27% celebrate holydays differently, depending on the circumstances.














2022 6.0 75.3 3.8 2.3 2.3 30.3 9.2 2023 #33 3.2 7. 0.2 2023 16.2 14.8 (continued) 76.2 5.1 77 1.8 17.7 2022 81.6 1.3 8.3 3.7 1:9 3.2 3.4 3.6 1.7 31.4 14.8 22.5 2022 9.8 2.4 2 2022 14.8 5.9 10.6 79.1 do not belong t 75.4 2021 11.6 2.4 3.9 2.6 4. 4.3 3.2 2021 24.8 2021 75.2 9.4 3.7 14.8 15.6 7.9 4.1 16.9 20.1 2020 4.5 4.6 +09 8.9 1.2 6.7 74.1 2020 3.5 2020 75.8 2.8 9.7 3.7 4.4 4.6 17.4 23.0 6.2 13.4 35.4 2018 1.5 5.6 76.3 6.6 2.7 4.1 77.0 2018 2018 9.0 3.4 3.0 3.6 29.0 6.3 6.8 11.3 23.5 4.1 2010 75.9 11.9 5.9 0.8 3.6 2.0 23.1 2.0 2010 77.8 5.8 1.6 2010 3.0 8.8 4.1 2023 5.6 3.8 21.3 8.0 43.3 15.2 9.1 14.4 3.1 68.1 5.1 2022 5.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.2 5.3 2.6 2023 12.3 70.3 14.2 4.8 4.4 7 2023 52.4 0.0 16.2 78.1 21.4 2021 64.0 6.5 4.0 7.2 4.6 13.7 2022 76.3 12.0 4.2 1.2 1.2 2022 54.3 4.6 2.9 1.7 10.9 5.1 25.7 Çity Just Christians 2020 64.9 15.0 3.3 7.7 4.1 5.1 9.01 4.9 3.5 2021 73.4 2.9 5.2 3.2 2021 54.4 5.3 1.8 6.6 25.1 -59 2018 3.0 6.0 69.4 12.2 5.7 3.7 50-2020 9.69 6.9 3.6 2020 11.7 2.7 5.4 67.6 19.6 2.2 0.0 3.9 6.7 2010 69.2 8.9 9. 4.8 3.9 11.3 RRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER YOU GO TO CHURCH OT NOT. WHO DO YOU THINK YOU ARE? 2018 72.9 0.3 5.4 2.9 4.6 4.0 2018 50.0 6.5 7. 29.9 8.4 3.9 2023 6.9 4.0 5.2 2.7 Incomplete or complete 69.1 12.1 2010 76.0 8.3 8.0 17 4.2 2.4 2022 2010 12.5 9.0 9.7 74.0 11.9 5.9 2.3 4.1 1:0 22.9 0.7 45.1 68.9 4.6 2021 63.0 14.9 6.9 4.2 7.2 20223 2023 14.6 4.3 3.5 95.9 0.0 0.0 8. 0.0 higher 2.3 4.1 2020 63.8 5.0 4.7 14.2 3.1 9.1 2022 75.4 11.9 3.8 1.4 4.3 3.2 2022 92.6 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0: 2018 3.9 69.2 5.7 5.3 12.7 3.1 2.0 2021 67.8 15.2 5.7 5.5 3.7 2021 9.0 9.0 9.0 0.0 9.0 40-49 Jecc 2010 -1 1 1 2020 6.0 2020 9.89 16.0 3.4 2.3 0.5 0.0 0: 3.7 95.3 0.0 3.1 풀 2023 70.8 2.8 5.8 4.2 2.3 7. 2018 68.5 14.9 4.2 6.3 3.6 2018 0.0 1.6 2.7 1.6 0.5 Secondary special 96.3 0.0 2022 74.3 11.5 4.3 2.6 4.3 2.9 2.6 15.0 1.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 2010 98.0 0.0 2010 68.2 9.1 2021 11.9 5.2 2.6 5.3 4.3 1.3 0.7 70.7 2020 4.5 9.59 5.6 2.9 6.5 5.6 70.4 12.2 3.2 6.2 3.4 2023 9: 2023 13.8 9.69 7. 4.3 2.8 20.6 % of respondents 74.0 2018 2.3 11.7 5.2 3.7 3. 2022 72.6 12.9 4.9 1:9 4.4 3.4 2022 18.8 2.3 0.0 2.6 73.4 2.9 Just Orthodox 2010 1 1 1 5.0 3.5 6.5 3.5 16.5 5.5 2021 14.3 2021 1.3 4.8 71.7 0.3 67.1 30-3 2023 72.4 6.3 1.7 4.8 2.8 12.0 Incomplete or complete 2020 64.0 14.5 4.8 3.3 5.3 2020 8.3 22.5 3.3 0.5 4.0 4.9 64.7 2022 74.0 4.2 0.8 5.2 1.3 14.6 73.0 2018 4.0 3.2 4.9 3.8 2018 71.5 14.0 1:9 0.4 ≓ 6.4 5.7 2021 11.5 5.0 3.5 6.0 3.0 7.1 2010 16.2 7. 5.3 3.4 2020 4.5 2010 18.0 9.0 3.3 4.6 67.7 6.1 12.5 3.5 9.9 3.1 69.7 3.1 64.9 9.5 5.0 8. 2018 9.3 5.9 2.8 2023 12.2 2.7 71.3 5.7 2023 91.3 5.2 0.0 0.0 6:0 1. 5.1 2010 1 T 1 ı 9.6 3.4 6.2 2022 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.8 2022 21 92.4 5.3 3.7 65.1 2.8 8. 3.5 2023 11.8 2.4 7.77 11:0 JOC-MP 5.5 4.9 2021 15.2 7.3 2021 86.8 8.2 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.8 5 6.1 25-2 2022 2.6 1.4 3.0 1.9 10.4 80.7 2020 64.4 3.4 3.4 2020 1.3 14.7 2.8 6.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.6 90.1 2021 6.6 4.0 2.6 5.0 3.4 Women 75.1 2018 66.2 15.0 5.3 2.9 7.2 3.4 2018 81.8 11.2 1.9 0.8 2.3 1:9 2020 73.6 11.6 2.6 4.9 4.0 3.3 2010 1.5 5.6 2010 .5 87.3 65.7 ≓ 10. 6.1 2018 3.0 1.6 3.4 3.8 8.7 = 0.4 =78.9 9.3 2010 5.8 1.0 1.9 2023 7.5 3.4 78.7 9.6 2.9 14.9 10.3 8.6 2023 55.2 84.3 11.5 0.2 0.8 6: ₩. 2023 7.6 7.5 4.6 61.7 14.4 4. 픙 2022 9.09 19.4 8.6 4.0 6.3 2022 88.0 9.0 1.2 ≔ 0.7 0.3 0.8 2022 7.5 6.3 2.5 14.4 3.1 66.1 9.0 2021 5.0 5.5 2021 83.3 11.4 0.4 0.0 1.6 3.3 48.2 19.1 13.1 18-24 000 2021 16.8 7.8 4.4 7.5 4.4 59.1 Men 2020 4.5 7.0 52.3 13.6 5.5 2020 86.2 9.0 1.6 0.8 0.5 1:9 17.1 2020 61.3 5.3 3.5 14.6 5.2 10.2 2018 11.5 8.3 3.2 6.9 4.6 2018 65.4 2018 65.9 6.8 4.7 7.6 3.9 14.1 3.5 2010 10.2 118 1.2 2010 2010 9.0 1.9 5.0 56.1 7. 62.4 13.8 6.2 ī ı A person who wavers between faith and A person who wavers between faith and wavers convinced atheist convinced atheist convinced atheist I don't care about these things and don't care about don't care about A non-believer A person who w between faith a non-belief A non-believer A non-believer hese things hese things Hard to say Hard to say non-belief non-belief A believer Hard to say A believer believer






										■ No	ovembe	r 2023
				REGI	ONS							
		West			Centre			South			East	
	2022	2	2023	2022	2	2023	2022	2	2023	2022	2	2023
More religious and faithful than before	31.2	:	30.7	24.3		22.2	22.0		26.9	23.3		16.1
Less religious and faithful than before	4.1		4.3	4.0		4.9	0.5		6.4	5.9		5.2
No changes in the attitude towards religion and faith	62.0		61.9	65.8		69.1	75.1		63.7	63.0		73.2
Hard to say	2.8		3.2	5.9		3.8	2.4		3.0	7.8		5.5
				AC	E							
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	)-39	40	-49	50	-59	6	0+
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More religious and faithful than before	18.4	16.6	17.8	19.7	22.1	19.7	25.5	24.1	23.8	25.5	33.6	28.5
Less religious and faithful than before	4.0	2.3	3.4	4.8	4.1	3.9	4.6	7.6	4.8	5.4	3.1	4.8
No changes in the attitude towards religion and faith	75.3	74.3	73.3	70.1	66.5	72.5	64.8	64.9	65.4	65.2	59.5	63.9
Hard to say	2.3	6.9	5.5	5.4	7.3	3.9	5.1	3.5	6.0	3.9	3.8	2.7
		CON	FESSIO1	AL AND	CHUR	CH IDEN	TITY					
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP		ust nodox	UG	CC		ust stians	belong	not g to any gion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More religious and faithful than before	31.2	31.9	38.2	34.8	20.4	11.0	31.2	35.6	17.7	15.4	3.4	0.4
Less religious and faithful than before	4.2	6.6	4.6	3.5	4.7	3.5	2.4	2.3	2.9	6.1	3.4	4.4
No changes in the attitude towards religion and faith	61.3	59.3	50.4	57.4	67.4	81.2	65.4	58.1	73.1	74.6	86.4	87.8
Hard to say	3.3	2.3	6.9	4.3	7.6	4.3	1.0	4.1	6.3	3.9	6.8	7.4



#### WHICH SOCIAL COMMUNITY DO YOU IDENTIFY YOURSELF WITH IN THE FIRST PLACE?

			%	of respo	ondents							
		UKRAIN	ΙE					REGIO	DNS			
	2021	2022	2022	,	West		Centi	re e	Sou	th	Ea	st
	2021	2022	2023	202	2 20	23	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
With citizen of Ukraine	68.2	73.5	74.8	71.9	9 71	.4	72.4	74.1	79.3	85.0	74.8	75.0
With residents of my city (village)	15.6	13.9	14.5	14.0	5 <b>16</b>	.8	15.6	14.0	9.1	13.3	12.2	13.4
With residents of my region	8.1	5.5	3.8	5.!	<b>5 5</b>	.8	4.9	4.0	3.8	0.0	7.3	2.5
With people of my profession	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	7 0	.7	1.6	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.0
With people of the same faith	2.7	2.6	2.4	3.0	0 1	.7	3.1	2.9	1.9	0.4	1.5	3.0
With people of the same Church to which I belong	1.0	1.5	1.2	1.8	B <b>1</b>	.5	1.3	1.5	2.9	0.0	1.0	1.0
Other	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.0	<b>o</b>	.2	0.3	0.2	1.0	0.0	1.2	1.7
Hard to say	2.5	1.1	1.6	0.0	9 1	.9	0.7	1.1	1.9	1.3	1.5	2.5
				AG								
	18- 2022	2023	25- 2022	-29 2023	2022	-39 2023		0-49 2023		2023	2022	0+
With citizen of Ukraine	79.0	<b>75.4</b>	76.4	79.7	74.3	76.6		78.6	74.5	74.2	69.6	70.1
With residents of my city (village)	10.8	14.9	11.5	12.2	11.4	14.1	14.4	13.0	14.4	14.7	16.8	16.2
With residents of my region	2.8	2.9	4.7	4.1	7.0	2.9		3.2	4.5	4.5	6.0	4.3
With people of my profession	0.6	1.1	1.4	0.7	1.9	1.5		1.4	1.5	0.6	0.2	1.7
With people of the same faith	1.7	1.1	2.0	0.7	2.4	2.4		0.8	2.4	3.3	4.5	3.6
With people of the same Church	1.7	1.1	2.0	0.7				0.6		3.3	4.5	3.0
to which I belong	1.1	1.1	2.0	0.0	1.2	0.2	1.4	0.5	1.2	1.5	2.1	2.6
Other	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.7
Hard to say	2.3	3.4	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.9
		CONFE	ESSION	AL AND			NTITY					
	00	CU	UOC	-MP		ust iodox	U	GCC		ust istians		t belong religion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	3 2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
With citizen of Ukraine	74.8	78.4	64.4	64.3	81.4	77.6	72.8	64.9	74.1	76.3	69.1	74.6
With residents of my city (village)	14.9	13.2	15.9	19.1	10.5	13.7	16.5	20.7	13.2	12.7	13.1	15.4
With residents of my region	4.5	3.8	6.1	4.3	2.9	2.0	6.3	5.9	8.6	3.1	10.6	3.7
With people of my profession	1.5	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.9	1.7	2.2	1.7	1.1
With people of the same faith	2.5	1.5	6.1	8.7	1.6	0.8	2.4	4.1	0.6	1.8	0.4	0.4
With people of the same Church to which I belong	1.2	1.3	4.5	2.6	0.0	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.0
Other	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.0	1.7	2.6
Hard to say	0.7	0.7	2.3	0.0	1.6	2.7	0.0	1.4	0.0	3.5	3.0	2.2








WHICH OF THE FOLLOW	ING ST	ATEMEI		OUT A		ER WO	ULD Y	OU AGE	REE WIT	TH THE		•
	_		75 (			Λ.	GE		_	_	(cont	inued)
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	-39	40	-49	50-	-59	6	1+
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
A person can be just a believer and not profess a particular religion	60.9	57.4	67.1	56.5	60.6	61.2	58.6	56.6	58.3	56.3	48.6	51.0
A believer must profess one religion or another	27.0	30.1	28.8	34.0	33.3	30.8	32.7	36.1	34.5	36.4	44.2	42.6
Hard to say	12.1	12.5	4.1	9.5	6.1	8.0	8.6	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.2	6.3
				CONF	ESSIO	NAL ANI	D CHUR	CH IDE	NTITY			
	0	CU	UOC	C-MP		ıst odox	UG	CC	Ju Chris	ist itians		belong religion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
A person can be just a believer and not profess a particular religion	52.2	53.4	40.9	33.9	69.7	69.8	34.6	26.6	75.9	69.3	73.3	76.8
A believer must profess one religion or another	41.0	42.7	53.8	58.3	23.5	23.9	61.0	66.2	19.0	17.5	8.5	7.0
Hard to say	6.8	3.9	5.3	7.8	6.8	6.3	4.4	7.2	5.2	13.2	18.2	16.2

		WHIC	_	ION DO Y	OU BELC dents	NG TO?				
	2000	2010	2013	2014	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Orthodoxy	66.0	68.1	70.6	70.2	67.3	64.9	62.3	60.0	62.7	60.8
Roman Catholicism	0.5	0.4	1.3	1.0	0.8	1.6	1.2	0.8	1.9	1.2
Greek Catholicism	7.6	7.6	5.7	7.8	9.4	9.5	9.6	8.8	10.2	11.0
Protestant and Evangelical churches	2.0	1.9	0.8	1.0	2.2	1.8	1.5	1.5	3.7	1.4
Judaism	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Islam	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1
Buddhism	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0
Hinduism	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Paganism	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.4
I am just Christian	6.9	7.2	8.6	6.3	7.7	8.0	8.9	8.5	8.7	11.3
Other	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1
I do not belong to any religion	15.3	13.2	11.3	12.5	11.0	12.8	15.2	18.8	11.7	13.4
No answer	_	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.1




