

UKRAINE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES*

INTRODUCTORY SPEECHES

NO FOREIGN POLICY CAN BE SUCCESSFUL WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL DOMESTIC POLICY



Kostiantyn YELISIEIV,
Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

The need of new ideas is especially acute now, when the world around us is on the move, so noticeable and strong. Maybe not everybody in Ukraine is aware of that, but a new Europe and a new world are being shaped before us. It is not accidental that parallels are drawn between the present times and those twenty years ago. Then, the bipolar world was coming to an end, today – unipolar. America and the European Union are passing a period of difficult perturbations.

New global actors arise on the international scene in addition, sometimes – as counterbalance to the USA and the EU. As a result, a new, more tangled cobweb of international relations appears, centred in not one or two, but dozens of the world capitals.

The new “diplomatic cobweb” continues to enmesh the world. Exactly in that context should one see the changes taking place in Ukraine’s foreign policy. **It is changing not because the national government changes. It is changing because international relations in general are changing.**

Is it accidental that NATO and the USA simultaneously put forward new security strategies, largely reconsidering previous political approaches? It is not me who shall tell you that such coincidences never happen.

Just a week ago Hillary Clinton, presenting the new National Security Strategy at the *Brookings Institute*, said that the current international life was shaped by two decisive verities. *First* – no country in the world can cope with present-day challenges on its own; *second* – to be a leader and respond to common challenges one should learn to build coalitions despite existing obstacles.

“To build coalitions, despite existing obstacles” – such is the essence of the reset policy now extended not only to the US-Russian ties, but to the entire system of international relations.

What goes on in the Ukrainian foreign policy is also kind of a reset caused by both internal and external reasons. The main external reason is the changes taking place around us.

Has NATO changed? It has – fundamentally. Now, it is no longer a military bloc or union. It is a security organisation with a fundamentally new world outlook, new mission statement, new problems and new partners, including Russia.

Has Russia changed? It has – fundamentally. It became stronger, more consolidated and self-confident. It has its foreign political charisma with which no one cannot but reckon – neither the USA, nor NATO or the EU. The latest example – the idea of setting up the Russia-EU political and security committee on Lavrov-Ashton level.

Has the EU changed? It has – fundamentally. One may view those changes differently. The EU was and remains the most successful and sound political project of all times. However, the latest crisis shows that that project still remains “*a work in progress*”. And that *progress* will largely depend on whether the EU finds a really effective policy towards Ukraine, Russia and other post-Soviet countries. Unfortunately, such policy is not in sight so far.

Has the USA changed, compared to 2000? Yes, today it is a state with a fundamentally new foreign policy. Terrorist attacks of 9/11, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, rises and falls of George W. Bush’s democracy promotion policy shaped new US approaches on the international scene.

And what about Ukraine? Could it afford not to change? Or could it exist under the laws of international relations, ten or even five years old? No, it could not. To be sure, the main question is how to change. Last time when new Europe led by the EU and NATO was born in 1990s, Ukraine was evidently late for that train. To stand on the rails, repeat yesterday’s slogans and wait it back – this is not for us.

We should make conclusions from yesterday’s defeats and not repeat the mistakes. **The main conclusion of the past years is as follows: no foreign policy can be successful without a successful home policy.** There can be no coordinated foreign policy without a coordinated domestic policy.

* International conference within the Spanish-Ukrainian Strategic Dialogue took place on 8 June, 2010. The conference had four parts: I – introductory speeches, II-IV – thematic panels.

The texts are presented after the discussion records, in an abbreviated form, in the order of presentations by the panellists.



After years of discord and palsy, fundamentally new things appeared in the home policy – coordination, force, strict pragmatism. For the first time in many years, we finally began to do two important things: try to make what we promise, and not promise what we *a priori* cannot make.

We should speak the same language in Moscow, in Brussels and in Washington. The time when we tried to please everyone passed away.

One may agree or disagree with Ukraine's new course, but that course has finally been clearly formulated and is being consistently implemented. So, there is every reason to hope for another fundamentally new thing to appear in our home and foreign policy – success.

It is no secret that one word is on the lips today – non-bloc. Some are sad, some are happy, some agree, some (retroactively) balk. I personally thought a lot about the subject. It seems to me that our non-bloc was among the political decisions that were not imposed and formulated artificially, but naturally grew on the Ukrainian soil. And, if you think, it is logical. No information or public relations campaign is needed. Everything is clear: having failed to join NATO, Ukraine chose another road.

Whose fault is greater here – of Ukraine, NATO, or the historic fate that put the Ukrainian nation at the juncture of countries and civilisations? Or maybe it is not the fate's fault, but a gift that made Ukraine a personification of both Eastern and Western "historic impetus"?

Recently, we have often repeated that there is no middle road. Either Ukraine joins NATO, or is "swallowed" by Russia. No great intellect is required to repeat such "bogeyman stories". **Intellect is needed to wage a political game with the cards you have in hand.** Our cards are not the worst. And *de facto* declaration of non-bloc does not cancel our game. On the contrary, our partners expect to see our move in the big game titled "the new European security architecture". And we should meet their expectations. **The President in his address spoke of the need of implementation and promotion of Ukraine's own clear stand on provision of European security.** Such a stand will promptly be made public and consistently implemented into life.

More than that, if the present world is really "reset", non-bloc will let us simpler adapt ourselves to it and catch the new "train". The ticket to it is very simple – economic success and democracy. Ukraine's democracy is its internal choice, the road it will never turn off. And as far as economic success is concerned, is there a better road to it than to make friends with all neighbours and stop being a bur in the throat for international politics?

In other words, Ukraine's political game is not over. It just entered a new phase. According to Hillary Clinton's recipe, we also began "building coalitions despite existing obstacles". A coalition with Russia does not mean that there will be no coalition with the USA and the EU, now gaining strength.

Coalitions with the USA and the EU do not mean that there will be no coalition with China, Brazil, or India. For the world knows only one way not to get lost in strange "diplomatic cobweb": to start weave one's own. ■

TO CHERISH STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN RELATIONS WITH EUROPE



Valeriy CHALY,
Deputy Director General,
Razumkov Centre

Since our previous meeting in Madrid, the situation has changed in the world, in Europe, and in Ukraine alike. So, it will be interesting to hear the opinion of our Spanish friends about European security developments and their influence on the neighbouring regions, listen to assessments by Ukrainian representatives. The conference agenda is very interesting – security in Europe, relations in the NATO/EU-Russia-Ukraine triangle, cooperation between Ukraine and the EU.

So, although we titled the Conference "Ukraine in the European Security System" it remains unclear what that system presents by its essence. The bill on Principles of Ukraine's Domestic and Foreign Policy (apart from removing the goal of NATO membership) mentions strengthening of the European collective security system. But is there any European security system today, except NATO?

The new Ukrainian authorities proposed legal establishment of non-bloc, but failed to propose an alternative – since the phrase of non-bloc is ungrounded. What shall we do with the deficit of security for Ukraine? There is no answer to this question. Promises are made to adopt amendments to the national security strategy, the military doctrine, pass other documents that will specify the state actions corresponding to the proposed status, but no concrete steps have been identified so far.

I am not against the new President, having won public trust at elections, to implement his idea of the foreign and security policy. But I oppose anchoring such ideas for 25-30 years ahead. I do not think that he had the right to do so.

Sometimes, they in the West (and here, too) say that it is important to reform the security sector, while prospects of membership in the Alliance are unimportant. Let me remind you of the Spanish experience: its accession to NATO was prompted by the goal of unity with Europe – that is, for integration in the EU, Spain considered it important to join the allied security system. This is a historic fact, although, of course, every country has its specificity. But despite the active process of building a new security architecture involving the EU, so far, NATO remains the chief structure in charge of security. And in the issues of, say, fighting terrorism Spain relies on NATO rather than the EU.

I am absolutely positive that in 5-10 years Ukraine will return to the Euro-Atlantic model of the collective security system. Such is the logic of development. But how shall we look in the eyes of our partners in the EU and NATO then?