										MH	CHR	WHICH RELIGION DO YOU BELONG TO?  % of respondents	ION of res	GION DO YOU E % of respondents	OU E	3ELC	NG	[0;													(cont	(continued)	$\widehat{\sigma}$
															РЕГІОНИ	ОНИ																	
			West	+;							Ö	Centre								South	Ч								East				
	2000 2010	2014	2018	2020	2021	2022	2023	2000	2010	2013	2014	2018	5050	2021	2022	5003	2000	2013	2014	2018	2020	2021	2022	2023	5000	2010	2013	2014	2018	2020	2021	2022	5023
Orthodoxy	52.3 45.9 60.2		54.0 45.6	, 46.3	45.0	39.9	45.0	0.69	73.8	79.4	79.5 6	69.3 69	99 6.69	66.6 74.7		<b>71.8</b> 68	68.8 76.4	4 73.2	2 67.4	4 61.6	64.9	61.3	68.9	65.8	2.69	71.8	2.99	71.6	61.6	64.7 6	61.4 6	64.5 5	55.6
Roman Catholicism	1.3 1.0 3.8	8 1.0	0 1.3	3 2.3	1.9	4.1	2.8	0.8	0.5	6.0	1.5	0.8	1.7 0	0.9	1.4 0	0.5 0	0.0 0.3	3 0.3	3 0.9	0.0 6	0.4	1.2	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.2	0.8	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.5
Greek Catholicism	38.4 37.2 26.8		36.2 39.7	38.2	34.9	36.3	39.6	9.0	0.3	1.2	0.7	0.4	1.2	1.2 0	0.7 0	0.6	0.0	0.0 0.3	3 0.5	5 0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	9.0	0.7	1.5
Protestant churches	0.8 3.8 0.5	5 1.4	1 5.3	3 1.9	1.5	5.4	₽	2.9	0.5	9.0	0.3	. 7.1	1.6	2.6 2	2.7 1	1.8	1.7 0.	0.0 0.3	.3 2.3	3 2.9	2.1	1.2	1.9	0.0	1.9	3.2	1.2	6.0	2.9	0.8	=	4.4	1.7
Judaism	0.5 0.0 0.5	5 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.3 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 0.3	3 0.7	7 0.0	0.0 0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2 (	0.0	0.2
Islam	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.7 0	0.1 0	0.0	0.0	3.0 4.	4.9 4.	4.2 0.5	5 0.4	0.8	1.2	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.5
Buddhism	0.0 0.3 0.	0.0 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.4 0	0.1 0	0.2 0	0.1 0	0.3 0.	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hinduism	0.0 0.0 0.	0.0 0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3 0.0	0.0 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Paganism	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1 0	0.0	0.0	0.4 0	0.7 0.	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.2	1.2
I am just Christian	2.7 6.9 4.	4.3 4.1	4.9	6.7	7.3	5.2	3.5	7.8	7.7	5.5	10.3	4.1 10	10.0	10.0	9.3 14.1		4.0 7.2		6.5 6.5	5 14.5	7.4	=======================================	10.0	13.7	6.6	7.0	15.2	3.8	14.5	8.6	6.3	11.2	14.1
Other	0.0 0.8 0.	0.0 0.2	0.0	0.0 (	9.0	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3 0	0.0	0.2 0.	0.2 0	0.7 0.0		0.0 0.0	0.0 0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.0
I do not belong to any religion	4.0 4.1 3.	3.6 3.1	3.2	4.6	8.7	7.2	7.8	18.2	17.0	10.8	7.1 2	22.4 13	13.9 18	18.0 10	10.7 10.	<b>10.4</b> 20.9	.9 10.2	2 14.1	1 18.1	20.2	23.6	21.8	17.2	18.4	16.6	16.3	15.0	21.7	20.2	22.6 2	27.7 10	16.6 2	24.4
No answer	0.0 0.0 0.3	3 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.4 0	0.1		0.0 0.7		0.0 3.7	7 0.4	1 0.4	0.8	0.0	0:0	0.0	0.5	9.0	9.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.2	0.2
		18-24					25-	25-29					30-39			AGE _		A	40-49					0.5	50-59	н	п	н	н	+09	н		
	2002	7	2003	C		2022			2003		2				2003		2022		2	2003	C		2022			2003			2000			2003	
Orthodoxy	50.9		43.8	)		510			57.1		1 ~0	62 4		56.3	} ~		64 4	1 4		29.6	)		643			299		1	67.2		í <b>'</b> G	67.5	
Roman Catholicism	3.4		Ξ			1.4			0.0			1.7		_	1.2		2.4	4		0.5			1.8			1.8			1.4			1.5	
Greek Catholicism	10.9		14.2			12.9			10.2		<u>~</u>	10.9		10.9	6:		8.6	9		11.4			10.5			11.1			9.6		5	6.7	
Protestant churches	2.7		Ξ			2.7			1.4			4.1		0	0.5		3.2	2		1.9	_		3.9			1.5			3.3		,,	2.1	
Judaism	0.0		0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0		0	0.2		0.0	0		0.0			0.0			0.0			0.3			0.0	
Islam	9.0		9.0			0.0			0.0			0.0		0	0.0		0.3	2		0.0	_		0.3			0.3			0.2		J	0.0	
Buddhism	9.0		0.0			0.7			0.0			0.0		0	7		0.3	3		0.0			0.3			0.0			0.0			0.	
Hinduism	0.0		0.0	_		0.0			0.0			0.0		0	0.0		0.0	0		0.0	_		0.0			0.0			0.3		J	0.0	
Paganism	9.0		0.0	_		0.0			0.0		_	0.2		0	0.5		0.3	3		0.8	~~		0.0			9.0			0.0			0.2	
I am just Christian	9.8		11.9	_		13.6			12.2			7.8		15.3	ci.		9.4	4		12.7			7.2			7.8			8.4		٥.	9.2	
Other	9.0		0.0			0.0			0.0			0.5		0	0.5		0.0	0		0.0			0.3			0.0			0.3			0.2	
I do not belong to any religion	18.3		26.7			17.7			19.0		_	12.4		14.3	'n		10.8	œ		13.0	_		Ξ:			10.2			9.8		σ.	9.4	
No answer	0.0		0.6	,0		0.0			0.0			0.0		0	0.0		0.3	3		0.0			0.3			0.0			0.3			0.2	






















		ST	RUCT	URE (	OF REL %	IGIOU: of respo			URC	:H GI	ROUPS					
								EGI	ONS							
		We				Centre					South				East	
	2020	2021		2023	2020	2021	2023		2020	2020	2021	2023	2020	21	2021	2023
OCU	31.2	24.	2 <b>2</b>	2.8	48.3	47.2	51.	.5	12.	.0	7.5	10.9	8	.5	21.1	14.8
UOC-MP	22.3	20.	2 1	17.7	34.7	34.6	32.	.7	6.	.6	12.3	22.1	36	.5	32.9	27.4
Just Orthodox	7.2	9.	8 1	0.2	41.7	40.2	51.	0	14.	.5	16.8	13.7	36	.7	33.2	25.1
UGCC	94.8	94.	4 9	5.1	4.7	4.5	2.	2	0.	.0	0.6	0.0	0.	.5	0.6	2.7
Just Christians	17.9	20.	3	8.3	43.0	44.8	52.	6	10.	.1	15.7	14.0	29	.1	19.2	25.0
I do not belong to any religion	7.2	11.	1 <b>1</b>	5.4	35.0	36.4	32.	4	18.	.6	14.0	15.8	39.	.2	38.5	36.4
								AC								
		18-29			30-39			40-	.49			50-59			60+	
	2020	2021	2023	2020	2021	2023	2020	2021	1707	2023	2020	2021	2023	2020	2021	2023
OCU	14.6	15.9	14.0	19.4	17.7	19.3	17.8	19	.9	17.1	16.0	16.3	17.7	32.2	30.3	31.9
UOC-MP	10.9	6.6	11.4	15.3	16.5	9.6	17.2	13	.2	17.5	20.8	24.7	18.4	35.8	39.1	43.0
Just Orthodox	18.5	17.3	10.2	22.0	22.0	20.5	15.6	15	.8	21.3	16.9	18.0	19.3	27.0	27.0	28.7
UGCC	16.5	15.2	18.3	16.5	19.1	21.0	19.1	19	.1	18.8	19.1	17.4	16.5	28.9	29.2	25.4
Just Christians	20.1	27.5	16.7	22.9	22.8	27.6	20.7	15	.2	20.6	13.4	15.2	11.4	22.9	19.3	23.7
I do not belong to any religion	31.4	25.3	27.7	19.3	22.1	21.8	17.0	16	.8	17.7	14.1	14.2	12.5	18.3	21.6	20.3
							(	SEN	DER							
		201	21	Me	n	2022					2021	W	omen		2022	
		202				2023					2021				2023	
OCU		43.				40.5					56.4				59.5	
UOC-MP		32.				32.5					68.0				67.5	
Just Orthodox		49.				44.5					50.4				55.5	
UGCC		42.				43.5					57.9				56.5	
Just Christians		53.	5			54.8					46.5				45.2	
I do not belong to any religion		55.	4			60.5					44.6				39.5	









<sup>\*</sup> The proportion of those who did not answer was not included in figures and tables because of their small number.



НО	W OF							<b>ERVIC</b> rices, m				IINIST	RIES?			
	200	00	2010	)	2013	1	2016	20	)19	202	0	2021		2022	2	023
More than once a week	4.	.4	3.5		3.7		4.2	4	1.9	4.2	)	4.1		7.5		6.4
Once a week	15.	.9	15.7		14.9		17.7	19	2.1	22.4	1	15.9		24.8	2	4.9
Once a month	13.	.1	20.8		18.5		17.0	20	.1	18.4	ļ	23.1		16.4	1	8.0
On religious holidays	52.	.0	50.4		53.0		51.7	48	8.8	47.2	)	44.2		42.9	4	2.0
Once a year	8.	.1	5.4		6.3		6.4	4	.2	3.6	5	8.8		4.5		5.1
Less than once a year	3.	.0	2.2		1.7		1.9	1	1.3	2.0	)	2.8		2.2		2.5
Never, almost never	0.	.3	0.9		0.6		0.1	0	.5	0.7	,	0.4		0.4		0.4
Other	2.	.9	0.6		0.1		0.2	0	.4	0.5	5	0.3		0.0		0.2
Hard to say	0.	.0	0.0		1.1		0.0		.7	1.0	)	0.4		1.4		0.5
		\/\	est			Ca	ntre	REGION	IS	So	uth			E:	ast	
	2020	2021		2023	2020	2021		2023	2020	2021		2023	2020	2021	2022	2023
More than once a week	6.2	4.5	12.6	11.0	3.5	3.7	3.3	2.8	3.9	3.9	7.8	5.1	1.5	3.9	4.0	3.0
Once a week	40.1	26.6	35.0	36.8	10.3	10.9	19.0	15.8	10.4	10.5	15.6	30.6	15.3	7.7	16.0	9.8
Once a month	26.7	27.9	19.5	20.6	17.6	21.1	15.5	15.8	9.1	23.7	5.2	20.4	6.1	17.9	16.0	14.3
On religious holidays	24.3	33.0	29.3	27.2	57.5	49.9	52.4	56.3	67.5	48.7	62.3	38.8	65.8	53.1	46.9	50.4
Once a year	1.5	6.6	1.1	3.0	4.0	9.6	6.5	6.0	3.9	10.5	5.2	4.1	7.1	10.6	8.0	9.8
Less than once a year	0.5	1.1	1.4	0.7	4.0	3.5	1.3	2.8	2.6	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.5	4.8	6.9	9.0
Never, almost never	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.1	1.5
Other	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.8
Hard to say	0.2	0.0	0.7	0.2	8.0	0.5	2.0	0.5	1.3	1.3	2.6	0.0	3.1	0.5	1.1	1.5
		18-24		25	-29		30-3		GE	40-49		50	-59		60+	
	2022		023	2022	2023	3 20	022	2023	2022		)23	2022	2023	3 20	)22	2023
More than once a week	11.0		2.8	7.7	7.0		3.7	4.0	6.3		1.3	7.3	8.5		).1	8.5
Once a week	17.8	3 19	9.4	21.5	19.7	24	4.3	18.3	24.0	23	3.0	20.4	26.0	30	0.0	31.5
Once a month	23.3		5.3	16.9	18.3		3.8	21.8	13.0		3.2	19.4	15.5		5.4	17.6
On religious holidays	41.1	5	1.4	49.2	43.7	4	9.1	47.0	47.4	46	5.5	41.4	38.5	36	5.9	35.9
Once a year	4.1		6.9	1.5	2.8		4.1	5.4	4.7		5.9	6.8	8.0		3.7	3.2
Less than once a year	2.7		2.8	0.0	8.5		3.2	3.5	2.6	C	).5	2.6	2.0	)	1.4	1.8
Never, almost never	0.0	)	1.4	0.0	0.0	(	0.0	0.0	0.0	C	).5	1.0	0.5	(	0.6	0.6
Other	0.0	) (	0.0	0.0	0.0	(	0.0	0.0	0.0		).5	0.0	0.5	(	0.0	0.0
Hard to say	0.0	) (	0.0	3.1	0.0		1.8	0.0	2.1	C	).5	1.0	0.5	(	).9	0.9




н	ow o	FTEN	DO YO	OU AT1	ΓEND	RELIG	IOUS	SERVI	CES, N	1EETII	NGS, N	1INIST	RIES?	)		
		•	% of th	ose who	o atten	d religi	ous ser	vices, r	neetin	gs, mini	stries				(conti	inued)
						CONFE	SSION	AL ANI	CHU	RCH ID	ENTIT'	Y				
		00	CU			UOC	C-MP				ist odox			UG	СС	
	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023
More than once a week	3.6	3.4	3.2	4.4	2.6	6.5	5.0	8.3	2.7	0.6	3.7	0.0	8.7	3.6	10.3	11.9
Once a week	20.8	10.1	20.9	19.2	15.1	18.9	25.0	34.5	9.4	4.9	10.6	10.8	34.7	30.2	39.7	42.4
Once a month	20.8	23.8	13.0	18.5	26.3	25.4	17.0	17.9	15.4	17.1	14.9	13.3	27.7	31.4	23.7	21.9
On religious holidays	49.5	50.9	50.4	48.7	45.4	38.4	47.0	34.5	63.8	52.4	60.2	63.9	25.4	32.5	25.8	21.0
Once a year	3.1	8.8	6.8	5.5	2.6	8.6	4.0	2.4	6.4	18.3	6.2	7.2	2.9	2.4	0.5	2.4
Less than once a year	2.1	1.8	2.4	2.7	1.3	1.6	0.0	1.2	1.7	6.1	3.1	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Never. almost never	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.7	2.6	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	2.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0






				OID \	OU.	ATTE	END	THE						AY (S	ATU	RDA	Y, FR	IDA	Y)?					
											respo											(C	ontin	ued)
								С	ONF			LAN	D CH	URC	H ID	ENTII	Υ							
		0	CU			UOC	C-MP				ust odox			UC	GCC				ust stians	5			belor eligio	
	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023
Yes	31.7	25.1	22.9	24.5	30.8	38.5	35.9	34.5	10.6	9.3	11.7	7.1	44.3	42.5	55.1	58.6	8.1	17.4	14.3	8.3	1.6	1.1	0.8	1.8
No	67.9	74.3	76.8	74.2	68.2	60.7	62.6	65.5	87.6	90.5	87.8	91.0	52.1	57.5	44.9	40.5	91.3	82.6	85.7	90.4	96.1	98.7	98.7	97.0
No answer	0.4	0.6	0.3	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.5	0.0	1.8	0.3	0.5	2.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.3	2.3	0.3	0.4	1.1
												A	GE											
		18	-24			25	-29			30	-39			40	-49			50	-59			6	0+	
	20	)22	20	)23	20	)22	20	)23	20	)22	20	)23	20	)22	20	)23	20	)22	20	)23	20	)22	20	)23
Yes	15	5.4	12	2.0	1	7.7	20	).4	2	1.1	17	7.5	22	2.2	18	8.9	23	3.7	2	7.2	3	1.9	30	).5
No	84	4.0	8	7.4	82	2.3	79	9.6	78	3.4	82	2.0	7	7.5	80	0.3	75	5.1	7	1.6	68	3.1	6	7.1
No answer	(	0.6	(	0.6	(	0.0	(	0.0	C	).5	C	).5	(	).3	(	0.8		1.2		1.2	C	0.0	2	2.4





			DID	YOU	PART	ICIPA'			<b>NE RI</b> ndents	ELIGIO	OUS S	ERVI	CES?				(conti	nued)
									A	GE							(COIIti	nueu)
		18-24			25-29			30-39	)		40-49			50-59	)		60+i	
	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023
Yes	16.7	7	9.1	13.6	5	10.2	14.8	3	17.2	15.4	4	15.6	18.0	0	15.6	11.9	7	15.6
No	57.	5 (	68.6	61.9	) (	69.4	60.8	8	60.0	59.0	5 (	64.2	57.7	7	61.6	58.6	5 (	62.2
No, it is unacceptable for me	25.3	3	22.3	24.5	5 2	20.4	24.1		22.3	24.7	7	19.7	24.0	) i	22.2	29.0	)	21.7
No answer	0.0	5	0.0	0.0	)	0.0	0.2	2	0.5	0.3	3	0.5	0.3	3	0.6	0.!	5	0.5
						CC	NFES	SION	AL AN	D CHU	IRCH	DENT	ITY					
		OCU		U	IOC-M	IP	С	Just Orthod	OX		UGCC	<u>`</u>	С	Just hristia	ns		ot bel y relig	ong to
	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023
Yes	14.4	12.9	14.1	8.0	15.2	18.3	5.5	2.9	6.3	55.7	52.4	46.8	5.6	10.3	4.4	0.3	0.4	4.1
No	68.8	66.8	67.9	69.3	61.4	61.7	65.0	59.0	68.1	39.2	41.7	46.8	74.9	52.9	55.5	58.0	58.7	66.8
No, it is unacceptable for me	16.8	19.9	17.5	22.6	23.5	20.0	29.5	37.6	24.8	5.2	5.8	6.3	19.0	36.8	39.7	41.6	40.0	28.8
No answer	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.4






## Currently the Church is actively using the latest information technologies (social media, «church in a smartphone», etc.). HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

% of respondents

		% of respondents (continued														nued)		
									A	GΕ								
		18-24			25-29			30-39	)		40-49			50-59			60+	
	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023	202	2 2	2023
Positive	45.4	4 4	12.3	35.4	1 4	14.9	41.5	5 4	43.9	43.9	)	41.2	42.0	) 4	14.9	35.9	) :	38.7
Negative	4.6	5	6.9	6.1	1	10.2	8.7	7	7.5	9.2	2	10.2	11.1		13.8	14.1		14.7
Indifferent	43.7	7 4	15.1	52.4	1	37.4	39.6	5 :	39.8	40.9	)	41.5	41.7	7 :	32.3	40.2	2 :	35.4
Hard to say	6.3 <b>5.7</b> 6.1				7.5	10.2	2	8.7	6.0	)	7.0	5.1		9.0	9.8	3	11.1	
						СО	NFES	SION	AL ANI	D CHU	RCH	DENT	ITY					
		OCU		L	IOC-M	Р	0	Just orthod	ОХ		UGCC	,	С	Just hristia	ns		ot bel y relig	ong to ion
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Positive	49.2	45.1	47.5	34.9	48.1	43.5	32.6	30.3	34.6	65.7	72.8	66.2	36.6	25.7	29.8	17.4	9.4	20.6
Negative	11.2	10.1	12.8	18.3	14.5	19.1	17.6	12.8	11.8	1.7	3.4	12.2	25.0	16.6	5.7	15.0	5.1	7.0
Indifferent	33.9	36.4	30.9	35.7	30.5	27.8	41.0	48.8	43.7	19.9	17.0	15.3	34.3	48.0	52.6	55.4	79.6	64.7
Hard to say	5.7	8.4	8.8	11.2	6.9	9.6	8.9	8.1	9.8	12.7	6.8	6.3	4.1	9.7	11.8	12.1	6.0	7.7






## AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (24 February 2022) COMPARED TO THE «PRE-WAR» TIME, DO YOU...

% of respondents

						AG	E					
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	-39	40	-49	50	-59	60	)+
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More often	11.4	5.7	8.2	9.5	9.2	7.5	11.1	10.8	10.2	10.5	12.7	14.9
Less often	10.9	5.1	9.5	8.8	10.9	9.0	12.7	8.4	11.4	8.1	15.1	9.2
As before	38.3	43.2	38.8	49.7	48.2	55.2	50.0	51.4	52.7	60.2	46.7	51.3
Neither went there before nor go there now	38.3	41.5	40.8	29.9	28.2	25.1	24.6	25.9	22.3	18.6	22.7	21.5
Hard to say	1.1	4.5	2.7	2.0	3.4	3.2	1.6	3.5	3.3	2.7	2.7	3.1

				CO	NFESSIC	DNAL ANI	D CHURC	H IDENT	ITY			
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP		ust odox	UG	СС		ıst stians		pelong to eligion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More often	11.9	12.8	14.4	18.3	7.3	4.3	16.2	21.2	5.2	6.1	0.4	0.0
Less often	13.9	10.4	17.4	10.4	13.1	11.8	15.2	8.6	13.8	5.3	2.6	1.1
As before	56.1	61.7	56.1	59.1	47.0	49.4	65.2	65.8	32.2	41.2	13.2	24.6
Neither went there before nor go there now	15.7	12.4	9.8	11.3	30.3	31.4	2.5	1.8	46.0	43.9	78.3	68.4
Hard to say	2.5	2.7	2.3	0.9	2.3	3.1	1.0	2.7	2.9	3.5	5.5	5.9








## AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (24 February 2022) COMPARED TO THE «PRE-WAR» TIME, DO YOU...


% of respondents

				/	o or respo	maems					(co	ntinued)
			Po	ersonally o	commun	icate with	priests?					
						REG	IONS					
		West			Centre			South			East	
	2022	2	2023	2022	2	2023	2022	2	2023	2022	)	2023
More often	13.1		9.7	6.7		8.6	4.8		8.1	4.6		4.2
Less often	8.3		5.2	11.5		5.2	5.8		12.3	9.5		9.4
As before	53.9		54.1	37.0		41.2	29.8		31.9	37.4		42.8
Neither communicated before nor do it now	20.5		26.7	42.9		42.2	57.7		44.3	43.3		40.6
Hard to say	4.2		4.3	1.9		2.8	1.9		3.4	5.1		3.0
						A	GE					
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	)-39	40	-49	50	-59	6	0+
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More often	5.7	5.2	6.2	4.1	7.5	6.3	8.6	8.4	6.9	5.4	8.9	12.1
Less often	5.7	3.4	6.8	8.8	8.5	6.3	9.7	5.9	9.6	7.5	12.3	7.9
As before	34.3	29.3	34.2	43.9	40.4	42.0	42.2	42.4	42.5	50.9	43.2	46.3
Neither communicated before nor do it now	52.0	59.8	49.3	39.2	39.7	41.5	37.8	40.0	37.0	32.9	32.2	30.6
Hard to say	2.3	2.3	3.4	4.1	3.9	3.9	1.6	3.2	3.9	3.3	3.4	3.1
				CO	NFESSIO	ONAL ANI	CHURC	CH IDENI				
	00	CU	UO	C-MP		ust nodox	UG	CC		ust stians		t belong religion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
More often	8.9	10.2	9.2	7.8	1.8	4.3	12.6	12.2	6.3	4.4	0.4	0.4
Less often	13.4	8.7	10.7	7.0	8.1	8.2	9.7	6.3	8.6	5.7	2.1	1.1
As before	48.6	51.6	56.5	67.8	34.5	37.3	62.1	55.4	22.9	27.6	11.1	16.9
Neither communicated before nor do it now	25.6	27.1	22.9	14.8	52.2	47.1	12.6	18.9	61.1	60.5	82.1	77.2
Hard to say	3.5	2.3	0.8	2.6	3.4	3.1	2.9	7.2	1.1	1.8	4.3	4.4











		I	DO YOU	SUPPOF	RT THE C		FINANC	CIALLY?			loo	entinuad)
							IONS				(00)	ntinued)
		West			Centre			South			East	
	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023
Yes, regularly	31.3	31.5	33.1	4.7	9.2	10.8	7.5	7.7	6.0	5.1	9.0	6.7
Yes, rarely	39.0	35.4	30.5	27.2	27.3	24.9	18.7	26.4	28.6	15.4	26.4	23.0
Never	12.1	12.7	14.6	30.9	22.6	25.4	37.8	35.6	24.4	36.5	36.7	37.9
I make donations on major holidays and pay for religious rites	17.3	20.3	21.9	37.1	40.7	38.8	35.3	30.3	41.0	42.9	27.6	32.4
							GE					
		-24		-29		-39		-49		-59		0+
V L	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
Yes, regularly	11.4	11.4	12.3	11.6	13.9	11.1	14.6	15.1	16.2	18.6	17.3	18.6
Yes, rarely	30.3	26.3	22.6	26.5	29.9	26.4	27.3	23.8	29.7	29.1	31.0	26.8
Never	37.7	42.9	32.2	32.7	23.1	25.7	22.4	24.3	21.0	17.7	21.4	21.4
I make donations on major holidays and pay for religious rites	20.6	19.4	32.2	29.3	33.1	36.8	35.7	36.8	33.0	34.5	30.0	33.2
				CO	NFESSIO			HIDENT	ITY			
		0	CU			UOC	C-MP			Just Or	thodox	
	2019	2020	2022	2023	2019	2020	2022	2023	2019	2020	2022	2023
Yes, regularly	18.0	15.7	14.7	16.3	10.8	12.5	17.4	19.1	4.2	3.3	4.4	5.5
Yes, rarely	37.1	36.8	37.3	31.9	35.2	31.1	28.8	35.7	29.4	21.1	26.9	25.2
Never	13.5	13.3	12.7	12.8	14.6	7.0	8.3	15.7	30.0	34.7	29.2	24.4
I make donations on major holidays and pay for religious rites	29.2	33.9	35.3	39.0	38.5	49.1	43.9	29.6	36.3	40.7	39.4	44.9
		UG	CC			Just Ch	ristians		Idor	ot belong	to any re	eligion
	2019	2020	2022	2023	2019	2020	2022	2023	2019	2020	2022	2023
Yes, regularly	27.7	43.5	39.5	42.8	4.4	2.2	5.2	5.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.7
Yes, rarely	45.0	38.9	42.4	36.9	16.3	24.7	19.0	16.7	5.8	3.9	6.4	7.0
Never	6.8	3.6	2.0	4.5	43.8	27.5	36.8	34.2	81.7	81.5	76.3	76.0
I make donations on major holidays and pay for religious rites	19.9	14.0	16.1	15.8	33.8	45.5	39.1	43.9	11.7	13.6	16.9	16.2

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  The proportion of those who did not answer was not included in figures and tables because of their small number.



#### WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOU ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS, MINISTRIES?\*

WHAI IS THE PURPOSE O			d religio						S, MINI	SIKIE	<b>3</b> {"	
		ı	UKRAIN	IE		14.				0		<b>.</b> .
	202	21	2022		2023	VV	est	Cent	re	South	Ŀ	East
Communication with God	48.	5	53.7		50.6	64	1.3	43.6	)	41.2	3	33.1
Participation in prayers, religious rites	47.	8	50.9		45.1	52	2.6	40.6	)	43.3	3	35.1
Religious service helps me calm down and forget about everyday worries	29.	9	34.9		35.1	32	2.8	39.6	)	35.1	2	28.6
I want to listen to a sermon	31.	2	35.2		34.1	33	3.5	36.4	l l	39.2	2	24.8
Service helps me address burdensome moral issues	25.	5	24.2		30.4	28	3.1	33.3	3	34.7	2	26.1
I have done so all my life	16.	7	13.7		15.5	9	2.2	21.1		18.6		17.3
I want to stay among like-minded people and those who I like	17.	5	19.6		14.3	14	1.6	15.9	)	21.6		3.7
Religious community gives me some help or support	3.	1	4.3		3.2		1.8	2.2		10.3		5.3
Other	3.	0	0.3		0.0	C	0.0	0.0	)	0.0		0.0
Hard to say	1.	5	0.5		8.0		1.4	0.2	2	1.0		8.0
	10			AGE					=-0			
		-24	25-		30-		40-		50-		60	
Communication with God		3.5	45			5.8		5.8	50		55	
Participation in prayers, religious rites Religious service helps me calm down	4	4.4	54	1.9	42	1.3	34	1.9	4.	7.0	48	).Z
and forget about everyday worries		5.5		5.4	36			3.4		2.3	40	
I want to listen to a sermon	34	4.7	46	5.5	28	3.7	34	1.6	33	3.7	34	1.4
Service helps me address burdensome moral issues		9.2		0.0		2.7		1.2	30		28	
I have done so all my life	1:	2.5	12	2.7	15	5.8	1	7.2	16	5.6	15	5.3
I want to stay among like-minded people and those who I like	10	6.7	3	3.5	Ċ	9.4	16	5.1	12	2.1	18	3.5
Religious community gives me some help or support	(	0.0	۷	1.3	3	3.0	2	2.7	2	1.5	3	3.2
Other		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Hard to say		4.2		0.0		1.0		1.1	C	).5	0	).3
	CON	OCU	NAL AN		UOC-MI			t Ortho	dov		UGCC	_
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Communication with God	49.8	53.4	44.2	62.7	54.5	61.9	32.9	37.9	37.8	49.4	61.3	70.1
Participation in prayers, religious rites	49.2	50.5	42.3	53.8	54.5	54.8	42.1	38.5	48.8	56.5	63.6	47.6
Religious service helps me calm down and forget about everyday worries	28.7	33.1	35.9	35.7	41.6	52.4	22.6	31.7	22.9	31.5	41.8	32.9
I want to listen to a sermon	33.1	32.7	34.5	36.6	36.6	36.5	18.9	23.1	24.4	36.3	38.1	34.8
Service helps me address burdensome moral issues	25.2	23.1	30.0	31.2	31.7	35.3	14.7	22.5	26.8	32.1	29.4	30.5
I have done so all my life	14.3	12.6	16.7	14.1	17.8	6.0	23.2	18.8	22.0	14.3	13.9	8.5
I want to stay among like-minded people and those who I like	14.9	18.4	13.0	24.3	14.9	23.8	9.1	17.4	7.3	18.5	12.9	18.0
Religious community gives me some help or support	2.4	2.8	2.1	3.2	5.9	10.7	0.0	3.7	3.7	3.6	2.6	2.4
Other	2.7	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0
Hard to say	0.9	1.0	0.4	2.2	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	2.4

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.