Another issue: equilibrium of Ukraine's foreign policy priorities. The multidirectional policy now turns unidirectional. The desire to improve relations with Russia (which, beyond doubt, should be welcomed) creates imbalance – one cannot improve relations with the Russian Federation at the expense of the European, Euro-Atlantic trend. So, the main task today is that that “foreign policy pendulum” does not deviate too far in one side.

I guess, the EU may be positively surprised with Ukraine's ability, in presence of the political will, to implement highly unpopular steps within the country – as it was demonstrated in relations with Russia. But in relations with Europe, there is no strong political will in sight yet. Such a “unidirectional” stand of the new authorities can cause apathy not only among citizens, but also among state officials, bureaucrats who will stay inactive on the European side. So, one cannot rule out situations like the one observed during the latest round of negotiations on the free trade area that can hardly be termed successful, through the fault of the Ukrainian side.

The President has recently said that “for five years, there was no stability in the relations of Ukraine and the EU”. This makes experts in European integration wonder. It is good that we speak about problem areas, but one should not forget about the great gains in the development of the EU-Ukraine relations in the past twelve to eighteen months – greater than ever. This happened before the presidential elections. Now, Parliament (including the Committee for European Integration), the Government, the Foreign Ministry are implementing the projects of that period. **So, one should not say that previously everything was incorrect, while now it is nice – instead, one should cherish stability and continuity in relations with Europe.**

We speak a lot about the provision of internal stability. In my opinion, stability means continuation of programmes of cooperation with the EU and NATO, prevention of authoritarianism in Ukraine, unconditional observance of human rights.

In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the Bill on referendum that passed the first reading in Parliament. That document, in particular, regiments media activity at coverage of referendum results. I will remind you that it is planned to reverse earlier changes to the Constitution by referendum and to introduce the presidential republic model. That is, to translate the situation *de facto* into the situation *de jure*. This is the *first* warning.

Second – today's court ruling to withdraw licences from two TV channels (5th Channel and TVi) that used to show rather a balanced stand, impartially covered actions of the authorities and gave floor to the opposition.¹

Third – a new bill limiting meetings and public events. This is inconsistent with earlier declarations of the forces that have come to power.

By the mouth of the State Department representative, the USA expressed concern with the freedom of mass media in Ukraine. Maybe the EU, too, should say a word – especially after the mentioned events. ■

MOVING STEP-BY-STEP TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION



Vicente GARRIDO,
Director,
International Affairs and Foreign
Policy Institute (INCIPE, Spain)

It's a pleasure to see how today's conference continues to strengthen the initiative that was launched in Madrid two years ago with a discussion on EU-Ukraine-NATO relations. It was named “Spanish-Ukrainian strategic dialogue”, since we did not want to limit ourselves to only one seminar, but to establish a regular contact between the research institutions of our countries.

From the very beginning we had the official support of both the Ukrainian Embassy in Madrid and the Spanish Embassy in Kyiv. This initiative was also welcome by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain. Our dialogue has proved its importance and significance for bilateral relations between Ukraine and Spain, and set a good framework for discussion of current issues such as cooperation and bilateral relations as well as other important European issues. Therefore, our institute wishes to propose to hold the next round of dialogue in Spain.

In recent years there have been many changes both in Europe and Ukraine, including the new vectors of Ukraine's foreign policy, transformed relations between Kyiv and Moscow, and continued talks between the EU and Ukraine on the Association Agreement and FTA. Therefore, it is very important for Spanish delegation to analyse the situation, to learn more about your position on European integration of Ukraine and its relations with the EU and NATO (here it is essential to remark that when speaking of Euro-Atlantic security, one should understand that the EU and NATO – are not the same thing).

A new environment, a new security climate has been formed in Europe (especially after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty), new NATO strategic concept has also been discussed. In this context it is worth mentioning that the recently released NATO report where Ukraine and Georgia are mentioned in the same paragraph with identical guidelines and recommendations to both countries. It seems to me this is not quite correct.

Two aspects should be emphasized here. First, is a recent proposal to Ukraine by the Russian President Medvedev regarding the new strategic relations between the two countries. Perhaps, this could represent Russian response towards the preparations of a new NATO Strategic Concept. The second aspect relates to the proclamations of non-bloc status of Ukraine. The

¹ Kyiv District Administrative Court Ruling to terminate the licence to broadcasting frequencies for the 5th Channel and TVi.

question is how this status can go in line with the fact that NATO-Ukraine cooperation today is much more intense than with any other country-partner (particularly in defense sector)?

We may express different positions here, but still have a lot in common. The Spanish experience of European integration could possibly help our Ukrainian partners to gradually and consistently move in the European direction.

Negotiations which Spain held with the EU to become a member of the European community were very difficult and lengthy. After Franco's rule, we had the transition from dictatorship to a democratic system, accompanied by some sacrifices on the Spanish side (particularly in the agricultural sector). In other words, EU integration represents a really long process that can take up to 10-15 years, and today it is difficult to predict how long it will take for Ukraine to join the EU.

This is not an easy task to accomplish. Moreover all the steps have to be explained to the society, where the people often fail to understand that a country has to make certain sacrifices prior joining the EU in order to gain many benefits in the long-term. No doubt, Ukraine must take concrete and pragmatic steps in dealing with the EU. This includes the introduction of European standards, and solidarity with common EU security policy.

I am certain that we will continue discussions between our countries on various issues including European integration of Ukraine and the role of Spain in this process. I consider this dialogue to be of a great importance in the context of future prospects for Ukraine's integration into the EU. ■

EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS AS A FACTOR OF SECURITY FOR UKRAINE AND ITS CITIZENS



Iryna SOLOENKO,
*European Programme Director,
International Renaissance
Foundation*

The notion of national security in the modern world get ever more comprehensive and goes far beyond the limits of traditional perception, which envisages protection of the state and its citizens from external (often military) threats and preservation of territorial integrity. After the end of the Cold War, approaches to security concentrated not on the state, but on an individual gained strength, implying a departure from the statist to anthropocentric perception of security. Since in Ukraine security is usually understood in a more traditional sense, all discussions focus on probable external threats and search of security guarantees against them (the discussion of a neutral and/or non-aligned status is demonstrative in this respect). Respectively, the

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Ukrainian discussion should be broadened with account of the new approaches. More than that, it we proceed from the anthropocentric approach to security, the relations between Ukraine and the EU – if Ukraine fully uses the opportunities offered by integration in the EU – can help enhance the security of Ukraine and its citizens.

Hence, the shift in approaches to international and national security was prompted by the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world. Such international organisations as OSCE and the UN played an important role here. The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report that introduced the notion of human security was demonstrative in that respect. The essence of the approach is that security is needed not for territories, but for humans, and the best investment in security is not to boost defence capabilities but to promote human development. Under such approach, the UN identifies the following elements of global and national security:

- economic security (guarantee of minimum incomes);
- food security (physical and economic access to foodstuffs);
- health security (minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy way of life);
- environmental security;
- personal security (protection from physical violence not only because of hostilities, but also from the bad criminal situation, home violence, etc);
- community security (meaning the threat of loss of traditional ties and values; more refers to religious and ethnic minorities);
- political security (respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms).

Separate elements of that approach are more topical for developing countries than for Ukraine. But by most of those elements, Ukraine cannot be deemed a safe country from the viewpoint of individual security. After all, access to justice and activity of law-enforcement bodies, protection of human rights, quality of the environment, elimination of poverty, the public health system, etc. are no less important elements of national security than its external guarantees. **So, the first point: the notion of national security and its discussion in Ukraine are**



too narrow and state-centred, while human interests and security are considered insufficiently.

The second point: at identification of national security threats and security strategy formulation, the state should be guided by its national interests, formulated publicly and transparently. Understanding of national interests and account of the results of the environment analysis alone make it possible to decide how those interests can be secured in a specific international context. National interests are a relatively stable category and cannot change with every change of government.

How are national interests identified? A known US analyst, author of the “soft power” concept Joseph Nye wrote that in a democratic state, national interests are formulated with account of the opinion of the majority of citizens, through broad dispute and discussion, and therefore, become common long-term interests of citizens and the state. So, it is important that the essence of the national interest is formulated in an open and transparent way, through discussions involving different groups of interests.