## WHY DON'T YOU ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS, MINISTRIES?\* % of those who do attend religious services, meetings, ministries

				J.,			
		UKRAINE		West	Centre	South	East
	2021	2022	2023	VVCSt	Centre	Journ	Last
I believe that it is not necessary to attend religious services or meetings in order to practice a particular religion	32.3	37.4	42.4	41.4	39.2	43.8	47.2
I do not feel any need to do so	36.6	35.8	30.7	26.5	30.5	28.5	33.5
I don't have time for that	26.7	26.9	28.1	23.2	27.5	39.0	25.3
I am a non-believer, an atheist	17.0	14.1	12.1	23.5	12.1	5.8	11.2
None of my acquaintances attend religious services and meetings	8.0	6.7	9.4	2.0	8.7	19.0	8.5
There are no religious communities where I live	2.0	1.9	1.8	0.0	2.9	1.5	0.7
There are no religious communities of the church or religion to which I belong	1.7	2.3	2.9	3.1	3.4	1.5	3.0
I participate in online religious services and meetings, listen / watch services on the radio or TV	1.4	1.8	1.9	4.0	1.6	2.9	1.5
Other	3.6	4.0	3.1	3.1	2.9	0.7	4.5
Hard to say	2.1	3.1	2.3	1.0	3.6	2.2	0.7
		GE (Novemb					
	18-24	25-29	30-	39 4	0-49	50-59	60+
I believe that it is not necessary to attend religious services or meetings in order to practice a particular religion	40.8	31.6	42.	9	45.7	44.0	42.8
I do not feel any need to do so	39.4	36.4	30.	.8	28.6	29.9	27.2
I don't have time for that	23.3	28.6	33.	.3	33.2	31.3	19.8
I am a non-believer, an atheist	25.0	17.1	10.	.0	10.9	9.7	9.1
None of my acquaintances attend religious services and meetings	8.7	10.4	11.	.9	10.8	6.0	8.2
There are no religious communities where I live	0.0	1.3	1.	9	2.7	2.2	1.6
There are no religious communities of the church or religion to which I belong	0.0	3.9	3.	8	2.7	3.0	3.3
I participate in online religious services and meetings, listen / watch services on the radio or TV	1.9	1.3	2.	.9	1.6	2.2	1.6
Other	0.0	0.0	0.	.0	0.0	1.5	11.5
Hard to say	1.9	1.3	2.	.4	1.1	2.3	3.7

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.




### DO YOU THINK SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE CHANGED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WHOSE RELIGIOUS SERVICES, MEETINGS AND MINISTRIES YOU ATTEND?\*

% of those who attend religious services, meetings, ministries

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,						AGE (Nove		ember 2023)					(COIILII	iiueu)
											50-59			
	18	3-24		25-29		30-	39	40	)-49		50-59		60	+
No changes are needed	5	6.3		59.2		59.	7	4	8.4		60.3		58.2	2
More attention to various types of assistance to community members, their support	1	2.7		12.7		6.0	0	1	6.1		11.1		13.	5
More attention to psychological support of community members	1	11.1		4.2		10.9	9	1	7.7		8.5		12.4	4
Ensuring services and sermons done in my native language		4.2		7.0		9.	4	1	4.0		10.1		11.8	8
Simpler rituals and reduced duration of the service		8.3		8.5		7.0	0	1	1.9		10.6		11.2	2
Greater focus on the problems of community members		6.9		5.6		4.	5	1	5.6		7.5		6.!	5
Greater focus on religious teaching of community members		9.9		4.3		5.	4		5.4		4.0		7.1	
Performing meetings and services at a more convenient time		2.8		4.2		3.	5		7.0		7.5		3.!	5
Other	(	0.0		0.0		0.0		1.1			0.5		0.0	О
Hard to say	1	11.3		9.9		13.9		7.5			9.0		7.3	3
		11.5		CC	NFE:	SSION	AL ANI	D CHURCH IDI		DENT	ENTITY			
		OCU		L	JOC-N	1P	С	Just orthodo	ΟX		UGCC		Just Christians	
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2023
No changes are needed	58.4	53.0	50.8	69.7	62.4	66.7	55.5	43.1	63.4	58.9	58.2	69.7	54.2	39.3
More attention to various types of assistance to community members, their support	13.1	14.7	13.1	13.0	11.9	14.3	12.8	16.9	6.1	8.9	19.1	9.0	24.1	23.0
More attention to psychological support of community members	9.1	12.8	7.5	11.9	10.9	7.1	6.7	11.3	4.9	10.7	8.7	7.1	10.2	19.7
Ensuring services and sermons done in my native language	6.1	11.6	13.7	1.6	10.9	4.8	3.0	11.9	12.2	3.6	3.1	0.5	6.8	19.7
Simpler rituals and reduced duration of the service	17.9	6.2	11.9	3.8	5.0	13.1	6.7	13.1	11.0	10.7	14.4	3.8	20.3	6.6
Greater focus on the problems of community members	10.9	17.7	13.1	10.3	13.9	10.6	8.6	11.3	7.3	6.5	7.2	7.6	28.8	23.0
Greater focus on religious teaching of community members	5.2	6.8	7.5	6.5	10.9	3.6	4.9	6.8	1.2	8.9	8.8	5.2	6.9	6.6
Performing meetings and services at a more convenient time	5.2	2.8	3.2	4.9	4.0	9.5	2.4	3.7	3.7	3.0	4.6	5.2	5.1	8.2
Other	0.3	0.9	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	2.4	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.7	0.0
Hard to say	6.7	8.8	9.1	5.4	5.9	10.7	15.9	13.0	9.8	6.5	5.7	6.2	3.4	18.0


<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.






 <sup>\*</sup> The sum of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».
 \*\* The sum of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».








		IS TH	IE CHUR	CH A MO	ORAL AU % of resp			OU TOD	AY?		(00)	ntinued)					
					· .		mber 202	3)			(00)	itiliueu)					
	18-	24	25	-29	30	-39	40	-49	50	-59	60	)+					
Yes	33	3.1	40	0.4	3	8.5	4	1.1	4	7.0	5	3.6					
No	48	3.0	4	5.2	4	5.8	40	0.8	3	9.5	30	0.8					
Hard to say	18	3.9	1-	4.4	1	5.7	1	8.1	1	3.5	1	5.6					
				C	ONFESSIO	ONAL AN	D CHURC	H IDENTI	ГҮ								
		00	CU		UOC-MP					Just Or	rthodox						
	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023					
Yes	57.0	63.6	58.7	53.0	55.9	69.3	65.6	68.1	35.4	36.6	33.7	26.3					
No	24.9	18.3	23.8	31.7	23.9	16.8	13.7	21.6	44.1	35.6	44.1	52.5					
Hard to say	18.1	18.1	17.4	15.4	20.2	13.9	20.6	10.3	20.5	27.8	22.2	21.2					
		UG	CC			Just Ch	ristians		l do n	ot belong	to any re	ligion					
	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023	2019	2021	2022	2023					
Yes	79.2	78.8	82.0	81.1	28.1	39.8	30.9	21.8	5.1	6.3	3.0	7.7					
No	12.5	7.8	6.8	11.3	55.6	28.1	46.3	57.2	80.9	70.4	81.3	73.2					
Hard to say	8.3	13.4	11.2	7.7	16.3	32.2	22.9	21.0	14.0	23.2	15.7	19.1					





WHICH S	STATEM	1ENT B	_	<b>WOUL</b> of respon		AGREE	WITH T	НЕ МО	ST?			
		_	70 0			NC (Na	vember	20221	_		(con	tinued)
		West			Centre	ONI) CNIC	verriber	South			East	
Clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins		49.9			44.6			35.6			38.9	
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people		27.7			17.2			28.8			17.1	
The majority of clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things		14.8			30.1			26.6			33.9	
Hard to say		7.7			8.1			9.0			10.1	
	- 10			2.0			mber 20					
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	-39	40	-49	50	-59	60	)+
Clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins	42	2.6	42	2.6	44	1.4	4	1.2	44	1.1	45	5.5
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	14	1.8	20	).9	18	3.7	20	).5	2	1.9	25	5.2
The majority of clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	30	).1	23	3.0	27	7.9	30.5		28.8		2	1.2
Hard to say	12	12.5 13.			9.0		7.8		Ę	5.1	8	3.0
				ONFESS	IONAL			IDENTI	ΤY			
		00	CU			UOC	C-MP		Just Or			
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023
Clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins	50.1	49.5	47.8	45.9	49.1	45.3	47.7	42.2	50.6	50.4	49.1	48.0
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	28.5	24.8	26.7	24.7	33.0	35.4	35.6	33.6	13.0	18.3	14.9	14.6
The majority of clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	15.2	20.2	16.7	24.0	13.6	14.8	12.9	16.4	26.6	23.3	23.0	29.9
Hard to say	6.1	5.5	8.8	5.4	4.4	4.5	3.8	7.8	9.7	8.0	13.1	7.5
		UG	СС			Just Ch	ristians				belong religion	
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023
Clergy, like most of us, have all the virtues and sins	61.1	60.7	44.2	45.2	44.4	54.7	52.9	42.4	35.9	38.5	41.3	37.9
The majority of clergy are deeply moral and spiritual people	26.4	25.8	35.4	30.8	10.6	12.2	14.9	12.2	4.2	6.9	5.5	5.1
The majority of clergy think about money in the first place rather than spiritual things	7.8	9.6	12.6	11.8	30.0	26.2	23.0	37.1	47.1	40.4	31.5	41.2
Hard to say	4.7	3.9	7.8	12.2	15.0	7.0	9.2	8.3	12.7	14.2	21.7	15.8








WHAT ROL	E DOES	THE C		H PLAY		DERN U	IKRAIN	IAN SC	CIETY	?	(000	الم مريد شاء	
		-	-			ONS (No	vember	2023)	-	-	(COI	itinued)	
		West			Centre			South			East		
Positive role		75.4			47.1			59.6			36.7		
Insignificant role		15.6			32.3			26.0			35.5		
Negative role		1.3			5.1			0.4			4.0		
Other		2.0			4.2			6.4			3.2		
Hard to say		5.6			11.3			7.7			20.6		
	10	-24	٦٢	-29		E (Nove	mber 20 40-		Γ0	-59		0+	
Positive role		2.6		-29 ).3		-39 7.2		7.6		-59 7.8		3.9	
Insignificant role	33	3.0	29	9.3	37	2.4	29	9.9	23	3.4	2.	3.8	
Negative role	Ę	5.7	3	3.4	4	4.8	2	2.7		1.8	2	2.7	
Other	Ę	5.1	4.8		5.1		5.1		2.4			1.9	
Hard to say	13	3.6	12.2		10.4		12.7		14.7 NTITY			7.7	
		00	CU	CONF	ESSIOI	NAL ANI UOC		CH IDE	NTITY	Just Or	thodox		
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	
	50	20	20	20	20	50	20	20	20	20	20	20	
Positive role	59.5	65.9	70.6	65.6	47.4	68.0	78.6	71.3	24.0	35.0	44.0	39.4	
Insignificant role	30.7	24.2	20.3	22.7	28.5	20.5	16.8	16.5	51.5	46.0	33.2	42.1	
Negative role	1.1	1.8	2.0	1.6	4.7	1.6	0.0	3.5	4.8	2.3	3.1	2.0	
Other	2.7	1.2	0.3	3.9	2.9	2.0	0.8	1.7	3.1	2.5	2.1	2.8	
Hard to say	6.1	6.9	6.8	6.2	16.4	7.8	3.8	7.0	16.7	14.3	17.5	13.8	
		UG	CC			Just Ch	ristians			I do not to any	t belong religion		
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020	2021	2022	2023	
Positive role	82.9	88.8	89.8	83.7	28.5	40.4	45.1	32.0	5.2	10.8	11.1	15.5	
Insignificant role	13.5	5.1	8.3	10.0	48.0	36.8	36.6	33.3	42.5	53.9	51.7	47.6	
Negative role	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.5	1.1	2.9	2.3	7.0	17.3	12.6	13.2	8.1	
Other	1.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	3.4	2.3	4.0	4.4	7.8	5.5	3.8	6.6	
Hard to say	2.6	5.6	1.0	5.4	19.0	17.5	12.0	23.2	27.1	17.1	20.1	22.1	





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



#### WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS THAT CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN UKRAINE SHOULD PURSUE?\*

% of respondents

%	of responde	nts				(continued)	
			REG	IONS		Foot	
	West		Centre	South		East	
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	51.8		48.5	62.0		46.0	
Worshipping God, praying together	69.7		44.8	42.7		39.7	
Helping vulnerable populations	19.3		37.8	29.9		24.1	
Promoting moral recovery of society	27.3		27.9	19.2		31.9	
Protecting traditional values	23.9		22.2	17.5		19.6	
Promoting peace and tolerance	8.8		14.4	20.1		20.6	
Educating youth	19.4		13.1	7.3		11.1	
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	8.2		7.4	19.2		10.1	
Spreading its influence in society	7.1		6.0	8.1		9.9	
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	3.7		3.8	7.7		3.7	
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	1.5		4.5	3.8		6.5	
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	1.3		3.2	3.0		5.7	
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	5.2		1.1	3.0		4.0	
Helping to master professions	0.6		0.8	0.4		1.2	
Other	0.2		0.1	0.4		0.2	
Hard to say	1.7		4.7	4.7		4.5	
	18-24	25-29		<b>GE</b> 40-49	50-59	60+	
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	38.3	48.3	51.0	52.7	52.3	51.7	
Worshipping God, praying together	45.1	53.1	45.8	44.5	52.4	56.4	
Helping vulnerable populations	29.1	27.9	30.6	29.5	30.9	27.2	
Promoting moral recovery of society	21.1	19.7	26.5	29.7	28.4	30.1	
Protecting traditional values	19.0	20.4	21.6	21.9	20.4	23.1	
Promoting peace and tolerance	14.3	12.2	17.2	16.2	13.8	13.5	
Educating youth	10.3	13.6	15.0	14.6	12.9	13.7	
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	8.6	8.1	9.2	10.5	8.4	10.4	
Spreading its influence in society	9.1	7.5	8.3	6.2	6.9	7.0	
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	4.6	3.4	3.9	4.1	4.8	4.4	
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.4	6.1	4.4	5.4	2.7	3.3	
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	3.4	3.4	2.4	4.6	1.8	3.6	
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	2.3	1.4	2.4	4.3	2.1	3.6	
Helping to master professions	2.9	0.7	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.7	
Other	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	
Hard to say	8.6	5.4	5.8	3.0	3.9	1.5	

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.

November 2023




#### WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS THAT CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN UKRAINE SHOULD PURSUE?\*

% of respondents

		% or respo						(C0	ontinued)
			CONFES	SIONAL	AND CH	IURCH I	DENTITY		
		OCU			UOC-MF	)	J	ust Ortho	dox
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	51.8	56.9	55.4	54.9	60.6	61.2	51.1	51.2	51.0
Worshipping God, praying together	50.4	52.5	53.7	57.0	55.7	64.3	46.1	38.6	41.6
Helping vulnerable populations	33.0	30.8	34.1	32.8	25.2	20.9	32.8	27.4	26.0
Promoting moral recovery of society	30.1	33.8	29.7	26.2	35.1	31.3	27.5	26.8	30.3
Protecting traditional values	18.9	22.2	21.2	26.6	30.5	21.6	16.8	28.5	21.2
Promoting peace and tolerance	18.5	11.4	15.8	11.9	13.6	10.4	16.3	14.1	14.2
Educating youth	15.4	12.8	14.1	13.5	14.5	17.4	12.5	14.9	9.0
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	8.5	5.3	6.7	11.5	3.8	14.8	7.5	7.6	9.1
Spreading its influence in society	7.9	8.0	5.3	7.4	6.9	8.7	6.5	3.4	10.2
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	3.0	4.2	4.5	1.6	0.8	4.3	1.0	2.9	3.5
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.3	1.4	2.7	2.9	0.8	1.7	2.5	3.1	3.9
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	2.9	2.7	1.3	2.0	6.1	6.9	3.0	3.1	2.8
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	4.5	3.5	2.9	1.2	3.1	1.7	2.3	4.2	2.8
Helping to master professions	0.8	1.4	0.9	8.0	0.8	0.0	1.0	0.8	1.2
Other	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0
Hard to say	1.8	1.8	1.5	2.0	0.8	1.7	4.0	6.8	5.1
		UGCC			Just C	hristians		I do not to any r	
	2021	2022	2023	20	21 2	022	2023	2021	2023
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	52.2	55.8	48.6	48.	3 4	9.1	46.5	26.9	32.8
Worshipping God, praying together	75.3	71.4	77.9	43.	3 4	0.6	37.6	31.3	24.3
Helping vulnerable populations	13.5	23.4	20.7	34.	5 3	3.7	35.4	27.4	21.8
Promoting moral recovery of society	26.8	30.7	31.2	26.	9 2	4.6	21.9	15.0	19.9
Protecting traditional values	19.1	32.2	27.9	25.		7.2	31.0	13.7	13.7
Promoting peace and tolerance	9.6	6.8	8.1	12.		7.7	17.1	13.7	17.7
Educating youth	23.0	23.9	22.5	13.	4 1	0.3	15.8	5.8	6.6
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	12.8	5.8	7.2	8.		4.6	12.7	12.7	16.2
Spreading its influence in society	5.1	3.4	8.6	12.	9 1	6.1	7.4	12.4	9.2
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	0.0	0.5	4.5	3.	5	5.2	4.8	1.8	3.7
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	0.6	2.4	1.8	7.	6	3.4	3.9	8.4	10.0
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	1.1	1.5	1.4	4.	7	4.6	7.0	5.5	6.3
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	7.3	6.3	5.4	2.	3	3.4	1.7	2.4	2.2
Helping to master professions	0.6	1.0	0.5	1.		1.1	1.3	8.0	0.7
Other	0.6	0.0	0.5	1.		0.0	0.0	2.1	0.4
Hard to say	0.6	0.0	0.9	4.	1	7.4	4.8	16.4	12.5

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS IM		ENTED BY T	HE CHURCI	H OR RELIG	PLEMENTED BY THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION THAT YOU BELONG TO?*	SIATION THA	TYOU BEL	*501 5NO		
e acin 10 %	wno associate	memseives	with a particul	ar church of r	% OT TIOSE WTO ASSOCIATE TREMSEIVES WITH A PARTICUIAL CHUICH OF TENGLOUS OFGAMISAUON (CONTINUED)	Isation (contil				(continued)
		REGI	REGIONS				В	BIK		
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	20-26	+09
Worshipping God, praying together	76.2	55.0	44.0	44.2	63.1	54.7	56.6	54.0	62.2	62.8
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	43.8	49.5	56.8	41.8	48.2	52.3	46.1	49.0	47.4	45.2
Promoting moral recovery of society	33.0	23.7	20.2	35.1	27.4	26.7	26.6	30.5	27.8	28.3
Protecting traditional values	26.2	29.4	29.0	26.9	22.6	31.8	27.3	25.9	26.4	30.7
Helping vulnerable populations	14.5	31.4	30.4	18.8	15.5	18.8	20.6	29.3	24.3	25.1
Educating youth	20.3	9.1	8.1	12.5	11.8	10.6	14.2	11.3	15.7	13.1
Promoting peace and tolerance	8.9	10.9	16.8	6.3	8.3	5.9	11.2	8.8	9.1	9.6
Spreading its influence in society	4.7	7.5	8.8	5.8	7.1	9.4	6.7	8.4	4.3	5.6
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	4.3	6.1	14.5	5.3	4.8	3.5	6.7	5.0	7.4	9.9
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	1.6	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.9	4.7	2.2	6.3	3.0	4.2
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	3.2	2.2	3.2	4.3	2.4	4.7	3.4	3.4	3.0	2.1
Shaping state policy, both domestic and foreign	2.7	2.2	4.8	2.4	2.4	3.5	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.8
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	2.9	0.7	4.8	1.9	2.4	1.2	3.7	1.7	2.2	1.4
Helping to master professions	0.5	Ħ	0.8	1.9	2.4	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.0	1.4
Other	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.5
Hard to say	2.7	5.2	2.4	4.8	4.8	8.2	3.7	3.8	2.6	4.0
* Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.	evant options.								No	November 2023

\* Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOALS IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION THAT YOU BELONG TO?* % of those who associate themselves with a particular church or religious organisation (continued)	LS IMPLEMEN	<b>VTED BY THE</b> nemselves with	<b>CHURCH OF</b> a particular ch	RELIGIOUS urch or religiou	<b>4AIN GOALS IMPLEMENTED BY THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION THAT YC</b> % of those who associate themselves with a particular church or religious organisation (continued)	N THAT YOU I	SELONG TO?*		(continued)
				ENOMINATIO	DENOMINATIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY	RCH IDENTIT	>		
		OCU			UOC-MP			OCC	
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Worshipping God. praying together	9.09	59.7	62.3	62.2	62.1	62.0	77.6	78.8	73.0
Providing spiritual support to people experiencing spiritual crisis	43.3	53.5	50.5	46.7	44.8	56.5	43.8	43.8	43.6
Promoting moral recovery of society	26.4	26.0	27.1	28.3	29.3	30.3	31.2	31.5	39.3
Protecting traditional values	29.5	27.2	28.5	31.0	21.4	29.6	21.8	42.1	28.1
Helping vulnerable populations	21.2	24.2	25.9	25.8	23.1	23.1	9.5	15.3	15.6
Educating youth	14.3	10.0	10.4	6.7	13.8	15.7	28.4	17.2	23.3
Promoting peace and tolerance	15.4	7.5	8.4	9.3	14.5	7.3	12.4	9.4	5.2
Spreading its influence in society	8.5	7.7	6.5	9.3	3.4	5.5	4.7	5.4	7.6
Involving as many believers in the church (religious association) as possible	4.4	3.7	5.7	4.4	6:0	9.2	4.7	4.0	4.3
Competing with other churches to influence the believers	3.6	2.5	3.9	1.8	0.0	2.8	0:0	2.5	2.4
Increasing revenues of the church (religious association)	Ξ	2.5	2.3	3.1	4.3	2.8	0.0	1.5	4.3
Shaping state policy. both domestic and foreign	2.8	3.8	3.6	1.8	6.0	6.0	9.0	1.0	2.4
Organising religious education and teaching of basics of religion	1.9	3.2	9:1	2.2	3.4	3.7	7.1	6.4	3.8
Helping to master professions	17	1.0	6:0	0.4	1.7	1.9	9.0	1.0	0.5
Other	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Hard to say	2.5	3.8	2.1	4.9	0.9	6.0	1.8	1.0	2.9

\* Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




# WHAT PLACE SHOULD SOCIAL SERVICE OCCUPY IN THE CHURCH, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES, NAMELY HELPING AND SUPPORTING PEOPLE (E.G., FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, HELP WITH LEARNING, ORGANISATION OF LEISURE TIME, ETC.)? % of respondents








Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)



The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all







		<b>REGIONS</b> (No	vember 2023)	
	West	Centre	South	East
Social service should play a leading role in the church (religious association) activities	29.9	34.4	36.1	32.4
Social service is an important but not the primary activity of the church (religious association)	40.7	29.5	28.3	28.7
Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)	9.1	7.6	9.0	14.9
The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all	6.5	10.9	7.3	5.0
Hard to say	13.8	17.5	19.3	19.1




## WHAT PLACE SHOULD SOCIAL SERVICE OCCUPY IN THE CHURCH. RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES, NAMELY HELPING AND SUPPORTING PEOPLE (E.G., FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, HELP WITH LEARNING, ORGANISATION OF LEISURE TIME, ETC.)?

% of respondents

		%	of responde	ents				(c	continued)
				AGE (	Novembe	r 2023)		(-	,
	18-24	ļ	25-29	30-39	9	40-49	50-59	7	60+
Social service should play a leading role in the church (religious association) activities	36.2		27.2	27.7		31.6	33.9		37.3
Social service is an important but not the primary activity of the church (religious association)	25.9		32.7	33.3		37.8	33.0		29.3
Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)	6.3		8.8	10.0		9.7	9.9		10.3
The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all	10.3		9.5	8.3		8.4	6.9		7.5
Hard to say	21.3		21.8	20.7		12.4	16.2		15.6
			CONF	ESSIONA	L AND CH	URCH IDE	NTITY		
		OCU			UOC-MP		Jı	ıst Orthod	lox
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Social service should play a leading role in the church (religious association) activities	37.7	34.2	40.7	33.1	33.3	25.2	33.3	30.5	25.9
Social service is an important but not the primary activity of the church (religious association)	47.0	43.9	34.2	43.3	36.4	38.3	30.0	32.6	33.7
Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)	6.1	7.1	7.2	4.9	9.1	20.0	8.5	8.1	11.8
The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all	3.7	2.9	6.7	8.2	9.1	8.7	7.8	5.7	6.7
Hard to say	5.5	12.0	11.3	10.6	12.1	7.8	20.5	23.0	22.0
			CONF	ESSIONA	L AND CH	URCH IDE			
		UGCC	;	Ju	ıst Christia	ins		o not belo any religi	
	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023	2021	2022	2023
Social service should play a leading role in the church (religious association) activities	28.7	33.0	30.3	27.5	24.1	26.6	23.5	25.0	25.7
Social service is an important but not the primary activity of the church (religious association)	60.1	48.1	42.1	31.0	33.9	27.1	25.6	15.7	18.4
Social service is insignificant activity of the church (religious association)	4.5	12.1	10.0	9.9	16.7	13.5	9.8	10.2	7.4
The church (religious association) should not engage in social service at all	1.7	1.5	5.9	11.7	6.3	10.5	11.6	19.5	15.1
Hard to say	5.1	5.3	11.8	19.9	19.0	22.3	29.6	29.7	33.5





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




# IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR SOCIETY?\* % of respondents (conti

			% 01	respond	uents					(continued)		
					REGIO	ONS (No	vember	2023)				
		West			Centre			South			East	
Psychological assistance		65.4			68.2			65.0			74.4	
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)		31.3			57.7			55.1			47.6	
Religious education		45.0			30.4			26.9			22.5	
Child rearing		38.7			28.7			17.9			30.8	
Financial assistance		16.2			24.5			36.8			24.3	
Organisation of leisure time		9.0			5.1			7.3			7.2	
Vocational guidance and training		4.1			6.1			6.8			4.7	
Other		0.0			0.1			0.0			0.5	
None		5.0			3.3			1.3			2.5	
Hard to say		3.9			6.5			3.0			6.7	
					1	<b>E</b> (Nove						
	18-			-29		-39		-49		-59	_	0+
Psychological assistance	64	.6	64	1.6	66	5.3	86	3.9	73	3.9	86	3.5
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	43.4 44.9		1.9	48.2		51.1		50.6		48	3.1	
Religious education			1.8	33.9		34.3		28.8		33.3		
Child rearing	21	.7	25	5.0	27	7.6	30.8		34.5		34.1	
Financial assistance	20	.0	14	1.2	2	1.1	20.8		24.6		30.0	
Organisation of leisure time	8	.0	8	3.8	7	7.5	7.0		4.2		6.5	
Vocational guidance and training	6	.3	2	2.0	4	1.1	4	1.9	6.3		6.7	
Other	1	.1	C	0.0	C	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.2	
None	4	.0	3	3.4	4	1.1	4	l.1	2.4		2.6	
Hard to say	8	.0	8	3.8	5	5.6	2	1.9	۷	4.2 4.8		
				CONF	ESSION	NAL ANI	D CHUR	CH IDE	NTITY		4.8	
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP		ıst odox	UG	CC		ust stians	belong	not g to any gion
	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023
Psychological assistance	67.8	77.0	63.5	69.6	60.5	72.2	46.6	62.4	59.3	60.5	40.6	47.2
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	48.7	52.2	49.6	49.1	55.4	49.4	41.9	39.6	41.5	48.7	38.5	44.9
Religious education	44.1	34.5	36.1	38.3	23.6	27.2	52.5	50.9	23.8	31.1	14.5	11.0
Child rearing	27.7	33.5	32.0	34.8	19.0	23.9	54.5	47.3	26.3	28.8	11.6	12.1
Financial assistance	23.8	24.0	26.6	20.7	23.3	28.2	13.4	16.2	21.1	30.3	23.2	20.2
Organisation of leisure time	8.3	7.2	5.7	9.6	3.8	6.3	2.8	8.1	8.2	6.1	9.0	4.4
Vocational guidance and training	4.9	5.3	6.6	3.4	3.3	3.1	12.3	8.1	11.6	9.2	6.3	3.3
Other	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.7
None	1.8	0.7	5.7	6.1	5.3	2.4	0.6	0.9	5.3	4.4	15.3	12.9
Hard to say	2.6	2.8	4.5	0.9	8.3	10.6	7.3	4.5	11.6	6.6	15.6	11.4

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




## WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS WOULD BE INTERESTING FOR YOU PERSONALLY?\*

% of respondents

		% of respond	lents			(continued)
			REGIONS (No	ovember 2023)		
	West		Centre	South		East
Psychological assistance	41.7		44.2	42.3		38.7
Religious education	31.0		18.2	20.9		10.7
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	10.1		23.5	36.3		11.1
Child rearing	23.6		15.5	12.0		12.6
Financial assistance	9.7		18.8	27.8		13.1
Organisation of leisure time	10.1		5.2	6.8		5.2
Vocational guidance and training	4.1		4.4	7.7		2.7
Other	0.2		0.0	0.0		0.0
None	21.5		24.3	15.4		41.8
Hard to say	8.4		12.2	12.0		6.5
	10.04	05.00		mber 2023)	50.50	
Develor de visal assistantes	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Psychological assistance	30.3	33.8	38.1	44.1	46.4	47.4
Religious education	17.7	22.4	16.0	20.8	21.0	23.2
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	12.0	12.9	16.3	17.6	20.1	24.7
Child rearing	10.3	16.3	16.0	15.9	19.8	17.5
Financial assistance	8.6	10.9	12.4	15.9	16.5	22.8
Organisation of leisure time	7.4	8.2	6.6	6.8	4.2	7.4
Vocational guidance and training	2.9	3.4	3.6	4.3	4.8	5.0
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
None	38.3	32.0	28.9	28.4	22.8	19.2
Hard to say	12.1	8.8	11.7	10.8	9.6	8.4
		CONFESSION	AL AND CHURO	CH IDENTITY (N	ovember 2023)	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	I do not belong to any religion
Psychological assistance	51.8	54.8	42.1	38.3	34.2	16.6
Religious education	22.1	33.9	21.6	12.2	17.9	11.0
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	24.5	31.9	10.2	37.4	11.0	2.2
Child rearing	16.9	27.8	11.8	31.1	12.7	4.4
Financial assistance	17.8	24.3	15.3	11.3	20.1	8.8
Organisation of leisure time	5.9	13.9	6.3	14.0	7.0	1.1
Vocational guidance and training	4.5	5.2	2.4	6.8	7.0	1.8
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
None	18.2	15.7	25.5	15.8	36.0	58.8
Hard to say	8.3	4.3	12.9	12.2	10.5	11.8