Only a national interest formulated in such a way can provide a sound basis for the state security strategy planning. Ukraine now has a chance to try to formulate a system of its national interests with passage of the new law On Principles of Domestic and Foreign policy. Given the document’s importance, its drafting and discussion should go beyond the Verkhovna Rada premises, involve the Ukrainian expert and academic communities. More than that, after expert discussion, the basic postulates of the future law should be made public and reasoned – for instance, by means of issue of a White Book elaborating the new principles of Ukraine’s home and foreign policy.

The third point: Ukraine’s orientation to European values and use of the opportunities given by integration in the EU (in particular, to implement reforms) will help enhance the transparency of formulation of critical state policies and strengthen the national security system primarily concerning the threats to individuals. The agenda of the Ukraine-EU relations envisages implementation of the majority of reforms associated with the above-mentioned security elements in Ukraine. On its part, the EU offers expertise, financial assistance and institutional support. From Ukraine, political will and effective coordination on the Government’s level are needed.

With the Association Agreement signing, Ukraine will get more capabilities and support from the EU to achieve the relevant security standards. In other words, **Europeisation** of Ukraine is meant – implementation of reforms designed to achieve European standards of governance in the broad sense of that word.

To sum up, let me note that I do not mean to underestimate the importance of discussion of external threats and foreign guarantees of Ukraine’s security. I mean that concentration on those security elements alone diverts attention from no less important problems: *first*, internal threats to security, originating from the lack of political will, good governance and rule of law, and *second*, the lack of transparency and non-involvement of wide expert circles in drafting of the basic documents outlining national interests. ■

TO FURTHER AND DEEPEN UKRAINE-SPANISH RELATIONS



Rafael OSORIO,
Deputy Head of the
Spanish Mission in Ukraine

On behalf of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to Ukraine Moyano who strongly supported the initiative of the Spanish-Ukrainian strategic dialogue, I wish to thank all organisers and participants of the international conference “Ukraine in the European security system: challenges and prospects”. First of all – Razumkov Centre and El Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (*INCIPE*, Madrid) for their weighty contribution to the dialogue between Spain and Ukraine. I would also like to thank *CIDOB* institute (Barcelona) and the Foreign Ministries of our countries.

The Conference takes place at a high level – it gathered key experts from Spain, Ukraine, other countries of the world, security analysts. To be sure, the agenda of this event is highly important not only in the format of Spanish-Ukrainian relations, but also in the wider pan-European context.

The European debate on security issues has reached a decisive stage, and I hope that at this conference we will sincerely exchange opinions and experiences of representatives of the EU and NATO member states, as well as countries staying beyond those organisations. This event is a good proof that Ukraine abides by the principles of democracy, pluralism of opinions, freedom of speech.

I wish to stress that the Ukrainian party has something to say on European security and stability problems. Ukraine has special relations with Russia and seeks to join the EU, it closely cooperates with NATO, maintains strategic partnership with the United States of America.

This Conference may give a good impetus for Ukraine’s more active involvement in discussion of European security issues. Spain supports Ukraine’s efforts, that is why our two leading think tanks sent their experts to Kyiv to discuss issues of security, European development, stability on the European continent. And this is another proof and sign of Ukraine’s importance not only for the Spanish Government, but also for the Spanish civil society.

Spain hails steady progress observed in talks on the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU and looks forward for its results in the near future. To achieve that goal, Ukraine should further enhance its negotiating capacities to complete talks on the Agreement items dealing with free trade. The Agreement, once it enters into

force, will bring serious economic and political effects to both Ukraine and the EU.

I would also like to note the results of the most recent EU-Ukraine ministerial meeting that marked notable success of the Spanish presidency in the European Union. In particular, it was decided to move the dialogue on visa-free travel as a long-term outlook into practice. That dialogue encompasses the development of a two-stage Action Plan resting on reforms Ukraine must implement for the attainment of that goal. ■

NEW APPROACHES TO THE STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

NEW APPROACHES TO ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE



Anatoliy ZLENKO,
President,
Foundation for Ukraine's
International Cooperation

The problem of stability and security in Europe has a global dimension and depends on a number of geopolitical factors. The world is moving towards multipolarity, the economy globalises, civil society changes – and in that way, the environment turns a new economic, political and philosophic reality.

Against that background, uneasy processes take place in the EU and NATO. The global economic crisis left a deep imprint on the international-political landscape of Europe and the entire Euro-Atlantic space. Europe's key trend is to try to preserve political and economic stability using the available multilateral institutes. Among such institutes, apart from the UN, one can mention OSCE, CoE, EU, NATO, and other institutes – regional (CIS and CSTO) and subregional. Sometimes they compete rather tensely, although usually, competition is productive, its most showy examples being EU-NATO, OSCE-EU-NATO, NATO-CSTO, OSCE-Russia, etc.

Thanks to those organisations, the required dialogue can be maintained, and proper decisions passed. Over the past 20 years, European multilateral institutes were effectively solving some of the problems important for the continent. It may be argued that stability in relations among big powers depends on their membership in NATO and the EU that ensure the required level of trust and interdependence of its members.

But if we speak of Greater Europe in general, a third of its population stays beyond the boundaries of relative stability and security, apparently, in the result of stoppage of geographic expansion of the concerned

leading European structures. So, 20 years after the formal end of the Cold War, the Euro-Atlantic space failed to part with the heritage of bipolar confrontation and create a steady and effective system of multilateral countering both traditional and new threats.

Unfortunately, Europe has no institutional and legal framework for cooperation of all states in such issues as fighting drug trafficking, terrorism, cybercrime, collective prevention of and response to emergency situations and humanitarian crises, cooperation in nature conservation and environmental challenges, including global climate change. It should be added that none of the present collective security organisations may claim the role of a universal cooperation and conflict-prevention tool (although the EU and NATO are trying to step up efforts in those domains, while OSCE, unfortunately, falls out of that tandem).

The main reason for the OSCE ineffectiveness lies in the absence of legal commitments of the member states to cooperate in the most critical issues. Furthermore, NATO's main focus on maintenance of peace and stability within the Euro-Atlantic community (and preservation of the Western unity on that basis) bars expansion of its capabilities both geographically and functionally. It may be assumed that the new NATO concept, now worked out by the so-called "Wise Men Committee", will consider those points while deciding on further activity of the Alliance. It may involve its transformation into a collective pan-European military and political union, or creation of a truly pan-European security system.

The EU efforts in the first place pursue promotion of multifaceted processes of internal integration and satisfaction of domestic needs. And the mechanisms formed (for instance, the European security and defence policy) are intended to unite the member states and enhance their individual capabilities – rather than to strengthen international security in general.

There are also no signs of the intention to attain that task in such projects as the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Their role apparently lies in the protection of pragmatic interests of the EU and other countries, in the first place – which only indirectly may be seen as extension of stability and security to their territory. One cannot but notice that for the EU it is important primarily to secure a belt of stability and security on its Eastern borders. In particular, in the case of Ukraine, such projects are mainly associated with long-term prospects of accession to the EU.

So if we speak about stability and security in Europe, it should be noted that the current division of "Greater Europe" greatly undermines effective countering of new security challenges, the main of them being proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, growing destabilisation in the Greater Middle East region, international terrorism, piracy, transnational organised crime, drug trafficking, etc. Furthermore, against the background of emergence of new centres of power (e.g., China), Europe is so far unable to present itself as an independent power counterbalancing and supplementing them.



In the past century, Europe ceased to be the leading centre of international relations. Its current attempts to influence those relations do not seem to be a success. The end of regular confrontation between the East and West, entrance of new countries to the political and economic scene, shift of the centre of gravity in the world economy to the Asian and Pacific region – all that moves the European political theatre to the relative outskirts of the international life. The area of the Persian Gulf, Middle East and Central Asia becomes the worst problem-hit region of the world, while South-Eastern Asia – the most dynamic and meritorious area.

Such balance of forces cannot stay unattended. It is not accidental that today, the issue of establishment of a new collective security system uniting the whole of Europe appears on the agenda. Along with requirements of observance of such important pan-European documents as the Charter for New Europe, the Helsinki document, the Charter for European Security and so on, new proposals are formulated and presented for public discussion. I mean, in particular, the initiative presented by the Russian side on 29 November, 2009, to European countries and key regional organisations – the draft European Security Treaty.