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




# WHAT TYPES OF SOCIAL SERVICE OF CHURCHES, RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED PERSONALLY (E.G., YOU RECEIVED SOME KIND OF ASSISTANCE?)\* % of respondents

			% of	respond	lents						(cor	ntinued)
					REGIO	ONS (No	vembe	r 2023)				
		West			Centre			South			East	
Psychological assistance		32.9			22.1			30.8			21.8	
Religious education		14.6			8.8			17.9			5.5	
Financial assistance		6.5			9.1			23.5			6.9	
Child rearing		9.5			3.9			7.7			3.0	
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)		1.7			5.3			16.2			2.0	
Organisation of leisure time		5.8			0.9			1.3			1.2	
Vocational guidance and training		1.9			1.1			4.7			0.2	
Other		0.0			0.2			0.0			0.0	
None		43.7			59.8			38.5			63.3	
Hard to say		6.9			5.9			4.7			6.5	
		10.04				<b>E</b> (Nove						
		-24		-29		-39		-49		-59		0+
Psychological assistance		8.9		0.4		2.6		4.9		7.3	3	1.7
Religious education	(	5.3	(	9.5	8	8.7	1	1.4	1.	3.8	1	1.6
Financial assistance	4	4.6	4	4.7	4	4.9		0.5	10	0.8		4.6
Child rearing	;	2.3	4	4.8	(	6.3	(	6.2	(	6.0	į	5.8
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	4	4.6	;	3.4	į	5.3	:	3.8	!	5.4	í	5.7
Organisation of leisure time		1.7	:	2.7		2.7	:	3.0		1.8		2.2
Vocational guidance and training	(	0.6		1.4		1.9		1.9		1.5		1.4
Other	(	0.0	0.0		(	0.0	(	0.3	(	0.0	0.2	
None	60	5.7	7 61.2		5	9.7	54	4.6	50	0.9	4!	5.0
Hard to say	(	5.3	8.8 5.1		5.1			7.5		ĺ	5.3	
				CONFESSIONAL AND		D CHURCH IDE		ENTITY				
	0	CU	UO	C-MP		ust nodox	UG	SCC		ust stians	belong	not g to any gion
	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023
Psychological assistance	22.2	33.2	29.5	40.0	12.3	16.9	19.1	32.9	19.9	13.5	4.5	6.3
Religious education	10.8	12.9	16.4	14.8	4.8	4.7	28.1	21.2	11.6	5.7	3.2	1.1
Financial assistance	4.3	11.0	8.6	18.1	3.0	7.8	3.4	7.7	3.5	7.9	1.3	2.9
Child rearing	5.9	5.3	6.6	5.2	1.5	2.8	10.7	14.4	9.9	7.0	2.1	1.5
Protection of vulnerable populations (victims of violence, homeless people, displaced persons, etc.)	5.3	5.4	14.3	9.5	3.8	2.4	5.1	1.4	4.1	8.8	3.4	3.3
Organisation of leisure time	3.1	2.3	5.7	5.2	0.5	1.2	6.7	7.7	8.7	0.4	0.5	0.4
Vocational guidance and training	1.8	0.9	2.5	6.9	0.8	0.8	0.0	2.7	5.2	2.2	1.3	0.0
Other	0.4	0.1	1.6	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
None	56.6	48.3	38.9	34.5	71.5	63.4	38.5	39.6	53.8	66.7	78.1	79.4
Hard to say	4.7	4.9	7.0	3.4	8.3	7.9	10.1	8.1	11.1	3.1	10.3	8.5

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



#### WHAT IS YOUR IDEA OF THE PRIORITY TASKS FOR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN WARTIME?\*

% of respondents (continued												
		REGIONS (November 2023)										
		West			Centre			South			East	
Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine		61.7			58.2			34.2			40.3	
Provision of psychological assistance		49.3			53.7			50.9			54.0	
Raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine		24.9			36.8			32.9			40.2	
Assistance in addressing social and living problems of citizens		23.2			32.4			38.9			26.7	
Assistance to internally displaced persons		21.6			18.9			23.9			22.3	
Mitigation of the aftermaths of destruction of cities, villages, social and transport infrastructure		14.6			15.2			31.6			14.9	
Meeting the needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad		3.4			3.2			6.4			3.5	
None of the above		4.7			2.8			4.3			2.5	
Hard to say		6.2		4.4 6.4					6.2			
	00	CU	UOC	CONF C-MP	Ju	IST odox		GCC	Ju	ust stians	belong	not g to any gion
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
Assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine	48.2	56.7	47.3	47.8	41.5	48.4	63.9	76.6	44.6	45.2	29.8	38.0
Provision of psychological assistance	62.0	57.9	55.7	57.8	48.3	50.4	58.7	47.3	50.9	51.3	32.8	38.2
Raising international attention and assistance to Ukraine	28.7	36.5	16.7	30.4	27.7	33.1	36.6	27.6	34.9	35.5	26.0	32.4
Assistance in addressing social and living problems of citizens	42.4	30.2	42.4	39.1	39.7	29.0	36.4	24.3	37.1	32.0	29.8	25.8
Assistance to internally displaced persons	21.4	21.3	32.6	24.3	20.6	18.8	29.8	23.4	29.1	18.9	15.7	19.5
Mitigation of the aftermaths of destruction of cities, villages, social	00.4	19.1	16.8	25.2	17.5	11.8	11.2	20.7	20.6	17.9	16.6	7.4
and transport infrastructure	20.4	17.1	1010									
and transport infrastructure  Meeting the needs of Ukrainian refugees abroad	3.0	4.5	3.0	6.9	3.9	3.1	4.9	2.7	2.9	2.6	4.3	2.9
and transport infrastructure  Meeting the needs of Ukrainian				6.9	3.9	3.1 4.3	4.9	2.7	2.9	2.6	4.3	2.9

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



# ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY CASES WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE ONSET OF RUSSIA'S LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (after 24 February 2022)...? % of respondents

UKF	RAINE		REGIONS (N	ovember 2023)	
2022	2023	West	Centre	South	East
	Provided assistar	nce to the Arme	d Forces of Ukrai	ne	
47.7	48.9	72.1	46.9	39.7	27.5
51.6	50.6	27.5	52.5	60.3	71.5
0.7	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.0	1.0
	Gav	e shelter to ref	ugees		
40.2	41.2	55.2	36.1	50.4	27.7
59.5	58.6	44.6	63.5	49.6	72.0
0.4	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.2
	Provide	d material aid to	refugees		
43.5	39.6	51.6	38.7	36.3	27.3
56.1	59.7	47.3	60.6	63.7	72.2
0.4	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.0	0.5
ا	Brought or distrib	uted humanitar	ian aid from abro	ad	
33.3	30.2	30.9	26.8	49.6	25.2
66.1	69.1	68.4	72.7	48.7	74.0
0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	1.7	0.7
	Provided assistan	ice to health an	d social institutio	ns	
24.1	25.4	29.5	27.6	29.9	12.4
75.4	74.0	69.7	72	69.7	86.6
0.5	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	1.0
Provided	d assistance to res	sidents of libera	ted and frontline	territories	
24.2	24.8	28.8	24.1	28.6	18.8
75.4	74.6	70.5	75.4	70.9	80.4
0.4	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.7
	Arranged	bomb shelters	in churches		
26.7	24.3	35.1	24.1	25.6	9.9
73.1	75.2	64.3	75.4	73.5	89.9
0.2	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.2
Assisted with ev	acuation from oc	cupied territorie	es and territories	under artillery fi	re
20.9	22.5	23.6	21.3	29.2	19.8
78.9	77.1	75.7	78.2	70.8	80.0
0.3	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.0	0.2
	Expressed	support for Rus	sia's actions		
6.0	8.9	10.1	8.5	13.2	5.5
93.7	90.5	89.2	91.1	86.3	93.8
0.3	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.7
	2022  47.7 51.6 0.7  40.2 59.5 0.4  43.5 56.1 0.4  33.3 66.1 0.5  Provided 24.2 75.4 0.4  26.7 73.1 0.2  Assisted with evaluation ev	## Provided assistant ### 47.7	Provided assistance to the Armer	Provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukrain	Provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine

 $<sup>\</sup>ensuremath{^{\star}}$  Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.



# ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY CASES WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE ONSET OF RUSSIA'S LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (after 24 February 2022)...? % of respondents (continued

						(continued)
	UKI	RAINE		REGIONS (N	lovember 2023)	
	2022	2023	West	Centre	South	East
	Mis	appropriated hun	nanitarian aid or	used it for own l	penefit	
Yes	4.5	5.8	3.6	5.5	6.9	8.7
No	95.2	93.5	95.7	93.9	92.3	90.6
No answer	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.7
		ŀ	lelped the invade	ers		
Yes	4.2	5.8	7.9	5.9	7.7	1.5
No	95.6	93.6	91.4	93.5	91.9	97.8
No answer	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.7
		CONFESSI	ONAL AND CHURC	CH IDENTITY (Nov	rember 2023)	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	l do not belong to any religion
		Provided assista	nce to the Armed	Forces of Ukrai	ne	
Yes	51.2	58.6	34.3	79.3	49.1	21.8
No	48.1	41.4	65	20.7	50.0	77.9
No answer	0.7	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.4
		Ga	ve shelter to refu	gees		
Yes	38.8	53.4	31.5	64.9	42.1	22.9
No	60.6	46.6	68.5	35.1	57.9	77.1
No answer	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Provide	d material aid to	refugees		
Yes	39.2	54.3	32.3	54.5	42.5	20.3
No	59.9	44.8	67.3	45.0	56.6	79.3
No answer	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.4
		Brought or distrik	outed humanitari	an aid from abro	pad	
Yes	30.4	33.0	24.0	33.3	34.5	21.0
No	69.1	66.1	74.0	66.7	65.5	77.9
No answer	0.6	0.9	2.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
		Provided assistar	nce to health and	social institution	ons	
Yes	25.1	38.8	18.0	32.9	31.1	11.4
No	73.8	60.3	81.6	67.1	68.0	88.6
No answer	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.0
	Provide	d assistance to re	sidents of liberat	ed and frontline	e territories	
Yes	25.7	39.1	17.3	28.1	26.8	12.2
No	73.6	60.9	81.5	71.9	72.8	87.1
No answer	0.7	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.4	0.7

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




# ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY CASES WHERE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION) DID ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE ONSET OF RUSSIA'S LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (after 24 February 2022)...?

% of respondents


						(continuca)							
	CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY (November 2023)												
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	l do not belong to any religion							
	Arranged bomb shelters in churches												
Yes	25.8	23.5	19.2	40.7	26.4	5.9							
No	73.4	76.5	80.4	59.3	72.7	94.1							
No answer	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.0							
	Assisted with eva	acuation from oc	cupied territorie	s and territories	under artillery fir	e							
Yes	23.1	27.6	15.7	27.5	26.3	12.9							
No	76.3	72.4	83.9	72.1	72.8	87.1							
No answer	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.0							
	Expressed support for Russia's actions												
Yes	11.3	4.3	5.5	5.0	8.8	9.9							
No	87.8	95.7	93.3	95.0	91.2	89.7							
No answer	0.9	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.4							
	Misa	ppropriated hum	nanitarian aid or i	used it for own b	enefit								
Yes	4.6	4.3	7.8	3.2	11.8	4.8							
No	94.5	94.8	91.0	96.8	88.2	94.5							
No answer	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.7							
		Н	elped the invade	ers									
Yes	8.6	1.7	3.5	0.9	3.1	6.3							
No	90.5	98.3	95.3	99.1	96.9	93.0							
No answer	0.9	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.7							

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose no more than three relevant options.




<sup>\*</sup> On a 10-point scale, «1» means «fully agree with the statement to the left» and «10» means «fully agree with the statement to the right».





<sup>\*</sup> On a 10-point scale, «1» means «fully agree with the statement to the left» and «10» means «fully agree with the statement to the right».






	DO YOU THINK TH	AT RELIGIO	OUS COMMUN	NITIES (OF AN	Y CHURCH)						
	DO ENOUGH RUSSIA'S LARGE-S			NCE THE ONS RAINE (24 Febr							
			of respondents								
		g assistance		orces of Ukraine							
19.2	30.1		15.2	3.5	31.9	20					
21.0	27.7		14.4	5.8	31.0	20					
		He	lping refugees								
18.3	33.4		15.5	3.2	29.6	20					
18.5	30.4		14.9	5.0	31.3	20					
	Helping res	sidents of th	e liberated and	frontline territo	ries						
14.5	21.3	14.6	5.9		43.7	20					
13.7	21.9	15.0	6.0		43.3	20					
	☐ They do:	thair hast	□ They do a lot	They do li	ttla						




# DO YOU THINK THAT RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (OF ANY CHURCH) DO ENOUGH OF THE FOLLOWING SINCE THE ONSET OF RUSSIA'S LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (24 February 2022)? % of respondents

				70 01 11	3000	7.00	0110				100)	ntinued)	
		West			Centre	REGI	ONS	South			East		
	P		ı assista	nce to		ed Ford	es of U				Lust		
They do their best		26.9	, assiste		22.5	ica i orc	.03 01 0	18.4			11.4		
They do a lot		41.3			22.4			37.6			14.9		
They do little		9.7 16.6 15.0									16.1		
They do nothing		5.2			5.6			2.1			9.2		
Hard to say		16.8			32.9			26.9			48.4		
Tidia to say		10.0		Helpin	g refug	<b>66</b> 5		20.7			70.7		
They do their best		21.1		ПСІРІІ	18.0			23.0			13.4		
They do a lot		39.3			27.1			38.7			20.3		
They do little		11.8			15.0			16.2			18.1		
They do nothing		5.2			6.0			0.9			5.0		
Hard to say		22.6			33.8			21.3			43.2		
Traira to say	Helr		idents d	f the lik		and fro	ntline to		26		43.E		
They do their best	11014	12.5	idenits c	T the lik	14.9	ana no		15.4			11.9		
They do a lot		30.1			18.9			34.6			10.2		
They do little		11.2			16.3			13.7			17.9		
They do nothing		6.7			5.9			2.6			7.4		
Hard to say		39.4 44.1 33.8							52.6				
,	CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY												
	0.4	OCU UOC-MP Just UGCC Chair								ıst			
	00	<b>.</b> 0	000	J-MP	Orth	odox	UG			stians	reli	g to any gion	
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	
	P	roviding	g assista	ince to	the Arm	ed Ford	es of U	kraine					
They do their best	20.5	25.5	27.5	28.4	12.5	13.7	30.2	27.7	15.5	16.1	5.5	7.4	
They do a lot	34.7	29.3	29.8	34.5	23.0	19.6	47.3	46.4	24.7	26.1	12.8	12.9	
They do little	14.4	15.1	10.7	9.5	21.1	12.5	9.8	9.1	22.4	15.2	17.4	19.9	
They do nothing	1.9	4.6	3.1	7.8	2.9	11.4	0.0	0.9	6.3	4.8	10.6	8.9	
Hard to say	28.4	25.5	29.0	19.8	40.5	42.7	12.7	15.9	31.0	37.8	53.6	50.9	
				Helpin	ıg refug	ees							
They do their best	21.8	21.7	19.7	25.4	13.9	11.0	22.8	23.1	15.4	12.8	4.3	9.2	
They do a lot	35.9	32.4	40.9	40.4	25.9	23.5	53.9	42.5	26.3	32.6	14.5	13.6	
They do little	14.7	13.9	9.8	9.6	21.7	16.1	6.8	11.3	23.4	15.0	19.6	22.1	
They do nothing	1.6	4.4	2.3	3.5	3.9	10.2	0.0	0.9	4.0	4.0	9.4	7.7	
Hard to say	26.0	27.5	27.3	21.1	34.6	39.2	16.5	22.2	30.9	35.7	52.3	47.4	
	Help	ing resi	idents c	of the lik	perated	and fro	ntline t	erritorie	es				
They do their best	18.3	18.4	20.6	14.7	10.7	9.4	11.7	9.5	10.9	9.2	3.0	7.0	
They do a lot		24.1	26.7	31.9	14.6	15.2	27.8	32.6	17.7	20.6	9.8	7.7	
They do d lot	24.8	2-7.1											
They do little	24.8 14.4	14.4	11.5	10.3	18.0	16.8	9.8	9.5	20.0	16.7	17.9	18.8	
-										16.7 4.8		18.8 10.0	








RAZUMKOV CENTRE 85




## DO YOU KNOW ABOUT PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ACCOMPANYING HUMANITARIAN CARGOES OR PARTICIPATING IN THE ORGANISATION OF HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS, EVACUATION FROM THE AREAS OF HOSTILITIES AND ADJACENT TERRITORIES?