It ensues from the draft that the Russian side proceeds from the need of drafting and signing by all Euro-Atlantic countries of a new all-embracing treaty of European security, resting on the principle of indivisible security, i.e., legally binding refusal of the member states from strengthening their security at the expense of security of others. According to the Russian side, the proposed Treaty is intended to put an end to the unfinished cold war and geostrategic rivalry in the Euro-Atlantic region – to spare strength for effective cooperation in countering new security challenges.

So far, most of the Western countries officially oppose the very idea of a new legally binding treaty, that is why it is very difficult today to predict prospects of the proposed document. But the main thing demonstrated by prior discussion is that the Western states are reluctant to recognise the need of restructuring the European security system, now suiting them, and this is probably the main reason for the reserved attitude to the draft Treaty. Meanwhile, one cannot rule out that the issue may in one or another form be considered at the OSCE summit, to be called by Kazakhstan later this year.

The problem of security and stability is topical not only for the EU countries, but also for Ukraine – since it lies in the heart of Europe and, while staying away any military or political union, still remains an object of keen interest of great powers. In such situation, Ukraine is trying to show its involvement with European security problems both through bilateral relations with European countries, and using multilateral mechanisms. Exactly in this context should one view the *Joint Statement by Presidents of Ukraine and Russia on European security issues* of 17 May, 2010, that announced the President of Ukraine initiative of building in Europe a new system of collective countering global threats and security challenges in the 21st century and at the same time voiced support for the Russian

President's initiative of conclusion of the European Security Treaty.

It is hard to predict today what shape the new European security will take but apparently, reset of relations with individual states affects security issues, configuration and formation of centres of influence. Regarding Ukraine, under any new situation it is necessary to properly respond to present-day challenges and take adequate measures. Review of the Bill on Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Ukrainian Parliament is among such measures. Foreign policy should be viewed as a key tool of provision of Ukraine's security through maintaining peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation with members of the international community in line with commonly accepted norms and principles of the international law.

Analysing new approaches to strengthening stability and security in Europe, one may come to the conclusion that the present European security system requires search of an adequate response to new challenges and, the main thing, should prevent growth of security vacuum in Europe. In this respect, it is important to observe basic principles of relations between states resting on their adherence to the international commitments, first of all, the UN Charter, along with provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the European Security Charter and other documents intended to make up a coherent international security system. ■

STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION TO ENSURE STABILITY AND SECURITY



Manuel ACERETE,
Deputy Director General
for Security Policy,
Spanish Ministry for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation

I will follow your invitation to speak freely and informally on some of the topics which have already been raised in this discussion.

As it has been stated, today the world seems to be changing faster than several years ago. The EU and NATO are currently in a dynamic development – the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the ongoing work on the new NATO Strategic Concept as well as the discussions on proposals for pan-European security. However, beyond these changes, we should be aware that the key bilateral and multilateral relations remain and that countries have their permanent interests to defend.

In an international environment where almost every country undergoes changes now, we need to gradually improve our national policies according to the enduring interests of our countries, and we need as well to further adapt and develop our multilateral institutions in order to provide for security and stability in Europe. In fact, today

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we basically are satisfied with these institutions. But this does not mean that they cannot be improved. For example, the proposal by Russian President Medvedev for a new European security architecture shows that Russia at least is dissatisfied with these institutions. But should it all be radically changed?

When drastic changes are made, it is more likely to worsen rather than to improve the situation – but this is not the recipe for conservatism. We must change and make progress, in order to improve the architecture of European and global security. But it should be based on what we already have – and this, in particular, is related to NATO.

The development of NATO's new Strategic Concept responds to the need to reflect the changes that have taken place in the world since 1999, for example after the September the 11th terrorist attacks. We must adapt the current Strategic Concept to the new challenges, which are also changing. But at the same time, we must not lose those achievements that we already have in NATO's policies. This also applies to relations with Russia.

In recent years, relations with Russia had their ups and downs: such as the Kosovo crisis, the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, etc. But at the same time there was a continuous development of relations, and despite all the obstacles we have had some major achievements and developed a strategic cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The EU also continues to undergo some serious changes and some important steps are being taken forward to improve the role of the EU as a global actor, but putting in place the new instruments following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty is quite a complex process. It is difficult to create new institutions, new bodies, which should serve not only as a platform for discussion, but also as a platform for collective governance and action.

We must continue to develop classical institutions like cooperative multilateral security system. For Spain, Ukraine or any other European country this means a clear understanding of the fact that there is not a single country in the world (even the US) that can deal with current threats and challenges alone.

This conclusion was already underlined in the 2003 European Security Strategy. This document can be seen as a call for joint transatlantic and European action, since no single European country (not even those who possess nuclear weapons and are members of the UN Security Council) is able to solve today's complex security problems.

We need to make joint efforts in a multilateral framework when addressing security issues – this is a concept that Spain has always advocated. In order to contribute to the development of international peace and security, we can take advantage of such institutions as NATO and the EU, which are indeed quite effective instruments for our joint efforts. This and other principles laid down in the European Security Strategy must not be forgotten.

This means that multilateral cooperation within the framework of the EU, the UN, NATO, OSCE should not become a mere platform for discussion of issues. In order for them to be of real use, such multilateral efforts should be done in a truly effective way – and NATO is a good example of this. Multilateral agencies have to ensure security, stability as well as crisis management. Undoubtedly, there are certain limitations, but it is very important to have the strength and means to act, not just to talk.

There are certain challenges in implementing this multilateral approach, but the progress is also evident. Many countries, including Ukraine, are actively involved in Afghanistan crisis resolution. The events in Somalia affect the interests of many countries in the world, including Ukraine and Spain. That is why we are undertaking humanitarian, diplomatic and military efforts to fight piracy and to help the citizens of Somalia.

Patrolling the waters off Somalia's coast is a very difficult operation. We welcome Ukraine's intention to contribute to these international efforts, in particular by providing protection detachments to be based on the ships of other countries taking part in the EU-led operation *Atalanta*. Such contributions to European operations are possible without being an EU-member. Nevertheless, the more Ukraine is integrated into the EU structures, the better it will be able to protect its own national interests.

For a long time, Ukraine has been in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The future prospects for this integration are the subject of public debate and have already been addressed during today's discussion from different points of view, including the question of how far this process has now been stopped. I think this is a question that should be addressed to the Ukrainian people, and it is up to them to make this decision in their own good time. It is also very important, while making this decision, not to have any external pressure on the Ukrainian government and society.

At the same time it is also important for Ukraine to preserve coherence and continuity in its foreign policy, to achieve progress in the concrete reforms needed for Euro-Atlantic integration, to keep improving cooperation with the EU and NATO to mutual benefit, and to step up to a new level of partnership with these organisations, i.a. through full use of the instruments existing in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and through the negotiation process on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

There are well developed partnership formats with the EU and NATO with certain achievements – all this must be preserved. The ongoing internal reforms are important for Ukraine not only to gain a membership in these institutions, but also to develop a properly functioning state, the transformation of which started two decades ago.

The reforms will enable Ukraine not only to join the EU and NATO in the future (if Ukraine chooses to), but also help to effectively manage the country and to increase Ukraine's participation in the international efforts within the framework of multilateral cooperation. ■



TO UTMOST USE THE TOOLS OF COOPERATION WE HAVE



Oleksandr LYTVYENKO,
Deputy Director
of the National Institute of
Strategic Studies, Ukraine

I need to start with a reservation: I will present my own opinion that may not coincide with the official stand of the Institute of Strategic Studies, but seems critically important to me.

For us, incorporation of the provisions of non-bloc in official documents was the greatest recent disturbance. Let me remind you that Ukraine has actually been non-bloc since the USSR break-up, i.e., 1991. Over the period of independence, the non-bloc policy had different contents: in early 1990s, it was used to part with the Russian Federation, in late 1990s – early 2000s – as the platform to come closer to the EU and, first of all, NATO.

I wish to make a small theoretical remark: when we speak of the USSR break-up, one should be aware that it fell apart not as a result of intensification of the struggle of enslaved republics, but because of weakening of the parent state and refusal of the Russian Federation to pay for the empire. This is a fundamental comment.

Also worth notice, our drive to NATO failed because the window of opportunities available in 2005-2008 was not used, mainly due to internal problems, lack of consensus in society and the political elite.

The year of 2008 was of key importance for the current situation, when the defeat of the Ukrainian diplomacy in Bucharest along with the Russian-Georgian war marked the beginning of emergence of a fundamentally new strategic situation and demonstrated the ability of the Russian Federation to attain its declared goals – i.e., conservation of the international *status quo*. That goal was expressly formulated in all Russian basic documents and remains invariable. The year of 2009 brought us reset of the US relations with the EU, on one hand, and the Russian Federation – on the other, along with the January gas deals that laid down actually all preconditions for the subsequent Kharkiv agreements signed in April, 2010.

The Kharkiv agreements have not become a new trend, but only nailed down the situation that arose in 2008-2009. It seems that the price of solution of tactical economic security problems was overstated. But maybe it was the only price suitable for Russia. Ukraine tried to solve economic security problems, having refused from the Euro-Atlantic integration and come under the Russian “security umbrella”. However, one should be aware that the situation is not easy; unfortunately

(or fortunately), it is much more tangled and controversial. I mean that the Russian Federation itself has nowhere and never spoke of extension of its “security umbrella” to Ukraine. Russia cannot and does not want to give such possibilities, and Ukraine in its present state cannot accept them.

Said agreements and declarations of non-bloc nailed down the situation observed in Ukraine, previously. In my conviction, the Kharkiv agreements and the draft Law on Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy marked not the beginning of a new era in the Ukrainian foreign policy, but the end of the previous one.

Another fundamental point – **in the current situation, Ukraine is bogged in the grey zone between the Russian Federation (I do not speak of CSTO, since Russia itself does not attach particular attention to that organisation) and the European security space.** That grey zone included not only Ukraine, but also Moldova and, to a large extent, Georgia. That zone is and will be characterised by further growth of many challenges and risks to national and international security.

Beyond doubt, those challenges and risks will largely be soft, but their quantity cannot but grow into quality. Proceeding from present-day views of security, one may state the difficulty of distinction between external and internal challenges. Our foreign policy problems mainly ensue from internal weakness, not only institutional. Controversial political processes are associated primarily with the weakness of democratic institutes – that is, our bogging in that zone is primarily a result of our own problems.

What is specific of our general situation? *First* – the global financial and economic crisis, not yet over. Apparently, the world will go out of that crisis fundamentally changed, through large-scale restructuring, including in the security sector.

Second – a relevant decrease in the world significance of Europe and, maybe, even greater decrease in the significance of Eastern and Central Europe as a region of the world. It may be bad, it may be good that the area turns into a kind of a “geopolitical province”. When we were in the thick of events during World War II and before 1991, it has not brought much happiness to our state, but cost it huge human, economic and other losses.

Third – problems of internal origin, problems of the Ukrainian elite. A lot has been said about that. But there are no hopeless situations. Vacuum of security is not only a state of complication and fear, but also an opportunity to build some clearly predictable line of conduct, an opportunity of institutional recovery, more principled, target-minded actions. Ukraine has approximately two years to implement serious transformations – because it is clear that the present serious relaxation of international tension will yield to growth of external risks in the middle run.

We have an opportunity to build our own policy – a unique set of consultative mechanisms that shaped the Ukrainian foreign policy over the past 20 years. Ukraine has such mechanisms in relations with next to all leading

world actors. The success of their use is another issue, but potentially such consultative formats of relations are available in relations with the EU, the Russian Federation, the USA, and NATO alike.

We have the format of distinctive partnership with NATO that may and should be used, especially in line with the Alliance's new strategic concept. We have declarations of strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, the Big Treaty, but no concrete substance in those documents.

We have the appropriate legal framework for relations with the EU, and a declaration on strategic partnership with the USA, but what is the degree of implementation of those agreements and declarations?

I guess, it is the time not for loud declarations, setting nice and very remote goals, but for inventory and sort-out of the existing agreements. We should utmost use the tools of cooperation we have. I am sure: history never sets tasks before a society the latter cannot perform. ■

RELATIONS IN THE NATO/EU- RUSSIA-UKRAINE TRIANGLE

A NEUTRAL, NON-BLOC UKRAINE AS A KEY FACTOR OF A NEW COOPERATIVE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM



Oleksandr CHALYI,
*Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine*

A few prior principled comments. **First:** search and conception of Ukraine's right and reasonable actions in the national security sector in the first place require balanced and thorough analysis, along with consideration of global and European trends. **Second:** some suggested here that Ukraine should begin "its own game". Yes indeed, but we should be well aware that in the coordinates of the present-day global geopolitics we are not a great power and possess neither the strength nor the capabilities to wage a game of our own. Ukraine can only influence the game of the great powers. If we do that wisely – this will give Ukraine prosperity and security; if we provoke confrontation among the great powers – this will mean serious problems for us. **Third:** the organisers of this Conference have termed the Russia-Ukraine-NATO/EU relations as a triangle. I guess that the EU and NATO should be separated, they are different actors of modern geopolitics, and it would be a mistake to pool them together.

Speaking of the European security system, one should proceed from fundamental references. For instance,

the UN Charter gives a definition of a regional security organisation, from which it ensues that NATO is a regional Euro-Atlantic, not a *European* security organisation (noteworthy, for many years it was known as Atlantic, and Europeans have long sought its name to be supplemented with the word "European").

There is one more regional security system on the European continent – CSTO. Plus a pan-European, so-called "soft security system" – OSCE. Additionally, there are treaties effective on the European continent (e.g., the Treaty on Conventional Forces) of key importance exactly for the pan-European security system. So, a pan-European security system from Vladivostok to Lisbon exists *de facto*, and now, we witness attempts to officialise it *de jure*. In fact, such is the essence of the new Russian proposal on the European security system (Medvedev's Plan).

In my opinion, it may be a project of a new OSCE or its substantial renovation (OSCE+).

Meanwhile, the focus of the struggle (or, rather, rivalry) between the USA and China in the 21st century becomes a key factor of global geopolitics. This means, *firstly*, that strategically, the USA will gradually release responsibility for the European security it bore after World War II, transferring it mainly to the EU sphere of responsibility (first of all, of Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the UK, Poland). Respectively, the EU (first of all, Germany and France) will be unable to build a new European security system without practical interaction and cooperation with the Russian Federation, which, in turn, will require creation of a new European cooperative security system.

Secondly – as a result, the future of the pan-European continent security lies in creation of a cooperative security system from Vladivostok to Lisbon. The substance of that new European security system is tackled by world leading experts.

In this respect, two things should be pointed out. *First:* the EU will not act as one actor in it. Providing European security, the EU will work together with renewed NATO, whose role in security guarantee on the continent will fundamentally change. Neutral countries will remain in Europe, too – Austria, Finland, Sweden (noteworthy, Ireland voted for the Lisbon Protocol only on the condition of reassurance of its neutrality).

Second: when building the new European security system, the problem of the countries with an uncertain security status – Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan – will be of the key importance, since as long as it remains unresolved, the Cold War is not over, legally.

So, a question arises: what security status to extend to Ukraine, what security status it needs, and what security status it may claim?

I flatly disagree with colleagues saying that we have not joined NATO and are not joining the EU through our own fault. We could *never* join the Alliance because of geopolitical realities now formed on the European



continent. We actually had no chance (except the first six months after the Orange Revolution, if right steps had been made).

It was suggested here that accession to NATO had been barred by domestic instability and lack of public support. Look, Georgia has the stability and 90% support for NATO membership – but still remains outside the Alliance. Hence, the problem is different: there is no geopolitical trade-off between NATO and the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine and Georgia.

That is why Ukraine's security in the new European cooperative security system should rest not on arms and armies, but on a considerate and wise diplomacy, well aware of global and regional trends and fit into them, to absorb their synergy. Beyond doubt – on the condition of serving Ukraine's national interests.