% of those who belong to a church or religious association

		CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY										
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP	UG	icc						
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023						
Yes, I know	22.0	24.7	26.1	18.5	29.6	28.0						
No, I don't know	68.1	66.4	60.0	62.0	63.3	63.0						
Hard to say	9.8	8.9	13.9	19.4	7.0	9.0						










RAZUMKOV CENTRE 87



## DO YOU KNOW ABOUT PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN AID AND SOCIAL SUPPORT TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE?

	% of those who belong to a church or religious association (continu										
		REGIONS (November 2023)									
	West		Centre	South			East				
Yes, I know	52.0		39.2	65.7			40.1				
No, I don't know	40.7		48.4	27.9			50.5				
Hard to say	7.3 12.4 6.4 9.										
		CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY									
	0	CU	UOC	C-MP		UG	CC				
	2022	2023	2022	2023	202	22	2023				
Yes, I know	51.3	45.4	54.2	44.4	62.	0	58.2				
No, I don't know	42.7	48.2	38.1	49.1	36.	0	30.0				
Hard to say	5.9	6.4	7.6	6.5	2.	0	11.7				






# DO YOU KNOW ABOUT PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG PARTICIPATING IN THE DEFENCE OF UKRAINE (AS CHAPLAINS, SERVICEMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE, TERRITORIAL DEFENCE)?


% of those who belong to a church or religious association

inued)

		CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY									
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP	UG	icc					
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023					
Yes, I know	50.2	50.7	47.9	30.6	53.5	53.3					
No, I don't know	43.2	43.3	40.3	59.3	43.1	37.4					
Hard to say	6.6	6.0	11.8	10.2	3.5	9.3					










### DID THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY TO WHICH YOU BELONG DO ANYTHING OF THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE ONSET OF RUSSIA'S LARGE-SCALE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE (after 24 February 2022)...?

% of those who belong to a religious community (parish)

	% of those w	ho belong to a re	eligious commur	nity (parish)		(continued)
				D CHURCH IDEN		
	00			C-MP	UG	SCC
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023
	Provided ass	istance to the	Armed Forces	of Ukraine		
Yes	67.9	77.0	75.9	68.3	89.2	94.5
No	8.1	9.9	5.6	7.9	3.3	3.9
I don't know/Hard to say	24.0	13.1	18.5	23.8	7.5	1.6
		Gave shelter	to refugees			
Yes	53.8	52.1	64.8	53.2	58.3	57.0
No	19.0	22.1	18.5	17.7	32.5	31.3
I don't know/Hard to say	27.1	25.8	16.7	29.0	9.2	11.7
	Pro	vided materia	l aid to refuge	es		
Yes	72.5	55.4	70.4	50.8	71.7	57.0
No	10.4	17.4	13.0	14.3	13.3	30.5
I don't know/Hard to say	17.1	27.2	16.7	34.9	15.0	12.5
	Brought or di	istributed hum	nanitarian aid	from abroad		
Yes	37.1	35.2	35.8	27.0	30.8	32.8
No	26.2	30.0	22.6	31.7	28.3	43.8
I don't know/Hard to say	36.7	34.7	41.5	41.3	40.8	23.4
Provid	led assistance	to residents of	liberated and	frontline terri	tories	
Yes	35.3	34.9	37.0	35.9	24.2	28.3
No	23.5	25.0	14.8	20.3	38.3	39.4
I don't know/Hard to say	41.2	40.1	48.1	43.8	37.5	32.3
	Provided ass	istance to hea	Ith and social	institutions		
Yes	38.5	31.6	40.7	38.1	33.9	31.3
No	24.9	31.1	20.4	33.3	33.1	44.5
I don't know/Hard to say	36.7	37.3	38.9	28.6	33.1	24.2
	Arrai	nged bomb sh	elters in churc	hes		
Yes	31.1	23.5	40.0	22.2	16.5	31.5
No	45.5	44.6	30.9	44.4	73.6	52.8
I don't know/Hard to say	23.4	31.9	29.1	33.3	9.9	15.7
Assisted with	evacuation fro	m occupied te	rritories and t	erritories unde	r artillery fire	
Yes	26.6	22.1	21.8	21.0	22.3	18.8
No	32.4	37.1	34.5	27.4	49.6	57.8
I don't know/Hard to say	41.0	40.8	43.6	51.6	28.1	23.4


















#### IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE CHURCH IN UKRAINE, WHY SO?


% of those who consider it inappropriate to establish the state church in Ukraine

This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches




Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations





12.8

8.2 9.8 8.3 10.4 9.0 7.4 9.4 8.3 8.2




95



#### IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATE CHURCH IN UKRAINE, WHY SO?

% of the	ose who	conside	r it inapp	ropriate	to estab	lish the	state ch	urch in U	kraine		(con	tinued)	
					REGI	ONS (No	vember	2023)					
		West			Centre			South		East			
This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches	35.8			42.7			47.4						
Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations						38.8 43.9				22.2			
Other		3.8			8.2		8.8			4.7			
Hard to say		5.7			10.3			0.0			11.7		
				CON	FESSIO	NAL ANI	CHUR	CH IDEN	ITITY				
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP		ıst odox	UGCC			ıst stians	belong	not to any gion	
	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	2022	2023	
This is contrary to the right to freedom of conscience and will discriminate against believers in other churches	38.9	33.0	44.3	65.4	38.6	46.1	35.0	41.0	41.2	62.7	40.6	61.2	
Ukraine has historically been a multi-denominational country and giving priority to any church will only cause additional tensions in interchurch and church-state relations	50.0	50.8	37.7	26.9	48.4	38.2	48.3	53.0	45.1	28.4	37.6	17.4	
Other	4.4	7.9	4.9	5.8	4.9	4.5	8.3	-	9.8	6.0	7.5	8.3	
Hard to say	6.7	8.3	13.1	1.9	8.2	11.2	8.3	6.0	3.9	3.0	14.3	13.2	





### HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE INCREASING INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHURCH IN STATE OR PUBLIC RITUALS, SUCH AS BLESSING DURING THE OATH TAKING BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MEMBERS OF OTHER SECURITY FORCES, CONSECRATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES, ETC.?

% of respondents

											(00)	munuea)	
					REG	IONS (No	ovember 2	(023)					
		West			Centre			South			East		
Positive		61.4			61.9			57.7		44.9			
Negative		11.2		6.4			13.2						
Indifferent		18.9		22.1				22.6			32.0		
Hard to say		8.4			9.6			6.4		12.4			
				<b>AGE</b> (Noven 25-29 30-39				3)					
	18-	-24	25	-29	30	-39	40	-49	50	-59	60	0+	
Positive	42	2.0	51	1.0	56	5.1	58	3.1	50	9.3	64	1.7	
Negative	6	.3	8	3.8	9.2		10.0		10.5		9.1		
Indifferent	41	1.4	30	0.6	24.5		22.4		21.0		17	7.3	
Hard to say	10	).3	ç	.5 10.2		).2	ç	).5	(	9.3	8	3.9	
				CO	CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY								
	00	CU	UOC	C-MP		Just Orthodox		CC		ust stians		t belong religion	
	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	
Positive	59.1	69.8	54.3	69.6	34.6	54.7	67.4	72.1	27.3	49.3	11.9	15.9	
Negative	11.4	7.7	13.1	9.6	21.1	7.9	5.6	2.7	25.0	8.3	25.6	19.2	
Indifferent	20.5	14.3	18.0	16.5	34.6	25.6	19.1	14.9	32.0	31.0	48.8	55.0	
Hard to say	8.9	8.1	14.7	4.3	9.8	11.8	7.9	10.4	15.7	11.4	13.7	10.0	

#### HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FOLLOWING RELIGIONS, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHURCHES?

		% of resp	ondents			
	UKR	AINE		REGIONS (No	ovember 2023)	
	2021	2023	West	Centre	South	East
		Ortho	odoxy			
Positive	73.6	75.8	71.9	80.3	77.7	70.8
Indifferent	12.2	16.9	22.8	10.1	17.6	23.0
Negative	1.4	1.6	2.2	1.3	2.6	0.5
Never thought about it	10.9	5.6	3.0	8.1	2.1	5.4
Never heard about such religion/movement	1.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2
	Orthodox C	hurch of Ukrain	e (Metropolitan	Epiphanius)		
Positive	55.4	66.6	68.3	70.7	63.5	57.7
Indifferent	21.8	21.6	24.6	16.7	22.7	27.2
Negative	4.0	3.6	2.8	2.6	7.7	4.5
Never thought about it	15.5	7.7	4.3	9.2	6.0	10.1
Never heard about such religion/movement	2.7	0.4	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5



#### HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FOLLOWING RELIGIONS, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHURCHES?

		% of resp	oondents			(continued)
	UKF	RAINE		REGIONS (N	ovember 2023)	
	2021	2023	West	Centre	South	East
Ukrainia	n Orthodox Cl	nurch of Mosco	w Patriarchate	e (Metropolitar	n Onufriy)	
Positive	33.8	12.2	5.6	10.1	28.9	15.6
Indifferent	24.3	19.2	13.3	17.3	23.0	29.0
Negative	20.4	58.5	78.9	60.4	36.2	40.2
Never thought about it	18.0	10.0	2.2	12.0	11.9	15.1
Never heard about such religion/movement	3.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
		Greek Ca	tholicism			
Positive	37.3	36.3	64.5	26.1	31.9	22.8
Indifferent	31.7	40.5	29.2	42.6	40.9	50.7
Negative	3.4	3.4	0.6	4.1	6.0	4.2
Never thought about it	22.1	18.8	5.8	26.3	19.6	19.8
Never heard about such religion/movement	5.1	1.0	0.0	0.8	1.7	2.5
		Roman C	atholicism			
Positive	30.7	27.9	40.2	24.7	29.2	17.6
Indifferent	34.4	45.8	45.6	43.5	42.5	52.6
Negative	4.3	4.7	5.2	4.0	6.9	4.0
Never thought about it	24.0	20.1	8.8	26.0	19.7	23.1
Never heard about such religion/movement	6.3	1.6	0.2	1.8	1.7	2.7
		Protes	tantism			
Positive	14.5	13.6	13.4	11.5	22.2	13.1
Indifferent	34.2	45.2	50.4	40.6	41.5	50.2
Negative	14.2	14.6	19.4	14.1	10.3	11.6
Never thought about it	28.1	23.5	15.3	29.4	23.9	21.8
Never heard about such religion/movement	8.6	3.2	1.5	4.4	2.1	3.2
		Isl	am			
Positive	13.3	10.0	6.7	9.5	18.4	10.4
Indifferent	32.9	45.6	48.5	42.1	40.2	52.4
Negative	14.4	16.0	20.0	15.4	15.4	12.4
Never thought about it	30.4	26.6	23.8	30.8	23.9	22.8
Never heard about such religion/movement	8.8	1.8	0.9	2.1	2.1	2.0
		Jud	aism			
Positive	11.9	10.5	7.9	9.4	18.8	11.9
Indifferent	34.7	47.1	50.5	43.9	42.3	51.9
Negative	12.3	12.5	16.6	11.3	12.8	9.2
Never thought about it	30.2	26.8	22.8	31.0	23.9	25.1
Never heard about such religion/movement	10.6	3.1	2.2	4.4	2.1	2.0

Never heard about such

religion/movement

2.9

3.4

1.9



#### HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FOLLOWING RELIGIONS, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHURCHES? % of respondents (continued) AGE (November 2023) 18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Orthodoxy 61.7 70.7 72.8 73.6 80.2 82.2 Positive Indifferent 25.7 21.8 20.9 18.3 13.5 11.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.9 1.7 Negative Never thought about it 10.3 5.4 4.4 7.0 5.4 4.4 Never heard about such 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 religion/movement Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Metropolitan Epiphanius) Positive 55.4 63.3 63.1 65.1 70.3 72 Indifferent 26.9 23.8 26.2 24.6 18.0 16.4 4.0 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.6 1.6 Negative 12.0 8.8 8.4 7.2 6.8 Never thought about it 6.6 Never heard about such 1.7 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 religion/movement **Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (Metropolitan Onufriy)** 9.8 12.9 Positive 10.2 8.2 10.8 16.6 20.4 Indifferent 23.6 24 21.4 18.3 13.5 Negative 56.3 55.8 60.5 57.6 57.7 59.4 Never thought about it 10.3 13.6 7.3 10.3 11.1 10.1 Never heard about such religion/movement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 **Greek Catholicism** 30.3 34.0 32.7 38.9 41.6 Positive 36.4 Indifferent 42.2 46.2 36.8 44.6 40.8 36.7 4.6 4.1 2.7 2.7 3.0 Negative 4.3 Never thought about it 19.4 18.4 17.7 16.5 18 21.1 Never heard about such 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.6 1.5 religion/movement **Roman Catholicism** 25.9 24.6 32.5 29.3 Positive 18.2 30.8 Indifferent 52.8 46.9 51.3 46.8 41.9 41.0 3.5 4.8 Negative 5.7 4.1 3.6 5.7 Never thought about it 21.6 21.8 19.2 17.6 19.6 21.8 Never heard about such 1.7 1.2 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 religion/movement **Protestantism** Positive 12.6 12.8 11.8 16.2 14.7 12.8 Indifferent 50.9 44.6 49.0 46.8 42.6 41.3 Negative 10.9 14.2 15.2 12.4 15.3 16.3 Never thought about it 22.9 25.0 22.0 22.4 23.4 25.3