We can criticise the term of non-bloc or neutrality, but Ukraine cannot join the new European cooperative security system as a CSTO or NATO member. If it tries to do that (or some great power tries to do that instead of it) – it will face the fate of the 19th century Poland, i.e., division. So, Ukraine's non-bloc status, neutrality in course of building a new European security system is a natural geopolitical reality. Ukraine should itself in the first place be interested in its non-bloc status, neutrality, since exactly in such status it can play a key role in the creation of a new cooperative security system in Europe.

As far as I see it, every neutral country is non-bloc, but not every non-bloc country is neutral. In other words, non-bloc status means policy and tactics, while neutrality means a status and resultant international legal recognition.

So, fears of the term of “neutrality” among Ukrainian experts are a great mistake. Exactly today, Ukraine faces an opportunity to *demand* for itself international treaty-based recognition of its security status. In such situation, the Ukrainian diplomacy should play a more fundamental, more strategic game. Ukraine should raise the issue of its status as a geopolitical centre of the new European security system, now in the making, as a permanent neutral state. By contrast to other *de facto* non-bloc countries we have two key advantages – legislative establishment of the non-bloc status within the country, and international legal establishment of that status in the Budapest Memorandum.

In view of the above, I cannot fully agree with the Foreign Minister's statement who, commenting on the issue of Ukraine's relations with NATO, said that “the issue of membership is *now* withdrawn from the agenda”. That is – withdrawn now, but may reappear tomorrow? This shows that the present-day Ukrainian diplomacy treats non-bloc status as tactics rather than strategy of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. In my opinion, this is a mistake, because such uncertainty may lead to destabilisation both inside and outside the country.

I would also like Ukraine to be a NATO member. But this is impossible, in view of the present and future global and European geopolitical realities. That is why I realise that we should act by other means, namely –

by means of recognition of Ukraine's status of a permanent neutral state. If we had united on the platform of neutrality a year ago – there would have been no agreements of the Black Sea Fleet. If we are not united on the formula of permanent neutrality as a key and practical security formula for Ukraine today, we will lose a chance to make a historic contribution to building the new European cooperative security system.

In this context, our Conference might propose the Ukrainian government to host in Kyiv an OSCE summit in 2013 (when Ukraine presides in OSCE) to approve the key principles of the new European cooperative security system. ■

TODAY, MORE SHOULD BE SAID ABOUT EUROPEAN VALUES



Yuriy SHCHERBAK,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine

I am probably the only person in this room who in 1997 took part in the ceremony of signing the NATO-Ukraine Charter in Madrid. It was an extremely bright and hopeful period of our diplomacy. The idea of Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU arose at the very onset of independence. It was an idea of Ukraine's civilisational choice, our aspiration to be a civilised, democratic country confessing European values. In the past years, despite some mistakes and miscalculations, much effort has been made in Europe, good European prospects offered to our state.

But today, after 19 years of independent development, Ukraine found itself in a situation of a rapid turn in foreign and home policy priorities. One can wrap in bright cover (as fellow diplomats do) tough actions by the administration of Viktor Yanukovich, often contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution and laws that put Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence, but in reality this reminds return to Brezhnev's times of limited sovereignty, in a new wording though.

So, it would be nice if Ukraine promoted its own model of European security, not that of Dmitri Medvedev, now rejected in the West. But a number of joint declarations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation show that the foreign policy of our state is falling within the umbrella of the Russian foreign policy. This not only deprives the Ukrainian diplomacy of the freedom of manoeuvre, but questions the independence of Ukraine's position on the world scene.

Panellists here have already mentioned “Finlandisation” – behaviour of weak countries pressed by stronger ones. This is what Ukraine will face if subsequent steps of the new authorities are similar to

those made by now. And if Europe swallows that, Spain will face the same fate, since we are all interconnected, there is no separate “island of Ukraine” and separate “island of Spain”. So, our problems should be clear to our Spanish counterparts.

Within two hours, Ukrainian MPs altered the legislation gained through much suffering over 10 years and refused from prospects of accession to NATO. But it's nonsense – to remove the provision of accession, and at the same time to implement the relevant Annual National Programme.

Stationing of foreign troops in Ukraine has been extended for an unprecedented term, whereby the neutral status looks senseless. The non-bloc status was proclaimed – and immediately, an invitation came to join CSTO. But why should Ukraine join that Russian bloc, as it borders on NATO countries and cooperates with NATO countries?

NATO representatives, Ukraine's partners are at a loss and cannot understand what this means.

This means Russia's greatest geopolitical victory. Russia began its operation in 2005, right after the Orange Revolution, successfully implemented it and secured a victory. However, that victory was secured not in 2010 in Kharkiv, but in 2008 in Bucharest – where France and Germany, with the US silent consent, barred Ukraine's admission to NATO.

The world economic crisis brought great changes, first of all – toughening struggle between globalisation processes and a bent for preservation of national identity. In the EU, the divide between West and East European countries is deepening. In particular, a fight goes on for Poland leading the “Eastern group” in the EU and being a critical element for the establishment of a new world order, i.e., the geopolitical alliance of Germany and Russia. There is a divide between the European North and South. I'll be frank, there are no stable alliances in Europe now, everything is in a very dynamic movement. The strategic paradigm – NATO and EU enlargement – tailed, European institutes undergo serious rearrangement. So, Ukraine found itself at crossroads not only because of its poor policy, but also because of those changes.

Today, it is again choosing one of the two models. The first is the model of Western democracy – of tolerance and democratic compromise. The second is the model of “guided democracy”, in fact – authoritarianism. The new authorities are imposing on society the second model. There are attempts to curtail the democratic space, to limit the freedom of speech, to cut human rights – what European integration can we talk about, what cohesion in society? We should be frank: Ukrainian society is not united since its two parts confess different civilisational models, in other words, there is a European Ukraine and a Eurasian Ukraine, closer to the Russian realities. That is why forcible imposition of one model may cause a very serious split in society.

Meanwhile, Europe is enchanted with stabilisation in Ukraine. There are no quarrels, disputes and conflicts. But this is not stabilisation. It rests not on a consensus found under a democratic procedure, but on forcible, administrative pressure. Such stabilisation is illusory and cannot be lasting and durable.

I wish to warn our Spanish colleagues against a very dangerous illusion (already seen in the West) that Ukraine and Russia make one geopolitical space, as it was in the Soviet times. This is not true. The majority of Ukrainian citizens adheres by the European way of Ukraine's development. So, I guess that today, more should be said about European values than membership in the EU and NATO – organisations whose effectiveness is disputable. After all, everything can be changed, everything goes away – values remain.

The year of 2010 marks the beginning of a very difficult period in human history, there are many indications that the forthcoming years may be very contentious, and we should do our best to avoid that, to preserve the most important of our common European values – democracy, tolerance, the rule of law and the sovereign right of citizens of every country to decide their fate on their own. ■

POTENTIAL OF THE EU-UKRAINE PARTNERSHIP

TO JOINTLY STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY



**Jose Manuel
PINTO TEIXEIRA,**
*Head of the EU's
Delegation to Ukraine*

The EU-Ukraine relations now rest on agreements made more than 10 years ago, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Our relations are developing on the principles of good-neighbourliness and intended to strengthen democracy, protect human rights and create effective market economy in Ukraine. Those relations have become especially active, sincere and fruitful in the past five years.

For instance, for more than three years now, negotiation of the Association Agreement is underway in different domains, from judiciary to energy and environmental protection. Right after Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008, talks started on a comprehensive free trade agreement as an integral part of the Association Agreement. That is, the latter may be signed only after all issues associated with the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine are resolved. If the Association Agreement is signed and implemented, Ukraine will be integrated in the EU economically, and become its associated member politically. That is, in the European space, it will obtain the same status as Norway or Switzerland.

Currently, the Agreement preparation goes on within the framework of the Association Agenda approved at the end of 2009 that envisages implementation of related measures and reforms in Ukraine. On 26 January,



2010, the list of priorities of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was approved, setting 78 priorities for 2010. Noteworthy, implementation of those measures was annually assessed by the European Commission (last – approximately a month ago) and the assessments were published on the EU Delegation to Ukraine official web site. Monitoring of the Association Agenda implementation has been started, another round of the relevant talks and discussions will be held in September.

Regarding negotiation of the political section of the Association Agreement text, a few issues remain to be agreed, including that of Ukraine's future EU membership, which the Ukrainian side wants to be incorporated in the Agreement. There are other issues for discussion, too, especially critical being that of Ukraine's ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.²

Talks about a free trade area are held regularly, on a quarterly basis, in Kyiv and Brussels in turns. They are far from completion, but this does not mean that coordination of positions (including on transitional periods on different markets) is impossible. Both parties are well aware of the bottlenecks, and leading the process to the end phase is only a matter of the political will.

One more line of our cooperation deserves mention – the Eastern Partnership. It is a process started in 2009, covering cooperation with six post-Soviet states – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It does not replace bilateral relations of those countries with the EU, but intends to extend the best experience of such relations to all the mentioned countries in their cooperation both with the EU and with each other. Currently, the EU has the most advanced relations with Ukraine. That is why that experience was extended, e.g., to Moldova that also not long ago commenced negotiation of an Association Agreement. And it should be noted that in that process, it is already catching up with Ukraine.

Another issue highly important for our agenda is that of the EU visa procedures for Ukrainian citizens. As we know, there is the effective EU-Ukraine Visa Facilitation Agreement that entered into force in January, 2008, and exerted positive influence on the visa problem solution: in that timeframe, the number of issued visas rose substantially, while the number of refusals decreased accordingly (down to 5% of all applications), more than one and half million visas were issued under a simplified procedure – to the categories of citizens specified in the Agreement (scholars, students, journalists, businessmen, etc). I hope that the visa problem solution will be further facilitated by the EU Visa Code approved recently, whose provisions will apply to both the EU countries and those of the Schengen Area staying beyond the European Union. Introduction of the Code will make visa issue more transparent (in particular, it provides for obligatory explanation of the reasons for refusal of entry).

At the same time, we continue dialogue with Ukraine about visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens. Recently, that process has reached the EU ministers' level and now immediately deals with the development of an Action Plan for extending such procedures to Ukraine. The document is to list the measures to be taken by the Ukrainian side dealing with better management of migration processes, border controls, etc. I believe that negotiation of the document will be completed promptly.

The issues of energy and energy security are also very important for us – since the EU countries get 20% of energy resources via Ukraine and Belarus. And we all know of the “energy crises” that occurred recently, in particular, due to kind of suspension in some issues between Ukraine and Russia. The European Union expects security and predictability of energy supply, so that Ukraine preserves its role of an important energy transit country.

So sum up, I wish to say that our cooperation with Ukraine involves many tools of assistance with reformation of numerous sectors of public life: from state governance and the judicial system to science and environmental protection. And, naturally, we ever more actively cooperate in the security policy sector. Say, issues of Ukraine's role in would-be EU missions abroad are currently under discussion. I hope that such role will be successful and serve our common cause of strengthening the European and world security. ■

JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIVISIBLE EUROPEAN SECURITY



Yevhen PERELYHIN,
Director,
European Integration Bureau
of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine Secretariat

One prior notice: we speak here of the “potential of Ukraine's partnership with the EU”. I guess, today, the notion of partnership is somewhat obsolete – since in the recent years Ukraine has been pursuing an active policy of transition from cooperation to integration and from partnership to association. So, I would like to speak of the potential of Ukraine's would-be association with the EU, including cooperation in the security sector.

The security issues should be examined from the viewpoint of common European security, responsibility for whose provision and enhancement should rest with both the EU and its member states, and countries staying beyond the EU. Exclusion of any actor from the

² Meaning the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, made in 1998 at a Diplomatic Conference of the UN member states in Rome. The Treaty was signed by 120 UN member states. The Treaty entered into effect in 2002, the Court commenced its activity in 2005. – Ed.

International Conference, 8 June, 2010



pan-European security chain will cause weakening of security of entire Europe. That point is especially relevant in the Ukrainian case.

But before assessing the potential of EU-Ukraine association in the security sector, one should mention the challenges and threats faced by Europe and its separate actors.

I guess, the majority of experts will agree that in the present geopolitical conditions the danger of aggression against any EU member state is actually reduced to zero. Instead, there are other, less predictable threats – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, etc. Those threats are of an international character, so, no country can effectively cope with them on its own.

Here comes the first point: interdependence in the present-day world prompts the overwhelming majority of states to search collective means of strengthening both international and national security, join efforts for maintenance of peace and stability.

At that, one should keep in mind that the notion of national and international security has long been seen not only in military terms – it covers actually all domains of public life: economy, energy, environmental protection, social and cultural sectors, etc.

Present-day threats should be countered with adequate and modern measures including a set of mechanisms known in the international diplomacy – an active political stand of the lead actors on the international scene, crisis management, humanitarian, police and economic actions, creation of adequate international legal mechanisms. That entire set is now termed “*soft power policy*”, in the conditions of present-day asymmetric threats being the most adequate means to prevent international conflicts and crises.

Henceforth, the following point: today, the EU with its partners is an international power quite capable of ensuring the required level of such “soft security” on the European continent. Exactly such role of the EU is needed for the regional and global security system.

One of the key problems immediately influencing the development of the European security system is presented by the degree of ESDP autonomy and its dependence on

NATO (“dependence” in quotation marks). As we know, many EU member states are so far unready to cede their sovereign rights in the security and defence sector to the EU joint bodies. So, recognising the lead role of NATO at this stage, European countries escape (at least, try to escape) unnecessary competition and duplication of functions. I guess that the EU “soft power” measures backed with NATO “hard power” guarantees, on the basis of the UN and OSCE security principles, can ensure firm and stable security both globally and on the European continent – as witnessed, in particular, by the substantial progress in the development of ESDP initiated in 1992, and by practical results of strengthening pan-European security.

On Ukraine’s role in the European security system. I have no doubt that security potential is needed in Europe, and Ukraine should be an actor in security integration processes. Here comes **the third point: there should be no “grey” security areas in Europe, so, it is a common task for Ukraine and the EU to promote the creation of an indivisible security space on the continent on the basis of available international legal and institutional mechanisms.**

Resting responsibility for building the European security system on one actor – the EU – is erroneous. That process will be a success only on the condition of involvement and consideration of interests of all European security actors, since security, as we noted, is an indivisible notion.

What are the gains of EU-Ukraine cooperation now? First of all, let us mention our active cooperation at settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict and removal of its effects. Thanks to mediation efforts and crisis management measures, peace and stability were imposed in that region of Moldova, although the process of achievement of the set goal is underway, and Ukraine will continue cooperation with the EU in that field.

Another example of successful cooperation is presented by the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are other lines of cooperation, maybe formally not related with the security and defence policy but exerting decisive influence on European stability – joint measures to fight illegal migration, smuggling, human trafficking, cooperation of border services, joint countering challenges in the energy sector, etc.

A few words on prospects of cooperation. Ukraine sought to take part in the EU *Atalanta* operation of fighting piracy near the African coast. On 20 January, 2010, the relevant decree was signed by the President of Ukraine, and now, the Government considers the format of participation in the operation and the mechanisms of deployment of the Ukrainian contingent. Ukraine also expressed interest in participation of its Armed Forces units in formation of the EU multinational battle groups, to be on alert in the 2nd half of 2011. Now, concerned ministries and agencies, EU bodies consider concrete aspects of such participation. Furthermore, in response to the EU proposals, Ukraine’s accession to the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is being considered. Ukraine and the EU traditionally show joint interest in the Ukrainian military airlift capabilities, unfortunately, still not properly used.



Is that sufficient for the time being? I don't think so. So, **the last point: we should set for ourselves and achieve more ambitious goals. Therefore, the future Association Agreement should speak of deeper cooperation of Ukraine with the EU, including within the ESDP framework.** ■

TO USE THE POTENTIAL OF COOPERATION WITH THE EU



Borys TARASIUK,
Chairman
of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine Committee
for European integration

I am happy that the initiative of the Spanish-Ukrainian strategic dialogue started in 2008 continues. As a person involved in the development of not only that initiative, but of bilateral Spanish-Ukrainian relations as a whole, I can say that both sides lack attention to issues of mutual interest, including security issues – that is why continuation of the Spanish-Ukrainian strategic dialogue is beyond doubt an important move.