4.3

2.2

3.9



HOW DO YOU FEEL A	BOUTTHE FOL	LOWING RELIC % of resp		OUS MOVEME	NTS AND CH	JRCHES? (continued)
			<b>AGE</b> (Nove	mber 2023)		
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
		Isla	am			
Positive	7.4	10.9	9.0	12.1	11.1	9.4
Indifferent	50.9	44.2	49.0	47.2	42.6	42.6
Negative	14.9	17.0	17.5	13.5	17.7	15.8
Never thought about it	25.1	26.5	23.5	25.9	26.7	29.5
Never heard about such religion/movement	1.7	1.4	1.0	1.3	1.8	2.7
		Juda	aism			
Positive	8.6	11.6	9.0	12.2	12.6	9.6
Indifferent	49.4	44.2	50.6	48.6	45.6	44.3
Negative	13.8	15.0	14.0	11.1	11.1	12.2
Never thought about it	26.4	27.2	24.2	26.2	26.4	29.5
Never heard about such religion/movement	1.7	2.0	2.2	1.9	4.2	4.5
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		CON	FESSIONAL AN	D CHURCH IDEN	TITY	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	I do not belong to any religion
		Ortho	odoxy			
Positive	89.9	95.7	87.8	63.1	66.2	34.6
Indifferent	5.7	3.4	7.5	28.4	19.7	51.8
Negative	0.8	0.0	0.0	3.6	2.6	3.3
Never thought about it	3.4	0.9	4.7	5.0	11.4	10.3
Never heard about such religion/movement	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Orthodox Ch	urch of Ukrain	e (Metropolita	n Epiphanius)		
Positive	89.2	47.8	61.6	58.9	52.8	29.5
Indifferent	4.6	31.0	21.6	33.0	28.8	53.1
Negative	2.5	14.2	4.3	2.2	2.6	4.1
Never thought about it	3.5	7.1	11.4	5.8	15.3	12.5
Never heard about such religion/movement	0.2	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.4	0.7
Ukrainia	an Orthodox Ch	urch of Mosco	w Patriarchate	(Metropolitan	Onufriy)	
Positive	5.2	82.3	16.1	0.9	16.2	10
Indifferent	11.4	6.2	24.0	7.6	27.1	44.6
Negative	76.2	4.4	44.1	90.1	39.7	29.5
Never thought about it	7.3	7.1	15.4	1.3	17.0	15.9
Never heard about such religion/movement	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
		Greek Ca	tholicism			
Positive	37.7	26.1	23.1	96.4	19.7	11.0
Indifferent	41.7	40.9	44.7	2.3	45.2	59.2
Negative	3.4	9.6	3.9	0.0	2.6	4.4
Never thought about it	16.5	21.7	25.9	1.4	31.1	24.3
Never heard about such religion/movement	0.7	1.7	2.4	0.0	1.3	1.1




#### HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FOLLOWING RELIGIONS, RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHURCHES?

% of respondents


		% of resp	oondents			(continued)
		CON	IFESSIONAL AN	D CHURCH IDEN	ITITY	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	I do not belong to any religion
		Roman C	atholicism			
Positive	31.8	18.3	20.8	53.6	18.9	9.2
Indifferent	45.6	44.3	45.1	33.6	45.8	59.2
Negative	4.0	13.0	4.7	5.5	2.2	5.1
Never thought about it	17.1	21.7	26.7	7.3	31.7	25.0
Never heard about such religion/movement	1.5	2.6	2.7	0.0	1.3	1.5
		Protes	tantism			
Positive	15.7	5.2	11.8	10.4	10.1	8.5
Indifferent	46.3	37.9	44.1	43.4	38.6	57.4
Negative	11.4	31.9	10.2	30.8	16.2	9.2
Never thought about it	23.6	20.7	30.7	13.1	31.1	22.8
Never heard about such religion/movement	3.0	4.3	3.1	2.3	3.9	2.2
		lsl	am			
Positive	12.0	6.0	9.8	5.0	8.3	8.9
Indifferent	45.2	50.0	42.0	42.5	39.9	54.4
Negative	16.2	15.5	15.3	26.7	13.6	12.2
Never thought about it	24.9	25.9	31.4	24.4	36.4	23.0
Never heard about such religion/movement	1.8	2.6	1.6	1.4	1.8	1.5
		Jud	aism			
Positive	13.0	6.1	9.4	5.0	10.1	8.8
Indifferent	46.4	47.8	43.5	49.3	40.4	54.0
Negative	12.4	16.5	11.4	17.6	10.5	11.8
Never thought about it	24.6	26.1	33.3	25.3	36.4	22.8
Never heard about such religion/movement	3.5	3.5	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.6

101 **RAZUMKOV CENTRE** 















<sup>Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.
In questionnaires for years 2000, 2010 and 2013 this option was absent.</sup> 






<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.



WHY ARE THERE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE FAITHFUL OF DIFFERENT CHURCHES IN UKRAINE?  % of respondents  (continued)																		
				% of	respo	onder	nts									(C	ontini	ued)
					С	ONF	ESSIC	IANC	L AN	D CH	URC	H IDI	ENTI	ГΥ				
		OCU		U	OC-N	1P	Oı	Just thod		l	JGC		Cł	Just hristia		belo	do no ong to eligio	any
	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023	2020	2022	2023
Conflicts between churches are purely political	28.7	45.2	43.7	33.9	50.8	59.1	36.1	41.5	49.6	39.9	34.5	41.0	33.0	50.3	44.3	39.9	34.7	37.3
Conflicts are mainly around property and buildings	38.0	31.2	29.9	48.4	32.1	34.8	43.1	35.0	32.3	38.9	32.7	22.6	36.9	37.7	40.2	37.3	34.0	35.4
Church hierarchs seek power	24.3	25.3	27.0	27.7	16.8	31.3	31.0	20.6	34.9	22.8	30.6	27.5	26.3	25.7	28.5	36.6	33.1	41.2
National question is the essence of the conflicts	14.4	19.8	26.4	26.3	16.8	17.4	21.8	21.7	22.8	21.8	26.2	19.4	19.6	21.8	22.4	17.3	18.7	18.0
The media incites religious intolerance and inter-church conflicts	23.7	15.4	14.9	15.7	26.0	32.8	17.4	14.9	15.7	25.9	16.5	8.1	20.1	22.3	23.7	16.3	14.5	16.6
The true Church must prove its superiority over others	9.9	11.3	14.5	9.1	8.3	7.8	7.5	9.7	13.0	8.3	8.3	7.2	5.0	13.2	11.8	6.5	8.9	8.9
Other	1.1	1.0	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.0	0.8	0.0	8.3	2.4	0.0	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.4
Hard to say	12.2	1/1 7	0.2	7.2	17 /	2 /	0.0	10.2	12 2	5.7	11 2	10 0	10 1	16.7	0 2	17 ∩	247	12 E






#### IN WHAT CASES IS SUCH A BAN ACCEPTABLE?\*

% of those who believe that it is acceptable in principle to ban activities of individual churches by state authorities

% of those who believe that it is acceptable	UKRAINE REGIONS (November 2023)									
	202		2023	7	West	Cent		South		East
If this religious association publicly supports the aggressor country's policy	38.1		81.1		87.8	77.8	3	77.6	-	79.4
If this religious association practices violent religious rites, threatening the lives and health of citizens	65.3	3	63.6		52.8	66.0	)	65.5	7	75.7
If this religious association preaches misanthropic ideas	58.7	7	62.1		51.5	66.1		50.6	7	75.8
If this religious association is a totalitarian sect that fully controls, subjugates its believers and exerts dangerous psychological influence on them	66.8	3	58.6		46.3	63.6	5	56.0	ć	58.9
If this religious association calls for violence against members of other religions	50.2	2	51.0		53.9	46.7	7	40.0		61.6
If this religious association violates the laws of Ukraine	37.4	1	50.1		53.7	47.4	4	36.5	5	56.6
If this religious association prohibits its followers to perform certain civic duties or exercise rights, such as serving in the military or voting in elections	30.4	1	33.8		23.6	33.3	3	40.5	5	50.0
If this religious association operates without being officially registered in Ukraine	14.5	5	30.1		23.8	28.5	5	36.5	2	12.6
If this religious association promotes teaching, which is not traditional for the country's religions	14.5	5	18.5		8.7	17.2	2	35.7		31.6
Other	0.2	2	0.5		0.6	0.0	5	1.2		0.0
Hard to say	0.8	3	0.8		1.8	0.0		0.0		0.0
	00	CU	Ju	ıst odox			Jı	ust stians	I do not belong to any religion	
	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023	2021	2023
If this religious association publicly supports the aggressor country's policy	51.4	82.4	31.3	77.9	45.5	94.4	26.5	71.1	41.2	74.1
If this religious association practices violent religious rites, threatening the lives and health of citizens	73.2	65.5	63.1	64.6	67.7	61.8	69.1	66.0	57.2	56.0
If this religious association preaches misanthropic ideas	61.6	63.6	56.4	58.4	57.0	60.0	72.1	53.6	54.1	62.9
If this religious association is a totalitarian sect that fully controls, subjugates its believers and exerts dangerous psychological influence on them	69.6	62.2	67.0	61.1	60.6	45.8	70.6	55.7	69.6	55.2
If this religious association calls for violence against members of other religions	47.2	53.8	53.1	44.2	58.0	59.3	61.8	35.1	50.0	41.4
If this religious association violates the laws of Ukraine	44.8	52.6	40.8	46.9	21.2	60.7	25.0	35.1	43.3	44.0
If this religious association prohibits its followers to perform certain civic duties or exercise rights, such as serving in the military or voting in elections	30.0	40.5	31.8	30.1	22.2	17.4	33.3	22.7	42.8	31.9
If this religious association operates without being officially registered in Ukraine	20.8	34.4	8.9	28.3	2.0	22.1	14.5	17.5	20.1	33.0
If this religious association promotes teaching, which is not traditional for the country's religions	14.8	21.4	7.3	17.7	3.0	8.3	14.7	13.4	26.8	20.7
Other	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
Hard to say	0.8	0.7	1.1	2.7	0.0	0.7	1.5	0.0	0.5	0.0

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.







#### IF YOU BELIEVE THAT SUCH CHURCHES OR RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS EXIST, WHICH OF THEM SHOULD BE BANNED? % of respondents % of those who believe that there are churches or religious associations in Ukraine whose activities should be banned % of all respondents **UOC-MP** 30.3 8.0 Jehovah's Witnesses 2.4 0.7 2.0 «Cultists» Churches with governing 0.3 1.0 centres located abroad 0.3 Protestants 0.9 «All those that support the war, 0.3 0.7 justify russia» 0.3 **Baptists** 0.7 0.2 Spiritual centre «Revival» 0.7 0.2 Mormons 0.6 «All churches that are closed 0.1 0.4 to the public» 0.2 Satanists 0.4 0.1 0.3 Islam 0.1 «Radical Islam» 0.2 0.1 Judaism 0.1 0.1 0.1 AllatRa 0.1 The White Brotherhood 0.1 Ukrainian True 0.1 Greek Catholic Church 0.1 («Dognalites») 0.0 Pentecostals 0.1 0.0 «Houses of worship» 0.1 Hard to say/ 2.4 6.9 No answer November 2023




### ON WHAT TERMS SHOULD THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF MOSCOW PARTIARCHATE EXIST? % of respondents

**REGIONS** UKRAINE West Centre South East Activities of the UOC-MP should be banned in 55.5 74.0 56.9 33.8 40.1 Ukraine The UOC-MP should unite with the Orthodox 12.4 10.7 12.1 9.0 17.3 Church of Ukraine The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions, but only after it declares autocephaly and completely withdraws from 9.3 5.2 7.8 20.5 11.4 canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without 4.5 1.9 2.8 10.7 7.9 any restrictions The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions, but its official name should 3.0 0.7 4.0 8.1 1.2 indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 15.3 7.5 17.9 22.0 Hard to say 16.4


		CONFE	SSIONAL ANI	CHURCH II	DENTITY	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	l do not belong to any religion
Activities of the UOC-MP should be banned in Ukraine	66.5	1.8	47.6	92.8	37.6	36.2
The UOC-MP should unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine	11.9	24.1	14.2	2.7	13.5	15.9
The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions, but only after it declares autocephaly and completely withdraws from canonical subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	1.6	5.4	3.5	0.0	7.4	3.7
The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions	1.6	38.4	3.5	0.5	3.5	5.5
The UOC-MP should operate in Ukraine without any restrictions, but its official name should indicate that it is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	9.2	18.8	9.8	0.9	14.0	7.7
Hard to say	9.0	11.3	21.3	3.2	24.0	31.0

November 2023









I do not support it at all

I am not interested

Hard to say

0.7

3.24.6

31.9

0.9

10.6

5.5

12.9

11.0

0.5

1.4

4.1

4.4

21.1


8.3

2.6


30.9

12.1










November 2023

	REGIONS								
	West		(	Centre	South		East		
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine	82.4			66.5	48.3		47.5		
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill stand for peace and against war	1.5 3.8 9.0		5.2						
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill do not have a clear position on the Ukraine war	3.4			10.8	8.1		6.9		
I don't know / Hard to say	12.7		18.9		34.6		40.3		
		COI	NFES	SIONAL AN	D CHURCH I	IDENTITY			
	OCU	UOC-	-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christia	I do not belong ns to any religion		
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow encourage and support russia's aggression against Ukraine	79.3	25.	0	58.4	77.9	50.9	43.0		
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill stand for peace and against war	2.0	23.	2	4.7	0.0	6.1	3.7		
The Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill do not have a clear position on the Ukraine war	7.0	14.	3	9.4	2.3	11.0	7.7		
I don't know / Hard to say	11.7	37.	5	27.5	19.8	32.0	45.6		





<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.



### WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE) IN THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE?\*

% of respondents

(continued)

					`	,
		CONFES	SIONAL ANI	CHURCH I	DENTITY	
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians	l do not belong to any religion
Members of the UOC-MP clergy spread russian propaganda and justify russia's actions	58.1	11.6	39.6	69.7	30.3	30.9
Members of the UOC-MP clergy cooperate with the russian occupation authorities	44.0	10.7	20.5	50.2	24.6	23.2
Priests and parishes of the UOC-MP in the temporarily occupied territories carry out social service, provide material and humanitarian aid to Ukrainian citizens	4.2	37.2	8.3	1.4	8.8	6.6
Priests and parishes of the UOC-MP in the temporarily occupied territories provide spiritual support to Ukrainian citizens	6.2	32.7	6.7	2.3	6.1	4.8
I don't know / Hard to say	22.3	30.4	44.7	16.1	44.3	55.0

<sup>\*</sup> Respondents were asked to choose all relevant options.

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### WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DECISION OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH TO SWITCH TO THE REVISED JULIAN CALENDAR?

% of those who consider themselves Christians

	UKRAINE	REGIONS			
		West	Centre	South	East
Positive	50.2	75.3	45.2	39.6	27.9
Negative	15.0	6.1	16.3	19.8	23.6
Indifferent, not interested	14.4	6.5	17.1	16.7	19.2
I don't know what this means	9.1	2.6	10.2	10.9	15.8
Hard to say/Hesitant	11.2	9.5	11.2	13.0	13.5
	CONFESSIONAL AND CHURCH IDENTITY				
	OCU	UOC-MP	Just Orthodox	UGCC	Just Christians
Positive	62.2	20.5	23.9	81.7	21.4
Negative	11.3	60.7	22.7	4.9	9.2
Indifferent, not interested	12.0	12.5	20.0	4.9	27.5
I don't know what this means	4.9	2.7	18.0	0.4	25.3
Hard to say/Hesitant	9.5	3.6	15.3	8.0	16.6

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