It goes without saying that the EU-Ukraine partnership has a huge potential in all sectors. The question is why it is not fully used, and who is to blame for that.

Now, under the new government, it became fashionable to criticise everything that was done in the previous five years. Home critics are echoed by some EU officials who begin to speak of “the need for Ukraine to choose its road – stability”. What stability – North Korean, Iranian or some other similar model? Why should Ukraine give up the priority of the European values?

I wish to remind you that in the previous five years, the Ukrainian side did a lot for the EU and the EU citizens, our relations were on the rise. In that timeframe: Ukraine allowed visa-free entry for millions of EU citizens; the EU recognised Ukraine a market economy and helped it to join the WTO; we started negotiation of a new large-scale agreement (later called the Association Agreement) and a free trade area; we also commenced a visa dialogue with the end goal of granting Ukrainian citizens visa-free entry to the EU.

That is why I am surprised to hear that the previous authorities made declarations rather than practical deeds. Then, a question arises of the origin of \$30 billion worth of foreign investments made in the Ukrainian economy over those five years – compared to \$9 billion over the previous 14 years. Noteworthy, 78% of those investments came from the EU countries.

I say this, because it is strange to hear from the EU officials that nothing has been done in the previous

years, and to prevent attempts of the current government to take over the achievements of its predecessors. I disagree with such approach. I am a professional diplomat and wish to say that foreign policy, its successes and failures should be assessed impartially, abstracting away from the current situation – thanking those who are in power now.

We mentioned here an important element of relations with the EU – the visa dialogue. Ukraine still has no Action Plan (or Road Map) of visa-free travel agreed with the EU. What is Ukraine doing now, to obtain such plan? On 1 June, 2010, only one required law was passed in the second reading – on personal data protection (let us hope that the President will sign it), but there remains a number of international documents pending ratification. A year ago, the Law on Fighting Corruption was signed – Parliament has twice postponed its effectiveness: first, till 1 April, 2010, now – till 1 January, 2011. Meanwhile, without the effectiveness of that Law, the UN Convention against Corruption already ratified by the Verkhovna Rada will not enter into force in Ukraine.

No single body in charge of migration has been established so far. I do not mention passports with biometric data here – it is a technical issue that can be solved promptly, if there is the will and the funds.

There are other problems, too, without whose solution we cannot go forward and where we should not put the blame on Brussels, but take a closer look at our own faults.

It should be mentioned that on 24 April, 2010, after meeting the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Policy Štefan Füle, I turned to President Yanukovich with a proposal saying what documents should be adopted, what steps should be made by the President and the Government to pass the required laws. There has been no answer so far. This illustrates the attitude to the current authorities to one of the key elements of the Verkhovna Rada – the Committee for European Integration, maybe even to the officially announced European integration policy.

Now, back to the potential of the EU-Ukraine relations.

First. It has been said here that Ukraine is joining the EU statements “from time to time”. This is not quite true. Ukraine joins 95% of the EU statements on international and regional policy, which cannot be termed “from time to time”. On the contrary, this proves that Ukraine is a consistent and active party to all steps dealing with the EU common foreign and security policy.

Second. Some of my colleagues in diplomacy advocate the advantages of Ukraine's non-bloc – while just two months ago, they were substantiating the imperative of joining NATO with a similar zeal. I feel sorry about Ukrainian diplomats, now forced to fundamentally change their stand, following “the party line”.

Third. It was said here that Ukraine's non-alignment “naturally grew on the Ukrainian soil”, in no way imposed from outside. But how should we treat statements by Russian politician Konstantin Zatulin


who calls upon us to immediately hold a referendum on non-alignment – for Ukrainians never even dare think of NATO membership? They abroad want to solve the issues of our security, values and priorities instead of us – such policy will lead us to nowhere.

A question arises: if we are a non-aligned state, how are we going to take part in European Security and Defence Policy, to be an EU member?

In my opinion, calls upon Ukraine to take part in a big game termed “the new European security architecture” are intended not for professionals, but for the “party line”. The big game termed “the new European security architecture” was designed in the Kremlin, its main goal is to press the USA out of the European security policy, to impose and enhance Russia’s role in the European security space.

To sum up, I want to stress: Ukraine has not used its potential in relations with the EU yet. Similarly, Brussels is not using the potential of those relations either. ■

TO FURTHER AND DEEPEN SPANISH-UKRAINIAN DIALOGUE



Anatoliy SHCHERBA,
*Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary Ambassador of
Ukraine to the Kingdom of Spain*

It is surely a good development that thanks to the Conference sponsors – Razumkov Centre, Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (*INCIPE*), and Barcelona-based *CIDOB* centre – the Spanish-Ukrainian dialogue initiated in 2008 in Madrid goes on. I believe that we will be able to arrange many more useful joint events in this format.

Today, we witnessed an interesting discussion on issues dealing with NATO, the EU, the general situation on the European continent. But unfortunately, the Spanish-Ukrainian dialogue as such was, so to speak, the background for the discussion – only some mentions were made of the Spanish experience of the EU integration. In fact, it seems to me that the Spanish experience might be very useful for Ukraine, since it is the experience of not a remote history but of the new time, the experience of democratic development of the country after 1975.

During the conference, a lot has been said about stability. In Spain, the road to stability lied through the search of national consensus. Exactly at the time of democratic transformations started in 1970s, the uniting national idea was formed, with integration in the EU as one of its elements. And the national consensus was found, in particular, in 1977, in the so-called *Moncloa*

Pact that became the starting point for concerted efforts of the main political forces and parties of the country.³ To be sure, problems were many, but political forces and society pursued common national interests, lying, in particular, in the European integration.

Next time, I would like our Spanish partners to make more detailed analysis of that experience of Spain – a big European country (by its population comparable to Ukraine). And that experience of search of consensus among the main political actors might be adequate and useful in the Ukrainian context, since lessons of history always have a constructive sense at passage of new political decisions.

Our conference concurs with the discussion in Ukraine of the prospects of its cooperation with NATO. In this connection, the Spanish experience is of interest. For instance, in today’s discussion of Ukraine-NATO contacts a known formula was mentioned – never say “never”.

This formula is proven by the experience of Spain that joined NATO in 1982 and went through rather a difficult period afterwards – at that time, Socialists came to power on the tide of anti-NATO slogans. And what happened next? At a referendum four years later, Spain gave 52% of votes for further membership in the Alliance. The question of the country’s further stay in NATO was put to referendum with reservations that envisaged that Spain’s membership in the Alliance would not mean accession to its military organisation, and the ban on nuclear arms deployment on the Spanish territory would persist. Spain obtained full NATO membership only in the fall of 1999, when discussions and emotions on that issue were left far behind. That is why I think that we should not say “never” in the issues dealing with NATO.

We are discussing security issues, but unfortunately leave unattended the subject of energy security and, again, the relevant Spanish experience. Spain more than Ukraine depends on foreign supplies of gas, but it found the proper formula of energy security encompassing high geographic diversification of energy supply and active employment of renewable energy resources. I guess that at our following meetings attention should be paid to the experience of creation of the national energy security system in Spain.

Another issue that deserves notice – Spain’s relations with our neighbour, Russia. In the Spanish media one can find impartial assessments of the Russian politics. Meanwhile, in general, their approach has actually always been unbiased and rather critical. But this does not prevent Spain – a NATO member – from having perfect relations with Russia. In particular, using its European Presidency in the first half of 2010, Spain was the “engine” of the dialogue about visa-free travel with Russia, despite the absence of consensus within the EU on that issue.

To sum up, I wish to express gratitude to all representatives of Razumkov Centre, their Spanish colleagues from *INCIPE* and *CIDOB* for their support for our initiatives and wish successful continuation of the Spanish-Ukrainian dialogue in the interests of further development of cooperation between our countries. ■

³ Moncloa Pact – the pact signed by representatives of all leading Spanish political parties and movements in the Moncloa Palace that outlined the strategic prospects of the country development, in particular, its democratisation under parliamentary monarchy, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, etc. One of its key provision was that of no mention of past mutual accusations (hence – “the Pact of Silence”).